

**THE IMPACT OF EU CONDITIONALITY ON
DEMOCRATISATION IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PERIOD OF 1999-2008***

*Fatma Zeynep ÖZKURT***

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the impact of EU conditionality on democratisation in Turkey by delving into the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in the area of civil-military relations. The internal and external factors stemming from external incentives and social learning models in the framework of Europeanisation are operationalized to identify reasons behind the domestic change in Turkey concerning the political actors, institutions, cultural norms and values embedded in Turkish political system. They are tested by a cross-periodical analysis to trace the process on policy changes at the national level under the influence of EU conditionality. The results support the assumption that irrespective of different theoretical approaches, a complete domestic change can be achieved if favourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality are maintained.

Key Words: European Union, Conditionality Principle, Democratisation, External Incentives, Social Learning, Civil-Military Relations.

* *This article is based on the author's PhD thesis from the University of Nottingham, Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Politics and International Relations, United Kingdom.*

** *Assist. Prof. Dr., İstanbul Gelişim University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations, fzozkurt@gelisim.edu.tr*

AB KOŞULLULUĞUNUN TÜRKİYE'NİN DEMOKRATİKLEŞMESİ ÜZERİNE OLAN ETKİSİ: 1999-2008 DÖNEMİ SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİ ÖRNEĞİ

ÖZ

Bu makale, sivil-asker ilişkileri konusunda kurumsal dönüşümleri ve politik (re) formasyonları inceleyerek, AB koşullarının Türkiye'deki demokratikleşme sürecinde olan etkisini ele almaktadır. Makale, Avrupalılaşıma çerçevesi içindeki dış teşvikler ve sosyal öğrenme modellerine bağlı içsel ve dışsal faktörlerin, Türkiye'nin politik sistemi içinde yer alan politik aktörler, kurumlar, kültürel normlar ve değerlerle ilgili olarak nasıl etki yaptığını, bu etkiyle Türkiye'deki değişimlerin altında yatan sebeplerin neler olduğunu incelemeyi hedeflemiştir. AB koşulluluğunun etkisi, ulusal ölçekte yaşanan politika değişimleriyle ilgili süreci takip etmek üzere, dönemler arası karşılaştırmalarla analiz edilmiştir. Makalede elde edilen bulgular, farklı teorik yaklaşımlardan bağımsız olarak, eksiksiz bir içsel dönüşümün uygun iç koşullar ve güçlü koşulluluk sağlanması halinde gerçekleşebileceğini öne çıkarmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Koşulluluk İlkesi, Demokratikleşme, Dış Teşvikler, Sosyal Öğrenme, Sivil-Asker İlişkileri.

INTRODUCTION

In 21st century, international democracy promotion has become a prominent process in international relations as it globally leads to democratic peace, economic well-being and increased welfare of societies (Burnell, 2008: 414-415). International organisations (IOs) progressively engage in large-scale democracy promotion through instruments endorsing political liberalisation and democratic consolidation (Kubicek, 2003: 1) based on democracy aids and additional support (technical or financial) as 'the most common and often most significant tool for promoting democracy' around the world (Carothers, 1999: 6). IOs principally use conditionality instruments to promote and protect their self-interests within specified domains (Sørensen, 1993, 1995; Stokke, 1995) such as target states by providing incentives in return for their compliance with the IOs' conditions and policies. Conditionality thus implies an interaction of multi-level actors such as donors and recipients among which conditionality-compliance dichotomy transpires different policy outcomes (Hughes et al., 2004a, 2004b).

In post-Cold War period, due to the changes in balance of power, IOs have become powerful actors in world politics as the political environment became more apt for political changes and the expansion of democracy in the European continent. In this context, the European Union (EU) is accepted as one of the 'well-established' international actors in democracy promotion, particularly around its wider region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU has acted as an arbitrator in the democratisation of ex-communist countries through developing institutional structures surrounding common liberal democratic norms and values. The EU has also set democracy promotion as a central aspect of its foreign policy and external relations as seen in its enlargement and neighbourhood policies.

