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Esenboga Kullesiyesi C-325, Ankara, Turkey

[ulumdergisi@gmail.com](mailto:ulumdergisi@gmail.com)

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Karabük University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Kalam and Islamic Sects  
Karabük, Turkey s.mutekellim@gmail.com

**Dr. Özcan AKDAĞ**

Erciyes University, Faculty Of Theology, Department of Philosophy of Religion  
Kayseri, Turkey ozcanakdag@erciyes.edu.tr

**Dr. Kadir GÖMBEYAZ**

Kocaeli University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Kalam and Islamic Sects  
Kocaeli, Turkey kgombeyaz@hotmail.com

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**Abdullah Demir**

Assistant Professor, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University,  
Faculty of Islamic Sciences, Department of Kalam  
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi,  
İslami İlimler Fakültesi, Kalam Anabilim Dalı  
Ankara, TURKEY  
abdillahdemir@hotmail.com  
orcid.org/ 0000-0001-7825-6573





## The Concept of 'Nature' in Peripatetic Islamic Philosophers\*

Nuri Adıgüzel \*\*

### ABSTRACT

In this study, lexical and terminological meanings of the term “nature” were analyzed and some Peripatetic Islamic philosophers’ opinions about this term were included. A comparison was made between the words “tabiat” and “doğa” which are used in Turkish language to meet the term “nature”. The realm of existence which Peripatetic Islamic philosophers have used “nature” in as a noun was explained. Debate between Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) about the necessity of proving the term “nature” was mentioned. Ibn Sīnā's views on what “nature” portends in terms of being a source of motion and duration in objects were presented in comparison with Aristotle. Later definitions which are made by philosophers for “nature” as a term were presented. Peripatetic Islamic philosophers’ definition of the term “nature” which has a critical role in Islamic philosophy and the way they use it differentiates from that of Aristotle’s. The term “nature” which they especially use to explain every kind of becoming and motion enables to connect all reason to Allah in aspects of etymology. And it is also known that the term “nature” serves as a basis for differentiation between physics and metaphysics. The purpose of this article is to clarify the possible usages of the term “nature” in relation to new theories.

### KEYWORDS

Islamic Philosophy, Peripatetic, Ṭabī‘a, Cause, Reason, Principle

\* This article has been published previously in Turkish: Adıgüzel, Nuri. “Meşşâi İslam Filozoflarında ‘Tabiat’ Kavramı”. *Dini Araştırmalar* 5/13 (2002): 41-56.

\*\* Professor, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Faculty of Islamic Sciences, Department of Islamic Philosophy, Ankara, TURKEY  
Prof. Dr., Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, İslami İlimler Fakültesi, İslam Felsefesi Anabilim Dalı  
nadiguzel@hotmail.com  
orcid.org/0000-0002-3233-9143

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## Meşşâî İslam Filozoflarında ‘Tabiat’ Kavramı

### ÖZ

Bu çalışmada “tabiat” kavramının sözlük ve terim anlamı analiz edilmiş ve ona ilişkin bazı Meşşâî İslam filozoflarının görüşlerine yer verilmiştir. “Tabiat” sözcüğünü karşılamak üzere Türkçede kullanılan “tabiat” ve “doğa” sözcükleri arasında bir karşılaştırma yapılmıştır. “Tabiat”ın Meşşâî İslam filozofları tarafından isim olarak kullanıldığı varlık alanı hakkında bilgi verilmiş ve İbn Sina ile İbn Rüşd arasında cereyan eden tabiatın ispatının gerekip gerekmeyeceği tartışmasına değinilmiştir. Cisimlerde görülen hareket ve sükunun kaynağı olması bakımından “tabiat”ın nelere delalet ettiği hususunda İbn Sina’nın görüşleri Aristo ile mukayeseli olarak sunulmuştur. Daha sonra bir terim olarak “tabiat”ın filozoflar tarafından yapılan tanımı ortaya konulmuştur. İslam felsefesinde önemli bir yere sahip olan “tabiat” kavramına Meşşâî İslam filozoflarının yükledikleri anlam ve onu kullanma biçimleri, Aristo’dan farklıdır. Özellikle her türlü oluş ve hareketin kaynağını açıklamak amacıyla kullandıkları “tabiat” kavramı etimolojik açıdan tüm nedenleri Allah’a ulaştırmaya imkan sağlamaktadır. Ayrıca kavramın, “tabiat – tabiat ötesi” ayırımına dayanak teşkil ettiği de bilinmektedir. Makalenin amacı, “tabiat” kavramının günümüzde yeni teorilerle ilişkili olarak kullanılma imkanlarını belirginleştirmektir.

### ANAHTAR KELİMELER

İslam Felsefesi, Meşşâî, Tabiat, illet, Sebep, İlke

### INTRODUCTION

It is extremely obvious that societies have an accumulation in every area that is humanitarian in essence and every accumulation is exclusive for a particular society and so the development of philosophy and science, which are the most significant human output, is only possible with the handing down of this accumulation from generation to generation. However, it is also inevitable that inadequate or inaccurate transference of this accumulation leads to negative consequences. In this context, in order to overcome the experienced difficulties, today’s intellectuals need to sufficiently consider and evaluate this inheritance. However, due to various problems – especially the language problem – the evaluation of this inheritance is not an easy task for new generations. Beyond doubt, it can hardly be said that it is realistic to turn to solutions that are gradually moving away from the past and particular accumulations of the society and overlook the society’s essential historical dynamics. As such, we argue that the basic concepts which constitute the philosophies of Islamic philosophers are not understood adequately and in no time, they should be studied in detail and the meanings of which should be revealed accurately. Therefore, we have studied the concept of “nature” which is commonly used among other concepts by Islamic philosophers. We hope that our study will make contribution to the proper understanding of Islamic philosophy.

The reason for the limitation of this study to only the peripatetic Islamic philosophers is that the members of this school have a great integrity with each other and see this specific concept as one of the most important concepts. Thus, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) the XII. century philosopher (d. 1198), states that the concept of “nature” should be known by all philosophers in detail as in the following: “Since the concept of nature is used for causes and the things that are the reasons of causes and, also philosophy takes the causes

as a subject matter, the philosopher needs to know and distinguish in how many different meanings of nature are used and which of them is more suitable to this term and lastly which one is granted with this meaning first...”<sup>1</sup> Hence, the arguments of peripatetic Islamic philosophers are included here first; however, when it is needed the current meaning of the concept and the arguments of another philosophers are also addressed.

Peripatetic Islamic philosophers approach the concept of “nature” within the context of nature-cause relation, nature-will relation and in general meaning its impact on the formation of an action. Yet, in this study only the concept of “nature” itself is researched, not the problems that involve the “nature” concept or the concept leads to and what peripatetic Islamic philosophers understand from it is tried to be brought to the light.

### 1. “NATURE” CONCEPT IN A DICTIONARY

“Nature” as a word has its roots in Arabic language and it is derived from the verb “ṭabī‘a” (In Turkish language, it is: “Tabiat, doğa”\*, in Greek language: “Physis”, in Latin: “Natura”, in German: “Natur” and, in French and English: “Nature”). It has several usages as a verb and its meaning changes depending on the subject and the object it takes; for example:

a) If the subject is God and the object is human, it means “created”, “built”, “has done it according to a right example, has given it a form”;

b) if it takes an indirect object when the subject is the God (with a preposition ‘alâ’), it means The God took the “ability of knowing and understanding power from him/her, The God sealed him/her”.

c) It can be used with the meaning “sealed” when the subject is human, but this is different from the first one, here it means “seal something” by using a seal.

d) If the subject is human and the object is a book or an article, it means “to print out the content of a book or an article with using a printing or writing tools.

e) When the subject is human, depending on the object it takes, it means “impressed” him, “kissed” him, “turned towards Qibla”, “made the pot from the mud etc.”.

f) Also, again when the subject is human, it is used in passive form and (with ‘alâ’ preposition) if it takes an indirect object, it means “reinforced”, the thing put in his “natural disposition”, “get used to”.<sup>2</sup>

g) Different from the usages above, it can also be used as the government coined money.<sup>3</sup>

It is possible to draw these conclusions below by the usages compiled above:

<sup>1</sup> Ibn Rushd, Averroes, Tafsîr Mâ ba’d al-ṭabī‘at, ed. M. Bouyges, S.J. 3rd Edition (Beirut: s.n., 1983), 2: 508.

\* Also in old Turkish the word “sajyya” was being used for the same meaning and “sajyya” means “a state in human nature”. For more information see: Muhammad ‘Ali al-Tahānawī, *Kashshaf istilāhāt al-funūn*, ed. Ali Dahruj, translated Farsi to Arabic by Abdullah al-Hālidi, translated to European languages by Corc Zeynati (Beirut; Dār al-Kutub, 1966), 1127.

<sup>2</sup> *Al-Munjid fi l-luga wa-l-‘ilam* (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986), 460; Ibn Manzūr, *Lisān al-‘Arab* (Beirut, 1990), 8: 232-233; Asım Efendi, *Kamus Tercemesi* (Istanbul, nd.), 3: 343; Commission, *Al-Mu‘jam al-‘Arabī al-Esāsī* (Tunus, 1989), 784-786.

<sup>3</sup> Commission, *Al-Mu‘jam al-Wasīf* (Cairo: Academy of Islamic Research, 1972), 2: 549-550.

1. The verb from which “nature” is derived, is only used for the sensible beings (God and human being). If it is used for government than there we can talk about an activity performed by human beings.
2. When the subject is God, it has both positive (“created”) and negative (“eliminated=dispelled) meanings.
3. When the subject is human or the government, it has only positive meaning.
4. Excluding the usage in the meaning of “kissed” for human, the rest of the meanings have a permanence and durability. In other words, it is understood that this act which is carried out by sensible beings results in not a temporary but a permanent outcome.
5. When it is used in the passive form, it means transitivity. Namely, effect always rises to the surface in others, it does not occur in itself.

However, the word “nature”, which is used as a name, has a wider content that we can list here as follows:

- a) *“Everything that is created in the universe as mountains, plains, plants, the sky etc.*
- b) *“The character (mizāj) of the humankind that is the mixture of moral quality, disposition”.*
- c) *“The usual thing” (the opposite one, extraordinary).*
- d) *“The force and the power that penetrate the body itself and the other bodies that reach their natural perfection”.*
- e) *“(A body) that the Supreme God achieved its mixture with a thing.”* For instance, the nature of fire, medicine etc..<sup>4</sup>

The equivalent of the word “nature” in Turkish dictionaries correlates with the meanings in Arabic: “Nature:

1. *Nature, material world.*
2. *Everything that is the work of the creation, all the things that are created, the whole universe, the cosmos.*
3. *The harmony and the order among the created things, established by the divine wisdom.*
4. *The inherent force in the created things.*
5. *The nature, basic qualifications and the invariable, intrinsic properties and peculiarities of a body, innate character, moral quality, humor, temper, disposition.*
6. *Custom, habit.*
7. *Hardship or easiness of the bowel movement.*<sup>5</sup>

It can be said that all these above-mentioned meanings of the word “nature”, which is used as a noun, express a positive permanency. Since all the meanings it contains are resistant to time. Therefore, it could be said that the “nature” as a word expresses the positive and the permanent effect and expresses the object that the effect is stemmed from, too. Hence, when we consider the verb stem of the word, it is seen that the noun “tabiat”, which is derived from the verb “tabea (taba’a)”, is derived to express the object (the affected). The objects that the “tabea” verb is mentioned in could be animate or inanimate, so the “nature” concept that is derived for them has a wider content than the verb that it is derived from. In this usage being smart is out of question.

<sup>4</sup> Commission, *Al-Mu'jam al-'Arabī al-Esāsī*, 786; *Al-Mu'jam al-Wasīf*, 2: 549-550/ II/549-550; al-Tahānawī, *Kashshaf*, 1127.

<sup>5</sup> D. Mehmet Doğan, *Büyük Türkçe Sözlük* (Ankara, 1986), 1046.

According to us, in Turkish, the word “doğa (nature)” which is derived to express the word “tabiat” is not adequately meet the meaning of it. Because, the verb stem of “doğa” is “doğmak” (to be born) and it is not used for the intelligent beings only and, also it is not transitive. In Turkish dictionaries, you can find these meanings for the verb “doğmak (to be born)”: “To be born:

1. *Come into the world, get out of the womb, to be born.*
2. *To be sighted on horizon: Sun rise, moon rise.*
3. *To occur, to be the result of something: Why did this disorder occur?*
4. *To appear in a sudden, to arise, to come into existence: To cross one’s mind.”*<sup>6</sup> As you can see here, the verb “doğmak (to be born)” different from the verb “taba’a” is used for all the beings as animate and inanimate and it is also used as intransitive. Besides, in the verb “doğmak (to be born)” there is no permanency meaning as in the verb “taba’a”. On the contrary, “doğmak (to be born)” is an immediate act. Therefore, the subject and the object of this verb is the same and it expresses the act of all objects that has no permanency and durability.

However, the verb “doğmak (to be born)” from which the word “doğa (nature)” is derived, correspond to the stem from which Ancient Greek word “physis” is derived. The actual meaning of the Ancient Greek word “physis”, which is used as an equivalent of “ṭabī’a (or “nature), comes from the stem “phy” and “phy” shows the process of germination, birth, fertilization, organic development...”<sup>7</sup> In this case, it is possible to say that the word “doğa” is not derived to express the concept “tabiat”, but to correspond to the Ancient Greek concept “physis”.

The consequences of using the concept of “doğa” instead of “tabiat” will be discussed later in this article.

## 2. ‘TABIAT (NATURE)’ AS A MULTI MEANING NOUN

Aristotle and the peripatetic Islamic Philosophers try to determine to which things the “nature” concept has been given as a name and each philosopher consider the usage of this concept only until the age they live in. At this point, philosophers are not concerned about introducing new things, they are only interested in making some evaluations related to the usages of the concept.

Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) does not talk about the significations of “nature” as a noun in his works, yet he dwells on its definition in detail. Ibn Rushd (Averroes) who states that the “nature” is generally used for forms, substances, changes, and the things related to them<sup>8</sup>, transfers what Aristotle says about this matter. However, in his work *Physics* Aristotle discusses the three significations of the concept of nature<sup>9</sup>, while in his work *Metaphysics* he says it has six significations. These are as follows: a) “existence or nascence”, b) “the first element (component) that the growing thing originated from”, c) “the principle of the first move in a

<sup>6</sup> Doğan, *Büyük Türkçe Sözlük*, 270.

<sup>7</sup> Hüsamettin Erdem, “Tabiat (Doğa)”, *Sosyal Bilimler Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1990), 4: 40.

<sup>8</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Talkhiş Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, ed. Osman Emin (Cairo, 1958), 32.

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, translated by Saffet Babür (Istanbul, 1997), II. Book, 193a 29-33. It can be said that Aristotle also indicates other meanings of “nature” here. But these informations are not systematical.

body”, d) “the first item of artistic objects”, e) “the substance of natural objects” and f) “all kinds of substances”.<sup>10</sup> Ibn Rushd elaborates his views and puts them in order as follows:

1. First of all, the noun “nature” is used for the movements that shows up in bodies. These movements are four in total as **a)** generation and corruption (Kawn wa-Fasād) **b)** transposition, **c)** growth, **d)** alteration of qualities.<sup>11</sup>

Among these movements Ibn Rushd only discusses the growth in detail. According to him, growth appears in various forms as *growth with contact*, *growth with fusion* and *growth with mixture*. In growth with contact, the sum of the growing and the thing which is born as a result of growth is not one (but two). Since, in both of them there is no common piece whatsoever. On the other hand, in growth with fusion and in growth with mixture, the sum of the growing and and the thing which is born as a result of growth is one. Because; in fusion, there is a fused piece which is common in both sides. According to him, just as fetuses (embryo) grow attached (with contact) to the pregnant, fruits and seeds also grow via fusion or contact attaching to the trees.<sup>12</sup> However, Ibn Rushd indicates that there is a difference between the fusion and the mixture. Accordingly, the piece, that is fused, brings forth a fused unity not in terms of quality but in terms of contiguity. Namely, it is impossible for such a body to split quantitatively. So, the things that are combined via fusion are not one in terms of quality, but they are one in terms of contiguity and quantity. On the other hand, mixtures are one in terms of quality.<sup>13</sup>

According to Ibn Rushd, the principle of movement and change in any entity can be found both as the principle of all variation kinds and as the principle of certain parts of the variation. For instance, an animal has all the principles of the four movements (transposition, growth, alteration and generation and corruption). Whereas this is not the case with simple substances such as the water and the earth. The water and the earth have the three movements excluding the growth. For celestial body, Ibn Rushd claims that it only has the movement in space (moving motion). The other movement kinds can not be seen in celestial body.<sup>14</sup>

2. A specific thing is also called as “nature” from which an object is originated, or it gives birth to an object.<sup>15</sup> Ibn Rushd identifies that if “nature” concept is used with this meaning then it contains the component as well. Since, according to him, the people who attribute this meaning to “nature” argue that the nature of natural objects and the nature of their components are the same. For example, when we say, “the

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, V. Book, 1014b 16-36, 1015a 1-13.

<sup>11</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, 32. Aristotle phrases this as “being”. See: Aristotle, *Physics*, II. Book, 193b 13,14. (In “metaphysics”, he phrases it as “occurrence”. See : Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, V. Book, 1014b 16-17). But according to Aristotle “being” means the way that leads to “nature”. He explains this with health and treatment example. In his view it is not possible to call the way that leads to treatment “nature”; because what is needed from treatment isnt for it to go in the direction of art of treatment but for it to come from the art of treatment. In this case treatment is not the way to “nature” whereas health is. See : A.e., 193b 13-14.

<sup>12</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, 2: 508. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, translated by Ahmet Arslan (Izmir, 1985), V. Book, 1014b, 16-20.

<sup>13</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, 2: 510. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, V. Book, 1014b, 24-26.

<sup>14</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā’ at-Ṭabī’ī*, ed. Josef Puig (Madrid, 1983), 20.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, 2: 509. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, V. Book, 1014b, 17-18.

nature of water”, “the nature of fire”, “the nature of earth” and, “the nature of air”, we refer to the components of the water, fire, earth and the air.<sup>16</sup> Secondly, Ibn Rushd gives a bronze sculpture as an example. The sculpture is made of bronze and when the sculpture is made of that, the bronze stays as it is. It is same for the goods that sculpted from wood. The nature of wood continues in that good.<sup>17</sup> Ibn Rushd discusses that the proponents of this view do not accept any substance but hyle and, also, they deny the existence of form. According to Ibn Rushd, those who claim this accept hyle as the only substance. That’s why ancient philosophers act differently in this matter and, some recognize the water as a component, some recognize the earth, some recognize the air, some recognize the fire and some of them recognize all of these as a component and they argue that the nature of things is identical with the thing that they say component.<sup>18</sup>

3. Thirdly, “nature” is used for the form (şūra) of natural objects. According to the proponents of this argument, “nature” is the structure (bunya) of the first composition that exists in each natural object one by one. Since, according to them, in a mixture, the mixed thing can not be a component. A component of an object can not be found in that object as a mixture but in actual sense. For someone who adopts that the component exists in the mixture as an act, the composition can not be anything else but the form. As an example, Ibn Rushd gives a house that is made of stone and concrete. Composition or the mixture is the shape of the house, it is not the stone and the concrete which are the components of the house. Stone and the concrete do not become a mixture in any way. They continue to exist as stone and concrete and they are in movement form. According to Ibn Rushd’s quotations from Aristotle, Empedocles’s (d. B.C. 440)\* opinions also support this argument. According to Empedocles, the mixing and changing of objects create the nature of the composed objects. In other words, the forms and the substances of the composed objects are in the mixture and in the change; they are in the alteration of the pieces. For Ibn Rushd, it is the mixture that is made up of the composition from which Empedocles refers to as change and mixture in actual sense.<sup>19</sup>

4. Fourthly the concept of “nature” is used for hyle (hayūlā). For Ibn Rushd, hyle has two parts. The first part is the prime matter that is common to everything; and the second part is the hyle that is unique to each individual entity. Here, with the prime matter Ibn Rushd refers to the hyle which is the main substance of a gender or species; he is not referring to the absolute hyle of which God put in action first. For instance, bronze is the closest thing to everything made of bronze. However, since the the prime matter of fluxing materials, bronze is also one of them, is water, then the prime matter of the objects made of bronze is water.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Talkhiş Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, 32.

<sup>17</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, 2: 510. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, V. Book, 1014b, 26-30.

<sup>18</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, 2: 511. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, V. Book, 1014b, 32-35.

\* For more information about Empedocles and his views see: Bertrand Russel, *Batı Felsefesi Tarihi*, translated by Muhammer Sencer (Istanbul, 1983), 65-69; Macit Gökberk, *Felsefe Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1985), 34; Alfred Weber, *History of Philosophy*, translated by H. Vehbi Eralp (Istanbul, 1991), 28-30.

<sup>19</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, 2: 512. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, V. Book, 1014b, 35, 37, 1015a, 2; Aristotle, *Physics*, II. Book, 193a 33-37, 193b 1-4.

<sup>20</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr Mā ba’d al-ṭabī’ah*, 2: 513-514. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, V. Book, 1015a, 7-10; *Physics*, II. Book, 193a 28-29. In “Physics” Aristotle phrases hyle as subject. He says that first matter can only be called “nature” after it



After all these meanings Ibn Rushd compiles till here, he explains the argument which he supports. According to him, genuinely the concept of “nature” can only be a noun to substance and the thing that indicates the substance is the form. Then in real terms, only the form can be named as “nature”. Because it is the form that makes the natural beings what they are, and it is special to each entity individually, so when it originates in the existent, then distinctive acts emanate from that existent entity. Yet the substance is common.<sup>21</sup> The usage of the name “nature” about the substances other than the form (material and a composite entity that is formed with a material and a form) is a secondary usage. In other words, they take this name due to the fact that they become an attribute to a gender or a species. Besides, it is also possible for “nature” to be a name for substances other than form with semantic extension due to the caused effects.<sup>22</sup>

On the other hand, for Ibn Rushd, there is also a priority and recency in giving the name of the “nature” to itself among the forms and in this point the one which has the highest priority is the simplest form. Since it is more eligible to call the mechanic principle as “soul” not as “nature”. Therefore, when physicians say, “Nature did this, nature did that”, they mean the power which command the bodies and this power is the nutritious (gâziya) power. Because, according to the physicians, although this power is mechanic, it is simpler than the other powers. For this reason, they nearly never use the term “nature” for heart power. From this angle, natural act and the act that based on thought are contradictory.<sup>23</sup>

### 3. ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF “NATURE”

In general, peripatetic Islamic philosophers base their ideas about logic, physics, and metaphysics largely on the ideas of Aristotle (d. B.C. 322)<sup>24</sup> and especially about the basic concepts of philosophy they hold on to his views.<sup>25</sup> And it is the same for the concept of “nature”.

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merges with semblance, power or possibility can't be called “nature”. See also Aristotle, *Physics*, II. Book, 193a, 36-37, 193b 1).

<sup>21</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā' at-Ṭabī'ī*, 22-23.

<sup>22</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Tafsīr Mā ba'd al-ṭabī'ah*, 2: 514. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, V. Book, 1015a, 10-13. Aristoteles, *Fizik*, II. Book, 193b 1-9). According to Aristotle the reason to call form “nature” comes from form being according to “nature”. And the reason we call matter “nature” is because it is an “output of nature”. See also Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 193a 31-32.

<sup>23</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ Mā ba'd al-ṭabī'ah*, 32; Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā' at-Ṭabī'ī*, 23.

<sup>24</sup> Alfred Weber, *History of Philosophy*, translated by H. Vehbi Eralp (Istanbul, 1991), 68; Macit Gökberk, *Felsefe Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1985), 74.

<sup>25</sup> For this subject see Mahmut Kaya, *İslam Kaynakları Işığında Aristoteles ve Felsefesi* (Istanbul, 1983). In this book the importance of Aristotle's every work for Muslims is explained.

Al-Kindī (d. 873?)<sup>26</sup>, considered as the first peripatetic Islamic philosopher, gives short definitions of “nature” in his works and does not go into the details of the concept.<sup>27</sup> As far as we have searched, Al-Fārābī (Alpharabius) (d. 950)<sup>28</sup> who is respected as the Second Master after Aristotle, also does not approach to the concept of “nature” as a concept, but he uses it with same meaning as Aristotle in various problems.<sup>29</sup> Among peripatetic Islamic philosophers, Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037) and Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) are one of a few philosophers who discuss the concept of “nature” comprehensively.

To start with we should specify that, since it is solely the discipline of philosophy which deals with the existents just because they exist and since the peripatetic Islamic philosophers themselves, who deal with the concept of “nature”, are philosophers, they first begin to question whether nature exists or not. Hence, Ibn Sīnā argues that such a questioning will be beyond the capabilities of a naturalist who engages with the natural science and so he emphasizes that the subject should be handled by philosophers and needed to be proved with evidences/demonstrations.<sup>30</sup> According to Aristotle, however, the existence of nature is so obvious that trying to prove it is ridiculous. At the utmost, this could be the work of someone who can not distinguish between the obvious and the obscure like a blind man making comments on colours. According to him, such people talk about words and nouns, but they can comprehend nothing.<sup>31</sup> Ibn Rushd defends Aristotle in this regard and claims that Ibn Sīnā does not understand him. Because according to Ibn Rushd, what Aristotle wants to mean is, there is no truth as obvious as nature, so we can deny the existence of nature with some evidences whatsoever.<sup>32</sup> The discussions made on this subject have an importance in determining the context in which nature is addressed. It is therefore useful to remember the outline of the discussion.

The criticism directed by Ibn Rushd to Ibn Sīnā is as follows: “It is obvious that these uttered things clearly state which are the natural entities and what does nature mean, which is seen in this way and which

<sup>26</sup> Date of death is debatable. Islamic philosophers gives years 860, 866, 870, 872 or 873 as the date of death. For date of death and about him being the first Islamic philosopher see: Mehmet Bayrakdar, *İslam Felsefesine Giriş* (Ankara, 1988), 184; A. Fuad al-Ehvānī, “Kindī”, translated by Osman Bilen, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. M.M. Sharif, 2: 35-48; Mahmut Kaya, “Introduction”, *Kindī Felsefi Risaleler* (Istanbul, 1994), XII; Henry Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, translated by Hüseyin Hatemi (Istanbul, 1994), 279; Hasan Şahin, *İslam Felsefesi Tarihi Dersleri* (Ankara, 2000), 79.

<sup>27</sup> Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī, *al-Kindī's Philosophical Essays*, translated by Mahmut Kaya (Istanbul, 1994), 58, 73.

<sup>28</sup> Bayrakdar, *İslam Felsefesine Giriş*, 200; İbrahim Medkur, “Farabi”, translated by Osman Bilen, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. M.M. Sharif, 2: 67-68; Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 286; Şahin, *İslam Felsefesi Tarihi Dersleri*, 85.

<sup>29</sup> Al-Fārābī. “Kitāb al-Ta‘līqāt”, *Al-A‘mal al-falsafiya* (Beirut, 1992), 1: 381; “Tahsīl al-sa‘āde”, *Al-A‘mal al-falsafiya* (Beirut, 1992), 1: 164-166; “Fīmā yasihhu wemā lā yasihhu min ahkām al-nujūm”, *Al-A‘mal al-falsafiya* (Beirut, 1992), 1: 290-291

<sup>30</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiiyat (I) Al-Simā al-tabī*, ed. Said Zāid (Cairo, 1970), 1: 30.

<sup>31</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 193a 3-8.

<sup>32</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā‘ at-Ṭabī‘ī*, 21-22. Ibn Sīnā also criticises Aristotle for ridiculing the ones who try to give evidence to nature’s existence. For more information see: İbn Sina, *eş-Şifa, Tabiiyyât/*, 30-31.

is not possible to appear in any other ways. On the other hand, Ibn Sīnā ascribes irrelevant meanings to the views of peripatetic philosophers. Ibn Sīnā says: “The definition of nature given here is not clear at all. Someone who deals with the first philosophy undertakes to explain this.” If Ibn Sīnā implies that it is that person, who deals with the first philosophy, undertakes to remove all the things that may lead to doubts about the existence of nature or more eloquently about negating anything that is obvious in nature, then it is true. But according to his implication, if that means that the existence of nature is unknown then he makes a mistake, in fact we can understand it from this phrase ‘the person who deal with the first philosophy, shows evidence about the existence of nature’. Because eventhough there might be some evidences, these evidences need to be formed with the secondary things within the science of nature. If there is an evidence from the first philosophy about this subject, the evidence must be from more familiar things and in terms of being, it must exist before the science of nature; and, which is not possible, however the related reasons can be given. But, in natural objects, the existence of the nature in the style that we specify is a self-evident, an obvious matter. So, it is possible to think about this much here”.<sup>33</sup>

These explanations suggest that Ibn Rushd argues that there is no metaphysical aspect besides the four causes of nature (and the chain of causes till the First Cause). Ibn Rushd expresses that Aristotle also agrees with this and he goes on trying to prove that the criticisms which are directed by Ibn Sīnā to Aristotle about the existence of nature are unjust and irrelevant. It can be said that his criticisms are focused on Ibn Sīnā’s misunderstanding of this subject.

Briefly, Ibn Sīnā appoints philosophers to explain the movements of bodies according to the principles they based on and to give evidences on this subject and he sees it impossible for a body to be a mover due to the fact that it is a body. He argues that the reasons of the movements that emerge in bodies are the powers that exists within those bodies; these are also the principles of the movements and acts of those mentioned bodies. He lists these powers **according to the types of activity**<sup>34</sup> as follows:

1. The power (ḳuwwa) that is called as “nature”. These are the powers which are not subject to a will and which do not depend on an outside power but have the capability to move and change. The act or the movement that comes out of them all happens in the same way. For instance, “the stone falls and it stands in the middle”. According to him, this is the **nature**.
2. The powers in the souls of the spheres (aflāk). These are the powers in which the exit of the movements and acts are based on both will and power and besides, they are artistic. Just like the rotation of the sun, these are the **souls of the spheres**.
3. The powers that are named as “vegetative soul”. The powers whose movements and acts, which emerge from them, are not voluntary but artificial. Such movements, eventhough their act based on an artistic power, are not subject to the will. For instance, the formation, growth, and the corruption of the plants. Since plants move with growing into several directions, branching, and growing longer with attaching to the trunk. And this is called as the **“vegetative soul”**.
4. The powers named as the “soul of the animals”. The powers which are the cause of the voluntary movement in bodies. And these are the powers that lead to the movements of the animals and named

<sup>33</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā’ at-Ṭabī’ī*, 21-22.

<sup>34</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 30.

as the “**soul of the animals**”. Ibn Sīnā defines that this classification that he has already done here could also be done for the immobility.<sup>35</sup>

For him, in movements and acts that are realized by the soul of the animal, animals use their own wills and this usage of the will is not subject to any coercion whatsoever.<sup>36</sup>

Thereby, Ibn Sīnā classifies the powers according to their activity to which the movements and the acts of the bodies based on and accepts the powers which are the causes of the movements and the acts as a body. Thus, in this body he distinguishes the nature from other kinds and puts it into a context of its own.

In order to better enlighten the subject, after the powers that are the principles of the movements and the acts of the bodies, Ibn Sīnā, **himself classifies the movements and their acts** into three:

1. The movements and the acts whose cause and the body that is caused are the same. Such acts have no reason excluding the body that they are. The reason is the body itself that the act cause. For instance, if you leave it on its own, boiled water will cool down again depending on its own nature or a stone that is lifted up, will fall down again depending on its own nature when it is released. According to Ibn Sīnā it is the same as in the seeds becoming plants and a semen drop becoming an animal.<sup>37</sup> These movements and acts are also divided into two:

1.a. The movements and the acts whose cause and the body they are born into are the same and the movements and the acts which follow a single-string path at all without diverging. The movements of the water and the stone from above given examples are such.

1.b. The movements and the acts whose cause and the body they are born into are the same and which follow both multiple and various and an artificial but not a single-string path.<sup>38</sup> As an example, we can take the seeds that grow into plants and the semen drops that grows into animals.

2. The movements and the acts whose cause are outside the body they are born into, or the movements and the acts which do not depend on the body they are born into but to a cause from outside. For instance, the boiling of water and the lifting of the stone.<sup>39</sup> In water example, the boiling of water is not an act caused by the water, likewise in stone example, the lifting of stone is not an act caused by the stone itself.

3. The movements and the acts whose causes are not the bodies they are born into and they do not depend on an outside cause that we can sense. In other words, these movements and acts, outside the body, emerge as a result of the impact of the movers that are out of our reach. This mentioned mover can be not only a separate mover, but also a mover whose self can be sensed but its affect can not. In this point, for Ibn Sīnā, the thing that indicates a positive relation between the mover and the body which is affected by the mover, is not sensed. He explains this with an example of magnet. This is the situation of anyone who does not see the magnet pulls the iron, who does not sense it with his/her senses and who does not know it has

<sup>35</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 30; *Al-Najāt* (Beirut, 1992), 1: 124.

<sup>36</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 29; *Al-Najāt* (Beirut, 1992), 1: 124.

<sup>37</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 29.

<sup>38</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 29.

<sup>39</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 29.

the capability to pull the iron. But after the same person sees the iron moves towards the magnet, he/she can guess that the iron will move towards the magnet automatically as well.<sup>40</sup>

In the case of Aristotle, he first distinguishes beings as “natural beings” and “artificial beings”. When he makes this distinction, he considers whether the beings have the principles of movement and immobility in terms of location, quality or quantity. According to him, animals, plants and simple bodies, namely the four elements (earth, air, fire, water) have the principle of movement and immobility in terms of location, quality or quantity. However, in artificial beings, there is no such principle since they are artificial. Therefore, this is the most obvious difference between the natural beings and the artistic/artificial beings.<sup>41</sup>

Therefore, to define the “nature”, Aristotle places it somewhere in the most universal concept “existence” and puts the natural one opposite the artificial one. However, Ibn Sīnā recognizes the power which is the principle of movement and immobility as the kind of “nature”, not the “existence” and he places the “nature” as a form in this kind. Hence, it can be said that the argument of Ibn Sīnā is more perceivable and more knowable.

From Al-Fārābī’s explanations regarding the soul, it is understood that he also distinguishes the bodies into two as Aristotle: the “natural” ones and the “artificial” ones. Besides for him, the natural ones also are divided into two as the animates and inanimates.<sup>42</sup>

Ibn Rushd who makes extensive explanations about the concept of “nature”, also follows the ideas of Aristotle as much as he could and expresses Aristotle’s arguments more systematically. When entering the explanations about the concept of “nature”, like Aristotle he also defines the place of “nature” within the existence in the most meaning. He states the following in this regard:

“Bodies are divided into three: a) artificial b) natural and, c) coincidental. The artificial ones are everything in general that are the product of an art such as a chair, a couch. The natural ones are the animals, the plants and the other things that are the product of nature. As it can be seen, there are differences between the natural bodies and the artificial bodies. In natural bodies, there is the principle of movement and the immobility...”<sup>43</sup>

Moreover, Ibn Rushd also approaches the concept of “nature” in the context of the Muslim theologians’ denials of it and criticises them; but since this debate is a problematic one, it is not going to be discussed here.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 30.

<sup>41</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 192b 3-20.

<sup>42</sup> Al-Fārābī, *Risāla fī masāil mutafarriqa* (Haydarabad, 1344), 19.

<sup>43</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā’ at-Ṭabī’i*, 19-20.

<sup>44</sup> For more information about this see: Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (Beirut, 1986), 450-451, 472.

#### 4. THE DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF “NATURE”

In his work “Physics” Aristotle argues the followings regarding the “nature”: “it is a principle or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not accidentally”.<sup>45</sup> In this definition, he studies all the meanings to which the concept of “nature” indicates as a noun one by one and he considers the significance that is common in all.<sup>46</sup>

Peripatetic Islamic philosophers also follow the same way when defining the “nature” and they are based on Aristotle’s definition. For instance, Ibn Sīnā implies that, “nature is not the sign but personally the first principle of any movement or rest in a body”.<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, in his work *Kitāb as-Simā’ aṭ-Ṭabī’ī*, Ibn Rushd defines the “nature” as a thing that is “the first principle of and rest (in natural bodies).”<sup>48</sup>

Islamic philosophers emphasize every word that are in the definition of the concept of “nature” and explains what they mean in depth. To start with, according to Ibn Rushd who stresses the “movement” and the “rest”, “movement” means “change” and “rest” means “lack of change”. For him, what is implied with the phrase of “being the principle of movement” is that “the nature as a principle can have an impact on its own, and it tends to change and to be affected”.<sup>49</sup> Ibn Rushd does not separately mention about “the nature being the principle of the immobility”, he confines himself to the explanations he gives about the “movement”. However, this is not possible from Ibn Sīnā’s perspective. Since, for him, the principle of movement is the mover and it can only be the perpetrator and its impact appear in some others.<sup>50</sup>

According to Ibn Rushd, in some existences nature could only be the principle of one of the movement types (transposition, growth, transmutation and generation and corruption) and in some others it could take place as a principle which realizes all four variations of change. As a matter of fact, in an animal, nature is the principle of all four variations of movement. Whereas in simple bodies, there are only the principles of variations of three movement excluding the movement of growth. For instance, water and earth.<sup>51</sup>

For Ibn Sīnā, the word “first” mentioned in the definition refers to “the closest” and “lack of a mediator between the self and the mover”. For him, nature and the soul, which is from the same kind with nature, could be the principles of movement of “growth” and “transmutation in the bodies they exist”, but they can not be the first. Their being the principle of movement can only be via natures and qualities.<sup>52</sup>

However, Ibn Rushd defines that with the usage of the word “first” in the definition of nature, it is aimed at putting forward the existing difference between the nature and the art and distinguishing the nature and the art from one another. He also argues that the principles of the objects that move some of the

<sup>45</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 192b 21-22.

<sup>46</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 192b 3 - 193b 21.

<sup>47</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 31.

<sup>48</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā’ aṭ-Ṭabī’ī*, 20. See also al-Tahānawī, *Kashshaf*, 1127.

<sup>49</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā’ aṭ-Ṭabī’ī*, 19-20.

<sup>50</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 31 (13-14. lines). Furthermore Tehānevi also accepts Ibn Sīnā’s remarks. See Tehānevî, *Keşşâf*, 1127.

<sup>51</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 31; Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā’ aṭ-Ṭabī’ī*, 20.

<sup>52</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 31.

artistic existence do not exist in the mentioned artistic objects for the first time. The movement of a ship, which is an art production, on its own by the help of the wind can be given an example to this.<sup>53</sup> Since, here the movement of the wind is not in the first principle position for the movement of the ship.

Ibn Sīnā has the following explanations for the other words in his definition of “nature”: the word “*present*” in the definition is for distinguishing nature from both the art and the coercion. The other word “*personally*” is interpreted in two different ways: according to the mover and to the one which is moved. When it is interpreted according to the first one, it is stated that ‘if nature moves a thing, it happens because of the self of the nature, it does not happen because it bows to a coercion’. Since it is not possible for a coercion (vulgar power), which is used to move, not to move a thing unless it is prevented by a reverse movement. The second case, in which the word “*personally*” is related to the moving thing, is interpreted as ‘nature moves a thing which is already moving thanks to its own self, it does not move a thing from outside’. Likewise, the expression “*not accidentally*” can be interpreted in two ways. In the first one is about the nature and the second one is about the moving one. When it is about the nature, it is understood that “for nature, the movement is not accidentally, it is the principle of an essential thing.” For accidentally movement, this can be a perfect example: a person on the ship moves with the movement of the ship. With relation to the movement, the movement of a statue caused by the nature can be given as an example. Since when the nature moves a statue, it moves the statue accidentally, yet it is not the statue itself the nature moves, it is the bronze (that the statue is made of). And the statue also, as the same in the movement of the stone, does not move depending on the nature just because it is a statue. Therefore, physic can not be nature. When a physician treats himself and moves the physic in himself, the presence of physic in him is not because he is sick, on the contrary it is because he is a physician. Since when physician treats himself and recovers, his recovery is not thanks to his being a physician but his treatment. This is again because his being the treater in one thing and being the one who is treated is another thing. In terms of treating himself, he is the treater and the person who knows how to treat and in terms of being treated, he is the sick person who takes the treatment...”.<sup>54</sup>

Both Al-Kindī and Al-Fārābī, as mentioned earlier, do not emphasize the definition of the concept of “nature”, they only give explanations when necessary.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, the definitions given by Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd clearly define the position of the nature within the kind and the body to which it belongs. Especially the two of the definitions made by Ibn Sīnā regarding the powers and the movements makes it easier to understand the subject.

<sup>53</sup> Ibn Rushd, *Kitāb as-Simā’ at-Ṭabī’ī*, 20.

<sup>54</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifa Al-Tabiyyat*, 1: 32-33.

<sup>55</sup> Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī, *al-Kindi's Philosophical Essays*, translated by Mahmut Kaya (Istanbul, 1994), 58. Here Kindī says “Nature: The principle of movement and stillness which follows it. Nature is one of the first powers of soul “ p. 58; see also a.e., 73. As for Farabi he explains the term in relation to problems and gives different explanations to it for different problems. For examples see: al-Fārābī, “Kitāb Al-Ibāra”, *Ta’āliq Ibn Bācca Alā Mantiq Al-Fārābī*, ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut, 1994), 167-168; “Tahsīl al-sa’āde”, 1: 164; “Kitāb al-Ta’līqāt”, 1: 391, 394.

## CONCLUSION

Introducing the concept of “nature” as a concept is essential both for the present day “Islamic Philosophers”, and for the philosophy of Islam in historical sense. It is essential in terms of Islamic philosophy because Islamic philosophers are Muslim, and they live in an Islam dominant culture.<sup>56</sup> In other words, their acceptance of God primarily is according to how Qur’ān foresees the acceptance of God. It is inevitable and natural for this understanding to dominate their philosophy or at least to have an impact on it. No matter how religious a philosopher, it can not be claimed that a philosopher or a scientist, who reflects his thoughts to his ideas, puts religious arguments in each statement. However, it can be claimed that his beliefs have an impact on his each thought one by one. Briefly, Islamic philosophers’ definitions regarding the concept of “nature” are closely related with their Muslim identity<sup>57</sup>.

The explanation of the concept of “nature” is also very essential for the present day “Islamic philosophers”. Since achieving new goals both in scientific field and in the field of philosophy is only possible with taking advantage of what previous generations have produced.

Although the definitions assigned to the concept of “nature” by Islamic philosophers do not lead to significant debates among peripatetic Islamic philosophers, now we need to list the possible conclusions related to the concept of “nature”:

1. First of all, the concept becomes a milestone to the “nature - beyond nature” distinction. Because the limits of natural world are determined according to this.
2. In the definition of “nature”, excluded activities and types of actions are perceived as the opposite of nature even from the Antiquity and the Sophists use the word “nature = physis” to refer everything done or created by God (Demiurgos)<sup>58</sup>. They call the laws made by human as “nomos”, name the things that people set as norms as “thesis” and again call the things that people form with skills and art in time as “techne” and they distinguish all these from each other. Nature and coercion is assumed as the opposite things since they leave the meanings of coercion and outside intervention outside and nature-coercion contrast is discussed. Accordingly law-nature contrast is also brought forward and the Sophists are the first ones who bring them into question.

However, Aristotle uses the word physis as the mover in every single thing and as the binding law (which binds everything to each other). In Stoics physis is defined as the whole or the “common nature” which includes the vitality or the life as one of its parts within its secluded order. Besides Physis is continued to be understood as a unique capability related to the plants different from the inorganic nature, animals and psyche and logos of human and even something contrary to this. Cicero uses the Latin natura for the

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• In this phrase we mean the people who studies on academic level.

<sup>56</sup> Bayrakdar, *İslam Felsefesine Giriş*, 1-2.

<sup>57</sup> For the examples of Islamic philosophers clear statements of them being a muslim see: al-Fārābī, *İdeal Devlet*, translated by Ahmet Arslan (Ankara, 1997), 33-53; Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Najāt*, 77-124; Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (Beirut, 1986). Actually it is possible to see this case in all of their works.

<sup>58</sup> Erdem, “Tabiat (Doğa)”, 4: 39. In the same title it is indicated that sophists express the laws that were made by humans as “nomos”, norms that were presented by humans as “thesis” and things that were shaped by humans’ craftsmanship and skills as “techne”. See also *Mawsū‘at muṣṭalahāt ‘ilm al-mantiq ‘inda al-‘Arab*, 507.



word physis. As a stem *natura* means an activity of birth, blossom and appearance and all the existences are made of this. Lucretius understand the word nature in four different meanings: a) The creative power that presents in everything, b) the universe created by this power, c) each and every created thing, d) the order of the nature. The grasp of the term “nature as in its full meaning occurs after XVI. century and in XVII. century it reaches the concept as modern physical nature.”<sup>59</sup>

It is seen that the act of nature defines all its units as first of all its activity defines as movement and immobility, it includes all four movements and immobility is explained as the opposite of these. Besides it should be underlined that the nature which is the principle of movement and immobility, does not realize these two acts together but only one of them.<sup>60</sup> So it is possible to say that this present definition is accurate and complete.

After Islamic philosophers examine the concept of nature in detail, they enter several discussions about it. For instance, the conditions for nature to realize its acts, is the act of nature (to move things or to immobilize) infinite etc.

For Ibn Sīnā, there can not be a hindrance which will hinder the act of nature in the body where the power called “nature” exists. But if there is any deficiency in the body, then it means that the nature does not belong to that body. For instance, the body could be big or small, this does not constitute a hindrance or a support for the nature to realize its act. It is only the deficiency in the power that is called nature that can cause the act of nature not to realize. Since, power can change depending on the change in its location.<sup>61</sup> It is needed to be stated here that same as in the movements that are impelled, eventhough the deficiency in the acts of other powers arise from the one who accept the power, in natural acts this arise from the power itself.<sup>62</sup>

Briefly, Ibn Sīnā states that the body in its nature is not something that is subject to move or hinder things. For him, the reason is the power that the body accepts.<sup>63</sup>

The answer to the question why Ibn Sīnā emphasizes these kind of problems is, he wants to search the causes and the principles of the powers that naturally moves or immobilize things in the universe. His reasoning regarding this and other identical problems proves that both bodily/material powers and bodies themselves are finite.

As it is mentioned earlier, since examining the concept of “nature” problematically will exceed the boundaries of this article, further detail would be irrelevant.

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<sup>59</sup> Erdem, “Tabiat (Doğa)”, 440.

<sup>60</sup> For more information about this see: al-Tahānawī, *Kashshaf*, 1127.

<sup>61</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*, ed. Sulayman Dunya, 3rd Edition (Cairo, 1985), 3: 171. This book’s first printing was started at 1983 with first volume and the third edition we used here was published at 1985.

<sup>62</sup> Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, *Al-Sharh al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*. ed. Sulayman Dunya. 3rd Edition. Cairo, 1985, 3: 172-173 (Sulayman Dunya, published this exegesis together with *al-Ishārāt*. Ibn Sīnā’s texts are on the top of the pages and al-Tūsī’s exegeses are at the bottom).

<sup>63</sup> For more information see al-Tūsī, *Al-Sharh*, 170.

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## God's Omnipotence and Impossibility in al-Ghazālī and Thomas Aquinas\*

Özcan Akdağ \*\*

### ABSTRACT

During the Middle Ages, most theological and philosophical works were translated into Latin language, such as Avicenna's *al-Shifā: İlāhiyāt* (*The Metaphysics of The Healing*), Al-Ghazālī's *Maqāşid al-falāsifa* (*The Aims of Philosophers*), and Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle's books. Thanks to these translations, Latin world have got acquainted with various controversial issues in the Islamic thought, such as whether "God knows particulars in their essence", "whether God acts necessarily because of His nature" and "whether reason and revelation can be reconciled or not" conveyed into Latin West. In addition to these issues, Latin thinkers have also got to know the problem of what scope of God's absolute power. In this paper, I tried to show the idea that God can do what is logically possible and this does not limit God's absolute power was conveyed in to Latin West because of translation of Avicenna's *al-Shifā* and Al-Ghazālī's *Maqāşid al-falāsifa*. As far as I can see, there is drastic textual similarity between idea of Al-Ghazālī and Thomas Aquinas about this matter. Based on the similarities between Al-Ghazālī and Aquinas, it is highly probable that Aquinas' idea about God's power goes back to Islamic tradition.

### KEYWORDS

Philosophy of Religion, Impossibility, Necessity, God's Omnipotence, Al-Ghazālī, Aquinas.

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\*\* Assistant Professor, Erciyes Univ, Faculty of Theology, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Kayseri, TURKEY  
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Erciyes Üniversitesi, İlâhiyat Fakültesi, Din Felsefesi Anabilim Dalı  
[ozcanakdag@erciyes.edu.tr](mailto:ozcanakdag@erciyes.edu.tr) orcid.org/0000-0002-7156-401X

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## Gazzâlî ve Thomas Aquinas’ta Tanrı’nın Kudreti ve İmkânsızlık

### ÖZ

Orta Çağ’da, İslam düşüncesi içerisinde yazılmış olan İbn Sînâ’nın *eş-Şifâ: İlahiyat*’ı, Gazzâlî’nin *Makâsıdu’l-Felâsife*’si ve İbn Rüşd’ün, Aristoteles’in eserlerine yazmış olduğu şerhler gibi pek çok felsefî ve teolojik eser Latinceye çevrilmiştir. Söz konusu çeviri eserler vasıtasıyla, İslam düşüncesinde carî olan, Tanrı’nın tikelleri kendi zatlarında bilip bilmediği, Tanrı’nın zatı gereği fiilde bulunup bulunmadığı, din ve felsefenin uzlaşıp uzlaşmayacağı gibi tartışmalı pek çok mesele Batı’ya intikal etmiştir. Bunlara ilaveten Tanrı’nın mutlak kudretinin alanının ne olduğu sorunu da Batı düşüncesinde bilinir hale gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada, “Tanrı mantıksal olarak mümkün olanı yapabilir ve bu durum Tanrı’nın mutlak kudretine hanel getirmez” anlayışının Latin Batı dünyasına İbn Sînâ’nın *eş-Şifâ*’sı ve Gazzâlî’nin *Makâsıdu’l-Felâsife*’sinin çevirileri vasıtasıyla intikal ettiği ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Tespit edebildiğimiz kadarıyla, Gazzâlî’nin *Makâsıdu’l-Felâsife*’de bu konuya ilişkin serdettiği fikirler ile Hristiyan teolog/düşünür Thomas Aquinas’ın fikirleri arasında önemli ölçüde benzerlik söz konusudur. Söz konusu benzerlik temele alınarak, Thomas Aquinas’ın bu hususta İslam düşüncesinden beslendiğini söylemek kuvvetle muhtemeldir.

### ANAHTAR KELİMELEER

Din Felsefesi, İmkânsızlık, Zorunluluk, Tanrı’nın Kudreti, Gazzâlî, Thomas Aquinas

### INTRODUCTION

In our daily lives, while we call various things as “possible”, we also call some others as “impossible”. As we do this, we base on our judgement of whether those things are within the extent of our power or not. As a matter of fact, we describe what is requested from us or what we plan to do as “possible” if it is in our limits, or we describe it as “impossible” if the request exceeds our power’s limits. It is obvious that there is a relation between the understanding of possibility, which is revealed by human actions, and the scope of power extension. In this context, it seems possible to describe possibility and impossibility as being a matter of power or not. Then, when it comes to God, is it possible to describe the concepts of possibility and impossibility as the things that are included in his scope of power? For instance, can we describe an action that is with the scope of God’s power extension as possible and an action that is not so as impossible? Or can we assume possibility and impossibility as realities that are independent of power? In other words, is the notion of possibility or impossibility not related to power and is it a mode that is related to things themselves. In this study, within the framework of the questions posed above, we will discuss the perspective of Al-Ghazālī’s (1058-1111), and Aquinas’ (1225-1274), who are one of the prominent figures in the mediaeval Islamic thought and mediaeval Christian thought respectively, and we will try to show that Aquinas was inspired by Muslim philosophers, such as Avicenna and Al-Ghazālī.

## 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Lexical meaning of possibility is doing something easily, the absence of obstacles to do something and that action is manageable.<sup>1</sup> According to Aristotle (367-347 BC), possibility is the thing that has probability to accept one of two opposites. For example, if Socrates is sitting, the statement that “Socrates is not sitting” will be wrong. However, inaccuracy of the that relevant statement is valid only for that moment because it is possible for Socrates to perform that action of not sitting in another time, and then the statement “Socrates is not sitting” might be correct.<sup>2</sup> And “necessity” is used to refer to something whose absence is impossible.<sup>3</sup> In other words, being obligatory is not to be either this or that way.<sup>4</sup> As for Muslim philosopher Al-Fārābī (874-950), possibility is the thing that is capable of accepting one of two opposites. If only one of these opposites was correct, it would not be possible for this thing to accept opposite cases. He also notes that existence of things depends on the possibility originated from their nature; if these things did not have a possibility in this way, they would not be mentioned in the God’s creation and destruction acts. Therefore, possibility is a condition that accepts the nature of creation and destruction. *If X necessarily accepted one of these capabilities/possibilities, X would be something necessary in this case.* For this reason, it would not be subject to God’s creation and destruction acts, and it would not be possible to accept one of these capabilities for the things that are possible due to their nature.<sup>5</sup> For Al-Fārābī, impossible cannot to exist and we need hardly mention that.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to this, from Al-Fārābī’s perspective, necessity is a mutual notion and has three meanings. The first is used for the being whose existence is eternal and everlasting and means that the absence of the thing is impossible. From this point of view, God is *wajib al-wujud* (necessary existence), which means God exists, and his existence depends on nothing. The second resembles the fact that the presence of color blue in the eye continues as the presence of eye itself continues to exist. Similarly, as long as the subject continuous to exist, the qualification of that subject also persists. The third meaning of necessity is the continuation of the state as long as the agent does the relevant action. For example, when John remains standing and the condition that he stands upright is necessary part of the action and continues as long as the action is done. From Al-Fārābī’s perspective, while the first meaning of the concept of necessity is primary, the others refer to a relative necessity.<sup>7</sup>

Avicenna (980-1037), on the other hand, defines “possible” as the probability of every existing things before they exist. If something was impossible in terms of its essence, that thing would not exist. Something

<sup>1</sup> Mahmut Kaya, “İmkân”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: TDV Publications, 2000), 22 (2000): 224.

<sup>2</sup> Aristoteles, *Metafizik*, trans. Ahmet Arslan (Istanbul: Sosyal, 2010), 263.

<sup>3</sup> Aristoteles, *Metafizik*, 207.

<sup>4</sup> Aristoteles, *Metafizik*, 223.

<sup>5</sup> Abū Naşr al-Fārābī, *Peri Hermenias Muhtasarı*, trans. Mübahat Türker-Küyel (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 1990), 94.

<sup>6</sup> Mahmut Kaya, “Al-Fārābī”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: TDV Publications, 1995), 12 (1995): 149.

<sup>7</sup> Abū Naşr al-Fārābī, *Peri Hermenias Muhtasarı*, 94.

eventuality appears into existence not only because the owner of the power makes it so, but also because of the possibility of this entity’s essence. If something was impossible, it would not be within scope of power extension. Power extends to possible, not to impossible.<sup>8</sup> Just as the notions ‘being’ and ‘thing’ are first principles (avvalī), the notions ‘necessity’, ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ are also first principles.<sup>9</sup> But in *Dānišnāma-i Alāī* (*The Highest Knowledge*), Avicenna offers different definitions of *necessity* and *impossible* other than those mentioned above. Everything that exists is either *per se* necessary or not. Something that is not *per se* necessary is either possible or impossible. Something that is possible in itself is necessary providing that there is a cause and it is impossible providing that there is no cause. Without cause, something is neither necessary nor impossible. For example, if number 4 is impossible, it cannot exist. But if we consider that it exists due to the addition of 2 and 2, then it will be necessary in terms of its condition.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, according to Avicenna, possibility is not something ordained or something affected by eternal being’s power extension because we cannot know whether something is ordained or not, but we can know that it is possible or not. Therefore, the state of something’s being ordained is in consequence of possibility owned by that thing.

Now that we have mentioned what prominent philosopher’s, such as Aristotle, Al-Fārābī and Avicenna understand from notions like necessary, possible and impossible with broad strokes we can move on to what kind of an attitude Al-Ghazālī and Aquinas adopt in this matter.

## 2. AL-GHAZĀLĪ AND THOMAS AQUINAS

In the theistic tradition, God is almighty and able to do anything He wants. Therefore, there is nothing that limits His power. Being a theist thinker, Al-Ghazālī thinks that God is a perfect being not only in terms of His omnipotence but also in terms of His other characteristics. For this reason, it is not possible that there is a being equal to Him. If there were two beings with absolute power that are equal in power, then whoever created the earth would have been able to create the sky. If one of these beings is capable of creating the sky and the other one would not, then one of them would be incapable. If there were a cooperation between them, this would annihilate the quality of absolute power. As a result, if one of these beings has the absolute power, it is not possible for the other to have absolute power, which is the evidence known as the *argument of tamanu’* (*argument from hindrance*).<sup>11</sup> With this argument, although Al-Ghazālī tries to prove that God is one, he also aims to prove that God is a being that is omnipotent. Moreover, Al-Ghazālī also tries to prove that universe is a neat and arranged act by omnipotent God. The universe is firm and organized. Every act that is arranged emanates from an omnipotent agent. In that case, the universe emanated from a powerful agent.

<sup>8</sup> Abū ‘Alī Ibn Sīnā, *Metafizik*, trans. Ekrem Demirli ve Ömer Türker (Istanbul: Litera, 2004), 162; Cüneyt Kaya, *Aristoteles’ten İbn Sīnā’da Varlık ve İmkân* (Istanbul: Klasik, 2012), 186.

<sup>9</sup> Kaya, *Aristoteles’ten İbn Sīnā’da Varlık ve İmkân*, 282.

<sup>10</sup> Abū ‘Alī Ibn Sīnā, *Dānišnāma-i Alāī: Alāī Hikmet Kitabı*, trans. Murat Demirkol (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2013), 213-214.

<sup>11</sup> al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad, *al-Iqtisād fī al-İ’tiqād*, ed. İbrahim Agah Çubukçu-Hüseyin Atay (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi, 1962), 77-78.

Therefore, the mind necessarily accepts the statement “Every arranged act emanates from an omnipotent agent.”<sup>12</sup>

To show that God is almighty, Aquinas also starts with experience in other words with the universe. According to him, the secondary reasons act in the universe that we experienced, they act with the power of the First Principle’s power. If the divine activity were to stop, all activities of secondary reasons would also disappear. So, every act can ultimately be returned to God.<sup>13</sup> We should also consider that from Thomas’ perspective, even though the power of the things that we experience and of the things that naturally act is determined to be actualized as a singular act, God’s power is not in this way. Yet God acts with His own will, not because of a natural obligation.<sup>14</sup>

As we have seen, both philosophers base God’s possession of absolute power on the basis of universe. Then, when we say that “God is capable of everything”, in which context should this statement be understood? What is implied with the notion *everything* that is cited in the statement? In that case, can God create a circle-square or make  $2+1=17$  equality real? According to the claims of writers like Peterson and Hasker, it has been traditionally accepted since Thomas Aquinas that God’s power should be limited to at least logically possible. Limiting God’s power to logically possible does not remove God’s absolute power. In addition to this, God cannot perform an action like climbing Mount Everest because he does not have a body to do this action. For this reason, God can perform every act that is logically possible and consistent with His nature.<sup>15</sup> To our knowledge, God’s power to do what is possible in terms of His own nature is an acceptable claim. However, this idea had appeared formerly in Islamic tradition before Aquinas introduced it. We claim that Aquinas also internalized the idea that God’s power extends to possible things in terms of His own power and introduced it to mediaeval western world due to being partially being influenced by Avicenna and Al-Ghazālī. In this context, to ground our claim, it would be right to elaborate what Al-Ghazālī and Aquinas have understood from the notions *possible* and *impossible*.

For Al-Ghazālī, possibility is a rational (*aqlī*) state. The judgements ordained by reason are possible, whereas those not ordained and not to be conceived by reason are impossible. If reason cannot ordain a judgement’s/thing’s absence, then it is also necessary.<sup>16</sup> Just like Avicenna, Aquinas also argues that the possibility of something is not in relation with power, but on the contrary, in relation with that thing’s necessity or impossibility. For example, the necessity for an addition of a triangle’s interior angles equals to

<sup>12</sup> Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād fī al-i’tiqād*, 80-81.

<sup>13</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University, 2001), 3: 219-222.

<sup>14</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University, 2012), 2: 68.

<sup>15</sup> William Hasker Michael Peterson, *Akil ve İnanç: Din Felsefesine Giriş*, trans. Rahim Acar (Istanbul: Küre, 2009), 88; Özcan Akdağ, *Tanrı ve Özgürlük: Gazālī ve Thomas Aquinas Ekseninde Bir İnceleme* (Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2016), 138; Mehmet Ata Az, “Descartes’ta Tanrı, Kudret ve Ezeli Doğrular”, *Şırnak Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 2/2 (2011): 69-90; Mehmet Ata Az, “Ghazālī ve Thomas Aquinas’ın Nedensellik Görüşlerinin Karşılaştırılması” 2/7 (2016): 85-100.

<sup>16</sup> al-Ghazālī, Abū Hāmid Muḥammad, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, ed. Salah al-Din al-Hawārī (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Asriyya, 2010), 74-75.



addition of two right angles cannot be a matter of power, and this necessity do not remove God’s absolute power.<sup>17</sup>

Even though Al-Ghazālī mentions “possible” as a rational concept in *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* (*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*), in *al-Iqtisād* (*Median in Belief*) he says that possible is an ordained thing. Based on the contention that power does extend to possible things only, he comes to the conclusion that possible is an ordained thing. Although reason has the quality of cognition, everything cannot be cognized at the same level. Among the first principles are the impossibility for something to be both created and eternal at the same time, and for it to be both existing and absent, the fact that the existence of the particular entails the existence of the general, and the fact that number two is bigger than number one, two times three makes six. These are necessary statements that mind possesses related to necessity, possible and impossible. Reasoning -in other words information gathered by research-, is not the information that the mind accepts immediately, but it is the information that is accepted and obtained after certain research processes.<sup>18</sup> In another work of his, Al-Ghazālī draws attention to the impossibility of existence of a thing that is possessed as impossible in mind. For instance, if a person, who is perceived as a saint, says that “The person ‘X’ will die tomorrow” the mind is limited with regard to this piece of information because this can only be known by God. If someone, who pretends to be a saint, argues that information like “God will create a being similar to Himself” is revealed to him, reason immediately refuses it. This is not because of mind’s failure in understanding that but it is due to the impossibility in the essence of the thing. A more impossible statement than the previous one is someone’s claim that “God will convert me into something similar to Him, and I will be God.” According to a statement like this, the created being will be an eternal being, which is impossible.<sup>19</sup> In his discussion of aspects, Al-Ghazālī points out that attribution of the notion *living* to human is necessary, and the statement “Human is a stone” is impossible in itself because the notion *stone* is contradictory with essential properties of human being.<sup>20</sup>

Even though Al-Ghazālī states in *Mi’yār al-ilm al-Mantıq* (*The Criterion of Knowledge in the Art of Logic*), in which he discusses possibility, necessity and impossibility<sup>21</sup> that his aim is to explain the concepts used by philosophers, he adds that there are two types of impossibility: *impossible in itself* and *impossible by virtue of other*. For example, attributing whiteness and blackness to the same subject at the same time is *impossible in*

<sup>17</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, trans. Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University, 2009), I: 262.

