THE NEW TERRORISM AND ANALYSIS OF THE PKK IN THE CONTEXT OF LEARNING TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

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Abstract

According to David Rapoport's Four Waves theory, "modern terrorism" is historically handled in four waves: "anarchist, anti-colonial, new left, and religious." However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, new terrorism advocates stated that a fifth wave had begun. Al-Qaeda and ISIS terrorist organizations are generally at the center of these discussions as actors in new terrorism. Although the PKK terrorist organization is in the third wave in Rapoport's classification of terrorist waves, it has sought to change its organizational style, goals, motives and motivation sources, action methods, and tactics according to time and environment, with the methods it has experienced and learned from al-Qaeda and ISIS. In this study, the PKK's search for change, which is called a learning terrorist organization, is analyzed on the basis of the arguments of new terrorism. The main question of the study is whether the PKK can be considered as an actor of new terrorism, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS terrorist organizations.

Yeni Terörizm ve Öğrenen Terör Örgütleri Bağlamında PKK'nın Analizi

Öz

David Rapoport'un terörizm çalışmalarında da önemli bir yeri olan Dört Dalga teorisine göre "modern terörizm" tarihsel açıdan "anarşist, sömürge karşıtı, yeni sol ve köktendinci" olmak üzere dört dalga halinde ele alınmaktadır. Ancak, 11 Eylül terör saldırılarından sonra yeni terörizm savunucuları beşinci bir dalganın başladığını ifade etmişlerdir. Bu tartışmaların odak noktasında ise yeni terörizmin aktörleri olarak El Kaide ve İŞİD terör örgütleri bulunmaktadır. PKK terör örgütü de Rapoport'un terör dalgaları sınıflandırmasında üçüncü dalga içerisinde yer almasına rağmen, El Kaide ile İŞİD'den tecrübe ettiği ve öğrendiği yöntemlerle birlikte örgütlenme biçimini, hedeflerini, motif ve motivasyon kaynaklarını, eylem yöntem ve taktiklerini, zamana ve ortama göre değiştirme

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arayışı içerisinde olmuştur. Bu çalışmada, öğrenen bir terör örgütü olarak adlandırılan PKK'nın söz konusu değişim arayışı, yeni terörizmin argümanları temelinde analiz edilmektedir. PKK'nın El Kaide ve İŞİD terör örgütleri gibi yeni terörizmin bir aktörü olarak değerlendirilip değerlendirilemeyeceği çalışmanın temel sorusunu oluşturmaktadır.

INTRODUCTION

Although the concept of new terrorism was coined in the literature in the 1990s, its use became widespread after the attacks on the United States of America (USA) by the terrorist organization al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the changing organizational structures, motives, tactics, and methods of terrorist organizations have begun to be conceptualized as new terrorism, based on the example of al-Qaeda.

The conceptualization of old and new terrorism is vigorously debated in the literature. Scholars who analyze recent terrorist acts through the concept of new terrorism often emphasize the change in the character of terrorism. On the other hand, the concept of new terrorism skeptics state that today's terrorism has not undergone a radical change and that the violence created by terrorism points to basic continuities with previous expressions.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, David Rapoport published an article in which he developed a research framework in the field of terrorism. This article includes a discussion of modern terrorism in a historical context and the historical evolution of violence. With his wave approach, Rapoport puts forward four waves of terrorism, which he categorizes as "anarchist wave, anti-colonial wave, new left wave, and religious wave". However, the new terrorism debate has brought with it a new debate about whether there is a possibility of a fifth wave.

Despite being included in the third wave, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorist organization sought to alter its organizational form, goals, motives and motivation sources, and action methods and tactics to respond to the changing environment and the impact of new terrorism. The PKK terrorist organization has been trying to transform itself from a hierarchical structure to a cell and network type structure, especially with the methods it

learned from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). At the same time, it is trying to transform into a structure in which it can process religious elements in addition to its ideological motivations and can use technological capabilities with suicide bombings in addition to its limited actions.

In this study, it is argued that terrorism has always been politically motivated and based on violence, but in the process, it has transformed into a new conflict mode. Based on this assumption, the main purpose of this study is to analyze the PKK's efforts to change its organizational style, organizational goals, motive and motivation sources, and action methods and tactics within the framework of terrorism's transforming structure. This study is a qualitative-based single-case analysis over time, and the analysis of PKK's change efforts is made in two parts.

The first part of this study is a comparative discussion of the concepts of new terrorism and old terrorism, with a focus on their general assumptions. In the second part, the PKK's efforts to change organization style, organizational goals, motive and motivation sources, and action methods and tactics are analyzed within the framework of the assumptions put forward by the new terrorism.

The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism and The New Terrorism Discussions

Rapoport, who has an important place in terrorism studies, claims that modern terrorism started in the late 19th century and has historically been divided into four waves. According to Rapoport, the changing structure of the international system gives terrorism a cyclical character in waves (Rapoport, 2016, p. 217). Rapoport defines four waves as a cycle that takes place over a period of approximately 40 years. Each cycle is dynamic in terms of expansion and contraction. Groups within a given wave adapt to the necessities of their time (Kaplan, 2016). Moreover, each organization has its own motivational sources, action tactics, and weapons, and there are also turning point events that lead to the emergence of the next terrorist wave. Although the transition to the next wave is generally seen as the end of the previous one, in some waves, some features of the previous wave may transform to adapt to the next wave (Biçer, 2020, p. 920).

The four waves revealed by Rapoport are the "anarchist wave (1880-1920)", "anti-colonial wave (1920-1960)", "new left wave (1960-1990)" and "religious wave (1979- …)" (Rapoport, 2004, p. 47). As the first wave, the anarchist wave emerged in the 1880s under the influence of the

movements spread by the French Revolution, and its effects lasted until the First World War. After the anarchist wave, the anti-colonial wave started in the 1920s with the effects of self-determination and nationalism. The second wave lasted until the 1960s. The new left-wing wave started in the 1960s in line with Marxist-Leninist ideology and lasted until the 1980s. The fourth wave is a religiously motivated and fundamentalist wave that emerged in 1979, especially with the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and is still there. The breaking point of the religious-motivated terror wave was the 9/11 attacks carried out by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization.

With the 9/11 attacks, old and new terrorism debates have undoubtedly become a central issue in international relations, and the question of old and new terrorism has been actively discussed in the security studies literature. This concept, which gained importance as a result of 9/11, was originally put forward in the 1990s and claimed that terrorism took on a different form with a new characteristic. In the security studies literature, there are many academic studies claiming that the nature and character of terrorism have transformed into a new form.

Al-Qaeda's cell-type organizational structure, its radical interpretation of the religion of Islam and its religious motivations, and also its actions and pattern of tactics based on suicide attacks have led to an intense debate over the fifth wave of terrorism. At this point, it should be noted that the debates on new terrorism occurred shortly before the 9/11 attacks and gained importance after the attacks (Burnett and Whyte, 2005, p. 2). It has now been proven that terrorism has acquired a new dimension with ISIS's field of action and pattern of tactics. With the 9/11 attacks, old and new terrorism debates have undoubtedly become a central issue in international relations, and the question of old and new terrorism has been actively discussed. New terrorism was originally put forward in the 1990s, and it was claimed that terrorism took on a different form with a new characteristic. The most common argument in these studies is that the organizational forms, motivations, aims, tactics, and actions of terrorist organizations have been transformed (Copeland, 2001; Lauquer, 2003; Burnett and Whyte, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Goertz and Streitparth, 2019). In other words, it has been recognized that the new terrorism has different motives, different actors, different sponsors, and more lethality than the old terrorism (Copeland, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004, p. 439-440; Crenshaw, 2008; Gofas, 2012).

The question that needs to be raised at this point is whether the form that terrorism has taken is really new since those who defend the opposite of this view claim that none of the elements put forward as the characteristics

of the new terrorism are completely new, that terrorist acts are continuous and that the elements mentioned as new are the result of the evolution of old terrorism (Tucker, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Spencer, 2006; Spencer, 2016).

In this study, four variables will be examined comparatively in order to explain the elements that make the new terrorism new. As shown in Table 1, these variables are organization style, organizational goals, motive and motivation sources, and action method and tactic.