The channels of dispersion of the EU's democratic principles that are strictly embedded in its treaties, declarations, and partnership documents go through various strategies and influence mechanisms such as Europeanisation. Europeanisation in this context is seen as the catalyst for a process of structural change, influencing both social and political actors, formal institutions as well as ideas and interests (Featherstone, 2003: 3). Europeanisation, by intertwining international governance approaches with the models of domestic politics thus presents an understanding of the domestic impact of international politics and the causativeness of agency on domestic change (Radaelli, 2004: 2-3).

In light of Europeanisation and within the scope of its enlargement policy, the EU's most salient interference in democratisation is entrenched in its precondition for membership. Hereof, the EU offers 'conditionality' as an intensive form of interconnected structures as the 'essence' of political interactions; and forces candidate states to adopt a democratic political system and implement liberal democratic norms and values associated with the EU. These interactions in turn, portray the EU as the main external actor impacting upon domestic change and triggering democratisation process at the domestic level (Pridham, 1999: 59-60).

Concordantly, target states subject to EU conditionality compel towards institutional transformation and policy (re)formation. In this causal interference, whilst institutional transformation indicates the establishment of new institutional structures and the restructuring of political principles in the realm of domestic politics, policy (re)formation denotes normative and ideational changes in prevailing national policies of a nation-state.

Consenting to the predominant argument that Turkey's democratisation process is externally triggered by the EU accession negotiations through its

engagement with the EU's pre-accession framework, this article specifically explores the impact of EU conditionality on democratisation in Turkey by delving into the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in the area of civil-military relations in the period of 1999-2008.

The empirical findings show that Turkey's exposure to Europeanisation has hardly succeeded in achieving complete transformation in the policy area of civil-military relations under the influence of EU conditionality. In fact, the analysis reveals that EU conditionality has only been a triggering factor, and its effectiveness has been limited at certain points in history attributable to various domestic factors making the EU's conditionality strategy imperceptible for Turkish political context. Furthermore, the results show that institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of civil-military relations in Turkey could only be maintained at a certain level if and only if the conditional configurations are maintained, which are favourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality irrespective of different theoretical approaches.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The main research question is formulated around the assertion that the prospective EU membership has been the 'strongest catalyst' for democratic reform in Turkey (Gordon, Taşpınar, 2004: 6). By delving into the mechanisms of Europeanisation, this article seeks to understand how this phenomenon affects the political actors, institutions, political cultural norms and values embedded in Turkish political system; and aims to identify the causal and determining factors for domestic change combined with instruments of external influence.

Accordingly, the theoretical framework of the empirical analysis is set around Europeanisation; and the postulations are drawn on the external incentives and social learning models stemming from rationalist and sociological institutionalism, respectively. The systematic analysis concentrates on the EU-level and domestic-level factors suggested by these two models, which can be listed as the *size of domestic adoption costs*, *credibility*, *size of rewards*, *legitimacy*, *identity*, and *resonance*.

Methodologically, this article conducts cross-temporal analysis within one policy area. The periodization of the cross-temporal analysis is completed by examining key events in Turkey-EU relations. In that respect, the selected timeframe of 1999-2008 is divided in three periods. The first period (1999-2002) starts with the granting of EU candidacy status for Turkey at the

Helsinki Summit in 1999 and ends with the early general elections held in Turkey bringing the Justice and Development Party (AKP) into power as the first single-party government that had come to power since 1987. The second period (2002-2005) takes up from the early general elections and continues until the opening of accession negotiations in October 2005. The third period (2005-2008) hence covers a phase when the accession negotiations were actively pursued by the Turkish government until 2008. 2008 is chosen as a logical end-point for the empirical analysis as the accession negotiations of Turkey came to a sudden halt; and no significant progress on democratisation under the influence of the EU has been achieved since then.

In order to uncover the causal inferences behind the domestic change (or its lack of) in Turkey, the process-tracing method is utilised. This method is found to be useful for interlinking the causal propositions and the decisional processes based on consistent evidences (King et al., 1994: 227). As stated by George and Bennet (2005: 153) process-tracing method is also convenient to observe any 'causal chain coupling independent variables with dependent variables and evidence of the causal mechanisms posited by a theory'.