<sup>18</sup> al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad, “*Mishkat al-anwār*”, *Majmuat al-Rasāil al-Imam al-Ghazālī*, ed. İbrahim Emin Muhammed (Cairo: al-Maktabat al-Tawfiqiyya, nd), 290-291; Id, *al-Iqtisād fī al-ı’tiqād*, 84; Id, *Mihāk al-Nazar*, ed. Muhammed Bedreddin Na’sanî (Beirut: Dār al-Nahdati al-Hadīse, 1966), 35; Id, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, trans. Ahmet Kayacık (Istanbul: Ahsen, 2012), 79; Id, *Mi’yār al-ilm fi al-Mantık*, ed. Ahmed Şemseddin (Lebanon: Dār al-Kutub al-İlmiyah, 1990), 178; Id, *Mi’yār al-ilm: İlmin Ölçütü*, trans. Ali Durusoy-Hasan Hacak (Istanbul: TYEKB, 2013), 252-254.

<sup>19</sup> al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad, *al-Maqṣād al-asna fi sharah Asma’ Allahu al-Husna* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-İlmiyah, nd.), 125; Id, *İlahi Ahlak*, trans. Yaman Arıkan (Istanbul: Elif Ofset, 1983), 339.

<sup>20</sup> al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, ed. Ahmad Farid Mezidi (Lebanon: Dār al-Kutub al-İlmiyah, 2008), 30.

<sup>21</sup> Ghazālī, *Mi’yār al-ilm fi al-Mantık*, 283-284; Id, *Mi’yāru’l-İlm: İlmin Ölçütü*, 416-418.

itself. While it is possible for the world to come to an end at this very moment, it is *impossible by virtue of other* because there is a certain date designated for it in God's eternal knowledge, and it is impossible for His knowledge to turn into ignorance.<sup>22</sup> Based on this point of view, we can say that Al-Ghazālī does not just explain philosophers' notions, but he also accepts a differentiation as impossible in itself and impossible by virtue of other.

Al-Ghazālī, who makes a similar assessment in *al-Iqtisād*, with respect to whether universe is necessary, possible and impossible according to God's eternal will. If God's eternal will ordain the absence of that thing, the existence of the thing will be impossible. If His will ordains that the universe will be necessary, the universe would be necessary. If eternal will did not ordain to create the universe, then the universe would be impossible because there must be a reason for the existence of created thing (*hadith*). If there is no reason, the existence of a thing that is created is impossible. It is seen that the universe is possible when the essence of universe is considered without considering the eternal will. Therefore, a state that is possible can be impossible due to an external cause. Similarly, if there is knowledge in God's eternal knowledge that Zayd will die on Saturday morning, with respect to the case of whether there will be a creation of life for Zayd or not, Al-Ghazālī states that the creation of *life* is possible because of its essence, but it is impossible because of immutability and impossibility of God's wisdom for returning to ignorance.<sup>23</sup> Also in the case of Abu Jahl's conversion to Islam, Al-Ghazālī indicates that his believing is not per se impossible, but on the contrary, it is impossible because of an external cause, that is God's wisdom.<sup>24</sup> After all, if something exists in the eternal wisdom and if the eternal wisdom ordains that it will exist so, then that thing will exist in that way.<sup>25</sup>

By following Aristoteles,<sup>26</sup> Aquinas separates possibility and impossibility into three: *The first* is possibility-impossibility in terms of actual and potential ability. For example, humans are capable of walking and while they are able to walk because of this ability, it is impossible for them to fly. *The second* is that possibility or impossibility of something is not dependent on any power. That thing is possible or impossible due to its essence. For instance, two opposite predicates cannot be concurrently attributed to the same matter. For this reason, the same predicate cannot be concurrently contradicted or confirmed, and this state cannot be discussed with reference to God's capability. This is not because of an absence in God's capability, but it is due to the lack of per se possibility of that thing. *The third* is mathematical possibility in the geometric calculations. If we know a square's area, we can calculate the measure of its one side using this information.<sup>27</sup> Based on the discrimination we mentioned, Aquinas comes to a conclusion that God's not doing something results from two reasons that are *will* and *power*. If God did not will something, He cannot do it. Human

<sup>22</sup> Ghazālī, *Mīyār al-ilm fi al-mantik*, 332-333; Id, *Mī'yāru'l-İlm: İlmin Ölçütü*, 524; Id, "İlcām al-avām an-İlmi al-Kalām", *Makāsıd al-falāsifa*, ed. Ahmed Ferid Mezidī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-İlmiyah, 2008), 236; Id, *al-Iqtisād fi al-i'tiqād*, 161-162.

<sup>23</sup> Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād fi al-i'tiqād*, 84-85.

<sup>24</sup> Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād fi al-i'tiqād*, 181.

<sup>25</sup> Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād fi al-i'tiqād*, 175.

<sup>26</sup> Aristoteles, *Metafizik*, 264-265.

<sup>27</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *The Power of God*, trans. Richard Regan (New York: Oxford Universtiy, 2012), 9-10.

beings will happiness by nature. In the same way, divine will cannot will something opposite to divine goodness. Although God has the absolute power, He cannot perform some actions that are done with organs. The reason of God’s not being able to perform such actions is not about the power itself, but it is related to per se possibility. For instance, it is impossible for God to create another being that is equal to Him because the thing that is created will include potentiality and this is against the fact that God is pure act of being. Being actual pure is an attribution that is only peculiar to God and this attribute cannot be credited to other beings.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, from the perspective of Thomas, possibility of something is the possibility in terms of its very essence, and God cannot remove the possibility or impossibility arising from essence of things.<sup>29</sup>

Discussing the issue in detail in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Thomas states that God does not act against the nature of being as a being and lists what God cannot do as eleven items. *First*, God is not capable of acting to remove the essence of something. For example, existence is the opposite of absence. God cannot make something existing and non-existing concurrently. Therefore, God cannot perform contradictory states. *Second*, God cannot gather two contrary predicates simultaneously in the same perspective and on the same subject. *Third*, removing something’s essential attributions of something means removing that thing. For instance, humans are a being composed of soul and body. God cannot create a human without these essential elements. *Fourth*, God cannot do anything against some initial principles of sciences, such as the fact that genus is a predicate for its subspecies, every line that is drawn from the center of a circle is equal and the addition of a triangle’s interior angles equals to two right angles. *Fifth*, God cannot make the past erased because it will lead to a contradictory state. *Sixth*, because God created everything as it is, He cannot do anything that does not comply with the nature of the thing in question. *Seventh*, a being that is created is a caused being, and a caused being cannot be the First Cause. Therefore, God, who is the First Cause, cannot create a being that is like Him. *Eighth*, everything needs God to exist and continue to exist. For that reason, God cannot create other beings that exist per se. *Ninth*, God cannot will the things that he is not capable of doing. Thus, God can will the things that He is capable of doing. *Tenth*, God wills His own essence necessarily, and for this reason, He cannot will His non-existence. *Finally*, God cannot will to do evil, and hence cannot commit a sin.<sup>30</sup>

As we have seen, Aquinas thinks that possible in itself and impossible in itself determine the scope of God’s power extension. In addition to things that are metaphysically impossible and forming logical contradictions, a state that existed in the past cannot be subjected to God’s ability. Even though Aquinas offers an argument that there is no past and future for God, and all times are eternal for Him, and because past and future do not arise an obligation in terms of His acts in *The Power of God*,<sup>31</sup> he highlights the fact that making what occurred not occurred leads to a logical contradiction in *Summa Contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theologica*. Accordingly, if Socrates performed the sitting action, the statement “Socrates sat down” is necessarily correct and the statement “Socrates did not sit down” is necessarily wrong. It is impossible that both of these statements are correct at the same time, because making a state that occurred in the past not happened

<sup>28</sup> Aquinas, *The Power of God*, 17-18.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 1: 146-147.

<sup>30</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, 2012, 2: 74-76; Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1: 146.

<sup>31</sup> Aquinas, *The Power of God*, 17.

cannot be subjected to God’s power. However, the impossibility mentioned here is not an impossibility as in the case of resurrecting a dead person. Resurrecting the dead does not include a contradiction and is not a state that is per se impossible. This act is regarded as impossible with reference to power. Therefore, because God has absolute power and the act being mentioned is not per se impossible, resurrecting the dead can be subjected to God’s power.<sup>32</sup>

Although it is accepted by many theists that God has absolute power, the discussions about absolute power focus on its extent. For example, according to Al-Ghazālī, the statement “God is omnipotent” is a customary belief/generally accepted thing (*mashurat/endoxa*). Everyone and the majority accepts such statements such as “Lies are bad, To excruciate an innocent person is bad, It is good to be grateful to the benefactor or To help someone at the point of death is good, Prophets should not be tormented” are accepted by everyone or by the majority. These well-known statements are not certain as the necessary truths that express certainty. Besides being sayings that are heard since childhood, they are also rules that are used to bring order to social life. If these statements are offered to a person, who has not lived in any society and has not received education, it is possible for that person to refuse them. However, if the statement “Two is bigger than one” or similar statements are offered to that person, it is unthinkable that this person refuses this statement, as these statements are necessary. Therefore, some of these customary belief statements might be correct and some might be wrong. The statement “God is omnipotent” is also one of the customary statements. This proposition is accepted as true even though God is not capable of creating His own essence and attributions.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, when we say that God is omniscient” it should be understood that God can know everything that is possible for Him to know. Because God cannot know of a being like Himself.<sup>34</sup>

Al-Ghazālī writes “...when we say that “God is omnipotent”, we cannot see immediately that there might be something over which He did not have power until we realized that He could not create another being like Himself. Then we aware of the error of our assertion. But the true assertion is that “He can do everything that it is possible for Him to do” and there is no conflict in it.”<sup>35</sup>

Customary statements can be considered in terms of proper or improper, not in terms of being truth or falsehood as contradictions. What contradicts with wrong is correct, but the contradiction of customary belief is what is improper. Therefore, there are many things that are improper (shani’) but correct for Al-Ghazālī, and there are many wrongs that are customary beliefs.<sup>36</sup> It may not appear that the proposition “God is omnipotent” includes a contradiction at the first sight, but when this proposition is analyzed, it will be deduced that the proposition “God is omnipotent” contains a contradictory state because it is impossible for God to create another being like Him. This is because a being that is created cannot be God. From this point of view, we can deduce that God’s power extends to things that are possible in itself. As a result, the

<sup>32</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I: 32,147; Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. C. I. Litzinger (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1993), 362.

<sup>33</sup> al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad, *Mustasfā: min Ilmi al-Usul*, ed. Hamza b. Zūheyr Hafız (Madinah, s.n., 1413), 150-152; Id, *Mustasfā: İslam Hukuk Metodolojisi*, trans. Yunus Apaydın (Istanbul: Klasik, 2006), 74-75.

<sup>34</sup> Ghazālī, *Maqāşid al-falāsife*, 51.

<sup>35</sup> Ghazālī, *Maqāşid al-falāsife*, 55.

<sup>36</sup> Ghazālī, *Maqāşid al-falāsife*, 51.

statement “God can do all things that are possible in itself” does not contain a contradiction in contrast with the proposition “God is omnipotent.”<sup>37</sup> According to my research, Avicenna also mentions the proposition “God is omnipotent” as a customary statement, and without offering a more detailed explanation, he tells that proposition “God is omnipotent to do impossible, and He is omniscient and omnipotent in terms of His assistant.” The one who ignorant of letters is cannot be characterized by the power to perform the art of calligraphy.<sup>38</sup> In my opinion, when Al-Ghazālī says “God is omnipotent in everything that is possible in itself.” he is influenced by Avicenna’s explanations in *as-Shifa*<sup>39</sup> and *Dānišnāmah* and introduced it in a clearer way by improving it.

When Al-Ghazālī discusses the conditions of syllogism in *Mihāk al-nazar fi al-Mantiq*, which he wrote after *Maqāsid al-falāsifa*, he draws attention to the point that to make the syllogism, it should be concepts (tasawur) and propositions which are based on these concepts. Just as a person needs materials like wood and adobe to build a house, s/he needs propositions to create syllogism. The universe is a whole that consists of singular parts. Part’s precedence over the whole is necessary.<sup>40</sup> Al-Ghazālī, who discusses the same matter in *al-Mustasfā*, which is one of his latest works, states that at least two propositions are needed to form the demonstrative knowledge. Therefore, in Al-Ghazālī’s view, requesting evidence without concepts, propositions and assent (tasdiq) is requesting the impossible. This process resembles to the case of a person wanting to write although he is not able to write the letters, or to the case of a person wishing to be a clerk, who writes fine and properly, although he is not able to write a single word. Parts of a whole always precede the whole, which is a necessary state. According to Al-Ghazālī, this state is valid for everything that is united. In brief, just as a person cannot be qualified with fine and proper writing ability without knowing words, the Omnipotent Being cannot be qualified with creating the unified knowledge without singular concepts.<sup>41</sup> In other words, God cannot be qualified with a power to create the propositions and universe, which are composed of parts, as a whole without parts.<sup>42</sup>

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Al-Ghazālī says that divine omnipotence can extend to the things possible in itself. Even though Al-Ghazālī mentions philosopher’s ideas in *Maqāsid al-falāsifa*, he holds this opinion both in *Mīyār al-ilm*<sup>43</sup> and *al-Mustasfā*, despite partial discrepancies. Although Al-Ghazālī inherited the idea about God’s omnipotence that he propounded in *Maqāsid al-falāsifa* from Avicenna, it is possible to say that he internalized and even improved this idea.

<sup>37</sup> Ghazālī, *Maqāsid al-falāsife*, 55.

<sup>38</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *Dānišnāme-i Alāi: Alāi Hikmet Kitabı*, 102-104.

<sup>39</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *Metafizik*, 62.

<sup>40</sup> Ghazālī, *Mihāk al-nazar*, 12-13; Ghazālī, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, 63-64.

<sup>41</sup> Ghazālī, *Mustasfā: Min Ilm al-Usul*, 91.

<sup>42</sup> Ghazālī, *Mihāk al-nazar*, 12-13.

<sup>43</sup> Ghazālī, *Mīyār al-ilm fi al-Mantık*, 187-188.

Aquinas also thinks that although God’s omnipotence is absolute, His power extends to everything that does not contain contradiction. Therefore, according to Aquinas, the expression “God is omnipotent” implies that His power extends to things that are *per se* possible and not contradictory.<sup>44</sup> In his work *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas draws attention to the point that although God’s possession of absolute power is accepted by everyone, the scope of omnipotence’ extension is disputed, and he states that meaning the word *everything* (*omni*) in the proposition “God is omnipotent” contains only the things that are within the bounds of possibility. For this reason, Aquinas clearly states that the statement “God is omnipotent” should be understood as “God is omnipotent in everything that is possible.”<sup>45</sup>

As is seen, Thomas’ explanations about God’s omnipotence share similarities with Al-Ghazālī’s approach, in fact the propositions that Aquinas used show similarities to a large extent with the statements that Al-Ghazālī used in his work *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, which was translated into Latin in the mid 12th century and which Aquinas gave reference. Instead of continuing his predecessor’s, Anselm<sup>46</sup> who has a voluntarist perspective about God’s omnipotence, Aquinas adopted the idea that God’s not doing something, which is logically impossible, does not harm His absolute power. In my opinion, he obtained this understanding generally from Islamic thought and specifically from Avicenna and Al-Ghazālī and used in his own system. Therefore, as we mentioned earlier in our study, the claim that what is mentioned by like Peterson and Hasker, such as “God’s omnipotence does not extend to logically impossible” can be traced back to Aquinas is invalid because it is a thought accepted by philosophers, such as Avicenna and Al-Ghazālī and it is known by other thinkers in Islamic thought. Consequently, we can easily say that Aquinas thanks was intellectually fed by Avicenna and Al-Ghazālī in this matter introduced that perspective into the western thought.

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<sup>44</sup> Aquinas, *The Power of God*, 19-20.

<sup>45</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1: 145-146.

<sup>46</sup> Anselm, “Why God Became Man”, *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works*, trans. Brian Davies - G.R. Evans (New York: Oxford Universtiy, 1998), 342.

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## One of The Founders of The Hanafi School Zufar Ibn Hudhayl's Approach to Istihsān\*

Adem Çiftci \*\*

### ABSTRACT

From the earliest times when schools of legal thought (*madhhab*) have started to form, there has been debate whether or not “istihsān (juristic preference; moving away from the implications of an analogy to an analogy that has a stronger evidence from the Qurʾān, Sunnah or ijmaʿ)” is a method of “istidlāl (inference)”. At the basis of these discussions, the effect of the arbitrariness/subjectivity implied by the term “istihsān”, which has not yet completed its conceptualization process, is far too much. Therefore, those who adopted “istihsān” as a method were subjected to serious accusations. Hanafī jurists are at the forefront among those who adopted “istihsān”. So much so that the “istihsān” method has become known by the Hanafī School. However, we have come across with two opposing arguments about the approach of Zufar ibn Hudhayl, who is one of the leading representatives of the school, prominent with his analogical reasoning, to “istihsān”. As a result of our research and investigation, it is seen that neither of the claims is right; in addition to the skill of the Zufar to make analogies, he is in favor of analogical reasoning to the full extent on the issue of having recourse to “istihsān”; but in cases where analogies are inadequate in producing solutions to the issues or do not give correct outcomes, as a necessity for not to leave the issue without any verdict, he had recourse to “istihsān”. As a result, it can be said that being bound to the Hanafī method in general terms, Zufar ibn Hudhayl has narrowed the framework for using “istihsān” as a method of “istidlāl”; on the issue of having recourse to analogies, on the other hand, he tried to broaden the boundaries as much as possible.

### KEYWORDS

Islamic Law, Hanafī School, Zufar ibn Hudhayl, Analogy, Istihsān, Istidlāl

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\*\* Assistant Professor, Cumhuriyet University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Islamic Law, Sivas, TURKEY

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fakültesi, İslam Hukuku Anabilim Dalı

[ademciftci28@hotmail.com](mailto:ademciftci28@hotmail.com)

[orcid.org/0000-0002-9040-2753](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9040-2753)

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## Hanefî Mezhebi’nin Kurucu İmamlarından Biri Olan Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in İstihşana Yaklaşımı

### ÖZ

Mezheplerin teşekkül etmeye başladığı ilk dönemlerden itibaren istihşanın bir istidlal yöntemi olup olmadığı tartışılmalıdır. Bu tartışmaların temelinde kavramsallaşma sürecini henüz tamamlamamış olan istihşan teriminin çağrıştırdığı keyfiliğin/sübjektivitenin etkisi çok fazladır. Bu yüzden istihşanı bir yöntem olarak benimseyenler, ağır ithamlara maruz kalmışlardır. İstihşanı benimseyenlerin başında Hanefî hukukçular gelmektedir. Öyle ki istihşan yöntemi Hanefî mezhebiyle anılır hale gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte mezhebin önde gelen temsilcilerinden biri olan ve kıyas metodunu kullanmasıyla ön plana çıkan Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in istihşana yaklaşımıyla ilgili iki farklı yaklaşım tespit edilmiştir. Yaptığımız araştırma ve inceleme neticesinde her iki tespitinde isabetli olmadığını; Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in kıyas yapmadaki becerisinin yanı sıra istihşana müracaatta sonuna kadar kıyas taraftarı olduğunu; ancak kıyasın meselelere çözüm üretmede yetersiz kaldığı ya da doğru sonuç vermediği durumlarda ise ızdırârın da bir gereği olarak meseleyi hükümsüz bırakmama adına istihşana müracaat ettiği görülmektedir. Sonuç olarak Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in genel hatlarıyla Hanefî usulüne bağlı kalmakla birlikte istihşanı bir istidlâl yöntemi olarak kullanma hususunda çerçeveyi oldukça daralttığını; kıyasa başvurma konusunda ise sınırları mümkün olduğunca geniş tuttuğunu söylemek mümkündür.

### ANAHTAR KELİMELER

İslam Hukuku, Hanefî Mezhebi, Züfer b. Hüzeyl, Kıyas, İstihşan, İstidlâl

### SUMMARY

Starting from Hijri 2<sup>nd</sup> century which was the beginning of the formation of idolatry, in terms of whether it is the nature and the method of stratification, istihşân, generally described as “Because of stronger evidence, it would be better to abandon the provision of similar powers to another ruling”, has been argued. So much so that two different approaches have emerged in the form of supporters and opponents.

The opponents of istihşân have accused the people who adopted and done sets of fiqh deductions accordingly of judging according to their desires and to establishing a new sharia. However, the effect of the concept of istihşân, which has not yet completed its conceptualization process, arbitrary/subjective sense of this oppositional approach is too great.

Imam Shafî was a strong opponent of istihşân. However, Shafî, consulted istihşân to regard the amount of “mut’a” (consolation gift) thirty dirham and the period of the “shuf’a” (right of pre-emption) as three days, he even used this concept by saying “I am doing istihşân”. Therefore, it can be said that the opposition of Imam Shafî is aimed at the “logic of exception” which resides in istihşân rather than the provision reached by the means of istihşân.

Imam Shafî’s istihşân opposition is more directed to the Hanafis, who are identified with istihşân. Particularly, it is seen that the students Abu Yûsuf and Imam Muhammad and Abu Hanifa one of the founder imams

of Hanafi School consulted istiḥsān frequently. However, there are not sufficient and clear information about Zufar ibn Hudhayl's view of istiḥsān. Zufar ibn Hudhayl, who is at this point also worth investigating and examining, because he is one of the founding imams of the school and has his own ideas.

Different determinations on Zufar ibn Hudhayl's approach to istiḥsān were done by contemporary researchers. One of these is a proof that Zufar ibn Hudhayl was using istiḥsān largely similarly to other founder of the Hanafi School; and the other is that he fell in line with Imam Shafi in terms of istiḥsān. Since both studies are not directly related to Zufar ibn Hudhayl's approach to istiḥsān, the researchers did not feel the need to point the arguments that they based these assumptions on.

Zufar ibn Hudhayl has passed away after a very short time (d. 158/775) from Abu Hanifa, and he spent the 6 of his last 8 years in Basra. Therefore, there is no detailed information about him like the other founding imams of the school. Moreover, the absence of any work or the lack of knowledge about it, makes it very difficult to determine Zufar ibn Hudhayl's views of istiḥsān. This necessitates the application of Hanafi resources from the initial period for further investigation.

Especially in the examination of the classical period Hanafi School's method and furū' al-fiqh (substantive law) literature, we could not reach any knowledge about Zufar ibn Hudhayl's approach to istiḥsān. However, almost all layered authors describe Zufar ibn Hudhayl as a "qiyās (analogy) expert" and emphasize his skill and expertise in using analogy. This is also quite remarkable. However, in the works of Pīrī-Zāde and Kawtharī, who directly examine Zufar ibn Hudhayl's fiqh, there is no information about what philosophical background of his was about what is meant by the qualifications of "expert" or "qiyās expert" about him.

Two conclusions can be reached from these characterizations about Zufar ibn Hudhayl: one of them is, he was quite successful and competent in using analogies against the matters where the provision is absent and the other one is his loyalty to istiḥsān where the different provisions can be obtained regarding fiqh matters unlike comparison.

It is highly probable that the second meaning was the one intended. Because the literature shows that other founding imams besides Zufar ibn Hudhayl also were at least as wise and skillful as Zufar ibn Hudhayl in making analogies. In addition, some information contained in the classical Hanafi literature supports this opinion.

Muhammad Biltaji, one of the contemporary researchers, also, says things that confirm the second approach: *"Zufar ibn Hudhayl was trying to reduce the field of judgments via istiḥsān as much as possible; and in regard to qiyās he showed great effort to expand the boundaries as far as possible. The fact that Zufar ibn Hudhayl almost never applies istiḥsān, does not leave him out of the general principles of the Hanafi School that was allied on. Because the method of Zufar ibn Hudhayl is in itself was the method itself. Zufar ibn Hudhayl's understanding of fiqh is shaped generally within this procedural framework. That is why his resources were also qiyās and istiḥsān in the same manner."*

*In practice, however, when applying the methods to the occasions, he preferred qiyās more frequently than istiḥ̄sān. He was dissent about applying istiḥ̄sān to the issues. This opposition, however, does not mean fundamentally opposing or rejecting it entirely, either about qiyās or about istiḥ̄sān.”*

In the research we have conducted on the classical Hanafi literature, we have found that Zufar ibn Hudhayl was consulting to istiḥ̄sān in a very limited area on only four subjects. Apart from these examples, we could not find any other use of istiḥ̄sān by him. Zufar ibn Hudhayl’s preference for istiḥ̄sān here is not because there is no possibility to use qiyās; perhaps, qiyās was not responding to necessity, or was not able to provide the right result.

However, when Zufar ibn Hudhayl’s applications of istiḥ̄sān in fiqh practices are examined, it is seen that all three of the other imams or some of them have passed judgements based on qiyās. This situation makes it very difficult to determine a general rule of Zufar ibn Hudhayl’s application of istiḥ̄sān regarding the situations and purpose.

Moreover, Zufar ibn Hudhayl’s application of istiḥ̄sān, even in a narrow field, reveals that the findings of researchers today, such as his frequent use or refusal of istiḥ̄sān as the other imams of the school, are far from reflecting the truth.

To put it briefly, while qiyās was fundamental for Zufar ibn Hudhayl, even if for a limited and narrow field, he applied istiḥ̄sān as well.

## INTRODUCTION

It is an indisputable fact that Abū Ḥanīfa's (d. 150/767) jurisprudential views and thoughts have played a dominant role in the formation and efflorescence of the method, doctrine and systematization of the Hanafi School.<sup>1</sup> Besides, Abū Ḥanīfa's prominent students such as Zufar ibn Hudhayl (d. 158/775), Abu Yusuf (d. 182/798), Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805) and al-Ḥāssan ibn Ziyād al-Lu'lu'iyī (d. 204/819), who were trained in a circle of scholar-student relationship in the fiqh academy founded by Abū Ḥanīfa himself in the city of Kufa, had intense efforts in systematic and well-organized conveyance and dissemination of a rich fund of knowledge they inherited.<sup>2</sup> Although Abū Ḥanīfa was the founding imam of the school, the prestigious names such as Zufar ibn Hudhayl, Abu Yusuf, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī and al-Ḥāssan ibn Ziyād maintained their influence in the school with their ideas, and even at times, put forward different views from their masters on certain subjects, which was not found strange within the school. Some of the mentioned ideas were even taken as basis for Fatwā; while others were disapproved and remained discrete views.

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<sup>1</sup> Ali Bardakoğlu, “Hanefî Mezhebî”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: TDV Pub., 1997), 16: 1.

<sup>2</sup> Mustafa Uzunpostalcı, “Ebû Hanîfe”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: TDV Pub., 1994), 10: 137.

Zufar ibn Hudhayl, who was Abū Ḥanīfa's trainee<sup>3</sup> and friend to Abū Ḥanīfa for more than twenty years and who was among the most important names of fiqh academy,<sup>4</sup> was also a member and the head of ten-person committee formed with the objective to note (*tadwīn*) his master's jurisprudential views.<sup>5</sup> Thanks to this duty, Zufar found a chance to compile Abū Ḥanīfa's thoughts towards jurisprudential topics and to review and evaluate what he learned during lectures or discussions, which turned him into one of the prominent figures of the school. We consider following finding to be of great significance for the demonstration of Zufar ibn Hudhayl's position in the school: It has been ascertained through research on al-Sarakhsi's (d. 483/1090) *al-Mabsūṭ* that Zufar ibn Hudhayl had 570 individual arguments independent of his teacher and friends.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, his further seventeen remarks on different subjects have been accepted as basis for *fatwā* (*authoritative legal opinion*), i.e., "muftā bih" (the chosen authoritative legal opinion).<sup>7</sup> Zufar ibn Hudhayl's thoughts on *usūl al-fiqh* (roots of jurisprudence) and *furū‘al-fiqh* (branches of jurisprudence) are therefore worth to be examined and propounded. No doubt, one of the most important factors in the achievement of

<sup>3</sup> Muhammad Zahid al-Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓar, fi Sira al-Imam Zufar* (Cairo: Maktaba al-Azhariya, nd.), 27; Abdulkadir Şener, “İmam Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl”, *İslām İlimleri Enstitüsü Dergisi* 2 (1975): 91; Muhsin Koçak, “Züfer b. El-Hüzeyl (Hayatı ve Eserleri)”, *On Dokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 5 (2008): 126; Murteza Bedir, “Züfer b. Hüzeyl”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslām Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: TDV Pub., 2013), 44: 527-528.

<sup>4</sup> In academy, Zufar would sit in line with his master and Abū Yūsuf would sit beside him. See. Abū ‘Abd Allah al-Husayn Ibn Ali al-Saymarī, *Akhbār Abī Hanīfa wa-ashabih* (Bairut: ‘Alam al-Kutub, 1985), 111.

<sup>5</sup> Saymarī, *Akhbār Abī Hanīfa*, 113; Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. ‘Alī b. Thābit b. Aḥmad b. Mahdī al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Ta’riḫ Baghdād*, ed. Bashār Avvād Ma’rūf (Bairut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2001), 16: 363; Hāfiz al-Dīn Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Shihāb al-Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Hanīfa*, (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-Arabī, 1981), 2: 460; Abū Muḥammad Maḥmūd b. Aḥmad b. Mūsā Badr al-Dīn al-‘Aynī, *Maghani al-Akhbār fi Noarh Asami Rijal Ma’ani al-Atsar*, ed. Muhammad Hasan Ismail (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyye, 2006), 1: 331; Aḥmad b. Muṣṭafā Ṭashkopruzāde, *Miftāḥ al-sa’āda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fi mawḏū‘āt al-‘ulūm* (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyye, 1985), 2: 224; Takī al-Dīn b. Abd al-Qādir al-Tamīmī, *al-Tabaqāt al-saniyya fi tarādjim al-hanafiyya*, ed. Abdülfettah Muhammad el-Hulv (Cairo: al-Meclis al-‘Ala lī al-suūn al-Islāmīya, 1970), 3: 257; Nur ad-Dīn Abu al-Hasan Ali b. Sultan Muhammad al-Hirāwī al-Qārī, *al-Asmār al-Janiya fi Asmā al-Hanafiya*, ed. Abd al-Muhsin Abd Allah Ahmad, (Baghdad: Dīvan al-Vakf al-Saniyya, 2009), 1: 261. To find out who formed this ten-member committee see. al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Ta’riḫ Baghdād*, 16: 363; Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓar*, 11; Şener, “İmam Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl”, no. 2: 95; Koçak, “Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl”, no. 5: 139; Bardakoğlu, “Hanefī Mezhebi”, 3.

<sup>6</sup> Koçak, “Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl”, no. 5: 132.

<sup>7</sup> Muḥammad Amīn b. ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. ‘Ābidīn, *Radd al-Muḥtār ala al-Dur al-Mukhtār*, ed. Adil Ahmad Abd al-Mevcūd-Ali Muhammad Muavvid (al-Riyād: Dār al-Alām al-Kutub, 2003), 1: 172; Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓar*, 21; Wahba al-Zuhayli, *al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa-adillatuh*, (Dimashq: Dār al-Fikr, 1975), 1: 58; Şener, “İmam Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl”, no. 2: 96; Koçak, “Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl”, no. 5: 141. For detailed information on these views see Burhan al-Din İbrāhīm b. Husayn b. Ahmad Pīrī-Zāde, *al-Kavl al-azhar fi mā yüftā fihi bi-kavl al-Imām Zufar*, ed. Umar b. Muhammad b. Abd al-karīm al-Shayhili (s.l., s.n., 2011), 37-52.

this variety of views in the school is the fact that Abū Ḥanīfa paved the way for his students to move on the principles and to present their ideas freely, in addition to self-confidence he provided for them.<sup>8</sup>

Notwithstanding Zufar ibn Hudhayl's extensive knowledge and importance in the school, none of his works containing his jurisprudential views and thoughts has reached to this day.<sup>9</sup> In fact, the information on Zufar ibn Hudhayl's life given in Ḥanafī Ṭabaqāt (biographical) literature is also relatively limited and repetitive.

It is likely to chance on Zufar ibn Hudhayl's jurisprudential views and ideas in early Ḥanafī literature, even if disorderly. Included in the books as "*Zāhir al-Riwāya*" and "*Nādir al-Riwāya*", which are considered to be the first and fundamental sources of Ḥanafī School, the views belonging to Zufar ibn Hudhayl give us some revealing clues on his jurisprudential method and practice, yet are too meager to allow us to set forth his scholarly point of view in its entirety.

With regard to methods employed and proofs referred in resolution of problems in Ḥanafī doctrine, Zufar ibn Hudhayl seems to have followed broadly the same line with Abū Ḥanīfa and Imamayn, namely Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī. The points he opposed were limited to secondary subjects rather than essential issues.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, he has been observed to hold a different viewpoint from other imams in the utilization of istihsân (juristic preference) as a deductive method.

The motive that prompted us to conduct this study was Zufar ibn Hudhayl's attitude mentioned in sources, which brings his analogical approach to the forefront. In addition, a great variety of inferences on Zufar ibn Hudhayl's approach towards istihsân are included in a number of modern studies as well. One of the inferences is that Zufar ibn Hudhayl often used istihsân in fiqh practice as a method of deduction as well as other prominent imams of the school,<sup>11</sup> while another one is that he held the same opinion with Imām al-Shāfi'ī, who denied istihsân.<sup>12</sup> There might be several reasons behind the emergence of these contrasting theses. As expressed above, Zufar ibn Hudhayl has no work presenting his jurisprudential thoughts, which necessitates a review on early Ḥanafī fiqh literature to be able to determine his attitude towards istihsân. Therefore, either the fact that the technological means were relatively unadvanced when these two studies

<sup>8</sup> Abū Ḥanīfa forbade his disciples to imitate him see. Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓar*, 20; Şener, "İmam Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl", no. 2: 95.

<sup>9</sup> Zufar ibn Hudhayl has limited writings. See. Kardarī, *Manāqib Abi Hanifa*, 2: 460; Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓar*, 7.

<sup>10</sup> Muharrem Önder, *Hanefi Mezhebinde İstihsan Anlayışı ve Uygulaması* (Istanbul: Hikmetevi Pub., 2014), 91.

<sup>11</sup> There is no information included in Classic literature on whether Zufar adopted istihsân as a juristic method of deduction or whether he disapproved it. In modern studies, however, this matter is held only with a number of phrases with no reference mentioned. Besides, the works cited above are not directly related to Zufar's approach towards istihsân, but covers the istihsân in a broader sense. See. Ali Bakkal, "İstihsanın Mahiyeti ve Çağdaş Problemlere Çözüm Getirmedeki Önemi", *İslâmi İlimlerde Metodoloji/Usûl Meselesi* (Istanbul: Ensar Publishing, 2009), 3: 18. The same author notes in another statement that Zufar ibn Hudhayl would not use istihsân unless he would have to. See. Ali Bakkal, "Ebû Hanîfe'nin İstihsan Anlayışı", *İmam-ı Âzam Ebû Hanîfe ve Düşünce Sistemi* (Bursa: Kurav Pub., 2003), 1: 275.

<sup>12</sup> See. Koçak, "Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl", no. 5: 140 (This study does not directly cover Zufar ibn Hudhayl's understanding of istihsân.)

were carried out or the limited opportunities to access or review these works at that time might be the reason behind the appearance of different two arguments mentioned above.

We have aimed to determine the actual reason why Zufar ibn Hudhayl has shone out this much when in fact the school's other founding imams employed qiyās as often as him. The question is whether this attribution is due to Zufar ibn Hudhayl's skill of doing qiyās or because he embraced qiyās and remained distant from istihsān. Besides, we decided to carry out this study in order to find out which one among arguments mentioned above is true or whether a third separate case is possible and to put this forward with a proper exemplification.

This study seeks to answer the question to what extent Zufar practically gave place to istihsān, which was frequently adopted by founding imams of Ḥanafī School in their jurisprudential deductions. The ongoing debates about istihsān will be touched by making short citations when necessary, without entering into details.

Although the istihsān method forms the main theme of the study, correct comprehension and reliable interpretation of istihsān lie behind the accurate understanding of the concept of qiyās.<sup>13</sup> It is therefore necessary to address Zufar's understanding of qiyās in order to be able to read and present his approach towards istihsān accurately.

In this article, initially, brief information on the concept of istihsān and its types will be given without details, after Zufar ibn Hudhayl's conception of qiyās will be presented and finally his view towards the method of istihsān will be covered.

## 1. THE TERM OF ISTIHSĀN

Whether istihsān is a method of the deduction has always been discussed.<sup>14</sup> Those who adopted istihsān as a method in their jurisprudential deductions have not adequately defended themselves against accusations of creating new Sharī'a and have suffered heavy criticism, neither have they been able to elucidate what they mean by istihsān.<sup>15</sup> However, as a deductive method, istihsān is identified as an effort of *mujtahid* (jurist who is qualified to exercise *ijtihād* based on sources and methods of Islamic jurisprudence) to produce juristic solutions within the measures of justice and fairness for the affairs unsettled in *nuṣūṣ*

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<sup>13</sup> Şükrü Özen, "İstihsan Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler", *İslami İlimlerde Metodoloji/Usûl Meselesi* (Istanbul: Ensar Publishing, 2009), 3: 266.

<sup>14</sup> al-Bazdawī argues that the reason why the opposers antagonized istihsān is that they read the phrase from a mere literal perspective; all the same, those people used the expression (استحبكنا) which carry the same meaning. See. Fakhr al-Islam al-Bazdawī, *Kanz al-wusûl ila ma'rifat al-usûl*, in *Kashf al-asrâr* (Bairut: Dâr al-Kutub al-'IlmiyaDâr al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 1997), 4: 18. For similar phrases see Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abî Sahl Abû Bakr Shams al-A'imma al-Sarakhsî, *al-Usûl*, ed. Abu'l-Wafâ al-Afgânî (Bairut: Dâr al-Kutub al-'IlmiyaDâr al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 1993), 2: 201.

<sup>15</sup> Remark like "If someone rules by istihsān, it means he imposes a new Sharia" is credited to Imam al-Shāfi'î. See. Sayf al-Dîn 'Alî b. Abî 'Alî al-Āmidî, *al-Ihkâm fî usûl al-ahkâm* (Bairut: Dâr al-Kutub al-'IlmiyaDâr al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 2005), 2: 390; Alâ al-Dîn Abd al-Azîz b. Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Bukhârî, *Kashf al-asrâr an Usûl Fakhr al-Islâm al-Bazdawî* (Bairut: Dâr al-Kutub al-'IlmiyaDâr al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 1997), 4: 4; Abû 'Abd Allâh Badr al-Dîn Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allâh b. Bahâdur al-Zarkashî, *al-Baḥr al-Muhîṭ fî usûl al-fikh*, ed. Muhammad Muhammad Tâmir (Bairut: Dâr al-Kutub al-'IlmiyaDâr al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 2007), 4: 386.

(explicit texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah), in a way that will not contradict the spirit of *nuṣūṣ*.<sup>16</sup> As you can see, *istiḥ̄sān* does not produce arbitrary, desultory solutions for the desires of *nafs* (human soul); in contrast, it is an effort to produce solutions fitting to the framework determined by *nuṣūṣ* and is a phenomenon suitable to the soul and general principles of Islam. In this respect, *istiḥ̄sān* is an important principle injecting dynamism into Islamic law.

Even those who strongly disapprove *istiḥ̄sān* are also seen to have employed this method under different names.<sup>17</sup> The reason behind this intolerable opposition against the method of *istiḥ̄sān* is related to its naming rather than its nature. As an answer to those who accused them of ruling according to “*hawā* and whim” (fancifully) Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805) stated that *istiḥ̄sān* is a method based on Shari‘ evidence; otherwise it would be *kufr* (disbelief) anyways, laying emphasis on the fact that the conflict arose from the term.<sup>18</sup> Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083), one of Shāfi‘ī scholars, accentuates the disaccord to be literal by saying “*If istiḥ̄sān is as explained by those who accepts it, then there is no one opposing it. For it is a requisite to abandon the weaker one from two evidences and act over the stronger one. Accordingly, it is necessary to renounce the analogy because of the strong evidence.*”<sup>19</sup> Likewise, Abū al-Muzaffar al-Sam`ānī<sup>20</sup> (d. 489/1096) notes the principal motive behind the opposition to be directly related to its denomination and with his following words “*They (Shāfi‘īs) do not not accept an istiḥ̄sān conception that has been claimed to be vindicated by Ḥanafīs. Yet we (Shāfi‘īs) do not object to Ḥanafīs’ definition of istiḥ̄sān, which they voice when explaining their thoughts, ‘to abandon the former ruling because of an evidence stronger than it’*”, he indicates that there is not any significant dissent on the nature of *istiḥ̄sān* and that the opposition is in fact literal.<sup>21</sup>

There is no doubt that the fact that *istiḥ̄sān* did not complete the process of conceptualization especially during development period of the schools of legal thought, and was assigned with different meanings because of the subjectivity it evoked played a significant role in the emergence of these two fronts. It is therefore of great importance to reveal the conceptional process *istiḥ̄sān* has gone through.

<sup>16</sup> Şükrü Özen, “Hicrî II. Yüzyılda İstihsan ve Maslahat Kavramları”, *Marife Dergisi* 1 (2003): 44.

<sup>17</sup> Aḥmad b. ‘Alī Abū Bakr al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *al-Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl*, ed. Ujayl Jāsım Nesemī (Istanbul: Maktaba al-ırsād, 1994), 4: 226.

<sup>18</sup> See. Abū Zayd ‘Ubaydallāh b. ‘Umar b. ‘İsā al-Dabūsī, *Takvīm al-adilla fī uṣūl al-fikh*, ed. Halil Muhyi al-Dīn al-Mays (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘İlmiyaDār al-Kutub al-‘İlmiya, 2007), 404-405.

<sup>19</sup> Abū Ishāk, İbrāhīm b. ‘Alī b. Yūsuf al-Shīrāzī, *at-Tabṣıra fī uṣūl al-fikh*, ed. Muhammad Hasan Hayto (Dimashq: Dār al-Fıkr, 1983), 494.

<sup>20</sup> For detailed information on Abū al-Muzaffar al-Sam`ānī see. Abdullah Aygün, “Sem’ānī”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslām Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: TDV Pub., 2009), 36: 463-464.

<sup>21</sup> Abu ‘l-Ḳāsım Aḥmad b. Maṣṣūr b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Djabbār al-Sam`ānī, *Qawāṭı‘ al-adilla fī al-usūl*, ed. Muhammad Hasan Muhammad Hasan İsmail (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘İlmiyaDār al-Kutub al-‘İlmiya, 1997), 2: 270; Özen, “İstihsan Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler”, 3: 265.

### 1.1. Conceptional Development

If literal discussions are put aside, one can see the method of istihsan has been accepted and used by the majority of jurists.<sup>22</sup> The view that Abū Ḥanīfa was the first person to have used istihsān as a jurisprudential term is included in the sources.<sup>23</sup> Imam Mālik is also seen to have utilized istihsān on juristic affairs.<sup>24</sup> Yet, the information given both in the writings of Hanefī methodologists and in one of Ḥazm's (d. 456/1063) work, which was written to refute istihsān, consolidate the argument that Abū Ḥanīfa was the first to have employed istihsān.<sup>25</sup> It should be noted that the contributions of later Ḥanafī methodologists also have important place in justification and systemetization of the method of istihsān.<sup>26</sup>

Ibn Ḥazm reports that al-Ṭahāwī (d. 321/933), who was involved in both Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī schools, protested utterly against istihsān.<sup>27</sup> It can be clearly seen in the sources that even Imam al-Shāfi'ī, who opposed to istihsān and was accredited with such expressions as "ruling by it is superstitious,"<sup>28</sup> or even means to invent a new Sharia,"<sup>29</sup> used this method, it is even seen that he put it to use in settling of *mut'ā* amount (consolation gift given to a divorced woman), which is mentioned in al-Baqarah, as thirty dirhams and fixing the *shuf'a* (right of pre-emption) duration as three days, using the word istihsān itself.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Abū Muḥammad 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. Sa'īd Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Ihkām fī usūl al-ahkām*, ed. Mahmud Hamid Osman (Cairo: Dār al-Hadīth, 2005), 6: 798.

<sup>23</sup> Saymarī, *Akhbār Abī hanīfa*, 25-26; Muwaffaq b Aḥmad al-Makkī, *Manāqib Abī Hanīfa* (Bairut: Dār al-kutub al-Arabī, 1981), 1: 81, 84; Önder, *Hanefī Mezhebinde İstihsan Anlayışı ve Uygulaması*, 69; Özen, "Hicrî II. Yüzyılda İstihsan ve Maslahat Kavramları", no. 1: 31. Ignaz Goldziher (d. 1921), reports the principle of istihsan was first introduced by Abū Ḥanīfa himself. See. Abdulkadir Şener, *İslam Hukukunun Kaynaklarından Kıyas, İstihsan ve İstislah* (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Pub., 1974), 116; Özen, "Hicrî II. Yüzyılda İstihsan ve Maslahat Kavramları", no. 1: 33; Bakkal, "İstihsanın Mahiyeti", 3: 15, 18.

<sup>24</sup> Jaşşās, *al-Fuṣūl*, 4: 229; Abū Muḥammad 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. Sa'īd Ibn Ḥazm, *Mulakḥḥaş ibtāl al-kiyās wa'l-ra'y wa'l-istihsān wa'l-taklīd wa'ta'līl*, ed. Sa'īd al-Afgānī (Dimashq: Matbaa al-Dimashq, 1960), 9; Önder, *Hanefī Mezhebinde İstihsan Anlayışı ve Uygulaması*, 69.

<sup>25</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Mulakḥḥaş*, 9; Zarkashī, *al-Baḥr al-Muhīt*, 4: 386.

<sup>26</sup> Bakkal, "İstihsanın Mahiyeti", 3: 15.

<sup>27</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Ihkām*, 6: 799; Id, *al-Mulakḥḥaş*, 51.

<sup>28</sup> Zarkashī, *al-Baḥr al-Muhīt*, 4: 386.

<sup>29</sup> Imam al-Shāfi'ī's fierce opposition against istihsān is probably not because he disapproves the rules deduced through it, but it should be something against the "logic of exception" which istihsān is based on. See. H. Yunus Apaydın, "İstihsanın Mahiyeti ve İşlevi", *İslâmi İlimlerde Metodoloji/Usûl Meselesi* (Istanbul: Ensar Publishing, 2009), 3: 130.

<sup>30</sup> See. Jaşşās, *al-Fuṣūl*, 4: 229; Abd al-aziz al-Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 18; Zarkashī, *al-Baḥr al-Muhīt*, 4: 394; Kawtharī, *Fiqh Ahl al-'Iraqwa Hadithuhum*, ed. Abd al-Fattah Abū Gudde (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-azhariyya, 2002), 28.



## 1.2. Definition

Derived from the Arabic root of "hsn" and used in infinitive form, istihsān lexically means "to see something good and beautiful, to find something beautiful, to assume something is beautiful, to believe something is beautiful"<sup>31</sup> Terminologically, however, different definitions for the word istihsān have been made.

Karkhī (d. 340/951), often mentioned in Ḥanafī sources as the first person to define istihsān,<sup>32</sup> identifies the term as "The case when mujtahid set an opposite rule, abandoning the rule previously fixed by him for similar cases, by virtue of a stronger and superior evident that would necessitate the renouncement of that prior ruling".<sup>33</sup>

One of Karkhī's disciples, al-Jaṣṣās (d. 370/980) gives the description of istihsān as "renouncement of qiyās because of a stronger evident".<sup>34</sup>

Al-Bazdawī (d. 482/1089), although not giving a full definition, explains istihsān as "giving up an analogy and adopting a stronger one",<sup>35</sup> whereas al-Sarakhsī expounds it in his work named *al-Usūl* as follows "what comes to mind instantly without reflecting on it is the evidence contradictory to clear qiyās, and after a profound contemplation on the ruling of the case along with the orders given to similar cases, this contradictory evident will turn out to be more potent and the ruling must be done with it",<sup>36</sup> while in *al-Mabsūt*, he sets forth a more substantial definition somehow evocative of a guidance: "abandoning the complexity, opting for facility".<sup>37</sup>

The notable point in abovementioned definitions is the presence of a more solid justification that entails the exclusion of the rule deduced through qiyās, in other words, the emphasis laid on the existence of stronger evidence that leaves no choice but to abandon what is imposed by qiyās and to prefer istihsān. For all that, the baseline for those who oppose against istihsān is "subjectivity" (arbitrariness/fancifulness), which cannot be correlated with juristic logic evoked by the lexical meaning of the term istihsān and which causes misperceptions and misinterpretations.<sup>38</sup> To avert this perception and frustrate the assertions against istihsān, the emphasis that a rule decided over istihsān is not a rule that is not based on any source or put forward arbitrarily and cursorily, but a product of a thorough reflection grounded on more solid and powerful justification<sup>39</sup> has been intended to be brought fore in all definitions.

<sup>31</sup> Dabūsi, *Takvīm al-adilla*, 404; Sarakhsī, *al-Usūl*, 2: 200; Abd al-azīz al-Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 3. Ayrıca see. Jawharī, *al-Sihāh*, "hsn" md.; Jurcānī, *al-Ta'rifāt*, "Istihsan" md.; Fīrūzābādī, *Qāmus al-muhīt*, "Istihsan" md.; Tahānawī, *Kashshāf*, "Istihsan" md.

<sup>32</sup> Imam al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) is reported to be the first scholar before Karkhī to describe istihsān. See. Bakal, "İstihsanın Mahiyeti", 3: 19.

<sup>33</sup> Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 4.

<sup>34</sup> Jaṣṣās, *al-Fuṣūl*, 4: 234.

<sup>35</sup> Abd al-azīz al-Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 4.

<sup>36</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Usūl*, 2: 200.

<sup>37</sup> Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abī Sahl Abū Bakr Shams al-A'imma al-Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt* (Bairut: Dār al-Ma'rifa, nd.), 10: 145.

<sup>38</sup> See. Bilal Aybakan, "İstihsan", *İslâmi İlimlerde Metodoloji/Usûl Meselesi* (Istanbul: Ensar Publishing, 2009), 3: 134.

<sup>39</sup> Özen, "Hicrî II. Yüzyılda İstihsan ve Maslahat Kavramları", no. 1: 45.

## 2. ISTIHSĀN TYPES IN HANAFI FIQH DOCTRINE

Ḥanafīs, who have attributed value to istihsān and adopted it as an inferential method, divided it into several parts. Now let us briefly discuss these types of istihsān.

### 2.1. Istihsān on the Basis of Juristic Discretion

Ḥanafī methodologists, al-Jaṣṣās and al-Sarakhsī named the undisputed istihsān type as istihsān on the basis of juristic discretion with regard to two different meanings ascribed to it. The Lawgiver (*al-Shāri‘ī*) as well named this type of istihsān as appreciation istihsān owing to the fact that the determination of the details and execution of a legal norm with general content, whose frameworks he adjusted by himself in *nuṣūṣ*, were left to mujtahid's appreciation. The calculations of the amounts related to some monetary payments included in Qurʾān were left to mujtahids providing they were within the limits of rightness and fairness are evaluated in the frame of appreciation istihsān. This is how the amount of *mut‘a* and alimony to be given to women are fixed.<sup>40</sup> Imam al-Shāfi‘ī consulted to this type of istihsān as well, while setting the duration of pre-emption as three days and estimating the *mut‘a* amount as thirty dirhams.<sup>41</sup>

### 2.2. Istihsān on the Basis of Concealed Analogy (Qiyās)

Two kinds of qiyās are mentioned in Ḥanafī jurisprudential doctrine, *jalī* (clear) and *khafī* (hidden). The qiyās which can be understood immediately without a deep thinking and examination and whose ‘illa (effective cause) can be easily determined was denominated as clear, while the one which necessitates a thorough tafakkur (reflection) and a more meticulous dissection and whose cause cannot be ascertained at a single glance was called hidden. In other words, methodologists have named the clear qiyās with weak effect as *jalī* and the hidden one with a strong effect as *khafī* or istihsān.<sup>42</sup> Although it contradicts itself in terms of hukm (rule), qiyās al-*khafī* has been preferred over qiyās al-*jalī* thanks to the strength of its cause and to its preponderance with regard to its effect.<sup>43</sup>

When the term of istihsān is used in an absolute manner, it is referred as qiyās al-*khafī*.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, istihsān of hidden qiyās has also been called istihsān al-*qiyās*.<sup>45</sup> For instance, the fact that the recrements of billed raptors are regarded as clean may be given as an example to the istihsān of hidden qiyās.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Jaṣṣās, *al-Fuṣūl*, 4: 233; Sarakhsī, *al-Usūl*, 2: 200; Kawtharī, *Fiqh Ahl al-‘Iraqwa Hadithuhum*, s. 29; Önder, *Hanefi Mezhebinde İstihsan Anlayışı ve Uygulaması*, 191; Ali Bardakoğlu, “İstihsan”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: TDV Pub., 2001), 33: 342.

<sup>41</sup> Abd al-azīz al-Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 18; Zarkashī, *al-Baḥr al-Muhīt*, 4: 394.

<sup>42</sup> Dabūsī, *Takvīm al-adilla*, 404; Bazdawī, *Kanz al-wusūl*, 4: 8; Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 10: 145; Id, *al-Usūl*, 2: 203; Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 3, 5; ‘Ubaydallāh b. Mas‘ūd al-Maḥbūbī al-Bukhārī al-Ḥanafī Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a al-Thānī, *al-Tawdih ala at-Tanqih*, ed. Sa‘īd al-Abras (Dimashq: Maktaba al-Marzuk, 2006), 382.

<sup>43</sup> Dabūsī, *Takvīm al-adilla*, 404; Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a, *al-Tawdih*, 382; Bakkal, “İstihsanın Mahiyeti”, 3: 35.

<sup>44</sup> Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a, *al-Tawdih*, 382.

<sup>45</sup> Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 3; Abd Al-Wahhāb Khallāf, *Masādir al-tashrī al-Islāmī* (Quwayt: Dār al-Kalam, 1993), 73; Bakkal, “İstihsanın Mahiyeti”, 3: 35.

<sup>46</sup> Bazdawī, *Kanz al-wusūl*, 4: 9-10; Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a, *al-Tawdih*, 383.

Regardless of its denomination as qiyās al-khafī, istihsān is conceptually much more extensive than that.<sup>47</sup> That is to say, every qiyās al-khafī is istihsān yet not every istihsān is qiyās al-khafī.<sup>48</sup>

### 2.3. Istihsān on the Basis of the Text (Naṣṣ)

The renouncement of a rule given to a similar case owing to the naṣṣ that brings exceptional rule or bringing an exceptional rule apart from the general rule inferred from the nuṣūṣ is called istihsān on the basis of naṣṣ.<sup>49</sup> The naṣṣ, which brings exceptional rule, may be a verse as well as a hadith. To exemplify, based on the Sunnah (the tradition of the prophet Mohammed) in opposition to the general rule that forbids the sale of the non-existent, the anticipation and lease contracts are considered permissible.<sup>50</sup>

### 2.4. Istihsān on the Basis of Consensus (Ijmāʿ)

Formation of a consensus over an exceptional solution contrary to the rule applied to similar cases after renouncement of a general rule is called istihsān on the basis of *ijmāʿ*. Work contracts are given as example for this type of istihsān.<sup>51</sup>

### 2.5. Istihsān on the Basis of Necessity (Dharūra)

It is the type of istihsān in which mujtahid attempts to eliminate the inconvenience caused by the necessity and satisfy the requirement (*rafʿ al-haraj*), abandoning the general rule due to a necessity or a dominant exigence. Cleaning the wells can be shown as an example for this type.<sup>52</sup>

After the brief information about conceptual framework, definition and types of istihsān, let us now look into Zufar ibn Hudhayl's approach towards the methods of qiyās and istihsān.

## 3. IMAM ZUFAR IBN HUDHAYL'S APPROACH TOWARDS ISTIHSĀN

The importance of the role of qiyās in Zufar ibn Hudhayl's jurisprudential view is a point unanimously accentuated by the sources that hold information about him. However, the Ṭabaqāt writers, apart from

<sup>47</sup> Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 5.

<sup>48</sup> Şadr al-Sharīʿa, *al-Tawdih*, 382.

<sup>49</sup> Bardakoğlu, “İstihsan”, 343.

<sup>50</sup> Bazdawī, *Kanz al-wusūl*, 4: 6-7; Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 7; *Khallāf, Masādir al-tashrī*, 74; Bardakoğlu, “İstihsan”, 343. Some Islamic jurists saying, “at an istihsān based on naṣṣ, the true basis is naṣṣ”, points out that this kind of exceptions cannot be named as istihsān. See. Mustafa Ahmad al-Zarqa, *al-Madhal al-Fihi al-ʿAm* (Dimashq: Dār al-kalam, 2004), 1: 94; İbrahim Kâfi Dönmez, “İslâm Hukukunda Kaynak Kavramı ve VIII. Asır İslam Hukukçularının Kaynak Kavramı Üzerindeki Metodolojik Ayrılıkları” (Doktora Tezi, Atatürk Üniversitesi, 1981), 148; Ahmet Yaman, “İstihsan Ne Değildir”, *Usûl Dergisi* 8 (2007), 170; H. Yunus Apaydın, *İslam Hukuk Usûlü* (Kayseri: Kardeşler Ofset, 2016), 114.

<sup>51</sup> Dabūsī, *Takvīm al-adilla*, 405; Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 7-8; Bardakoğlu, “İstihsan”, 343; Bakkal, “İstihsanın Mahiyeti”, 3: 43.

<sup>52</sup> Dabūsī, *Takvīm al-adilla*, 405; Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 8; *Khallāf, Masādir al-tashrī*, 74.

using lucid expressions about his talent and expertise on making qiyās,<sup>53</sup> have not offered satisfying information about his strict adherence to it.

On the other hand, the fact that Zufar ibn Hudhayl's exceptionally limited recourse to istiḥsān, which was utilized amply by his master and friends, is worthy of notice. We attribute the foregoing fact to the importance he attached to qiyās in producing solutions to the problems.

Before passing on Zufar ibn Hudhayl's approach towards istiḥsān, we are going to try to touch on the importance and place of qiyās in his fiqh, because no istiḥsān concept can be imagined independently of qiyās in Ḥanafī School.<sup>54</sup>

### 3.1. The Place of Qiyās in Zufar ibn Hudhayl's Fiqh Conception

Zufar ibn Hudhayl, who kept attending assemblies of the traditionists (ahl al-hadith) at the beginning yet later participated in assemblies of the rationalists (ahl al-ra’y),<sup>55</sup> has drawn wide criticism.<sup>56</sup> He attended Abū Ḥanīfa's lectures for more than twenty years<sup>57</sup> and was regarded as one of the most prominent

<sup>53</sup> Baghdādī, *Ta’riḫ Baghdad*, 2: 567; Abu ’l-Ḳāsim Aḥmad b. Manṣūr b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Djabbār al-Sam‘ānī, *al-Ansāb*, thk. Abdullah ’Umar al-Bārūdī, (Bairut: Dār al-Jinān, 1988), 3: 484; 4: 433; ’Abd al-Qadir b. Abi al-Wafa’ al-Qurashī, *al-Jawāhir al-Mudiyya fi Tabaqāt al-Hanafiyya*, ed. Abd al-fattah Muhammad al-Hulv (Cairo: Dār al-Hijr, 1993), 2: 207; Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Hanīfa*, 2: 461; ‘Aynī, *Maghani al-Akḥbār*, 1: 330; Ḳāsim b. Ḳuṭlūbughā, *Tāj al-tarājim*, ed. Muhammad Hayr Ramazan Yusuf (Dimashq: Dār al-kalam, 1992), 169; Maḥmūd b. Sulaymān al-Kafawī, *Katā’ib A’lām al-Akhyār min fukahāyi maḍhab al-Numān al-Mukḥtār*, Tahrān: Kitabhāna-i Meclis-i Shūrā-i Millī, nr. 87846, 111b; Nur ad-Dīn Abu al-Ḥasan Ali b. Sultan Muhammad al-Hirāwī al-Qārī, *Ṣerḥ Musnad Abī Hanīfa* (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiya Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiya, 1985), 45; Tamīmī, *al-Tabakāt al-saniyya*, 3: 254; Abū ‘Umar Yūsuf b. ‘Abd Allāh Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr al-Qurtūbī al-Namarī, *al-Intiqā’ fi faḍā’il al-thalātha al-a’imma al-fuqahā’*, ed. Abd al-Fattah Abū Gudde (Bairut: Makataba Matbūa al-Islāmī, 1997), 335; Ibn ‘Ābidīn, *Radd al-Muḥtār*, 1: 142; Abū l-Ḥasanāt ‘Abd al-Ḥayy b. ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm b. Amīnallāh al-Laknawī, *al-Fawāid al-bahiyah fi tarājim al-Ḥanafiyah* (Cairo: Dār al-kitāb al-Islāmī, nd.), 75; Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓarnaẓar*, 21; Muhammad Abū Zahra, *Abū Hanīfa: Hayatuhu wa-asruhu wa ārauhu wa fiqhuhu* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-Arabī, nd.), 245; Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, *al-A’lām* (Bairut: Dār al-’ilm li’l-Malāyīn, 2002), 2: 45; Muhammad Biltāji, *Manāḥij al-teṣrī’ al-Islāmī fi al-karn al-sānī al-hijrī* (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2007), 1: 291.

<sup>54</sup> Apaydın, “İstihsanın Mahiyeti ve İşlevi”, 3: 129.

<sup>55</sup> Abū Nu‘aym Aḥmad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Ishāḳ al-Iṣfahānī, *Dhikr akḥbār Ishāḥān* (Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiya, nd.), 1: 317; Abū Ishāḳ Ibrāhīm b. ‘Alī b. Yūsuf al-Firūzabādī al-Shirāzī, *Tabaqāt al-fukahā’*, ed. Ihsan Abbas (Bairut: Dār ar-Rāid al-Arabī, nd.), 135; Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū Zakariyyā’ Yaḥyā b. Sharaf b. Murī al-Nawawī, *Tahdhīb al-Asma’ wa’l-Lughat* (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiya Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiya, nd.), I, 197; Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Abu ’l-‘Abbās Shams al-Dīn Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A’yān wa-Anbā’ Abnā’ az-Zamān*, ed. Ihsan Abbas (Bairut: Dār al-Sādr, nd.), 2: 318; Ziriklī, *al-A’lām*, 2: 45; Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓarnaẓar*, 4, 27; Koçak, “Züfer b. El-Hüzeyl”, no. 5: 126; Bedir, “Züfer b. Hüzeyl”, 528.

<sup>56</sup> See. Shihāb al-Dīn Abu’l-Faḍl Aḥmad b. Nūr al-Dīn ‘Alī b. Muḥammad Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asḳalānī, *Lisān al-Mizān*, haz. Salman Abd al-Fattāh Abu Gudde (Bairut: Maktaba al-Matbua al-Islāmī, 2002), 3: 501-503; Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓarnaẓar*, 21-32; Şener, “İmam Züfer b. el-Huzeyl”, no. 2: 93-94; Koçak, “Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl”, no. 5: 134-138.