	Old Terrorism	**New Terrorism**
Organization Style	Hierarchical Structure	Cell and Network Type Structure
Organizational Goals	Local	Regional and Global
Motive and Motivation Sources	Ideology	Religion and Political Authority
Action Method and Tactic	Selective and Limited Impact	Non-selective and High Impact

Table 1. Characteristics of Old and New Terrorism

New Terrorism and Organization Style

The modern terrorism discourse mainly focuses on two types of terrorist organization structures: hierarchical and network type (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010, p. 1045). Old terrorism has a command and control mechanism and an easily identifiable form of organization. There are also certain political, social and economic tools in this type of organizational structure (Hoffman, 1999, p. 8). In this organizational model, there is a strict hierarchical structure and stratification, and the effectiveness of the leading staff is quite high. (Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini, 1999: p. 40-41).

As new forms of terrorism emerge, al-Qaeda and ISIS have shifted from a vertical hierarchical structure to a horizontal and flexible network structure. In this system of cell-type structuring, terrorist organizations have a decentralized network structure that allows local units to take the initiative on actions (Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini, 1999, p. 48-51).

According to Tucker (2001, p.1-2), terrorist organizations are now willing to develop forms of network organization for the same reason as businesses. The information revolution reduces communication costs and allows the hierarchical structure that controls the functions of businesses to be pushed out of the system. For the same reason, organizations transform the pyramids of authority and control from a hierarchical structure to a flat organizational structure. These organizations are transformed into networks and divided into groups consisting of autonomous entities connected to each other for common purposes (Tucker, 2001, p.1-2).

For terrorist organizations, network organization is advantageous in terms of resistance to the disintegration of organizations. This organizational structure allows members of the organization to form cells without the need for face-to-face meetings (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010, p. 1045). This structure also increases the learning opportunities of organizations and makes them more flexible and adaptable. Thus, organizations can become more resilient because if one or more of their founding elements are destroyed, the others can continue. In summary, a network, unlike a hierarchical structure, becomes indestructible by neutralizing its leader (Tucker, 2001, p. 1-2). Since communication between cells is minimal in planning terrorist acts, this form of "leaderless terrorism" is more difficult for security forces to eradicate (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010, p. 1046). Al-Qaeda, for example, gradually changed its structure from a rigid hierarchical model to network structures, which resulted in a highly dispersed and multi-structured cellular design. From 1979 to 1989, the organization adhered to the principles of a hierarchical structure to ensure participation in the anti-Soviet war. Each unit was connected to the organization led by Osama bin Laden in a pyramid-like structure. This structure, following its success against the Soviet army in Afghanistan, has come to a point where it can carry out terrorist acts in the Western world and turn into a global terrorist organization. Al-Qaeda turned to network-type organization principles and restructured in line with this goal (Mishal and Rosenthal, 2006, p. 277-278; Gofas, 2012, p. 22).

The organizational transformation of al-Qaeda has also created an infrastructure for ISIS. This infrastructure has made ISIS one of the most complex networked terrorist organizations in terms of organizational structure and administrative effectiveness. The organization is divided into many cells that carry out terrorist acts in different parts of the world under the so-called "caliphate institution" and are connected to each other with common religious motives. The mentioned organizational transformation in terrorist organizations is also reflected in their organizational goals.

New Terrorism and Organizational Goals

The advocates of the new terrorism approach draw attention to the fact that while the actions of traditional terrorist organizations have a certain geographical orientation, current terrorist organizations carry out their activities on a global scale with the aim of changing the current world order (Gofas, 2012, p. 23). Old terrorism has a local character in terms of action areas. Both rural and urban areas are at the center of their terrorist actions. The new terrorism, on the other hand, aims to increase the effect of terrorist acts by choosing city centers with high social mobility as areas of action. At the same time, the actions of new terrorism are regional and global in nature, as their organizational goals are global rather than local. Unlike the old terrorism, the new terrorism does not pursue goals that can be pacified or compromised (Crenshaw, 2008, p. 122-123). The motivations of the new terrorism are religious fanaticism rather than a set of agreeable political demands (Gofas, 2012, p. 19). Crenshaw (2008, p. 123) expressed the purpose of new terrorist acts as "to enslave whole nations and intimidate the world."

Although in the new terrorism, terrorist organizations challenge the established dynamics of international law and society and exert their influence on a global scale, terrorist organizations still emerge and flourish in weak states. In these cases, terrorist organizations control certain parts of weak states and carry out their actions in order to create an alternative administration in those regions. For this purpose, they organize terrorist acts against both the weak state they aim to control and third-party states (Honig and Yahel, 2019, p. 1211).

The capabilities of terrorist organizations in the new terrorism differ from those of most terrorist organizations in history, as they aim to control territory and parts of a state. According to Honig and Yahel (2019, p. 1211), new terrorist organizations have hybrid structures with both conventional military capabilities as well as guerrilla and terrorist capacities. They also exhibit state-like behavior (Honig and Yahel, 2019, p. 1211). Practices such as the creation of police forces, education, justice, health, and social infrastructure can be mentioned in this context (Honig and Yahel, 2019, p. 1213). In previous waves, hit-and-run tactics were used to weaken the state's authority in rural or urban centers. The new terrorism, on the other hand, aims to create an alternative administration to the state authority by carrying out terrorist acts aimed at providing area control in city centers. Lia (2015, p.31) claims that the goals of such terrorist organizations are to become proto-states and such terrorist organizations share at least four different characteristics: being intensely committed, internationalist,

regionally expansive, and irredentist. These organizations have a way of denying nearly all aspects of the Westphalian world order, including the names and borders of existing states (Lia, 2015, p. 31). Such terrorist organizations, especially those with religious motives, have a long history in the Middle East and sometimes seriously challenge the existing regimes. The growth and spread of jihadist organizations became more evident after the Arab popular uprisings in 2011. The counter-revolution campaigns following these uprisings and the onset of civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen led to the growth and spread of such organizations (Lia, 2016, p. 3). In this context, the spread of ISIS and its cells both in the Middle East and in other regions shows that the jihadist proto-states are a serious new security problem (Svensson and Finnbogason, 2021, p. 573).

At this point, the following question arises: What are the differences between ISIS and other so-called old terrorist organizations in terms of organizational goals? First, ISIS aims at de facto statehood, which refers to a political authority operating within a region without international legal recognition. This occurs when a central government loses its monopoly of authority over a region and becomes unable to prevent the establishment of an alternative political institution in the region it claims sovereignty over. This reflects ISIS's tendency to seize cities by targeting countries and its effort to establish a state in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq. Second, it refers to transnational terrorism, which poses a serious threat to peace and stability at regional and global levels. The establishment of a de facto state is often locally motivated and results from the ethnic, religious, or ideological division of a particular society (Özpek and Yağış, 2019, p. 23-24). However, ISIS has changed this thought with its global actions and regional area control within the borders of more than one state.

Although ISIS is a terrorist organization operating globally and trying to influence as many states as possible in the "Islamic world", it aims to establish a de facto state in the Middle East, especially Syria and Iraq (Goertz and Streitparth, 2019, p. 119). Changing regional dynamics such as the Arab Spring, which created a power vacuum in Syria and disappointed Sunni Arab tribes due to the increasing authoritarianism of the Iraqi government under Nuri al-Maliki, allowed ISIS to control the weakened regions and authorities (Özpek and Yağış, 2019, p. 27).

New Terrorism and Motive and Motivation Sources

The new terrorism is characterized by perpetrators with fundamentalist elements. In addition, religion is also used as a dominant motivation for terrorist acts. Based on the old terrorism classification,

terrorist organizations in this category mostly adopted the extreme left or right ideological division. Old terrorism is also based on ideological foundations of self-determination or political/regional autonomy. At this point, it should be noted that although there are organizations that still exist on the basis of ideological motivation, the effectiveness of these organizations has decreased relatively (Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini, 1999, p. 42). The predominantly secular ideological motivations of the old terrorist organizations are no longer the primary sources of motivation for carrying out terrorist acts (Hoffman, 2006, p. 89). In sum, terrorist acts are now perceived as a "sacred duty" under the influence of religion rather than a goal for terrorists.

According to Goertz and Streitparth (2019, p. 10), terrorist organizations are trying to create a new world order through religious motivations. This process has been described as "cosmic warfare" that triumphed over chaos. Cosmic warfare focuses on the metaphysical conflict between "good and evil" and "us against them", and terrorist organizations derive moral justification for violence from these dilemmas through religion (Goertz and Streitparth, 2019, p. 10). This argument, when combined with terrorist organizations' aims to destroy the existing world system, also provides the basis for large-scale terrorist acts aimed at mass casualties (Hoffman, 2006, p. 89).