Therefore, in virtue of this method, the causal paths defining the domestic change in Turkey in relation to its democratisation process under the influence of EU conditionality are uncovered within the selected timeframe. This approach also makes allowance for conclusions on the causal interactions touching upon conditionality and compliance dichotomy with reference to the variables posited by the external incentives and social learning models. In view of this methodology, the analysis adopts 'concomitant variation measures' (George, Bennet, 2005: 153) for the scaling of the variation of Turkey's compliance with EU conditions. A dichotomous coding is used by appointing 'high' (positive) and 'low' (negative) values to independent variables instead of 'present' or 'absent' to indicate whether the variables advance or stall the level of compliance in different timeframes.

EUROPEANISATION AS INSTITUTIONALISATION

Europeanisation as institutionalisation reflects on the ways in which the EU level polities and policies are transferred and institutionalised at the domestic level. It captures a process that makes domestic policies progressively conditional on European policy-making (Börzel, 1999: 574). Europeanisation as institutionalisation thus transforms macro-domestic structures (i.e., public administration, political, legal and representation structures, intergovernmental connections), public policies (i.e., actors, problems, instruments and resources), normative and cognitive structures

(i.e., values, norms, discourses, narratives, policy paradigms) (Radaelli, 2003: 35-36). In this line of thinking, the imperative features of Europeanisation acquaints with 'the importance of change in the logic of political behaviour [...], refers to process of institutionalisation [...], accommodates both organisations and individuals [...], is broad to cover variety of interests [...], and can be applied to both the member states and to other countries' (Radaelli, 2003: 30).

The extensive debates on the impact of IOs on prompting domestic change in target states (Schmitter, 1995; Grabbe 1999, 2001, 2003; Vachudova, 2001, 2005) show that there are two main theoretical underpinnings: rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. In the scope of Europeanisation, rationalist institutionalism assumes that the EU by the way of changing 'opportunity structures' for domestic actors assists domestic change at the national level. Europeanisation thus creates a new political opportunity structure wherein cost-benefit calculations of strategic actors shape the effectiveness of rule transfer (i.e., EU policies). It is assumed that these actors would either wield supportive influence on change or restrain the other actors' capacity. Therefore, it is hypothesised that domestic change is ensured if domestic political institutions in the target state prevent domestic political actors from vetoing adaptation to EU rules and conditions; and if the benefits are higher than the costs associated with domestic change and rule adoption (Börzel, 2010: 6).

In contrast, sociological institutionalism specifies the influence mechanisms based on 'ideational and normative' processes of Europeanisation. It follows the 'logic of appropriateness' to explain how actors are influenced by collectively-shared understandings of socially accepted behaviours which define their perception of 'rational action' (March, Olsen, 1998; Checkel, 1998). Therefore, meeting social expectations in a given situation emerges as the main driving factor for actors rather than maximising their self-interest (Börzel, 2010: 7). In this standpoint, Europeanisation is distinguished based on the emergence of new norms and practices to be adopted within the domestic structures by target states. It is hypothesised that domestic change is more likely to take place if actors are socialised into new norms of appropriateness by means of persuasion and social learning; and if epistemic communities as norm entrepreneurs succeed in making EU policies resonate with domestic beliefs through persuasion (Börzel, 2010: 7).

In the context of Europeanisation, both rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism assume that there is a 'misfit' between European and domestic policies, institutions and political processes. Thus,

they investigate individual or combinational factors upon the effectiveness of conditionality as an influence mechanism used by the EU to trigger domestic change in order to find out the causal inference between conditionality as external impact and domestic compliance as internal response. In this context, conditionality is seen as the “most resonant of deliberate efforts to determine the process’s outcome through external pressure” amid other conceptions of international influences on democratisation process (Pridham, 2002: 956).

EU CONDITIONALITY

EU utilises conditionality by following ‘a strategy of reactive reinforcement or reinforcement by reward’ scheme (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2005) principally dictating the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and the adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire* for membership. It follows a process where a candidate state is expected to comply with EU conditions necessitating the restructuring of domestic policies. If compliance is achieved, EU reinforces the process by providing a reward. In case of non-compliance, EU generally withholds the reward, and in some cases, gives a sanction or punishment for failures on policy change or transfer. Conditionality therefore reflects on the ‘power asymmetry between the EU and target states since it provides the EU with extra powers, enabling it to impose rule adoptions as a precondition for membership admission (Hughes et al., 2004a: 523).