<sup>57</sup> Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓarnaẓar*, 27; Şener, “İmam Züfer b. el-Huzeyl”, no. 2: 91; Koçak, “Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl”, no. 5: 126; Bedir, “Züfer b. Hüzeyl”, 527-528.

jurisprudents of his time.<sup>58</sup> Abū Nu`aym al-Fadl ibn Dukayn (d. 219/834) referred to Zufar's jurisprudential knowledge by saying "He was excellent on fiqh"<sup>59</sup>, while al-Hasan ibn Ziyād laid emphasis on his success in jurisprudent debates.<sup>60</sup> As a matter of fact, Zufar ibn Hudhayl's analogous prowess manifests itself in the resolution of jurisprudential complications.<sup>61</sup> All this information demonstrates his sharp wit as well as his comprehensive knowledge of evidences.<sup>62</sup>

Having stood out with his fiqh knowledge, Zufar ibn Hudhayl also shone out among Abū Ḥanīfa's disciples by using qiyās method.<sup>63</sup> Abū Ḥanīfa's words about him, "He is the best analogist among my trainees",<sup>64</sup> the remarks of one of the Shāfi'ī jurisprudents, al-Muzanī's (d. 264/878), about him when asked of the people of Iraq, "He is the most au fait with qiyās",<sup>65</sup> along with the unanimous emphasis on his expertise on using the evident of qiyās laid by the sources citing him are worthy of attention.<sup>66</sup>

The following comments included in Ḥanafī Ṭabaqāt books, extolling Zufar ibn Hudhayl are also of great important concerning the demonstration of his perfection in qiyās:

*"The bow of qiyās tensed during his lifetime; it not that tense any more*

*In jurisprudential qiyās, he has risen so high a level that goes beyond cognizance*

*His qiyās was so pure in his own sea of thoughts; yet those of who envied him were rather feculent because of the spite in their nature.*

*He was struggling to shatter people's perception of qiyās, while, in fact, they were bowing down before him (his success in qiyās).*

*Whereas the eyes of those who nursed grievance against him were fastened with somnolence, the sleeplessness was latch for his eyes.*

<sup>58</sup> Saymarī, *Akhbār Abī hanīfa*, 109; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *al-Intiqā'*, 335; Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Hanīfa*, 2: 459, 461; Koçak, "Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl", no. 5: 129.

<sup>59</sup> Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓar*, 6.

<sup>60</sup> Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Hanīfa*, 2: 461; Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓarnaẓar*, 5.

<sup>61</sup> Biltāji, *al-Manāhij*, 1: 312.

<sup>62</sup> Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓarnaẓar*, 20.

<sup>63</sup> 'Aynī, *Maghani al-Akhbār*, 1: 330.

<sup>64</sup> Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ḥibbān al-Tamīmī Ibn Ḥibbān, *Kitāb al-al-Thiqāt* (Ḥaydarābād: Dāira al-Maārif al-Otmānī, 1973), 6: 339; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān*, 2: 318; Qurashī, *al-Jawāhir al-Mudīyya*, 2: 207; 'Aynī, *Maghani al-Akhbār*, 1: 330; Ibn Ḳuṭlūbughā, *Tāj al-tarājīm*, 169; Kafawī, *Katā'ib A'lām al-Akhyār*, vr. 111b; Ali al-Qārī, *Şerh Musnad Abī Hanīfa*, 45; al-Tamīmī, *al-Tabakāt al-saniyya*, 3: 254; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *al-Intiqā'*, 335; Laknawī, *al-Fawāid al-bahiyah*, 75; Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓar*, 21; Abū Zahra, *Abū Hanīfa*, 245; Ziriklī, *al-A'lām*, 2: 45; Biltāji, *al-Manāhij*, 1: 291; Şener, "İmam Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl", no. 2: 94; Koçak, "Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl", no. 5: 132.

<sup>65</sup> al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Ta'riḫ Baghdād*, 2: 567; Sam'ānī, *al-Ansāb*, 3: 484; 4: 433; Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Hanīfa*, 2: 461; Ibn 'Ābidīn, *Radd al-Muḥtār*, 1: 142; Abū Zahra, *Abū Hanīfa*, 245; Biltāji, *al-Manāhij*, 1: 312; Koçak, "Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl", no. 5: 129, 140.

<sup>66</sup> Saymarī, *Akhbār Abī hanīfa*, 111; Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Hanīfa*, 2: 460; al-Zuhayli, *al-Fiqh al-Islāmī*, 1: 31; M. Esad Kılıçer, *İslam Fikhında Re'y Tarafatları* (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Pub., 1994), 109-110; Koçak, "Züfer b. El-Hüzeyl", no. 5: 133.

*No one is equivalent to him in qiyās, may ever be the same pure gold and a stone?"*<sup>67</sup>

Having had substantial reputation for using the method of qiyās,<sup>68</sup> Zufar ibn Hudhayl never preferred qiyās over hadith even though he attached great importance to it and constantly utilized it for the solutions of juristic issues.<sup>69</sup> He elucidates his view on this matter as follows: "We do not adjudicate by our own judgement as long as there is a hadith. If a hadith conveyed to us on a certain matter, we would abandon our own stance".<sup>70</sup>

Two different conclusions can be drawn from the information included in the sources about Zufar's analogous skills: He was considerably successful and competent in applying qiyās to the issues whose rule could not be found in *nuṣūṣ*, and he was firmly attached to qiyās rather than istiḥṣān when having treated the issues for which different verdicts could be given over qiyās and istiḥṣān. In fact, when Ḥanafī jurisprudential literature is reviewed, it can be seen that the number of the examples showing Zufar ibn Hudhayl to have generally chosen qiyās over istiḥṣān is considerably high.<sup>71</sup> We can outline some examples of this as below.

### 3.1.1. Anointing of Torn Slippers

There must not be any holes or tears on the slippers worn on foots so that they can be anointed. Abū Ḥanīfa and Imamayn share the opinion that only a few wholes and tears would not hinder the anointing as to istiḥṣān and the principle of facilitation/ease. Zufar ibn Hudhayl, however, reckons that, according to qiyās, any whole and tear on slippers preclude the anointing regardless of how many they are, because, no matter how few the tears are, the impurity flows in even when a part of the foot is exposed and thus the slipper's function of veiling disappears. Besides, foots are not divisible in washing. Therefore, not a part of the foot, but the whole should be washed.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Hanīfa*, 2: 463; al-Tamīmī, *al-Tabaqāt al-saniyya*, 3: 257-258; Kawtharī, *Lamahāt al-naẓar*, 28; Koçak, "Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl", no. 5: 143.

<sup>68</sup> Sam'ānī, *al-Ansāb*, 1: 339; Aynī, *Maghani al-Akḥbār*, 1: 331.

<sup>69</sup> Şener, "İmam Züfer b. el-Huzeyl", no. 2: 94.

<sup>70</sup> Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Hanīfa*, 2: 457; Aynī, *Maghani al-Akḥbār*, 1: 331; Ali al-Qārī, *Şerḥ Musnad Abī Hanīfa*, 45; Id, *al-Asmār al-Janiya*, 1: 261; Tamīmī, *al-Tabaqāt al-saniyya*, 3: 256; Şener, "İmam Züfer b. el-Huzeyl", no. 2: 94; Koçak, "Züfer b. el-Hüzeyl", no. 5: 137.

<sup>71</sup> For information about the examples where Abū Ḥanīfa and Imamayn takes qiyās as basis see Yusuf Erdem Gezgin, "Hanefiler'de Öncelik Açısında Kıyas ve İstihsan Tahlili" (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Necmeddin Erbakan Üniversitesi, 2016), 41-60.

<sup>72</sup> 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Samarḳandī, *Tuḥfat al-fuḳahā'* (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-'İlmiya Dār al-Kutub al-'İlmiya, 1984), 1: 57; 'Alā' al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Mas'ūd al-Kāsānī, *Badā'ī' al-Şanā'ī' fi Tartīb al-Şarā'ī'* (Bairut: Dār al-Fikr, nd.), 1: 16-17; Burhān al-Dīn Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Abī Bakr b. 'Abd al-Djalīl al-Fargḥānī al-Marghīnānī, *al-Hidāya şerḥ Bidāya al-mubtedī* (Bairut: Dār al-Arkām, nd.), 1: 36; Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd Akmal al-Dīn al-Bābartī, *al-Ināya* (Bairut: Dār al-Fikr, nd.), 1: 150; Abu Bakr al-Haddād al-Zabīdī, *al-Jawharah al-Nayyirah Sharḥ li Mukhtasar al-Imam al-Quduri*, ed. İlyas Kaplan (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-'İlmiya, 2006), 1: 79; Zayn al-Dīn b. İbrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad İbn Nujaym, *al-Bahr al-rāiq sharḥ kanz al-daqa'iq* (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-'İlmiya, 1997), 1: 304-305. Al-Qudūrī and Al-Sarakhsī also treats this matter, yet they give the argument that little tears on slippers will preclude the anointing as Imam al-Şāfī's view, without mentioning Zufar. See. Abu'l-Ḥusayn/al-Ḥasan Aḥmad b.



As is seen, Zufar ibn Hudhayl, unlike other three imams, does not find it appropriate to appoint a rule over istiḥ̄sān by making an exception under the principle of facilitation/ease. He therefore as a result of qiyās (i.e. established rule) that anointing would not be acceptable when the slippers are pierced or torn no matter how many the wholes and tears are and that the washing of the foots is indispensable for the correctness of ablution. Zufar ibn Hudhayl, unlike Abū Ḥanīfa and Imamayn, adopts the idea that "few and small things should not be null and void".<sup>73</sup>

### 3.1.2. Intent for Imamate upon Women

According to Abū Ḥanīfa and Imamayn, intent towards imamate is not necessary for a community comprised of men only. In that case, it is accurate for community to obey the imam. However, when it comes to imamate upon a community including women, one has to intend separately to imamate for their obedience to be valid. Zufar ibn Hudhayl does not agree on this view analogizing women with men and saying there is no need for a further intent towards imamate by woman.<sup>74</sup> Nonetheless, this rule Zufar reached by analogizing women and men has been criticized on account of the inaccuracy of the qiyās made.<sup>75</sup>

### 3.1.3. A Muslim Person's Incognizance of Islamic Judgement in Dār al-Ḥarb (Territory of War)

For Abū Ḥanīfa and Imamayn, in case a Muslim is not aware of the imposition of services such as prayer, fasting and alms, pursuant to istiḥ̄sān, does not have to make up for the duties he omitted when he finds it out. Zufar ibn Hudhayl, on the other hand, argues that that person is obliged to make up for these duties omitted before. He states that a person automatically consents to the Islamic provisions by being Muslim. And religious duties such as prayer, fasting and alms are among the principal provisions of Islam. Although unawareness can be accepted as an excuse concerning the sins, it does not rule out the responsibilities to fulfill obligatory rules. Just as unawareness does not eliminate the responsibility in Dār al-Islām (territory of Islam), neither does it in Dār al-Ḥarb.<sup>76</sup>

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Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Ja'far b. Ḥamdān al-Baghdādī al-Ḳudūrī, *al-Tajrīd*, ed. Muhammad Ahmad Siraj, Ali Cum'a Muhammad (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2004), 1: 320; Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 1: 100.

<sup>73</sup> al-Dabūsī, *Ta'sīs al-nazar*, ed. Mustafa Muhammad ad-Dimashqī (Bairut: Dār Ibn Zeydūn, nd.), 95; Id, *Mukāyeeseli İslam Hukuk Düşüncesinin Temellendirilmesi*, translated by Ferhat Koca (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Pub., 2002), 176; Bedir, "Züfer b. Hüzeyl", 529. For Zufar ibn Hudhayl's similar view that smaller things would not be counted as void see al-Jaşşās, *Mukhtasar Ikhtilāf al-fuqaha*, ed. Abd Allah Nazır Ahmad (Bairut: Dār al-Basha'r al-Islāmiya, 1995), 1: 131.

<sup>74</sup> Ḳudūrī, *al-Tajrīd*, 2: 866; Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 1: 185; Kāsānī, *Badā'ī' al-Şanā'ī'*, 1: 191; Majd al-Din Abu al-Fadl Abdullah b. Mahmud b. Mawdud al-Mawşilī, *al-Ikhtiyār li ta'lil al-mukhtār*, haz. Halid Abdurrahman al-Ak (Bairut: Dār al-Ma'rifa, 1998), 1: 82; Fakhr al-Din Uthmān b. 'Alī al-Zayla'ī, *Tabyīn al-ḥaqā'iq: sharḥ kanz al-daqqā'iq*, (Bulak: al-Matbaa al-Kubra al-Amiriyye, 1313/1896), 1: 138.

<sup>75</sup> Kāsānī, *Badā'ī' al-Şanā'ī'*, 1: 191-192.

<sup>76</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 2: 181-182; Kāsānī, *Badā'ī' al-Şanā'ī'*, 1: 202; Burhān al-Din Mahmūd b. Ahmad b. Abd al-Azīz Bukhārī Ibn Māza, *al-Muhīt al-burhānī fi al-fiqh al-Nu'mānī* (al-Riyad: Maktaba al-Rushd, 2000), 3: 127; Abd al-azīz al-Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 179; Ahmet Özel, *İslam Hukukunda Ülke Kavramı: Dârulislam Dârulharb* (Istanbul: İz Pub., 1998), 195; İbrahim Kâfi Dönmez, "Cehâlet", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: TDV Pub., 1993), 7: 220.

Analogizing the lack of knowledge in Dār al-Islām to unawareness in Dār al-Ḥarb, Zufar ibn Hudhayl, in contrast to Abū Ḥanīfa and Imamayn's ruling, which they base on istiḥ̄sān, holds the idea that this should not constitute a pretext and the person’s responsibility thereby cannot be dismissed.

#### **3.1.4. Sacrificing Someone Else’s Sacrificial Animal without Permission**

Pursuant to istiḥ̄sān, in case of an animal bought to be sacrificed is butchered by someone else without permission from its owner, it remains acceptable for sacrifice.<sup>77</sup> The one who slaughters the animal without permission does not even have to repay the value of the animal because the purchase of the animal by the owner for sacrifice is already a sort of criteria by its own. Even if in sign, this would be counted as permission for butchering. And permission by sign replaces express permission.

Zufar ibn Hudhayl, on the other part, claims this action is not allowed as to qiyās, thus the one who slaughter the animal without permission has to compensate the owner for the cost of the animal. He compares this case with the phenomenon that a person compensates the butcher for his animal slaughtered without permission and points out that sacrificial ritual will be fulfilled only with person’s own intent and action. Though owner’s intent and action is not present when his animal is slaughtered without permission. Therefore, since the animal butchered without permission could not be counted as sacrifice, the slaughterer has to pay the price of the animal.<sup>78</sup>

#### **3.1.5. Incorporation of Partners to the Sacrifice of an Animal Bought for Oneself**

Pursuant to istiḥ̄sān, it is permissible for a person who has bought cattle for sacrifice to partner six people subsequently. Zufar ibn Hudhayl, however, advocates this act to be illicit according to qiyās and justifies his view with the argument that the purpose of buying an animal for sacrifice is to get closer to Allah. Yet making partners for cattle prepared for sacrifice signifies welshing on worship set out to with the intention of making money, that is to say, selling it of, which is prohibited by religion. And its being a religious duty precludes it to be sold and its expense to be shared.<sup>79</sup>

#### **3.1.6. Making Exceptions in Confession**

For Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yusuf, when someone says “*I owe thousand dirhams to someone except for one dinar or a bundle of wheat*”, it is acceptable as per istiḥ̄sān. After subtracting the price of one dinar or a bundle of wheat, the remaining cost is paid. According to Zufar ibn Hudhayl, this kind of exclusion is not permissible as to qiyās.<sup>80</sup> Because for the exclusion to be admissible, the thing excluded and the word followed by the

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<sup>77</sup> Mawṣilī, *al-Ikhtiyār*, 5: 26.

<sup>78</sup> Ḳudūrī, *al-Tajrīd*, 12: 6341; Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 12: 17-18; Marghīnānī, *al-Hidāya*, 2: 358; Mawṣilī, *al-Ikhtiyār*, 5: 26; Ibn Māza, *al-Muhīt al-burhānī*, 8: 474; Haddād, *al-Jawharah al-Nayyirah*, 2: 458; Ibn Nujaym, *al-Bahr al-rāiq*, 8: 328; Ayşe Çeşme, “el-Mevsilī’nin el-Muhtâr’ında Züfer’e Ait Görüşlerin Tahkîki” (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Selçuk Üniversitesi, 2010), 34.

<sup>79</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 12: 15; Marghīnānī, *al-Hidāya*, 2: 353; Ibn Māza, *al-Muhīt al-burhānī*, 8: 477; Zayla’ī, *Tabyīn al-ḥaqā’iq*, 6: 4; Ibn Nujaym, *al-Bahr al-rāiq*, 8: 319.

<sup>80</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 18: 87; Mawṣilī, *al-Ikhtiyār*, 2: 189; Muḥammad Ibn Farāmurz Mulla Khusraw, *Durar al-ḥukkām fī sharḥ ghurar al-aḥkām* (Istanbul: Fazilet Publishing, 1978), 2: 364.



subtraction should be of the same sort.<sup>81</sup> In this example, however, mentioned dinar and wheat are of different sorts from dirham from which the formers are subtracted. Subtractions made are therefore void.

### 3.1.7. Mentally Deranged Person’s Obligation to Fast

According to Ḥanafī jurists, a mentally handicapped person is not obliged to make up afterwards for the fasting he/she has omitted in Ramadan.<sup>82</sup> But if this person recovers from mental derangement during the month of Ramadan, whether he/she is obliged to make up later for the days he/she has omitted the fasting is under dispute.

Abū Ḥanīfa and Imamayn applied istiḥ̄sān on the subject over the verse “*So whoever sights the month, let him fast it,*”<sup>83</sup>. What is implied in the verse is not sighting entire month but a point of it. In other words, reaching to a part of Ramadan is the reason why fasting is obligatory in entire month. Therefore, as to istiḥ̄sān, the necessity for recuperated person to make up for the days he/she has omitted fasting is binding.

Zufar ibn Hudhayl is of the view that the one who loses his/her mental health at one point in Ramadan neither has to make up for the whole month in case the disability continues entire month nor has to compensate only for the days he/she omitted. Comparing the situation of mentally disabled person with the case of a teenager entering the period of adolescence, Zufar ibn Hudhayl argues that just as the quality of being juvenile which lasts until adolescence precludes making up for the fasting omitted in those days, mental derangement likewise rules out the compensation for previously omitted fastings.<sup>84</sup>

### 3.1.8. Marriage Contract of an Apostate Couple

According to the majority of Ḥanafīs, the marriage of a husband-wife who apostatised from the religion and then converted to Islam again remains legitimate pursuant to istiḥ̄sān.<sup>85</sup> Zufar, however, claims they have to split up and grounds it on qiyās because the apostasy of either husband or wife annuls the marriage contract. If both of them abandon Islam, one of them's apostasy and an addition comes into question. Therefore, as their apostasy priorly obstructs the constitution of marriage, it should also prevent its continuation.<sup>86</sup>

### 3.1.9. Emancipation of a Slave for *ḡihār* (Type of Divorce in Which the Husband Likens His Wife to His Mother) Expiation

In Abū Ḥanīfa and Imamayn view, in case of *ḡihār* if someone intends to recompense by buying and freeing his father (who is a slave), this would be enough according to istiḥ̄sān. On the contrary, Zufar holds the idea that it would not be lawful with respect to qiyās. The duty of man in *ḡihār* expiation is emancipating

<sup>81</sup> Rifat Uslu, “İmam Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in Hayatı ve Fikhî Görüşleri” (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Selçuk Üniversitesi, 1992), 127-128.

<sup>82</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 3: 87; Mawşilī, *al-Ikhtiyār*, 1: 174.

<sup>83</sup> al-Baqarah, 2/185.

<sup>84</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 3: 88; Marghinānī, *al-Hidāya*, 1: 154; Abd al-azīz al-Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār*, 4: 372; İbrahim Kâfi Dönmez, “Cünûn”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: TDV Pub., 1993), 8: 127.

<sup>85</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 5: 49; Marghinānī, *al-Hidāya*, 1: 155; Mawşilī, *al-Ikhtiyār*, 3: 141.

<sup>86</sup> Ḡudürī, *al-Tajrid*, 9: 4551; Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 5: 49; Marghinānī, *al-Hidāya*, 1: 155; Kāsānī, *Badā’i’ al-Şanā’i’*, 2: 201; Ibn Māza, *al-Muhīt al-burhānī*, 3: 132.

a slave. Yet to buy a slave does not mean to set him free. Buying brings the property while setting free takes the possession away. The difference between these two actions constitutes an ultimate contrast. On the other hand, due to the blood relationship between them, father obtains the right to be free by getting into his son's possession. And hence, this cannot be counted as expiation.<sup>87</sup>

### 3.1.10. Emancipating Only One Slave for Multiple *Zihār* Expiations

For Ḥanafīs, if one frees one slave for two *zihār* divorces he did before, he can count this as recompense for one of his wives, whichever he wants, and it is lawful as to *istih̄sān* for him to intercourse with her. It is same as for expiation by fasting and feeding someone. It is because intent of determination in the things of same sort is invalid and unnecessary. The determination here is not therefore paid regard to. In the things of different sorts, however, the situation is not same. For instance, if someone who omitted fasting a couple days in Ramadan intends to recompense, this is licit even if it does not ascertain what days he/she has to fast. Contrariwise, if one has missed and voluntary fastings, he/she has to make a precise fixing as the types of the fastings are different.

Zufar ibn Hudhayl is in the opinion that it would not be lawful pursuant to *qiyās*. For him, the intention of the man given in the above example is not to determine one of the two *zihār* divorces. In this case, that man turns out to have freed a half slave for each *zihār*, because none of the *zihārs* a man does is superior than another. It is similar to freeing one slave for expiations of killing and *zihār* at once.<sup>88</sup>

### 3.2. General Overview on Zufar ibn Hudhayl's Approach towards *Istih̄sān*

From the middle of the second century AH, when *fiqh* made rapid progress, an opposition began to show itself against *istih̄sān*, which were used by some schools as a method of deduction. As expressed before, this counteraction towards *istih̄sān* was primarily caused by the fact that the meaning frame of *istih̄sān* had not yet settled outright during its process of conceptualization, as well by the perception of "subjectivity", which the term *istih̄sān* etymologically evokes and which is not seen to be possible to be associated with jurisprudential logic. Nevertheless, *istih̄sān* carries the characteristic of being a deductive method having the potential to provide jurists with wide horizons and new gateways in producing solutions for the emerging problems.<sup>89</sup>

Besides, the fact that the term *istih̄sān* was often used within the doctrine as an antonym to *qiyās* or as the name of abandoning it can be said to have played a part in the generation of this perception.<sup>90</sup> It is quite possible to find the correct answer, above all in Ḥanafī jurisprudential doctrine, to the question whether *istih̄sān* was actually an alternative to *qiyās* or it was a way out for the interpreters in meeting society's needs and finding an answer to their juristic problems when *qiyās* was not able to respond their requirements or when it led to deadlocks or negative results.

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<sup>87</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 7: 8.

<sup>88</sup> Jaṣṣāṣ, *Mukhtasar Ikhtilāf al-Fuqaha*, 3: 255; Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 7: 10; Kāsānī, *Badā'ī' al-Ṣanā'ī'*, 5: 148; Mawṣilī, *al-Ikhtiyār*, 3: 204; Ibn Māza, *al-Muḥīt al-burhānī*, 3: 335-336; Zayla'ī, *Tabyīn al-ḥaqā'iq*, 3: 13.

<sup>89</sup> Hamza Aktan, "İslam Hukukunda İstih̄san Ufku", *İslāmi İlimlerde Metodoloji/Usūl Meselesi* (Istanbul: Ensar Publishing, 2009), 3: 76.

<sup>90</sup> Özen, "Hicrī II. Yüzyılda İstih̄san ve Maslahat Kavramları", no.1: 41.

In his juristic interpretations, Zufar ibn Hudhayl uses qiyās where *nuṣūṣ* are not found mostly as a deductive method. Innumerable examples are available for the foregoing fact. On the other hand, in a problem where Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions present different views as to istihsân and qiyās, Zufar is observed to firmly embrace qiyās, preferring it over istihsân; yet he sometimes, although rare, is seen to lean towards qiyās al-khafī (hidden), renouncing qiyās al-jalī (clear) because of documentary evidence, companions' sayings and common practice.<sup>91</sup>

From this aspect, it can be said that, in general terms, Zufar adhered to Ḥanafī method; yet regarding the usage of istihsân as a deductive method, he tried to narrow down the frame; while in terms of consulting to qiyās, he intended to expand the limits as much as possible.<sup>92</sup> As a matter of fact, Zufar ibn Hudhayl limited istihsân to a considerably straitened scope merely regarding it sometimes as the renouncement of qiyās due to Prophet Muhammad's Sunnah or sometimes as abandonment of qiyās al-jalī because of common practice or seldomly of qiyās al-khafī.<sup>93</sup> After all, the author who depicts Zufar to have frequently employed istihsân also notes in a different writing that he did not resort to istihsân unless he had to.<sup>94</sup>

There is not any information neither from founding imams of Ḥanafī School nor from Zufar himself, claiming Zufar to have rejected istihsân. Such information has never been encountered neither in subsequent Ḥanafī jurisprudential and methodological literature, nor in the sources belonging to Shāfi‘ī School, which were in the forefront of the opposition against istihsân, and to remaining schools having stood against istihsân. Albeit unconfirmed, Ibn Ḥazm remarks al-Ṭahāwī (d. 321/933), a Ḥanafī member, to have disapproved istihsân totally.<sup>95</sup> Had Zufar frowned on istihsân too, Ibn Ḥazm or another objector would have certainly mentioned it in order to consolidate the stance against istihsân or to promote his own thought. However, we have not come across such record during our research. Even if we accept the assumption for an instant that such information was never conveyed to Ibn Ḥazm because of the geography he lived in and thereby he could not have included it in his works, this would have still served as a vital argument for, above all, Imam al-Shāfi‘ī, who objected to istihsân and defined it as "*adjudicating fancifully and inventing a new sharia*" and for other Shāfi‘ī scholars opposite to istihsân to refute the justifications put forward by Ḥanafīs on the purpose of vindicating istihsân. And they should have used it as a rigid cornerstone and reference point in proving istihsân to be wrong. However, such information is not referred to in any Shāfi‘ī work on jurisprudence or the principles of jurisprudence. Furthermore, within the examination we have made on Ḥanafī

<sup>91</sup> Biltāji, *al-Manāhij*, 1: 311; Muharrem Önder, “İstihsan Kavramının Ortaya Çıkışı”, *İslam Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi* 7 (Nisan, 2006): 206; Uslu, “İmam Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in Hayatı ve Fıkhî Görüşleri”, 28. For the examples showing Zufar to prefer the method of qiyās on several matters to which istihsân is applied see. Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 1: 182; 2: 203; 3: 88; 5: 49; 7: 5-6; 18: 87; Kāsānī, *Badā’i‘ al-Ṣanā’i‘*, 1: 16-17, 119, 191-192, 202, 353; Marghīnānī, *al-Hidāya*, 1: 155; 2: 353, 358; Kamāl al-Dīn Muhammad b. Abd al-Wāhid b. Abd al-Hamid Ibn al-Humām, *Fath al-qadīr* (Bairut: Dār al-Fikr, nd.), 7: 114; 9: 511, Mawṣilī, *al-Ikhtiyār*, 1: 155; 174; 2: 46, 189; 3: 141; 5: 26; Çeşme, “el-Mevsilī’nin el-Muhtâr’ında Züfer’e Ait Görüşler”, 21, 34.

<sup>92</sup> Biltāji, *al-Manāhij*, 1: 311-312.

<sup>93</sup> Biltāji, *al-Manāhij*, 1: 312.

<sup>94</sup> Bakkal, “Ebû Hanīfe’nin İstihsan Anlayışı”, 1: 275.

<sup>95</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Ihkām*, 6: 799; Id, *Mulakḥḥaṣ*, 51.

literature are instances demonstrating Zufar to employ istiḥsān, even if just a hint. Therefore, the claim is not seen to be accurate.

Apart from all these analyses, Muhammad al-Biltāji explains Zufar ibn Hudhayl's approach towards istiḥsān as below:

*"Zufar ibn Hudhayl is in an effort to narrow down the limits of ruling by istiḥsān as much as possible, while concerning the utilization of qiyās, he intends to maximize the area. Zufar ibn Hudhayl's almost total avoidance from using istiḥsān does not rule him out of agreed general principles of Ḥanafī School because Zufar ibn Hudhayl's method is in fact the same as this very method in general terms. His jurisprudential understanding is shaped largely around these principles. Therefore, he takes qiyās and istiḥsān as a source as well. However, he mostly adopts qiyās when practically approaching to the problems, while preferring istiḥsān seldomly. He stays aloof from istiḥsān only in its application to problems. And this opposition does not signify radical objection or total rejection of utilizing either qiyās or istiḥsān."*<sup>96</sup>

As al-Biltāji notes above, Zufar does not repudiate istiḥsān in an absolute manner, even accepts it as a method of deduction; still, unless he has to, he does not recourse to istiḥsān in creating solutions for problems, adopting qiyās instead. As a matter of fact, Zufar has been unanimously designated by Ṭabaqāt and Manākib authors as analogist. It will be more accurate to read this designation as, apart from his ability to analogize, he indeed favored qiyās all the way unless istiḥsān was inevitably required; in some cases, however, when qiyās failed to satisfy in producing solutions for the problems or when it brought incorrect results, he turned to istiḥsān, even infrequently, by force of necessity and in order not to leave problems unsolved. Let us now look into applications of istiḥsān Zufar performed in his jurisprudential practice.

### 3.2.1. Examples to Zufar ibn Hudhayl's Istiḥsān Practice

We have tried to carry out an extensive research in available Ḥanafī jurisprudential literature in an attempt to determine the istiḥsān examples in Zufar ibn Hudhayl's juristic practice. And we have seen that the matters on which he resorted to istiḥsān are quite limited. Now let's see these examples together.

#### 3.2.1.1. Recitation of an Illiterate Person at Salah (Prayer)

For Abū Ḥanīfa, if a person that does not know how to recite the Qurʾān performs a part of salah without recitation, then learns a sūrah (chapter) and recites it at the remaining part of salah or if he/she recites only in first two rakaʿāt (units) and forgets the remaining recitation, in both cases his worship is not accepted. According to Imamayn, in the first case, that person has to reperform the salah over again, but in the second case, he/she can go on as to istiḥsān.

Zufar ibn Hudhayl, on the other hand, is in the view that the salahs in both cases will not be disrupted pursuant to istiḥsān, basing it on the fact that the recitation is obligatory only in two rakaʿāt. Just as it is enough for a person acquainted with the recitation of Qurʾān to omit the recitation in initial two rakaʿāt and recite in last two rakaʿāt instead; likewise, if he/she performs the obligatory recitation in first two rakaʿāt, passing over the recitation in final two rakaʿāt would not spoil the salah. Similarly, the illiteracy in initial two rakaʿāt of a person who recites in last two rakaʿāt after learning something from Qurʾān would not spoil his worship either.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>96</sup> Biltāji, *al-Manāḥij*, 1: 312.

<sup>97</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 1: 182; Kāsānī, *Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ*, 1: 353; Ibn Māza, *al-Muḥit al-burhānī*, 2: 189; Ibn ʿĀbidīn, *Radd al-Muḥtār*, 1: 358; Id, *Minha al-ḥāliq ala'l-Bahr al-rāiq* (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiya, 1997), 1: 650.

### 3.2.1.2. When One of the Victims Forgives the Offender after Diya (Bloodwit) and Qişâş (Retaliation) is Ruled

Ḥanafî School applies qişâş against one who cuts more than one person's same organs to which qişâş is applicable. The offender also must pay half of the diya for the relevant organ to each victim.<sup>98</sup> To exemplify, for the implementation of qişâş penance to the one who has cut two people's right hands simultaneously or separately, victims must apply to the court, and, after the judge rules qişâş and diya before the victims, if one of the victims renounces his right to claim qişâş after receiving diya and pardons the offender, this pardon will be lawful and the other victim's right to demand the execution of qişâş is ruled out automatically. He only receives the remaining half of diya. In case when one of the victims forgives the offender before receiving his share of half diya, for Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yusuf, other one's right to demand qişâş remains as to qiyās, according to Zufar ibn Hudhayl and Imam Muhammad, however, his right to request qişâş would also be forfeited pursuant to istihsân. Embracing the rule deduced over istihsân, Zufar ibn Hudhayl and Imam Muhammad analogizes this situation to the case when one of those whose hands are cut renounces qişâş after receiving diya because the arbiter can validly rule either qişâş or diya for the victims. As a necessary consequence of the foregoing, qişâş right is conjunct between them. When one of them forfeits his right, the other one should be entitled with half of the right of qişâş, yet of course, cutting the half of the hand as retaliation is unthinkable.<sup>99</sup>

### 3.2.1.3. Punishment for Cutting the Nails During State of *Ihrām*

For Abū Ḥanīfa and Zufar ibn Hudhayl, if a person in *ihrām* (sacred state which a Muslim must enter in order to perform the pilgrimage) cuts three of his fingernails, he/she will be sentenced to sacrifice an animal as to istihsân. Though al-Sarakhsi remarks Abū Ḥanīfa to have backed down from this argument later.<sup>100</sup> This argument is justified as follows: As is known, a person who cuts all the nails of one hand is unanimously punished with animal sacrifice. And the better part of the nails is like its whole. Therefore, the one who cuts not less than three of his/her nails during *ihrām* is considered to have cut all of them and thereby he must sacrifice an animal as penalty.

According to Imamayn and Abū Ḥanīfa's posterior view, for each nail, a *şadaqah* (charity) must be paid, which is grounded as: The animal sacrifice penalty is actually given when all the nails of both hand and foot are cut. One hand, however, constitutes merely the quarter of the whole, which reminds of quarter of the head in shaving. This proportion is the lower limit for the sacrifice penalty to be obligatory. In nailcut, however, it is not possible to regard three nails as whole. If so, an unpreventable infinite vicious circle would

<sup>98</sup> Sabri Erturhan, *İslam Ceza Hukukunda İctima* (Istanbul: Rağbet Publishing, 2003), 155.

<sup>99</sup> Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Farḳad al-Shaybānī, *Kitāb al-Asl=al-Mabsūt*, tsh. Abu'l-Wafā al-Afgānī (Bairut: 'Alam al-Kutub, 1990), 4: 443; Sarakhsi, *al-Mabsūt*, 26: 141; Zayla'ī, *Tabyīn al-ḥaqā'iq*, 6: 116; Ibn Nujaym, *al-Bahr al-rāiq*, 9: 52; *al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyye*, ed. Shaykh Nizam (Bairut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 2000), 6: 16-17; Ibn 'Ābidīn, *Radd al-Muḥtār*, 10: 208. The information that this view also belongs to Zufar is only included in al-Sarakhsi's *al-Mabsūt*. Others credit this view only to Imam Muhammad.

<sup>100</sup> Sarakhsi, *al-Mabsūt*, 4: 77.

occur. So a charity penalty for each nail will solve this problem. As a matter of fact, a juristic rule given for what is little in quantity cannot be applied to what is less.<sup>101</sup>

#### 3.2.1.4. Unspecified Divorce

According to the majority of Ḥanafīs, if someone divorces one of his two wives before witnesses, yet witnesses say in court afterwards that they have forgot which spouse the man divorced, in this case testimonies of both witnesses will be deemed invalid. The divorce will therefore be illegitimate.

Zufar ibn Hudhayl, on the other hand, is in the view that as per istiḥsān the testimonies of these two people would be accepted and the man would be forced to repudiate one of his spouses because uncertainty on the testimony does not constitute an impediment to the legitimacy of the testimony regarding its purpose. Moreover, the testimony towards divorce is considered under "amr bi al-ma'rūf" (encouraging righteous behaviour). Here, the testimony of both witnesses proves that the husband has divorced one of his wives. In other words, there is indeed a case of divorce. Uncertainty is that which one of the women was divorced. Therefore, the judge will be considered to have heard the husband's words for divorce and the husband will be obliged to divorce one of his wives.<sup>102</sup>

#### 3.2.2. Evaluation of the Examples Related to Zufar ibn Hudhayl's Istiḥsān Practice

When we examine the jurisprudential rulings done by Zufar ibn Hudhayl through the method of istiḥsān, we can see that the remaining imams usually appealed to qiyās and held different views compared to that of Zufar. However, as Zufar was prominent with his commitment to qiyās, his practice of istiḥsān instead of qiyās in such case, along with the rule he deduced over it is somehow striking, even seems like a strange attitude.

As a matter of fact, the reason why Zufar chose istiḥsān in cases, which could already be solved through qiyās might be that the latter does not answer the requirement or leads to wrong conclusion. However, as for the question whether the recitation of an illiterate person would be accepted in salah, Zufar turns to qiyās to ground istiḥsān, which may be called qiyās al-khafī. From the viewpoint that the recitation is obliged only in first two raka'āt, he analogizes the recitation of an illiterate person to the recitation in the last two raka'āt by the one who knows how to recite and he remarks his prayer is accurate. Here, Zufar ibn Hudhayl may have aimed to facilitate salah, the prayer occupying an important place in Muslim's life, especially for those who have newly become Muslim and who is not yet been able to recite Qur'ān by heart, and as well to encourage them.

Zufar seems to have reached to the rule that if one of the victims, in a case where diya and qiṣāṣ is ruled, forgives the offender before receiving his share of half diya would rule out other victims right to demand qiṣāṣ as to istiḥsān, basing it on qiyās. Just as when the one whose hand has been cut renounces qiṣāṣ after receiving diya, it factors out the other victim's right demand qiṣāṣ; his forgiving the offender before getting diya would also eliminate the other victim's right. Here, he compares the forgiving before

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<sup>101</sup> Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 4: 77-78. Züfer b. Hüzeyl'in görüşü için see. Jaṣṣāṣ, *Mukhtasar Ikhtilāf al-Fuqaha*, 2: 199; Kudürī, *al-Tajrīd*, 4: 1821; Kāsānī, *Badā'ī' al-Ṣanā'ī'*, 2: 291-292; Marghinānī, *al-Hidāya*, 1: 196; Ibn al-Humām, *Fath al-qadīr*, 3: 39; Haddād, *al-Jawharah al-Nayyirah*, 1: 404.

<sup>102</sup> Shaybānī, *Kitāb al-Asl*, 3: 29 (Imam Muhammad does not mention Zufar ibn Hudhayl's name here.); Sarakhsī, *al-Mabsūt*, 6: 145; Ibn Māza, *al-Muhīt al-burhānī*, 5: 156.



taking diya to forgiving after taking it. In this example qiyās forms a ground for istiḥ̄sān. That is to say, here also qiyās al-khafi is a matter of question.

For the case where a person in the state of *ihrām* cuts his three nails, Zufar predicates his ruling on the principle of majority and defends that this person must sacrifice an animal as penalty. The other Ḥanafī imams, however, take the total number of both finger and toe nails into consideration and assert that one must pay charity for each of nails he cuts, grounding this on the idea that cutting three nails represents the minority. Here, an important question comes to mind: "Why do not Ḥanafī scholars hold the same perspective when they rule that for the anointing to be legitimate, it must be done with at least three fingers of one hand and the tears on slippers must not amount to three; or when they evaluate the tears on each slipper separately, adding them together?"

Most Ḥanafīs defend the view that the divorcement will not be accepted, grounding it on the case at which testimonies are counted invalid when husband forget or can't remember which of his wives he has divorced. Zufar ibn Hudhayl, however, basing upon the presence of the divorce act, states that invalid testimony of the witnesses will not prevent the fact of divorcement, and that in this case the judge can prevent the husband from approaching to his wives until the he ascertains which of his spouses he divorced.

Here, in an important matter such as divorcement, Zufar ibn Hudhayl finds it sufficient for the husband to use one of his divorce rights; stating that the fact that witnesses has forgotten which of his wives was divorced by the husband will not spoil the divorcement because divorce is an action regarded in the form of *isqātāt* (release). So as per the basic principle suggesting, "what is dropped cannot be brought back",<sup>103</sup> one of the divorce rights will drop even it is unwitnessed. Besides, Zufar may have aimed through this approach to prevent unwitnessed divorces from being misused and hinder some negative consequences that could occur as a result of this misuse.

### CONCLUSION

The examples included in Classical Ḥanafī literature demonstrate the important role qiyās played in Zufar ibn Hudhayl's jurisprudential path. They also display his mental agility and that he fully deserved the exaltations and qualifications attributed to him on his application of qiyās, which requires a wide fund of jurisprudential knowledge.

When Zufar's employments of istiḥ̄sān in his jurisprudential practice are examined, one can see that it is exceptionally difficult to settle a comprehensive formula unraveling when and why he resorts to istiḥ̄sān. It seems extremely difficult to ascertain his methodological course for the reason that he passed away at an early age shortly after Abū Ḥanīfa's death, when the institutionalization of the school had not yet been completed and also because he has left no work to explain his juristic thoughts. Besides, neither subsequent methodologists nor jurisprudents have any significant explanations on his approach towards istiḥ̄sān. In fact, considering that the jurists of his period wasted all their energy to ground istiḥ̄sān and the instances based on istiḥ̄sān thanks to its extremely controversial nature and tried all the time to convince the opposers, the above fact does not seem to be odd at all.

In the cases where Zufar ibn Hudhayl adopted istiḥ̄sān, remaining three imams seem to have resorted to qiyās, yet sometimes not all of them. The fact that Zufar preferred istiḥ̄sān over qiyās is not

<sup>103</sup> See. Majalla, 51.

because the latter was inapplicable, but maybe because it did not sometimes answer the questions or because it sometimes led to inaccurate conclusions. Then again, Zufar's limited usage of istihsān should not leave the impression that he contravened unanimously agreed general principles of Ḥanafī School.

The arguments that Zufar ibn Hudhayl frequently turned to istihsān the same as the school's other imams or totally opposed it do not reflect the reality. He intended to expand the scope of qiyās while applying istihsān in limited number of cases and in a narrow field.

As conclusion, what was essential for Zufar is qiyās. Yet he is known to have adopted istihsān as well, even seldomly, which demonstrates he was not against istihsān in principle.

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## A Comparative Approach to the Problem of Evil from a Theological and Philosophical Perspective\*

Metin Özdemir\*\*

### ABSTRACT

The problem of evil is the common problem of both philosophy and theology. Philosophers and kalām scholars have developed a theodicy/defense of divine justice that is in keeping with their understanding of religion, paradigms and methodologies. They have tried to explain and make sense of the evil in the world in accordance with their theories of creation. For this reason, both sides show serious differences in both metaphysical and moral evil. Philosophers have drifted away from rational thought on the topic of metaphysical evil as they have stuck to emanation theory based on fictional assumptions, yet have taken an exceptionally rational path towards moral evil. Kalām scholars, on the other hand, have never been able to disentangle themselves from turning both the matter of natural and moral evil into a metaphysical problem. The truth is that this problem will be more resolvable when it is evaluated together with the laws of universe, testing process and the belief of hereafter. In order to be able to see their point of departure and rational basis in this subject, we have tried to present this article in a comparative manner with the main lines.

### KEYWORDS

Kalām, Philosophy, Theology, The Problem of Evil, Rationality, Moral and Metaphysical Evil.

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\*\* Professor, Social Sciences University of Ankara, Faculty of Religious Education, Department of Kalām, Ankara, TURKEY  
Prof. Dr., Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi, Dini İlimler Fakültesi, Kelam Anabilim Dalı  
ozdemirmetin@hotmail.com  
orcid.org/0000-0001-5678-8579

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## Kötülük Problemine Felsefi ve Kelâmî Açıdan Mukayeseli Bir Yaklaşım

### ÖZ

Kötülük meselesi, hem felsefenin hem de teolojinin ortak problemidir. Filozoflar ve teologlar bu konuda kendi din anlayışlarına, paradigmalarına ve metodolojilerine uygun bir teodise / ilahi adalet savunusu geliştirmişlerdir. Onlar dünyadaki kötülük olgusunu kendi yaratılış teorilerine uygun olarak izah etmeye ve anlamlandırmaya çalışmışlardır. Bu nedenle her iki taraf da hem metafizik hem de ahlaki kötülük konusunda ciddi ayrılıklar göstermektedirler. Filozoflar, tabii kötülük konusunda, kurgusal varsayımlara dayalı sudur nazariyesine bağlı kaldıklarından rasyonellikten uzaklaşmış; ancak ahlaki kötülükler konusunda son derece rasyonel bir yol izlemişlerdir. Buna karşılık kelamcılar ise hem tabii hem de ahlaki kötülük konusunu metafiziksel bir sorun haline dönüştürmekten kurtulamamışlardır. Hakikat şu ki bu sorun, evrende işleyen yasalar, imtihan süreci ve ahiret inancı ile birlikte değerlendirildiğinde daha makul bir çözüm imkânına kavuşacaktır. Söz konusu ayrılık noktalarını ve onların rasyonel temellerini görebilmek için, bu makalemizde konuyu ana hatlarıyla mukayeseli bir şekilde sunmaya çalıştık.

### ANAHTAR KELİMELELER

Kelâm, Felsefe, Teoloji, Kötülük Problemi, Rasyonel, Ahlakî ve Metafizik Kötülük.

## INTRODUCTION

The good and evil are a quality of actions. Whether the actions acquire good or evil character by themselves or due to their doers' purpose and to the results they bring about is an arguable matter. In a relative manner, the action that provides benefit for its subject is characterized as good, while the ones that bring harm are qualified as evil. By his nature, human chooses what is useful for him and avoids the harmful ones. Therefore, he describes what he prefers as good and what he avoids as evil. However, these judgements about actions do not mean that they actually carry the value of good or evil. In some cases, the actions identified as good might be bad or the ones characterized as evil may be good. The foregoing fact brings forth the problem of objective identification of the good and evil.

## 1. DEFINITION OF THE GOOD AND EVIL

### 1.1. The Good and Evil from a Philosophical Perspective

Philosophers' definitions of the good and evil are closely related to their understanding of existence. According to Muslim thinkers, on top of the existential hierarchy is Necessary Being. It requires nothing in its presence since its existence is by itself. The reason for the existence of other beings is its knowledge of itself. Since it knows its own essence it knows how to get all beings extracted out of it in a complete and perfect order. Therefore the universe has existed as an inevitable consequence of its knowledge of its own essence.<sup>1</sup> In Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna)'s ontology, the array from the highest level to the lowest of the beings

<sup>1</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilahiyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, trans. Ekrem Demirli - Osman Türker (Istanbul: Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, 2011348; al-Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjānī, *Sharh al-Mawāqif fi 'ilm al-Kalām*, trans. Ömer Türker (Istanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2015), 3: 308; Muḥammād b. A'ḷā Tahānāwī, *Kashshaf istilahāt al-funūn* (Beirut: s.n., nd.), 3:1235.

derived from Necessary Being with a certain arrangement and order is explained in a very systematic manner.<sup>2</sup> Yet in this article, we have had to suffice with discussing only a part of the subject concerning the definition of evil.

Considering the reason for existence is the Necessary Being's knowledge of itself and hence the emanation of all beings from it in a complete and perfect order, it can be clearly seen that the principal intention of existence is the appearance of said completeness and perfection. The aspects regarded as evil are thus considered among the elements enabling this completeness and perfection. According to this thinking, since the knowledge of Allah encompasses what is complete and perfect, an order of object more perfect than that is unthinkable. This point of view has necessitated the definition of evil through concept of existence. Therefore, from the philosopher's point of view, evil is divided into two parts as essential evil and accidental evil: Essential evil is the absence of one of the fixed quality that object inherently possesses, whereas accidental evil emerges depending on an external reason that hinders the quality of object. quality that as the absence of an existing quality or of a quality likely to exist. Consequently, absolute absence signifies nothing from their perspective.<sup>3</sup>

In this context, for instance, weakness is due to the absence of strength which is a quality; while disability is due to the absence of health, another quality. Hence both are qualified as evil. As seen, we do not speak ontologically of an unalterable existence such as strength or health, but the absence. This is the motive of how evil is ontologically considered nothing more than a reality with regard to philosophy.

## 1.2. The Good and Evil from a Theological Perspective

To eliminate the inconveniences resulting from relative definition of the good and evil, Mu'tazila separated the concepts of *khayr* (good) and *shar* (evil) from pretty and ugly, defining the good and evil along with pretty and ugly. As they realized that an action, on top of its intrinsic beauty, may not be beneficial for its doer, even may harm him/her, they took the action itself as a basis in definition of the good and evil along with drawing attention to the doer's goal in doing the action.<sup>4</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār defines the good and bad as: "The good is profit that is pretty, the status of all actions in Allah's land of offering is as this, whereas the evil is harm that is ugly. Allah is excluded/beyond of committing the evil that is ugly."<sup>5</sup>

The attention-grabbing point in these definitions is that the benefit in the definition of good is qualified as pretty and harm in the definition of evil is qualified as ugly. By these characterizations, Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār presents the exact essential definition of good and evil. In logic, exact essential definition is based on the close distinction of a thing from its close genus as in "Human is a speaking animal". In this definition, animal is the close genus to human, human is the species defined, while "talking" is the close distinction.<sup>6</sup> In Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār's definition of evil, evil is the species defined, harm is its close genus and ugly is the

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<sup>2</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilahiyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 307.

<sup>3</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilahiyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 349-356.

<sup>4</sup> Muhammad as-Sayyid al-Julaynid, *Qaḍīyyat al-khayr wa al-sharr fī al-fikr al-Islāmī: uṣūluhā al-naẓariyya, jawānibuhā al-taḥbīqīyya, dirāsa 'ilmiyya li mas'ūliyyat al-insān fī al-islām* (Cidde: s.n., 1981), 28.

<sup>5</sup> Abū l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, "*al-Mukhtaṣar fī uṣūl al-dīn*", *Rasā'il al-'adl wa-l-tawḥīd*, edited by Muḥammad 'Imāra (Cairo: s.n., 1971), 1: 211.

<sup>6</sup> İbrahim Emiroğlu, *Ana Hatlariyla Klasik Mantık* (Istanbul: s.n., 1999): 92-93.



close distinction.<sup>7</sup> According to Mu'tazila the pretty and ugly are not qualities that assigned to action depending on external factors such as good and evil and benefit and harm but they are qualities that contained in action itself. That is to say, from their view, an action is qualified as pretty or ugly as to a number of features contained in itself. To exemplify, let's examine the action of unjust killing. The action is not ontologically different from murder committed with another motive for the reason that both actions eventually include ending someone's life. Nevertheless, what make the action of unjust killing evil yet the action of killing an enemy when defending your motherland good are qualities that are added on ontological realities of both actions. Every action that carries these qualities will naturally take the same characterization. What causes the action of unjust killing to be denominated as evil is its being cruel. Mu'tazila names this phenomenon as the direction that renders action ugly (*wajh al-qubḥ* /the direction of ugliness). According to them, a further thinking and examination is required for this direction to be known.<sup>8</sup>

When we consider what we have described above, we can see that, according to Mu'tazila, there are two basic conditions for understanding whether an action is ugly/evil. The first one is to know the direction that makes action ugly. For instance, as for the action of unfair killing, the direction is that it has the quality of being unjust. The second is to make an additional thinking and investigation to determine whether this direction is actually contained in the action or not. Again examining the action of unfair murder, it is important in this context to ascertain that it is committed without any motive behind and that it is unjust. In the opinion of Mu'tazila, since mind is competent in all of these stages, it not only determines the good and evil independently of revelation, but also can oblige to do what is good and to avoid what is evil. In fact, in Muslim thought, the first person to mention this matter was Jahm,<sup>9</sup> founder of Jahmiyya and later Mu'tazila improved his view.

Māturīdītes, despite being in the same line with Mu'tazila about cognizance and determination of the good and evil, dissent from their argument suggesting reason has authority to order the pursuance of good and to forbid the evil.<sup>10</sup> Ash'arites, however, think completely different on this subject from them. Although they are in accord with the others on definition of the good and evil in relative and aesthetic sense,<sup>11</sup> they totally diverge about the good and evil from the view of religion and morals. According to Ash'arites, the good and evil can only be determined by divine will. From their view, determination of the good and evil by a criterion other than divine will means the latter is kept within bounds of this criterion. However, divine will is absolute, and something absolute cannot be restricted by anything.<sup>12</sup> In this respect, Ash'arites make

<sup>7</sup> al-Julaynid, *Qaḍīyyat*, 28.

<sup>8</sup> Abū l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *Al-Muḥīṭ bi-l-taklīf*, edited by Sayyid al-Azmī (Egypt: s.n., nd.), 235; Samih Dughaym, *Falsafat al-qadar fi fikr al-Mu'tazila* (Beirut: s.n., 1985), 282. For detailed information see. Metin Özdemir, *İslam Düşüncesinde Kötülük Problemi* (Istanbul: s.n., 2014), 311-320.

<sup>9</sup> Abu'l-Fath Abd al-Karīm al-Shahristānī, *al-Mīlel wa al-niḥāl*, edited by Muhammad Sayyid Ghaylānī (Beirut: s.n., ts.), 1:88

<sup>10</sup> Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī, *Kitābu't-Tevhid Tercümesi*, trans. Bekir Topaloğlu (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2002), 127-128.

<sup>11</sup> al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, 3:312.

<sup>12</sup> Sa'd-al-Dīn 'Umar al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid: Maqāṣid fi 'ilm al-kalām*, edited by Abd al-Rahman Umaya. Beirut: s.n.,1989), 3:288.

the definition of the good and evil as: "What requires praise in this world and recompense in hereafter is good, what requires satire in this world and punishment in hereafter is evil."<sup>13</sup>

As a conclusion, kalām scholars in general, have two different viewpoints in definition of the good and evil. For Muʿtazila and Māturīdites good and evil are qualities that can be determined through reason and objective criteria. Therefore, the benefit that is pretty is good and the harm that is ugly is evil. From their perspective, the praise and satire are only applicable to this kind of actions. Ashʿarites, on the other hand, predicate this matter on compliance with divine will. They say no judgement of reason is valid before the word of Allah, because in their view, giving any role to the reason on this sort of matters signifies the limitation of the divine will to boundaries of the reason. According to their understanding of denial of likeness and similitude, nothing that implies deficiency in attributes of Allah is acceptable. The reason why Asharite view comes to a dead end on this issue is that they do not include wisdom in their conception of denial. No doubt that the reason and experience clearly manifest the good and evil to have been known even before having been defined by Allah.

## **2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL REASON AND WISDOM BEHIND THE EVIL'S INCLUSION IN THE DIVINE DECREE**

Under this title, we will try to cover primarily the reasons and wisdoms behind metaphysical and natural evil deeds which stem from flaws and defects in creation and then we will seek to elucidate why moral misdeeds are allowed.

### **2.1. The Reason and Wisdom behind the Inclusion of Natural Evil in the Divine Decree**

The main question in this context is: "Why Allah the Omnipotent, who is vested with all titles of perfection, does not will goodness to prevail over entire existence, hindering all that is evil?"

Before proceeding to the details of philosophical responses to this question, it will be useful to outline Muslim philosophers' approach to the divine decree. In this regard, Al-Fārābī says: "The providence of Allah has embraced all beings and reached everyone. Everything that happens is due to His divine providence and destiny. Evil deeds are also come from His divine providence and destiny, as evil that object is supposed to possess are relative, and evil about inferior realm. They accidentally have some benefits, because if evil did not exist, the good would not be much and perpetual. If a great good is abandoned while only a spot of evil is avoided, it would cause the evil to rise."<sup>14</sup> We can say that this meaning assigned to divine decree is widely relevant for other Muslim philosophers as well. For instance, when examining what Avicenna says about the reason and wisdom behind evil, we can see that almost the same expressions are used.<sup>15</sup>

If we return to the question above, we must say above all that this issue is directly related to philosophers' postulation of the divine providence as was also mentioned in philosophical definition of evil. Simply expressed, Allah, the Necessary Being, is at the top of the existential hierarchy. Therefore, he is in need of

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<sup>13</sup> al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, 3:312.

<sup>14</sup> Mahmut Kaya, *Felsefe Metinleri* (Istanbul: s.n., 2003), 128.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilahiyyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 348 vd.

nothing in his existence, which demonstrates that he possesses all attributes of divine perfection. Thus, not a single inability can be thought in himself. All of his attributes are absolute and illimitable.<sup>16</sup> In this sense, it is not philosophically possible to directly ascribe any inadequacy to the Absolute Being, who is flawless. So where does evil stem from?

The *raison d'être* of all that exists is the Necessary Being's knowledge of Himself who surrounds the knowledge of the most possible perfect order of everything. By virtue of this knowledge, he has consented that all benevolence and the order of blessing emanate from him in a most complete way possible. Hence, every existence has flown out of him in a flawless order in compliance with His consent. This is what divine providence means to Muslim thinkers.<sup>17</sup>

When we follow the ontologically hierarchical order of this effusion, we can see that the first the Universal Intellect, Universal Soul and other celestial beings came to existence. No evil is present in this very part of the universe. Thus, pure goodness prevails over the latter. Evil could not find a way to infiltrate into it, for the reason that said universe does not accept evil by its nature. However, when it comes to sublunary realm, the foregoing fact becomes different. Evil has found a chance to appear in sublunary realm due to the fact that it is composed of a material which welcomes form and nothingness. The essential point in this context is that the existence of a material that could function as material without accepting form and nothingness and would not necessitate the material itself is unthinkable. Flame, for example, cannot be created without its feature of burning. If so, we would have to speak of something else other than fire. Thus, a relation should be established between what is burnt-what is heated and what burns-what heats to achieve perfection in the existence of fire. In this web of relations, the initial aim in creation is the provision of benefits some beings require. For instance, in that case, flame would cause beings, which need to be burnt and warmed, to be burnt and warmed. Yet it may also lead to some disasters such as combustion of an innocent person's organ. However, this kind of misfortunes produced by flame's feature of burning is relatively few when compared to benefits it provides.<sup>18</sup> When nature is observed from this perspective, it can be clearly seen that the mostly dominant situation is the actualization of the goodness that is aimed. Then, we cannot say that all units of a species are in danger seeing a number of harms emerging alongside intended benefit. If we look again into flame example, a great majority of individuals of human species, which is under Animalia kingdom, obtain huge benefits off flame's character of burning and heating. Of course, some of its units might get harmed. Total prevention of this harm hinges on non-existence of the flame, which brings about lots of good and right that are aimed by virtue of its ability to burn and heat. If the foregoing case happened, a large number of good would be hindered owing to a few evil.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, in the notion of providence of philosophers like Avicenna, this kind of approaches is found contrary to divine wisdom, because this requires the materialization of potential good and right. The existence of evil is therefore indispensable for fulfillment of potential good and right in sublunary realm. This indispensability does not arise

<sup>16</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilahiyyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 291, 348.

<sup>17</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilahiyyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 348.

<sup>18</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilahiyyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 350-351.

<sup>19</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilahiyyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 351-355.

from a deficiency in divine providence, quite the contrary, it is rooted in interactions contained in the web of relations lying in it.<sup>20</sup>

This line of reasoning can be explained with another example as: The power of fury triggers the desire of superiority. Hence a person with anger becomes happy as long as he/she meets this desire of him/her. Yet sometimes, this power is likely to incite cruelty. In that case, he/she becomes evil in comparison with who is wronged. Nonetheless, human might get competent by hindering the desire to be superior, which stems from the negative impact of the power of anger by the power of reason. In this case, produced by the power of anger, the desire of superiority again becomes evil compared to this preventive action. The result deduced from this is that each action actually qualified as evil is a competence in comparison with the motive behind the action. For example, the desire to surpass is a competence when compared to what produces it, the power of anger. Therefore, this sort of actions is regarded as evil when compared to respondents they affect or to a better action that holds them back.<sup>21</sup>

The evil adhered to substance can occasionally be caused by external sources as is in the case where a defect emerges at the creation of some living beings. For instance, when the substance that is active during the generation of human or horse is not able to accomplish its ability due to an external factor, a number of flaws and defects might occur during birth. This phenomenon is not provoked by actor reason which grants ability to sperm, but caused by the fact that the substance, which is in the passive position, is not able to accept its aforementioned ability thanks to an external factor. Hindering the ability of sperm, these external factors, aside from being harmful in some instances as we saw in flame example, are beneficial in many other cases. Therefore, we cannot desire these external factors to disappear completely. For the reason that preventing numerous benefits that occur all the time to avoid the risk of a sporadically emerging harm is not consistent with the wisdom.<sup>22</sup>

Having grounded their thoughts on this point, philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Avicenna do not hold with the pessimistic view that evil is larger than the good. For them, this view contradicts both experience and divine providence, the source of existence. Therefore, from Muslim philosopher's point of view, preventing much good from happening lest little evil would occur is the greatest evil.<sup>23</sup>

Avicenna expounds this notion as: "[With regard to good-evil relationship], in phenomena and events these [five] cases come to question: What you design to exist are either what are absolute evil, what are not likely to be evil or deficient or those when happen the good would predominate, whose different occurrence contradicts its own nature or what are dominated by evil or existences where two cases are leveled. Existence without evil in it is not present in nature. There is no type of existence either, where all is evil or evil prevails or where the good and evil are leveled. The thing in whose existence the good is dominant, however, must exist when the good prevails."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *Risaleler*, translated by Alparslan Açıkgenç - Hayri Kirbaşođlu (Ankara: s.n., 2004), 61.

<sup>21</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-İlahiyyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 352-353.

<sup>22</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *al-İlahiyyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 350; Kaya, *Felsefe Metinleri*, 300.

<sup>23</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *Risaleler*, 61-62; Ibn Sīnā, *al-İlahiyyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā*, 352.

<sup>24</sup> Kaya, *Felsefe Metinleri*, 304.

Briefly stated, according to the philosophical point of view we have outlined above, evil is rooted in the contrast between the opposite elements playing a part in the interaction of the doer, the action and what is acted against, which contribute to the fulfillment of divine providence, the source of a common good and right. Even though sometimes damages spring from the confrontation of two opposite elements with burnable and burning natures, the principal intention in their creation is aspired common good and rights. Thusly, emerging harms do not depend upon the principal intention, but upon the secondary intention as inevitable consequences of abilities created for the fulfillment of the principal intention's goals and targets. This secondary intention is not something directly aimed at, on the contrary, is an indirect consequence that emerges inevitably for the fulfillment of the principal intention.

## 2.2. The Reason and Wisdom behind the Inclusion of the Moral Evil in Divine Decree

When philosophers dwelled on morals, they did something different than kalām scholars and considered the relationship between philosophy and morals. However, the most important problems in terms of morality for them are human freedom and determination of moral values. So we will briefly address these last two points under this heading because of their direct relevance to our subject.

