Birleşme ve Devralma Sözleşmelerinde Yer Alan “Break Fee” Klozlarının Birleşik Krallık Hukuku Çerçevesinde Finansal Yardım Yasağı Yönünden Değerlendirilmesi

Year 2024, Issue: 27, 141 - 154, 15.01.2024

Güray Özsu

Abstract

Finansal yardım yasağının amacı, şirket kaynaklarının şirket dışı çıkarlar için kullanılmasını önlemek ve böylelikle hissedarları ve alacaklıları korumaktır. Bu yasak ile şirket kaynaklarının, şirket hisselerinin satın alımı için kullanılması engellenmek istenmiştir.
Break fee anlaşmaları, hedef şirketin, satın alma işlemi tamamlanmadığı takdirde alıcıya belirli bir ücret ödemesini gerektiren bir anlaşma koruma mekanizmasıdır. Bu anlaşmalar anlaşmayı koruma amacının yanı sıra başka amaçlara da hizmet etmektedir. Bu anlaşmalar alıcının; due diligence giderleri, avukatlık ücretleri veya gerekli regulasyonel onaylar için yapılan masrafları geri alabilmesini sağlamaktadır. Hedef şirket açısından ise; satım anlaşmasının tamamlanmasını bilinen bir maliyetle reddetme fırsatı olarak görülebilmektedir.
Öte yandan, break fee anlaşmaları “hisselerin satın alma yolunu kolaylaştırdığı” gerekçesiyle Birleşik Krallık Hukuku kapsamında finansal yardım türlerinden olan “diğer mali yardım” olarak nitelendirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, “diğer mali yardım” niteliğindeki break fee anlaşmaları, şirketin net varlıklarını önemli ölçüde azaltmakta ise yahut hedef şirketinin net varlığı bulunmuyorsa, 2006 tarihli Birleşik Krallık Şirketler Kanunu gereğince hukuka aykırı şekilde bir finansal yardım gerçekleşmiş olacaktır.

Keywords

Break Fee Anlaşmaları, Finansal Yardım Yasağı, Anlaşma Koruma Mekanizması

Ethical Statement

There is no requirement of Ethics Committee Approval for this study.

EVALUATION OF BREAK FEE CLAUSES IN M&A CONTRACTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF UK LAW IN TERMS OF UNLAWFUL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Abstract

The ban on financial assistance aims to prevent the usage of company resources for external interests and protect the shareholders and creditors of the company. The justification for this restriction is that a company’s resources should be exclusively for the benefit of that company itself, not to facilitate the acquisition of its shares.
A break fee clause (or agreement) is a deal protection mechanism which requires a target company to pay a bidder a certain amount of fee if the target doesn’t complete the proposed transaction. Break fees serve another purposes in addition to protecting the deal. In terms of the bidder, it enables the bidder to recover its costs arising from due diligence, legal fees, or applications to obtain regulatory approvals required for the transaction. On the other hand, from the target company’s point of view, a break fee clause can be viewed as an opportunity for the target to refuse the completion of the deal at a known cost.
Break fee agreements could be characterized as “other financial assistance” under UK case law because they “smooth the path towards the acquisition of the shares”. In this context, if a break fee agreement as “other financial assistance” reduces the net assets of the company to a material extent or the target company has no net assets, unlawful financial assistance occurs under the Companies Act 2006.

Keywords

Break Fee Agreements, Unlawful Financial Assistance, Deal Protection Mechanism

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