The presumption on EU conditionality points to a direction of causality where it is considered to be effective if target candidate states comply with the EU’s democratic criteria. Compliance henceforth indicates that through the mechanism of conditionality externally induced EU norms and values produce different forms of policy changes and rule adoptions at the domestic level. This in turn puts a great emphasis on the ‘differential impact’ of the EU on domestic changes (Cowles, Risse, 2001; Börzel, Risse, 2003). Consequently, domestic change is classified as: i) formal rule adoption and alignment with EU provisions, ii) transformation of institutions and capacity development, iii) EU norm diffusion and cooperation between domestic and EU level institutions.

EXTERNAL INCENTIVES MODEL VERSUS SOCIAL LEARNING MODEL

As previously indicated, democratisation process can be quantified by assessing the influence of external and/or international factors. Nonetheless,

it is widely argued that prevailing domestic factors should also be taken into consideration as joint testing points for conceptualisation of Europeanisation at domestic level in order to verify the decisiveness and explanatory value for domestic change (Schmitter, 2001; Whitehead, 2001; Schweltnus, Schimmelfennig, 2008). In this framework, it is assumed that domestic compliance with EU conditionality is determined by the strong impact of the EU rules (downward pressure) and domestic willingness (upward pressure) during the accession negotiation process.

In order to test the explanatory values of the EU-level and domestic-level factors based on the external incentives and social learning models, a minimal model of interaction is formulated (see Table 1) inspired by the analytical framework presented by Schweltnus (2005). This model – by portraying four configurations on Europeanisation – demonstrates a two-dimensional reflection on the process outcome based on the ‘supply side’ of EU conditionality and ‘demand side’ of domestic factors.

Table 1. Process Outcomes Based on Domestic Conditions and EU Conditionality

Process Outcomes Based on Domestic Conditions and EU Conditionality			
		Effectiveness of EU Conditionality	
	→ ↓	<i>Strong EU Conditionality</i>	<i>Weak EU Conditionality</i>
Domestic Conditions (Cost-Benefit Analysis)	<i>Favourable Domestic Conditions (Benefits>Costs)</i>	Affirmative / Positive Europeanisation	Self-driven / Social Learning-driven Europeanisation
	<i>Unfavourable Domestic Conditions (Costs>Benefits)</i>	Fractional / Conditionality-driven Europeanisation	Negated / Negative Europeanisation

Whilst favourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality present the best composition in terms of process outcome (i.e., *Positive Europeanisation*), it is conjectured that favourable domestic conditions along with weak conditionality can still produce domestic change (i.e., *Self-driven Europeanisation*) although it may not be as significant as the first composition. The third composition, on the other hand, presupposes that there would be a single-sided and/or imbalanced domestic change (i.e., *Fractional Europeanisation*) where target states can only partially europeanise due to unfavourable domestic conditions coupled with strong conditionality. The fourth composition however indicates that there cannot

be an actual domestic change in the absence of favourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality. Thus, the probable outcome would be the abandonment of any efforts on compliance with the EU rules and norms (i.e., *Negative Europeanisation*).

The dissection of domestic-level and EU-level factors are formulated around the external incentives and social learning models. The postulations derived from these models need not be mutually exclusive since they can explain different aspects of external impact and domestic change. The domestic-level factors represent the aspirations of target states, more specifically the governments as well as other internal conditions that facilitate or limit the impact of external influence mechanisms on domestic change. The EU-level factors epitomise the EU's stance and strategies on rule adoption and compliance by the target states over and above its accession framework to trigger domestic change in target states. Hereof, based on the literature on Europeanisation and the transformative power of EU, the factors included in this analysis are operationalised in Table 2.

Table 2. Operationalisation of Variables

Operationalisation of Variables		
External Incentives Model		
	Factors in Accord	Factors in Contention
Size of Rewards (EU-level)	extensive forms of financial and technical assistance	absence or limited forms of financial and technical assistance
Credibility (EU-level)	prompt and proportional delivery of rewards	absence or failure of prompt and proportional delivery of rewards
Size of Adoption Costs (domestic-level)	ability to adopt rules, absence of veto players	inability to adopt rules, presence of veto players
Social Learning Model		
Legitimacy (EU-level)	high normative quality of the EU rules and norms; presence of coherent presentation and ownership perception	low normative quality of the EU rules and norms; absence of coherent presentation and ownership perception
Identity (domestic-level)	successful self-identification with the EU; perception of the EU as an aspirant group	unsuccessful self-identification with the EU; absence of perception of the EU as an aspirant group
Resonance (domestic-level)	high levels of conformity between domestic rules and EU conditions	no or low levels of conformity between domestic rules and EU conditions