### 2.2.1. Determination of Good and Evil

Philosophers based on the happiness of man while trying to determine the good and the evil. For example, according to Al-Fārābī, happiness is purely good. The reason he saw happiness as purely good is that he thought of happiness as the ultimate competence that man can attain. When one reaches happiness, he/she is freed from material dependence and reaches ultimate peace.<sup>25</sup> That's why Al-Fārābī describes the city where people do not know what happiness is and do not even think about it as the City of Ignorance.<sup>26</sup> Hence for him, all means that lead to happiness are good, and every element that hinders is bad. But the goodness or the badness of these means and elements are not because of their essence, but because they cause happiness or hinder it.<sup>27</sup>

Al-Fārābī believes that through the power of thought, people can comprehend all the elements that can assist them or obstruct them on their pursuit of happiness. According to him, objects are discovered by the power of thought to help achieve an aim and a will. The one who makes an invention must first take the goal into account. Then decide on the tools that can be used to reach this goal. Al-Fārābī believes that there is a prime point to all human experience. According to him, the prime point for the power of thought is when one discovers the most useful tool to achieve their goals. Surely, the goals could be good, they could also be bad. Or it could be believed that they can only be good. That is the point that creates a red line where good and bad can be distinguished. If the discovered tools are the most useful things for a virtuous purpose, they are good. If the goals are bad, the tools which are discovered to achieve this goal through the power of

<sup>25</sup> Abū Nasr al-Fārābī, *Farabî'nin Üç Eseri*, trans. Hüseyin Atay (Ankara: s.n.,1974), 45.

<sup>26</sup> Abū Nasr al-Fārābī, *al-Madīna al-fādila*, trans. Nafiz Danışman (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 2011), 98.

<sup>27</sup> al-Fārābī, *al-Madīna al-fādila*, 60, 70

thought are also bad, vulgar and evil. If the goals are believed to be good, the useful tools to achieve the goals are also believed to be good.<sup>28</sup>

### 2.2.2. The Theoretical Foundation of Moral Evil

Muslim philosophers have mostly followed the Platonist tradition in their theories of moral virtues. Their theories on moral virtues are based on the balanced and measured use of person's natural endowments. Therefore, for them the main source of moral evil is the immeasurable and unbalanced use of these natural endowments.

According to Ibn Miskawayh, there are three natural endowments of the human soul, which are the power of thought or mental power, sensual or animal power and anger or lion power. From these, the mental power is located in the brain, the animal power is located in the liver and the anger is located in the heart. All of them have both virtue and disgrace. The emergence of moral virtue depends on a balanced and measured use of all three of them. But in these three endowments, the mental power is the captain. Therefore, the fact that the other two endowments are balanced and measured depends on the guidance of a balanced and measured mind. When the power of thought becomes balanced and tries to reach the knowledge of the truth, its virtuous knowledge or wisdom emerges. In this respect, immoderacy and instability in the power of thought cause ignorance which is the opposite of knowledge and wisdom. When sensual power becomes balanced and measured with the direction of mind, its virtuous decency and generosity arise. Otherwise, indecency becomes the subject, which means not being able to take oneself away from the shameful evils. Finally, when the anger power is subject to the direction of mind, its virtuous self-restraint and valiance take place. An anger power out of control of the mind causes cowardice or cruelty. With the measured and balanced use of these three virtues, the virtue of justice ensues.<sup>29</sup>

The Muslim philosophers who have acted on the theoretical ground, for which we drew the frame above, counted wisdom, decency, valiance and justice as the most important virtues. Therefore, the opposite of them, ignorance, indecency, cowardice and cruelty are the greatest disgusts and evils. All other virtues of mankind are a part of these four virtues. For example, sharp understanding and learning ability is a part of wisdom, virtues such as shame, patience, docility and good temperance are a part of decency, virtues like generosity, courage and nobility are a part of valiance, virtues like equity, friendship, habituation and piety are a part of justice.<sup>30</sup>

According to Ibn Miskawayh, by its nature, person's virtue is to compliment the wisdom and knowledge and to avoid materialist actions. But for the soul to act according to its nature, one must ask for this virtue. The virtue of man is as big as the desire for the soul's merit. So, if a person takes care to act according to his or her virtue to the extent he/she is able to handle and to avoid actions that would prevent it, he will be virtuous. In this context, the first thing a person has to do is to purify his soul from the disadvantages that are in opposition to his virtue. Ibn Miskawayh describes these disgraces generally as low bodily lusts and ugly animalistic desires. At this point, by coming near Mu'tazila, he says that if one knows and

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<sup>28</sup> al-Fārābī, *Farabî'nin Üç Eseri*, 27-28.

<sup>29</sup> Ibn Miskawayh, *Tahzib al-Akhlaq*, edited by Ibn al-Khatib (Cairo: s.n., 1398), 23-37; Macit Fahri, *İslam Felsefesi Tarihi* (Istanbul: s.n.,1987), 151-152; M.M. Sharif, *İslam Düşüncesi Tarihi* (Istanbul: s.n.,1990), 2:95.

<sup>30</sup> Ibn Miskawayh, *Tahzib al-Akhlaq*, 23-73; Fahri, *İslam Felsefesi Tarihi*, 152.

recognizes these disgraces, one will try to avoid from doing them and from being mentioned with them. Yet if one thinks them to be virtuous, he will not give up and will make them traditions. In this respect, humans get away from the virtues and contaminate their souls with these disgraces that they see as virtues.<sup>31</sup>

Thinkers who composed the *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā* (Treatises of the Brethren of Purity) tend to reduce people's differences in moral attitudes and behaviors into biological factors. According to them, “warm-tempered people, especially those who have the heart structure of a warm-tempered person, are usually brave, generous, mindless in fearful situations, low on determination and attention, quick-tempered, but easily calmed, smart and astute and imaginatively powerful people.”

Cold-tempered (mebrūd) ones are usually foolish, vulgar in nature, minger and morally immature people.

Those who are moist and calm (mertüb) are usually not intelligent, not persevering to their jobs, mute, tolerant, moral, irresponsible in natural matters, easy to persuade and quickly forgetting.

Those who are dry (yābis) are patient in their jobs, hard-minded and hard to persuade. With these people, feelings like patience, hatred, stinginess, conservatism and protection are overwhelming.<sup>32</sup>

Al-Ikhwān Al-safā' presents the way to reach moral maturity with a text they claim to be one of the books of Israelites as: “If dryness takes one and drifts them to extremism, one's tenacity turns to roughness and rudeness. If moisture takes one and directs them, one's tenacity turns to intimidation and suffering, if heat directs one, one turns to anger, contradiction and vulgarity; if coldness directs one, one turns to distraction and foolishness. If these are balanced and at the same level, then his moral will be balanced and his work will be on the direction of integrity.”<sup>33</sup>

Al-Ikhwān Al-safā' believes that the equilibrium in these mixtures may vary depending on the geographical characteristics of the people, the education they have received since childhood and the beliefs they hold.<sup>34</sup>

As seen, moral virtues or disgraces, according to Al-Ikhwān Al-safā', arise from the extremism or balance in biological mixtures in human nature. According to Muslim philosophers, it depends on whether the psychological factors are used balanced way and prudently.

Briefly, according to Muslim philosophers, the basis of the moral virtue is to act according to the wisdom that is born through the measured use of mind because man can achieve all its virtues only through the wisdom that is acquired this way, with the prudent and balanced use of all the natural endowments. That's why a person should pay great attention to purifying the soul from the disgraces that keep them away from virtues and should be very willing to do so. Therefore, according to them, the source of moral evil is not to be willing to stay away from the disgraceful obstacles that keep one away from the noble virtues.

<sup>31</sup> Ibn Miskawayh, *Tahzīb al-Akhlaq*, 18.

<sup>32</sup> *İhvân-ı Safâ Risâleleri*, edited by Abdullah Kahraman (Istanbul: Ayrıntı Publications, 2012), 1:205.

<sup>33</sup> *İhvân-ı Safâ Risâleleri*, 1:206.

<sup>34</sup> *İhvân-ı Safâ Risâleleri*, 1:207-212

### 3. THE REASON AND WISDOM BEHIND EVIL'S INCLUSION IN THE DIVINE DECREE FROM A KALĀMĪ/THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Even though the visions of the philosophers and kalām scholars on moral evil concur, their opinions about natural evil have diverged as their understanding of Allah and realm has been different. While the philosophers have approached the problem of evil through theories of creation, kalām scholars have discussed it over the reason and wisdom of the creation of universe.

#### 3.1. The Reason and Wisdom behind the Inclusion of Natural Evil in the Divine Decree

This subject is directly related to kalām scholars' understanding of predestination and fate. Whereas the word "al-qaḍā' (predestination)" lexically means "edict", conceptually, it refers to universal divine judgements about "the objects of universe" (a'yān al-mawjudat/the essence of all beings), handed down in accordance with circumstances that eternally exist.<sup>35</sup> The word "al-qadar (fate)" however, is "the relation between divine will and idiosyncratic time of the object". Fate is therefore the connection of each quality of object to a certain time and reason. In other words, it represents the gradual rising up of possible beings from nonentity to the area of existence in compliance with predestination. Thus both fate and predestination refer to the judgements' passage to the existence when the conditions become suitable in the realm of objects, former in pre-eternity, latter in the ongoing time.<sup>36</sup> Even though Māturīdītes name what Ash'arites call predestination as fate or vice versa, they agree upon the meaning content.<sup>37</sup>

These definitions, for the most part, come from kalām scholars' fundamental understanding towards Allah's title of wisdom. Embracing the idea that the knowledge of Allah encompasses everything that eternally exists, kalām scholars have had to comply with the argument that predestination and fate come to pass pursuant to this wisdom; yet in details, some notable disagreements come in sight. Mu'tazila,<sup>38</sup> who are of the same opinion with Ahl al-Sunnah (the people of the Sunnah) on divine knowledge, totally disagree with them on the argument suggesting the actions to be created to solve human's problem of freedom.

When examining the definitions of predestination and fate by kalām scholars, they are understood to consider everything that occurs in universe as part of the divine will. The main issue in this frame is whether the happenings which we count as evil such as various disasters, calamities or natural catastrophes would also be considered evil in terms of divine actions. Since the phenomenon of natural evil is a subject directly related to Allah's titles of wise, willed and potent, it should be evaluated within the frame of divine actions. Divine deeds are treated as the justice of Allah by Mu'tazila, as his will by Ash'arites, while identified as his

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<sup>35</sup> al-Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb at-Ta'rifāt*, edited by Abd al-Munīm al-Hafnī (s. l: Dār al-Rushd, 1991), 200; Özdemir, *İslam Düşüncesinde Kötülük Problemi*, 145.

<sup>36</sup> al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb at-Ta'rifāt*, 196; Id, *al-Sayyid Sharīf. Sharh al-Mawāqif* 3:308; Tahānāwī, Muhammad b. A'la. *Kashshaf*, 3:134.

<sup>37</sup> Özdemir, *İslam Düşüncesinde Kötülük Problemi*, 145-146.

<sup>38</sup> Abū l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *Sharh al-Uṣūl al-khamsa*, trans. İlyas Çelebi (Istanbul: s.n., 2013), 1:258.



wisdom by Māturīdītes. Allah, according to Mu‘tazila, only does what is just and good, to Ash‘arites, whatever He wants and for Māturīdītes, He does nothing but wise things.

As a matter of fact, all Muslims have agreed on that there is no disorder, imbalance or flaw in the creation, which is one of the results of their general acceptance of the view that all the titles of Allah are good, pretty and right. What have been disputed over are the questions whether Allah created the evil or whether He force people to act.

First of all, all kalām scholars are cognizant that evil is a reality. From their perspective, when something has already been perceived by sense organs and experienced, there is no need to seek further evidence about its existence or reality.<sup>39</sup>

From Mu‘tazila viewpoint, when divine actions are defined, it is necessary to pay regard to whether they are unjust and whether they are illogical concerning their consequences. Allah does not perform anything unjust or irrational. All His actions are therefore good and pretty;<sup>40</sup> as He performs them either to provide a benefit or eliminate a suffering or to impose a deserved punishment.<sup>41</sup> However, this kind of approach cannot be said to clinch the issue. In fact, the questions of “what sort of benefit is in the suffering and anguish the children, animals or innocent people live through, what harm this situation eradicates or what misdeed of children it corresponds to” have not yet been satisfactorily answered. Mu‘tazila tries to solve the foregoing issue over the belief that, in hereafter, everyone is going to be thoroughly repaid in exchange for miseries and sufferings they will have undergone in this world. Such situations are similar to the fact that we force our children to learn so that they would benefit from that education or that a worker forces himself to work in return for certain payment. In brief, the income acquired as a result of such situations justifies the existence of suffered miseries and sorrows.<sup>42</sup>

About natural misdeeds, Mu‘tazila have sought to present a proper solution to the understanding of justice suggesting that Allah in no case would create what is evil and ugly; on the contrary, He always creates what is good and pretty,<sup>43</sup> trying to find a reasonable justification for all the matters seemingly considered as ugly and evil such as sufferings and torments. The essential concept they appeal to while producing latter justification is the divine wisdom. What is ugly to us is eventually a good existence created by the divine wisdom. In fact, Mu‘tazila, with reference to the Qur'anic verse “Had Allah willed, He would have made you an ‘ummah’ (one Muslim community)” (al-Maide 5/48), says that Allah can guide all people into true path and make them a single ummah whenever He wants; yet the flawless wisdom does not necessitate such

<sup>39</sup> al-Māturīdī, *Kitābu’t-Tevhid Tercümesi*, 10; Abū Ḥasan ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-‘ad*, edited by Ahmad Fuād al-Ahvānī (Egypt: s.n., 1962), 13:229-230.

<sup>40</sup> Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 13:278.

<sup>41</sup> Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 13:218, 335, 369

<sup>42</sup> Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 13:388.

<sup>43</sup> Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharh al-Uṣūl al-khamsa*, 8.

action".<sup>44</sup> So according to them, human has no reason to object to the phenomena which are brought by Allah's unreachable wisdom, such as existence of penury and grief.<sup>45</sup>

Yahya Ibn Hamza (d. 749/1348, one of the imams of al-Zaydiyya, outlines Mu'tazila's abovementioned understanding which was developed in line with the concept of divine wisdom as: "Allah does not commit what is ugly and does not transgress what is necessary; all of His actions are good. In this sense, Allah's wisdom and justice express the same thing. He therefore shows His wisdom by creating everything in a solid and ordinate manner in conformity with all kinds of usefulness. He furthermore, by knowing the object, holds all of its facts and details within His wisdom. So the word the all-wise in its meaning of absolute, used only to describe Allah, and encapsulates above three senses."<sup>46</sup>

In conclusion, from Mu'tazila point of view, divine wisdom necessitates divine actions to safeguard human's interest, to prefer always what is the most beneficial (aslah)<sup>47</sup> and to be in absolute prettiness. What make this prettiness in divine actions necessary are humans' benefits.<sup>48</sup> Ash'arites, however, do not seek any human effectiveness while trying to find an answer to this problem. On the contrary, they accentuate divine will grounding it on their distinctive understanding of tanzih (to declare that Allah is beyond any similarity to anything). They embrace the idea that Allah does whatever He wishes. Divine will cannot be restricted by any motive. They hence identify divine justice as "the at-will dispositions by Allah at His own domain".<sup>49</sup> Consequently, according to Ash'arites, Allah's torments upon human beings are not wrong, but absolute justice for Him. For everything is in Allah's possession. And the fact that He disposes as He wish is mere justice.

When it comes to Māturīdītes, they have made an effort to follow a reasonably consistent path on this subject. They have put the wisdom notion in the center of their comprehension of tanzih. Wisdom, in Māturīdī view, means "to find the proper place for something, put everything where they belong to",<sup>50</sup> which, at the same time, is the definition of justice. According to Māturīdītes, as all actions of Allah stems from His eternal wisdom, everything in universe is flawless and in the proper place. The natural events which result in catastrophic disasters should also be considered in this category. al-Māturīdī studied this matter in the subject "Wisdom of Creating Harmful Things" in *Kitāb al-Tawhīd*.<sup>51</sup> al-Māturīdī interprets the term of wisdom as following: Allah sets forth the difference between the beings in terms of harms and benefits as a proof of that they have an administrator above them who is knower of all and who carries out every single thing over a wisdom; and also presents their cohesion as an evidence of His oneness.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Abū l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *Al-Muḥīṭ bi-l- taklīf*, edited by Sayyid al-Azmī (Egypt: s.n., nd.), 273-283.

<sup>45</sup> Özdemir, *İslam Düşüncesinde Kötülük Problemi*, 114.

<sup>46</sup> Ahmad Mahmud Subhi, *al-İmām al-Mujtahid Yahya b. Hamza ve ārāuhu al-Kalāmiyye* (s.l.: Menshūrāt al-Asr al-Hadīs, 1990), 96.

<sup>47</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 14:35.

<sup>48</sup> Abu'l-Fath Abd al-Karīm al-Shahristānī, *Nihāyāt al-Aqdām* (s.l.: Maktabatu al-Saqafa al-Dīniyye, nd.), 400.

<sup>49</sup> Abu'l-Fath Abd al-Karīm al-Shahristānī, *al-Milel wa al-niḥāl*, ed. Muhammad Sayyid Ghaylānī (Beirut: s.n., ts.), 1:42.

<sup>50</sup> al-Māturīdī, *Kitābu't-Tevhid Tercümesi*, 51, 124.

<sup>51</sup> al-Māturīdī, *Kitābu't-Tevhid Tercümesi*, 137.

<sup>52</sup> al-Māturīdī, *Kitābu't-Tevhid Tercümesi*, 138.

Apart from His wisdom about belief aspect of existence, He has a number of moral and earthly wisdoms as well, which were created to humiliate the tyrants and kings and elevate those who are weak. Thus they would not sink into pride about the abundance of their men and armies and, after seeing His power to inflict sultans upon one another, would not exceed the limits Allah imposes. Moreover, when the fact that the existence is composed of beneficial and harmful objects is reflected upon, Allah's self-sufficiency and mightiness can be seen clearly because the actions of none but a being with these qualities take place in a way to produce no harm but benefit. Besides, harmful objects have some side benefits whose essence cannot be conceived by humans. For instance, aside from its feature of burning, fire has the potential to sanitize foods. Likewise, beings both may live with water or may die in it. Such are the objects that are bitter or poisonous. They have curative character for some severe diseases. Therefore, every thinking person knows that it is wrong and erroneous to speak of absolute goodness or evil of the things and hence that every object may cause harm or bring benefit.<sup>53</sup>

al-Māturīdī strongly criticizes Mu'tazila's vision of "aslah" (the most beneficial). According to former, aslah cannot be parallel to the concept of divine wisdom<sup>54</sup> since it contrasts with reality. In fact, when we look into everyday life, we witness that many poor and wealthy people are not in behaviors to pass the test which they are subjected to in the context of worshipping Allah. According to al-Māturīdī, this is a clear indication that Allah does not always choose the best (aslah) for his servants. Therefore, such cases cannot be explained by the notion of aslah, but only with concept of wisdom. What makes testing humans under different conditions essential is not their affairs, but the divine wisdom, which knows the insight of happenings. Testing everyone under the same circumstances would be a huge obstacle to both the realization of all moral maturity and the continuance of long-established world order. In a world where everyone is rich, how moral and religious virtues such as patience, cooperation, solidarity and confidence in God could be realized and how would it be possible to find people to be tasked with the provision of basic necessities for the continuation of life!<sup>55</sup>

Notwithstanding that the concept of divine wisdom is clearer and more comprehensible when compared to aslah view, it is a closed conception in some respects. Because the reason does not have the means to encircle all the wisdom behind the divine actions. Therefore, the problem of natural evil could not be elucidated over the concepts such as aslah (better) and hikmah (wisdom), but is solvable by the help of the joint evaluation of laws of universe, Allah's test on human being and belief in afterlife. It is us who the laws of universe bind. As required by the test, everyone has been given different opportunities. It is left to the person's responsibility to utilize these chances. All inequalities and imbalance that occur in this world as an inevitable consequence of us being tested will be compensated in hereafter, all wrongdoers will be duly punished.

<sup>53</sup> al-Māturīdī, *Kitābu't-Tevhid Tercümesi*, s.138-139.

<sup>54</sup> Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī, *Ta'vilāt al-Qur'ān*, edited by Ahmet Vanlıoğlu (Istanbul: Mizan Publications, 2005), 12:90; 5:43-45; 6:25-26, 30-31, 112-113; 9:104-105; 13:135-136.

<sup>55</sup> Metin Özdemir, "Māturīdī'nin Kötülük Problemine Yaklaşımı", *Māturīdī'nin Düşünce Dünyası*, ed. Şaban Ali Düzgün (Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2011), 407-408.

### 3.2. The Problem of Moral Evil

All kalām scholars including Jahm, the founder of Jahmiyya, agree that the people are responsible for their actions. Jahm has never said the opposite. His words describing human to be floating in front of the wind were not voiced in context of human responsibilities, but to defend the argument that there is no similitude between human and Allah in terms of attributes against the Mujassimites (the Anthropomorphists) and Mushabbihah (The Assimilators).

Nevertheless, kalām scholars have faced three fundamental issues about moral evil.<sup>56</sup> The first is the problem of the creation of actions; the second is why Allah guides people to the right path or deflect from it and the third is the ascertainment of elemental criterion in determination of the good and evil. Hence, under this heading, we will only be addressing briefly to these three fundamental issues in the context of moral evil.

#### 3.2.1. The Problem of the Creation of Actions

Unlike the philosophers, who regard this as a human problem, kalām scholars have treated this as a metaphysical problem similar to natural evil. Because from their point of view, the principal determinant in problem of moral evil is the notion of tanzih (to declare that Allah is beyond any similarity to anything), the same as it was in problem of natural evil.

According to Ahl al-Sunnah, as the unique creator of everything, He is the one who forms human actions. The oneness of the creator is an unavoidable result of the tawhid (the principle of uniqueness). Thus no one can be endowed with the ability of creating, but Allah.<sup>57</sup> On the other hand, Mu'tazila, who discuss tawhid in first place among their five essential principles, claim without any hesitation that human is the creator of their own actions.<sup>58</sup> For them, had the human actions been created by Allah, there would be no such thing as human responsibility; moreover, Allah would be denominated as the creator of evil. However, as expressed above, their principle of justice vindicates the idea that Allah cannot be qualified as the creator of evil. Mu'tazila's view suggesting that human actions are created by Allah, human responsibilities would disappear stems from their consideration of Allah as the true agent of actions.<sup>59</sup> For Ahl al-Sunnah, however, criterion that determines the true doer of the action is the direction of free will towards that action.<sup>60</sup>

After all, this divine will issue has been a contradictive matter between Ash'arites and Māturīdites. Formers say, the actual motive behind humans held responsible for their actions is because they are the ones who acquire (acquisition [al-kasb]) them. al-Kasb for Ash'arites, is the realization of the action by human's power of hādith (the thing that comes from nonexistence into existence). Yet, this power show itself simultaneously with the action, not before the action. That is, a separate power is created for each action and man hence perform his action via this generated power. Therefore, Allah is the one who, in fact, creates

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<sup>56</sup> al-Shahristānī, *al-Milel wa al-nihal*, 1:86.

<sup>57</sup> al-Jurjānī, *Sharh al-Mawāqif*, 3:244.

<sup>58</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 8:3.

<sup>59</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 7:115 vd.

<sup>60</sup> Ibn al-Humām, *al-Musāyara fī ilm al-Kalām* (Egypt: s.n., 1317), 1:110-111.

al-kasb according to Ash'arites.<sup>61</sup> So for them, there is no answer to the question "what is the role of human in execution process of the actions? Ash'arites have thus been denominated by their antagonists as al-jabr al-mutawassit (relative fatalism).<sup>62</sup>

Māturīdites, on the other hand, have followed a more liberal path on this subject when compared to Ash'arites. They claim human to have an *total will* (*al-irādat al-kulliyā*) created by Allah. When man freely directs this will to a particular object, it turns into *particular will* (*al-irādat al-juz'iyyā*), which totally belongs to human. They have tried to overcome the question of who is the creator of this particular will in the context of the principle that Allah is the creator of everything, by the argument that this particular will is only a nominal situation. That is to say, the particular will has no real existence and hence is not actual, but a nominal situation. In other saying, it is not a created object, but a kind of psychological or spiritual state attributed to human. As a matter of fact, while trying to establish rational grounds for human responsibility, al-Māturīdī underlines that they have the conscious of liberty.<sup>63</sup>

Contrary to Mu'tazila viewpoint, from Ahl al-Sunnah perspective, the creation of actions by Allah would not entail that He should be identified as the doer of evil. In their way of thinking, Allah does not create the quality of the action but the action itself. The action takes the quality of being good or evil from the servants' kasb or the direction of particular will towards it, not from the fact that Allah creates it. In any case, the real agent of the action is man himself. For Allah predetermines his actions as to his own kasb or particular will. To sum up, what initiates the process of the action's creation by Allah is human's acquisitional or partial will.

The dispute between Ahl al-Sunnah and Mu'tazila in this subject is due to the fact that both parties do not understand one another correctly. The latter mention two sorts of creation, the first of which is the creation out of nothing. The foregoing belongs to Allah completely. The second is that human execute their actions with a generated power contained in them. By contrast with Ahl al-Sunnah thought, this power comes before the action. Mu'tazila present the Qur'anic verse "So blessed is Allah, the best of creators!" (Mu'minūn 23/14) as a proof of these views of them. Ahl al-Sunnah interprets the word "create" mentioned in the verse as "appreciation".<sup>64</sup> Yet Mu'tazila uses it to describe the realization of the action by human with a power of hādith (the thing that comes from nonexistence into existence) inside them.<sup>65</sup>

As a result, both Mu'tazila and Ahl al-Sunnah try to solve this issue over metaphysical concerns. About human actions, Mu'tazila's apprehension is the protection of the divine justice, while Ahl al-Sunnah's cause for concern is the vindication of the principle of tawhid. Though when the meanings ascribed to the concept of creation by the former are taken into consideration, they cannot be said to damage the principle of tawhid. As the philosophers treat the problem as a mere moral issue, they are observed to have reached

<sup>61</sup> Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd (Cairo: s.n., 1969), 1:339.

<sup>62</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 8:164-165.

<sup>63</sup> Ibn al-Humām, *al-Musāyara*, 1:110-111.

<sup>64</sup> Abū Bakr Muhammad b. Tayyib b. Muhammad al-Bākillānī, *el-Inṣāf*, edited by Imād al-dīn Ahmad Haydar (Beirut: s.n.,1987), 208.

<sup>65</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 8:163.

more useful and efficacious results by having focused on the moral principles that would bring man to maturity.

### **3.2.2. The Significance of Allah's Guidance to the Right Path or His Deflection from It**

There are verses in Qur'an saying that "Allah guides or misguides whoever He wants to or from the right path". While some of these verses can be interpreted as "Allah sends astray [thereby] whom He wills and guides whom He wills", in some cases this translation is not accurate, as in the verse "That is the guidance of Allah by which He guides whom He wills. And one whom Allah leaves astray - for him there is no guide."<sup>66</sup>

Kalām scholars have resorted to interpreting this sort of verses in the direction of their own understanding of tanzih (to declare that Allah is beyond any similarity to anything). According to Ahl al-Sunnah, these expressions signifies that Allah creates guidance or misguidance in the servant's heart in respect to his acquisitional or partial will.<sup>67</sup> Mu'tazila, on the other hand, explain the verses as, Allah names his servant by the principle of justice as "finding the right path" or "going astray" depending on the actions he does or Allah leaves the servant astray as a punishment or even He guides the servant through the reason and revelations.

In conclusion, kalām scholars have dealt with this problem within a metaphysical frame. When it comes to the philosophers,<sup>68</sup> however, it is not a metaphysical matter for them but a merely moral issue and occurs in a direct connection with human will.

### **3.2.3. The Question of What Is the Key Criterion in Determination of the Good and Evil**

Whereas the philosophers have covered this subject as a purely mental matter,<sup>69</sup> kalām scholars have fallen into dispute on it thanks to their different understanding of tanzih.

On the subject, Mu'tazila makes inferences convenient with the principle of justice. The reason, for them, had ability to determine the good and evil before religion came on the scene. Religion verifies the reason and helps it on the matters that are out of its scope such as prayers and religious services, because the goodness and evil are not qualities attached to objects from outside, but special attributes contained inside them. For instance, the evil in the action of killing a man undeservedly arises from the quality of injustice and wrong lying in it. This quality is contained in the mentioned action itself. Thus it is not articulated to the action from outside. Therefore, when the reason determines these qualities, it can easily dominate the evil contained in the actions which bear these qualities alone. For this reason, from their perspective, the reason has authority and ability to order what is good and forbid what is evil. Over this way of

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<sup>66</sup> al-Zumer 39/23.

<sup>67</sup> al-Māturīdī, *Ta'vilāt al-Qur'ān*, 6:116; Abu'l-Mu'īn al-Nasafī, *Kitāb al-Tamhīd*, edited by Cibullah Hasan Ahmad (Egypt: s.n., 1986), 377-378.

<sup>68</sup> al-Fārābī, *Farabī'nin Üç Eseri*, 100-101.

<sup>69</sup> al-Fārābī, *Farabī'nin Üç Eseri*, 21.

thinking, Mu‘tazila regards the actions that are praised as good while labels others that are condemned as evil.<sup>70</sup>

For Ash‘arites, the determination of the good and evil in the actions which lay responsibilities on human, belongs entirely and directly to the divine will. In this sense, Allah may qualify what seems good to the reason as bad or vice versa. The idea that Allah settles the good and evil as per the reason would mean that His will is restricted by the limits of the mind. Yet in their view, the divine will is an absolute existence and thus impossible to set limits on in any manner. So the authority to both settle the good and evil, and order and forbid them is fairly pertains to Allah.<sup>71</sup> Finally, Māturīdites, agree with Mu‘tazila about the determination of the good and evil. Yet they have converged with Ash‘arites on designation of good and evil as necessary or illicit.<sup>72</sup> For all that, all three orders are of the same mind on determination of the good and evil in an aesthetic sense.

## EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

In general terms, the phenomenon of evil is a topic that has been assessed in the context of God-universe relation by theist philosophers and kalām scholars. The deniers, however, opt to treat the subject rather as a problem of belief; because in their opinion, the belief of a God ascribed with supreme titles is in the contradiction with the existence of evil.

The deniers' dilemma is rooted in the fact that they discuss the problem of evil only in the context of the high titles attributed to God. But this subject, especially from the theologian perspective, is related to God's aim and intention behind creation as much as to His epithets. According to kalām scholars, Allah created human to test them and hence designed this universe in a way that it would suit with this testing process. He therefore allowed evil to be contained in the process of universe along with the goodness. Of course, had He willed, He could have created a world with no evil in it. However, a world like this would not have been a place inhabited by free beings who would have had chance to realize themselves, display their talents and abilities, on the contrary, it would have been a world where non-skilled beings deprived of will like angels would live. There is no evil in the realm of angels, nor are there human-specific features and opportunities such as creativity and productivity. If Allah had contented Himself only with creating the realm of angels, the perfection and prosperity in creation would not have come to fruition. On the other hand, as only God possesses the power to create something out of nothing, the authority to take decision in this regard belongs only to Him. Thus human's part in this context is to utilize all genuine abilities such as creativity and productivity and hence all the possibilities for the correction and improvement of the earth, standing in awe of His decisions and choices.

Although theist philosopher's and theologian's efforts for the vindication of divine justice are shallowly grounded on this frame, when descended to particulars, significant discrepancies between them manifest themselves. According to Muslim thinkers, who embrace the theory of emanation while grounding the existence, natural evils are not Allah's primary objective. They spring from the deficiencies and flaws that

<sup>70</sup> Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Muhīt*, 252-253.

<sup>71</sup> al-Shahristānī, *Nihāyāt al-Aqdām*, 371-372.

<sup>72</sup> Ibn al-Humām, *al-Musāyara*, 1:154, 158.

emerge in the nature of the object as a necessary result of ontological hierarchy produced by emanation when descended into sublunary realm. Perfection and competence are at the most excellent degree at the top levels of ontological hierarchy, they are also in Principal Mind which was emanated from Allah in the first place as a necessary result of His knowledge of Himself. When gradually descended downwards however, a decrease is seen in this perfection and competence, which finally becomes clearly apparent in sublunary realm. So natural evil is an accidental and relative phenomenon that arise due to the departure from the principal source. In fact, evil things are very few compared to the goodness. To desire them to completely disappear means to desire many good not to exist as well, because in sublunary realm, thanks to the aforementioned ontological hierarchy, it is not possible to achieve the good without facing any evil. Briefly stated, the evil seen clearly only in sublunary realm are somehow inevitable escorts of the good which are abundant. Consequently, the desire of non-existence of evil despite many good is not reasonable at all, since it would necessitate all good to disappear as well.

Kalām scholars and theologians have adopted the principle of creation out of nothing. Allah for them, is a self-determining creator. The universe is not a direct outcome of His essence, but his absolute will and His limitless power. In this sense, the place of natural evil in universe should be sought within the frame of Allah's goal in creation, which, as pointed out above, is the subjection of human being to a test. Universe was created in accordance with this testing process. Yet kalām scholars have not been able to come together on a single viewpoint in the context of Allah-universe relation. While some of them regard universe to run in connection with the laws of causality as in the case of Mu'tazila and Ahl al-Sunnah scholars, others like Ash'arites, base the continuity of the universe on the action of direct creation which Allah does at all times. The theoretical ground of this creation has been established on their universe concepts based on essence and accident dualism.

When it comes to the moral evil, the philosophers have considered it a pure moral problem. They have thus managed to kept the subject out of being a metaphysical problem by focusing on the abilities human possess during their maturation process. Kalām scholars, on the other hand, have kept regarding this issue as a metaphysical question just as they treat natural evil as a natural consequence of their understanding of tanzih. Mu'tazila, however, unlike other kalām scholars, followed a path proximate to the philosophers with regard to determination of the good and evil and accordingly in designating the actions as necessary and unlawful, and hence managed to develop a natural and instinctive moral approach within the limits of the capacity of human mind. Māturīdītes, aside from joining them in the subject of determination of the good and evil, differed from them about the competence and authority to render something necessary or unlawful.

The philosophers have drifted away from rational thought on the topic of natural evil as they have stuck to emanation theory based on fictional assumptions, yet have taken an exceptionally rational path towards moral evil. Kalām scholars and theologians, on the other hand, have never been able to disentangle themselves from turning both the matter of natural and moral evil into a metaphysical problem. The truth is that this problem will be more resolvable when it is evaluated together with the laws of universe, testing process and the belief of hereafter.



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## An Overview of the Adventure of Meaning of Concept of Messiah within the Covenant Tradition\*

Mustafa Selim Yılmaz \*\*

### ABSTRACT

The concept of Messiah a basically reformed in Judaism and Christianity is the principal matter of this paper. This concept that was outlined by more humanely worries can be found in many cultures. Nonetheless the main purpose is to evaluate it only chronologically from Judaism to Islam, that is to say, the Covenant Tradition. It is tried to clearly understand that which kind of transformation been faced about it and on the other hand what is approach of Holy Qur'ān the last ring of the revelation to this concept's adventure throughout history and which imagination can be true in terms of Qur'ān. Consequently, it can be accepted that the concept of Messiah has been as an important sample of instrument for disregarding human nature.

### KEYWORDS

Kalām, Messiah, Human Being, Judaism, Christianity, Islam

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\*\* Assistant Professor, Karabuk University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Kalam, Karabuk, TURKEY  
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Karabük Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fakültesi, Kelam Anabilim Dalı  
s.mutekellim@gmail.com  
0000-0002-2346-804X

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## Ahit Geleneğindeki Mesih Kavramının Anlam Serüvenine Genel Bir Bakış

### ÖZ

Temel olarak Yahudilik ve Hıristiyanlıkta teşekkül ettirilen Mesih kavramı bu makalenin ana temasıdır. Daha ziyade insani kaygılarla çerçevesi çizilen bu kavrama birçok kültürde rastlanmakla birlikte bunun, yalnızca ahit geleneği diyebileceğimiz Yahudilikten başlayıp Müslümanlığa doğru kronolojik bir perspektifte ele alınması temel amaçtır. Bu süreçte, özellikle Yahudi ve Hıristiyan toplulukların karşılaştığı ciddi sorunlar neticesinde Mesih anlayışının ne tür bir evrimleşme geçirdiği, vahiy geleneğinin son halkası olan Kur’an-ı Kerim’in ise söz konusu serüvene ilişkin yaklaşımı ve nasıl bir tasavvuru salık verdiği anlaşılmaya gayret edilecektir. Sonuç itibarıyla insan tabiatının görmezden gelinerek iradi ve ameli bir varoluşun önünün alınmasına önemli bir örnek olarak Mesih kavramının kullanıldığı düşünülmektedir.

### ANAHTAR KELİMELER

Kelâm, Mesih, İnsan, Yahudilik, Hıristiyanlık, İslam

### INTRODUCTION

The word “Messiah”, which is derived from the verb “مسح” that means rubbing with hand and cleaning by patting with water,<sup>1</sup> literally means “anointed one” that refers someone’s being oiled to become a king or prophet,<sup>2</sup> blessed and specially chosen.<sup>3</sup> The root of this notion is “Mashiah” as it is mentioned in *The Babylonian Talmud*, and it is an Aramaic word.<sup>4</sup> This notion, which has made a very deep impression in the history of humanity and has shaped some worldviews, has maintained its both significance and influence until today. This notion that has a content that represents “Eschatological Savior”<sup>5</sup> has been developed in Jewish and Christian theology. The traces of this tendency, besides, can be encountered in every region and at every period of time when the hope is lost and where there is a search for a new hope.

Even though the concept of Messiah heavily a theological issue, it is a psycho-sociologic phenomenon in essence. The ideas shaped around the notion “Messiah” are formed by human’s fear and anxiety and grounded as a way of social salvation. Once various religious and cultural communities are examined, different perceptions of Messiah that are based on similar basis can be observed.<sup>6</sup> In every period of the history and in every community, there have always been people who are oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Due to this oppression they urges themselves to seek for a way out. In this way, they seek for a salvation and desire to obtain a peaceful life. Sometimes they produce radical solutions with reference to their personal

<sup>1</sup> See Abu al-Fadl Ibn Manzur, *Lisan al-‘arab* (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1955), 2: 593.

<sup>2</sup> See Ibrahim Mustafa, *Mu‘cem al-vasit* (İstanbul: Çağrı Publications, 1992), 868.

<sup>3</sup> See Cengiz Batuk, *Tarihin Sonunu Beklemek: Ortadoğu Dinlerinde Eskatoloji Mitosları* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2003), 67.

<sup>4</sup> See Isidore Singer, *The Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York: Funk&Wagnalls Com., 1904), 8: 505.

<sup>5</sup> See Batuk, *Tarihin Sonunu Beklemek*, 66 etc.

<sup>6</sup> For example, further information about the Saviour Saoshyant in Ancient Persia see Joseph Campbell, *Batı Mitolojisi-Tanrı’nın Maskeleri*, trans. Kudret Emiroğlu (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003), 195 etc.; and Krishna in Ancient India and Hercules in Ancient Greece see Joseph Campbell, *Doğu Mitolojisi-Tanrı’nın Maskeleri*, trans. Kudret Emiroğlu (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003), 284 etc.; and Mahdî in Islamic tradition see Al-Tirmidhî, *Al-Sunen*, Mahdî, 2230.

abilities, and sometimes facing realities might be horrifying for them, so they may develop some kinds of defense mechanisms by escaping from them. However, the important thing is to face these realities.<sup>7</sup> But not being able to show such an effort leads to people evade their responsibility and to appeal to others' to produce a solution. Consequently, a person, who has such a consideration, expects the arrival of a divine savior who will save himself and people like him and establish justice by eliminating cruel ones, and this thought is called as “Messianism”.<sup>8</sup> One who can analyze and resolve people with such backgrounds can create many legends that are engraved on minds for centuries.<sup>9</sup>

## 1. MESSIAH ACCORDING TO BIBLE

“Messianic Culture”<sup>10</sup> has found its meaning systematically in Judaism and Christianity. Therefore, an interpretation on this issue with reference to Bible that contains both religions' holy scripts is necessary. When this book's wording is examined in general, it will be seen that the Old Testament and the New Testament, namely; two main divisions of this book, are exactly a history book. The first one is the history of a chosen group of people,<sup>11</sup> that is to say Jews, and the other one is the history of a chosen person<sup>12</sup> who comes to save people from their original sins. The understanding of Messiah is formed because of great difficulties that are encountered in this historical writing. To understand the intellectual and historical extents of Messiah correctly, it is important to approach the Old Testament and the New Testament as a whole and chronologically because while the first one makes prophecies about Messiah's personality, attributes and future,<sup>13</sup> the other one discusses the actualization of these prophecies within Jesus Christ's essence.<sup>14</sup> From this point of view, the Old Testament, which is also called “Tanakh”<sup>15</sup> has a crucial value for testification of the New Testament's claim since “Tanakh” itself is Messiah's source of justification.

This framework of meaning that is summarized cares and prioritizes a future in which it is thought that there is the end of history or where the delayed hopes become exceedingly real instead of a past where the identity is built but not bright.<sup>16</sup> Here this perception of history indicates that wording of Bible has an “apocalyptic” structure.

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<sup>7</sup> For further information see Erich Fromm, *Kendini Savunan Adam*, trans. Necla Arat (İstanbul: Say Publications, 2001).

<sup>8</sup> See M. Hayri Kırbasoğlu, “Hz. İsa'yı Gökten İndiren Hadislerin Tenkidi”, *İslamiyat* 3/4 (2000): 147. And also see Mustafa Selim Yılmaz, *Kunran Yazmalarının Ahit Geleneği Çerçevesinde Değerlendirilmesi* (İstanbul: Ayışığı Kitapları, 2013), 104 etc.

<sup>9</sup> See Eric Hoffer, *Kesin İnançlılar*, trans. Erkal Günür (İstanbul: İm Publications, 2005), 25 etc.; Gustave Le Bon, *Kitleler Psikolojisi* (İstanbul: Yağmur Publications, 2005), 19.

<sup>10</sup> See Singer, *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, 8: 505–512.

<sup>11</sup> Ezekiel 37/27 etc.

<sup>12</sup> Luke 2/11; Hebrews 1/3 etc.

<sup>13</sup> Isaiah 40/10–11; Daniel 7/13–14; Ezekiel 37 etc.

<sup>14</sup> In fact, there are some words in the Bible such as “...so was fulfilled what was spoken.” in this context. See Matthew 13/35 etc.

<sup>15</sup> Today, the synonym word used for the Old Testament is Torah. Actually, this usage is wrong because Torah is one of the main divisions of the Old Testament. And Torah is composed of the Five Books; Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy. The other divisions are “Nevi'im” (the stories of the prophets before and after the exile) and “Ketuvim” (about the revelation of Yahweh and Jewish responses to the laws of Yahweh). For further information see Mahmut Aydın, *Anahatlarıyla Dinler Tarihi* (İstanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2010), 285-292.

<sup>16</sup> See Batuk, *Tarihin Sonunu Beklemek*, 71.

The aforementioned “apocalypticism” should have found some notions that will be used by emphasizing and reinterpreting further while mentioning itself within the ambience it is included, and these should have belonged to new world order which will be formed in the future. Therefore, if one of these term is the divine sovereignty that will be formed in future, then the other one will be Messiah, title of the person who is send by God to form this sovereign. Appropriately, “apocalypticism” reevaluated and explained “malkhut” and “messiah” notions. The word malkhut, which is derived from the word “malak” that means to dominate and to reign over in Hebrew, refers to both political sovereigns in secular terms and God’s eternal and everlasting sovereigns in the Old Testament. Within the “apocalyptic” understanding, we can easily infer that the divine sovereignty is regarded pertinent to future only. The second key notion that “apocalypticism” reinterpreted is “Messiah”.<sup>17</sup>

This conceptualization generates a radical fatalism, that is to say the fulfillment of inevitably expected prophecies. Accordingly, people who suffered torture and punishment for centuries will be saved by a leader as qualified as Moses. This savior’s name is Messiah. He will purify his people from their sins,<sup>18</sup> renew the disrupted covenant<sup>19</sup> and lead them by the law of God.<sup>20</sup> He will save them from their troubles,<sup>21</sup> endure difficulties for them,<sup>22</sup> and thus heal them.<sup>23</sup> He will herd them as a good shepherd,<sup>24</sup> choose them among many nations and gather them, be their sole king and shepherd and make the lands they settled theirs forever. Thus, they will be God’s people, and He will be their God.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, this Messiah transforms into a God who sacrifices Himself on the cross to save humanity in the New Testament.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, this understanding destroys the individuality<sup>27</sup> completely that should be essential in the religious thought, more precisely the framework of being human as being willingly and actual. It is possible to say that this thought, which follows from this perspective, is a logic in which all responsibility of a group of people is shouldered by a charismatic leader and the aforementioned people are contently submissive without questioning. This is theoretically called as “shepherd-flock” relationship in political literature.<sup>28</sup>

A community’s getting used to live as slaves and thus internalizing the slavery is sort of an expression of underdeveloped sense of responsibility. However, someone appears and regards liberating the society as

<sup>17</sup> Mehmet Paçacı, “Kur’an-ı Kerim Işığında Vahiy Geleneğine–Kitab-ı Mukaddes Bağlamında– Bir Bakış”, *İslami Araştırmalar* 5/3 (1991): 190.

<sup>18</sup> Daniel 9/24 etc.

<sup>19</sup> Jeremiah 31/31–34

<sup>20</sup> Jeremiah 31/33

<sup>21</sup> Psalm 34/17–20 etc.

<sup>22</sup> Psalm 69/4 etc.

<sup>23</sup> Isaiah 53/5 etc.

<sup>24</sup> Isaiah 40/11 etc.

<sup>25</sup> Ezekiel 37.

<sup>26</sup> Romans 8/3–4 etc.

<sup>27</sup> Here, it is not implied that the individuality is self centered and isolated from society. On the contrary, it is pointed out that the individuality based on the teachings of Qur’an, inasmuch as Qur’an constructs individual identity and individuals construct society and social institutions.

<sup>28</sup> An evaluation for this relation see Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri, *Al-Aql al-‘arabī al-siyāsī* (Beirut: al-Markaz as-Saqafi al-Arabi, 1991), 39-40.

a maxim, saves people with the help of God from unfavorable and hopeless situations they are in and helps them to have many blessing.<sup>29</sup> This person is Moses.<sup>30</sup> However, because they could not understand the thought of liberation that was sent via Moses, they lost the blessings they had and experienced enormous difficulties throughout the history.<sup>31</sup> Having said that, the personalities of Moses and the Messengers of Allah<sup>32</sup> who followed his path engraved in those people’s minds as a prototype. However, the historical fact reveals that this prototype was imagined in the opposite direction of the line that was oriented by tradition of the revelation. Accordingly, Moses is the perfect shepherd who takes the all responsibility, and they are a group of people who need to be directed. The emperor of Babylonia “Nebuchadnezzar’s (605-562 BC)<sup>33</sup> invasion” of their lands and exiling them is the milestone for Jews to form the Messiah literature based on the imagery of King David in which political power and influence is matured on the basis of Moses. Besides, they were significantly influenced by the Persians who gave them their freedom during this construction process. After they are subjected to a second exile by Romans (70 AD) and their temples were demolished, they raised this literature to its maximum level throughout this two thousand years of exile. As a result, they made the Messianic idea one of the thirteen principles of Jewish faith.<sup>34</sup> The Christians, who inherited the Messianic idea from them, on the other hand divinized this idea.<sup>35</sup>

In the messianic conceptualization, it should be focused on the key word, namely; “son”, which has a theological importance. It is the most important stage in which the conceptual transformation occurred. However, it does not show similarity with the word “son” in Christian literature. On the contrary, this is used in the meaning of chosenness. In this context, it aims to justify people or person,<sup>36</sup> who were confirmed via the prophecy<sup>37</sup> in which God revealed His purposes for the world, by symbolically engendering.<sup>38</sup> Also, the use of an expression of such gratification can have a meaning when the historical experience is analyzed because to save a group of people, who were oppressed for centuries, from this psychology of oppression, a catchy rhetoric style that will motivate them is necessary. From this perspective, such an expression could

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<sup>29</sup> al-A’raf 7/137–141 etc.

<sup>30</sup> al-A’raf 7/104–105 etc.

<sup>31</sup> al-Ma’idah 5/20–26 etc. The clearest evidence of failure to comprehend this mentality can be seen that they said to Moses when God command them to enter the holy land due to fear from the people there: “They said, O Moses, indeed we will not enter it, ever, as long as they are within it; so go, you and your Lord, and fight. Indeed, we are remaining right here.” al-Ma’idah 5/24.

<sup>32</sup> This term is conceptualized as “Prophets” in the western thought.

<sup>33</sup> The period of his sovereignty

<sup>34</sup> See Moses Maimonides, *The Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah) Book Two*, trans. Menachem Kellner (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 176; Moses Maimonides, *Dalalat Al-Hairin*, ed. Hüseyin Atay (Ankara: AÜİF Publications, 1974), 409. Besides for further information see Rabbi I. Epstein, *Judaism* (London: The Epworth Press, 1949), 77-78; David S. Ariel, *What Do Jews Believe? The Spiritual Foundations of Judaism* (New York: Schocker Books, 1995), 230-232; Louis Jacobs, *A Jewish Theology* (London: Behrman House, 1973), 292-300; Aydın, *Anahatlarıyla Dinler Tarihi*, 298 etc.

<sup>35</sup> See Paçacı, “Vahiy Geleneği’ne Bir Bakış”, 193; Yılmaz, *Kumran Yazmaları*, 36-45.

<sup>36</sup> See William H. Propp, “Chosen People”, *The Oxford Companion to the Bible*, ed. Bruce M. Metzger and et al., New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 110.

<sup>37</sup> See R. Martin Achard, “Prophecy (Old Testament)”, *Vocabulary of Bible*, ed. J. J. Von Allmen (s.l.: Lutterworth Press, 1958), 345.

<sup>38</sup> See Psalm 2/7; Ezekiel 37/23 etc.

be used in order to keep their morale high.<sup>39</sup> Also, a story that is told in John 10/22-39 supports this idea.<sup>40</sup> Consequently, this concept in Judaism is symbolically understood as a term that the presence of human belongs to God and there is a moral relation existing between Him and man instead of the ontological one.<sup>41</sup> However, this notion was altered by Paul the Apostle (d. 62 AD) and Messiah was shown as a God who sacrifices Himself on cross for people’s original sins and is reborn to make pagan communities become Christian.<sup>42</sup> In addition, it is important to mention the concept of “sin” in relation to the notion of “son”. According to Judaism, doing right things is because of human being’s creation, but committing sins means the corruption of his/her nature because sin means “human being’s betraying the covenant between God and himself”, which is another important conceptual framework. This covenant and thus the laws granted by God are assurances for natural life, that is to say the order of the universe. The order will be disrupted, and this will be followed by disasters when sin is committed, in other words sin will bring punishment with it. Therefore, it is vital to be protected from sins. If human being is involved in sins, it becomes a part of his nature, and salvation will not be possible without God’s help and involvement. The sinner should be sincerely and absolutely regretful to make it actual. Here sacrifice which is offered as redemption is the most important indicator of this regret, and the purpose of this is to protect whole society’s existence and order at the cost of a life.<sup>43</sup> However, with reference to the concept “son”, Christian theology transformed this conceptual framework into humanity’s ontological corruption on the basis of “the original sin”, and it is

<sup>39</sup> Additionally, the logic of the languages has been taken into consideration, because a conceptual framework has different meanings according to national mentalities. Furthermore, Judaism was surrounded by many ancient polytheistic religions in the beginning era of its cultural, spiritual and systematical construction. As a result, it was inevitable that they were influenced by the polytheist societies around them as in the sample of the concept “son”. In this inculturation process, even if Judaism borrowed some pagan terms, it did not lose its essence due to strong monotheistic emphasis in its structure. On the contrary, the Christian inculturation process was accomplished by pagans themselves. For a detailed comparison see Geza Vermes, *The Changing Faces of Jesus* (London: The Penguin Press, 2000), 263-265.

<sup>40</sup> Accordingly, the discussion between Jesus and the Jewish opponents in the Festival of Dedication is told. At the time of discussion, the Jewish opponents stoned Jesus. But he asked, though he showed many good works, the reason of their stoning. They said that the reason is for his blasphemy claiming to be God. By implying that he is the son of God, he provided a proof from the Jewish laws to be his righteousness: “Is it not written in your Law, ‘I have said you are “gods.”’ Apart from the discussion about the authenticity of this scene, it indicates the nature of a basic mentality: the Jewish perception of the concept of son is not within an ontological nature.

<sup>41</sup> See Yılmaz, *Kumran Yazmaları*, 27. “The fully developed concept of election is summarized in the Palestinian Talmud by the third-century CE Galilean Rabbi Lazar. Expounding the words of Deuteronomy quoted above, he comments: ‘When the Israelites do the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, they are called sons; but when they do not do His will, they are not called sons.’” Geza Vermes, *The Complete Dead Sea Scrolls in English (Revised Edition)* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), accessed: 3 June 2018. [https://archive.org/stream/pdfy-Uy\\_BZ\\_QGsaLiJ4Zs/The%20Dead%20Sea%20Scrolls%20%5BComplete%20English%20Translation%5D\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/pdfy-Uy_BZ_QGsaLiJ4Zs/The%20Dead%20Sea%20Scrolls%20%5BComplete%20English%20Translation%5D_djvu.txt), 103.

At this point, it is useful to mention about the Dead Sea Scrolls that they were founded in 1947 and dated to ancient times between 250 BC and 70 AD. The scrolls brought a new, different and clearest perspective to the concept of son. This concept stands for being chosen. It is used to express the people that consider rightly of the matter and they are on the right path. That is to say, the Sons of Light. On the other hand, the concept of the Sons of Darkness is used for the opposites to the Sons of Light. See Vermes, *Ölü Deniz Parşömenleri*, 97 etc. Finally, it is focused on Qur’ân because it is the last ring of the revelation that finishes that kind of discussions by clearly establishing the right perspective. Qur’ân has considerable regard for good moral character instead of the chosen people or person. It also emphasizes that virtue is not hereditary, on the contrary, it is for everybody that has good moral character: “And thus we have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you.” Al-Baqarah 2/143.

<sup>42</sup> See Acts 17/29; Philippians 2/6; Colossians 1/16–20. And also see Mehmet Sakioğlu, *İncil’i Kim Yazdı* (İstanbul: Ozan Publications, 2004), 151 etc.; Paçacı, “Vahiy Geleneği’ne Bir Bakış”, 193. For an evaluation about the concept of son in Judaism and Christianity see Yılmaz, *Kumran Yazmaları*, 27-45.

<sup>43</sup> See Yılmaz, *Kumran Yazmaları*, 55-59.

believed that the salvation from this is via acceptance of Jesus Christ, who is announced as the son of God, as the offering of redemption.<sup>44</sup>

In the light of these explanations, when the perception of Messiah appeared in the Old Testament and the New Testament is analyzed, the following results should be noted: According to Judaism, Messiah has not arrived yet,<sup>45</sup> but according to Christianity, Messiah is Jesus Christ,<sup>46</sup> and he fulfilled his fundamental duty that he undertook.<sup>47</sup>

### 1.1. Messiah in the Old Testament

According to “Tanakh”, Messiah is a prophet, who is a sign from the Lord for Jews, and whose name is “Emmanuel”,<sup>48</sup> and who will arise at the Dreadful Day of the Lord.<sup>49</sup> He is the sprout which springs up from the stump of Jesse, and a sapling which produces fruit.<sup>50</sup> He is the one from the descendants of Jacob, who will reign.<sup>51</sup> He is the one whose sovereignty will be on David’s throne.<sup>52</sup> He is a priest forever in the order of Melchizedek.<sup>53</sup> He is the one who will raise the scepter from “Judah”, and the one who will not let the scepter slip through his feet.<sup>54</sup> He is the one who will sit beside the Lord’s right until He makes his enemies footstool of his feet.<sup>55</sup> He is the one who will rule as a king, act wisely and bring justice. In his time, Judah

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<sup>44</sup> See Yılmaz, *Kumran Yazmaları*, 235 etc.

<sup>45</sup> For further understanding, it should be focused on the circumstance of the revelation of Ali ‘Imran 3/183 that there was discussion between Muhammad (pbuh) and the Jews of Madinah. The verse: “[They are] those who said, ‘Indeed, Allah has taken our promise not to believe any messenger until he brings us an offering which fire [from heaven] will consume.’ Say, ‘There have already come to you messengers before me with clear proofs and [even] that of which you speak. So why did you kill them, if you should be truthful?’” According to Jews, a burned offering to the Lord in the Temple is compulsory in the Law of Moses. At the time of Muhammad (pbuh), approximately 500 years passed over the destruction of the Temple and the only person offering a burned over an altar was Messiah. Because he is the only man that redeems Jews from the exile, conveys them to the Holy Land, rebuilds up the Temple and performs the aforementioned offering. Therefore, the Jews of Madinah discussed with Muhammad (pbuh) in order to know whether he is Messiah or not. On the contrary, as mentioned in the verse, the Messenger of Allah spoke the truth clearly to them and stated that they are untrustworthy to their claim. See Muhammed Esed, *Kur’an Mesajı*, trans. Cahit Koytak et al. (İstanbul: İşaret Publications, 2002), 128. After Jesus, many false Messiahs emerged during the history. Sabbatai Zevi from Izmir had especially a great effect on Jews and kept alive their hopes for a long time. Unfortunately, his declaring being a Muslim in front of the Ottoman Sultan had deeply disappointed Jews. For further information about Sabbatai Zevi see Gershom Scholem, *Sabatay Sevi “Mesih mi? Sahte Peygamber mi?”*, trans. Selahattin Ayaz (İstanbul: Burak Publications, 2001); John Freely, *Kayıp Mesih*, trans. Ayşegül Çetin Tekçi (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003). As a result, Jewish people are still waiting for the advent of Messiah.

<sup>46</sup> See Mark 1/1 etc.

<sup>47</sup> “God presented Christ as a sacrifice of atonement, through the shedding of his blood—to be received by faith. He did this to demonstrate his righteousness, because in his forbearance he had left the sins committed beforehand unpunished— he did it to demonstrate his righteousness at the present time, so as to be just and the one who justifies those who have faith in Jesus.” Romans 3/25–26; Matthew 1/21 etc.

<sup>48</sup> Isaiah 7/14 cf. Matthew 1/21, 23.

<sup>49</sup> See Malachi 4/5.

<sup>50</sup> See Isaiah 11/1.

<sup>51</sup> See Numbers 24/19 cf. Luke 1/33.

<sup>52</sup> See Isaiah 9/7.

<sup>53</sup> See Psalm 110/4.

<sup>54</sup> See Genesis 49/10 cf. Hebrews 7/14.

<sup>55</sup> See Mezmurlar 110/1.



will be saved and Israel will be safe. He will be called, “Jehovah is our righteous savior”.<sup>56</sup> His kingdom is expressed in prophet Daniel’s dream as follows:

“In my vision at night I looked, and there before me was one like a son of man, coming with the clouds of heaven. He approached the Ancient of Days and was led into his presence. He was given authority, glory and sovereign power; all nations and peoples of every language worshiped him. His dominion is an everlasting dominion that will not pass away, and his kingdom is one that will never be destroyed.”<sup>57</sup>

Messiah will show various miracles, such as healing blinds, lames and mutes.<sup>58</sup> Besides, he is the one who will enter Jerusalem on a donkey and welcomed with cheers.<sup>59</sup> Apart from that, in addition to his enlightenment of Jews, other nations will follow his light.<sup>60</sup>

Messiah, who has such remarkable powers, is also described as a servant who suffers for Israel. His worth will not be appreciated by his people, but later his people will repent because of their ignorance of Messiah.<sup>61</sup> Messiah is also told in the words of Ezekiel, and these messages are given to Jews: just as Ezekiel resurrects dead bones and leads them by God’s consent, Messiah will resurrect Jews from the condition of death they are in and will bring them to life. He will gather sons of Israel from nations, make them a single nation and a steady staff in God’s hand. He is the one who will unite them so as not to be separated and become their sole king and shepherd. He will make sure that they obey God’s laws strictly, and make the lands they settled theirs forever.<sup>62</sup> Accordingly, the destiny expressed as “and my dwelling place will be with them, and I will be their God, and they will be my people”<sup>63</sup> will be fulfilled.

## 1.2. Messiah in The New Testament

Jesus Christ is the centralized person around whom the New Testament is formed because he is the most important part of the creed of trinity. Not accepting the story that is depicted in relation to him will make the Christianity meaningless.<sup>64</sup> In the New Testament, the most important qualification of Jesus Christ

<sup>56</sup> See Jeremiah 23/5–6.

<sup>57</sup> Daniel 7/13–14. And also see Isaiah 11/5–6; Isaiah 11/10; Psalm 2/13–14.

<sup>58</sup> See Isaiah 35/5–6 cf. Matthew 9/35; Al-i ‘Imran 3/49.

<sup>59</sup> See Zechariah 9/9 cf. Matthew 24/4–5; Luke 19/29–38.

<sup>60</sup> See Isaiah 60/1–3 cf. Acts 13/47–48. There is also an important point here: The light of Messiah to the Apostle Paul and his friends; and his Kingdom to christianise people transformed. The attracting people to the light of Messiah is stated that people believe in the principles of Paul.

<sup>61</sup> See Isaiah 53.

<sup>62</sup> See Ezekiel 37.

<sup>63</sup> Ezekiel 37/24.

<sup>64</sup> The Dead Sea Scrolls allowed some interesting speculations about Jesus and his essence. For example: “Another influential work, *The Crucifixion by an Eye-Witness*, which appeared in German towards the end of the 19th century and in English around 1907, purported to be a genuine ancient text composed by an Essene scribe. Jesus was depicted as the son of Mary and an unnamed Essene teacher, whose fund of secret Essene medical knowledge enabled him not just to survive the Crucifixion, but also to appear to his disciples afterwards as if ‘risen from the dead’. George Moore undoubtedly drew on this work when, in 1916, he published *The Brook Kerith* and scandalised Christian readers across the Englishspeaking world. Moore, too, portrayed Jesus as a protégé of Essene thought, who survives the Crucifixion and retires to an Essene community in the general vicinity of Qumran. Here, years later, he is visited by a fanatic named Paul, who, quite unknowingly, has come to promulgate a bizarre mythologised account of his career and, in the process, promote him to godhood.” Michael Baigent – Richard Leigh, *The Dead Sea Scrolls Deception* (New York: Touchstone, 1991), 160. “‘Christianity’, as it will subsequently evolve from Paul, has by now severed virtually all connection with its roots, and can no longer be said to have anything to do with Jesus, only with Paul’s image of Jesus.” Baigent – Leigh, *The Dead Sea Scrolls Deception*, 178. Additionally, Geza Vermes depicts the Teacher of Righteousness (one of the main characters in the Scrolls) as the

is that he is the son of God. As mentioned, Jesus is descended from David,<sup>65</sup> and he is the beloved son of God who has His consent<sup>66</sup> and is given birth by a virgin<sup>67</sup> who got pregnant by the Holy Spirit.<sup>68</sup> John the Baptist has an important role in proving this matter, and he states that Jesus is the one who baptizes with the Holy Spirit, and testifies that he is the son of God.<sup>69</sup>

Jesus Christ is the one who comes to save his people from their sins.<sup>70</sup> This salvation is not only limited to his people, but also it is extended to everyone who believes in him.<sup>71</sup> He is the incarnation of God for this purpose.<sup>72</sup> In other words, he is the son of God who arrives to be offered as redemption for humans' original sins and for justice of God and goodness of people who believe in Jesus.<sup>73</sup> Such an offering reveals a transformation of a basic thought in “Tanakh”: Imposing the redemption of mistakes made by Jews in the past on Messiah transformed into an original sin that people carried since their birth, and Messiah is transformed into an offering of sacrifice who pays the price as a result of the justice of God.<sup>74</sup> Hereby this conceptual evolvement is the most important indication that shows the separation of Judaism and Christianity and the last one transformed into a different religion.