Religiously motivated terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, unlike ideologically motivated terrorist organizations, do not hesitate to carry out attacks that may cause mass deaths, as they only care about a small, selected circle and are not restricted by the fear that extreme violence will disturb some voters (Tucker, 2001, p. 2-3). In this context, the target of terrorist organizations to cause more mass casualties has also been reflected in the methods of terrorist acts.

New Terrorism and Action Method and Tactic

The change in strategy towards the method, target, and tactic of terrorist acts is also among the elements that make the new terrorism new. Old terrorism is especially selective in its target choice and resorts to the use of proportional violence. In this type of terrorism, rather than indiscriminate use of violence, mostly military personnel, law enforcement officers, high-level representatives of a state, or certain segments of society are targeted because old terrorism aims to broadcast messages that attract the attention of the public rather than a terrorist act inflicting high casualties (Simon and

Benjamin, 2000, p. 59-75; Roy, Hoffman, Paz, Simon and Benjamin, 2000, p. 156-172). As emphasized by Prunckun (2012, p. 178), old terrorism uses the doctrine of "kill one, frighten ten thousand" in terms of its method and tactics. The weapons used in each terrorist wave have changed and developed in direct proportion to technological developments. Old terrorism does not aim to gain access to weapons of mass destruction and is bound by strategic and political considerations (Field, 2009, p. 200).

With the increase in proxy warfare, new terrorist groups can easily find sponsors, and with the effect of globalization, they can easily access new technological tools, bombs, explosives, and weapons at a low cost. For this reason, these groups have had the opportunity to carry out attacks with high destructive power. Moreover, the loss of many lives is a result of the technology paradox. Today, many terrorist organizations, especially ISIS, can easily access all kinds of tools and equipment, including advanced conventional weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, and show the ability to use them. This allowed terrorist organizations to more easily combine conventional military capabilities with guerrilla capabilities and has led to the transformation of action methods and tactics.

In line with the technology paradox, the most important distinguishing feature of new terrorism is that it carries out its actions indiscriminately. Unlike old terrorism, there is no target selectivity in new terrorism. In a nutshell, what is new about new terrorism is the deliberately indiscriminate nature of terrorist attacks, given the large number of professional or amateurish, successful or unsuccessful attempts to detonate bombs among civilian targets and kill as many civilians as possible. Now the aim is not just to make armed propaganda through actions but to carry out great destruction. New terrorism is both deadlier and unpredictable because it is non-selective (Lauquer, 2003, p. 9; Kurtuluş, 2011, p. 485-486). Contrary to old terrorism, these groups "want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead" (Simon and Benjamin, 2000, p. 71).

Terrorist organizations are increasingly attracted to the lure of suicide attacks because of their unique tactical advantages over traditional acts of terrorism in killing large numbers of civilians. Suicide acts, whether with a suicide bombing, drone, or other vehicle, tend to be more destructive and deadly, as well as less costly and often easier to implement than other tactics of action since there is no need for an escape plan, and if the attack is successful, there is no attacker to be caught or questioned. Also, given the overwhelming impact of brutality and bloodshed, media coverage of suicide-based terrorism is almost certain. In this context, suicide acts are a particularly powerful psychological weapon. Therefore, the terrorists'

decision to use this tactic is neither irrational nor out of desperation, as is sometimes portrayed. Rather, it is a purely rational and calculated choice consciously adopted (Hoffman, 2006, p. 132-133).

Although there are many examples of suicide attacks in the historical process, after the Second World War, such acts increased quantitatively and qualitatively and transformed from a military method to an action method used by terrorist organizations. In this context, Hezbollah's attack against the American Embassy and Naval Forces in Lebanon in 1983 introduced the public to suicide acts. Suicide acts increased, especially after 9/11, with the effect of technology. The frequent use of such acts by al-Qaeda and then by ISIS has caused suicide acts to become almost a phenomenon among terrorist organizations (Yeşiltaş, 2016).

As a result, primarily al-Qaeda and then ISIS were seen as important examples of new terrorism due to the impact of the 9/11 attacks. Although, the PKK terrorist organization has different motives and motivations than al-Qaeda and ISIS, it has started to set an important example of new terrorism with the skills it learned and gained from al-Qaeda and ISIS. At this point, the first question to be answered is "why terrorist organizations need learning and change." In the next section, this question will be answered.

PKK in the Context of New Terrorism and Learning Terrorist Organizations

Attempts to define organizational learning have generally focused on how it occurs rather than what it is. At the same time, scholars do not agree on how organizational learning takes place. For instance, there is some disagreement as to what conditions should occur in order to detect that learning has taken place, in particular whether the process should be intentional as well as the knowledge gained should be relevant to the actions and goals of the organization concerned. When defining organizational learning, organizations need to focus on their learning capabilities, especially in changing or uncertain environments. According to Trujillo and Jackson (2005, p. 181), who emphasized that organizational learning is a process, organizational learning is "a process through which members of a group acquire new knowledge or technological capabilities that can improve strategic decision-making, tactical planning or design and operational activities". Levitt and March (1988, p. 319), on the other hand, defined organizational learning as "routine-based, history-dependent, and target-oriented." They claim that organizations learn by transforming their own

experiences as well as the experiences of others into routines that guide behavior (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 319). Dibella and Nevis (1996, p. 363) also define organizational learning by emphasizing the impact of experience on organizational learning. According to their definition, organizational learning is the capacity to develop or maintain performance based on experience.

Today, terrorist organizations have become organized structures that experience learning processes, and they regard these processes as necessary for the continuation of their existence. Terrorist organizations are faced with both the needs of the group and the challenges of the external environment. Although they continue to use existing tactics, they aim to both increase the effects of their operations and cope with complex situations with the new operational skills and tactics they have acquired (Bell, 1998, p. 183). Organizational learning in a terrorist organization is the acquisition of new knowledge or technological capabilities that the group will use to make better strategic decisions, plan and design tactics more skillfully, increase morale and confidence, and conduct more "successful" operations. In short, learning is the change to improve the performance of a group (Jackson et al., 2005, p. 2). Based on this definition, one can argue that the learning ability of terrorist organizations affects the following variables: organizational forms; areas of action; motives and motivation sources; action methods and tactics.

A terrorist organization establishes a relationship between past experiences, current activities, and future plans in the organizational learning process and aims to achieve maximum benefit for itself in this process. If a terrorist group learns particularly "well" in this process, it can both act systematically, strengthen its capabilities, and determine its strategy and tactics accordingly. In this context, with organizational learning, a terrorist organization can develop and use new weapons and tactics; increase its skills in the use of existing weapons and tactics; collect and use intelligence information; and maintain the capabilities it has developed despite the organization's losses, depending on the organization's ability and level (Jackson, 2005 et al. ix). However, terrorist organizations cannot automatically or immediately gain the ability to use learned skills or perform certain types of actions. Capabilities are created through a process. Terrorist organizations collect information while designing their actions, choosing their targets, and using new technological tools, and they complete the learning process by integrating this information with their past experiences (Jackson, 2004, p. 2). In sum, terrorist organizations have to adapt to the innovations and changes taking place in their environment and develop their skills in order to ensure their continuity (Demir, 2008, p. 58).

One of the most basic elements that ensure the continuity of a terrorist organization is the surprise nature of its actions. This can be achieved through space, time, and/or technological development. When terrorist organizations cannot achieve this development, they may go extinct. For this reason, they have to change in order to reach their goals and learn to gain talent (Demir, 2008, p. 63).

The technological sophistication and tactical expertise of a terrorist organization largely determine the lethality, scale and effectiveness of the organization's actions. For example, a particular bomb can be planted in many different places by an organization targeting a single building. Depending on the types of tactics, engineering, intelligence, and other information available to the group, the same bombing could range from a mere limited action to an extremely deadly terrorist attack. Technology adoption is the organizational learning process in which groups learn and acquire techniques that may be useful to them, integrate them into group operations, and adequately train or experiment with their staff to use them well (Jackson, 2004, p. 8-9). As a result, terrorist organizations are making an effort to adopt new methods and tactics to develop existing action methods, and they prefer to interact with or communicate with other organizations in the learning process.