CONCEPTUALISATION of CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

'Civilian power' is considered as an important measure of 'progress towards democracy' and a major concern for human governance (Kohn, 1997: 140). Along with protection of the rule of law, judicial independence, and promotion of minority rights and fundamental freedoms, civilian control of military henceforth has become an important component of liberal democracies (Diamond, 1999: 3-4, 10-12). In fact, it is considered that democratic political institutions would fail to develop and persist under the influence of the military as it would cause the biggest internal hazard for the political system; hence civilian control over military is accepted an 'essential' condition for democracy (Dahl, 1998: 148-149).

In democracies, a functional state apparatus is expected to provide civilian control through measures concerning the transparency and accountability of the military as well as its abstinence from intervening in politics (Kohn, 1997: 144-146). This is vitally important as the military intervention in politics has a restrictive impact on the functioning of democratic institutions, thus a functional state apparatus (Przeworski, 1995: 46-48). This type of vicious circle that intertwines all factors necessitates a constitutional and legal framework at the domestic level in order to protect the liberty of domestic institutions and curb the influence of military on political matters (Hänggi, Tanner, 2005: 15).

In post-Cold War era, various IOs such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), introduced a new framework on the promotion of 'democratic civil-military' relations (Cotter, Forster, 2004). In the context of democratisation, they have embarked upon topics such as national security, democratic governance of defence sector, influence of military in politics extensively. For the same purpose, the EU adopted a democratic promotion agenda targeting states within its enlargement and neighbourhood policies. Hereof, the rationale behind the EU's stance on democratisation processes involves civil-military relations transpiring within its contention that political and economic liberalisation can only be achieved in modern democracies if the military forces are subject to civilian control.

However, the EU shows significant deficiencies in providing a thorough framework for its member states and candidate states. Principally, *Acquis Communautaire* – the main body of the EU law – does not incorporate any legal provisions on civilian control of the military. In fact, rather than having

a comprehensive policy and legal framework formalising civil-military relations or democratic control of security forces, the EU heavily relies on the formal documents, recommendations or the codes that are provided by the aforementioned IOs. The lack of a legal framework on civil-military relations particularly limits the EU's ability to provide clear benchmarks in this policy area for the candidate states when it comes to the transfer rules and norms from EU-level to domestic level.

Nonetheless, it is evident that even in the absence of a common policy on civil-military relations the EU seeks to illegitimately demand political reforms in this area as part of the pre-accession framework. The EU does so by vaguely interpreting conditions on civilian control of the military within the scope of the Copenhagen criteria and by incorporating accession requirements in European Commission Regular Reports and in Accession Partnerships targeting states that are in the pre-/process of accession negotiations.

EU CONDITIONALITY ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

The issues of democratisation and human rights have been major features of Turkey-EU relations particularly after Turkey was granted candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. Since then, Turkey has become subject to the EU's formal accession criteria involving democratic principles whilst the political affairs between the two actors revolved around human rights issues and consolidation of democracy. The EU's intensive involvement in democracy promotion in Turkey as a candidate state has in turn accelerated Turkey's Europeanisation efforts in line with its determination to become a member of the EU.

As a result, a dynamic yet unsteady domestic transformation process has started in many facets of the Turkish political spectrum including civil-military relations as one of the most intricate policy areas to reform nationally. Essentially, the military has always been leading force behind the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the transformation of the social, economic and political structure of the Turkish state (Karabelias, 1999: 130). Therefore it has enjoyed its autonomy to intervene in politics to a great extent in order to safeguard the unity and secularity of the state (Greenwood, 2006: 38).

It is often argued that in the early days of the Republic, Turkey inevitably inherited 'hierarchical lines' from the Ottoman Empire resulting in close state-military ties wherein the military has straightforwardly gained a

permanent role in society (Narlı, 2000: 108). In fact, the military was accepted as one of the major actors in the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire. It was mainly due to the military ventures that the Ottoman Empire imported modernity, technological transfer and modern knowledge from Europe; thus the military became responsible for the 'state-crafting' in the Ottoman Empire (Gürpınar, 2014: 183).

