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Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?

Yıl 2018, Sayı: 2 - 2018, 17 - 34, 04.10.2018

Öz

Defeasibility theories aim to reach a plausible definition of knowledge by finding strategies to exclude true beliefs based on faulty justifications. Different philosophers have advanced with their own understandings of undefeated justification. Zagzebski (1994) indicates that the strong defeasibility condition violates independence between truth and justification because undefeated justification never leads to false beliefs. Following this, Zagzebski and some other philosophers who pursue a similar line of reasoning (e.g., Merricks, 1995) conclude that undefeated justification entails truth. In this paper, I argue that the truth condition is not superfluous by presenting an example of undefeated justification that does not entail truth. My claim is that beliefs about metaphysical questions (e.g., Does God exist?) can have undefeated justifications. Nonetheless, such undefeated justifications are not capable of assigning truth to the beliefs that they support.

Kaynakça

  • Bonjour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Everitt, N. (2004). The Non-Existence of God. London: Routledge.
  • Ezcurdia, M. (1998). The Concept-Conception Distinction. Philosophical Issues, 9, 187-192.
  • Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, 23(6), 121-123.
  • Hetherington, S. (n.d.). Gettier Problems. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (J. Fieser & B. Dowden, Eds.). Retrieved from https://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier
  • Higginbotham, J. (1998). Conceptual Competence. Philosophical Issues, 9, 149-162.
  • Klein, P. D. (1980). Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification. Philosophical Studies, 37(1), 81-89.
  • Klein, P. D. (1984). Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  • Lehrer, K. & Paxson, T. (1969). Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief. Journal of Philosophy 66(8), 225-237.
  • Lehrer, K. (1990). Theory of Knowledge. Boulder and Colorado: Westview Press.
  • Levy, S. R. (1977). Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(1), 115-123.
  • Merricks, T. (1995). Warrant Entails Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 841-855.
  • Nagel, J. (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass, 2(6), 792-819.
  • Pust, J. (2016). Intuition. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/intuition
  • Russell, B. (2017). A Priori Justification and Knowledge. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/apriori
  • Sudduth, M. (n.d.). Defeaters in Epistemology. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (J. Fieser & B. Dowden, Eds.). Retrieved from https://www.iep.utm.edu/ep-defea
  • Taliaferro, C. (2014). Philosophy of Religion. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/philosophy-religion
  • Williamson, T. (2004). Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement. Dialectica, 58(1), 109-153.
  • Williamson, T. (2007). Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
  • Zagzebski, L. (1994). The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174), 65-73.

Doğruluk Koşulu Bilginin Sarsılabilirlik Kuramları için Gereksiz midir?

Yıl 2018, Sayı: 2 - 2018, 17 - 34, 04.10.2018

Öz

Sarsılabilirlik kuramları makul bir bilgi tanımına ulaşabilmek için hatalı gerekçelendirmelere dayalı doğru inançları eleme stratejisini güder. Farklı felsefeciler kendilerine özgü sarsılabilirlik anlayışları geliştirmiştir. Sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmeler hiçbir zaman yanlış inançların dayanağı olmadığından Zagzebski (1994) katı sarsılabilirlik şartının inancın doğruluğu ile gerekçelendirilmesi arasındaki bağımsızlığı ortadan kaldırdığını ifade eder. Bunu takiben, Zagzebski ve yine benzer görüşleri savunan bazı felsefeciler (ör. Merricks, 1995) sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmenin zorunlu olarak doğruluğu beraberinde getirdiği sonucuna varır. Bu makalede, sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmelerin her zaman doğru inanca ulaşmaması durumuna örnek göstererek, doğruluk koşulunun lüzumsuz olmadığını iddia ediyorum. İddiama göre metafizik sorulara (örneğin: Tanrı var mıdır?) ilişkin inançlar sarsılmaz gerekçelendirmelere sahip olabilirler. Buna rağmen söz konusu gerekçelendirmeler destekledikleri inançlara doğruluk atfedemez.

Kaynakça

  • Bonjour, L. (1998). In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Everitt, N. (2004). The Non-Existence of God. London: Routledge.
  • Ezcurdia, M. (1998). The Concept-Conception Distinction. Philosophical Issues, 9, 187-192.
  • Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, 23(6), 121-123.
  • Hetherington, S. (n.d.). Gettier Problems. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (J. Fieser & B. Dowden, Eds.). Retrieved from https://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier
  • Higginbotham, J. (1998). Conceptual Competence. Philosophical Issues, 9, 149-162.
  • Klein, P. D. (1980). Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification. Philosophical Studies, 37(1), 81-89.
  • Klein, P. D. (1984). Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  • Lehrer, K. & Paxson, T. (1969). Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief. Journal of Philosophy 66(8), 225-237.
  • Lehrer, K. (1990). Theory of Knowledge. Boulder and Colorado: Westview Press.
  • Levy, S. R. (1977). Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(1), 115-123.
  • Merricks, T. (1995). Warrant Entails Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 841-855.
  • Nagel, J. (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass, 2(6), 792-819.
  • Pust, J. (2016). Intuition. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/intuition
  • Russell, B. (2017). A Priori Justification and Knowledge. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/apriori
  • Sudduth, M. (n.d.). Defeaters in Epistemology. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (J. Fieser & B. Dowden, Eds.). Retrieved from https://www.iep.utm.edu/ep-defea
  • Taliaferro, C. (2014). Philosophy of Religion. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/philosophy-religion
  • Williamson, T. (2004). Philosophical ‘Intuitions’ and Scepticism about Judgement. Dialectica, 58(1), 109-153.
  • Williamson, T. (2007). Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
  • Zagzebski, L. (1994). The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174), 65-73.
Toplam 20 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Uğur Aytaç Bu kişi benim 0000-0002-4773-5472

Yayımlanma Tarihi 4 Ekim 2018
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2018 Sayı: 2 - 2018

Kaynak Göster

APA Aytaç, U. (2018). Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi(2), 17-34.
AMA Aytaç U. Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?. KFD. Ekim 2018;(2):17-34.
Chicago Aytaç, Uğur. “Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, sy. 2 (Ekim 2018): 17-34.
EndNote Aytaç U (01 Ekim 2018) Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 2 17–34.
IEEE U. Aytaç, “Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?”, KFD, sy. 2, ss. 17–34, Ekim 2018.
ISNAD Aytaç, Uğur. “Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 2 (Ekim 2018), 17-34.
JAMA Aytaç U. Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?. KFD. 2018;:17–34.
MLA Aytaç, Uğur. “Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, sy. 2, 2018, ss. 17-34.
Vancouver Aytaç U. Is the Truth Condition Superfluous for Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge?. KFD. 2018(2):17-34.