According to the story told in Matthew 27/39-44,<sup>75</sup> Jews expect Jesus, who introduces himself as Messiah, to show some signs by the concept that is developed in “Tanakh”. However, actualization of this is not possible considering Christianity's redemption doctrine because it is necessary that Jesus dies on cross in order for God's justice to be done, and thus the destiny is fulfilled to save his believers from their sins. Therefore, even though Jesus deeply feels the pain of shouldering such responsibility,<sup>76</sup> he needs to complete

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image of wisdom from the point of the Dead Sea Scrolls: “...the Scrolls directly impute to the Teacher a particular God-given insight into the hidden significance of prophecy. He was ‘the Teacher of Righteousness to whom God made known all the mysteries... of His servants the Prophets’ (IQp-Hab VII, 1-5). He was, ‘the Priest [in whose heart] God set [understanding] that he might interpret all the words of His servants the Prophets, through whom He foretold all that would happen to His people’ (IQp-Hab VII, 8-10). He was the Teacher who, ‘made known to the latter generations that which God had done to the latter generation, the congregation of traitors, to those who departed from the way’ (CD I, 12-13). The Teacher's interpretation alone, propagated by his disciples, offered true enlightenment and guidance.” Vermes, *The Complete Dead Sea Scrolls in English (Revised Edition)*, 101.

<sup>65</sup> There is an exceptional case at this point. The genealogy of Jesus is traced to David through the fiancé of Mary, Joseph instead of herself. Actually, in the Jewish tradition, it should be through the mother. See Matthew 1/1-18. It might be said that the reason for this sort of narration is adopting the easiest way to tell pagans about Jesus. Because the founder of Christianity, the Apostle Paul grew up in a pagan cultural environment.

<sup>66</sup> See Matthew 3/17; Luke 3/21-22 etc.

<sup>67</sup> See Matthew 1/18-25 etc.

<sup>68</sup> See Matthew, 1:18.

<sup>69</sup> See John 1/32-34 etc.

<sup>70</sup> See Matthew 3/21.

<sup>71</sup> See Romans 3/21-24.

<sup>72</sup> See Colossians 1/14-15, 17 etc.

<sup>73</sup> See Romans 3/25-26.

<sup>74</sup> For an explanation about the differentiation between Judaism and Christianity in terms of sin see Joseph A. Komonchak et al., *The New Dictionary of Theology* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990), 956; Yılmaz, *Kumran Yazmaları*, 55-67.

<sup>75</sup> “Those who passed by hurled insults at him, shaking their heads and saying, ‘You who are going to destroy the temple and build it in three days, save yourself! Come down from the cross, if you are the Son of God!’ In the same way the chief priests, the teachers of the law and the elders mocked him. ‘He saved others,’ they said, ‘but he can’t save himself! He’s the king of Israel! Let him come down now from the cross, and we will believe in him. He trusts in God. Let God rescue him now if he wants him, for he said, ‘I am the Son of God.’ In the same way the rebels who were crucified with him also heaped insults on him.”

<sup>76</sup> See Matthew 22/46.

this duty by praying<sup>77</sup> for those who are unconscious of this responsibility. On the other hand, the Messianic thought in Christianity is isolated from the context that is formed by Judaism in relation to this world with reference to religious-political basis and presented within the framework of a totally celestial kingdom.<sup>78</sup>

According to the expressions in Gospels, many miraculous events occurred after Jesus was crucified<sup>79</sup> and died:<sup>80</sup> Darkness falls all over the whole Earth.<sup>81</sup> The curtain of the temple is torn into two, and the Earth quakes. The bodies of many holy people come out of their tombs and appear to many people while walking in the holy city. The Roman centurion and others who see these events confirm that Jesus is the son of God.<sup>82</sup> Then Joseph from Arimathea, a rich man and disciple of Jesus, takes his body with the permission of Pilate and places Jesus in a new tomb that he has already made for himself.<sup>83</sup>

Jesus resurrects after three days of his death<sup>84</sup> despite the all efforts<sup>85</sup> of the chief priests to refute his word. An angel comes down from heaven, rolls back the rock at the entrance of the tomb and sits on it.<sup>86</sup> The guards, who were placed at the entrance of his tomb by the chief priests to prevent a creation of myth because of the theft of Jesus' body, shake from fear of this angel and play possum.<sup>87</sup> Mary Magdalene and Mary the Virgin see these remarkable events. The angel knows that they come to see Jesus and charges them with the duty of informing disciples about this situation by showing where he lays. And while they are happily on the way to disciples, they meet Jesus and clasp his feet and worship him. Then Jesus sends a message via them to tell the disciples to gather in Galilee.<sup>88</sup> Jesus gathers with his disciples here and makes each of them prophet by blowing them the Holy Spirit.<sup>89</sup> Thus they are charged with gathering disciples from other people and baptizing them in the name of Father and the Holy Spirit.<sup>90</sup> After that, contrary to the narration in the Old Testament, Jesus is taken up into heaven and sits at the right hand of God.<sup>91</sup> The belief of Messiah

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<sup>77</sup> See Luke 23/34.

<sup>78</sup> See John 18/33–38.

<sup>79</sup> See Luke 19/23 vd.

<sup>80</sup> See Luke 23/46 vd.

<sup>81</sup> See Matthew 27/45 etc.

<sup>82</sup> See Matthew 27/51–54 etc.

<sup>83</sup> See Matthew 27/57–60.

<sup>84</sup> See Matthew 28/6.

<sup>85</sup> See Matthew 27/62–66.

<sup>86</sup> See Matthew 28/2.

<sup>87</sup> See Matthew 28/3–4. According to Christian belief, the chief priests agreed with the guardians in order to falsify the reality: “While the women were on their way, some of the guards went into the city and reported to the chief priests everything that had happened. When the chief priests had met with the elders and devised a plan, they gave the soldiers a large sum of money, telling them, ‘You are to say, ‘His disciples came during the night and stole him away while we were asleep.’ If this report gets to the governor, we will satisfy him and keep you out of trouble.’ So the soldiers took the money and did as they were instructed. And this story has been widely circulated among the Jews to this very day.” Matta 28/11–15.

<sup>88</sup> See Matthew 28/1, 5–10.

<sup>89</sup> Bkz. John 20/21–22.

<sup>90</sup> See Matthew 28/16–10.

<sup>91</sup> See Mark 16/19; Acts 1/1–2 cf. Psalm 110/1.

that is formed in this point of view has become the basic doctrine of Christianity and formed the basis of the missionary thought, which reached today as a serious institutional structure.

## 2. MESSIAH ACCORDING TO QUR'ĀN

Qur'ān is the revelation which brings the tradition of the Messengers of Allah, in other words, the covenant tradition to an end.<sup>92</sup> For this reason, it reveals the real knowledges about serious separations that people fall in the past and adjudicates.<sup>93</sup> Here Messiah, that is to say Jesus,<sup>94</sup> comes first among the principal matters in which Qur'ān removed controversies. Accordingly, Qur'ān points out a common ground, where all people can come together, by expecting people of the scripture to use the common sense.<sup>95</sup>

According to Qur'ān, Jesus, who is the real and the only Messiah, is a human being that was born<sup>96</sup> without a father.<sup>97</sup> As mentioned in Maryam 19/21, the creation of Jesus is the symbol of Allah's love and mercy for people. His creation is not different from human's creation because the expression that is used to refer to his creation is the same as the expression that is used to refer to the creation of Adam:

”فَنَفَخْنَا فِيهَا مِنْ رُوحِنَا.”<sup>98</sup>

Moreover, it is stated that his coming into existence is the same as that of Adam.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>92</sup> See Al-Ahzab 33/40. "Because of the universal applicability and textual incorruptibility of its teachings - as well as of the fact that [the Messenger of Allah] Muhammad is 'the seal of all [the Messengers of Allah]', i.e., the last of them (see 33:40) - the Qur'an represents the culminating point of all revelation and offers the final, perfect way to spiritual fulfilment." Muhammad Asad, "The Message of the Quran", accessed: 31 May 2018, [http://www.islamicbulletin.org/services/all\\_ebooks\\_p4.aspx](http://www.islamicbulletin.org/services/all_ebooks_p4.aspx), 224.

<sup>93</sup> See Al-Baqarah 2/213.

<sup>94</sup> See Al-Ma'idah 5/72 etc.

<sup>95</sup> "Say, 'O People of the Scripture, come to a word that is equitable between us and you - that we will not worship except Allah and not associate anything with Him and not take one another as lords instead of Allah.' But if they turn away, then say, 'Bear witness that we are Muslims [submitting to Him].'" Ali 'Imran 3/64.

<sup>96</sup> Because of the birth of Jesus without father, his mother Mary was accused of unchastity by the Jews who were unable to grasp the truth. By being heralded with Jesus, then she disclosed her fear. See Maryam 19/20 etc. But Allah expressed her fear as unreasonable and calmed the frightened Mary. See Meryem 19/21 etc. Allah undertook to testify that she is the symbol of the chastity and He did this testifying through Jesus being wrapped in swaddling clothes. See Maryam 19/26-33 etc. Additionally, Allah stated that she is a proud and honest and blessed and heralded woman: "And [mention] when the angels said, 'O Mary, indeed Allah has chosen you and purified you and chosen you above the women of the worlds. O Mary, be devoutly obedient to your Lord and prostrate and bow with those who bow [in prayer].' That is from the news of the unseen which We reveal to you, [O Muhammad]. And you were not with them when they cast their pens as to which of them should be responsible for Mary. Nor were you with them when they disputed. [And mention] when the angels said, 'O Mary, indeed Allah gives you good tidings of a word from Him, whose name will be the Messiah, Jesus, the son of Mary - distinguished in this world and the Hereafter and among those brought near [to Allah].'" Ali 'Imran 3/42-45.

<sup>97</sup> See Maryam:19/19-22 etc.

<sup>98</sup> See Al-Anbiya 21/91 cf. Al-Hijr 15/29; Sad 38/72; As-Sajdah 32/9. For further understanding that point clearly, it should be focused on the interpretation of Muhammad Asad: "This allegorical expression, used here with reference to Mary's conception of Jesus, has been widely - and erroneously - interpreted as relating specifically to his birth. As a matter of fact, the Qur'an uses the same expression in three other places with reference to the creation of man in general - namely in 15:29 and 38:72, 'when I have formed him... and breathed into him of My spirit'; and in 32:9, 'and thereupon He forms [lit., 'formed'] him fully and breathes lit., 'breathed'] into him of His spirit'. In particular, the passage of which the last-quoted phrase is a part (i.e., 32:7-9) makes it abundantly and explicitly clear that God 'breathes of His spirit' into every human being. Commenting on the verse under consideration, Zamakhshari states that 'the breathing of the spirit [of God] into a body signifies the endowing it with life:' an explanation with which Razi concurs." Asad, "The Message of the Quran", 688.

<sup>99</sup> See Al-i 'Imran 3/59.

Contrary to the expectation of human beings for the Messengers of Allah to have extraordinary personalities, Jesus’ having completely human attributes is explained in this way by himself: “Peace on me the day I was born, will die and will be resurrected.”<sup>100</sup> It is stated that Jesus and his mother are saleh (good) people and not different from ordinary people: “Messiah, son of Mary, is just a Messenger of Allah: All other the Messengers of Allah passed by before him; his mother was someone who never deviated from the truth, and they both used to eat food.”<sup>101</sup>

“Whenever the nature of Mary’s son is discussed as an example, they make a fuss for this reason and say, ‘Which one is better; our Gods or him?’” However, they make this comparison just to oppose: Yes, they are an aggressive community! As for Jesus, he is just a person. He is a servant who is honored by being a Messenger of Allah and is an example for sons of Israel. And if we wanted, we would make you, the worshippers of angels, angels that come one after another on the earth.”<sup>102</sup>

This conceptual framework shows that the prominent figures who can be exemplary for people, that is to say the Messengers of Allah, should be human just as the ones who are the addressed by messages of the Messengers of Allah because this is the basis of showing that the principles that are wanted to be applied are applicable. With reference to this basis, those who formed false thoughts about Jesus are criticized fiercely.<sup>103</sup> It is stated by Jesus himself that these thoughts are definitely false.<sup>104</sup>

As known, when the Muslim religious thought encountered with different cultural environments, it was affected by their religious doctrines in particular messianic culture that had an important place in their memories. It can be said that whether it is associated with Jesus or not, the verses are interpreted, and compulsory commentaries were made under this influence.<sup>105</sup> The verses of Qur’ān that stand out here are these:

- ◆ “Then Allah said, ‘O! Jesus! I will give you death, I will honor you with high spiritual ranks in my presence<sup>106</sup> and purify you by taking you out from the people who are conditioned to deny the truth.’”<sup>107</sup>
- ◆ “In fact, they did not kill and crucify him, but they thought so. Truly, they have doubts about the things in which they have different opinions. In this matter, they have no other information than doubt. They did not know it for sure, on the contrary, Allah raised him to Himself. Allah is omnipotent and omniscient.”<sup>108</sup>

<sup>100</sup> Maryam 19/33.

<sup>101</sup> Al-Ma’idah 5/75.

<sup>102</sup> Az-Zukhruf 43/57–60.

<sup>103</sup> See At-Tawbah 9/30–31 etc.

<sup>104</sup> See Al-Ma’idah 5/116–118.

<sup>105</sup> For very strong criticism of this point see Mahmut Şeltut, “Hz. İsa’nın Göğe Yükseltilmesi ve Tekrar Dönüşü”, trans. Mustafa Baş, *Dini Araştırmalar* 7/21 (2005): 291 etc.

<sup>106</sup> Mustafa Öztürk, *Kur’an-ı Kerim Meali: Anlam ve Yorum Merkezli Çeviri* (İstanbul: Düşün Publications, 2013), 80.

<sup>107</sup> Ali ‘Imran 3/55.

<sup>108</sup> An-Nisa 4/157–158. From the sources of tafsir, Mustafa Öztürk said that “ما قتله يقينا” stands for “blinding the matter entirely.” This is an idiomatic usage. See Öztürk, *Kur’an-ı Kerim Meali: Anlam ve Yorum Merkezli Çeviri*, 139.

- ◆ “... You are the one who watch over them once You give me death...”<sup>109</sup>

The derivative of the word “death” in Al-Ma’idah 5/117 is interpreted as Jesus’ death after his coming down from heaven at a time close to doomsday. In fact beyond this, the verb “decease/تَوَفَّيْتَنِي” is used for putting Jesus into sleep by many commentators (mufasssirun) and provided as a basis for the legend of ascension.<sup>110</sup> On the other hand, the expression “to raise someone up to / رَفَعَ” is interpreted as the ascension of Jesus.<sup>111</sup>

If these interpretations are carefully examined, it will be seen that the Messiah concept in the Bible was effective in their propositions. However, when the basic principles of Qur’ān are taken into consideration, it is more precise to interpret these statements in this way: Allah makes a promise to Jesus: to make his glory great, to honor him<sup>112</sup> and not leave him to die in the hands of disbelievers. Allah has kept this promise in the best way.<sup>113</sup>

These verses of Qur’ān are also used as evidences for coming down of Jesus:

- ◆ “And there is no one among the People of the Scripture who do not apprehend the truth about Jesus at his time of death, and Jesus himself will witness against them during the Day of Resurrection.”<sup>114</sup>
- ◆ “He is a sign that announces the arrival of the Day of Resurrection...”<sup>115</sup>

Above all, it is necessary to interpret the verses wholly and in a way that is not contrary to basic logic of Qur’ān.<sup>116</sup> Accordingly, the contexts of verses should be taken into account. It is mentioned before the verse that Jesus was rescued from his enemies, and the People of the Scripture’s lack of information or mistakes they made for any reason are criticized and immediately followed by this verse of Qur’ān. Therefore, the People of the Scripture of those times will eventually learn the truth. However, the damage will already be done. According to another thought, it is stated that this perception of truth will be like the removal of curtain and sighting of reality.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> al-Ma’idah 5/117.

<sup>110</sup> See Mehmet Ünal, “Tefsir Kaynaklarına Göre Hz. İsa’nın Ölümü, Ref’i ve Nüzülü Meselesi”, *İslamiyat* 3/4 (2000): 137 etc.

<sup>111</sup> See Şeltut, “Hz. İsa’nın Göğe Yükseltilmesi”, 291 etc.; Recep Önal, *Ebû Mansûr el-Mâtürîdî’ye Göre İslam Dışı Dinler* (Bursa: Emin Publications, 2013), 339-344.

<sup>112</sup> “The verb rafa ahu (lit., ‘he raised him’ or ‘elevated him’) has always, whenever the act of raf’ (‘elevating’) of a human being is attributed to God, the meaning of ‘honouring’ or ‘exalting.’ Nowhere in the Qur’an is there any warrant for the popular belief that God has ‘taken up’ Jesus bodily, in his lifetime, into heaven.” Asad, “The Message of the Quran”, 200.

<sup>113</sup> See Şeltut, “Hz. İsa’nın Göğe Yükseltilmesi”, 293-294.

<sup>114</sup> An-Nisa 4/159. “... the pronoun in the word ‘*hu*’ is not the pronoun of third person, but, it is the demonstrative pronoun that means ‘this’. It refers to the aforementioned claim of the Jews about Jesus. Accordingly, the verse points out that everyone of the People of the Scripture resists on blasphemy never give up their distorted beliefs and claims about Jesus until their death.” Öztürk, *Kur’an-ı Kerim Meali: Anlam ve Yorum Merkezli Çeviri*, 139.

<sup>115</sup> al-Zukhruf 43/61.

<sup>116</sup> “For understanding a verse from Qur’ān, it should be focused on these frameworks: 1- The framework of the verse, 2- The framework of the before and the after of the verse, 3- The integrity of Qur’ān, 4- The framework of the physical and social codes in the universe and 5- The framework of common sense.” Ahmet Akbulut, “Allah’ın Takdiri – Kulun Tedbiri”, *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 33/1 (1994): 138-139.

<sup>117</sup> See Ünal, “Tefsir Kaynaklarına Göre Hz. İsa’nın Ölümü”, 143-144; Öztürk, *Kur’an-ı Kerim Meali: Anlam ve Yorum Merkezli Çeviri*, 139; Önal, *Mâtürîdî’ye Göre İslam Dışı Dinler*, 282-289.

The pronoun “هـ”, which is in the verse that starts with the statement “وَأَنَّهُ لَعَلَّمِ لِّلسَّاعَةِ”, is attributed to Jesus, and this verse is shown as an evidence for his arrival on the Hour. However, making such an interpretation causes the matter to deviate from the context. While Qur’ān tells its principles to people, it uses some kind of examples, logical reasons and stories, and right after it states that it is a guide which shows the right way. Accordingly, when the aforementioned verse is taken into account, it will be seen that wrong ideas of polytheists about Jesus and angels are systematically refuted and the principle is applied: The straightforward way is the way that is set by Qur’ān, and for this reason it is necessary to be subjected to it, so the aforementioned pronoun “هـ” refers to Qur’ān.<sup>118</sup>

The purpose of Jesus’ being a Messenger of Allah is to verify the Torah, which arrived before him, to herald a Messenger of Allah whose name is “Ahmad”<sup>119</sup>, who will arrive after him, and to inform that something that were made forbidden are lawful.<sup>120</sup> In addition, Jesus is supported with miracles, for example he makes a bird out of clay and breaths into it and this bird springs to life by Allah’s consent. He heals blinds and leprosy, and resurrects the dead again by Allah’s consent.<sup>121</sup> However, these miracles have been interpreted as a sign of Jesus’ godhood in Christianity. Theologians have put forward counter arguments against this claim since first periods and formed a serious tradition of criticism with reference to the principle “miracle’s being an act of Allah<sup>122</sup> that proves the nubuwwa of the Messenger of Allah”.<sup>123</sup>

More accurate approaches can be developed if Ali ‘Imran 3/49 is considered in terms of the loop in the historical process and generally the Messengers of Allah’ spiritually bringing people to life. Essentially, the purpose of this matter can be interpreted as channeling the understating of Messiah which is formed by Jews throughout the history to an accurate direction and saving them from the bad condition they are in. From this perspective, the symbolic interpretation of the aforementioned miracles will help the matter to be enlightened and the circle to be completed. Accordingly, the bird image generally represents “fate” or “fortune” both in its usage before Islam and in Qur’ān.<sup>124</sup> For this reason, if Jews follow him, he will change their unfortunate fates with the power of the revelation and understating granted to him.<sup>125</sup> On the other hand, Jesus, with this aspect, will bring unhealthy, blind and dead minds and hearts to life.<sup>126</sup>

However, despite all efforts made by Jesus, his truth and message was not able to comprehend, and Jews and Christians conflicted with each other. In other words, although it is clearly revealed to Jews by Allah himself, that Jesus is certainly the Messiah, the Messenger of Allah, whose arrival has been expected

<sup>118</sup> See Esed, *Kur’an Mesajı*, 1006. And also see Öztürk, *Kur’an-ı Kerim Meali: Anlam ve Yorum Merkezli Çeviri*, 677.

<sup>119</sup> See As-Saf 61/6.

<sup>120</sup> See Ali ‘Imran 3/50.

<sup>121</sup> See Ali ‘Imran 3/49.

<sup>122</sup> For example, see Abu Mansur Al-Mâtürîdî, *Tawilat al-Qur’ân*, ed. Ahmed Vanlioğlu et al. (İstanbul: Mizan Publications, 2005), 2: 308-309; Abu Al-Hasan Al-Ash’arî, *Usul ahl al-Sunnah wa al-jama’ah*, ed. Muhammad Sayyid Al-Juleind (s.l.: Cairo: 1987), 45-46; Abu Al-Mu’in al-Nasafî, *Tabsira al-adillah fi Usul al-dîn*, ed. Hüseyin Atay et al. (Ankara: DİB, 2003), 2: 31 etc.; Qadi Abd Al-Jabbar, *Sharh al-usul al-khamsah*, ed. Ahmed b. Al-Husseini, trans. İlyas Çelebi (İstanbul: TYEKB, 2013), 1: 431 etc.; Sa’d Al-Din Al-Taftazanî, *Sharh al-maqasid*, ed. Abdurrahman Umeyra (Beirut: Alam Al-Kutub, 1419/1998), 5: 12 etc.

<sup>123</sup> For an evaluation of this point see Önal, *Ebû Mansûr el-Mâtürîdî’ye Göre İslam Dışı Dinler*, 311-319.

<sup>124</sup> Esed, *Kur’an Mesajı*, 99.

<sup>125</sup> See Al-Ma’idah 5/110.

<sup>126</sup> See Esed, *Kur’an Mesajı*, 99.

for centuries by them, they refused him.<sup>127</sup> This matter, which is used as a basic argument of the conflict of Greek-Hebrew thought<sup>128</sup> is a sort of secret reason of the separation of Judaism and Christianity, lost its real meaning with the belief of Christianity, and the aforementioned miracles were accepted as a sign of being a God and thus they isolated Jesus from his original personality and rendered him meaningless. However, because Qur’ān is the last revelation, it explained the truth in this matter and cleared the way for those who want to develop a correct understanding.

## CONCLUSION

In messianic thoughts that are formed in historical process, the fact that the weaknesses of people are concealed and canalized to a direction that is desired by some people, attracts the attention. Besides, these aimed to make people, who are disappointed, bear all difficulties and look at the future with hope. Thus, the history of Jews, as told in the Old Testament, is the best example of this fact. This fact, which later resulted in a failure of meaning, is transformed into an expression of divine identity with Christianity.

Qur’ān, which is the last ring of the revelation tradition, stands out in this matter with its confirmation and corrections. Thus, when the relevant verses are examined, it is seen that the purpose is to form a real Messiah concept and to remove the obstacles on individual activity and productivity. The purpose is essentially to prevent people from attributing an identity that makes Muhammad’s identity meaningless as in the example of Jesus by repeating the same mistakes in the past.<sup>129</sup> Islamic thought, which continues to develop thanks to the companions of the Messenger of Allah generally, considerably progressed in establishment of such an understanding. Moreover, the Islamic civilization that contribute to humanity is the best example of this.

In addition to this, in the process of time the messianic concept of ancient traditions has been settled into Islamic thought with some sort of changes. If the current condition of Muslim world is taken into consideration, these kinds of thoughts will mean providing opportunity for the “Salvation Theory” that may cause the loss of identity for human contrary to the being a Messenger of Allah’s perspective that is essentially based on forming the human indirectly.<sup>130</sup> Consequently, with reference to expressions stated in verses, such as Az-Zukhruf 43/60, Al-Ma’idah 5/75, etc., it will be easily understood that accepting Jesus as one of us, but as a moral person, who directs us to principles that brings us to life, is a more accurate approach. Because belief in all the Messengers of Allah, per se, is an essential requirement of Islam,<sup>131</sup> an accurate concept related to Jesus that will be introduced in the right way will contribute to the progress in the perception of the being a Messenger of Allah as a model that develops human beings.

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<sup>127</sup> For an evaluation of the aforementioned miracles of Jesus happened by the favour of Allah and as a sign for his being a Messenger of Allah see Abu Ja’far Muhammad al-Tabarī, *Jami’ al-bayan ’an ta’wil ay al-Qur’an*, ed. Abdullah b. Abdul Muhsin Al-Turkī (Cairo: Dar Hijr, 1422/2001), 5: 418-430.

<sup>128</sup> See Yılmaz, *Kumran Yazmaları*, 5 etc.

<sup>129</sup> See al-Tawbah 9/30-33. And also see Al-Bukharī, *Ahadith Al-Anbiya*, 48 (3445).

<sup>130</sup> See Avni İlhan, *Mehdilik* (İstanbul: Beyan Publications, 1993), 143–144. And also see Batuk, *Tarihin Sonunu Beklemek*, 135.

<sup>131</sup> See al-Baqarah 2/285 etc.



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## An Overview of Knowledge-Value Relationship in Mu'tazilite Ethical Theory\*

Fethi Kerim Kazanç \*\*

### ABSTRACT

This article is concerned with the problem of the relationship between knowledge and value because the ethical theory of Mu'tazila has an importance in the Mediaeval Age Muslim world. Contrary to Ash'arites, Mu'tazila has supported that some objective value terms whether a religion is sent or not, good, bad, and necessary can be known via wisdom with reference to the relationship of knowledge-value. Mu'tazila supports objectivism in the scope of ethical values; however, we can describe such an objectivist thought, which is supported by them and receives its necessity completely from God, as "divine objectivism", so to speak. These values were placed in both world of objectives and human mind only by God at the beginning. According to Mu'tazila, both wisdom and narration are the essential sources about knowing value concepts like good and bad. Therefore, the wisdom that is supported by Mu'tazila can be accepted as "partial rationalism". Consequently, according to the ethical system of Mu'tazila, human can sustain a moral life by using the competent mind given by God at the beginning of creation.

### KEYWORDS

Kalām, Mu'tazila, Ethic, Divine Objectivism, Necessary Knowledge, Value

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\*\* Professor, Ondokuz Mayıs University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Kalam, Samsun, TURKEY  
Prof. Dr., Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fakültesi, Kelam Anabilim Dalı  
fkazanc@hotmail.com  
orcid.org/0000-0003-1555-4914

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## Mu'tezilî Ahlâk Nazariyesinde Bilgi-Değer Münasebetine Bir Bakış

### ÖZ

Mu'tezilî kelâmcıların ortaya attıkları ahlâk nazariyesi Ortaçağ İslâm dünyasında önemli bir yer işgal eder. Bundan dolayı, bu makale bilgi-değer münasebeti sorununa ayrılmıştır. Eş'arî kelâmcıların aksine, Mu'tezilîler, bilgi-değer münasebetinden yola çıkmak suretiyle, din gönderilsin ya da gönderilmesin, iyi, kötü ve zorunlu gibi bazı objektif değer terimlerinin akıl kanalıyla bilinebilirliği tezini öne sürmüşlerdir. Mu'tezilîler, ahlâkî değerler alanında nesnelciliği savunurlar, ancak onların savunduğu ve zorunluluğunu bütünüyle Tanrı'dan alan bu türden bir nesnelcilik anlayışını, deyim yerindeyse, “ilâhî nesnelcilik” diye nitelendirmek mümkündür. Onlarca, değerler daha başlangıçta hem nesnel âlemine hem de insan anlığına sadece Tanrı tarafından yerleştirilmiştir. Mu'tezilîlere göre, hem akıl hem de nakil iyi ve kötü gibi değer kavramlarını bilme hususunda iki asıl kaynaktır. İşte bu nedendir ki, Mu'tezilîlerin savunduğu akıl “kısmî akılcılık” olarak kabul edilebilir. Sonuç itibarıyla, Mu'tezilîlerin ahlâk sisteminde, insanoğlu daha başlangıçta onu yaratırken Tanrı'nın kendisine bahşetmiş olduğu yetkin aklını kullanmak suretiyle erdemli ve ahlâki bir yaşam tarzı sürdürebilir.

### ANAHTAR KELİMELEER

Kelâm, Mutezile Ahlâk, İlahi Nesnelcilik, Zorunlu Bilgi, Değer

### INTRODUCTION

Just as the ethical theory developed by Mu'tazila has an importance in the history of general ethical thought, it is also important in the history of Islamic thought. It seems that they pay attention to the potential of knowing some good or bad objective values by mind with reference to logic, mathematics, and experimental principles in relation to knowledge-value relationship,<sup>1</sup> value included notions category, and the principle of the possibility of producing objective knowledge from all these without considering the religion is sent or not.

We can evaluate the ethical theories in the Mediaeval Muslim world primarily in the context of ethics of “happiness”. The essential fact that caused the development of two theories that are debated among Muslim theologians is the problem of whether the origin of good and evil, as being a general tool-value that brings happiness in general, is based on Allah's commands and prohibitions. The first person who had mentioned this, one of the most archaic and important problems of philosophy of ethics, is Plato, and he had influenced<sup>2</sup> Muslim philosophers by saying, “Is something good because Allah wants it so, or does Allah want it because it is good?”. Then, is something good by its essence, or is it good because it is beneficial to humans?

<sup>1</sup> Majid Fahry, *Ethical Theories in Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 31.

<sup>2</sup> Platon, *Euthyphron*, translated by Pertev Naili Boratav (Istanbul: Maarif Publications, 1958), 12-20.

Ash'arītes say that there are no realities that are changeable by their essences as being productions<sup>3</sup> of discontinuity, non-continuation and possibility doctrines that are related to substance-accident metaphysics in the world of objectives in which they relate the existence of values completely to the will of Allah, and they say that all these exist with a divine habit, and meanwhile human's mental attitude has a great importance in determining values by constantly emphasizing motives at a humane level, such as emotion, thought, faith, interest, purpose, benefit and profit, and they refuse objective values by using subjective facts as an excuse. Mu'tazila and partially Māturīdīs supported that the existence of values is because of their essences and nature provided that they are placed both in the world of objectives and human mind by only Allah in past eternity, and contrary to Ash'arītes, they tried to base on value's objective realities by saying something is good or evil by its essence and tried to guarantee these objective realities with Allah's justice and wisdom attributes<sup>4</sup>. In that case, we can define such an objectivism that must originate from Allah as “theistic objectivism”, so to speak. Therefore, we can evaluate why the value's quality problem of Muslim theologians, in other words, the matter of good and evil, is debated in this point of view.

The ethical theory that is introduced as closed in the Mediaeval Muslim world by Muslim jurists, and theoretically commenced by Ash'arītes, who accept Allah's absolute power and dominance and servant's absolute resignation and submission to Him as the primary principle of the Qur'ān, is called as “theistic subjectivism”. This theory is subjectivist because by denying anything that is objective in the characteristics of actions themselves, it establishes a connection between a judge or observer's mental attitudes, behaviors, thoughts, observations and opinions, such as desiring and not, commanding and prohibiting, recognition and approving and not approving values of actions. This theory is theistic because instead of various kinds of humane activity, the being that makes decisions and determines as a subject is only the divine being. Nevertheless, this theory is also defined as “ethical voluntarism” as usual because it supports that the value notions like good and evil should be accepted by basing on Allah's will and preference. Accordingly, some ethical values, such as goodness, evil, justice and cruelty do not have meanings other than Allah ordained. In other words, actions can have an ethical meaning by only divine will.<sup>5</sup>

Contrary to theistic subjectivism, the ethical theory is the ethical objectivism that is developed by Mu'tazila and Samarkandī Māturīdīs. Mu'tazila scholars persist in their attitudes that we can know many religious and ethical truths that are true and necessary included Allah's existence and oneness with a mental instinct that works depending on the grace of God, and they attribute the qualities of good and evil to their essences provided that Allah placed them into objectives' essences right at the beginning. Mu'tazila essentially asserts that there is a consistence or coordination<sup>6</sup> between the objectives in the external universe

<sup>3</sup> Muḥammad Âbid al-Jābirī, *Arap-İslâm Kültürünün Akıl Yapısı: Arap İslâm Kültüründeki Bilgi Sistemlerinin Eleştirel Bir Analizi*, translated by Burhan Köroğlu, Hasan Hacak, Ekrem Demirli (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1999), 254-257.

<sup>4</sup> İlhami Güler, *Allah'ın Ahlâkîliği Sorunu: Ehl-i Sünnet'in Allah Tasavvuruna Ahlâkî Açıdan Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım* (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Publications, 1998), 54-66.

<sup>5</sup> George F. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 12-13.

<sup>6</sup> Peter Klein, *Felsefe ve Psikopatoloji (Kategorilerin Gelişimi Üzerine)*, translated by Özgür Karaçam (İstanbul: Gendaş Company, 1998), 340-341.

and human mind.<sup>7</sup> In other words, they try to defend the objectivity of ethical values with reference to external universe because Allah placed the knowledge of good or evil values that are related to objectives in the observable universe in human's mind as a general law. Therefore, we can describe such a discipline as “theistic objectivity”, as being a little different from its modern-day meaning, due to the fact that good or evil values receive their objectivity necessarily from God's act of creation. Likewise, according to Māturīdī, just as Allah created human by providing him with power and capabilities that will help him in reaching true and objective realities, He also provided the world of objectives/nature in a way that helps it in reaching true and objective realities. Therefore, we can say that Māturīdī, who emphasizes the external universe too much and follows a realistic method, pays full attention to the reality of external universe and supports the objectivity of values.<sup>8</sup>

In the Mediaeval Muslim world, debates about philosophy of ethics are centered on two questions that are considerably related to each other. These questions are “What is the origin of the ontological status (objective-subjective) of ethical values, such as good, evil, justice, cruelty, truthfulness and lie and the origin of knowledge (reason-revelation) of aforementioned ethical values?”<sup>9</sup> In this study, the answer for the second question, which mostly queries the values theoretically, is sought.

Mu'tazila has a tendency for the thought of objectivity in order to support that Allah is a being that has absolute justice, He will never show cruelty, actually He will do only good, and He is excluded from doing evil. They consider good or evil deeds, which humans do with their free wills, and rewarding of goodness and punishing of evils as a necessity of Allah's justice, and they support that this can necessarily be known with an intuitionistic reason that works or performs to honor the grace of God. Thus, contrary to Ash'arites, Mu'tazilates and Māturīdīs tried to base on the theory that human is responsible/obligated by the capability, aptitude, power, will, capability to choose and free will given by Allah at the beginning even though the religion is not sent. For them, describing an act as ethical is only possible by a free will.

Mu'tazila, who represent the rationalist cult in the philosophy of ethics, are regarded as the first real ethicists of Muslims who tried to base ethical provisions on rational principles. They did not only formulated consistent answers for basic ethical problems, but they also triggered the ethical developments that would appear later in theological communities.<sup>10</sup> In this context, they tried to enlighten the nature of some basic ethical notions that include value, such as good-evil, benefit-harm, advantage-beneficial, gratitude-ungratefulness, truthfulness-lying and justice-cruelty, by directing the debates about them. Thus, these had a great importance in their efforts for theorizing the ethics. On the other hand, Ahl al-Sunnah tried to develop an antithesis of ethics of Mu'tazila by focusing more on theistic subjectivism. In other words, Mu'tazila showed

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<sup>7</sup> R.M. Frank, “Several Fundamental Assumptions of The Basra School of The Mu'tazila”, *Studia Islamica* (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve-Larose, 1971), 33:7.

<sup>8</sup> Hanifi Özcan, *Māturīdī'de Bilgi Problemi* (Istanbul: IFAV Publications, 1993), 51-53.

<sup>9</sup> George F. Hourani, *Juwaynī's Criticisms of Mu'tazilite Ethics, Reason and Tradition Islamic Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 124.

<sup>10</sup> Fahry, *Ethical Theories in Islam*, 31.

the success of presenting a general scheme about the philosophy of ethics for the first time in Muslim theology. However, it is seen that there are debates about the ethical value notions too in the works of Ahl al-Sunnah.

The Mu'tazilite theory of ethics that holds on to the principle of disclosure of evidence<sup>11</sup> in the invisible world with reference to the visible world alternates between divine and humane scope. The philosophy of ethics formed considerably depending on the thought of theistic justice. However, the philosophy of ethics of Mu'tazila is about humans themselves. They attributed the value notions to theistic actions in the same way as the actions of human.<sup>12</sup> In brief, according to Mu'tazila, ethical values, such as goodness, evil, justice, cruelty, wisdom, foolish, advantage, advantageous, truthfulness, lying, praise, scorn, reward and punishment, have a real existence independent of Allah's will. There are objective qualities that make actions or behaviors ethically good or evil. An action's being ethically good or evil is about the beneficial or harmful qualities in that behavior, not about Allah's commanding or forbidding/prohibiting it. In fact, Allah's commanding or forbidding a behavior is about the attributes, which are placed in human's essence at the creation by Allah, in the aforementioned behavior. According to them, divine commands or prohibitions do not necessitate something's being good or evil, but it indicates them. In this matter, Māturīdīs agree with Mu'tazilates, but they attribute Māturīdī's authority for making something obligatory or forbidden to divine command or prohibitions. Then according to Mu'tazila and partially Māturīdīs, ethical values like good or evil that have an objective existence independent of Allah's will is known by reason.

## 1. THE POSSIBILITY AND DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE

Basra Mu'tazilite support that Allah will never allow the corruption of evidences in the external universe. Allah does not deceive His servants by creating an unimaginable, irrational universe. Mu'tazila supports that Allah acts accordingly the rational laws that are completely originated by His essence, not dictated from outside.<sup>13</sup> "All actions of Allah are good. Allah neither does harm nor violates the necessity obligated for Him; He neither lies about His information nor does an injustice about the judgement He formed. He neither tortures sons of polytheists for crimes of their fathers nor creates a miracle for false prophets. He does not regard His servants as responsible formatters in which they are not strong or well-informed enough to overcome them. He does these so the one that is destroyed is destroyed with a clear evidence, and the one that lives keeps living with a clear evidence as well." Basra Mu'tazila is epistemologically realistic. They say that the essential facts that make up the universe are real beings, not theory, and it is possible to have knowledge about them. It is impossible to think that this realistic thought of knowledge is consistent with the skeptical approach which supports that it is impossible to know objects.

Qādi Abd-al-Jabbār criticizes the skeptical group and supports the correctness of perception. He criticizes the thought 'the reality is whatever a subject believes in' as follows:

<sup>11</sup> Abū Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *al-Muḥīṭ bi-l- taklīf*, edited by Sayyid al-Azmī (Cairo: Dar al-Misriyye, 1965), 167-168; al-Jābirī, *Arap-İslâm Kültürünün Akıl Yapısı*, 208-209.

<sup>12</sup> George F. Hourani, *The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar, Reason and Tradition Islamic Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 101.

<sup>13</sup> R.C. Martin, M.R. Woodward, D.S. Atmaja, *Defenders of Reason in Islam* (Atlanta: s.n., 1997), 11.



1) Whenever two judgements about the same object are not consistent, that object has contradictory qualities.

2) Humans could change the qualities of object by changing their beliefs about the object. In fact in this context, even Allah's existence and attributes would be linked to our faith. However, the incorrectness of these results are directly known. In that case, faith does not affect the reality.

3) If someone did not believe in anything about something, that thing would neither exist nor absent and neither be eternal nor finite.

4) No one could have admitted that he made a mistake or was uninformed for his all former beliefs would be correct by definition. Furthermore, he could claim that someone else constantly made mistakes or was uninformed. The incorrectness of these claims is known via introspection.<sup>14</sup>

According to Abd al-Jabbar, it is impossible for the perception not to show the thing that is perceived as how it is. Therefore, perception is a source of knowledge. Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār insists on the fact that when a subject perceives something, he believes that the object is really just as he perceives, and he is satisfied with this belief. Even though it is skeptical, it is not possible for someone to abandon his belief about the object. A definition of information that is a belief in which nafs is in peace, is formulated by Abū Hashim.<sup>15</sup>

According to Mu'tazila, knowledge has both objective and subjective specific differences as emotional satisfaction with mental sense that is appropriate for reality as truth and nafs security. Hereby both of the two distinctive qualities are necessary for knowledge. Mu'tazila theologians did not see a difference between knowledge and faith. Therefore, they thought refusing the imitative faith and supported questioning the faith dependent on others' authority in terms of correctness.<sup>16</sup>

According to theologians, the object could not be completely known only by perception as in its essence. They tried to establish a connection between our knowledge about obtaining the object as being a production of object and perception as in its essence in the external universe with reference to the theory of the attributes of objects and emphasized objective and subjective facts in the process of acquiring knowledge. As Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār revealed, the knowledge about the object of perception acquired by the owner of perception corresponds to the way of that object's being perceived. Accordingly, on the basis of object-subject relationship, correctness of knowledge can be shown by considering the form of consistency between being and mind.<sup>17</sup> The attribute that we perceive an object via itself or by its help is the attribute in which this perceptual object is distinguished from all other perceptual object classes via itself. Therefore, this special attribute is one for each perceptual object class, and it is the determinant attribute for that class. If we were to perceive an object with an attribute that does not have a determinant attribute, then the

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<sup>14</sup> Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 19.

<sup>15</sup> Abū Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-'ad* (Cairo: Nashra al-Sharika, 1962), 5:70; Alnoor Dhanani, *The Physical of Kalām: Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian Mu'tazilī Cosmology* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 22.

<sup>16</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 12:123.

<sup>17</sup> For correspondence see. Harun Tepe, *Platon'dan Habermas'a Felsefede Doğruluk ve Hakikat* (Ankara: Ark Publications, 1995), 81-84.

correctness of perception would not be guaranteed, and the perception would convey us to ignorance because we would not succeed in knowing the object.

## 2. TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

According to Ahl al-Sunnah and Mu'tazila, knowledge splits into two parts as necessary and acquired.

### 2.1. Necessary Knowledge

Necessary Knowledge has two types:

a) Knowledge that is acquired by perception is always about details. This is the most explicit type of knowledge because we do not need evidence for what we have perceived. Theologians consider the perceptual knowledge as necessary knowledge.

Perception either tends to objects of external universe or spiritual realities of interior world. Basra Mu'tazilates regard both our current consciousness such as being angry, frightened, etc., the knowledge about our internal states, and our congenital knowledge about the principle of non-contradiction, incorrectness of two opposites in the same matter or the impossibility of an object's existence at two different places at the same time as direct knowledge. The perceptual knowledge that is perceived is as an important kind of knowledge as our prior knowledge which is about rational principles, such as our existential knowledge that is about our internal states that belong or get into the class of direct or necessary knowledge and the principle of non-contradiction. Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār describes the direct knowledge as a kind of knowledge that appears in us without our efforts and cannot be denied by us in any case.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, feeling pain, heat or cold, having the power to perform an action or not reflects the reality about our internal states.

Mu'tazilates dissented in the matter of separating knowledge into two main categories as “necessary” and “acquired”. They mostly support that Allah can only be known by reasoning. Al-Jahiz supports that all knowledge is necessary.<sup>19</sup> According to Eshres, because goodness and evil are necessarily known by reason and Allah is good, it is necessary to know Allah. Even though prophets did not arrive, reason would still be necessary to know Allah.<sup>20</sup> According to al-Balkhī, because of his debt of gratitude towards Allah, it is necessary for human to know Him.<sup>21</sup>

b) Necessary knowledge is obtained explicitly by the rational insight that gives the knowledge of general realities. “To know that justice and truthfulness are good; cruelty, lying and ill-wishing are bad.” can be given as an example for necessary knowledge acquired in this way. Such knowledge is obtained via reason by anyone who has mind because such knowledge is completely about insight, not reasoning. Because necessary knowledge precedes knowing Allah and believing in Him, it does not depend on revelation. Therefore,

<sup>18</sup> Abū Ḥasan ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, edited by Abdulkarīm Osmān (Cairo: Maktab al-Wahba, 1988), 48.

<sup>19</sup> Abū Mansūr ‘Abd al-Qāhir b. Muḥammad al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn* (Istanbul: Matbaa al-Dawla, 1928), s.32.

<sup>20</sup> Mir Veliyuddin, “Mu'tezile”, translated by Altay Ünalay, *İslam Düşüncesi Tarihi*, edited by M.M. Sherif (Istanbul: İnsan Publications, 1990), 1:249.

<sup>21</sup> A.S. Tritton, *İslam Kelamı*, translated by Mehmet Dağ (Ankara: AUİF Publications, 1983), 156.

the ethical realities known as necessary are approved by everyone who believes or not.<sup>22</sup> However, Ash'arites does not consider the knowledge of general ethical realities within the scope of necessary knowledge due to some reasons. At this point, they give some rational evidences about the Mu'tazila argument that goodness and evil can be apprehended by reason.

### 2.1.1. Mu'tazila's Evidences Considering the Mentally Perceptibility of Ethical Values

First, Mu'tazila regards people's having correct ethical judgement without knowing Qur'an as incorrectness of Ash'arī approach. For example, according to Mu'tazila, Brahmins reached the ethical realities owing to the reason given by Allah at birth although they did not receive any divine helps like book or prophet.<sup>23</sup>

Second, according to Mu'tazila, humans know before the arrival of prophet that it is good to save someone drowning or dying; cruelty and hostility are evil.<sup>24</sup>

Third, if someone with reason faces a situation in which it is equal for him to satisfy his needs with a right or wrong method, he knows that choosing the right one is more favorable without receiving a warning or reminder.

Fourth, people used to solve their problems by reasoning and thinking before shari'a/divine law arrived. If there were no goodness or evil in the essence of being, people would not dispute among each other to find it.<sup>25</sup>

Fifth, if actions were not beautiful and ugly by themselves, messengers would not be able to find a way for theistic invitation by silencing their answerers with evidences.<sup>26</sup>

Sixth, if we removed the beautiful and ugly qualities from humane actions and transformed them to religious acceptations, the interpretation with reference to revelatory needs that we extracted from judgments' religious originals would be lost for it would not be possible to compare actions and words.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Abū Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-'ad*, edited by Ahmad Fuād al-Ahvānī (Cairo: Muassasa al-Misriyya, 1962), 6:18,21,63.

<sup>23</sup> Hourani. *Juwaynī's Criticisms of Mu'tazilite Ethics*, 129.

<sup>24</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:19.

<sup>25</sup> Abū Fath Abd al-Karīm al-Shahristānī, *Nihāyāt al-aqdām*, edited by Alfred Guillaume (Cairo: Maktab al-Mutabanna), 374.

<sup>26</sup> Sayf al-Dīn Abū Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-Amidī, *al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām*, edited by Aḥad al-Afādīl (s.l.: s.n., 1968), 1:84,85.

<sup>27</sup> Mihrī Ḥasan Abū Sa'de, *al-Ittijā al-'aqdī fī mushkila al-ma'rife 'inda Mu'tazila* (Cairo: Dar al-Fiqr al-Arabī, 1993), 304.

Seventh, Allah's commanding or prohibiting something is because that thing is mentally accepted as “evil” or “good” before its being commanded or prohibited.<sup>28</sup> Qāḍī Abd-al-Jabbār tries to base on this argument of Mu'tazilite's thesis by explaining Qur'ān's verse(16/90).<sup>29</sup>

According to Hourani, the efforts of Mu'tazila for basing on the objectivity of ethical values is more suitable for Qur'ān's general tendency. For him, Qur'ān had already used the known language of ethics in the pre-Islamic age of ignorance except from a few semantical corrections and reforms. Allah leads people in matters of good and evil values that are the most debated ones by sending prophets to help humans in their practical lives as a token of his gratitude. Accordingly, Qur'ān strengthened the basic ethical values that already objectively exist in the community of Jahiliyyah by reminding them and based them on capability of sanction of a theistic authority. To prove his thesis by analyzing verses that mention some ethical notions that were important in the period that Qur'ān was revealed, such as husn/beautiful, kubuh/ugly, hayr/goodness, sharr/evil, birr/righteousness, sulh/peace, k̄st/equality, cruelty and justice, Hourani assumes that these ethical messages already exist in the human mind objectively and currently. For him, Qur'ān helps avoiding negative behaviors and applies ethical principles to communal living by using psychological methods like encouragement and motivation with its commands and prohibitions.<sup>30</sup>

### 2.1.2. Evidences of Ash'arites and Criticisms of Mu'tazilites about Them

Ash'arites tried to refute the evidences about ethical values by criticizing them. The basis of their refutations depend on two evidences. First one of these is a wise person's attitude towards a mathematical theorem like “Two is bigger than one” and an ethical theorem like “Lying is ugly for it deserves the censure of Allah” even though he did not receive education and religious training. Although that person mentally knows how these two theorems should be in reality, it is seen that he digresses from the mental maturity of the mathematical theorem in the ethical theorem about lying. This being the case, whoever claims in relation to reason that judgements are equal, that person acts stubbornly by getting beyond the scope of mental judgements.<sup>31</sup>

Al-Ghazālī objected that the principles which seem evil and good can be necessarily accepted obviously and mentally, and he said that these are principles that take form depending on humans' customs and traditions.<sup>32</sup> For him, these are theoretical statements and judgements such as “Justice is good” and “Cruelty

<sup>28</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:65-66; Ahmed Mahmūd Subhī, *al-Falsafa ahlākīyye fī al- fiqr al-Islāmī* (Beirut: Dār Nehda al-Arabiyya, 1992), 128-142; Id, *Fī ilm al-Kalām: Dirāsa falsafīyya li ārā al- firāq Islāmīyya fī uşūl al-dīn* (Beirut: Dār Nehda al-Arabiyya, 1985), 1:153-156; Muḥammad Ammara, *al-Mu'tazila we mushkil al-ḥurriya al-insāniyya* (Cairo: al-Muassasa al-Arabiyya, 1988), 143-144; Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 55-62.

<sup>29</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:113; Subhī, *al-Falsafa ahlākīyye*, 128-142; Hasan Ḥanefī, *Min al- 'aqāde ilā al-Sevra* (Cairo: Maktab Māḍbūlī, 1988), 3: 456-566.

<sup>30</sup> George F. Hourani, *Ethical Presuppositions of the Quran, Reason and Tradition Islamic Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 27-37; Güler, *Allah'ın Ahlākīliği Sorunu*, 36-37.

<sup>31</sup> al-Shahristānī, *Nihāyāt al-aqdām*, 371-372.

<sup>32</sup> Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Miḥaq al-naẓar*, edited by Muḥammad Bedruddīn al-Nasānī (Beirut: s.n., 1966), 63.

is evil” that are accepted by everyone.<sup>33</sup> With reference to the fact that these statements are changeable rights depending on the tradition, Al-Ghazālī has a tendency for the argument of Ash'arī sect, one of whose members is Al-Ghazālī, that ethically good and evil values are relativistic.

The second evidence is about the absence of goodness in lie and the absence of evil in righteousness. Without considering the truthfulness' being good and lying's being evil, a person comprehends the reality of all. Accordingly, goodness and evil show that truthfulness and lie do not have essential qualities and it is possible to think without them. Hereby the objections towards Mu'tazila, which depends on the basis of the nature and reality of an action's being something and the value of judgement related to its being something else, originate from this evidence.

Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār thinks that the aforementioned objections of Al-Ghazālī do not damage the thesis that the things which are regarded as good or evil are mentally acquired principles at birth because for him, no person with reason dissents about accepting the cruelty always as evil; the discord appears in the matter of qualifying actions that depend on the form of cruelty as cruel or not even though they are good. This situation necessitates reasoning and thinking.<sup>34</sup>

As we come to the objection that qualifying actions with goodness and evil resembles qualifying forms with beauty and ugly and this situation's exiling the necessary knowledge about judgements of actions,<sup>35</sup> Mu'tazila evades this with cruel one's deserving to be denigrated if s/he acted deliberately. In fact, this is known as necessary although there are some objections. The discords of people with reason originates from ignorance about the attribution in which the act is beautiful because of it or ugly in terms of complementation of knowing it by reasoning. However, ignorance about attribution does not remove the obligation of knowing the goodness and ugliness principles in general. As for word, form and objects, rational people may not be in accord about their beauty or ugliness, in fact, the same person might see a form sometimes as beautiful and sometimes as ugly. This is because the beauty or ugliness of the relevant form depend on the perceiver, not on the focused object itself.<sup>36</sup> Here something like this is contrary to the idea that goodness and evil, which Mu'tazila accepts, are subjective, absolute attributions.<sup>37</sup>

If qualifications, such as goodness, ugliness, permitted, forbidden, cleanliness and dirtiness, were about original attributions of objects and actions, both a religion's beautifying something and another one's uglifying it and abrogation of religions to change them with forbidden and permitted would be unimaginable. Al-Shahristānī shows the implementation of marriage to a sister of the same father and mother in sharia law of Adam's being contradictory to the law about marrying to two sisters at the same time in the religion that the Prophet Muhammad revealed as an example. In fact, Mu'tazila avoids this evidence by separating two types of judgements from each other. At this point, reasonable judgements that are known via channel of reason in relation to rational goodness and ugliness and religious judgements that are known via the way of sharia in relation to religious goodness and ugliness are in discussion. Thus, Mu'tazila emphasizes the

<sup>33</sup> Necip Taylan, *Mantık Tarihi Problemleri* (Istanbul: IFAV Publications, 1996), 135.

<sup>34</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:20.

<sup>35</sup> Abū Hāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād fī al- i'tiqād* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Ilmiyye, 1983), 109.

<sup>36</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:19.

<sup>37</sup> al-Shahristānī, *Nihāyāt al-aqdām*, 388.

general thought which is good and evil values are absolute and essential attributions that are impossible to change by claiming that changeability of the religious judgements cannot be mentioned within the scope of ethical values.

According to Mu'tazila, reasonable judgements are the judgements that are not disputed by rational people and cannot be acquired by experience as being congenitally necessary. Therefore, the beauty and ugliness of those judgements are about the attributions that extend to them and not extend to others.

On the other hand, it is possible for religious judgements to change in time and from case to case. In other words, the relativity basis of values has great importance in this matter, and this changeability originates from the principle of Maslaha, which has single signification origin. If the aspects of benefit and harm in these judgements are known, their beauty and ugliness are also known by reasoning.

While Mu'tazila accepts the origin of general good and evil ethical values as reason that functions owing to an ability that is placed in human's mind by Allah, it supports that the judgements about good and evil in religion depend on religion again, not on reason. According to them, reason and religion do not require these two types of judgements at the same time because both judgements precede the signification that indicates the beauty and ugliness that exist together with the action itself.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, we can say that Mu'tazila regards reason and religion as sources that indicate goodness and evil.<sup>39</sup>

In this rational debate between Ash'arites and Mu'tazilates about the nature of good and evil values, we can say that Mu'tazilates, who rely upon the thought of theistic justice, successfully overcame the pressures of Ash'arī thought of absolute power and dominance that degrades the ethical values completely to religious judgements. Essentially, this value for reason that Mu'tazila puts does not decrease the greatness of theistic power contrary to the argument of Ahl al-Sunnah because finally, reason and revelation as being originated from the same source are theistic blessings for responsible people to fulfill their tasks in knowing and accepting Allah, to whom they are responsible to, as one as required.

## 2.2. Acquired Knowledge

Acquired knowledge is a type of knowledge that can only be obtained by reasoning. The essence or reality of reasoning is the idea because without idea, no one can apply reasoning. Idea means to think about something's form and to compare that thing or fact with others. Reasoning that produces idea in human is the reasoning that is dependent only on evidence. Accordingly, acquired knowledge is a type of idea that is dependent on evidences and does not present transformation. If all philosophers properly apply reasoning on a single thing's evidence, it is impossible to dissent on the idea obtained by this reasoning. Thus, when it is correct that reasoning provides constant, universal knowledge for some people, it is necessary that it produces the same kind of knowledge for all other people.

Rational analysis splits into two: while the first one expresses the rational analysis that is referred in earthly matters such as methods of treatment and the scope of experience, the second one is the rational analysis that is used in religious matters. For example according to Mu'tazila, the mentally necessary reasoning that should be referred in the matter of knowing Allah is the first one of the rational necessities. In that case, because our knowledge about Allah is obtained as a result of the method of reasoning, it is an

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<sup>38</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:63-64.

<sup>39</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa*, 75.

indirect knowledge, not a necessary one.<sup>40</sup> Therefore according to them, there are no doubts that religious obligations come after Allah's knowledge, oneness and justice.<sup>41</sup>

According to Jubbāi, the knowledge about Allah that is dependent on evidence is not necessary knowledge. Human knows the knowledge of Allah and the knowledge of good and evil via reasoning. The first thing that human beings should know is Allah given that they did create themselves, because not knowing Allah is rebellion. Prophet can only confirm the realities that are known via the channel of reason.<sup>42</sup>

There is another special type of acquired knowledge that comes via revelation. Although the ethical judgements that can only be known via the channel of revelation are called as “judgements of revelation”, the ones known via reasoning are called as “reasonable judgements”.<sup>43</sup> The ethical knowledge that is obtained by the channel of revelation is acquired knowledge, not necessary because the acceptance of revelatory knowledge comes after the mentally acceptance of the source of revelation. In other words, the revelatory knowledge must be confirmed with rational evidences. The righteousness of the judgements known by revelation can only be possible by rationally knowing that Allah is dominant and just, He will not ethically do evil, He will not break the obligation imposed on Him, He will not command the evil, He will not forbid the goodness, and therefore, his all actions are good.<sup>44</sup> Because attempting to confirm revelation with revelation leads to a vicious circle.

### 3. VALUES IN THE ETHICS OF MU'TAZILA AS KNOWLEDGE OBJECTS

Value is anything that is desirable and important to humans. Values are mostly dependent on needs.<sup>45</sup> It is possible to say that every object is valuable in terms of how much it is desired or served the purpose. The deprivation fact is the thing that determines the worth of value. For example, a person who wastes his time understands the value of time better after what is done is done. Value contains the separation of what is happened and what should happen as a criterion and always seems as something positive as good, beautiful and beneficial or negative as evil, ugly and harmful.

Value splits into categories such as religious, ethical, lawful and aesthetical.<sup>46</sup> In terms of ethical behavior, value means a standard criterion or benchmark that is referred while evaluating humans, humane

<sup>40</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 12:65-66, 67; Marie Bernard, *Le Problème de la connaissance d'après le Muğni du Cadi 'Abd al-Ġabbar* (Algiers: s.n., 1982), 137-141.

<sup>41</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-uşūl al-khamsa*, 75.

<sup>42</sup> al-Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-mawāqif fī 'ilm al-Kalām* (Cairo: Matbaa al-Saāda, 1907), 8:183-184; Tritton, *İslam Kelamı*, 142.

<sup>43</sup> Abū Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-'ad*, edited by Tāhā Husayn, Amin al-Hūlī (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub, 1963), 17:101-102.

<sup>44</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-uşūl al-khamsa*, 66, 69.

<sup>45</sup> Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Bilgi ve Değer* (Ankara: Kürsü Publications, nd.), 218.

<sup>46</sup> Joseph M. Bochenski, *Felsefece Düşünmenin Yolları*, translated by Kurtuluş Dinçer (Ankara: Ark Publications, 1994), 66.



qualities, wishes and intentions, and actions and behaviors. For example, Ali is a good person. Why? –because he helps people as much as he can, and helping people is regarded as a good behavior.

According to philosophy, there are four basic approaches about the possibility and ways of formally knowing the ethical values:<sup>47</sup> 1) Absolutism: It expresses that ethical values are real, constant and eternal-everlasting realities that do not show a change from person to person, from age to age and from community to community. These are absolute facts that must be certainly applied to life. 2) Objectivism: It mentions that standards of values, such as goodness, righteousness and justice, exist in the external world independent of our humane perception in that world, and these values are objective realities or facts that do not show a change from culture to culture. 3) Subjectivism: It states that values like goodness, righteousness and justice do not have objective realities; therefore, conditions of mind of the subject have a great importance to know these values, and these values do not have an objective basis in the external world. 4) Relativity: It expresses that values are arranged by personal and social preferences that are determined by person's environment, culture and characteristics.

It is observed that while Ash'arites act accordingly with subjectivism and relativity in general when they try to explain the conditions of values in the ethical scope, Mu'tazilates prefer to explain the ethical knowledge objects with examples from the perspective of objectivity, absolutism and relativity with a method that shows consistency with their system.

Along with the explanation of how people know all kinds of ethical theorems, the scheme of ethical theory of Mu'tazila can be drawn with various types of ethical theorems that people can find in the philosophy of ethics and with examination of other relevant points that are connected to each other, respectively.<sup>48</sup>

### 3.1. Definitions of Value Terms

In the ethical theory of Mu'tazila, general value notions are terms of goodness or evil that can be defined by the terms that necessitate praise and scorn. Mu'tazila's system related to value terms resembles a network of value descriptions that shows a notable harmony. The most striking feature of these descriptions is the relationship of all actions and praise and scorn of the deserved.

Another feature of definitions is the notion of evil's being in the first place. The followed method is not an ordinary definition. This method reflects the general perspective of Mu'tazila in which the definition of evil depends on someone who is subject and his possessing a positive act, not depends on someone who abandoned as a positive matter. Mu'tazila does not attribute the evil that is done at the humane level by servants to Allah contrary to Ahl al-Sunnah. Therefore, we can deduce that Mu'tazila also presented a realistic approach towards evil in the world of objects just as Ahl al-Sunnah did, in other words, they regarded them as facts that have objective realities. In that case, we should state that the evil that has an importance in the ethical theory of Mu'tazila is regarded as a key notion.

<sup>47</sup> Bedia Akarsu, *Felsefe Terimleri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul: İnkılap Publications, 1994), 49-50; Ahmet Cevizci, *Felsefe Sözlüğü* (Ankara: Ekin Publications, 1996), 124; Erdal Cengiz, "Törebilimde Değer ve Ölçüt Sorunu", *Doğu Batı*, 1/4 (Ağustos-Eylül-Ekim 1998): 34.

<sup>48</sup> Hourani, *The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar*, 101.