Since the military has always enjoyed a considerable power in Turkish politics, for most of the time, its subjugation to civilian rule became a major obstacle for Turkey's integration into the EU. Nonetheless, the EU accession process has created a suitable environment wherein the EU as an external actor endorsed its conditionality strategy on Turkey for the purpose of aligning Turkey's policies with that of the EU, including the civil-military relations. In this context, Turkish society and the Turkish government came to realise that the military's involvement in politics is in contradiction with the EU's democratic principles. Therefore the EU - in principle - has put forward the democratic control of military as one of the primary conditions in line with the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for Turkey's accession negotiations (Güney, Karatekelioğlu, 2005: 440-441).

More specifically, as stated by the European Commission and the European Parliament, the EU's formal requirements from Turkey on civil-military relations mainly involve the good governance, institutional stability, democratic control, transparency and accountability of the military in Turkey through the way of eliminating its role and influence on state affairs in relation to its institutional structure and policy impact on political matters (Drent, 2006: 69-86).

Under the responsibility of meeting these substantial requirements, Turkey heavily involved itself in the process of domestic change in the area of civil-military relations in the period of 1999-2008. This involved the concessions and relative weight of costs associated with the bargaining process on one side; and alterations on preferences based on non-material incentives, convergence of ideas and policy transfer on the other. The next section presents the cross-temporal analysis of domestic change based on the internal and external factors (see Table 2) that are utilised in explaining policy change.

EUROPEANISATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

For the accurate tracing of Europeanisation of civil-military relations in Turkey, it is highly important to analyse domestic-level and EU-level factors

stemming from the external incentives and social learning models cross-periodically. Only this type of systematic analysis is equipped to provide the most conclusive answer to the main research question initially formulated.

The following cross-period analysis shows that whilst some factors have the explanatory value for changes between periods, some others fail to explain the variances on policy outcomes as they remain unaltered within different periods. For instance, neither *legitimacy* as an EU-level factor nor *resonance* as a domestic-level factor has the explanatory value for policy changes across three periods for the reasons set forth in the previous section. Concisely, the EU fails to provide a fully institutionalised character on civil-military relations since its norms and rules on civilian control of military are not embedded in its legal framework; and this piece of evidence remained intact during the period of 1999-2008. Thus, it is accepted that the *legitimacy* factor of its own accord cannot explain Turkey's varying compliance with EU conditionality as it shows a low value for all three periods.

Similarly, due to its guardianship role since the establishment of the Republic, the military has quite often stepped into political affairs, thus has become a conventional figure in Turkish politics. This constant element of Turkish politics entirely conflicts with the EU's norms and practices on civil-military relations; and consequently shows that *resonance* factor cannot be accounted for the variance in Turkey's compliance with EU conditionality as it also shows a low value for all three periods.

Nonetheless, the remaining EU-level factors (*size of rewards* and *credibility*) and domestic factors (*size of domestic adoption costs* and *identity*) prove to have a differential impact across three periods and therefore they can be accounted for the different policy outcomes on Turkey's Europeanisation process under the influence of EU conditionality, which will be discussed next.

A PERIOD OF RISING HOPES (1999-2002)

In the first period, the EU's first condition on the institutional transformation of the military in Turkey involved the constraining of the National Security Council's (NSC) power and guaranteeing of the transparency and accountability measures on military budget (European Commission, 1998). The coalition government of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Motherland Party (ANAP) initially made successful constitutional amendments in June 1999. The government firstly banished military judges from the State Security Courts which was followed

by the amendment to the Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution in favour of increasing the number of civilian members in the NSC. This amendment consequently made the NSC subordinate of the State by substituting its main obligation to 'notifying' the State from providing 'priority consideration' on urgent security matters (Jenkins, 2007: 346).

In turn, European Commission found the reforms in early 2000s as unsatisfactory and required that the military officials appointed at institutions such as the Council of Higher Education and the Higher Education Advisory Board should be relieved of duty; and more importantly, required the subordination of the Chief of the General Staff to the Defence Minister instead of the Prime Minister (European Commission, 2000). Turkey's reform measures in turn were put into practice within the scope of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) in March 2001.