The PKK, which is the main subject of the study, also enters the learning process to adapt to the requirements of new terrorism and interacts with terrorist organizations, especially al-Qaeda and ISIS, even though they have different sources of motivation. In the next section, this interaction will be examined under the headings of organization style, organizational goals, motive and motivation sources, and action method and tactics, which are the variables of the new terrorism.

PKK's Organizational Style

Founded by Abdullah Öcalan at a meeting that took place in Fis village of Lice in Diyarbakır in 1978, the PKK defined its mission as making a "communist revolution" and establishing a "separate Kurdish state" through armed struggle (guerrilla warfare) (Başbuğ, 2011, p. 17). The PKK did not have enough weapons, personnel, and sources to finance its activities; it turned to robbery and drug smuggling. However, since almost all left-wing terrorist organizations used the same methods, the PKK could not be noticed by the authorities as a separate group. On the eve of the

September 12, 1980, military coup, the PKK left Turkey to complete the necessary organization in the Syrian-controlled Beqaa valley due to the increase in ideological conflicts and the martial law in effect in the eastern and southeastern provinces (Criss, 1995, p. 18-19).

Having completed its organizing process in Beqaa, Öcalan announced the establishment of the organization with the Eruh and Semdinli attacks in 1984, when it carried out the attack with the Liberation Units of Kurdistan (HRK), the armed wing of the PKK. As of 1985, it established the Kurdistan National Liberation Movement (ERNK), the political arm of the PKK, in order to transform into a more organized structure. ERNK has been tasked with carrying out activities such as collective activities, press conferences, raids, recruitment of personnel, training, logistical support, creating financial resources, and providing international connections, especially in Europe (Özdağ, 2005, p. 38). However, ERNK and HRK could not achieve the desired effect in the beginning, as they lacked public support with their "hit-and-run missions". HRK was dissolved in 1986 and replaced by the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK) (Criss, 1995, p. 19-20). This new structure started to carry out terrorist acts such as ambushes, bomb attacks, armed attacks, sabotage, raids, road blockades, and kidnapping (İşeri, 2008). In the following period, the PKK increased its terrorist activities on Turkish territory and has been continuing these actions against Turkey for 38 years.

In these 38 years, the PKK has undergone an important but not yet understood transformation in terms of organizational structure. Like Marxist-Leninist terrorist organizations in general, the PKK tries to position itself as a party. The PKK has a hierarchical organizational structure, and Öcalan is at the top of this hierarchy. Subordinate to Öcalan are the presidential council, the central committee, and the central disciplinary committee (Bacik and Coşkun, 2011, p. 251). In this respect, it can be said that the PKK has a command and control mechanism dependent on the leader and an easily identifiable organizational form. There is also a strict hierarchical structure and stratification in the PKK's organizational model. It can also be stated that the effectiveness of the leadership cadres in this structure is quite high. Although Öcalan's leadership influence and the structure of the organization have continued after Öcalan's capture in 1999, the PKK has been making an effort to become a more institutional structure by undergoing a transformation in terms of its administrative and decision-making mechanisms. It can be proposed that the basis of this effort is both the aim of preventing the disintegration of the organization after Öcalan's capture and the intra-organizational leadership struggle after Öcalan.

Within the framework of this transformation and struggle, the PKK first transformed its armed wing, ARGK, into the People's Defense Forces (HPG) in 2000. Subsequently, it tried to reorganize under the name of the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in 2002 and the Kurdistan People's Congress (KONGRA-GEL) in 2003. In 2005, the functions of these organizations started to change, and these organizations were also restructured (White, 2016, p. 9-11; Özeren, Sever, Yılmaz and Sözer, 2014, p. 327).

It is observed that the PKK is trying to become an umbrella organization like al-Qaeda and ISIS due to the branches it has within itself and the ties between these branches. Moreover, although the PKK is a vertically hierarchical organization that is characteristic of old terrorism, it has begun to show the characteristics of an organization with a horizontal and flexible network structure. In this context, the PKK is trying to adapt to the cell-type structure, which is seen as the distinguishing feature of the new terrorism, as well as the organizational structure that allows its local units to take the initiative over the actions. The PKK seeks such a change, as cell and network-type organizations are advantageous in terms of resistance to the disintegration of organizations.

The decisions taken at the PKK's 8th Congress (the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress- KADEK 1st Congress), held on April 20-24, 2002, are important in terms of these transformation efforts. In the congress, decisions were taken to establish new organizations in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, especially in Turkey, in order to increase the effectiveness of the organization again. After the decisions taken in the congress, the PKK established the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in 2003 to establish an autonomous structure in Syria (T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2017, p. 11).

In 2005, the PKK in Turkey, the PYD in Syria, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) in Iran and the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK) in Iraq were combined under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and entered the institutionalization process (Soner, Aslan and Kıyıcı, 2017, p. 7). The KCK is an "umbrella" organization established to facilitate the creation of an alternative state system, of which the PKK is also a part (Özeren, et al., 2014, p. 327). In the KCK Agreement, the purpose of these new organizations is stated as being able to establish a "Democratic Confederal Kurdistan" in the relevant countries (T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2017, p. 11). When the terrorist organization took on this new guise, it not only changed its name, but also restructured its propaganda and organizational methods (Özeren, et al., 2014, p. 327).

The PYD should also be mentioned separately, as it significantly affected the PKK's transformation process in the context of learning organizations in the restructuring process. As a result of Turkey's coercive diplomacy, the effectiveness of PKK networks decreased in the region after the Assad regime drove Öcalan out of Syria in 1998. The support of Syrian Kurds for the PKK decreased at the end of the 1990s. The PKK established the PYD in 2003 in order to revive local support in Syria through the remnants of the organization and to remove Assad's pressure on the PKK. After 2003, the PKK continued its activities in Syria through the PYD and established new networks in Syria for recruiting, training, financial support, and smuggling (Self and Ferris, 2017, p. 19).

The developments in Syria after the Arab Spring as well as the authority vacuum caused by the civil wars afterwards provided a wide range of action for the PKK and its Syrian branch, the PYD. They established the People's Defense Units (YPG), the armed wing of the PYD, to carry out their actions (T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2017, p. 9).

The onset of a civil war in Syria and the increased effectiveness of ISIS caused the PYD to be perceived as the representative of the Kurds in the northeastern provinces of Syria as well as a structure that took on the task of protecting them. As a result of this, the YPG has become an actor used by the USA to fight ISIS. Although the fight against ISIS is brought to fore in the public opinion, the main goal of the PYD is to establish an autonomous Kurdish region in line with the PKK's plan. Arrangements for electing an 82- member popular assembly to enact the autonomous region policy in Afrin, Ayn al-Arab (Kobani) and Hasakah are a result of this goal (Lawson, 2016, p. 484-485). In addition, the PYD/YPG terrorist organization tried to create "autonomous cantons" within the scope of the "democratic autonomy" approach, which is the main target of the PKK, by building "legislative, executive, and judicial" powers in these regions it seized (Kerman and Efegil, 2017, p. 163-164).

The YPG's taking control of the regions in northern Syria under the name of fighting ISIS was an important step towards achieving its goal of creating an autonomous structure. However, the most important effect is the YPG's application of what it learned or experienced from ISIS in its fight against Turkey under the PKK umbrella. This situation was also reflected in the organizational structure of the PKK. The PKK, like ISIS, began to take the initiative in its cells without being tied to the hierarchical level, in terms of action planning and realization. The PKK attracted attention with its strict hierarchical structure in the 1990s, and this situation points to a new organizational structure. The PKK recruited the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons

(TAK) in 2004, the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) in 2013, the Civil Defense Units (YPS) in 2015, and the Civil Defense Units (YPS) in 2020 to put into practice the terrorist acts in the cities, which it calls "urban guerrilla methods". These branches started using the Children of Fire Initiative. The common point among these structures is that they are affiliated with the PKK through their local cells.

With this new strategy that was put into practice after 2015, the PKK started to have the YDG-H take the city actions and generally kept its own militants in the background (Yeşiltaş and Özçelik, 2016, p. 8; Blaser and Stein, 2016). YDG-H is composed of radical youth and the main goal here is to normalize terrorism and turn its subjects into youth. According to Yeşiltaş and Özçelik (2016, p. 8-9), this situation brought about a significant change in the character of terrorism. Accordingly, "the most important feature of the new character of PKK terrorism, besides city warfare, is that it forces the society to radicalization in which armed violence can be used" (Yeşiltaş and Özçelik, 2016, p. 14). In addition, this structure's bond with the KCK, which is the umbrella structure, is more important than its organic bond with the PKK's armed wing. In this context, it can be stated that local cells are directed by "KCK neighborhood assemblies and local organizations" (Yeşiltaş and Özçelik, 2016, p. 14).