Qāḍī Abd-al-Jabbār explains the notions of praise, scorn and deserving that are mentioned in the definitions of good and evil which he supported as being necessarily known in this way:

1. Evil: Whoever does this deserves scorn.

2. Good: Whoever does this does not deserve scorn.

2a) Permissible (mubah): Whoever does or does not do this does not deserve praise or scorn.

2b) Benevolence (tafaddul) or recommendation (nedb): Although the one who does this deserves praise, the one who does not do this does not deserve scorn.

2c) Necessary (vācib): Whoever does not do this deserves scorn.

Qāḍī Abd-al-Jabbār refers to texts written in modern language to show that a wrong definition and defining are not in the same scope in the debate of definition or how the method used does not comply with a form by including wrong factors.<sup>49</sup> For example, benefit is used for anything that conveys to pleasure and happiness or to both of them. Thus, benefit has a wider range of meaning than others because when it conveys human to pleasure and happiness, he can benefit from something that directly harms him. Again if the evil only meant “forbidden”, a person who forbids something would make an action evil, and an action that is commanded by Allah and forbidden by a human would be both necessary and evil. In other words, the same action would have two opposite qualities.<sup>50</sup> Evil’s definition is limited to only religion to avoid this situation, but other similar objections still continue.

Qāḍī Abd-al-Jabbār presents an unprecedented attitude of wisdom about the language in the high literature Arabian culture that controls the Mediaeval Muslim world. For instance, his realization of semantical development explains how the ‘forbidden’ was started to be used as an equal to evil<sup>51</sup> in some communities with examples. As is seen, the definitions in the ethical system of Mu'tazila are discussed separately from reasons.<sup>52</sup>

### 3.2. The Values of Action Classes

With the expression of the values of action classes, values like an action’s natural types, killing and torturing are implied.

a) The second type theorems that are discussed in Mu'tazila philosophy of ethics are the theorems which are general realities that are excluded from definitions, that is to say, the statements about which action class provides definitions. Mu'tazilates are aware of that a definition is a general expression of reality that is not about language. For instance, they are aware of the logical difference between the good’s meaning “everything that deserves praise” and the theorem “Justice is always good”. Although Abl al-Jabbar does not make differentiations about analytical and synthetic statements in a way that is seen in the Western tradition of philosophy,<sup>53</sup> he knows that justice in the second theorem is not the essence of good, but it is only

<sup>49</sup> Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:7; Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 27, 39.

<sup>50</sup> Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:28.

<sup>51</sup> Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 12:95-96.

<sup>52</sup> Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 29.

<sup>53</sup> For Kant's analytic and synthetic judgments see. Heinz Heimsoeth, *Immanuel Kant’ın Felsefesi*, translated by Takiyettin Mengüşoğlu (Istanbul: Remzi Publications, 1986), 74-75; Cemal Yıldırım, *Matematiksel Düşünme* (Istanbul: Remzi Publications, 1996), 66-67.

one of the reasons that makes an action good; however, the matter and the action in the first theorem belongs to the same essence.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, we can describe the good and evil notions analytically and a priori in the ethical thought of Mu'tazila. In this context, Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār does not try to show the analytical relationship between any of the most valuable value terms, which is the values of good, evil and necessary, and their reasons, such as justice, cruelty, benefit, blessing and gratitude. However, even though anyone with reason knows the good and evil values obviously or explicitly, that is to say, a priori, he can synthetically understand theorems, such as "Truthfulness is good", "Justice is good", "Lying is evil" and "Cruelty is evil". Essentially, Māturīdī agree with Mu'tazilites on that these kinds of theorems can be known by rational premises.<sup>55</sup> While the evil is defined accordingly with the standard of judgements about actions like deserving the scorn, cruelty is defined accordingly with the aspect of the action itself like doing harm and stealing someone else's property.<sup>56</sup>

Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār says that everyone can know general ethical realities like "Cruelty is always evil" via direct intuitive reason.<sup>57</sup> He says that someone with reason does not need to learn the things that he knows directly via revelation, such as cruelty and ungratefulness' being evil and justice and gratitude's being necessary:<sup>58</sup> "The thing that causes an object to have a quality (evil) can show a change, such as lying is evil because the action is evil and cruelty is evil because the action is evil."<sup>59</sup>

According to Abd al-Jabbar's theory of ethics, such judgements are absolute, general statements that are always correct in reality just because of their forms. Essentially according to Mu'tazila, violation of these kinds of absolute, universal statements depending on some conditions of place and time never harms the essence of goodness or evil. If cruelty is taken into consideration in relation to this class, it is always evil regardless of conditions, the mental state of agent, the ethics of the community that person lives in and even the commands of revelation. We can mention other evil reasons, such as lying, useless actions, not being grateful for blessing, ignorance, wishing the evil, commanding the evil and offering things that cannot be afforded. On the other hand, we can mention justice, advantage, benefit, truthfulness and wishing the good as the absolute reasons of goodness in general. Such realities are in the status of axiomatic which can be known by everyone with reason directly. Essentially, it can be said that these things provide the Mu'tazila philosophy of ethics with characteristics of intuitionism to some extent.<sup>60</sup>

In the Mediaeval Muslim tradition of thought, Mu'tazila scholars, such as Allāf, Nazzam and Kabī, say that the goodness and evil of actions are due to attributions of actions, not the attributions that necessitate

<sup>54</sup> Hourani, *The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar*, 102-103.

<sup>55</sup> al-Māturīdī, Abū Mansūr. *Kitāb al-Tawhīd*, edited by Fethullāh Huleyf (Beirut: Dār al-Mashrik, 2002), 100, 178, 200-201.

<sup>56</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 12:309-310.

<sup>57</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:57-58; 12:302-302, 308.

<sup>58</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 14:152.

<sup>59</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:61.

<sup>60</sup> Hourani, *The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar*, 103.

their essences. They try to prove the real attributions that absolutely necessitate this in both goodness and evil. In this way, it is seen that they support that the goodness and evil in actions are essential attributes.<sup>61</sup>

Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār notes that he adopts the ethical absolutism thought of Ka'bī. According to this thought, because some types of actions like killing are essentially evil, all actions, conditions and states that are included in this group are evil in any case.<sup>62</sup> Accordingly, an action's being evil is because of that action's having an attribution of killing that is the action itself, that is to say, its essential attribute. There are no essential differences between killing someone with a rightful reason and the action of killing, killing someone unjustly and death penalty because both actions as being the actions of killing are essentially aimed at ending lives with some sort of solid tools.<sup>63</sup>

b) The statements that we have defined above are valuable, ultimate and absolute judgements because we know that when an action is cruel, nonsense, lie and ungratefulness, it is evil, and when an action is justice, gratefulness and righteousness, it is good. However, some of these reasons, especially cruelty, exist in a complex condition in which all of them have a different value at the first appearance and can be outweighed by other aspects in particular conditions. For example, on the one hand, action is agonizing that is evil; on the other hand, it is a deserved punishment. Therefore, the principle that people should get what they deserve is good. Accordingly, because its rightful aspect outweighs, the action here is partly cruel.

No matter what happens, we have to consider the various aspects of the action before we can determine the value of action as a whole in most cases except from some types of actions that are good or evil. The first step to take in the process of judgement is to know the value of every aspect provided that it is taken as simple. For example, if pain is not essentially a necessary behavior that is aimed at benefits which will be gained in future and a useless suffering rather than being a just punishment for cruelty, then it is evil. In other words, according to intuitionist thought of ethics, it is possible to say that “pain is evil at the first sight”.<sup>64</sup>

What Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār tries to tell about the matter of evil is some particular deeds' being sometimes good and sometimes evil depending on the existence and power of several factors that are suitable for value in actions themselves. For example, pain is evil when it is a useless suffering that does not have any other aspect in its essence. The undeserved pain is primarily evil; on the other hand, pain is good when it is deserved, beneficial or when it fulfills some other positive conditions.<sup>65</sup> Cruelty, again, is described as harm that does not have benefit and avoiding the harm in itself.<sup>66</sup> Something like this means to say that harm is evil at the first sight because of cruelty, but it can be justified with the existence of some balancing aspects at the first sight.

<sup>61</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:31; Id, *al-Muḥīṭ*, 236-239; Mihri Ḥasan Abū Sa'de, *el-Ittijâ al-'aqdî fi mushkila al-ma'rifa 'inda Mu'tazila* (Cairo: Dar al-Fiqr al-Arabî, 1993), 295-296.

<sup>62</sup> Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 64.

<sup>63</sup> Hourani, *Juwaynî's Criticisms of Mu'tazilite Ethics*, 131.

<sup>64</sup> Hourani, *The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar*, 103-104.

<sup>65</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 12:229, 284-286.

<sup>66</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 12:298, 306, 312-315. 318, 321-323.

There are two ways of knowing the value of any of these aspects at the first sight such as knowing an action of justice's being good as being justice, and these methods are reason and revelation. According to Abd al-Jabbar, we directly know that it is good for intellectualist scholars to have difficulties in the researches about science and art.<sup>67</sup> This fact is mentioned to show that pain is sometimes good, and it takes part in the first sight of the pain's scope of value. Directly acquiring such ethical knowledge is an expected approach of an intuitionist theory because in this theory, there are no principles that are never in a connective manner just as the ones of pragmatism and can be extracted from second grade general realities.<sup>68</sup>

It is seen that the way of knowing the ethical values at the first sight is directly by intuitionism for Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār because acquired knowledge is nearly from the same type of the knowledge of general ethical realities.<sup>69</sup>

A particular group of actions that are the second sub-titles of second type theorems are obtained only via the channel of revelation. These are worships, such as prayer, pilgrimage to Mecca and fasting.<sup>70</sup> If reason did not receive help, it would regard them as useless and tiring. Regarding others, which are known as beneficial owing to reason, as equal can only be possible via revelation. It is possible to explain the classification of worships into goodness that is known by reason with the principle of necessity that makes the abandonment of normal religious tasks possible in difficult times.<sup>71</sup> The actions of worships sustain their tendencies for being necessary at the first sight regardless of being invalid because of exceptional conditions just as other particular action classes.<sup>72</sup>

Mu'tazila, which supports Allah's existence, attributions and that being a prophet can mentally be proven, says that matters like religion, resurrection and miracles that cannot be known by reason can be learned via the channel of revelation. Matters, such as Allah's existence, attributions and not doing harm that are dependent on the revelation of religion, are the matters known by reason. The matters that are known by religion and reason are dependent of the righteousness of being a prophet just as the oneness of Allah. The matters that are known only via the channel of religion, however, consist of religious benefit and debacles and commands of worships that can be perceived and evaluated a bit more specifically. The matters, such as the duty of prayer's being five times, fasting during Ramadan (the ninth month of the Muslim calendar) and alcohol's being forbidden, are in this category.<sup>73</sup> The main scope in which Mu'tazila uses the reason consists of matters related to nature and human, such as substance, accident, object, nafs (soul), will, choice, action and power. Another scope in which rationalism is important is qualities of good and evil,

<sup>67</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 12:281.

<sup>68</sup> Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 33.

<sup>69</sup> Hourani, *The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar*, 103-104.

<sup>70</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 17:95; Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-uşūl al-khamsa*, 566.

<sup>71</sup> Hourani, *The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar*, 104.

<sup>72</sup> Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 33.

<sup>73</sup> Abū Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Başri, *al-Mu'tamad fī uşūl al-fiqh*, edited by al-Sheyh Khalīl al-Meys (Beirut: Dār Kutub al-Ilmiyye, 1983), 2:227-228.

goodness and bad in the objects and actions that have ethical extent.<sup>74</sup> According to Mu'tazila, human is a being who arrived in world with competence, ability and capacity to know these because Allah placed the knowledge of general principles related to good and evil in humans' minds at birth and designed their minds accordingly.

It is correct that reason conveys to the result that it is necessary for humans to feel gratitude towards Allah, but it does not necessitate to know the form of worship which is the way of actualizing this gratitude. According to Abū Hāshīm, worships like prayer and hajj can be known via revelation, not by reasoning. The one who explains how to worship is the prophet, and whatever he says should be true. According to Abū Hāshīm, prophets are needed because they have already arrived to explain the matters that can be mentally known in general in details.<sup>75</sup>

Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār says that while reason is used to know the outlines of religious task, it cannot apprehend the details.<sup>76</sup> Although reason knows that the doomsday will happen, it is not capable of determining the nature of rewards and punishments that will be received by humans. Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār think that these details can only be known via revelation.<sup>77</sup>

The approach of Mu'tazila confirms the idea that everything cannot be known by reasoning.<sup>78</sup> Reason needs the assistance of revelation to enlighten the details of things that can be known by general statements. At the same time, revelation exists to confirm these things that can be known via reasoning. In other words, revelation is needed to confirm the rational command as religious command and rational forbidden as religious forbidden. According to Abū Hāshīm, prophets confirm the things that can be known by reasoning. Prophetic religion completes rational truths and makes them matured.<sup>79</sup>

Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār considers the potential problem of incompatibility between the religion dependent on revelation and ethical judgements formed by natural reason. He accepts that sometimes the duties of religion are separated from the tasks that are revealed to us by reason itself. For example, the worship of prayer is good in religious aspects, but it is apparently evil as being useless.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, Qādī Abd-al-Jabbār tries to clarify that Allah does not make religious judgements good only by revelation. Thus, revelation completes the deficiencies of reason without having contradictions with it. Revelation does not change something naturally evil to good or something naturally good to evil.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>74</sup> M. Sait Özervarlı, “Mu'tezile Akılcılığı”, *Uluslararası İslam Düşüncesi Konferansları 2* (Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür İşleri Daire Başkanlığı Publications, 1997), 105-106.

<sup>75</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Muḥīṭ bi-l- taklīf*, 22.

<sup>76</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Muḥīṭ bi-l- taklīf*, 12, 31.

<sup>77</sup> Abu'l-Fath Abd al-Karīm al-Shahristānī, *al-Milal wa al-nihal*, edited by Muḥammad Sayyid Ghaylānī (Beirut: s.n., 1986), 1:45.

<sup>78</sup> Ibn al-Humām Kemāleddīn, *al-Musāyara fī ilm al-Kalām* (Istanbul: Cagri Publications, 1979), 153.

<sup>79</sup> Albert Nasrī, Nāder, *Falsafa al-Mu'tazila* (Baghdād: Matbaa al-Rābiṭa, 1951), 2:42; Ḥanefī, *Min al- 'aqīde ilā al-Savra*, 4:45.

<sup>80</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:64; Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 33.

<sup>81</sup> Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, 6:53.

According to Mu'tazila, revelation's duty of determination of ethical rules is to either confirm and strengthen the mentally known or to give complementary information to reason.<sup>82</sup> They say that revelation performs a duty that is incentive and has power of sanction in implementation of ethical duty and rules to social life in the scope of ethics because Allah reports that He will reward the ones who fulfill their ethical duties and punish the ones who shirk their duties.<sup>83</sup>

As being Muslim rationalists, Mu'tazilites support that reason can prove the existence of Allah and social, ethical duty and responsibility of human. They rely upon the faith that revelation will be extremely beneficial for those who know Allah. In fact, Mu'tazila says that all actions of Allah are good, He will never do evil and He will never fail the task. They support that revelation is a benefit that knows the existence of Allah and exceeds the limits of mind with reference to the principle that revelation looks out for their servants more than themselves in terms of religion.<sup>84</sup>

### 3.3. Values of Particular Actions

Finally, the third type ethical theorems are particular theorems. These are the theorems that are associated with the rightness, wrongness and obligation of an action that is done by someone under certain conditions in particular place and time. Such theorems have a great importance in practical life because all decisions that we make in practical life are special decisions in a certain sense.

Conditions such as not deserving and abusing without gaining any benefits are understood from reasons in relation to particular actions. It is necessary to determine the reasons that can be related to a particular action in order to show its value and to evaluate these reasons together.

The ways of judgement logically come out from sub-classes of second type theorems according to the quality of sub-class in which the special theorem exists. Thus, they can be explained quite easily.

a) If the special action is one of the actions that are absolute principles, we need only one comparison for this. For example:

Truthfulness is always good.

This action is truthfulness.

In that case, this action is good.

b) Provided that the action is not within any absolute rule, we have to evaluate its various aspects at the first sight together and decide according to the thing that outweighs. For example, this action directly and considerably abuses someone, and the pain becomes undeserved, but it brings benefit to other people. Apparently, the problem of evaluating different factors as being pain and deserving is not only a tough issue for intuitionists, but it is also tough for Mu'tazilites.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Recep Kılıç, *Ahlâkın Dinî Temelî* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Publications, 1992), 99-101.

<sup>83</sup> For detailed information about Wa 'd and Wa'id see. Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-uşūl al-khamsa*, 123, 611-514; George F. Hourani, *Divine Justice and Human Reason in Mu'tazilite Ethical Theology: Ethics in Islam*, edited by Richard G. Hovannisian (California: Undena Press, 1985), 75.

<sup>84</sup> Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-uşūl al-khamsa*, 132-133; Martin, Woodward, Atmaja, *Defenders of Reason in Islam* (Atlanta: s.n., 1997), 12, 92-93.

<sup>85</sup> Hourani, *The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar*, 105-106.

If the action becomes a special type of action that is commanded by revelation, we refer to religion to learn this reality. Then again, this probably gives us a value only at the first sight because we have to consider also the other aspects of action at the first sight according to the doctrine of necessity<sup>86</sup> in which even Qur'anic commands can be suspended in the conditions of extreme distress or harm. In these conditions, a special decision is taken again by evaluating all factors at the first sight including the command of revelation. This is a situation that can happen under natural conditions. For example, carrion, blood, pork meat and an animal that is cut for the sake of someone else rather than Allah are absolutely forbidden in the verse of Qur'an (2/173). However, if someone has to eat something forbidden unavoidably, he can eat it to the amount of necessity that will not let him die of starvation and not exceed limits. There is no religious objection or harm in this action; in other words, this person is not considered as he committed sin. Accordingly, the principle, 'necessities make the objections permissible', is presented as an important perception in Islamic law.<sup>87</sup>

## CONCLUSION

According to Mu'tazilites, the good and evil values have unchangeable qualities contrary to Ash'arites. For them, the absolute and objective reason of existence for good and evil values is only Allah. Mu'tazila says that the reason of existence of values originates from the essence and nature of object provided that they are placed both in the world of objects and human's mind in the past eternity only by Allah Himself. Such thought of objectivity of Mu'tazila that receives its all necessity from Allah can be defined as "theistic objectivity". In this context, because they embraced the objective reality of world, Mu'tazilites try to ground their objectivist approaches by saying that Allah is an equitable being that has wisdom, He has to do what is best for His servants in earthly and spiritual matters and He will never do evil; thus, He will never deceive us.

Consequently, Mu'tazila considers that by establishing a relationship between knowledge and value someone with reason can objectively know some ethical values whether 'religion is sent or not' because for them, some part of values like the goodness of justice and evil of cruelty are known by necessary knowledge, and other parts of values like the evil of beneficial lie and goodness of harmful truth are known by acquired knowledge. Necessary knowledge does not depend on revelation because it precedes knowing Allah's existence and oneness. For this reason, the correctness of ethical realities that are necessarily known are confirmed by anyone rational whether that person believes in (Allah) or not.

Even though good and evil value terms and absolute ethical judgements like "Justice is always good" and "Cruelty is always evil" are necessarily known, Mu'tazila supports that the values of special actions can only be obtained by acquired knowledge. Therefore, they consider Allah's existence and oneness and religious knowledge within the scope of acquired knowledge. However, they say that revelation is at a position that reason cannot reach because it can inform and judge about revelation's afterlife conditions and lawful

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<sup>86</sup> Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 33.

<sup>87</sup> Muḥammad Abū Zahrā, *İslâm Hukuku Metodolojisi*, translated by Abdulkadir Şener (Ankara: Fecr Publications, 1986), 322-324.

conditions of worships like prayer. In that case, it is possible to interpret the reason Mu'tazila supports as partial rationalism rather than absolute rationalism.

According to Mu'tazila, reason and revelation are two main sources in knowing the good and evil values. To be more precise, reason and revelation are considered as important sources in knowing and revealing the scope of values in this thought of ethics. While revelation only confirms some realities that can be known mentally, it reveals the matters that cannot be known mentally. Consequently, according to Mu'tazila, reason knows religious and ethical goodness and evils and can form an ethical system of values by properly using its abilities which are independent of revelation.

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## Reincarnation (*Tanāsukh*) According to Islam: Comparative, Historical and Contemporary Analyses\*

Mehmet Bulğen \*\*

### ABSTRACT

This study has three parts. In the first part I am going to make a comparison between belief in the Hereafter in Islam and belief in reincarnation in Indian religions in terms of their respective views of about God and the universe. In the second part, I am going to discuss the group associated with belief in the migration of the soul (*tanāsukh*) and the reaction they received from Muslim thinkers through Islamic history. In the third part, I am going to deal with the idea of reincarnation as the modern version of the idea of the migration of the soul. In this context, I am going to discuss various claims of groups or organizations defending the idea of reincarnation. Among these claims, one may include the following: reincarnation is scientifically verified, belief in reincarnation solves the problem of evil, and reincarnation is supported by sacred books including the Qurʾān. My overall purpose is to show that the religion and thought systems reveal their doctrines of immortality within the integral framework of their ontology, epistemology and universe models. In this regard, I will conclude by noting that the belief in reincarnation is not only compatible with the Islam's belief in hereafter but also Islamic teachings concerning God, the universe, and man.

### KEYWORDS

Kalām, Islam, Indian Religions, *Tanāsukh*, Reincarnation, Hereafter, Immortality, Salvation

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\*\* Associate Professor, Marmara University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Kalām, Istanbul, TURKEY  
Doç. Dr., Marmara Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fakültesi, Kelam Anabilim Dalı

mbulgen@hotmail.com

0000-0002-2372-471X

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## İslam Dini Açısından Reenkarnasyon (Tenâsüh): Tarihi ve Günümüz Açısından Bir Karşılaştırma

### ÖZ

Üç bölümden oluşan bu çalışmanın birinci bölümünde İslam dini ile Hint kıtası dinleri arasında Tanrı, evren, insan tasavvurları ve ölümsüzlük doktrinleri ekseninde genel bir karşılaştırma yapılacak, böylelikle tenâsüh ve âhiret inancının ait olduğu dinî gelenek içindeki yeri gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. İkinci bölümde İslam düşünce tarihinde tenâsüh inancıyla ilişkilendirilen gruplar ve bunlara gösterilen tepkiler ortaya koyulacaktır. Üçüncü bölümde ise kadîm tenâsüh inancının günümüzdeki şekli olan reenkarnasyon düşüncesi ele alınacak; bu bağlamda ülkemizde çeşitli dernek ve vakıflar vasıtasıyla faaliyetlerini yürüten ruhçu akımların, reenkarnasyonun bilimsel olarak kanıtlandığı, kötülük probleminde çözüm getirdiği ve başta Kur’ân olmak üzere ilâhî dinlerin kutsal kitaplarının da bu inancı desteklediği gibi iddiaları değerlendirilecektir. Makalenin genel amacı ise din ve düşünce sistemlerinin ölümsüzlük doktrinlerini varlık anlayışları, dünya görüşleri ve bilgi nazariyeleriyle bütünleşik bir sistem dâhilinde ortaya koydukları, bu doğrultuda reenkarnasyon inancının da İslam dininin en temelde Tanrı, evren ve insan tasavvuruyla uyummadığını ortaya koymaktır.

### ANAHTAR KELİMELEER

Kelâm, İslam, Hint Dinleri, Tenâsüh, Reenkarnasyon, Âhiret İnancı, Ölümsüzlük, Kurtuluş

### INTRODUCTION

The term ‘*tanāsukh*’, derived from the Arabic word ‘*naskh*’, which literally means, “replacing something with another thing by repudiating it” and “transferring it from a place to another”, can be defined as the rebirth of a living being in a different body after its death to complete the evolution of its soul.<sup>1</sup> In Western languages e.g., French and English, the idea of rebirth in a different body is commonly referred to with the term ‘reincarnation’, ‘metempsychosis’ and even ‘transmigration’.<sup>2</sup>

Before discussing *tanāsukh* or reincarnation, it is important to determine the scope of our current study. There’s an admitted difficulty involved in studies about death and the beyond. Even though death is an observable fact, it is directly out of the scope of human experience in the sense that a human being lives life only once and when s/he experiences death, s/he cannot have the opportunity to describe what it was like. In that sense, death is the termination of every experience. So rationally or empirically proving

<sup>1</sup> Ibn Manzūr, “naskh”, *Lisān al-‘Arab* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, n.d.), 4407; Tahānawī, *Kashshāf Istilāḥāt al-Funūn* (Lebanon: Maktabatu Lubnan, 1996), 2: 511-512; al-Sayyid al-Sharīf Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-Ta’rifāt* (Beirut: Maktaba Lebanon, 1985), 72; Edward William Lane, *An Arabic English Lexicon* (Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1968), 8: 2788-2789.

<sup>2</sup> Ali İhsan Yitik, “Tenâsüh=Tanāsukh”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: TDV Publications 2011), 40: 441-443.

whether human immortality will be achieved via bodily resurrection or reincarnation of the soul seems as impossible as proving that such a thing will never happen from a materialistic point of view.<sup>3</sup>

In the Islamic tradition, issues involving the afterlife are known as *ākhirah* (hereafter) or *ma‘ād* (the returning); theologically, they are dealt with as a part of *fides ex auditu* topics (*sam‘iyyat*).<sup>4</sup> Such issues are about death and the beyond are called “*sam‘iyyat*” to emphasize that knowledge of them is principally based on “reliable reports” (*al-khabar al-ṣādiq*) acquired solely through hearing, rather than intellect or experience.<sup>5</sup> That is to say, while rational knowledge gained by reasoning and inference is commonly used in issues about divinity, such as God’s existence and His attributes, issues about the afterlife are mostly explained by proofs coming from revelation (the *Qur‘ān*) and reports from the Prophet Muhammad (*ḥadith*). Because it is based on proofs coming from transmitted reports discussions about the afterlife had an special place in the *kalām* books of the classical period.<sup>6</sup> Along with godhood and prophethood, Islamic theologians (*mutakallimūn*) regarded belief in the afterlife as one of the three important principles of religion (*al-uṣūl al-thalāthah*) and strove to understand *Qur‘ānic* verses and hadiths about the issue in order to form a properly Islamic account of the afterlife. Islamic theologians sought to make belief in the afterlife coherent and consistent with this belief in the oneness of God principle (*tawḥīd*), as well as *Qur‘ānic* notions such as isthmus (*barzakh*), judgment day, bodily resurrection, gathering of humans (*hashr*), reckoning, intercession, heaven and hell.<sup>7</sup> As regards the doctrine of *tanāsukh*, Islamic theologians rejected it in all its aspects on grounds of it being incompatible with the essentials of the Islamic religion, especially the *Qur‘ān*, *sunnah* and *ijmā‘* (consensus). As a result, anyone that endorsed *tanāsukh* was deemed an infidel.

Today, on the other hand, the doctrine of reincarnation is supported by various spiritualist trends and is claimed as being different from the classical *tanāsukh* view. This new account, which is supported by various association and foundations, sees rebirth as being more about a consistently progressing spiritual evolution rather than as a form of punishment and reward. People who support the idea of reincarnation don’t see it as a belief but more of a super-religious and super-national worldwide reality that has scientific status.

But before addressing this popular view of reincarnation, it will be beneficial to make a general comparison between, on the one hand, religions that adopted belief in the afterlife, and, on the other, Indian

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<sup>3</sup> Faruk Karaca, *Ölüm Psikolojisi=Psychology of Death* (Istanbul: Beyan Publications, 2000), 29; Hayati Hökelekli, “Ölüm ve Ölüm Ötesi Psikolojisi=Psychology of Death and After Death”, *UÜİFD* 3/3 (1991): 152.

<sup>4</sup> Bekir Topaloğlu, *Kelām Araştırmaları Üzerine Düşünceler= Thoughts on the Kalām Researches* (Istanbul: İFAV, 2004), 38; Özervarlı, *Kelâmda Yenilik Arayışları*, 116.

<sup>5</sup> Mehmet Bulğen, *Reenkarnasyonla İlişkilendirilen Ayetlerin Değerlendirilmesi=Evaluation of the Qur‘ānic Verses Linked to the Reicarnation* (Master’s thesis, Marmara University, 2005), 10.

<sup>6</sup> M. Sait Özervarlı, *Kelâmda Yenilik Arayışları=Searching for Innovation in Kalām* (Istanbul: TDV Publications, 1998), 116.

<sup>7</sup> For al-Ghazālī’s criticism of philosophers who deny the bodily resurrection that will take place in the hereafter, see his *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 20th chapter, edited by Sulaymān Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-Maārif, n.d.), 282 ff.

religions in which reincarnation is a common feature. The comparison will be made in terms of ideas involving God, the universe, and human knowledge since these latter determine the content of the former.<sup>8</sup> The comparison that we are going to make will hopefully contribute to an understanding of what mainly causes the difference between the accounts of immortality and salvation in these two religious systems.

### 1. The Comparison between Reincarnation Belief of Indian Religions and Hereafter Belief of Islam in Terms of God, the Universe, and Human Concepts

The desire for immortality or the maintenance of one’s existence after death is one of the essential qualities of human beings.<sup>9</sup> No evidence that is opposed to immortality has dissuaded the human hope for eternal life, and so humans have accordingly sought out solutions for the predicament of disappearance in religious and philosophical terms.<sup>10</sup> While many different solutions to this problem have been proposed throughout the history of thought,<sup>11</sup> the two main ones have been either a belief in a resurrection in an afterlife, and reincarnation in this world. The former is supported by monotheistic religions, such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and is dependent on the idea of a personal God; the latter is supported by Indian subcontinent religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism, and is dependent on the idea of the spirit’s immortality.<sup>12</sup>

Contrary to popular belief, the belief of *tanāsukh* does not seem to go back to a long way in the history of human thought. While the oldest writings that imply soul’s resurrection in different bodies until it

<sup>8</sup> Many chapters (*sūrah*) in the Qur'an collocate the verses describing the universe, the creation of man and the administration of the universe, and verses depicting the life of the Hereafter. See *Sūrah al-Mulk* (67), *al-Insan* (76), *al-Mursalāt* (77), *an-Naba* (78), *an-Nāzi'at* (79), *at-Tāriq* (86), *al-A'lā* (87). See Bekir Topaloğlu, “*Āhîret*”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: TDV Publications 1998), 1: 544.

<sup>9</sup> John Hick, *Death and Eternal Life* (Great Britain: Macmillan, 1994), 55.

<sup>10</sup> For different immortality solutions and their criticisms, see C. J. Ducasse, *A Critical Examination of The Belief In A Life After Death* (USA: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1961), 28 ff; Antony Flew, “Immortality”, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards (USA: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972), 4:139-150; Karaca, *Ölüm Psikolojisi=Psychology of Death*, 17; John Leslie, *Immortality Defended* (Singapore: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 56 ff; H. Mellone, “Immortality” *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hasting (Edinburgh: T T Clark Ltd, 1980), VII: 172-179.

<sup>11</sup> Harold Coward, *Life after Death in World Religions* (New York: Orbis Books, 1997), 2-9.

<sup>12</sup> The belief reincarnation was also embraced by some philosophers such as Pythagoras (570-500 BC), Plato (428-348 BC), Plotinus (205-270 AD), and some gnostic movements such as Spiritualism, Neo-spiritualism, and Theosophy. See Bruce Long, “Reincarnation”, *Encyclopedia of Religion*, edited by Lindsay Jones (USA: Thomson & Gale, 2005), XI: 7676-7681; N.W. Thomas, “Transmigration”, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hasting (Edinburgh: T T. Clark Ltd, 1980), XII: 424; Stuart C. Brown, *Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction with Readings* (London: Routledge, 2001), 5-52; Turan Koç, *Ölümsüzlük Düşüncesi= The Notion of Immortality* (Istanbul: İz Publication, 2005), 135; Libby Ahluwalia, *Understanding Philosophy of Religion* (United Kingdom: Folens Limited, 2008), 235; Metin Yasa, *Felsefî ve Deneysel Dayanaklarla Ölüm Sonrası Yaşam= The Life After Death with Philosophical and Experimental Basis* (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Publications, 2001), 23; Mehmet Aydın, *Din Felsefesi=Philosophy of Religion* (İzmir: İİFVY, 2001), 252, 264; Ninian Smart, “Reincarnation”, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards (USA: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1972), VII: 122-124.

reaches perfection are holy Indian texts like the Upanishads (800-400 BC), there is no such belief in texts that predate these like the Vedas (1300-800 BC).<sup>13</sup> Reincarnation as a view of the afterlife seems to have originated after 500 BC in Ancient Greece and Ancient Egypt.<sup>14</sup> In earlier texts, like the *Book of the Dead*, an Egyptian book written around 3000 BC, the condition of soul in material world are described instead of the idea about reincarnation in a different body in this world.<sup>15</sup>

While the belief of transmigration of soul was present in various societies from Ancient Greece to Ancient Egypt, it did not have a single determinant form in those contexts.<sup>16</sup> There are many separate beliefs in societies due to their structures, and beliefs that cannot include communities along with a support of a strong thought system do not have a determinant position in culture. There are six requirements that should all be met together for transmigration to have a distinct place as in the Indian subcontinent:

1. The understanding of a non-personal, absolute God;
2. Monism, in which God and the universe is accepted as one;
3. An epistemology that views the physical universe as imaginary or as a deception;
4. A dualist anthropology that views human beings as composed of a mortal body and an immortal soul;
5. A *karma* (moral law) that works independent of God and determines the soul's cycles of births and rebirths;
6. A caste system that is based on social stratification.<sup>17</sup>

The first contrast between Indian religions and divine religions is in their basic understanding of God. In Indian cosmology, God is not a personal being that exists beyond the universe. The universe as a whole is seen as God's embodied form or manifestation; He presents His existence in everything and in the whole

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<sup>13</sup> R. Garbe, "Transmigration (Indian)", *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hasting (Edinburgh: T T Clark Ltd, 1980) XII, 434; Wendy Doniger, *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions* (California: University of California Press, 1980), 3.

<sup>14</sup> Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, *Philosophy of Religion: An Historical Introduction* (USA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 172; Long, "Reincarnation", 7677.

<sup>15</sup> Mark Albrecht, *Reincarnation: A Christian Critique of a New Age Doctrine* (Illinois: Inter Varsity Press, 1982), 8-9, 26-35; Sir Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, New York: Banned & Noble Inc., 1971), 1: IV; Axel Michaels, *Hinduism, Past and Present*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 156; Ernest Valea, "Reincarnation: Its Meaning and Consequences", access: 6 February 2011, <http://www.comparativereligion.com/reincarnation.html>; W. M. Flinders Petrie, "Transmigration (Egyptian)", *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hasting (Edinburgh: T T Clark Ltd, 1980), XII: 431-432.

<sup>16</sup> Although the belief in reincarnation were defended by some philosophers such as Pythagoras (570-500 BC) and Plato (428-348 BC) in ancient Greece, it could not turn into mass belief in this society. Reincarnation was not a dominant belief in Egypt either. See R. Garbe, "Transmigration (Greek and Roman)", *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hasting (Edinburgh: T T Clark Ltd, 1980), 12: 431-432; W. M. Flinders Petrie, "Transmigration (Egyptian)", XII: 431.

<sup>17</sup> Joseph Prabhu, "Upanishadic Philosophy", *Encyclopedia of India*, edited by Stanley Wolpert (USA: Thomson Gale 2006), 198-200.



universe.<sup>18</sup> Now because in such a view of God is not an agent that voluntarily interferes in the universe, being an absolute being and without personality, this leads naturally to an account of the afterlife in terms of an immortal spirit or soul. And so claims such as the soul is an immaterial substance that and it can maintain its life by itself after the death of physical body are accepted as postulates.<sup>19</sup>

As for theistic religions, one of which is Islam, immortality is viewed in light of a personal divinity. According to this approach, it is not anything about the soul's essence that will make the human being immortal; rather, it is the promise of God, who has wisdom, will and capability, for recreation that will guarantee it.<sup>20</sup> A person who believes in Allah as the creator of the universe will also believe that He can recreate it as He wills.<sup>21</sup> For this reason, methods for proving the immortality with reference to soul's essence were not greatly favored among religious communities in Islam.<sup>22</sup> In Islamic theology, as can be seen in their discussions of issues falling under 'sam'iyāt', the theologians spent little time basing their belief in immortality on rational arguments but more on the idea of God's fulfilling a promise, contained in scripture, of bringing about the resurrection of human beings.<sup>23</sup>

The different approaches of these two religious systems to immortality that derive from their concepts of God can also be seen in their salvation theories. In Indian religions, salvation is determined by one's *karma*, the universal causal law that works independent of God.<sup>24</sup> It is human's own efforts dependent on this law that will bring salvation, not his/her faith in God.<sup>25</sup> Neither the idea of sacrifice, which is performed to save people, nor the chute, which follows the redemption, has a place in Hinduism. A human only saves or loses himself.<sup>26</sup> In Islam, salvation is only possible by gaining Allah's consent or favor,<sup>27</sup> and Allah's favor

<sup>18</sup> Paul A. Harrison, *Elements of Pantheism* (USA: Llumina Press, 2004), 13; A.S. Geden, "Pantheism (Hindu)", *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hasting (Edinburgh: T T Clark Ltd, 1980), 18: 617-620.

<sup>19</sup> Koç, *Ölümsüzlük Düşüncesi= The Notion of Immortality*, 46.

<sup>20</sup> al-Anbiyā 21/104.

<sup>21</sup> Yāsīn 36/77-81; Kāf 50/15; also see İlyas Çelebi, *İslām İnancında Gayp Problemi= The Problem of Invisibility (Ghayb) in Islamic Belief* (Istanbul: İFAV, 1996), preface.

<sup>22</sup> Ömer Nasûhi Bilmen, *Muvazzah İlm-i Kelâm=Annotated Science of Kalâm* (Istanbul: Fatih-Enes Kitabevi 2000), 412.

<sup>23</sup> The attempt to explain the concept of "immortality" in the Islamic world with the concepts of philosophy has become widespread in the post-Ghazālī period (d. 505/1111). For this discussion, see: Bulğen, *Reenkamasyonla İlişkilendirilen Ayetlerin Değerlendirilmesi= Evaluation of the Qur'ānic Verses Linked to the Reicarnation*, 96-98.

<sup>24</sup> Michael Witzel, "Hinduism (Dharma)", *Encyclopedia of India*, edited by Stanley Wolpert (USA: Thomson Gale, 2006), II: 190.

<sup>25</sup> Ahluwalia, *Understanding Philosophy of Religion*, 253.

<sup>26</sup> Mehmet Taplamacıoğlu, *Karşılaştırmalı Dinler Tarihi= Comparative History of Religions* (Ankara: Güneş Matbaacılık 1966), 145, 146.

<sup>27</sup> al-Fajr 89/28; Āl-i 'Imrān 3/15, 162; at-Tawbah 9/72; al-Bayyina 98/8.

can be gained by believing in Him and performing good deeds.<sup>28</sup> Without God’s help, guidance, and especially without faith in Him, salvation is impossible.<sup>29</sup>

In Indian religions, on one hand, soul gets purified with rebirths; on the other hand, it rises by broadening its knowledge and experience. This rise of individual soul (*Atma*) continues until the soul escapes from the cycle of rebirths (*Samsara*) by attaining salvation (*Nirvana*) which is supposed to be a state of union with ultimate reality or *Brahma*.<sup>30</sup> And hence it seems that while Indian spiritual thought accepts the post-eternality of individual souls, it does not accept their pre-eternality.<sup>31</sup> In the religion of Islam, salvation is understood as *lika’ Allah* i.e., meeting or congregation with Allah. But this state, which will take place in the afterlife, does not mean an ontological union with God or the disappearance of one’s personality in His essence. It is not possible for beliefs which threaten a person’s individual existence in terms of some future union or extinction in the divine, a union between creature and Creator, to be consistent with Islam’s monotheistic account of God its understanding of the relation of human beings to that God.

In the Indian religious tradition, ‘the self is an entity that has qualities, such as memory, identity and consciousness.’<sup>32</sup> These qualities, though they maintain its personal identity during its temporal existence, are not permanent in that with the death of the body, they all cease to be. What remains and is transferred to afterlife is *Atma*, the individual soul, which is loaded with karmic destiny.<sup>33</sup> In the Islamic tradition, on the other hand, there’s the promise of resurrection, an event in which a person’s ultimate accountability will be determined. This is because Islam sees a human being’s life experience for which s/he is responsible as an integral part of him/her. Therefore, when a person is resurrected in afterlife, s/he will be conscious of his/her identity and the things s/he did on Earth as an individual.<sup>34</sup>

In Indian cosmology, human does not have a special place in the universe; s/he is somewhere in the middle in the category of existence. This is because of the belief that soul is essential and body is instrumental. All living beings are said to have the same soul, which is why the soul in the human body can reincarnate as a form of animal or plant later. From this point of view, all beings are relatives because they have the same life.<sup>35</sup> According to the religion of Islam, the human being is not an ordinary being, but s/he is the noblest of creation (*ashraf al-makhlūqāt*). Everything on Earth is put into the service and disposal of human beings as they are the representatives (*khalif*) of God. Even the angels are ordained to prostrate before

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<sup>28</sup> al-Rad 13/22-24; al-Kahf 18/28; Tāhā 20/130; al-Rūm 38/38.

<sup>29</sup> al-Māida 5/5; al-A’rāf 7/147; al-Kahf 18/103-105.

<sup>30</sup> Chad Meister, *Introducing Philosophy of Religion* (London: Routledge, 2009), 25; T. Patrick Burke, *The Major Religions: An Introduction with Text* (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 24.

<sup>31</sup> Frank Jevons, *Comparative Religion* (New York: Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 76.

<sup>32</sup> Charles Taliaferro, *Contemporary Philosophy of Religion* (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003), 181.

<sup>33</sup> Warren Matthews, *World Religions* (USA: Cengage Learning, 2008), 74.

<sup>34</sup> Aydın, *Din Felsefesi=Philosophy of Religion*, 261; Hökeleki, “Ölüm ve Ölüm Ötesi Psikolojisi=Psychology of Death and After Death”, 164; Koç, *Ölümsüzlük Düşüncesi=The Notion of Immortality*, 135; Yasa, *Felsefi ve Deneysel Dayanaklarla Ölüm Sonrası Yaşam=The Life After Death with Philosophical and Experimental Basis*, 12

<sup>35</sup> Kürşat Demirci, “Tanāsukh”, *İslām’da İnanç İbadet ve Günlük Yaşayış Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: İFAV, 1997), 4: 333.

them.<sup>36</sup> All of these characteristics are due to a special duty and responsibility that is given to human beings by Allah.<sup>37</sup>

In Indian cosmology, accepting God and the universe as one (monism/pantheism) and thus regarding the physical universe’s existence as an unfortunate event, a lower form of life, and seeking salvation by reuniting with the Absolute, have caused people to have a pessimistic perspective with regard to physical world. Thus, the life that is lived with the external senses is seen as a source of evil and an unwanted condition, which separates humans from the union with the ‘Absolute’.<sup>38</sup> The religion of Islam, however, is optimistic about material life, insofar as in the *Qur’ān*, it draws a picture of the physical universe, which is in harmony and filled with beauties that show the perfection of its Creator.<sup>39</sup> Human beings are expected to maintain the harmony in nature, improving the Earth and making use of earth’s rightful blessings.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, gnostic approaches, such as cutting oneself off from the world and worldly things, inaction, refusing the reality of physical universe and discrediting degrading what is material are not compatible with the religion of Islam. The *Qur’ān* does not accept a dualist human theory according to which the soul is a human being’s true reality and the physical body as unimportant, is a kind of temporary prison, and reports that Satan was dismissed from Allah’s presence because of he disdained the fact that the human was made of clay.<sup>41</sup> According to the *Qur’ān*, it is humans themselves, who are born, live, die, and will be judged by being resurrected and then will go to heaven or hell, in a harmony of soul and body.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, the dualist human understanding that sees human’s soul as his immortal essence and body as his unimportant mortal vehicle or prison is not consistent with the *Qur’ānic* view of human beings, which sees them as body-soul unities and responsible in a holistic way.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>36</sup> al-Baqara 2/29-34; at-Tīn 95/4.

<sup>37</sup> Hûd 11/7; al-Mulk 67/2; al-Insân 76/2.

<sup>38</sup> Ismail Raji al-Faruqi, *al-Tawhîd: Its Implications for Thought and Life* (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1992), 31 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Kâf 50/6-11.

<sup>40</sup> Hûd 11/61; al-Baqara 2/168,172; al-Ankabût 29/17; al-Cum’a 62/10.

<sup>41</sup> al-A’râf 7/12; Sâd 38/76, The Qur'an also maintains that the creation of man from the earth as the evidence of God's existence and power (ar-Rûm 30/20).

<sup>42</sup> al-Baqara 2/72,233,286; an-Nisâ 4/1, 29,83; al-Mâide 5/32; al-An’am 6/151,152; al-A’râf 7/43; al-Isrâ 17/33; al-Kahf 18/74; Taha 20/40; al-Kasas 28/18; at-Talâk 65/7; ash-Shams 91/7-8, Âl Imrân 3/163; at-Tawbah 9/128; ar-Rûm 30/21, al-Anbiyâ 21/35, Lokmân 31/28, al-Fajr 39/27-30.

<sup>43</sup> Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an: Second Edition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 17; W. Montgomery Watt, *Islam and Christianity Today: A Contribution to Dialogue* (New York: Routledge 2008), 125-130; M. Saim Yeprem, “Ruh=Soul”, *Ansiklopedik İslâm Lügati* (Istanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi Publications, 1983), II: 579; Mehmet Paçacı, *Kutsal Kitaplarda Ölüm Ötesi=After Death in the Divine Books* (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Publications, 2001), 85; Mehmet Dalkılıç, *İslâm Mezheplerinde Ruh=The Soul in Islamic Sects* (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2004), 24; Aydın, *Din Felsefesi=Philosophy of Religion*, 241, 261; Erkan Yar, *Ruh-Beden İlişkisi Açısından İnsanın Bütünlüğü Sorunu= The Problem of Integrity vis-à-vis Soul-Body Relation* (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Publications, 2000), 42.

In Indian cosmology, the belief that views God and nature as one and the physical universe as ultimately illusory, a mirror that inaccurately reflects God, leads either to the sanctification of nature, on the one hand, or to the denial of the visible physical world altogether, on the other.<sup>44</sup> Thus, a mysterious, incomprehensible, and frightening understanding of nature, which has divine qualities and does not have reality at the same time, naturally emerges. Also, the thought that the visible universe consists of only imagination and illusion affected epistemology negatively, and language, written revelation and tradition are regarded insufficient and relative and thus as obstacles to a human being's grasp of ultimate reality. The combination of ideas like that of an illusory world, and irrationalist epistemology, and the belief in 'rebirth of a dead person's soul in a different body in the world' – all of which may seem contrary to the common sense of a Muslim or Western audience –, come to have the status of unquestionable doctrines.

As for the religion of Islam, the separation of creator (Allah) and His creatures (*makhlūqāt*) along definite lines, and the placement of the whole universe under the all-embracing control of a just God, who does not act arbitrarily, and the acceptance of the genuine reality of the physical universe, prevents nature from being understood in mythological terms and purges it of the random domination of gods. And this in turn becomes one of the most important factors in the development of natural science; for<sup>45</sup> it is not possible for science to work with an understanding of nature that is dominated by superstitions and magical features, a nature that is sacred,, incomprehensible, lacking any order or law..<sup>46</sup>

Finally, in Indian cosmology, not only human beings and other living beings, but also the whole universe itself is subject to reincarnation. Accordingly, when a universe's life is over, the universe disentangles and then gets reborn (*kalpa*).<sup>47</sup> The universe's being good or bad in its former existence determines its state in its new life too. Thus, in Indian cosmology history consists of successive, cyclical periods, and these periods continue forever.<sup>48</sup> As for the religion of Islam, history is not cyclical, but is rather linear in nature, with a beginning and end. The universe is not eternal; it is created by Allah out of nothing. Only Allah is eternal and everlasting.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Holmes Rolston, *Science and Religion: A Critical Survey* (USA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2006), 259 ff; R. Luis, *Hinduism* (New York: George Braziller, 1962), 40-41; Geoff Teece, *Hinduism Religion in Focus* (USA: Black Rabbit Books, 2005), 10; also see: George Mason Williams, *Handbook of Hindu Mythology* (USA: ABC-CLIO inc., 2003), 16.

<sup>45</sup> Isma'il Faruqi, "Islam and the Theory of Nature", *Islamic Quarterly* 26/1 (1984): 16-24.

<sup>46</sup> Jeffrey Brodd - Gregory L. Sobolewski, *World Religions: A Voyage of Discovery* (Canada: Saint Mary's Press 2009), 290.

<sup>47</sup> Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and The Profane: The Nature of Religion* (USA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1987), 108.

<sup>48</sup> Ralph Mark Rosen, *Time and Temporality in the Ancient World* (Philadelphia: UPenn Museum of Archaeology, 2004), 92 ff.

<sup>49</sup> al-Qasas 28/88; al-Ḥadīd 57/3; al-Furqān 25/2.

The Table That Compares The Religion of Islam and Indian Subcontinent Religions	
The Religion of Islam	Religions in Indian Subcontinent
The universe is everything other than God. Being consists of God and the universe (dualism).	The universe is everything that exists. God and the universe are separate only in mind; in fact, they are one and the same (monism/pantheism).
The universe is profane.	Because the universe is God’s manifestation, it is essentially sacred. For this reason, it is possible for the beings in the universe to be sacralized. This results in Polytheism.
The universe comes to exist after not having existed by God’s willing to create it	God is absolute and His voluntary intervention in the universe is not possible. Existence is eternal and everlasting.
The universe is under the management of a just and magisterial God who is omniscient and omnipotent.	The universe is under the control of a cause-effect law ( <i>karma</i> ), which is constant and impersonal.
No being can change the laws of nature except God.	It is possible for semi-gods, guru (priests), and avatars to influence the laws of nature.
History is linear in nature.	History is cyclic because the whole universe including gods is subject to <i>karma</i> and <i>tanāsukh</i> . When a universe’s life is over, it disentangles and a new universe is born. The universe’s being good or bad in its former existence affects its condition in its new life on the basis of god Vishnu’s different avatars in different and consecutive periods.
Material’s reality is constant. Physical universe has a genuine reality.	Physical universe is not real; it consists of imagination and illusion.
Comprehending the universe is possible. Nature is open to human understanding by experimental and observational research.	Comprehending or understanding the universe is impossible because it is God’s manifestation. Essentially, it is sacred, great, superior, magical, mysterious and unfathomable.
Language, tradition, and revelation are the essential reference sources in reaching the truth.	Language, tradition, and written revelation are obstacles in knowing truth. Someone reaches the truth under the guidance of gurus and avatars with meditation (like the authors of all holy Vedas and Upanishads).
The universe is essentially good, and life in it is a blessing. Humans ought to be grateful to God because He brought them to existence in it	Physical universe is an unwanted condition, a decrease in the level from Absolute reality. Because it separates human from absolute reality, the life that is lived with senses is a tragedy. It is necessary for people

	to free themselves from samsara (death-birth cycle) and reach absolute reality to attain salvation.
A Newborn is innocent. Human will reap in the afterlife what they sow in this worldly life.	Every newborn comes to the world with a karmic destiny to be fulfilled depending upon their former lives. The law of karma is the link between a person’s past and the future. Human happiness and pain in the earthly life are the result of his former life (since a human being will pass throughout five stages of life and rebirth like avatars).
Resurrection of human beings after death in the afterlife is possible by God’s recreation.	After the death of the body, soul reincarnates in this world in a different body in accordance with its karma. There is no need for the intervention of God or gods’ in this.
When resurrected in afterlife, a person’s identity in terms of his memory and consciousness will be preserved exactly the same. A human being will remember the actions s/he performed during the earthly life.	Personal identity markers from a former life, like memory and consciousness, are completely erased in rebirth. It is not possible to remember former lives.
A human being is an inseparable whole with his soul and body.	Soul and body dualism is essential. What really matters is the soul, and physical body is a worthless prison.
Human is the noblest of all creatures (ashraf al-makhlukat).	A human being does not have a privileged place in the universe.
Human’s salvation depends on the faith in Allah and His grace. If Allah wishes, He can forgive a person’s sins.	It is human’s own effort that brings salvation to him dependent on the karmic law, not God. Forgiveness, mercy, intercession or pity are irrelevant for in this matter.

After the above general comparison of the two religions, the question we must ask at this point is whether the belief of *tanāsukh* is consistent with the religion of Islam or not. Even though it is claimed that the transmigration of the soul can exist in divine religions with a syncretic approach, this does not seem quite possible considering the ontological, cosmological and epistemological differences that we have mentioned above. For the doctrine of *tanāsukh* is not just a simple belief about rebirth in this world, it also entails a certain ontology, cosmology, and epistemology which in turn require of view human being’s in the world that seems incompatible with core doctrines of a monotheistic religion. Hence, it seems that the approval of this doctrine in the religion of Islam is impossible without damaging core Islamic principles such as the belief in the oneness of God (*tawhīd*), the understanding of the universe, human’s position and role in the universe, belief in afterlife, etc. Further, the consequences of these essential principles, such as the doctrine of salvation, individual responsibility, the individualization of crime, presumption of innocence, pardon, mercy, forgiveness, and many more essentials, will also need to be rethought.

The approval is also not possible given the exclusivist claims of monotheistic religions; for such claims obstruct syncretism of any kind.<sup>50</sup> Accordingly, there will be only one right religion to bring salvation to humanity,<sup>51</sup> and all salvation theories of other religions, and those religions themselves, will be void.<sup>52</sup> For example, the comments of Abū Rayḥān Bīrūnī (973-1048 AD) on the belief of *tanāsukh* in Indian religions are such as to support this claim:

“Just as *shahada* [declaration of faith], the holy trinity and Saturday are important to Islam, Christianity and Judaism, respectively, *tanāsukh* is important to Hindus. For this reason, a Hindu who does not believe in *tanāsukh* is unimaginable. Anyway, Hindus do not accept someone as one of them, who does not think in this way.”<sup>53</sup>

As is seen, if a principle of belief gives a religion its distinguishing feature and especially if it is an essential principle for salvation and a core part of the religion, then belief in it by members of other religions will more or less amount to ‘conversion’.<sup>54</sup> But conversion is a difficult matter; as Vinet (1797-1847) stated, “It is easier to build Rome in one day than converting someone to religion.”<sup>55</sup> Therefore, it is meaningless to expect from members of divine religions to adopt the ‘salvation with transmigration’ doctrine, which has become distinctive feature of Indian religions.

Furthermore, the mystical features of few groups that adopted *tanāsukh* among divine religions corroborate the thesis above. For such mystical schools do not feel obliged to be bound to “text’s” literal understanding.<sup>56</sup> Mystical groups<sup>57</sup> tend to, through esoteric interpretations of scripture, remove differences,

<sup>50</sup> Kürşat Demirci, *Yahudilik ve Dinî Çoğulculuk= Judaism and Religious Pluralism* (Istanbul: Ayışığı Kitapları, 2000), 13.

<sup>51</sup> Āl-i ‘Imrān 3/85.

<sup>52</sup> Mahmut Aydın, “Paradigmanın Yeni Adı: Dinsel Çoğulculuk= New Title of Paradigm: Religious Pluralism”, *Hristiyan, Yahudi ve Müslüman Perspektifinden Dinsel Çoğulculuk ve Mutlaklık İddiaları*, der. Mahmut Aydın (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Publications2005), 26.

<sup>53</sup> Abū Rayḥān Bīrūnī, *Tahqīq mā li’l-Hind*, edited by A. Safā (Beirut: Ālam al-kutub 1983), 39; about the fact that Hinduism’s approach to the other is now an exclusionist, see Ali İhsan Yitik, “Hinduizm’in Diğer Dinlere Bakışı= Approach of Hinduism to Other Religions”, *Dinler Tarihi Araştırmaları - I* (Ankara: Dinler Tarihi Derneği, 1998), 145.

<sup>54</sup> Baki Adam, *Yahudilik ve Hristiyanlık Açısından Diğer Dinler=Other Religions from the Perspective of Christianity and Judaism* (Istanbul: Pınar Publications, 2002), 9.

<sup>55</sup> Alexander Vinet, *Outlines of Theology*, 84; quoted from James Strachan, “Conversion” *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hasting (Edinburgh: T T Clark Ltd, 1980), VII: 109.

<sup>56</sup> Süleyman Uludağ, *İslām Düşüncesinin Yapısı= Structure of Islamic Thought* (Istanbul: Dergah Publications1999), 129-136; common features of mysticism are: Mystery, negative attitude towards matter, journeying and initiation (sayr wa sulūk), successions, sources of information reached by internal enlightenment, attainment of absence, passivity, suffering. It should be noted that all these features are largely overlapping with the Indian world view that embraces reincarnation. see Mustafa Kara, *Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar Tarihi= History of Sufism and Religious Orders* (Istanbul: Dergah Publications, 1999), 13-17.

<sup>57</sup> Muhammed Tanjī, *İslām Tasavvufu Üzerine= On the Islamic Mysticism*, trans. Bekir Topaloğlu (Istanbul: Damla Yayınevi, 2002), 62-73.

contradictions and contrasts in all religions. As a result, there’s a strong tendency to pluralist view of salvation and a syncretic view of religion.<sup>58</sup> After overcoming the obstacle of exclusivism and removing differences of quality in religions, the notions and symbols that belong to ‘others’ become freely usable. This is also what pretty much happens in some groups such as Jewish kabbalah, Christian Catharsis and with groups that are associated with *tanāsukh* doctrine in Islamic world.

## 2. The Groups/Sects That Were Associated with the Belief of *Tanāsukh* in the History of Islamic Thought

Muslims, who participated in cultural exchanges with many cultures and appropriated certain of their elements have always approached with suspicion to the belief of transmigration of soul and refused to accept it. Especially in the development of Islamic thought, while Islam benefitted from many external factors, the belief of *tanāsukh* is hardly ever accepted, which should be an indication of its incompatibility with Islam. In fact, in the regions where circle Islamic influence spread, it caused the transmigrationalist and incarnationist beliefs to lose their effects to large extent.<sup>59</sup> Even so, however, there did remain certain marginal groups that were associated with beliefs such as *tanāsukh* and reincarnation throughout the Islamic history.

In the Islamic tradition, the origins of *tanāsukh* is controversial. Although there is not a clear information about pre-Islamic Arab’s afterlife beliefs, narratives like “when a person is killed a bird leaves his/her body and screams at the person’s grave once a century” are referred as manifestation of beliefs like transmigration of soul, weak as they may be.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, on the basis of the statements of polytheists, who rejected the afterlife belief, as cited in the *Qur’ān*,<sup>61</sup> it can be argued that a negative perspective that excluded everything about afterlife was dominant and valid among pre-Islamic Arabians.<sup>62</sup>

As to which cult had the greatest impact on the emergence of *tanāsukh* in the Islamic world, al-Shahrastānī (d. 548H/1158CE), who was a historian of sects, mentions a sophisticated interaction among various groups, such as Zoroastrian, Mazdakism, Indian Brahmanists, the Sabians of Iraq, and Greek Philosophers.<sup>63</sup> However, considering the regions where Muslims lived and their communication channels, it is possible to say that Indian influence outweighs.<sup>64</sup> In fact, it is known that Islamic philosophers subject to Aristotle (384-322 BC) in the matter of transmigration of souls, and they did not take this belief into their system.<sup>65</sup> In

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<sup>58</sup> Demirci, *Yahudilik ve Dinî Çoğulculuk=Judaism and Religious Pluralism*, 14.

<sup>59</sup> İlhan Kutluer, “İslâmî Akıl Reenkarnasyona Geçit Vermez = Islamic Intellect does not let Reincarnation”, *İzlenim* (Eylül 1993), 9.

<sup>60</sup> Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Nihāl*, trans. Mustafa Öz (Istanbul: Litera Publications, 2008), 437.

<sup>61</sup> al-Isrā 17/49; al-Duhān 44/34,35,36; al-Ahkaf 46/17; al-Nahl 16/38; al-An’am 6/29; Tagābun 64/7.

<sup>62</sup> Jawād ‘Ali, *Al-Mufasssal fî al-Tārîkh al-Arab qabl al-Islām* (Beirut: Dār al-‘Ilm, 1976), VI: 128-132.

<sup>63</sup> al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Nihāl*, 160.

<sup>64</sup> Dalkılıç, *İslâm Mezheplerinde Ruh=The Soul in Islamic Sects*, 308.

<sup>65</sup> Oliver Leaman, *An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 114-116; İrfān Abdulhamîd, *Dirāsât fî al-Firāq wa al-Aqāid al-Islāmiyya* (Beirut: 1984), 81-82; Hasan Özalp, “Aristoteles ve İbn



addition, it is true that concepts such as ‘immortal, absolute soul’, ‘dualism of soul and body’ and ‘God’s being Absolute’ that philosophers of Islam adopted from philosophers such as Plato (427-347 BC) and Plotinus (204-270 AD), who believed in *tanāsukh*, provided beliefs like transmigration an intellectual background and material ground.<sup>66</sup>

In the Islamic world, incarnation and transmigration were supported by some sects such as Kadariyyah, Rafiziyyah, Ismā‘īliyyah, Yazidiyyah, Bektāshīyyah, Hurufism, Druze, and people, such as Abū Muslim al-Khurasani (d. 137H/755CE) and Abu Bakr al-Rāzi (d. 313H/925CE). However, when the work of people and groups, such as Jabir ibn Hayyān (d. 200H/815CE), Ikhwan al-Safā, Muḥyiddin Ibn 'Arabi (d. 638H/1240CE) and Mawlānā Jalāl ad-Dīn Rūmī (d. 672H/1273CE), whose names are often mentioned in relation with *tanāsukh* and who have been considered to have tendency for this creed, are analyzed carefully it can be seen that these people do not truly endorse *tanāsukh*.<sup>67</sup>

Historians of sects cites two group who accepted *tanāsukh* in the Islamic community: some Mu'tazilīs and Rāfizīs (Ghulat-ı Shi'a).

The Mu'tazile theologian Nazzām's (d. 231H/845CE) students, such as Ahmed Ibn Hābit (d. 230H/845CE AD) and Ahmed b. Nānūs (between 227H/842CE and 232H/847CE) are associated with *tanāsukh*. For them, God tests those who obey or rebel against Him with distress, pain, abundance and tastes and sends them to earth in a different shape each time according to their conditions. At the end of this process, souls of good ones go to heaven at first and then pass to angels. The responsibility vanishes from the person who takes on the form of an animal because of doing so much evil. Their punishment is left to hell.<sup>68</sup>

The beliefs like incarnation and transmigration are adopted by all sects of Ghulat-ı Shi'a (Rāfizīs). Sabaiyyah from Rāfizīs is the first sect in which the incarnation is seen as they claim that God's spirit migrated into Ali. Ghulat sects such as Bayāniyyah, Hattābiyyah, Jahāniyyah and Rāwandīyyah consider imams as

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Sīnā'nın Reenkarnasyonu Reddi= Refutation of Reincarnation by Aristotle and Avicenna”, *Dinî Araştırmalar* 16/42 (2013): 78-100.