PKK's Organizational Goals

Historically, the PKK has targeted terrorist acts in both rural and urban centers, but mostly in rural areas, and has mainly used "rural guerrilla warfare" tactics since its establishment (Konaev and Kadercan, 2018). However, the terrorist organization started to adopt the tactics of "urban guerrilla warfare based on the countryside" by shifting its actions mainly to the city centers over time (Yeşiltaş, Düz, Öncel, and Öztürk, 2016, p. 6).

There are differences between the objectives of "urban guerrilla warfare" and "rural guerrilla warfare". In rural guerrilla warfare, military outposts and convoys in remote rural areas are targeted. In urban guerrilla warfare, on the other hand, government buildings, military facilities, police stations, police patrols, school buildings, and public facilities are targeted in city centers. In this context, by linking rural guerrilla and urban guerrilla warfare tactics, the PKK aimed to transform its one-way influence on the people into a two-way relationship with popular support (Yeşiltaş and Özçelik, 2016, p. 11-13). The PKK's efforts to spread its actions to the city centers, especially with the experience of the PYD in Syria, have also been a result of this goal (Dal and Kurşun, 2021, p. 373).

The PYD/YPG's fight against ISIS in Ayn al-Arab directly or indirectly encouraged the PKK to start a similar "urban guerrilla war" in cities where Kurds are densely populated in Turkey. In various cities, especially Diyarbakır, Cizre, and Silopi, barricades were built on the roads and ditches were dug. The PKK planned to create the so-called "autonomy" (Leezenberg, 2016, p. 683-684). According to Leezenberg (2016, p. 683-684), it was probably not a coincidence that the ditches were dense in cities relatively close to the Syrian border, and especially in cities close to Ayn al-Arab. The geographical proximity indicates a high degree of coordination between the PYD and the PKK in these actions.

According to Aydın (2021, p. 51), the PKK shifted its elements to the PYD with the onset of the civil war in Syria and aimed to test its experiences in Syria in the city centers under the YDG-H elements in 2015. The terrorist organization carried out activities through the YDG-H including identity control, so-called public order, and trial, in order to both spread violence to cities and make it accepted that it is an "alternative authority". In addition, it set up barricades in city centers, prepared hand-made explosive devices (IED), and confiscated citizens' homes and businesses. In addition, it tried to render public services inoperable by burning health centers, hospitals, schools, places of worship, and other public buildings (Aydın, 2021, p. 51). There are other tactics that the PKK learned from ISIS through the PYD in the "urban guerrilla warfare" strategy. Some of these tactics include setting up booby traps in buildings, hanging sheets and curtains to deter snipers and aerial reconnaissance, and drilling holes in home walls to provide safe passage between buildings. It has also tried to hide and go unnoticed in underground tunnels and underground sewer systems to ambush and attack less mobile security forces, as Hamas did in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, it placed snipers on the roofs, on the upper floors of the buildings and in the trenches (Konaev and Kadercan, 2018). For example, YPS' terrorist code-named Xebat, who gave an interview to the French newspaper Le Monde in front of the barricades in the Nusaybin district of Mardin, said that he came to Turkey after fighting in Ayn al-Arab and stated that "they had experienced tactics such as tunnels, barricades, bombs, and traps in Ayn al-Arab, learned about the city war in Rojava and used what they learned in Ayn al-Arab here (Bozarslan, 2016).

The main goal of this strategy is to impose its authority on the local people, in line with the PKK's aim of declaring so-called autonomy in cities.

Just as the PYD tried to do in Syria and ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the PKK aims to gain area control in certain regions by using violence as a tool, to act as a state authority in these regions, and to perform most of the public services themselves. Since its establishment, the PKK has tried to achieve this aim by establishing so-called courts, conducting identity checks, or attempting to seize public buildings. However, the fact that it spreads the conflicts in the city centers to the extent that people could be directly affected or involved differs from its goals in other periods.

In summary, it can be argued that the PKK, as an example of old terrorism, has a local character in terms of its areas of action and continues to choose both rural and urban areas as its focus. On the other hand, there are elements that show that the PKK aims to increase the impact of its actions at the regional level. The first of these is that it prefers city centers where social mobility is high and where it can influence and gather support, as areas of action. The other is to act with the PYD, which is its extension in Syria.

PKK's Motive and Motivation Sources

Being one of the most important examples of the third wave of new left terrorism, the PKK, with its Marxist and Leninist ideology, has centered ethnic nationalist and separatist discourses (Seren, 2019; Avcı, 2019, p. 145).

The ideological motive and organizational structure of the PKK were created by being influenced by the student movements at the time it was founded. It is stated that Öcalan was particularly influenced by Mahir Çayan (Başbuğ, 2011, p. 20). Although these preferences overlap with the cyclical conditions at the time the PKK was founded, there is a general belief that Öcalan put his ideas into practice as a result of being influenced by Mahir Çayan while founding the PKK (Bila, 2004, p. 29-30). Mahir Çayan adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology based on the labor-capital contradiction and accepted armed action as the only way to resort. According to Çayan, revolution is not possible without armed actions and armed propaganda, and it is necessary to establish a party in order to achieve the goals (Başbuğ, 2011, p. 20). As an alternative to the labor-capital conflict put forward by Çayan, Öcalan put forward Kurdishism, that is ethnicity, which he describes as a national problem or national contradiction (Bila, 2004, p. 31).

The terrorist organization drew on an intellectual framework to provide legitimacy for the reasons for its terrorist acts under the names of Marxism and Kurdishism (Demirel, 2003, p. 281). In this context, the ideologically motivated terrorist organization has adopted the strategy of "guerrilla warfare" since its establishment and has the goal of establishing an independent "Kurdish state" in the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey (Sarı, 2019, p. 108; Karadağ and Sıkı, 2021, p. 347).

The terrorist acts of the PKK cover two main periods: the period between 1978-1999 and the period after the capture of Öcalan after 1999. The first period is called the "long-term people's war strategy" period, and the second period is called the "legitimate defense strategy" period by the terrorist organization. Also, both periods have different strategies and sources of motivation to influence their audiences (Aydın, 2021, p. 49).

In its first period, the PKK focused on armed propaganda and aimed to intimidate its mass through violence. It has taken actions that will force the masses to obey by creating an atmosphere of fear, including attacking villages and killing civilians and public servants. The PKK tried to do this with a three-stage strategy called "strategic defense, strategic balance, and strategic attack". Strategic defense is the stage in which the state authority continues to dominate and the terrorist organization is on the defensive by taking advantage of "confidentiality, flexibility and mobility". At this stage, the terrorist organization aims to reach the point where it can fight the state by staging actions against its critical systems. When the terrorist organization reaches this point, the second stage, the strategic balance stage, comes into play. Strategic balance is the state of balancing with the state by involving the target public in the armed struggle with intense terrorist acts as well as by carrying out actions such as general strike, boycott, and occupation at a higher level. The third and final stage, the strategic attack, is the stage when the terrorist organization neutralizes all security forces in the countryside and in the city. In this framework, the PKK has never passed the strategic defense stage and reached the next level, even though it has made various attempts (Demirel, 2003, p. 288-289).

In its "legitimate defense strategy", the PKK gave prominence to the use of human rights and democratic political struggle discourses. This strategy includes popular actions, mass petitions, meetings, sit-ins, protests, boycotts, strikes, rallies, marches, demonstrations, occupations as well as many types of actions from conflict to armed and unarmed insurrections (Aydın, 2021, p. 49-50). In this context, the PKK has started to carry out its actions based on ethnic and cultural differences and has claimed that there is a deep ethnic discrimination and difference in Turkey and has tried to use

this claim in its propaganda elements (Başbuğ, 2011, p. 22). "Democratic confederalism" lies at the heart of this strategy. Öcalan put forward this ideology by being inspired by Murray Bookchin, who works on the ecological movement. In this regard, it has been claimed that the PKK, under the umbrella of the KCK, has abandoned its terror tactics for the "Marxist and Leninist revolution" by referring to "Bookchin's communalism" and will implement a largely non-violent strategy aimed at greater regional autonomy.