<sup>66</sup> Mehmet Bulğen, *Reenkarnasyonla İlişkilendirilen Ayetlerin Değerlendirilmesi=Evaluation of the Qur'anic Verses Linked to the Reicarnation*, 69.

<sup>67</sup> İlhan Kutluer, “İslâmî Akıl Reenkarnasyona Geçit Vermez = Islamic Intellect does not let Reincarnation”, 9; Mustafa Aşkar, “Reenkarnasyon (Tanāsukh) Meselesi ve Mutasavvıfların Bu Konuya Bakışlarının Değerlendirilmesi= Evaluation of The Issue of Reincarnation and Outlooks of Mutasawwifūn on It”, *Tasavvuf* 3 (2000), 89; Eyüp Bekiryazıcı, “Bazı İslām Filozoflarının Tanāsukh Meselesine Yaklaşımları=Approaches of Some Islamic Philosophers to the Issue of Reincarnation”, *Marife*,8/1 (2008), 05-219; Veysel Güllüce, “Mevlānā'ya İsnat Edilen Reenkarnasyon ve Evrim Görüşleri=Opinions of Reincarnation and Evolution Affiliated to Mawlānā”, *Uluslararası Mevlana ve Mevlevilik Sempozyumu Bildirileri-II* (Şanlıurfa 2007), 155-60.

<sup>68</sup> ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq*, edited by Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-‘Aşriyya, 1993), 275; Ibn Ḥazm, *Kitāb al-Faṣl fi al-Milal wa al-Ahwā' wa al-Niḥal*, edited by Muhammad Ibrahim Nasr and 'Abd al-Rahman 'Umayrah (Riyadh: Sharikat Maktabat 'Ukaz, 1982), 166-167; Shahristānī, *al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, 68.

manifestation of divine spirit. As for the belief of transmigration of souls, which means the reincarnation of souls in different bodies in the world, is most clearly seen in Tanāsukhiyyah.<sup>69</sup>

In Nuşayriyyah and Ismā‘īliyyah, which is an esoteric thought, incarnation and *tanāsukh* coexist. While some of these claim *imām*’s godhood with a sort of incarnation method, some others have claimed that imams will return to earth after death. According to Nuşayrī, if the sinners in their religions, they return to the earth as Jewish, Sunnī Muslim and Christian; but those who had never known Caliph ‘Alī and never believed in him return to the earth in animal bodies. Nuşayrī spirits, which complete the seven steps with *tanāsukh*, ascend to stars again that they actually descended from them previously. In Ismā‘īliyyah, faithless souls will travel between birth and death until they recognize the *imām* of that era, and they will escape from this misfortune only if they recognize the imam.<sup>70</sup>

The *tanāsukh* belief in Yazidism, on the other hand, has developed mostly under the influence of Saibism. Yazidis believe that after death, a human’s soul migrates to other people if s/he is a good person, or it migrates to animals if s/he is a bad person. Hell is the torture that evil people suffer in animal bodies in the life on earth; souls ascend to sky by transforming into good people after they pay their penalties.<sup>71</sup>

Druzism is one of the sects that adopted the *tanāsukh* belief. According to them, dying is to reline (*taqammus*). Soul changes the body like taking off a shirt and wearing it again. When soul reaches perfection, it does not need to change the shirt again. From that point, it is now reunited with universal intellect.<sup>72</sup>

Traces of *tanāsukh* belief are seen in Bektāshīyyah too. The statements in Bektāshī legends, such as a single soul’s appearance respectively in all prophets, starting from Adam and eventually to Prophet Muhammad, and ‘Alī’s returning to earth as Haji Baktash Walī and then as indwelling in the bodies of saints (*walī*) until the doomsday, all seem to be indicative of the idea of *tanāsukh* in Bektāshīyyah.<sup>73</sup>

As for the mainstream Islamic scholars, especially the theologians, they rejected the *tanāsukh* doctrine in all its aspects, on grounds that it contradicted the belief of the afterlife (*akhirah*) that is based on the *Qur’ān*, together with the *sunnah* and *ijmā* (consensus), and accused its followers with disbelief. For instance, Abū al-Hasan al-Ash’ari (d. 324H/936CE), who is one of the great imams of the followers of *Ahlu’s-Sunnah*, asserts that the sects that adopted *tanāsukh*, which he named as ‘extremists (*ahl al-guluw*), claim that heaven and hell are in this world by saying that the universe is not temporal; thus, they deny doomsday and afterlife, and also these people assume alcohol, adultery and many more unlawful things, which the religion of Islam

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<sup>69</sup> Abū l-Hasan al-Ash’arī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa-ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn*, edited by Muḥammad Muḥyi al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-‘Aşriyyah, 1995), I: 36,42,45; al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq*, 133, 270-76; Shahrīstānī, *al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, 160, 178.

<sup>70</sup> Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddima*, trans. Süleyman Uludağ (Istanbul: Dergah Publications2004), I: 594; B. Carra De Vaux, “Tenāsüh=Tanāsukh”, *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: 1979), 12:158-159.

<sup>71</sup> A. Bülent Baloğlu, *İslām’a Göre Tekrar Doğuş=Resurrection According to Islam* (Ankara: Kitabiyat Publications2001), 71-73; Veysel Güllüce, *Kur’ān Işığında Reenkarnasyon= Reincarnation in Consideration of the Qur’ān* (Istanbul: Rağbet Publications, 2004), 35.

<sup>72</sup> İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, “Dürzi Mezhebi”, *DFİD* 1-2-3 (Istanbul: 1926): 36-39.

<sup>73</sup> A. Yaşar Ocak, *Bektaşî Menakibnāmelerinde İslām Öncesi İnanç Motifleri= Pre-islamic Belief Patterns in Bektashi’s Manaqibnāma* (Istanbul: 1983), 139.

forbids, as lawful.<sup>74</sup> In his work “*al-Fark Bayna'l-Firak*,” Abdulqadir al-Baghdādī (d. 429H/1037CE) when he seeks an answer for the question ‘Who are Islamic communities and who are not?’, he uses the belief of *tanāsukh* and *hulūl* (incarnation) as a measure. According to Baghdadi, sects that have the belief of transmigration of soul, such as Bātiniyyah, Bayāniyyah, Jahāniyyah, Sabaiyyah, are the so-called sects that claim to belong to Islam even though they do not. He maintained the funeral prayers and marriage ceremonies of these people cannot be validly performed, and that the animals they slaughter cannot be permissibly eaten.<sup>75</sup> Ibn Hazm (d. 456H/1064CE) says that there is a consensus that followers of *tanāsukh* become disbelievers. For him, the Islamic community agrees on the view that reward and punishment will actualize in heaven or hell when souls return to their bodies after the judgment day.<sup>76</sup> Al- Ghazālī (d. 505H/1111CE) rejects *tanāsukh* which is tantamount to reincarnation of the soul to the body in this world by stating that the return of souls to their bodies is only possible in afterlife.<sup>77</sup>

Sufis’ opinions about this matter have a special importance, for they are often associated with transmigration. In his work *al-Luma’*, which is counted as one of the first of sufi’s classics, al-Sarrāj al-Tūsī (d. 378H/988CE) says, “Those, who believe in (*qāil*) soul’s migration from a body to another, are deviant and obviously in loss”. According to al-Sarrāj, just as how obedience and sin cannot become apparent from a body without soul or from a soul without body, punishment and reward cannot be given to only soul or body without the existence of the other. al-Sarrāj also rejects an idea of *tanāsukh* that means “Falling to earth with a separation from the Eternal one by becoming embodied, and then returning to the Eternal one through evolving by rebirths”; he states that the “Eternal does not separate from the eternal, and the creature cannot be united with the eternal.”<sup>78</sup> In his work *Kashf al-Mahjūb*, which is one of the important sources of Sufism before mystical sects, Hujvīrī (d. 470H/1077CE) also splits the sūfi sects into 12, and regards Hallājiyyah and Hulmāniyyah from these 12 sects as heretic and superstitious because they believe in incarnation and *tanāsukh*.

According to Hujvīrī, just as it is impossible for a human to have two lives, it is impossible for a soul to have two bodies.<sup>79</sup> In the same way, Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (465H/1072CE) also states that soul and body can’t exist apart from each other, and supports the view that a human being is an inseparable whole. al-Qushayrī also says that souls are created (*makhluq*) and a person will make a big mistake by believing in their eternity.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, According to Imām Rabbanī (d. 1034H/1625CE), who was a sūfi that had lived in Indian region where belief in reincarnation is widespread, the belief of *tanāsukh*, which he described as wandering of *nafs* in bodies for reaching perfection, is contrary to the essential’s of religion, which are based on sound narrations, and branded believers in it as infidels. According to Imām Rabbanī, “If every *nafs*

<sup>74</sup> al-Ash'arī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, 1: 67,77,82,114.

<sup>75</sup> al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq*, 13, 232.

<sup>76</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *Kitāb al-Faṣl*, 166.

<sup>77</sup> Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 299, 300.

<sup>78</sup> Abū Nasr Sarraāj, *al-Luma’*, trans. H. Kâmil Yılmaz (Istanbul: Altınoluk Publications1996), 226.

<sup>79</sup> Abu 'l-Ḥasan Hujvīrī, *Kashf al-Mahjūb*, trans. Süleyman Uludağ (Istanbul: Dergah Publications1996), 309-312.

<sup>80</sup> Abdulkarim Qushairī, *al-Risala*, trans. Süleyman Uludağ (Istanbul: Dergah Publications, 1999), 182.

will wander in bodies until they reach perfection, who will go to hell and thus how will it perform its action?”<sup>81</sup> Important sūfis, such as ‘Azīzuddīn Nasafī (d. 700H/1300CE), Niyāzī-i Mişrī (d. 1105H/1694CE) and Abū ‘Alī at-Tahānawī (d. 1158H/1745CE), likewise rejected *tanāsukh* too.<sup>82</sup>

The belief of *tanāsukh* was not favored by the Islamic Philosophers as well. For example, according to al-Fārābī (d. 339H/950CE), ‘*nafs*’ (soul) is not eternal, but it is created with body. Due to the principle of justice, after the body dies, soul either becomes happy or suffers from torture because it deserves either one of them. From this perspective, the idea that the soul migrates from one body to another is not possible.<sup>83</sup> As for Avicenna (d. 428H/1037CE), existence of soul before body is out of question. When the body starts to take a form and gets ready to receive the *nafs*, a self-contained *nafs* is given to it by “active intellect” and the body is given to the disposal of a single *nafs* that is conscious. After the death of the body, the soul continues to exist, but it is impossible for it to migrate into other bodies. If *tanāsukh* is accepted, there must be two souls in the same body -one of which comes from outside and the other one already existing in it;and this is impossible because a living being cannot have two different consciousness’s.<sup>84</sup> Philosophers, such as Nāşīruddīn at-Tūsī (d. 672H/1273CE) and as-Suhrawardī (d. 632H/1234CE), and scholars, such as al-Ghazālī and Fakhruddīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606H/1210CE), also followed Avicenna’s approach in their denial of *tanāsukh*, and favored an approach that is based on the uniqueness of the soul’s for each individual.<sup>85</sup>

As is seen, the belief of transmigration of soul is not included in classic Islamic thought except for some extremist marginal groups. Islamic scholars, particularly *mutakallimūn*, criticized this belief and accused its members with disbelief. However, while the criticisms that came from the prominent figures of Islamic schools of thought against the belief of *tanāsukh* are historically meaningful and valuable, it is obvious that the debates in this field have gained an additional aspect with the new claims of spiritualist trends. So we aim to contribute to the solution of an important problem of belief that today’s Muslims face by evaluating the most used claims by the spiritualist trends (especially in Turkey) in the matter of supporting reincarnation. Essentially, this situation will help us to show more clearly that reincarnation is not just a belief in the afterlife. Rather, it is a comprehensive belief system, in the sense that its acceptance will necessitate an alternative understanding of God, the universe, and human beings, which is contrary to orthodox Islam.

### 3. Evaluation of the Arguments by Some Spiritualist Trends for Reincarnation

While the belief in God and the afterlife in divine religions were criticized thoroughly by Western philosophers such as David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and

<sup>81</sup> Imām Rabbānī, *Maktūbāt* (371. letter), trans. Abdülkadir Akçicek (Istanbul: Çile Publications, 1978), 2: 1137.

<sup>82</sup> Mustafa Aşkar, “Reenkarnasyon (Tenâsüh) Meselesi ve Mutasavvıfların Bu Konuya Bakışlarının Değerlendirilmesi= Evaluation of The Issue of Reincarnation and Outlooks of Mutasawwifūn on It”, 89.

<sup>83</sup> Abū Naşr Fārābī, “Uyūn al-Masāil”, *İslâm Filozoflarından Felsefe Metinleri= Philosophical Texts from Islamic Philosophers*, trans. Mahmut Kaya (Istanbul: Klasik Publications, 2003), 125.

<sup>84</sup> Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-Najāt*, edited by Majid Fakhry (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda 1982), 227.

<sup>85</sup> Aḥmad Zakī Tuffāḥah, *al-Nafs al-bashariyah wa-naẓariyat al-tanāsukh* (Lebanon: 1987), 96; İrfān Abdulḥamīd, *Dirāsāt fī al-Firāq wa al-Aqāid al-Islāmiyya*, 72; al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, 299.

Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), doctrines like the transmigration of soul and Karma were not criticized.<sup>86</sup> While this absence is justified by saying that such beliefs are not taken seriously in the West, the weakening of belief in theism, which began with deism in Europe, and which facilitated secularization and culminated with materialism, caused the rebirth of Gnosticism. This situation gave rise to a whole host of spiritualist movements, cults, and trends –such as Spiritism, Neo-Spiritualism, Anthroposophy, Theosophy, New Age and Scientology.<sup>87</sup> These movements, which adopt reincarnation and simply provide an alternative system for religions with the metaphysics and epistemology they produce,<sup>88</sup> have organized globally with the influence of globalization. Their influence in the west is especially pervasive; studies show that one out of every five people, on average, in North America and West Europe believes in reincarnation.<sup>89</sup>

In Turkey, these trends are represented by mostly ‘Neo-spiritualist’ based constitutions, such as Metaphysic Investigations and Scientific Research Society (Metapsişik Tetkikler ve İlmi Araştırmalar Derneği) and Soul and Matter Publications (Ruh ve Madde Publications).<sup>90</sup> Such groups mostly adopt a reincarnationist view of the ‘immortality of soul’ and an ‘absolutist’ view of the divine on which God does not stand in a relation of creation with the universe. However, with regards to the former, they have a more optimistic world-view compared to traditional *tanāsukh* belief, basing their own account on ‘a spiritual evolution’ that always progresses in this context.<sup>91</sup> For members of these groups, reincarnation is not a belief but it is a scientific fact. It has a super-religious and super-national universal status. And they generally promote it with a wider audience with names and signs that symbolize peace and fraternity, as well as with distorted quotations from respected people, including statements from holy texts that belong to divine religions, in particular the *Qur’ān*.<sup>92</sup> This sort of propaganda or missionary activity has been so effective that some theologians have not definitively rejected reincarnation<sup>93</sup> and some even claimed that “Reincarnation is also

<sup>86</sup> Jan Bremmer, “Life After Death”, *Gale Encyclopedia Science Religion* (New York: Thomson Gale, 2003), 517-522.

<sup>87</sup> Mehmet Bulğen, “Kelām İlminin Kozmolojik Boyutları ve Günümüz Kozmolojisi= Cosmological Dimensions of Science of Kalam and Today’s Cosmology”, *Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi=Journal of Marmara University Theology Faculty* 39 (2010/2), 67; Albrecht, *Reincarnation: A Christian Critique of a New Age Doctrine*, 8-9.

<sup>88</sup> İlyas Çelebi, “Kur’ān ve Sünnetin Okültizme Bakışı= Occultism in the Eye of the Qur’ān and Sunnah”, *Kur’ān ve Tefsir Araştırmaları-V* (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2003), 153.

<sup>89</sup> Ian Stevenson, *Children Who Remember Previous Lives* (USA: McFarland, 2001), 30.

<sup>90</sup> See Baloğlu, *İslām’a Göre Tekrar Doğuş=Rebirth According to Islam*, 162; Kürşat Demirci, “Dünya Dinlerinde Tanāsukh İnancı= Belief of Reincarnation in World Religions”, *İzlenim* 9 (Eylül 1993), 6.

<sup>91</sup> Bedri Ruhselman, *Ruh ve Kāināt= Soul and Universe* (Istanbul: Gayret Kitabevi 1946), 3: 1026-1028.

<sup>92</sup> İ. Lütüfî Kuday – A. Sevil Akay, *Spiritualizm Ruh Ansiklopedisi= Encyclopaedia of Spiritualism and Soul* (Istanbul: Gayret Kitabevi, 1950), 236-239.

<sup>93</sup> For example, Süleyman Ateş, the former president of Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, says about reincarnation: "As a scientist, we do not reject this belief precisely and do not accept it. There are verses in the Qur'an that may be proofs of this belief, besides the ones that are not meant to be. We certainly do not refuse it, because if one day reincarnation is proved with certain proof that it is real then there is no point in imposing "No, there is no such thing in the Qur'an". See Süleyman Ateş, “Reenkarnasyon (Yeniden Bedenlenme)”, *Kur’ān Mesajı* 2/13-14-15 (1999), 108.

mentioned in the *Qur'ān*<sup>94</sup>. Let us, then, turn to evaluating the arguments that spiritualist trends use most frequently to support their reincarnationist views.

### 3.1. Is Reincarnation a Scientific Fact?

The most common argument that the neo-spiritualist trends use to support the transmigration belief in Turkey is that reincarnation is a scientific fact and a universal law. They cite 'past-life recall', which appears in children spontaneously and in adults under hypnosis, as evidence for their claims. In this context, it is said that a person, an object, a place and events in relation to past-life are recognized and remembered in detail. However, reincarnation is not the only way to explain events like these. There are also alternative psychological and psychosocial explanations of these events. For example, in the University of Iceland, Erlendur Haraldson, one of the professors from the Department of Psychology, confirmed that factors such as social isolation, taking attention, being under influence, multiple personality tendencies, a dream of a life full of wealth, parental problems and memory disorders, may lead to past-life recalls in a clinical study.<sup>95</sup>

Besides, research has revealed that claims like these are systematically seen in cultures and communities in which the belief of reincarnation is common.<sup>96</sup> This situation suggests the possibility of cultural conditioning because when we look at the content of these claims, we see that while most of the people make past-life claim as important characters, they are ordinary people now.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, it is quite likely that the people, who listen to stories like these in their culture and community and observe peoples' intense interest in them, come to eventually believe that they could have also experienced such things, and when the charm of the personality that they want to be is added to this, the person conditions himself psychologically with the help of his imagination.

Another explanatory factor is the subject of hypnosis. The subject, who has the tendency for obeying the suggestions of a hypnotizer, engages in fantasy recalls that he might later come to actually believe he really experienced. However, rather than being a reminder, these recalls are psychosocial constructions, in which the thought "to pretend to be someone else" is at play. Particularly the person's believing in reincarnation, wishes and desires, tendency for hypnosis, guidance of the hypnotizer, life experience, the level of education, the popular novels and stories that are read and the TV shows, movies and documentaries that are watched, all affect this process of construction.<sup>98</sup> In fact, the change in historical information with later findings revealed the incorrectness of very detailed information that is given under hypnosis. For example, the subjects would always describe themselves wearing a horned helmet consistent with the official historical depictions in their past-life memories about the Vikings. However, the subsequent historical findings

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<sup>94</sup> Yaşar Nuri Öztürk, *Kur'ān'daki İslām= Islam in the Qur'ān* (Istanbul: Yeni Boyut, 1996), 257-258; Ateş, "Reenkarnasyon (Yeniden Bedenlenme)", 108.

<sup>95</sup> Erlendur Haraldsson, "Psychological Comparison Between Ordinary Children and Those who Claim Previous-life memories", *Journal of Scientific Exploration* 11 (1997), 323-335.

<sup>96</sup> Ian Stevenson, *Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect* (USA: Greenwood, 1997), 1 ff.

<sup>97</sup> Gérard Encausse Papus, *Reenkarnasyon*, trans. Halûk Özden (Istanbul: RMY,1999), 117.

<sup>98</sup> Nicholas P. Spanos, "Multiple Identities and False Memories: A Sociocognitive Perspective", *American Psychological Association* (Washington: 2001), 131.

revealed that Viking sailors had not worn horned helmets, but they had worn a tight cap in the shape of funnel.<sup>99</sup>

Moreover, clinical studies showed that hypnosis may result in pseudo-memory. Thus, the person, who is under the hypnosis, accepts the false information along with the hypnotizer’s orientations, and then can pass on this information as it is real.<sup>100</sup> In addition, due to concern of performing the suggestions and satisfying the hypnotizer, the person can fill the gaps that he cannot remember with imagination.<sup>101</sup>

Ian Stevenson, who researched over 2500 past-life claims more than over 40 years says that even if all these cases were brought together, it would not mean that reincarnation is proven scientifically, and he says that reincarnation is fundamentally a belief.<sup>102</sup> Stevenson also states that the children, who tell memories like these, experience spiritual crises and dissociative identity disorder, refuse their parents and experience family tragedies where ex-husbands, wives and children fight with each other, things get messy and very problematic.<sup>103</sup> For this reason, identity changes, their causes in psychology and the processes of diagnosis and treatment are shown as the symptoms of ‘dissociative disorder’ disease. In a study, it was shown that a significant percentage of the patients that have dissociative disorder (22.9 %) experience reincarnation.<sup>104</sup>

In modern psychiatry, while reincarnation is regarded as a disorder to be treated, spiritualist trends represent reincarnation as a universal and scientific fact. Furthermore, the claims of incidents such as “birthmarks”, “deja vu”, “child prodigy”, “telepathy” and “near death experiences” prove reincarnation scientifically do not reflect the reality. Relevant fields of studies also make similar explanations for all these incidents.<sup>105</sup> Unlike the spiritualist trends, parapsychology, which studies unusual incidents like reincarnation, does not seek to accept that there is a different world of phenomena beyond physical reality by simplifying it and explain this zone with an epistemology that is an alternative to normative scientific practice. On the contrary, parapsychology intends to investigate the unusual phenomena with the best current scientific tools and thus provide further scientific justification of it, if any.<sup>106</sup> When we look at the historical process, we see that the study field of parapsychology gets narrower as incidents, which were regarded as

<sup>99</sup> Ian Wilson, *Reincarnation? The Claims Investigated* (London: Penguin, 1982), 8.

<sup>100</sup> Kevin M. McConkey, “Hypnosis and Pseudomemory”, *Truth in Memory*, edited by Steven J. Lynn - Kevin M. McConkey (New York: Guilford Press, 1998), 227.

<sup>101</sup> J. Dywan – K. Bowers, “The Use of Hypnosis to Enhance Recall, *Science* 222-4620 (Oct 14 1983):184-5.

<sup>102</sup> Ian Stevenson, “Interwiev”, *Omni Magazine* 10/4 (1998): 76

<sup>103</sup> Ian Stevenson, “Interwiev”, 76.

<sup>104</sup> Hamdi Tutkun, “Reenkarnasyon”, *Aksiyon Dergisi* (Şubat 1997): 155.

<sup>105</sup> It has been found that coordination disturbances between eyes during vision (one of the eyes transmits signals to the brain later than the other) may lead to the strange feeling that you have already experienced what is happening now (deja vu). It has been determined that some drugs used during pregnancy cause similar birthmarks. The appearance of similar birthmarks among close relatives also suggests genetic effects. See Paul Edwards, *Reincarnation: A Critical Examination* (New York: Prometheus Books, 1996), 48 ff.

<sup>106</sup> Tahir Özakkaş, “Parapsikoloji ve Metafizigi Anlamak=Understanding Parapsychology and Metaphysics”, *Kur’an ve Tefsir Araştırmaları-IV* (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2004), 338-329.

'paranormal' once, enter the borders of empirical explanation.<sup>107</sup> However, parapsychology could not make the phenomenon 'posthumous' a scientific matter despite all efforts.<sup>108</sup> The unrepeatable characters of paranormal phenomena that happen quite rarely make it harder to accurately determine their value in reality. That being the case, the arguments about posthumous can only be a hypothesis for now.<sup>109</sup>

Contrary to the claims that reincarnation has become scientific and a universal fact, there is a contradiction between this belief and the basic paradigms of today's science. For example, according to the Bing Bang theory, which has become standard in modern cosmology, everything in the physical universe, including energy, time-space and valid laws, started to exist 13.7 billion years ago.<sup>110</sup> After that, there have been periods that continued for billions of years without life in the universe. The beginning of life, particularly human's appearance in history, is a quite new phenomenon. Therefore, unlike the neo-spiritualist trends, according to which "souls are in an eternal relation with the matter", modern cosmology does not attribute qualities like eternity, everlastingness and infinity to the universe. It depicts a universe coherent with divine religions that is finite and limited.

On the other hand, the continuity of human consciousness and preservation of personal identity are accepted as a basic postulate in the perspective of both classic and modern philosophical and psychological approaches. Accordingly, for the claims of reincarnation or immortality to be valid, human needs to remember his former life, which is asserted as being the consequence of his current life, with his self-consciousness. Impersonal immortality, in which a person is not conscious of his former self, is the same as mortality,<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> It would be worth mentioning the activities of James Randi, a renowned illusionist and parapsychologist, who worked with the foundation he founded in Florida in 1996 to develop scientific explanations of any unusual activity observed on Earth. In a statement he made through his James Randi Educational Foundation, Randi promised "a million dollars" to those who could prove the opposite, arguing that there was no paranormal activity that could lead to break natural laws on earth. Randi has argued that all events called "paranormal" have an appropriate explanation in science and logic. Randi stresses that he, as a senior illusionist, has been performing the most complex stage shows for fifty years with the contributions of science such as engineering, chemistry, optics or physics. In the 1970s, Geller, who turned into a world-wide phenomenon with the mind-bending spoon number, was accused by Randi of being a fraud. Randi succeeded in repeating Geller's spoon bending number exactly in the face of the cameras, proving that this was done entirely by hand rather than by the power of the mind, and he had a great blow to Geller. Randi suggested that magicians were making demonstrations that stagnated people's minds, but they never create miracles. The JREF Foundation's call for a \$ 1 million prize covering all the para normal events from the necromancy to contact with the genie is valid and has not earned the right to receive this award until now. see <http://www.randi.org/site/index.php/1m-challenge.html> (access: 10.01.2011).

<sup>108</sup> Aydın, *Din Felsefesi=Philosophy of Religion*, 249.

<sup>109</sup> Koç, *Ölümsüzlük Düşüncesi= The Notion of Immortality*, 184.

<sup>110</sup> see Joseph Silk, *On The Shores of the Unknown: A Short History of The Universe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1 ff.; Leon Lederman, *The God Particle* (Canada: Delta Book, 1993), 1; James E. Lidsey, *The Bigger Bang* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 55; Steven L. Weinberg, *The First Three Minutes: A Modern View Of The Origin Of The Universe* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 11 ff.

<sup>111</sup> Koç, *Ölümsüzlük Düşüncesi = The Notion of Immortality*, 117.



because human becomes a human being and gains identity and individualism with his memories, experiences, goals, wishes and consciousness. From this point of view, the historical life experience that he lived is one of his integral parts without which he wouldn't truly count as himself Here's an analogy: it's as if a newborn is like an empty board, and every human paints his own authentic self on this board from his birth and continues this process for his entire life. Death marks the completion of this process. What reincarnation claims is that people make pictures always on the same board by gathering many historical identities living in one soul. Accordingly, the previous picture drawn on the board is erased, and a new picture is drawn from scratch after every rebirth. For example, according to reincarnation there will be no more a historical Napoléon portrait because there is someone else's picture on that board (soul). The existing picture will be erased too, and it will be replaced with someone else's picture. However, divine religions promise to save every historical portrait as how they are drawn. Reincarnationists, on the other hand, almost do a historical identity slaughter by erasing an authentic portrait-person that consists of memories, experiences, goals, sins and good deeds.

The thought of reincarnation again contradicts with basic paradigms of today's psychology too because modern psychology regards every living person as an independent individual, and invites human to be at peace with himself in this context. Accordingly, someone should reveal himself and confirm his position in the universe instead of pretending to be someone else. However, the claim of reincarnation means a person's renouncing being himself and sharing his soul and individualism with someone else, and this situation means this person's loss of self-respect. It is not possible for today's science of psychology to accept such an approach.

Another subject is the inheritance by human beings of various features from members in their family tree. For today's genetic science says that human has spiritual-physical features that are inherited from genes. For example, the comparison of twins that share the same genes and brothers that are not twins with different genes reveals that many forms of behavior are seriously affected by genetic inheritance.<sup>112</sup> However, according to the belief of reincarnation, it is unclear that how a soul that migrates into another body after death chooses a body that is compatible with its character and how to explain the inheritance in this case.<sup>113</sup>

On the other hand, the studies on human nature revealed that damages and chemical instabilities in specific parts of brain affect specific mental/spiritual abilities dramatically.<sup>114</sup> Therefore, science makes the soul-body dualism, which is the basic postulate of reincarnationists, controversial by revealing the strong dependence of mental and spiritual lives on biological processes. Modern science tends to consider human as a whole with his soul and body rather than separating him into two as soul and body.

Again according to the belief of reincarnation, the eternal souls keep reincarnating until they reach the perfection or the level of absolute soul. The soul that reaches the perfection exists the system by not

<sup>112</sup> Ian G. Barbour, *When Science Meets Religion* (USA: Harpercollins, 2000), viii.

<sup>113</sup> Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, “İslāmī Açıdan Tanāsukh Hakkında Bir Değerlendirme = An Evaluation about Tanāsukh in Islamic Perspective”, *İslām'da İnanç İbadet ve Günlük Yaşayış Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: İFAV, 1997), IV: 330.

<sup>114</sup> Barbour, *When Science Meets Religion*, viii.

having a need for *tanāsukh* anymore. On the other hand, because the souls are regarded as eternal and constant, an entry of a new soul to the system will not be possible. Accordingly, if the process of rebirth is an everlasting process, the souls should have finished their improvements until now and thus should have ended their rebirth processes. This cannot be refuted by saying that there is infinite number of souls because an infinite number of soul requires an infinite amount of matter. However, as we have mentioned before, Modern Cosmology does not equate the qualities, such as eternity, everlastingness and infinity, with the universe.

Consequently, the argument that reincarnation is a scientifically proven universal fact is completely a "spiritualist mistake"; in fact, this belief contradicts with today's science's basic paradigms about the universe and human beings.

### **3.2. Do Reincarnation and Law of Karma Solve the Problem of Evil?**

Another argument that modern spiritualist trends make to justify reincarnation is that the moral law (karma), which reincarnation depends on, explains the differentiations in society, and thus it solves the problem of evil (theodicy). For this reason, if someone is wailing in the grip of an illness in misery while someone else lives a happy life in prosperity, the reason of such inequality should be searched in the past lives of the people aforementioned. However, this claim of spiritualist trends is also contradictory because the doctrine of karma cannot explain how the differentiations appeared in the first place in the society or their origins. As is claimed, if every being's fate is destined according their previous existence, then how and according to what is the first form of being determined? Also, were the beings, which are in different status and forms now, in an equal state at the beginning? If it is assumed that they were not equal at the beginning, then an inequality for which they are not responsible, and the consequences of this, must be accepted in advance. But if they were equal at the beginning, it becomes necessary to say that their inequality started at one in their previous lives, which raises the question 'how is it disrupted?' Therefore, it is impossible to answer questions like these with an understanding that accepts the universe and the karma, which directs the universe's mechanism, as eternal.<sup>115</sup>

While the law of karma cannot explain how the differentiations between beings started, it will also pose other bigger ethical problems. For example, when B, who lives today, is regarded as manifestation of A, who lived in the past, punishing B because of A's mistake will be a big cruelty for B simply because B is not identical to A. Also, if person B suffers agony and does not know because of which sin he committed in his past he suffers, this will not be beneficial to individual's spiritual progress, and this situation will lead to a worse "karma" for the person C in the future. Thus, evil in the universe will constantly advance. On the other hand, it is also controversial issue that karmic law, which functions with an obligatory and cruel cause-effect relation, makes humane emotions, such as regret, forgiveness, mercy, pity and compassion, meaningless.

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<sup>115</sup> René Guénon, *The Spiritist Fallacy* (New York: Sophia Perennis, 2004), 199-200; Ali İhsan Yitik, *Hint Kökenli Dinlerde Karma İnançının Tenasüh İnançıyla İlişkisi= Relationship between the Belief of Karma in Indian-rooted Religions and the Belief of Reincarnation* (Istanbul: RMY, 1996), 201.

### 3.3. Does The Qur’ān Mention Reincarnation?

Another claim of the spiritualist trends in Turkey is that divine religions and holy books, particularly the *Qur’ān*, confirm reincarnation. According to them, the religion of Islam had presented reincarnation along with many other doctrines 14 centuries ago. But, they further claim, this doctrine was distorted or denied by some commentators due to ignorance and prejudice.<sup>116</sup> Accordingly, reincarnationists make exegesis of all verses about resurrection (*ba’s*) in the *Qur’ān* as “resurrection in the world after death”.<sup>117</sup> However, when they do this, they do not feel an obligation for being dependent on the methods of understanding, such as the occasions of revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*), the verse before and after a verse (*siyāq* and *sibāq*), other verses related to topic and the integrity of the *Qur’ān*.

For example, reincarnationists say that the statement “day of resurrection (*ba’s*)”<sup>118</sup> in the *Qur’ān* means the resurrection in this world. However, the words in the *Qur’ān* are not simply isolated and separate from each other. Combined with each other by various methods, they form an integral whole.<sup>119</sup> Accordingly, the word “*ba’s*” is a word that is used in the context of afterlife in the *Qur’ān*, and all words in this system are connected with each other by the word “day (*yawm*)”: “the day of resurrection”,<sup>120</sup> “doomsday”,<sup>121</sup> “a day that will certainly come”,<sup>122</sup> “the day of returning to Allah”,<sup>123</sup> “the day of calling”,<sup>124</sup> “the day of emergence [from the graves]”,<sup>125</sup> “the day of gathering”,<sup>126</sup> “the day of convergence”,<sup>127</sup> “the day of reckoning”<sup>128</sup> “the

<sup>116</sup> Sinan Onbulak, *Ruhi Olaylar ve Ölümden Sonrası= Psychic Phenomena and After Death* (Istanbul: Dilek Yayınevi 1975), 321.

<sup>117</sup> Kuday – Akay, *Spiritualizm Ruh Ansiklopedisi = Encyclopaedia of Spiritualism and Soul*, 328; Onbulak, *Ruhi Olaylar ve Ölümden Sonrası=Psychic Phenomena and After Death*, 321; Sadi Çaycı, *Ruhçuluğa Göre Kur’ān Öğretisi= The Qur’ānic Doctrine to the Spiritualism* (Istanbul: RMY, 1995), 94-101; Cem Çobanlı, *Reenkarnasyon* (Istanbul: Dharma Publications, 2001), 29.

<sup>118</sup> Hijr 15/36; Maryam 19/15, 33; al-Rūm 30/56.

<sup>119</sup> Toshihiko Izutsu, *God and Man in the Qur’ān* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2002), 27.

<sup>120</sup> al-Qaf 50/56.

<sup>121</sup> al-Qiyāmah 75/1.

<sup>122</sup> Hûd 11/103.

<sup>123</sup> al-Baqara 2/281; al-Nūr 24/64.

<sup>124</sup> al-Mu’min 40/32.

<sup>125</sup> al-Qāf 50/42.

<sup>126</sup> al-Şûrā 42/7; Tagābun 64/9; Hûd 11/103; al-Māida 5/109.

<sup>127</sup> al-Mu’min 40/15; al-Tawbah 9/77.

<sup>128</sup> Sād 38/49-57.

day of regret”,<sup>129</sup> “the day of promise” (*wa’d* and *wa’id*),<sup>130</sup> “the day of separation”,<sup>131</sup> “the day of religion”,<sup>132</sup> “the day of eternity”<sup>133</sup> can be given as examples for these.

That being the case, even if the word “resurrection/*ba’s*”, which is related to the context of afterlife via the word “day”, exists alone, it gains a depth of meaning that is strong enough to point out all other word’s content meaning as it is a part of the system it belongs. Therefore, it is impossible to consider the statement “resurrection day” in the afterlife belief independent of the meanings of words used in conjunction with the word “day” such as “doomsday”, “resurrection”, “reckoning” and “regret”.

Moreover, the ascribed meanings of the words that are mentioned in the *Qur’ān* must be consistent with the *Qur’ān*’s integrity too, not just with the system they belong. For example, reincarnationists claim that the statement “*al-Ba’s ba’da al-mawt*” (resurrection after death), which is mentioned in *Āmantu* (Pillars of Islam), means “being present to this world after death”.<sup>134</sup> However, it will not take much time to realize that an interpretation like this contradicts with other notions of the *Qur’ān* because if we understand *ba’s*, that is to say resurrection, as “rebirth in this world”, then in which way should we understand “the resurrection” in Demon’s statement “**My Lord! Then grant me delay until the day they are resurrected**”<sup>135</sup>? Will the Satan start chasing humans at their first resurrections and then stop following them at their subsequent resurrections? On the other hand, when we understand “*al-Ba’s ba’da al-mawt*” as “resurrection in afterlife after death”, better sense is made of the various verses which mention the word and their relation to each other..

In addition to this, spiritualists have claimed that the statement “**you killed two times, and you resurrected two times**” in the 11<sup>th</sup> verse of the chapter of Mu’min refers to reincarnation. However, this claim of reincarnationists is also baseless because cognate and implicit statements in the *Qur’ān* should be understood in the explanatory integrity of the *Qur’ān* and hadith. The close case that is formed in a verse of the *Qur’ān* because of eloquence can be explained in another verse or hadiths in details. In the same way, Glossators also explain the statement “two times killing and two times resurrecting” with some other verses in the *Qur’ān* (al-Baqara 2/28, Maryam 19/9 and al-Jāsiya 45/24-26). Accordingly, “first death” is people’s conditions of not having a life before resurrecting in the world; “second death” is their dying in this world. In the same way, the meaning of resurrection for two times is the resurrection in this world and the resurrection that will happen in afterlife.<sup>136</sup> Some glossators like Fakhraddīn ar-Rāḍī, and Elmalili Hamdi Yazir (1878-

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<sup>129</sup> Maryam 19/39.

<sup>130</sup> al-Qāf 50/20; Saba’ 34/30; al-Burūj 85/2.

<sup>131</sup> Sāffāt 37/21; ad-Duhān 44/40; al-Mursalat 77/13,14,38; al-Naba 78/17.

<sup>132</sup> al-Fātiha 1/4.

<sup>133</sup> al-Kahf 50/34.

<sup>134</sup> Kuday – Akay, *Spiritualizm Ruh Ansiklopedisi=Encyclopaedia of Spiritualism and Soul*, 236-239; Onbulak, *Ruhi Olaylar ve Ölümünden Sonrası=Psychic Phenomena and After Death*, 321.

<sup>135</sup> al-Hijr 15/36.

<sup>136</sup> Tabarī, *Tafsīr al-Tabarī* (Riyadh: 2003), 1: 443-450, 20: 290-292; Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf* (Riyadh: Maktaba al-Ubaykan 1998), 3: 418.

1942), who seems to be influenced by ar-Rāḍī, interpreted “to be killed two times” as humans dying in the world and dying after being resurrected in their graves after being questioned in the grave by the angels. And “to be resurrected two times” they interpret as the resurrection of humans in the grave and their resurrections in afterlife after doomsday.<sup>137</sup> The statement “Is there a way out?” that is mentioned in the verses (az-Zumar 39/58-59; al-Mu’minûn 23/99-100, 107-108; al-Munāfiqûn 63/10-11) only refers to peoples who wish to be resurrected; what they mean is that even though people will request Allah to ‘return to the world’ and be given ‘one more chance’, they will be refused strictly. For it is stated that the dead person cannot return to this world.

The *Qur’ân* explains the reason of not being returned to world with the following verse **“If they were turned, of course they would have turned back to what was forbidden for them again”**<sup>138</sup> because this return will necessitate not remembering the former life due to another Qur’anic principle i.e., “the belief of unseen (*ghayb*)”. A return that will happen in this way, on the other hand, will lead to “repetition (*takarrur*)”. To explain with a simple example, a child, whose hand gets burned when he touches a hot stove, will not touch it again. If we assume that this child forgot the experience he had, the child will keep touching the heating stove. However, if we say, “one can remember his/her former life”, then the principle of “the belief of unseen” will be disrupted because Allah created humans to test them.<sup>139</sup> The way of becoming successful in this exam is: faith and good deeds “even though they do not see” as is mentioned in many verses.<sup>140</sup> Thus, when human sees beings that actually should not be seen by him, then his test is over.<sup>141</sup>

In this case, it will not be wrong at all to put forward an idea like this:

- A) If returning to world after death will be mentioned, it is obligatory to completely forget the former life due to “the belief of unseen”.
- B) As human beings forget the experiences that they had in their former lives, they make the same mistakes that they did in their former lives.
- C) Conclusion: It is unnecessary to return to the world after death because this leads to repetition.

Reincarnation also contradicts with the “recall” and “regret” notions of the *Qur’ân*. Because, according to reincarnation, a human who is suffering in his present life, s/he is expected to not aware which deeds in his former life cause this due to “karma”. However, the *Qur’ân* states that humans will absolutely remember the reasons of the punishment that they will suffer when they are resurrected, and they will feel a deep regret for the things they have done.<sup>142</sup>

On the other hand, the *Qur’ân* rejects the belief that what exists today is a different manifestation of the past and also the belief in “karmic bonds”, which claims that the distresses and hardships that are suffered now are because of bad deeds in past lives. In many verses of the *Qur’ân*, people who lived in the past,

<sup>137</sup> Fakhraddîn Rāḍī, *al-Taḥsîn al-Kabîr* (Beirut: Dāru’l-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1990), 27: 36; Elmalılı M. Hamdi Yazır, *Hak Dini Kur’ân Dili* (Istanbul: Feza Gazetecilik, nd.), 6: 515.

<sup>138</sup> al-An’am 6/28.

<sup>139</sup> Hûd 11/7; al-Mulk 67/2.

<sup>140</sup> al-Anbiyâ 21/49; Fâtır 35/18; al-Mulk 67/12.

<sup>141</sup> al-An’am 6/8.

<sup>142</sup> al-Infitâr 82/4,5; al-Mujadala 7/58; Nâzi’ât 79/35; Yûnus 10/54; Maryam 19/39, al-Zumar 54/58; Shu’arâ 26/102.

live in the present and will live in the future, separated from each other strictly in terms of personal and lawful responsibilities, and it is revealed that mankind will be gathered as a whole in the presence of Allah in order to be judged.<sup>143</sup>

Reincarnation is explaining that only one life is not enough for the rise of the spirit and for human to be tested and living a long life is advantageous for human.<sup>144</sup> However, a way of thought like this is not consistent with the *Qurʾān* because the *Qurʾān* states that living a long life will increase the agony instead of saving the human from that pain.<sup>145</sup>

There is no statement that implies *tanāsukh* in the literature of hadith.<sup>146</sup> The prophet, Mohammad revealed that the book of deeds will be closed when a person dies.<sup>147</sup> In another report, it is stated that Allah resolved that a dead man cannot return to the world.<sup>148</sup>

Finally, on the basis of the works of spiritualist trends that adopted the reincarnation belief in Turkey, we will try to support our argument that reincarnation does not simply involve believing in returning to the world, but it entails an inaccurate i.e., non-*Qurʾānic* view of God, the world, and the place of human beings in relation to God and the world. And hence accepting this belief will harm basic essentials of Islam, particularly the belief in divine oneness.

According to neo-spiritualist thought, which adopted the understanding of an “Absolute” God, the “Absolute” is the thing that is not comparable with anything at all. Therefore, whereas it is impossible to associate God with any kind of action, it is also impossible to attribute qualities that exist by his essence, such as “omnipotence”, “omnipresence”, “goodness” and characteristic features, such as “creating” and “not creating” to Him.<sup>149</sup> For this reason, prophets, who were charged with the purpose of guidance for people, were sent by SMM (Spiritual Management Mechanism) to the world, not by God. In the same way, “the *Qurʾān* is not directly Allah’s expression” because it is not possible for the Absolute to address human, who is a finite being.<sup>150</sup> Also, the created beings, which continuously spread in the infinity to an extent that is beyond humans’ scope of imagination, is eternal and everlasting. Therefore, questions such as ‘How and when did Allah create the being?’ are meaningless. The universe’s being proportional causes it to be conducted and managed by “spirits/guardian beings” which are at different evolution levels, not by Allah. In this context, there is a constantly evolving hierarchy of spirits in the universe.<sup>151</sup> In this hierarchy, advanced

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<sup>143</sup> al-Baqara 2/134, 141; al-Wāqiah 56/47-50; Yāsīn 36/30-32; al-Baqara 2/286.

<sup>144</sup> Öztürk, *Kurʾân’daki İslâm=Islam in the Qurʾân*, p. 153.

<sup>145</sup> al-Baqara 2/94-96; Āl-i Imrân 3/178.

<sup>146</sup> İbn Hazm, *Kitāb al-Faṣl*, 166.

<sup>147</sup> Muslim, “Wasiyyah”, 14.

<sup>148</sup> Ibn Māje, “Muqaddima”, 13; “Jihād”, 16.

<sup>149</sup> Bedri Ruhselman, *Ruh ve Kāinat= Soul and Universe*, III: 1024, 1025; Id, *Allah* (Istanbul: Gayret Kitabevi 1955), 7-14.

<sup>150</sup> Çaycı, *Ruhçuluğa Göre Kurʾân Öğretisi=The Qurʾānic Doctrine to the Spiritualism*, 45, 93.

<sup>151</sup> Ruhselman, *Ruh ve Kāinat= Soul and Universe*, 3: 1025, 1030, 1031.

spirits that are at higher levels have a right to supervise and manage the undeveloped ones.<sup>152</sup> Before its rebirth, a low level spirit informs its rebirth in the world to the “mentor/guide being” in order to increase its experience. When the mentor being receives the answer, that is the application of the plan is approved, individual’s destiny is formed by “karmic factor”. Fate has started there, and the things that it will do become nearly apparent at that point. After that, reincarnation occurs. While the spirit implements its plan on earth, it may receive help, inspiration, courage and even warning from its mentor (an upper level spirit) as a result of its prayers and wishes.<sup>153</sup>

As is seen, there is a “polytheism” problem that is a lot worse than the *tanāsukh* problem. An understating which keeps Allah apart from the universe by accepting him as “absolute”, has found the solution for immortality in spirit; on the other hand, it has filled the ensuing divine emptiness with quasi- divine powers. Such an approach, firstly, will create an opportunity for occultism, which contains many elements of polytheism that Islam has refused since the very beginning, such as paganism, cult of saints, magic, worshipping angels, jinn or souls.<sup>154</sup> Besides, it is not possible to harmonize a thought of a passive God, who loses His all names and attributions as being an absolute being, and who becomes something that cannot be beneficial for anything with the religion of Islam’s belief of Allah, who can create always at every moment, in every action and occurrence,<sup>155</sup> and who is the only one worshipped and asked for mercy,<sup>156</sup> who maintains the existence of earth and heavens just as He has created them in the first place.<sup>157</sup> For there is no difference between belief in a god, who is nothing more than names and attributes and who has no effect on the universe, and accepting that God does not exist.<sup>158</sup>

## CONCLUSION

A human being, which is the only being that is aware of death in the world of livings, has kept the hope of an eternal life alive ever since Hz. Adam.<sup>159</sup> The feeling of death and disappearance that is the basis of all fears has always been the first reason in human behavior, and humanity has sought out the ways of escaping from death with religious and philosophic solutions. No evidence that is an opposition to immortality could prevent a human being from hoping for ‘eternity’; thus, the religions that promise an immortal

<sup>152</sup> Ergün Arıkdal, *Ansiklopedik Metapsizik Terimler Sözlüğü= Dictionary of Encyclopaedic Metaphysical Terms* (Istanbul: RMY, 1971), 95.

<sup>153</sup> E. Konyalıoğlu – C. Aksoylu, *Kader, Karma ve Tekrar Doğuş= Predestination, Karma and Resurrection* (Istanbul: RMY, 1987), 42-43.

<sup>154</sup> İlyas Çelebi, “Kur’ân ve Sünnetin Okültizme Bakışı= Occultism in the Eye of the Qur’ân and Sunnah”, 153.

<sup>155</sup> al-Baqara 2/255; al-Rahmân 55/29.

<sup>156</sup> al-Fātiha 1/5.

<sup>157</sup> Fâtır, 35/41.

<sup>158</sup> Halife Keskin, *İslâm Düşüncesinde Allah-Âlem İlişkisi= The Relationship between God and the Universe in Islamic Thought* (Istanbul: Beyan Publications, 1996), 175.

<sup>159</sup> al-A’râf 7/20; Tâhâ 20/120.

life for humans have proved to be more advantageous over the thought systems that do not have such beliefs in every period of history.<sup>160</sup>

Systematizing the belief that "life somehow goes on after death", which is seen since the beginning of humanity, is one of the most important functions of religion. Religions have not only legitimated the emotion of eternity that human beings deeply harbored, but they have also made it a religious and ethical obligation. However, while religions ground their "immortality" and "salvation" doctrines, they have performed it within the scope of a system that is in parallel with God, universe and human concepts. In this concept, the thought and religion systems that adopt an "absolute" God understanding, whose relation to universe is impossible, have reached the immortality by the "absolute soul" theory with their own logic. According to them, soul is already eternal by its essence, and it does not need God for immortality. Divine religions, one of which is Islam, on the other hand, have favored a "God centered (theocentric)" approach about immortality. For them, just as how the "the beginning (*al-Mabda'*)" was actualized by God, "the return (*al-Ma'ād*)" will also be actualized by His wisdom, will and power. A similar difference is present in religions' "salvation" theories as well. According to divine religions, without Allah's help and mercy, and particularly "faith", the actualization of salvation is impossible. According to religion and thought systems that adopted the Absolute God understanding, what brings salvation to human is his own efforts depending on the universal moral law (*karma*), not the faith in God.

It is obvious that the belief of "rebirth in this world" (*tanāsukh/reincarnation*), which is one of the solutions for human's desire of eternity, in our opinion, is not consistent with Islam's "resurrection in afterlife" (*akhirah*) doctrine. In fact, this matter has been discussed in detailed by books and articles were written in Turkey. However, we think that the most important thing to do for solving this modern belief problem is getting to the crux of the problem and emphasizing that these two beliefs are based on different conceptions of God, the universe and human concepts and relations. It is not possible for the religion of Islam's one God, who is at the center of everything, to allow humanity's salvation, which is an important essence of religion, in fact, the existence of it, to be explained in terms of concepts such as "immortal soul" and "universal law", which puts God on the back burner. Basically, such an understanding will make God an unimportant figure in an individual's life. If "soul" provides human's immortality and a "moral law" (*karma*) that is independent of God provides his salvation, then what is the reason for believing in God? In fact, this situation explains why there is no omnipotence personal God concept cannot be formed in the religion and thought systems that have *tanāsukh* and reincarnation as core components. Or on the contrary, if the religion of Islam is a God centered religion and the belief in Allah matters that much in personal and social life, it is mostly because of accepting God as the absolute authority, as being the owner of the day of punishment and reward in terms of immortality and salvation. That is why the *Qur'ān* constantly mentions Allah and the belief in the afterlife in almost inseparably. These two doctrines stand or fall together; a damage that occurs in one of them will lead to damages to the other one.

The *Qur'ān* represents the oneness of God concept (*tawhīd*), and in this context, describes the universe as "Everything except God". The *Qur'ān* draws attention to universe's being subsequent and finite with its all elements in order to reveal that the universe is not God (If skies, stars, planets and the Earth, that is to

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<sup>160</sup> Ernsts Von Aster, *İlk Çağ ve Orta Çağ Felsefe Tarihi= History of Antiquity and Mediaeval Philosophy* (Istanbul: İm Publications, 2000), 301.



say the universe as a whole, are formed subsequently and it is certain that one day their order will be disrupted and disappeared, then how can something that is created and mortal be God?). While the *Qur’ān* places the human being in a distinguished position in the universe, it also considers him as a part of the universe too; therefore, it accepts him in the same ontological status with the universe. This situation necessitates human’s being “subsequent” and “finite” as a whole as well. Therefore, it is impossible for the *Qur’ān* to accept a human nature with an absolute and immortal soul that has the same essence with the Creator. According to the *Qur’ān*, it is human “himself”, a soul-body unity, who is born, alive and dead, and will be resurrected in afterlife and questioned, and eventually, s/he will be placed in heaven or hell.

Although death is an observable fact, it is out of human’s scope of experience because it happens once for human, and the human, who experiences this phenomenon, cannot find the second opportunity to describe it. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether human’s immortality will be in afterlife by resurrection or by reincarnation by empirical means. On the contrary, it is possible to reveal the *Qur’ān*’s point of view about immortality and salvation for human being. This, however, can only be achieved by understanding the verses under the guidance of the right methods and techniques, because understanding and interpretation are not mechanisms that are free from personal attitude, expectation and prejudice. In this context, some people’s claim that “Reincarnation is cited in the *Qur’ān* too” becomes an obvious example of how a result that is not consistent with the *Qur’ān*’s integrity and Islam’s basic principles can be obtained when verses are discussed with ideological, partial, and fragmented approaches.

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## A Postcolonial Reading on Eurocentrism, Otherization and Orientalist Discourse in Sociological Thought and Its Criticism\*

İrfan Kaya \*\*

### ABSTRACT

Modernity has long been a dominant paradigm in producing knowledge and in determining theoretical framework of the disciplines although it is in connivance with a Eurocentric ideology and conflict of paradoxes in itself. The other participant of the crime, committed with Eurocentric ideology, is sociology as an observation method of modernity's self and developed with it. They also display a tautological view with each other. Compatibility of paradoxes in modernity makes the othering notions of rejection, negation etc. inevitable. Otherization in sociological literature has been a reference point in historiography that is developed with the claim that historical process experienced throughout Europe is the only straight and universal one with an essentialist perspective, in the Orientalist discourse that is established in parallelism with colonial activities and generating ideal tips. This article aims to criticize the framework and the narrative in modernity and sociology as they contain Eurocentric discourse according to post-colonial theory. While chasing a non-othering paradigm inquiring troubles and dilemmas that post-colonial theory faced will also

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\*\* Assistant Professor, Cumhuriyet University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Sociology of Religion, Sivas, TURKEY  
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fakültesi, Sosyoloji Anabilim Dalı  
[ikaya@cumhuriyet.edu.tr](mailto:ikaya@cumhuriyet.edu.tr) orcid.org/0000-0002-8761-7489

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be the other aim of this study. This paper aims to be authentic by determining the problems of post-colonial theory that criticizes the dominant paradigm through orientalist discourse yet falls into clutches of self-orientalism.

## KEYWORDS

Sociology of Religion, Orientalism, Euro-centrism, Otherization, Culturalism, Post-colonialism

## Sosyolojik Düşüncede Avrupa-merkezcilik, Ötekileştirme ve Oryantalist Söylem Üzerine Post-kolonyal bir Okuma ve Eleştirisi

### ÖZ

Modernite, uzun bir zamandır tüm dünyada, Avrupa-merkezci bir ideolojiyle suç ortaklığı yapmasına ve özünde barındırdığı çelişkilerin bağdaşmazlığına rağmen, bilgi üretimi ve disiplinlerin teorik çerçevesini belirlemede hâkim paradigma olmayı sürdürmektedir. Avrupa-merkezci ideolojiyle girilen suçun iştirakçilerinden bir diğeri de, modernliğin kendi kendini gözleme tarzı olarak ve onunla birlikte gelişen, aralarında totolojik bir görünüm sergileyen sosyolojidir. Modernitenin özünde barındırdığı çelişkilerin bağdaşmazlığı, yadsıma, inkâr vs. ötekileştirme nosyonunu kaçınılmaz kılar. Sosyolojik literatürde ötekileştirme, özcü bir yaklaşımla Batıda yaşanan tarihsel sürecin tek doğru ve evrensel olduğu iddiasıyla geliştirilen tarih yazımında, sömürgeleştirme faaliyetlerine koşut olarak geliştirilen oryantalist söylemde, ideal tiplerin oluşturulması gibi konularda referans noktası olmuştur. Bu makale, modernite ve sosyolojideki teorik çerçeve ve anlatının Avrupa-merkezci bir söylem barındırmasından hareketle post-kolonyal teoriye göreceleştirisini yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Ötekileştirmeyen bir paradigmanın izini sürerken post-kolonyal teorinin karşılaştığı zorluklar ve açmazları ortaya koymak da bu çalışmanın bir diğer amacı olacaktır. Çalışma, post-kolonyal teorinin sosyolojideki oryantalist söylem üzerinden hâkim paradigmayı eleştirirken self-oryantalizmin ağına düştüğü hususları belirtmek suretiyle özgün olmayı hedeflemektedir.

### ANAHTAR KELİMELER

Din Sosyolojisi, Oryantalizm, Avrupa-merkezcilik, Ötekileştirme, Kültürelcilik, Post-kolonyalizm

### INTRODUCTION

This study revolves around the assumption that the (classical) sociological tradition, which has a tautological character, remains incapable of elucidating, conceptually and theoretically, postmodern and post-colonial societal alterations such as modern-day post-industrial society, consummative, risk or information society by its depiction of modern society and its modernization theory, and is rather problematic.

Developments experienced in social sciences, particularly within post-structural and postmodern frame, have been more favored by postcolonial non-Western societies. It is essential to notice that the allocation of sociology as a discipline only to the West so that it could examine its own society has played a significant part in this appropriation. As a matter of fact, according to this narrative of classical period, the West, in its own opinion, has already left the civilization period behind and by accomplishing its evolutionary process, has claimed its place in history. Thanks to sociology, the West has also announced them to the world by legislating historical process of civilization by means of determining them in a self-directed manner and recording them through sociology. However, the field which non-Western societies have been deemed worthy is anthropology, known otherwise as the science of primitive societies and understood to have been invented in order to colonize mentioned societies.<sup>1</sup>

The relationship between sociological and anthropological societies has been somehow characterized as master-slave relation. Such exploitative hierarchical relationship even largely coheres with segregationist nature of modern paradigm, which shatters the truth and which has been made into a rule with science. Thus, I will be offering in this article to unriddle the exploitative structure of European sociology based on the argument that although colonialism has been determinative in the West's enrichment, colonial confrontations and exploitative activities are not mentioned in the tradition of sociology. In fact, modernity has shaped in flesh and bones and strengthened thanks to these colonial confrontations. From the perspective of postcolonial theory, sociology is coordinated with imperialistic culture and even contributes to it. Thus postcolonial theory<sup>2</sup> is in fact a criticism to sociology. It helps to reveal, above all, sociology's elements such

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<sup>1</sup> The famous anthropologist, Talal Asad, on the other hand, rejects the limiting of the study field of anthropology with local cultures. In the *Genealogies of Religion*, he argues that the Western culture has a significant role – either in a positive or a negative way- in the formation of the modern world and thus, analysis of this history should be one of the key issues of anthropology. See Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion, Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, translated by Ayet Aram Tekin (Istanbul: Metis Pub., 2015), 11 for his stimulating evaluations. For this reason, he subjects the *Formations of the Secular* to an anthropological reading. See Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular, Christianity, Islam and Modernity*, translated by Ferit Burak Aydar (Istanbul: Metis Pub., 2007).

<sup>2</sup> The affinity we have established, through this article, with the post-colonial theory (The post-colonial theory is defined as; the generally consistent structure of the written texts and thoughts which criticize the European colonialism and the supporting elements of its heritage and which aim for the transformation of these. See Julian Go, "For a postcolonial sociology", *Theory and Society* 42, no. 1 (January 2013):29) arises from the critical nature of the theory. We believe that, the functionality of the Frankfurt School comes from its critical nature, just like the Marxist tradition. Although it is not recognized in our country, it is possible to state that there a large literature on the post-colonial theory is being formed around the world. Particularly in the USA, it has become a trend among the academicians to write about this theory. See Julian Go, "For a Postcolonial sociology", 25. His ideas are theoretically based on Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* and Edward Said's *Orientalism*. Gramsci's analysis on hegemony and Foucault's analysis on power/knowledge are his main reference points. See Merve Kavakçı, "Questioning Turkey's Role Model Status: A Critical Examination of the Social and Political Implications of the Headscarf Ban in Turkey" (Doctoral thesis, Howard University, 2007), 31-32. For the postcolonial definition and relationship of the term, see Robert J. Young, *Post-colonialism: An Historical Introduction*, translated by Burcu Toksabay Köprülü-Sertaç Şen 8Ankara: Matbu Pub., 2016), 77 and see Robert J. Young, *Post-colonialism: An Historical Introduction*, 223-242 for its relationship with Marxism. For a critical review of the theory's relationship with global capitalism, see Arif Dirlik, *The*

as orientalism, Eurocentric universality, imperial repression and illuminative scientism.<sup>3</sup> Then the breakage of organic bond between modern empires and sociology may bring the mind the annihilation of sociology as it is.<sup>4</sup>

I will be developing my analyses in this article through the basic postulate suggesting Western thought makes the notion of *otherization* derived from its nature, which tears down the reality, unavoidable by means of producing dichotomies. Partial reality conception containing divisions between which a hierarchical order is established such as subject-object, mind-body, West-East, center-sphere or fact-value pertains to modern Western thinking initiated by Descartes. The relationship modernity established with nature, human, history and society was established to dominate.

As method, this study has adopted discourse analysis. As a matter of fact, analysis of orientalism set forth by Edward Said, who was inspired by Foucault, is discourse analysis functioning with philosophical tradition in social sciences. Anti-positivist discourse analysis, which positions itself against explicative and descriptive content analysis and which articulates itself to natural sciences and pretending to universality, generalizability and objectivity, reveals how discourse is shaped by power and ideology, and how influential it is in the formation of social identity, social relations and knowledge-belief systems. Content analysis, however, claims the feature of objectivity. Accordingly, information earns the feature of being scientific when it is objective. Scientific reality is only possible when it is given in an unbiased manner. What examines, explains, interprets is the subject itself and it speaks in certain historical and sociocultural context. There is no such thing as absolute reality; the reality is comprised of subjective and unique interpretations.

To this end, in the article, Oriental discourse relating specifically to Islam and generally to perception of East will be analyzed through two concepts that lay the ground for this discourse: Euro-centrism and Otherization. In fact, Euro-centrism is a broader concept that also includes orientalism. It spawned Otherization in itself. The West first defined itself over the East and then identified the East over itself. Therefore, we picked a reading form evolving from general sociology into sociology of religion.