"Bookchin's communalism", which the PKK references, is against the state and hierarchical state structures. It also advocates a policy where the people can participate in direct democracy in the dimension of municipalities, neighborhoods, and towns, which Bookchin calls "libertarian municipalism" for "self-governance" (Bookchin, 1996, p. 301). In line with this idea, the PKK has determined a confederate strategy of struggle that includes all Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The PKK aimed to unite the Kurds in the region under a single social, political, judicial and cultural administration in a non-hierarchical "democratic autonomy" structure based on the KCK Convention, which it put forward in 2005 (Soner, Aslan and Kıyıcı, 2017, p. 12). As a result, despite the claims that the PKK has undergone an ideological transformation from Marxist and Leninist ideologies with the ideas of "democratic confederalism" or "democratic autonomy", the main goal of both strategies is to break the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey from the control of the state by influencing the masses.

The motives and motivations of the PKK are based on the ideological foundations of the old terrorism of "self-determination or political/regional autonomy". Although the PKK is not characterized by perpetrators containing fundamentalist elements, as in the new terrorism, it has sometimes preferred to use religion as a source of motivation, "despite its secular ideological motivations". Despite having a Marxist and Leninist ideology, the PKK tried to use Islam in the 2000s. It has been inspired by terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and ISIS to influence religious Kurdish masses (Avcı, 2019, p. 151). The main reason why the PKK wants to use religious motifs is that Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and ISIS target the same audience in Turkey, in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, despite their ideological and purpose differences with the PKK (Övet, Hewitt and Abbas, 2022, p. 1).

The existence of such a competition is also clearly seen in a message released by Öcalan in 2013. In his message, Öcalan called for a "Democratic Islam Congress" to convene in Diyarbakır against groups that

betray Islam, such as al-Qaeda and al-Nusra" (BBC, 2013). After Öcalan's call, the so-called congress was held in Diyarbakır in 2014. At the meeting, which started with the recitation of the Qur'an, Öcalan stated in his message that "there is a constant need for a new Islamic institution in Kurdistan, as in the rest of Islamic lands" (BBC, 2014). Both statements made by Öcalan are important examples of the PKK's use of religion as a propaganda tool to influence the masses.

PKK's Action Method and Tactic

In addition to its armed actions against public-related targets such as military bases, government buildings, security forces personnel, village guards, and teachers, the PKK also intensely targets civilians with suicide acts. A suicide terrorist act (bomb vehicle, suicide vest, kamikaze planes, etc.) is a method frequently used by terrorist organizations with religious motives in the fourth wave and differs from other armed actions in terms of the type of action, as both the target and the suicide bomber die during the action. As mentioned above, the PKK is a Marxist and Leninist terrorist organization and it does not have religious motivations. At this point, it can be stated that religious motivation or belief in life after death and heaven is not essential to suicide acts. The motivation of the PKK in the suicide actions is "to save the ethnic identity from so-called state violence and to deter society and the state from fighting in the state-organization conflict" (Yeşiltaş, 2016). As Sarı and Tınas (2018, p. 16) point out, decisions regarding suicide attacks were taken at the fourth conference of the PKK held in May 1996. Accordingly, it was conveyed to the members of the terrorist organization that a decision was made to "send suicide squads with the approval of the central headquarters of each state and to carry out preparation and infrastructure works" (Sarı and Tınas, 2018, p. 16).

After this decision, it was observed that the PKK started to organize suicide attacks in Turkey and security forces were mostly targeted in these attacks. The first suicide attack of the PKK was carried out on June 30, 1996, when PKK female suicide bomber Zeynep Kınacı, detonated the explosives on her against the military unit present for a flag-raising ceremony in Tunceli, leaving 8 soldiers killed and 29 wounded. In the period from the first suicide attack to 1999, a total of 22 suicide attacks were carried out by the terrorist organization against the security forces and public personnel. The terrorist group aimed for maximum effect in its actions, and therefore civilian casualties were often incurred. During the period when the organization started to transform and become active again,

civilians were directly targeted in suicide attacks (Yeşiltaş, 2016). Among these actions, the suicide action carried out by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), a group linked to the PKK, on May 22, 2007, in the Anafartalar Bazaar in Ankara's Ulus district is an important turning point. This action caused the deaths of nine people and the injuries of more than 110 others. This suicide action is similar to the suicide actions after September 11, 2001, in which al-Qaeda directly targeted civilians with highly destructive bombs. It can be stated that the PKK was basically inspired by al-Qaeda.

Another type of suicide attack is a car bomb attack. With the US invasion of Iraq and the civil war in Syria, the use of bombed cars in terrorist acts has increased rapidly. After al-Qaeda's car bomb attacks in Turkey, the PKK also started to carry out such actions. The first known act of this kind by the PKK was carried out by the TAK on September 20, 2011, when a car loaded with explosives exploded on Kızılay Kumrular Street in Ankara. Considering the psychological impact, loss of life, damage and form of the explosion, the terrorist organization "achieved" its strategic terror target with this terrorist attack (Özçelik, 2016, p. 8-9). Between August 2, 2015 and August 25, 2016, the PKK carried out 11 suicide attacks with bomb-laden cars in Turkey. This is important in terms of showing that although al-Qaeda and ISIS have come to the fore in car bomb attacks, the PKK is also a terrorist organization that uses this type of suicide attack intensively (Sarı and Tınas, 2018, p. 17).

As a result, the PKK's strategy change in terms of methods, targets, and tactics in terrorist acts is among the elements that make the new terrorism new. In this respect, rather than acting selectively in target choice, the PKK carries out its actions without discrimination among its targets. It can be stated that the PKK is increasingly attracted to the lure of suicide attacks due to their unique tactical advantages compared to traditional terrorist acts.

Another issue related to acts of suicide is the advantage that technology provides terrorist organizations. First, the terrorist acts that ISIS tried to organize with drones in Syria and then the signs that the PKK tried to use these methods are important (Kasapoğlu and Kırdemir, 2019, p. 1-3). As Kasapoğlu and Kırdemir (2019, p. 3) state, "rotary-wing drones called quadcopters or 4-motor multicopter were used in terrorist acts that started in 2016, while fixed-wing, glider type hull platforms have been used recently." The drone attacks on the 8th Main Jet Command in Diyarbakır on May 19, 2021 and on the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Base Command, also known as the SİHA base in Batman on May 21, 2021, and the 23rd Infantry

Division Command in Şırnak can be mentioned as important examples of this situation (TRT Haber, 2021).

With the development of technology, the weapons used in all terror waves have also changed and improved. Today, like ISIS, the PKK can easily reach all kinds of tools and equipment, from advanced conventional weapons to unmanned aerial vehicles, and demonstrate the ability to use them. This situation allowed the PKK to more easily combine conventional capabilities with guerrilla capabilities. This has led to more destructive actions and tactics.

CONCLUSION

In order to develop an effective strategy in the fight against terrorism, it is crucial to analyze the development of terrorist organizations first. In the fight against terrorism, it is important to reveal the transformation of a terrorist organization and the factors affecting this transformation through its organizational style, organizational goals, motivation and motivation sources, and action methods and tactics, in terms of predicting the threats that the terrorist organization may pose. Especially the new form of terrorism after 9/11 and the fact that terrorist organizations interact more intensely by entering an organizational learning process in order to be more effective make it more necessary to study and analyze the transformations of terrorist organizations in the fight against terrorism. For this purpose, in this study, the transformation of the PKK is discussed. In the study, the concept of new terrorism and its general assumptions were put forward, and the PKK's organization style, organizational goals, motive and motivation sources, and action methods and tactics were discussed in detail on the basis of the assumptions put forward by the new terrorism. al-Qaeda and ISIS are generally the focus of new terrorism discussions. However, it can be argued that the PKK terrorist organization has started to form one of the most important examples of the new terrorism with the influence of the new terrorism and the elements it has experienced and learned from al-Qaeda and ISIS.

The first significant transformation effort of the PKK, evaluated within the framework of the new terrorism, was experienced in its organizational structure. At this point, it is observed that the PKK, due to the branches it has within itself and the ties between these branches, is trying to become an umbrella organization like al-Qaeda and ISIS through the KCK. Although the PKK is a hierarchical organization, it has begun to show the characteristics of a network-type organization.

In terms of organizational goals, the PKK started to use the elements of TAK, YDG-H, YPS, and the Children of Fire Initiative to increase terrorist acts in cities, which they call "urban guerrilla methods". Although the PKK wants to present these elements as independent from the "people", the common point of these structures is that they are affiliated with the PKK through their local cells. Those cells tried to bring the methods they had experienced and learned against ISIS under the umbrella of the PYD/YPG in Syria to the city centers in Turkey. Barricades and ditches were set up on the roads in various cities in Southeast and East Anatolia, and so-called autonomy was planned. Instead of using hit-and-run tactics to weaken the state's authority, the PKK carried out terrorist acts in rural areas or in urban centers to maintain area control in urban centers, as ISIS tried to do in Syria and Iraq. By doing so, the PKK tried to create a so-called alternative administration to the state authority.

At this point, it can be argued that the PKK, as an example of old terrorism, has a local character in terms of its areas of action and continues to choose both rural and urban areas as its focus. On the other hand, it is important to highlight that it aims to increase the impact of its actions at the regional level by preferring the city centers where social mobility is high, where it can act as areas of action and gather support, and by acting together with its extension in Syria, the PYD. These goals are also directly proportional to the motives and motivation sources that the PKK tries to create in line with its goals. In addition, although the motives and motivations of the PKK are not characterized by the perpetrators of the new terrorism that contain fundamentalist elements, the PKK has sometimes preferred to use religion as its motivation source "despite its secular ideological motivations".

In addition to its armed actions against public-related targets such as military bases, government buildings, security forces personnel, village guards, and teachers, the PKK also intensely targets civilians with suicide attacks. The method, target, and strategy of the PKK's terrorist acts are among the elements that make the new terrorism unique. In this respect, it is seen that the PKK does not act selectively in target selection and carries out its actions without discrimination. It can be concluded that the PKK is increasingly attracted to the lure of suicide attacks, especially because of their unique tactical advantages compared to traditional terrorist acts that kill large numbers of civilians. Finally, the PKK has diversified its action methods and tactics with the effect of technological developments in line with its objectives. In this context, it can easily access and use all kinds of tools and equipment, from advanced conventional weapons to unmanned aerial vehicles, especially due to the ongoing proxy war in Syria.

As a result, the PKK perceived the elements it experienced, especially in Syria through the PYD/YPG branch, as a reason or necessity for transformation and implemented similar methods against Turkey. The developments in Syria have created an infrastructure for the transformation of the PKK. For this reason, it seems likely that the extent to which the ongoing conflicts in Syria will evolve in the future, or the increasing gap in the central authority in Syria, will also affect the PKK's new transformation.

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GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET

Giriş

"Yeni terörizm" kavramı literatürde 1990'larda ortaya çıkmasına rağmen, 11 Eylül 2001 tarihinde El Kaide terör örgütü tarafından Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne (ABD) yönelik gerçekleştirilen saldırılardan sonra kavramın kullanımı yaygınlık kazanmış, söz konusu saldırılardan sonra El Kaide örneğinden hareketle terör örgütlerinin değişen organizasyon yapıları, hedefleri, motifleri, taktik ve yöntemleri "yeni terörizm" olarak kavramsallaştırılmaya başlanmıştır.

"Eski" ve "yeni" terörizm kavramsallaştırması literatürde yoğun bir şekilde tartışılmakla beraber, yeni terörizm üzerinden günümüz terör eylemlerini analiz etmeye çalışan düşünürler, terörizmin karakterinde yaşanan değişime odaklanırken, bu bakış açısına kuşku ile yaklaşan düşünürler de günümüzdeki terörizmin radikal açıdan bir değişime uğramadığını, terörizmin yarattığı şiddetin önceki ifadeleriyle temel süreklilikler işaret ettiğini ifade etmektedirler. Bu çalışmada ise terörizmin her zaman siyasal saik ve şiddet temelli olduğu, bu durumun devam ettiği, ancak süreç içerisinde yeni bir "çatışma moduna" dönüştüğü savunulmaktadır. Bu hipotezden hareketle çalışmanın temel amacı, terörizmin bu dönüşen yapısında Kürdistan İşçi Partisi (PKK) terör örgütünün organizasyonundaki, hedeflerindeki, motiflerindeki, taktik ve yöntemlerindeki değişim arayışını analiz etmektir.

Çalışmada PKK'nın bu değişim arayışı literatür taramasına dayalı nitel araştırma yöntemi kullanılarak iki bölümde ele alınacaktır. Birinci bölümde yeni terörizm kavramı ve genel varsayımları eski terörizm kavramıyla karşılaştırmalı bir biçimde tartışılacak, ikinci bölümde PKK'nın örgütlenme biçimindeki, hedeflerindeki, motiflerindeki, eylem yöntem ve taktiklerindeki değişim arayışı yeni terörizmin ortaya koyduğu varsayımlar özelinde analiz edilecektir.

Yeni Terörizm Tartışmaları

11 Eylül saldırıları ile birlikte eski ve yeni terörizm tartışmaları hiç şüphesiz uluslararası ilişkilerde merkezi bir mesele hâline gelmiştir. 11 Eylül saldırıları sonucunda gündeme gelen yeni terörizm kavramı özünde 1990'larda ortaya atılmış ve terörün yeni bir karakteristik ile farklı bir şekle büründüğü iddia edilmiştir. Güvenlik çalışmaları literatüründe terörizmin doğası ve karakterinin yeni bir biçime dönüştüğünü iddia eden birçok akademik çalışma bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışmaların ortak noktası terör örgütlerinin örgütlenme biçimlerinin, motivasyonlarının, amaçlarının, taktik ve eylemlerinin dönüştüğünü iddia etmeleridir. Ancak, günümüzde

terörizmin aldığı şekil gerçekten "yeni" midir? Zira, bu görüşün aksini savunanlar, yeni terörizmin nitelikleri olarak ileri sürülen unsurların hiçbirinin tamamen yeni olmadığını, terör eylemlerinin süreklilik içinde olduğunu ve yeni olarak bahsedilen unsurların eski terörizmin evrimi sonucu yaşandığını iddia etmişlerdir.

Terörizmin yeni bir biçime dönüştüğünü savunan çalışmalara göre terör örgütleri artık işletmelerle aynı nedenden dolayı ağ örgütlenme biçimleri geliştirmeye isteklidirler. Çünkü bilgi devrimi, iletişim maliyetlerini düşürerek, işletmelerin işlevlerini kontrol eden hiyerarşik yapının sistem dışına itilmesine olanak tanır. Örgütler de aynı sebepten dolayı otorite ve kontrol piramitlerini düzleştirmekte ve bir ağ formuna dönüşerek özerk varlıklardan oluşan ve ortak amaçlarla birbirine bağlı gruplara bölünmektedirler. Yine bu çalışmalar, geleneksel terör örgütlerinin eylemlerinin belirli bir coğrafi yönelime sahip olduğuna dikkat çekmekle birlikte, günümüzdeki terör örgütlerinin mevcut dünya düzenini değiştirme hedefiyle küresel çapta faaliyetlerini gerçekleştirdiklerini ifade etmektedirler. Söz konusu çalışmalarda yeni terörizmin köktendinci unsurlar içeren failler tarafından karakterize edildiği, dinin, terör eylemleri için baskın bir motivasyon kaynağı olarak kullanıldığı belirtilmektedir. Ayrıca teknoloji paradoksuyla doğru orantılı olarak yeni terörizmin en önemli ayırt edici özelliğinin eylemlerin ayrım gözetmeksizin gerçekleştirilmesi olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Kısaca eski terörizmin aksine yeni terörizmde seçicilik söz konusu değildir. Bu fikirler çerçevesinde terörizmin yeni bir biçime dönüştüğünü savunan çalışmalarda yeni terörizmin aktörleri olarak da El Kaide ve İŞİD terör örgütleri gösterilmektedir.

Öğrenen Terör Örgütleri Bağlamında PKK

Çalışmanın konusunu oluşturan PKK da yeni terörizmin gerekliliklerine adaptasyon için öğrenme sürecine girerek, farklı motivasyon kaynaklarına sahip olsalar da yeni terörizmin örnekleri olarak gösterilen El Kaide ve İŞİD'den etkileşim sağladığı görülmektedir. Bu etkileşim çalışmada örgütlenme biçimi, örgütsel hedefler, motif ve motivasyon kaynakları, eylem yöntem ve taktikleri başlıkları altında incelenmiştir.