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*Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*, translated by Galip Dođduaslan (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Pub., 2010). For the criticisms arguing that reproduction is needed when criticizing the dominant paradigm, see Vivek Chibber, *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital*, translated by Afife Yasemin Yılmaz (Istanbul: İletişim Pub., 2016), 42-51. For a postcolonial study criticizing the history of modernity and the postcolonial theory with Euro-centric sociology, see Gurminder K Bhambra, *Rethinking Modernity, Post-colonialism and the Social Imagination*, translated by Özlem İlyas (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Pub., 2015) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Can the Subaltern Speak?*, translated by Dilek Hattatođlu-Gökçen Ertuğrul-Emre Koyuncu (Ankara: Dipnot Publ., 2016) produced within the scope of the Sub-alternity Studies Project centered in India, which is the most popular representative of the postcolonial studies. Toplumbilim Journal's Special Edition on the Postcolonial Thought, can be given as an example from our country.

<sup>3</sup> Julian Go, "For a Postcolonial Sociology", 32.

<sup>4</sup> Sanjay Seth, "Historical Sociology and Postcolonial Theory: Two Strategies for Challenging Eurocentrism", *International Political Sociology* 3, no. 3 (September 2009): 338.

## 1. HISTORIOGRAPHY IN SOCIOLOGY

"I detest these castrated somatic desires of the history, and those who rigidly clings to austere ideal; I detest these flamboyant sepulchers producing life; I detest these exhausted and weak-willed creatures wrapping themselves up in the guise of sage and pretend they feature an objective view." *Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals*<sup>5</sup>

As stated by Foucault, history in modern sense, took shape in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe.<sup>6</sup> The West has imposed its superiority upon entire world by initiating *the end of history* with a Eurocentric history writing. Therefore, there could be nothing more natural than that postcolonial theory would start with the restoration of history perception in terms of opposing exploitation and oppression and of a viable struggle.<sup>7</sup> Yet today's (which forces the writing of its own history) post-poststructuralist, multicultural, historical and sociological conditions should be mentioned over this naturalness. And another reference must be made to the historicalness of elements such as Euro-centrism, which declares itself universal and has been made up of the tradition long-established on the orbit of the West that leads to the following question asked by Gyan Prakash: "How does the world write its own history?"<sup>8</sup> Because a historian, as Edward Carr pointed out, is a product of the history before he begins to write history. And history is not a retrospective knowledge, but today's people's perception on the past. Historical knowledge is not therefore rooted in the past, but in today.<sup>9</sup>

It is possible to approach to the problems caused by historicalness over the disputes between history and sociology –from the point of both Eurocentric history writing and subaltern's aspiration to write his/her own history-. Edward Carr, in his study named *What is History?*, befittingly clarifies common and harsh methodological arguments between historians and sociologists about connection and boundaries of both disciplines by saying "Sociologist's leaning upon history and historian's toward sociology would work both ways. The boundary between these two should be open for bidirectional traffic."<sup>10</sup> Philip Abrams, however, argues

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<sup>5</sup> Quoted by Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Soykütük, Tarih, (In *İktidar ve Özne V*, translated by Işık Ergüden (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Pub., 2011), 247-248.

<sup>6</sup> Foucault, *İktidar ve Özne*, 248.

<sup>7</sup> The things we have experienced in the past century prove the capability of Euro-centric historicist thoughts or texts indicating a certain integrity and direction to history under a certain philosophy, to create violence. This progressive historical understanding was the source of the philosophical basis of the fascist, socialist, in short, modernist totalitarian regimes we have experienced in the past century. Therefore, we found it appropriate to start our "Euro-centric discourse" analysis with history writing in sociology.

<sup>8</sup> Gyan Prakash, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32, 2 (April 1990): 383. For the comment regarding world subalterns' efforts of history writing as "making efforts to reach the end of the history", see Yasin Aktay, *Tarih Bozumu, Tarih Sosyolojisi Denemeleri Essays* (İstanbul: Açılım Pub., 2010), 63.

<sup>9</sup> Aktay, *Tarih Bozumu*, 49.

<sup>10</sup> Edward H. Carr, *What is History?*, translated by Misket Gizem Gürtürk (İstanbul: İletişim Pub., 2016), 122.

in his influential work, *Historical Sociology*, that history and sociology amount to the same thing, which he bases on the argument that sociological explanation is already historical in itself.<sup>11</sup> This contestation between history and sociology is somewhat caused by the fact that historiography has remained under the pressure of a puissant objectivity. Accordingly, decent historiography is predicated on the supposition that it is only possible when carried out in an objective and unbiased manner, without being influenced by its own historical, political and ideological position. Nietzsche denominates those who claim history can be written independent of all kinds of political or ideological impressions as "lustful eunuchs of the history".<sup>12</sup> Consequently, when it comes to history, objectivity is an illusion. It is therefore unverifiable and unfalsifiable, which is contrary to what science requires.

Classical sociological tradition has been shaped by the narrative of what societies went through and of the stages they faced in their historical process. Comte contributed to this narrative by arguing that history and societies have got through theological, metaphysical and positive phases, while Durkheim contributed by resorting to a dichotomy such as mechanical and organic solidarity. Marx contributed by putting primitive-communal, slaver, feudal, capitalist and social communities to an evolutionary line, while Weber contributed by setting forth a traditional and rational society conceptualization. Without any exception, all theoreticians of sociological tradition's classical period believed that history was passing through a great transformation and sought to understand how this transformation had begun and to shape how it would end. This effort to theorize the societies, or rather, to put them in line, is based on the principle that history progresses through stages and each new stage is somehow more advanced than the previous one. And existing societies were qualified on this linear and progressive historical line as "advanced", "rudimentary" or "primitive" and all societies have been expected to advance primarily on this line. One of the figures who pioneered the formation of this notion accrediting history with certain direction and integrity was undoubtedly Hegel. Having considered history as the extension of the soul, Hegel determined history as a condition for being state. After Hegel put the best state –inspired by Prussia- into the field of history and paved the way for reading of human history along with an evolutionary process. Thus, the state portrayed as the incarnate walk of the God or Absolute Mind has been ensured to represent the ultimate point of history with its quality of being the best state. Another precursor figure to contribute this metaphysical history perception is Marx. His thesis declaring the history to be nothing but class conflicts is a product of a teleological approach suggesting that history purposefully proceeds in a direction. What led Marx to remark that "if primitive societies want to see their past, they should look on India, and if Indians want to see their tomorrow, let them look on England" is the belief that all peoples could only become what Europe now is after living through the stages Europeans experienced. In this direction, the end of history thesis demonstrating how history can be built as a discursive instrument of social engineering effort reflects the desire of liberal West's hegemony to become eternal.<sup>13</sup> The end of history is an eschatological discourse in substance the same as other finite discourses, –the end of fascism, the end of ideologies, the end of humanity- and hence

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<sup>11</sup> Philip Abrams, *Historical Sociology* (New York: Cornell University, 1982), 5.

<sup>12</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ahlakın Soykütüğü*, translated by Orhan Tuncay (İstanbul: Gün Pub., 2005), 139.

<sup>13</sup> Aktay, *Tarih Bozumu*, 19, 59. Also for the discussions on the famous text of Francis Fukuyama, *Tarihin Sonu mu?* see Francis Fukuyama, edited by Mustafa Aydın-Ertan Özensel (Ankara: Vadi Pub., 2002).

is a religious discourse. The fact that eschatological discourse regarding earthly paradise, which enlightenment has imposed and promised to entire humanity from its very beginning, is coming true can be understood through Fukuyama's declaration of the end of history with a heralding religious rhetoric. It can be seen here that modern episteme was not able to break away from religion when developing its discourse about the end of the world.<sup>14</sup> As a matter of fact, not only the Jewish narrative that time would be in their favor as they are "the chosen tribe", but also the Christian faith in the return of the Messiah have become a reference point in the determination of modern eschatological discourse. Therefore, the starting point in the Eurocentric historiography, which aims to base the future on the past, has been determined according to the end. Such a linear history writing, from primitive to modern, from simple to intricate, has been drawn according to the writer's final state. The West has fortified its hegemony on the subordinate masses, which it had marked as "the ones without history", "the ones who tries to take part in history" and "the ones who are late for history" by "writing history". In the literature, its own development is explained through the primitiveness of the other, which it otherized. It would not have happened either way if the heaven it created had not been the hell of others because the legitimacy of the universal character of the *Gesellschaft* in the sense of modern society can only be realized through creating the reflection of the non-modern in the mirror.<sup>15</sup> As a result, the manipulation of the sense of time in Judaism and Christianity through "history" has become one of the greatest discoveries of the 19th century.<sup>16</sup>

Indeed, Hegelian or Marxist history readings, which attributes a direction and integrity to history, have developed based on the assumption that a model of Europe-centered social development is an "ideal-model" for the whole world and on the point of view regarding societies those not following this model as abnormal. It has also been the main reason that urged Max Weber to ask the original question "Why did not capitalism come out of Europe?" In his analysis developed based production relations, Marx, ranked societies hierarchically and labelled Asiatic societies as deviations. The statement "they do not know how to govern, they need to be governed", which he made about the "eastern" societies showing signs of deviation has been favored as a motto for the colonialism and acted upon.

Envisagement, which attributes direction and integrity to history, is the natural reflex of the West's motive to control, to rule and to have everything. At this point, by following Nietzsche, Foucault emphasizes persistently on the point of not spending any singular event in the grand narrative of history by breaking it from its own special circumstances, and against the totalitarian hazards of analyzing the history with grand theories.<sup>17</sup>

In the classic sociological tradition, the dual conceptualizations of Comte's *static and dynamic*, Durkheim's *mechanical and organic*, Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft*, Weber's *traditional-rational*, Marx's

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<sup>14</sup> Aktay, *Tarih Bozumu*, 75.

<sup>15</sup> Fuat Keyman, "Edward Said ve Bir Modernite Eleştirisi Olarak Oryantalizm", *Uluslararası Oryantalizm Sempozyumu* (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Müdürlüğü Pub., 2007), 124.

<sup>16</sup> Aktay, *Tarih Bozumu*, 61.

<sup>17</sup> Foucault, Nietzsche, *Genealogy, History*, 243-244.

*feudal-capital*, Simmel's *rural-urban* can be given as examples for the structure of the modern episteme that disintegrates the truth. These binary categorizations, which describe the historical development of societies, have been established according to a hierarchical scheme. Here, while "new and present" -by definition of modern- is identified with what is "superior", the "subordinate" is identified with what is "bygone and thus become obsolete". Now, whatever belongs to past has lost its validity in the face of the modern. However, the West ideationally bases its ancestry on ancient Greece.<sup>18</sup> Weber, for example, gives a central position to ancient Greek city states in his analysis of the historical development of the city.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, the Greek myth was manufactured to meet the needs of the founding of the modern West. At the same time, the Greek experience, which is believed to have originated from the uniqueness of modernity, has also been unique.<sup>20</sup> This contradictory state of the modern episteme, which overrule whatever is of old, can only be explained by "the compulsory belief in God, ultimate causes and teleology."<sup>21</sup> The search for the origin is a manifestation of having an objective viewpoint as a necessity of being scientific by acting on the assumption that it has deteriorated over time due to different factors. The necessity of being objective is to get to the basis. As a matter of fact, the basic research field of the sociology of religion constitutes the theories that have been produced about the origins of religion as a requirement of positivism. In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim tried to reveal the origin of religion's first, pure and unspoiled state. His aim was to catch what was universal with the result that will come from it. His study on the Aborigines is a typical example of reaching a universal sociological law based on historical data. However, we certainly know that universality is an illusion when it comes to social sciences, just as objectivity is an illusion when history is concerned. There is an essentialist and fundamentalist approach in the background of these kind of studies. According to traditional or linear history writing, the origin of something is its best moment. He believes that one thing's reality lies in the very basis of it.<sup>22</sup> According to Foucault, traditional history is dependent on traditional metaphysics and searches for the origin of the thing it has written. It describes the history as

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<sup>18</sup> For the assumption of Ancient Greece as a myth, see Martin Bernal, *Kara Athena*, translated by Özcan Buze (Istanbul: Kaynak Pub., 2016).

<sup>19</sup> Max Weber, *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, translated by Richard I. Frank (London: Verso Books, 1988), 69-75. Another importance of Greek cities for Weber is that, they reveal out the foundations of capitalism. Monetary economy became valid in Ancient Greek cities, which had an important role on this. See Lütfi Sunar, "Weber'in Tarihsel Şehir Sosyolojisi: Modern Toplumun Temeli Olarak Şehir", *Sosyoloji Dergisi*, 3, 22 (2011): 432.

<sup>20</sup> Lütfi Sunar, "Şarkiyatçılığı Niçin Yeniden Tartışmalıyız?" (Why should we re-discuss orientalism?) *International Orientalism Symposium* (Istanbul: Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Directorate General for Culture Pub., 2007), 34,36.

<sup>21</sup> Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 247.

<sup>22</sup> A similar approach was developed in Islamism for the Golden Age. For a critique of the seek for origins in Islamism, see İrfan Kaya, "Klasik Sosyolojide Nostaljik Paradigma ve İslamcılıkta Asr-I Saadet Dönemi", *Cumhuriyet Theology Journal* 21, 1 (June, 2017): 97-102.

a linear development, and assumes that what is written in history is moving in one direction, preserving its meaning in this developmental process:<sup>23</sup>

"We tend to think that this is the moment of their greatest perfection, when they emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator or in the shadeless light of a first morning. The origin of something always precedes its fall on earth. It comes before the body, before the world and time. It is associated with the gods, and telling its story always means singing a tune of theogony... Origin is the place of truth."<sup>24</sup>

In contrast, Foucault suggests genealogy as a method<sup>25</sup>. "As a counter-memory, genealogy rejects fixed essences and assumes that there may be different identities. Instead of trying to find the root of a given identity, it aims to resolve it. Genealogy denies the constant accuracy of the thing whose history it writes. Above all, genealogy claims that the thing, whose history it writes, does not follow a continuity which preserves its meaning after its emergence; on the contrary, there are many external interventions, deviations, mistakes and accidents in this process, thereby demonstrating that the process involves conflicts between different powers, and the resulting point is a consequence of these factors and the struggle. So neither the origin is unique and perfect nor the point reached is obligatory. For this reason, the ontology developed to show that the identities and boundaries imposed upon us at the time we are in history are not compulsory and can be overcome, must follow not traditional history method but genealogy. Genealogy is the methodological tool for rejecting the identities given to us."<sup>26</sup>

So far, we have tried to show that the writing of linear history is conducted by sociology as a means of exploitation to fortify the modern paradigm. As a modern invention, historical essentialism is consistent with the nature of the modern episteme with its foundational characteristics. The objection of post-colonial theory to (Eurocentric) historiography's claim of universality is obvious. However, the question "How does the Third World write its own history?" seems too naive, at the first glance because, this is a question which can be asked only by starting from the preconception of the East-West discrimination that shaped the historiography. The question seems hazardous concerning the position it has received, let alone answering the question. This formulation based on the East-West discrimination, transforms the writers of the Third World into "local whistleblowers" in Prakash's words. In brief, the idea of the third world writing its own history smells essentialism.<sup>27</sup> At the very least, it is obvious that speaking about a fixed place like the Third World will be problematic in today's post-modern culture conditions where places are consumed. Besides,

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<sup>23</sup> Ferda Keskin, Sunuş: Özne ve İktidar, Michel Foucault, *Özne ve İktidar, Felsefe Sahnesi 2* translated by Işık Ergüden-Osman Akınhay (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Pub., 2016), in 22.

<sup>24</sup> Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 233-234.

<sup>25</sup> We decided it would be appropriate to refer to Foucault's genealogy, as it revealed out the bottlenecks of graphical history writing.

<sup>26</sup> Keskin, Özne ve İktidar, 22-23.

<sup>27</sup> Prakash, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World", 383. Also for the rough criticism of the term 'third world' made by Aijaz Ahmad over Fredric Jameson, see Aijaz Ahmad, In "Teoride Sınıf, Ulus, Edebiyat, Jameson, Salman Rüşdi, Edward Said Eleştirisi" translated by Ahmet Fethi (İstanbul: Alan Pub., 1995), 112-141.



placing emphasis on the localism in the face of universality and on the plurality in the face of singularity is to fall into the trap of essentialism, when criticizing the West being essentialist.<sup>28</sup>

In the last instance, history has come to speak of a new domination over the world with the other social sciences systematized in the 19th century. This history is no longer the history of examples serving the present by presenting a mirror of the past. But it is a history that takes the world as a whole with all its aspects and all societies as its domain and aims to explain them in order to adjust and classify them systematically and in a monistic way. History is ultimately the most basic space of Eurocentrism.<sup>29</sup>

## 2. FROM EUROCENTRISM TO CULTURALISM<sup>30</sup>

The separating and compelling wording of the West has also been decisive in the emergence of social sciences qua science. The development of disciplinary techniques and scientific disciplines, as Foucault points out, has been largely synchronic and related while the West updated itself with Renaissance. Western thinking based on the science and the positive-mind has also transformed the foundational principles observed in nature sciences into practice to understand the social life of human being and revealed the conclusions it found from its own society, in the name of all humanity. Thus, it has developed a Eurocentric understanding of social sciences that claims universality with a discourse that positions itself in the center and marginalizes the other. As Wallerstein says, this understanding of social sciences manifests itself in five ways: historiography, the universality of these sciences being narrow-minded, the assumptions of Western civilization, being Orientalist, and the imposition of the theory of progress.<sup>31</sup> The social sciences and studies that we are standing on today have been emerged largely due to the unique problems of the West, and therefore, they belong to the West with all their color and scent.<sup>32</sup> This mind-set, which is essentially called Eurocentrism, manifests itself in all the practices of the West. With a quotation from Arif Dirlik, whom we know thanks to his criticisms of the postcolonial period and the theory, "Eurocentrism is the product of an

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<sup>28</sup> Boby Sayyid, For Azmeh, criticizing Islamism for being centrist, see Aziz Al-Azmeh, *İslamlar ve Moderniteler*, translated by Elçin Gen (İstanbul: İletişim Pub., 2014) He thinks it serves for the empowerment of the Western hegemony and argues, based on the idea that each criticism of centrism should also be based on the criticism of globalism, that, each claim of globalism is a product of a certain hegemony. According to Sayyid, each hegemony aims to globalize a partiality and make it transparent, to keep all partialities away in order to become global. See Boby S. Sayyid, “Kötü Niyet: Anti-Özcülük, Evrensellik ve İslamcılık” translated by Nuh Yılmaz, *Tezkire* IX, 18, (2000): 86.

<sup>29</sup> Arif Dirlik, *Kriz, Kimlik ve Siyaset, Küreselleşme Yazıları (Crisis, Identify and Politics, Globalization essays)*, translated by Sami Oğuz (İstanbul: İletişim Pub., 2009), 341.

<sup>30</sup> I would like to thank to Nesibe Şahin for her contribution to the preparation of the section “From Eurocentrism to Culturalism”.

<sup>31</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, “Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science”, *New Left Review* 226, (November-December 1997): 94, trans. by Gurminder K. Bhambra, *Rethinking Modernity*, 4.

<sup>32</sup> Mustafa Gündüz, “Kültür ve Medeniyet Bağlamında Batı Merkezci Eğitim ve Eleştirisi” (Western-centric education and criticism within the scope of culture and civilization), *İnsan & Toplum* 3, 6 (2014): 225.

unprecedented desire and endeavor to organize the information about the world in a single systematic whole."<sup>33</sup>

According to Bhambra, the term Eurocentrism with its disputed definition in the academic area, "is the belief, implicit or otherwise, in the world historical significance of events believed to have developed endogenously within the cultural-geographical sphere of Europe."<sup>34</sup> Amin, on the other hand, defines the Eurocentrism as a cultural paradigm, not an ordinary ethnocentrism, but a sign of a limited view that no people living on our planet can fully emancipate.<sup>35</sup> Yet those who tend to legitimize Eurocentrism claim that Eurocentrism is also a kind of ethnocentrism.<sup>36</sup> According to Amin, Eurocentrism is both a world theory and a world politics plan linked to it.<sup>37</sup> The way of thinking of the Western mind that disintegrates the reality has manifested itself in sociologists by distinguishing societies as pre-modern and post-modern. Accordingly, all human societies must follow the course of Europe's past, pass through the stages it has taken, and thus achieve the goal of being "modern". Theoreticians, considered the father of classical sociology, advocated the existence of a linear and unidirectional progression, in which history gradually progresses and each stage is regarded as development according to the previous one, in their analysis of how and where the exclusive transformation of the West began. For them, the ultimate destination of this progression must be Western modernity. Other societies, which imitate the West and desperately seek to capture it to achieve this goal, are placed at various points behind the West.<sup>38</sup> In this context, sociology can be regarded as an information system that both harmonized with (Western) history and brought to the body in that very history.<sup>39</sup> And of course in this "history", elements such as colonial activities and slave trade are always ignored. Besides, sociological analyses do not show the colonial practices of the western. Despite the acceptance of the presence of colonialism, the Eurocentric view that we have seen even in Marx's critique is an example to this.

The fact that modernity does not pay attention to differences but has a uniform paradigm manifests itself in its structural description of societies in coordinated sociology. This approach reveals how sociology looks at differences. In this respect, sociological history does not mention the interactions between non-Western societies and the West.

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<sup>33</sup> Dirlik, *Kriz, Kimlik ve Siyaset (Crisis, Identity and Politics)*, 342.

<sup>34</sup> Bhambra, *Moderniteyi Yeniden Düşünmek (Rethinking Modernity)*, 5.

<sup>35</sup> Samir Amin, *Avrupa-merkezcilik, Bir İdeolojinin Eleştirisi* translated by Mehmet Sert (Istanbul: Chiviyazıları, 2007), 15-16.

<sup>36</sup> Bobby S. Sayyid, *Fundamentalizm Korkusu, Avrupamerkezcilik ve İslamcılığın Doğuşu (The fear of fundamentalism, Eurocentrism and the Rise of Islamism)*, translated by Ebubekir Ceylan-Nuh Yılmaz (Ankara: Vadi Pub., 2000), 175.

<sup>37</sup> Amin, *Avrupa-merkezcilik (Eurocentrism)*, 97.

<sup>38</sup> Bhambra, *Rethinking Modernity*, 83.

<sup>39</sup> Bhambra, "Postcolonial Reflections on Sociology", *Sociology-The Journal of the British Sociological Association* 50, no. 5, (2016): 964 access 20.07.2017. <http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/81982>

At the end of the 1990s, the idea of multiple modernity, which introduced new approaches with a critical view of modernity, is closely linked to the Eurocentrism paradigm. Unlike the advocates of modernity, multi-modernity theorists have opposed a single modernity idea by considering the cultural diversity. However, taking references to Western modernity while examining alternative modernity notions, and comparing cultural dynamics of other civilizations with those of the West has put them in a trap of the Eurocentric paradigm that they have criticized.<sup>40</sup>

The intolerance of Western understanding against differences forced those who wanted to use "the right to be different" to seek alternatives for the Eurocentric paradigm. Culturalism is one of the paradigms that have caused the Eurocentric paradigm to lean in as a result of these quests. The culturalist approach sees universality as unnecessary and believes in the superiority of its own culture. Samir Amin considers this attitude in the same way with the mentality of a Eurocentric approach, because the dominant Eurocentric current is a kind of culturalism as it accepts the pursuit of European culture.<sup>41</sup> Dirlik, on the other hand, defines culturalism as a hegemonic ideology. According to him, the culturalist reduces all areas of social experience to the issue of culture by accepting that the cult is autonomous (economically, ideologically). This approach not only legitimizes hegemonic associations among societies, but also is responsible for hegemonic relations, such as exploitation and oppression within societies. According to Dirlik, this understanding assumes that the society we are studying is a society separate from the others.<sup>42</sup>

This also will force the culturalist understanding to possess the characteristic of the criticized Eurocentric paradigm, since it would otherize the rest.

Amin's assessment of Eurocentricity as a culturalist approach can be questioned in several respects. Eurocentrism does not need culturalism as it can arbitrate its own dominance as a paradigm with the support of the phenomenon of globalization. Therefore, it cannot be considered as culturalism in our opinion. On the other hand, while Eurocentrism is de facto as being universal, culturalism is based on the perception of taking its own cultures to the center and othering others. The character of Eurocentrism is active and hegemonic, culturalism is passive and reducible because the Eurocentric idea procures acceptance in the world through a reactionary mental structure, and culturalism has to settle with a reactionary style that expresses itself through Eurocentrism. Again, the West's basing itself on Ancient Greece is only due to the need to lie somewhere as a source. Therefore, it would be a constrained assessment to say this should count as culturalism, in our opinion.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Bhambra, *Moderniteyi Yeniden Düşünmek*,72.

<sup>41</sup> Amin, *Avrupa-merkezcilik*, 12.

<sup>42</sup> Dirlik, *Postcolonial Aura*,51.

<sup>43</sup> We believe it is acceptable that, approaches based on cultural differences should be discriminating, due to the fact that they need to have origins. Therefore, it seems impossible to assess such discrimination on cultural terms. Because it must be stated that, the European thought does not make Ancient Greece mythical when announcing it as a root, on the contrary, it continuously updates it. Besides, today's advanced capitalist structure is so sure of

At this point, it would be appropriate to exemplify the point reached by culturalist view in sociology. It is a culturalism practice that Ziya Gökalp, a very famous name in Turkish sociology, translated the Arabic "hars" expression which is used for the word "crop", as the word "culture" in the translation of the verse of Koran (el-Bakara 2/205) "... they devastate the crops, ruin the generations."<sup>44</sup> It is possible and meaningful to consider this as a manifestation of the modernization project at a time when Westernization is gaining momentum. From this perspective, this approach is also an example of the self-orientalist approach I will examine later on.

The paradigm of multiculturalism in culturalism debates is another important point of criticism. It has been seen that people who lived in the colonies, returned to Europe, tried to maintain their own culture and created ghettos after the liquidation of the colonialism. The West has sought to solve cultural and political problems of these societies through the policy of multiculturalism and has used this framework of thought in the analysis of these societies. And with that, the West has tried to identify and analyze what is different from its own, as it has always done, even proposed a multicultural approach to other societies experiencing ethnic problems. In fact, even if multiculturalism claims that different cultures can exist in harmony, it "holds the attitude of a Eurocentric distance or respect that looks down on local cultures".<sup>45</sup> Thereby, how much can the multicultural mind structure that expresses itself with the possibilities of the globalizing world, provided by post-modern and post-structural criticism, which has been emerged as the "exploited alterity" of Europe, tell itself to the world? Even if it does, is it possible to call that expressing oneself?

As one of the methods for expressing oneself, the concept of hybridity, which is attributed to post-colonial theorist Homi Bhabha,<sup>46</sup> is also facing the danger of falling into identity traps according to Dirlik.<sup>47</sup> While it must remove the boundaries, which are supposed to separate identities and cultures from each

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itself and the sense of entrapment is so deep that, it doesn't need legitimacy anymore. On the other hand, when we look at culturalism with respect to Dirlik's definition "it is the overall intellectual tendencies that have become crystallized around the reduction of social and historical questions to abstract cultural questions in terms of methodology" and thus, "it serves not only for the legitimization of the hegemonic relationships among the societies, but also for making the hegemonic exploitation and pressurizing relationships in societies, mythical", see Dirlik, *Postcolonial Aura*, 54 from Foucault's perspective, it is quite natural to say, based on the practices of the rulers until now, that, it is quite functional as a hegemonic discourse serving the rulers.

<sup>44</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (The principles of Turkism) (Ankara: Varlık Pub., 1968), 27.

<sup>45</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *Kırılğan Temas*, translated by Tuncay Birkan (Istanbul: Metis Pub., 2011), 282.

<sup>46</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, *Kültürel Konumlanış*, translated by Tahir Uluç (Istanbul: İnsan Pub., 2016).

<sup>47</sup> Dirlik, *Kriz, Kimlik ve Siyaset*, 245-272.

other,<sup>48</sup> hybridity itself often becomes an identity.<sup>49</sup> In the final analysis, like multiculturalism, which it grew together with in the process of globalization, it assumes that boundaries are certain cultural systems. It ignores violence that includes encounters, mixings and overlapping. It further codifies the cultures in question, homogenizes them, grants them authenticity, presents them to romantic attention and opens them to tourism.<sup>50</sup> According to Zizek's statement, while multiculturalism, as the motivation of Eurocentric paradigm, settles for the folkloric (non-dangerous) form of the *other*, which purified from the content, disregards its fundamentalist aspects. In the age of *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, the respect that is shown to the specificity of the *other*,<sup>51</sup> by multiculturalist, the ideal ideology form of global capitalism, is the exact form of expressing its own supremacy.<sup>52</sup>

As can be understood from the assessments we have made up to this point, it is an undeniable fact that postcolonial criticism of this ideology is inadequate, although it is the dominant ideology in social sciences as it is in all the practices of the West. Besides being a limited criticism due to the inadequacy of the conceptual equipment, the Reverse-Eurocentrism, which is seen in most of the critical approaches, has occasionally fallen into the error of strengthening the existing Eurocentric structure itself, by reason of the assessments made with an approach similar to the existing mind-structure or the starting points of the criticisms. According to Dirlik's analysis, in order to oppose Eurocentrism, East Asia's definition of its identity with the concepts of the West and with a Eurocentric spatialization, is an example of conceptual complexity / inadequacy. Thereby, this led Dirlik to reach the conclusion that, the anti-Eurocentric movements are in fact Eurocentric in essence, or more precisely, products of this perception.<sup>53</sup>

In the same way, appealing to other "centrist" perspectives while in search of an alternative for the Eurocentric mentality will also be an error for the seekers. Therefore, this understanding will not be able to go beyond being a bad copy of the structure of the Eurocentric mind-set, which pushes the different one into the background or ignores it, since it will bring along centering itself and alienating others.

Ultimately, multiculturalism, in Anne Phillips' words -despite its noble intentions- has not been able to free itself from being a "cultural straitjacket" rather than being a "cultural savior". The most criticized aspect of multiculturalism is its justified accusations on national identities that cause essentialism, which

<sup>48</sup> Sibel Yardımcı, "Canavar: Kültürizm ne zamandı?" (Monster: When was culturalism?), [www.e-skop.com](http://www.e-skop.com). e-skop journal, 10/2012, Issue 3, access 19.07.2017 <http://www.e-skop.com/skopdergi/canavar-kulturalizm-ne-zamandi/928>

<sup>49</sup> Mahmut Mutman, "Postkolonyalizm: Ölü bir Disiplinin Hatıra Defteri," (*Postcolonialism: Diary of a Dead Discipline*) *Sociology Postcolonial Thought Special Edition*, p. 25, (October 2010): 124.

<sup>50</sup> Yardımcı, "Canavar: Kültürizm ne zamandı?" (Monster: When was culturalism?),

<sup>51</sup> Zizek, *Kırılğan Temas*, 282.

<sup>52</sup> Zizek, *Kırılğan Temas*, 282.

<sup>53</sup> Dirlik, "Culture against History: Politics of East Asian Identity", *Development and Society* 28, 2 (1999): 176, trans. by Kerem Karaosmanoğlu-Defne Karaosmanoğlu, "A Critique of Eurocentrism: Bottlenecks and Alternatives", *İnsan & Toplum* 3, 6, (2014): 55.

excludes minorities, and that increase it. With a quote from Phillips, multiculturalism, "Exaggerates the internal unity of cultures, hardens the differences, which are not so stable now, and makes people from other cultures look like even more exotic and different than they actually are (a state of othering within itself). In that case, multiculturalism appears to us not as a cultural savior but as a cultural straitjacket."<sup>54</sup> Hence, the homogeneous and reifying approach of multiculturalism, which standardizes the culture, besides being far away from being the remedy for the masses of subaltern in the Third World, seems to have led to new problems, unintentionally even.

### 3. OTHERISATION

In his book, *The Eyewitnesses of History*, Peter Burke mentions two types of encounters with the Other.<sup>55</sup> The first reaction is to deny or ignore cultural distance and to make sense of others willingly or unwillingly based on our own insight and culture. The other is regarded as a reflection of our own. This can be seen in Christians' perception of Saladin Ayyub as a knight or in Vasco da Gama's perception of the statue of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva in a local temple as an image of the trinity or in the case of Chinese people perception of Virgin Mary as Buddhist goddess, Kuan Yin. Thus, the unrest caused by the first encounter with the other can be understood via simile.<sup>56</sup> The second reaction is exactly the opposite. Upon "otherizing" people who do not belong to his/her of culture, cultural codification is fictionalized. Demonization is then involved in this process. In *Roland's Song*, Islam is defined as evil mirror image of Christianity. Greek historian Herodot presents ancient Egypt culture as the opposite of Greek culture. In fact, the problem of "Other Cultures" has been an integral part of the Western social philosophy since Herodot indicated that all socio-cultural differences cause people to question the difference between natural and conservative.<sup>57</sup>

In the similar way, with the Enlightenment period the notion of otherization has become a prerequisite for the subject the West used while programing itself over pure epistemology. Only with the creation of an image of the other could the introduction of the motto "knowledge is power" enter in the development of modern identity in history. The presentation of the East as passive, irrational, conservationist, which Said

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<sup>54</sup> Anne Phillips, *Multiculturalism without Culture* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007),14.

<sup>55</sup> Peter Burke, *Afişten Heykele Minyatürden Fotoğrafa Tarihin Görgü Tanıkları*, translated by Zeynep Yelçe (Istanbul: Kitap Pub., 2016), 137.

<sup>56</sup> Using the other on the known by reducing it through analogy and using "epistemic" violence: There is an anecdote of Nasreddin Hodja where the villagers insist that the stork is a bird. Nasreddin Hodja takes the scissors and cuts the long beak and legs of the stork, which he has never seen before and says "now it looks like a bird"; or in Greek mythology, Procrustes cuts the organs of his captives, which overflow from the bed (Procrustean bed) or if they are short, he extends them until they fit the length of the bed. These are good examples to show the irregularity of the othering.

<sup>57</sup> Bryan S. Turner, *Oryantalizm, Postmodernizm ve Globalizm*, translated by İbrahim Kapaklıkaya (Istanbul: Anka Pub., 2002), 147.

rightfully presented as the prerequisite of dominant rational subject, is inherent in West’s effort for establishing hegemony in wisdom and knowledge.<sup>58</sup>

Thus, the nature of the Western idea that tear down reality by making dual distinctions has rendered the notion of *otherization* inevitable. The idea, which deconstructs reality and which has become a rule via science and through which a hierarchical order just as in between subject-object, mind-body, west-east, center-periphery, fact-value, is unique to modern Western idea which started with Descartes. Ultimately, the relation between modernity and nature, human beings, history, relation with the society is based on hegemony. It is seen that the power volition based on Western envision, which tears down reality, aims to dominate *irrational* on behalf of *irrational*, manipulate and overthrow. As a matter of fact, Western rationality is characterized with identicalness principle. With the principle of no contradiction (A is A, A is not B) uncertainty /intrication is reduced to minimum. This is a dualism that is expressed with some contradictions like mind/body, subject/object and which argues that something is either itself or something else.<sup>59</sup>

Besides, the *order* that is observed by nature scientists has become deterministic in the development of modern paradigm. It is such that the exploration of order in the nature prescribed *order* in thought as well. Modernity regarded *ordering* as a duty, which is achieved via classification. Classification means dividing or separating. In other words, it entails attribution of a structure to the world. Classification can be achieved via naming, and naming brings about restrictions. Restriction is a kind of making definition. For modernity, making definition for knowing something is indispensable. That is why the definition theory developed by Aristoteles in ancient period has been the building block for modernity. For those who define others, making definition means dominating the things defined. Modernity likes naming most. It restricts others by naming them and it cannot do so without externalizing. Otherization emerges in this way.<sup>60</sup> Attributing a structure to earth is actually a matter of design and action. The *other* of the order is ambivalence. In Bauman’s words, “the effort to eliminate the ambivalence of *the other* is a typical modern practice; it is the essence of politics, modern reason and modern life. This is an attempt to pressurize or eliminate everything that can be and cannot be defined for certain.”<sup>61</sup>

With this aim, the perspective that we can be regarded as reasoning method of the modern paradigm from the 15<sup>th</sup> century and 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>62</sup> grasps the world from the individual’s point of view—to comprise.

<sup>58</sup> Keyman, “Edward Said ve Bir Modernite Eleştirisi Olarak Oryantalizm”, 127.

<sup>59</sup> Madan Sarup, *Post-yapısalcılık ve Post-modernizm*, translated by A. Baki Güçlü (Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Pub., 1997), 172.

<sup>60</sup> Said argues that, during the construction process of the European concept that, the concept of the East came out first, then came the non-East (the West) and hence, he defines Orientalism as a “way of thinking based on the ontological and epistemological distinction between the East and West. See Edward W Said, *Orientalism, Orientalist Ideas of the West*”, translated by Berna Ülner (Istanbul: Metis Pub., 2001, 12.

<sup>61</sup> Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernlik ve Müphemlik*, translated by İsmail Türkmen (Istanbul: Ayrıntı Pub., 2014), 20-21.

<sup>62</sup> The perspective is a way of thinking which has generated the inventions related to the ‘modern’, which has started with *camera obscura*, the precursor of photography, has become three dimensional with *stereoscope* and has reached

The central perspective unique to the new age, this artistic method which determines what is in the front, what is at the back and what is far away, is an extension of Cartesian dominance. In this way, the world is converted into a tamed, reviewable and controllable extension.<sup>63</sup> However, artists of the Middle Age used to think that they could convey what they see before their eyes more demonstratively by walking around it, by feeling it from different perspectives and by almost touching it.<sup>64</sup> Besides, maps and chronometers that work on the principle of measurement and punctuality were the basic tools for removing ambivalence in the vision of the Enlightenment about how the world should be organized. All these organization practices are directed towards dominating, allotment, comprising, exercise dominance over and taming. The basic principle is not to leave anything desolate. All these episteme are the product of unprecedented will and effort to organize all knowledge about the world in a single systematic whole as in European-centralism definition of Dirlik. The main motive for writing this article is to reveal this fascistic character of the modern episteme.

In reality, the totalitarianism on this epistemic violence and knowledge could become possible with a continuous effort to reduce the other into the same. This integration effort in the western intellectual history has ended with somehow absorption of the other. Frantz Fanon, who is known to be the author of anticolonial manifesto, discusses the mirror stage which is regarded as the vital stage of subject creation in the scheme developed by Lacan. According to this, when human being watches himself in the mirror, he sees a smoother, more coordinated and balanced reflection. Thus, the (western) subject constructs itself by both imitating this image and by opposing it. Consequently, it can be argued that modernity is based on a compulsion applied on the other and otherness.<sup>65</sup>

Bryan Turner argues that the theological basis of otherization is the fact that everything that is different not included in the existence chain determined by God is regard to be problematic in Christianity. Under the influence of this theology, orientalism has created a profound "otherness" perception as it meets other cultures especially after the 17<sup>th</sup> century. This colonial experience with regard to otherness is an important

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its peak point with *panopticon*. For further details, see Zeynep Sayın, Sunuş, and Pavel Florenski, *Tersten Perspektif*, translated by Yeşim Tükel (Istanbul: Metis Pub., 2013).

<sup>63</sup> Sayın "Sunuş", Florenski, *Tersten Perspektif*, 10 give important clues for the understanding of the central perspective modern thought as a way of thinking, in Summa systems used in primary academic studies as a product of the Scholastic principle of "illumination, manifestation and clarification, - Summa as a type of literature- and the perspective central modern thought as a way of thinking. For further information about Summa and a research where the explicit explanation practice of the scholastic thought and the similarities among art, philosophy and religion are studies, see Erwin Panofsky, *Gotik Mimarlık ve Skolastik Felsefe, Ortaçağda Sanat, Felsefe ve Din Arasındaki Benzerliklerin İncelenmesi* translated by Engin Akyürek (Istanbul: Kabcacı Pub., 2014), 27-66.

<sup>64</sup> Samuel Edgerton, *The Renaissance Re-discovery of Linear Perspective*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), trans. by David Harvey, *Postmodernliğin Durumu, Kültürel Değişimin Kökenleri*, translated by Sungur Savran (Istanbul: Metis Pub., 2014), 272.

<sup>65</sup> Dirlik, "Global in the Local", *Global/Local*, coll. by R. Wilson-W. Dissanayake (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), 25.



problem for a large existence chain in which God positioned both animal and human species.<sup>66</sup> As a matter of fact, masses that are trained with the Christian theology and believed in Christ the Jesus did not allocate any place in the future of this world for others who did not enter the God's Kingdom. Therefore, this should be the theological ground for nationalism, multiculturalism, orientalism and colonial experiences in Europe to turn into painful and ready massacres and annihilation.<sup>67</sup>

#### 4. FROM OREINTALISM TO SELF-OREINTALISM

"Its fame, name, value, customary size –almost always wrong and random in the origin, left over it like a piece of cloth and strange to its nature and even to its skin- with his belief in it and in growth from generation to generation, it gradually covers it form inside and outside and it becomes the body itself: At the beginning, the thing that is appearance at the beginning and it almost always becomes the essence and becomes influential as the essence."<sup>68</sup>

There are two basic approaches that make up orientalism: Euro-centerism and Otherization. Among these three concepts, Euro-centerism is deterministic thanks to the perspective that grasps the world from individual's eye<sup>69</sup>. This strict central understanding based on over-regularatory fixed points of view of center as the pioneer of change and the periphery as its follower inevitably brings along otherization. The West first defines itself based on the East and then defines the East based on itself. With orientalism, these three approaches generate each other and enlarge each other's scopes, and thus fortify their hegemony.

One of the questions that shape the sociological thought is "why did industrialism first emerge in the West?" has in fact become an indispensable component of intellectual calculation system.<sup>70</sup> The Western sociology characteristically defines Islam society<sup>71</sup> as lacking autonomous institutions of bourgeois that end the hegemony of feudalism. Accordingly, Muslim society lacks independent cities, autonomous bourgeois class, rational bureaucracy, autonomous law, and private property. *Iran Letters* Montesquieu has written

<sup>66</sup> Turner, *Oryantalizm, Postmodernizm ve Globalizm*, 269-270.

<sup>67</sup> Aktay, *Tarih Bozumu*, 231-232.

<sup>68</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Şen Bilim: Main Text 1*, translated by Ahmet İnam (Istanbul: Say Pub., 2004), 68.

<sup>69</sup> See. Footnote 58 and relevant chapter.

<sup>70</sup> It should be stated that, comparisons are generally problematic in the sociological thought and mainly serve to orientalism.

<sup>71</sup> Yasin Aktay argues that, Aziz el-Azmeh revealed out the handicap of the discourse on sociology, which deals with Islam as an integrated category, even if with delay. Aktay states that, Azmeh displays an anti-orientalist attitude against the "essentialist" reductions involved in the idea of "Islam", assumed by the Orientalist literature as the origin of several clichés, through texts. Yet, he also criticizes Azmeh, arguing that his relationship with the anti-essentialist postmodern values involve too much essentialism. See Yasin Aktay, "Modernleşme ve Gelenek Bağlamında Dini Bilgi ve Otoritenin Dönüşümü", *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, İslamcılık*, (Transformation of religious information and authority in terms of modernization and tradition, "Political thought in modern Turkey") (Istanbul: İletişim Pub., 2011), 6, footnotes 358 and 3.

from the point of view of Eastern observers is related to Eastern despotism and is an example of how the West define itself from the eyes of the East. Montesquieu criticized *ancien regime* based on the Eastern despotism of the time, thereby seeking to warn his own society. Another point of comparison between the West and the East is the notion of civil society notion. Especially, in Scottish enlightenment, the rise of civil society was regarded as the most fundamental social development indicator of transmission from barbarity to civilization because individuals could acquire legal rights of property and safety only thanks to civil society. Although the lack of civil society in oriental despotism is formulated with reference to whole Asia, this notion has had a significant place in the analysis of Muslim societies because this notion is one of the main features of orientalist discourse. Bryan Turner duly stated that the relation Western orientalists establish between the Eastern despotism and civil society is actually developed in an environment of uncertainty in intellectual's despotism and monarchy in Europe. According to Turner, "orientalist discourse about the lack of civil society in Islam is the reflection of the basic political concerns about the case of political freedom in the West. In this sense, the problem of orientalism is not Orient but it was Occident (the West). In time these problems and concerns were turned over Orient. Thus, Orient has become a caricature of the West not a representative of the East."<sup>72</sup> It is seen that at the bottom of the Eastern despotism lies the Western monarchy, which virtually proves that the problem of history is not the past but today. The essential character of the orientalist discourse is to reveal the difference to demonstrate "the uniqueness of the West".

As a matter of fact, the sociology of Max Weber is based on difference. The formative question of why capitalism emerged in the West but not in the East is also the basic question Weber asks. It can be argued that Weber's question gained importance as many historical experiences in Europe are considered as fixed points in history and the societies that did not go through these points are considered to be away from the course of history and thus history itself<sup>73</sup>, in other words with the development of Euro-centric history and society. Weber displayed his *skills* and contribution to the attribution of the negative picture of the West to non-Western societies with an effort to create a character of "other-societies" with his analysis of the emergence of the capitalism. Weber, who emphasizes the emergence of capitalism requires bourgeois class, money economy, autonomous cities, free market of labor and rational law as prerequisites, argues that capitalism did not emerge anywhere other than Europe following from the fact that these did not exist in non-European societies. In particular, Weber thinks that all these elements "are prevented by the patrimonial nature of the Islamic institutions."<sup>74</sup> By preferring to remain loyal to his ethnocentric links when it comes to Islam instead of an understanding expected from him, negative question of Weber, who is the great master of Anlamacı sociology, why capitalism did not emerge in non-European societies, has become one of the essential reference points of Euro-centrism, a chronic problem in social sciences. Since this is the case, we think that Weber is the person who directed both colonial period in the 19<sup>th</sup> century reformists and post-colonial critics to sociological interest, which opens to self-orientalism press. As a matter of fact, Weber's negative question was asked in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Islamic geography and in the East. Today, it is still asked

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<sup>72</sup> Turner, *Oryantalizm, Postmodernizm ve Globalizm*, 63.

<sup>73</sup> Aktay, *Tarih Bozumu*, 130.

<sup>74</sup> Bryan S. Turner, *Max Weber ve İslam, Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım*, translated by Yasin Aktay (Ankara: Vadi Pub., 1997), 20.

among post-colonial theoreticians.<sup>75</sup> However, as Aktay duly remarks "Once this questions is asked, not matter how it is answered, it is not possible to avoid from defening the rest of the world as "abnormal."<sup>76</sup> This is the basis of simple operational logic of orientalism and the essentialism in this logic. Moreover, Bryan Turner thinks that almost all analyses social change were ironic when the 19<sup>th</sup> century Islam reformists started to define a new set of motives for Islam in the modern age.<sup>77</sup>In his work called *Max Weber and Islam*, Turner emphasizes that the heavy intellectual and cultural trauma Western emparialism and colonialism caused for deveout Muslims had great influence on this ironic case. Bryan Turner as the author of *The End of Marx and Orientalism*, which corresponds to the same year as Edward Said's *Orientalism*, is one of the rare sociologists who criticizes orientalist paradigm in sociological idea and thus who problematize Euro-centerism in social sciences. His readings of Nietzsche over Weber, and sociology readings over Weber indicates that the classical period in sociology history is rich enough to respond to modern needs.<sup>78</sup>*Max Weber and Islam* is the first work of the author in which he determined his orientalism concern and it focuses on criticisms against Weber that positions Weber into an orientalist framework. Turner argues that Weber's frequent reference to patrimonialism theory, which Weber designs as a model of society indigenous to the East, stems from Weber's profound attachment to an orientalist bias. At the simplest platform, Turner tries to show that when Weber asked the question why capitalism, which is regarded to be a prerequisite for rationalism and development, did not emerge in the East, and that Weber contracted orientalist assumption and disclose this assumtiom. Turner refutes the arguments of Weber, which are inherently orientalist, in particular for Islamic and ingeneral for Eastern societies. With this aim in mind, Turner argues that Islam is actually civic religion- as a supplementary component of capitaslims. With examples from Islami history, Turner claims that the holders of Islam are not warriors, as Weber argues, but merchants. He even argues that the language of Quran is tradesman language given its terminology.<sup>79</sup> Accordign to Turner, Islam was born in a civic environment of Mecca and developed in Madina's oasis. The theological basis of Prophet Muhammed is mostly related to problems in trade and the terminology used in Quran is trade terms. We can also see a similar approach by Sabri Ülgener, who is known as the pioneer of Weberian sociology and who has contributed to Turkish sociological and economic history with his research in mentality. According to Ülgener, many verses in Quran addresses to a civic society, which is beyond a simple society of carafitsman

<sup>75</sup> In this regard, for Chibber's rightful criticism that the post-colonial theory and the views of post-colonial theoreticians, Chakrabarty and Chatterjee's did not attack the Orientalist and colonial depictions of the East, but that, Sub-alternity studies sublimated these, see Chibber, *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital*, particularly Shapters seven and eight.

<sup>76</sup> Yasin Aktay, "Aklın Sosyolojik Soykütüğü, Soy Akıldan Tarihsel ve Toplumsal Akla Doğru," (The Sociologic Genealogy of the Mind: From Genealogic Mind to the Historical and Social Mind), *Toplum ve Bilim* 82,(1999): 17.

<sup>77</sup> Turner, *Max Weber ve İslam*, 249.

<sup>78</sup> For example, Georg Stauth-Bryan Turner, *Nietzsche'nin Dansı, Toplumsal Hayatta Hınç, Karşılıklılık ve Direniş (Nietzsche's Dance, Resentment, Reciprocity and Resistance in Social Life)* (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1988), translated by Mehmet Küçük (Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Pub., 2005) and Bryan S. Turner, *Max Weber, From History to Modernity*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993).

<sup>79</sup> See Turner, *Max Weber ve İslam* 177,-244.

and small bourgeoisie. Ülgener emphasizes that carriers of Islam are merchants (not warriors).<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, the studies on mentality by Ülgener seeks to reveal and rectify the fault Weber and the like have when regarding Islam as a religion with a feudal character. Besides, Ülgener pointed out that Sufism detracted Islam from its worldly and civic character and indicated Sufism as the reason for its regression.

In Turner's analyses, we get the impression that capitalism is regarded as the basic indicator of development.<sup>81</sup> It seems that he has not been able to protect himself from Euro-centric discourse, while proving that Weber's ideas about Islam and Islamic societies are orientalist and ontologically incorrect. Therefore, there is not a difference between Weber, who argues that Islamic societies do not have the necessary conditions for the emergence of capitalism, and Turner, who criticizes Weber for being orientalist and who claims that Islam has conditions necessary for the emergence of capitalism. We can also argue that Turner's approach is even stronger as it fortifies the position of capitalism regarding it the only factor for the development in all conditions. His argument that Islam is civic, its carriers are merchants and its language as merchant language is merely reproducing orientalism.

Ülgener's defending Islam by arguing it as civic religion since its birth, can be regarded as self-orientalism. As a matter of fact, given that he acts upon the presupposition that capitalism is a prerequisite for develop it seems that he seeks to modernize Islam as he cannot Islamicize modernity ment. This self-orientalist attitude developed as a result of dialogue with orientalism over the last two centuries is the reflection of an effort by societies to understand and express themselves over Western values, which we come across in the modernization process of non-Western societies. This kind of efforts to prove oneself means ultimately endorsing dominance of the West. On the other hand, while the relation Weber establishes between Protestant moral and capitalism should be understood as elective affinity relation instead of causal relation, the debates over the *protestanisation of Islam* in our country with an aim to reach level of contemporary civilization lay the dimension of such as ironic case bare. As a part of these debates, history was called in and Ahi-order as a merchant organization where the world and after-life balance is observed. Without caring about anachronic attitude, the achievements of people from Kayseri as *Muslim Calvinists* in business life was shown to all public and Europe. In fact, the arguments that "We also have them", which are indication that they expressed themselves over Western values, were actually imported hastily to save the Ottoman. These *borrowed terms* turn into self-orientalism, which is put into practice by actually accepting the superiority of Western values and by identification of democracy with consultation, public interest with affair, public opinion with idjma, and prosperity with civilization.<sup>82</sup>

Another example of self-orientalism, which expresses itself over Western values, is the culture definition of Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp interpreted the word "hars" in verse 205 of surah al-Baqarah "they destroy the

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<sup>80</sup> Sabri F. Ülgener, *Din ve Zihniyet* (Istanbul: Der Pub., 1981), 65.

<sup>81</sup> Turner's further essays show that he corrected this mistake later.

<sup>82</sup> Likewise, there are many articles in our country arguing that the discipline of Mevlana or Yunus Emre was humanist. These articles, which we regard to be striking examples of self-orientalism, can be accessed by from ISAM's article database by entering the key word; 'humanism'.

crops and spoil generations" as culture. It is meaningful to interpret this as manifestation of modernization in a period when westernization speeds up. Besides, Gökalp's well-known distinction between culture and civilization can also be read as a manifestation of Euro-centric argument that the West is materialist and the East is spiritualist. As in Milica Bakic-Hayden's definition of "constantly increasing orientalisms" "it is a reproduction model for the original dualism orientalism is based on".<sup>83</sup> This culturalist and self-orientalist practice in Gökalp's example, is actually a case of *plague from the West*, which is frequently observed in non-Western societies seeking to modernize. This case of plague from the west is also internalization of orientalism as westernism, which Edward Said criticizes for not discussing Easternizers who Easternize themselves when mentioning Easternizers.

We can formulize the cultural environment when the western expansion start to influence the Ottomans or when the superiority of the West reached at a global scale, around the following questions: How come a religion, which has reached perfection and sent by Allah, weakens and regresses; or in other words, if Christianity is a altered religion, what is then the secret for the power and superiority of the West? The answer should not be long; however, it should be able to present legitimate reasons for change in the modern world.<sup>84</sup>

The cultural trauma shaped around these questions, which we think is still valid, seems to have forced the victims of this trauma to think that the only way for change is "Islamization of Knowledge". However, this coerced orientation was presented "Islamisation" as a challenge against West's hegemonic intellectual paradigm and even as "return to self". Yet, Islamisation of knowledge makes Islamisation of pleasure (as in the example of Cola-Turka, Zemzem Cola) and manifestation of oxidentalism in the form of orientalism inevitable.<sup>85</sup> In the same way, alternative readings of modernity, which claim that modernity is not only composed of Euro-centric axis and thus "non-western modernity" and "multiple modernities" are possible, ultimately take Europe as a point of reference could not go beyond discourses that are developed over it and that consolidate Euro-centerism. Therefore, the orientalist question "Why has the West advanced, and the East has fallen behind?" is asked with a defensive reflex, it tries to rescue itself from the hegemony of orientalism and the West, it unwillingly ends up in the mangle of self-oryantalizm. Consequently, the barbarians who Easternize themselves were tamed so much that they started to give birth to new barbarians among themselves.

## CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT

According to the Western thought knowledge is power. The western thought is based on an idealist and essentialist epistemology. According to this epistemology, knowing means dominating. It first defines what

<sup>83</sup> Milica Bakic-Hayden, Sürekli Çoğalan Oryantalizmler: Eski Yugoslavya Örneği, translated by Birgül Koçak in *Oryantalizm Tartışma Metinleri*, edited by Aytaç Yıldız (Ankara: Doğu Batı Pub., 2014), 356-357.

<sup>84</sup> Turner, *Max Weber and Islam*, 250.

<sup>85</sup> Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Takdim yazısı, in Patrick Haenni, Piyasa İslamı, İslam Suretinde Neo-Liberalizm, translated by Levent Ünsaldı (Ankara: Heretik Pub., 2014), 6.

it wants to know for dominating it. Defining is manifestation of designing. As a requirement of organization, it also classifies and categorizes as a result of organization. The basic character of modern western thought is naming; it limits when naming and thus cannot avoid isolation. This makes otherization inevitable. The perspective that we assessed as the thinking method of the modern paradigm from the 15<sup>th</sup> century to the 20<sup>th</sup> century grasps the world from the point of the view of individual to embrace it and remains at bay. Therefore, orientalist perspectives having an objective attitude against the east in the ultimate analysis emerges by defining and thus actually by producing it. As a result, Orientalist point of view develops based on the inequality between "the defined-defining" and "active-passive". In fact, all dual controversions (indicator/ indicated, speaking/ writing, verbalism/ language, culture/nature, male/female, good/bad etc.) that take on metaphysical history is actually based on the notion of otherization that isolates each other using violence. Thus, when the west defines the Other, it controls, manipulates and even dmmoniates them by producing it. As a result, the identity or geographical location called as the East in the "imagery geography" is the product of orientalism emerged as a result of epistemology it belongs to. The process where the East is Easternized is discourse about the east is developed, reproduced and repeated, and taught by heart.

The self-orientalist attitude, which developed *against the Western thought* can be summarized as "Westernizing for resisting the west." After all, self-orientalism emerged as a result of dialogue with orientalism over the last two centuries. This attitude, which can also be regarded as oxidentalism, is the first manifestation of orientalism. However, it is very clear that orientalism cannot be a symmetrical counterpart of orientalist discourse, which created it, just because it is a reaction. According to the Western thought, the attitude it develops against the West is based on an epistemology which is based on the dichotomy like East-West distinction. However, Hegelian slave-maste diacletic has already thought us that the dichotomous contradictions are hierarchically established in favor of each other and all conceptual pairs, reversals ultimately have to produce the same hiearchy. Therefore, this type of Oxidentalism or self-oreintalism readings will have to reproduce orientalism at each step.

*In spite of the Western thought*, attitude does not determine its position as *according to Western thought*. Therefore, it saves itself from the trap the *opposite* attitude, which needs to reproduce orientalism, falls in. It does not act upon the presupposed distinction between the West-East because it establishes a dialectic relation but not a hierarchical relation. Islamization of knowledge "non-western modernity" and "multiple modernities" are actually a *despite* attitude. But it could not prevent them shape these *despite* attitudes on behalf of *contrary* attitudes on *according* to axis.

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## The Role of *Ijtihād* in Family Law Reforms of Modern Muslim-Majority States: A Case Study of Morocco (PhD. Dissertation)

Miyase Yavuz Altıntaş\*

### ABSTRACT

Yavuz [Altıntaş], Miyase. *The Role of Ijtihād in Family Law Reforms of Modern Muslim-Majority States: A Case Study of Morocco*. PhD. Dissertation, SOAS University of London Faculty of Law and Social Sciences School of Law, England, 2018.

The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the role of *ijtihād* in its application to Islamic law in modern Muslim-majority states by analysing its conceptualisations and the jurisprudential justification for its practices. The question of how and why *ijtihād* operates in legal reforms is addressed as well as what are the motivations, techniques, forms and reasoning adopted when practising it. This thesis involves examining whether *ijtihād* is exercised by going back to the primary sources, i.e. the Qur'an and the Sunnah or by choosing among existing juristic views in classical Islamic jurisprudence. To what extent the rules and principles of classical Islamic legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*) are respected and followed in bringing about the reforms by means of contemporary *ijtihād*, is explored. The main substantive area of focus is family law due to its

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\* Dr., Iğdır University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Islamic Law, Iğdır, TURKEY  
Dr., Iğdır Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fakültesi, İslam Hukuku Anabilim Dalı  
miyaseyavuz@gmail.com  
orcid.org/ 0000-0002-5338-3266

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being the most widely applied aspect of Islamic law among modern Muslim-majority states. Specifically, the reforms of the Moroccan Family Code of 2004 are examined as having been introduced on the basis of *ijtihad*. A central argument of the thesis is that whilst the modern conceptualisations of *ijtihad* and its practice differ from classical mainstream understanding of the notion in terms of their definition, scope, and the authority of exercising it, they can still be accommodated within Islamic law. That is, a conceptual analysis reveals that various *ijtihad* understandings and practices, which were particularly triggered by the socio-political changes of the historical context, existed in Islamic legal history. Based on the research findings, it is concluded that most modern *ijtihad* practices do not strictly follow the detailed rules and principles of classical Islamic legal theory, in general. Nevertheless, they do not lack jurisprudential justifications, and some of them can be rooted in classical Islamic jurisprudence. Moreover, these practices also present a legitimate theoretical, albeit rudimentary, framework.

## KEYWORDS

Islamic Law, *Ijtihad*, Contemporary *ijtihad* practices, Modern Muslim-Majority States, Family Law Reforms, Morocco, Moroccan Family Law Reform of 2004 (*Mudawwanah*)

## İctihadın Modern Müslüman-Çoğunluklu Ülkelerin Aile Hukuku Reformlarındaki Rolü: Fas Örneği (Doktora Tezi)

### ÖZ

Yavuz [Altıntaş], Miyase. *İctihadın Modern Müslüman-Çoğunluklu Ülkelerin Aile Hukuku Reformlarındaki Rolü: Fas Örneği*. Doktora Tezi, SOAS Londra Üniversitesi, Hukuk ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi Hukuk Anabilim Dalı, İngiltere, 2018.

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı *ictihad*ın modern dönemdeki kavramsallaştırma ve hukuki temellendirmelerini analiz ederek İslam hukukunun modern Müslüman-çoğunluklu ülkelerde uygulanmasındaki rolünü araştırmaktır. Bu araştırmada *ictihad*ın hukuk reformlarında neden ve nasıl kullanıldığı meselesinin yanı sıra uygulama esnasında hangi motivasyonlar, teknikler, formlar ve muhakeme usullerinin benimsendiği incelenmektedir. Aynı zamanda *ictihad*ın birincil kaynaklara, yani Kur’an ve Sünnet’e dönülerek mi yoksa klasik İslam hukuk bilimi içerisinde var olan hukuki görüşlerden seçmek suretiyle mi yapıldığı analiz edilmektedir. Son olarak klasik İslam hukuk teorisi (fıkıh usûlü) kuralları ve prensiplerinin ne derece itibar gördüğü ve bunların günümüzde *ictihad* vasıtasıyla gerçekleştirilen reformlarda ne derece takip edildiği araştırılmaktadır. Tezin ana odak noktasını modern Müslüman-çoğunluklu ülkelerde İslam hukukunun en yaygın uygulanan yönü olması sebebiyle aile hukuku teşkil etmektedir. 2004 Fas Aile Kanunu reformları *ictihada*

dayanılarak uygulamaya konduğundan dolayı özellikle incelenmiştir. Tezin ana argümanı *ictihad* kavramının klasik ana akımdaki anlayıştan tanım, kapsam ve *ictihad* etme yetkisi açısından farklılık gösterse de modern dönemdeki *ictihad* kavramsallaştırmaları ve uygulamalarının İslam hukuku içerisinde yer alması gerektiğidir. Nitekim kavramsal bir analiz yapıldığında özellikle tarihi bağlamın sosyo-politik değişikliklerinin zemin hazırladığı çeşitli *ictihad* anlayışlarının ve uygulamalarının İslam hukuk tarihi içerisinde var olduğu görülmektedir. Modern dönem *ictihad* uygulamalarına bakıldığında çoğunun genel olarak klasik İslam hukuk teorisinin detaylı kural ve prensiplerini sıkı bir şekilde takip etmediği görülmektedir. Bununla birlikte bu uygulamalar hukuki temellendirmelerden mahrum değildir ve bazıları klasik İslam hukuk bilimi içerisinde kaynağını bulabilmektedir. Dahası bu uygulamalar iptidai de olsa meşru bir teorik çerçeve sunmaktadır.

### **ANAHTAR KELİMELEER**

İslam Hukuku, *İctihad*, Güncel *İctihad* Uygulamaları, Modern Müslüman-Çoğunluklu Ülkeler, Aile Hukuku Reformları, Fas, 2004 Fas Aile Hukuku Reformu (*Müdevveneh*)