PKK'nın örgütlenme biçimi incelendiğinde; PKK'nın lidere bağlı bir komuta kontrol mekanizmasına ve kolayca tanımlanabilir bir örgütlenme biçimine sahip olduğu söylenebilir. Ayrıca PKK'nın örgüt modelinde sıkı bir hiyerarşik yapı ve kademelenme de mevcuttur. Bu yapı içerisindeki lider kadroların etkinliğinin oldukça yüksek olduğu da ifade edilebilir. 1999 yılında yakalanmasından sonra Öcalan'ın liderlik etkisi ve bu yapı devam

etse de PKK, yönetimsel ve karar alma mekanizması bakımından kendi içerisinde bir dönüşüm geçirerek daha kurumsal bir yapı hâline gelme çabası içerisinde olmuştur. Bu çabanın temelinde şüphesiz Öcalan'ın yakalanmasıyla birlikte örgütün dağılmasını engelleme amacı ve Öcalan sonrası örgüt içi liderlik mücadelesi yatmaktadır. Bu noktada PKK'nın, kendi içinde sahip olduğu kollar ve bu kollar arasındaki bağlar nedeniyle El Kaide ve İŞİD gibi çatı örgüt haline gelmeye çalıştığı, eski terörizmin özelliği olan dikey hiyerarşik bir örgüt olmasına rağmen, yatay ve esnek bir ağ yapısına sahip bir örgütün özelliklerini göstermeye başladığı gözlemlenmektedir.

PKK'nın örgütsel hedefleri incelendiğinde; Tarihsel olarak PKK'nın terör eylemlerinin hedefi hem kırsal hem şehir merkezleri olmuş, ancak genelde ağırlık merkezi kırsalda olmuştur ve kuruluşundan bu yana örgüt ağırlıklı olarak "kırsal gerilla savaşı" taktiklerini kullanmıştır. PKK, zamanla eylemlerinin ağırlık noktasını şehir merkezlerine de kaydırarak, "kıra dayalı şehir gerilla savaşı" taktiklerini benimsemeye başlamıştır. Söz konusu stratejinin temel hedefi PKK'nın şehirlerde sözde özerklik ilan etme amacıyla doğru orantılı bir şekilde otoritesini yerel halka kabul ettirebilmektir. İŞİD'in Irak ve Suriye'de ve yine PYD'nin Suriye'de şiddeti araç olarak kullanarak yapmaya çalıştığı gibi, PKK'nın da belirli bölgelerde alan kontrolü sağlayarak, bu bölgelerde devlet otoritesi gibi hareket edip, çoğu kamu hizmetlerinin kendileri tarafından yerine getirilme amacı taşıdığı görülmektedir.

PKK'nın motifi ve motivasyon kaynağı incelendiğinde; üçüncü dalga yeni sol terörizmin önemli örneklerinden olan PKK, Marksist ve Leninist bir ideolojiyle sahip olmakla birlikte, etnik milliyetçi ve ayrılıkçı söylemleri merkezine almıştır. Bu kapsamda ideolojik olarak motive olan terör örgütü, kuruluşuyla birlikte "gerilla savaşı" stratejisini benimseyerek, kendisine Türkiye'nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu bölgelerinde bağımsız bir "Kürt devleti" kurma hedefine sahiptir. PKK, Marksist ve Leninist ideolojiden "demokratik konfederalizm" ya da "demokratik özerklik" düşüncelerle ideolojik dönüşüm geçirdiği iddialarına rağmen her iki stratejinin de temel hedefi kitleleri etkileyerek, Türkiye'nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu bölgelerinin devletin kontrolünden kopartılmasıdır. Sonuç olarak PKK'nın sahip olduğu motifler ve motivasyon kaynakları, eski terörizmin "kendi kaderini tayin hakkı veya siyasi/bölgesel özerklik" ideolojik temellerine dayanmaktadır. Ancak PKK, yeni terörizmde olduğu gibi köktendinci unsurlar içeren failler tarafından karakterize edilmese de, "seküler ideolojik motivasyonlarına rağmen" zaman zaman dini de motivasyon kaynaklarını da kullanmayı tercih etmiştir.

PKK'nın eylem yöntemi ve taktiği incelendiğinde; PKK, askeri üsler, hükümet binaları, güvenlik güçleri personeli, köy korucuları, öğretmenler gibi kamu bağlantılı hedeflere yönelik silahlı eylemlerinin yanında, intihar eylemleriyle sivilleri de yoğun bir şekilde hedef almaktadır. İntihar eylemleri, genelde dini motifli terör örgütlerinin sıklıkla kullandığı bir yöntem olmakla birlikte, yeni terörizm çalışmalarında söz konusu yöntem hem hedefin hem de eylemi düzenleyenin kendisinin ölmesi sebebiyle eylem türü bakımından eski terörizmin silahlı eylemlerinden ayrılmaktadır. PKK, Marksist ve Leninist bir terör örgütü olması sebebiyle dini motivasyonlara sahip değildir. Bu noktada intihar eylemlerinde dini motivasyonun ya da ölümden sonra yaşam ve cennet inancının şart olmadığı sonucu doğmaktadır. PKK'nın da söz konusu eylemlerde motivasyon kaynağı "etnik kimliğin sözde devlet şiddetinden özgürleştirilerek devlet-örgüt çatışmasında toplum ve devleti mücadeleden caydırmaktır. Sonuç olarak PKK'nın terör eylemlerindeki yöntem, hedef ve taktiğe yönelik bu stratejisi yeni terörizmi yeni yapan unsurları arasında yer almaktadır. Bu doğrultuda PKK'nın, eski terörizmin özelliği olan hedef seçiminde seçici davranmadığı, yeni terörizmin en önemli ayırt edici özelliği olan eylemlerini ayrım gözetmeksizin gerçekleştirdiği görülmektedir.

Sonuç

Terörizmle mücadelede etkili bir strateji geliştirebilmek için öncelikle terör örgütlerinin nasıl bir gelişim gösterdiğinin analiz edilebilmesi gerekmektedir. Kısaca örgütlenme biçimi, hedefleri, motif ve motivasyon kaynakları, eylem yöntemleri ve taktikleri üzerinden bir terör örgütünün dönüşümünü ve bu dönüşümüne etki eden faktörleri ortaya koyabilmek terörizmle mücadelede önem teşkil etmektedir. Bu yöntemle terör örgütlerinin gelecekteki konumları ve oluşturabilecekleri tehditler daha kolay öngörülebilir olacaktır.

Özellikle 11 Eylül sonrası terörizmin aldığı yeni biçim ve terör örgütlerinin daha etkili olabilmek adına bir örgütsel öğrenme sürecine girerek daha yoğun bir şekilde etkileşime girmeleri, terörizmle mücadele noktasında terör örgütlerinin yaşadıkları dönüşümlerin analiz edilmesini daha fazla gerekli kılmaktadır.

Söz konusu amaç doğrultusunda bu çalışmada Türkiye'nin yaklaşık 38 yıldır mücadele ettiği PKK terör örgütünün yaşadığı dönüşüm ele alınmıştır. Birinci bölümde yeni terörizm kavramı ve genel varsayımları eski terörizmle karşılaştırmalı olarak ortaya konmuş, ikinci bölümde PKK'nın örgütlenme biçiminin, hedeflerinin, motif ve motivasyon kaynaklarının,

eylem yöntemleri ve taktiklerinin nasıl bir dönüşüm geçirme arayışında olduğu yeni terörizmin ortaya koyduğu varsayımlar özelinde tartışılmıştır.

Yeni terörizm tartışmalarının odak noktası her ne kadar El Kaide ve İŞİD olsa da, PKK terör örgütü de yeni terörizmin etkisiyle ve El Kaide ile İŞİD'den tecrübe ettiği ve öğrendiği unsurlarla birlikte yeni terörizmin önemli örneklerinden birini oluşturmaya başlamıştır.

Sonuç olarak PKK, özellikle Suriye'de PYD/YPG kolu vasıtasıyla tecrübe ettiği unsurları, bir dönüşüm gerekçesi ya da zorunluluğu olarak algılamış ve benzer yöntemleri Türkiye'ye karşı uygulamaya koymuştur. Bu noktada Suriye'de yaşanan gelişmeler PKK'nın dönüşümü için bir alt yapı oluşturmuştur. Bu sebeple gelecekte Suriye'de devam eden çatışmaların evrileceği boyutun, ya da oradaki merkezi otorite boşluğunun artarak devam etmesinin, PKK'nın yeni bir dönüşüm geçirmesine de etki etmesi muhtemel görünmektedir.