The NPAA in this context is accepted as one of the key plans that strategically plan the preparation and implementation of national legislations and the establishment of competent institutional structures accordingly. For instance, the medium-term action plan in the NPAA of 2001 involved the constitutional amendments concerning the functioning of the NSC and its alignment with the practices of the EU member states. In this context, the amendment of the Constitutional Court emerged as one of the major changes in relation to civilian control of the military since it curbed the political role of the military; and the military was put under the review of the Constitutional Court in cases of allegations concerning its unconstitutional acts (Capezza, 2009: 14).

Despite the abovementioned political reforms in legal terms, the internal security concerns since 1990s such as the Kurdish problem, the terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the resurgence of political Islam caused the military to continuously stay in the political domain. For this particular reason, the transformation of the institutional structure of the military and the respective (re)formation and implementation of policies on civil-military relations could not be accomplished completely. Overall, when the EU accession process is taken into consideration, it is observed that in conjunction with internal conflicts, the persistent role of the military on Turkish politics created a controversial environment; thus, it increased the *size of adoption costs* for the coalition government in this period.

Besides internally, the coalition partners' ideological disputes and their divergent perceptions on the role of the military and prospective EU membership significantly lowered the government's identification with the EU. For instance, the leading coalition partner DSP, as a social democratic and centre-left party, was initially inclined to take 'hard-line' policies towards EU membership, and gradually became engaged in the political reform process (Kirişçi, 2004a: 284-293) impelled by its coalition partners.

The second coalition partner MHP, as a far-right nationalist party known for its adherence to Turkish nationalism was also reluctant towards EU membership; and hence carrying out extensive political reforms. At most times, MHP regarded the EU conditions on wider political matters such as the minority rights in the conjecture of internal problems such as the Kurdish issue as a serious threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the Turkish state (Arıkan, 2003: 70; Keyman, Öniş, 2004: 183). This in turn, prevented MHP to show full commitment to comply with EU conditionality in general.

The third coalition partner, ANAP, as a centre-right neoliberal party was portrayed as the most pro-European party within the government. ANAP had not only been a strong advocate for liberal stances on politics, but also supported the transformation of Turkish economy into an open-market economy as a means of becoming a part of the European common market (Ergüder, 1991: 164-167). In that respect, it was mainly due to ANAP's impetus for prospective EU membership that incited DSP and MHP to commit to the process of institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in this period.

In that respect, the ideological disputes among the coalition partners undoubtedly increased the size of domestic adoption costs. In fact, these political parties could not form a consensually-shared collective identity in line with the EU failed to perceive the EU as an 'aspirant group' to a great extent. As a result, by showing a low value for this period, the *identity* factor internally pulled down the strength of favourable domestic conditions for Turkey's compliance with the EU conditionality.

On the other hand, externally, the granting of candidacy status for Turkey in 1999 initiated a tangible and credible conditionality strategy utilised by the EU. This was then followed by the timely delivery of the proportional rewards by the EU in return for Turkey's domestic compliance. To start with, in June 2001, Turkey became eligible for participating in the Community programmes giving Turkey full access to TAIEX offices for

business transactions concerning the Customs Union. Furthermore, by the end of 2001, the European Council started to apply PHARE procedures to EU-Turkey financial cooperation (Tanlak, 2002: 5). In the scope of MEDA, Turkey was also permitted to apply for financial assistance for the promotion of economic and social development at the domestic level (European Council, 2001). Therefore, regardless of the unfavourable domestic conditions, the essential catalyst for domestic change in Turkey was achieved through the effective and timely delivery of proportional rewards. In that respect, *size of rewards* and *credibility* factors show high values and constitute the main favourable EU-level factors for domestic change for this period.

To conclude, the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of civil-military relations did not show a complete change in the first period. Internally, the unsuccessful identification of the coalition government along with high adoption costs associated with unsuitable political environment and sensitive national security concerns created unfavourable conditions for domestic change. Under these domestic conditions and in conjunction with externally induced strong conditionality as a result of timely delivery of proportional rewards by the EU, Turkey could only partially adjust its policies on civil-military relations with EU conditions. This deficiency in level of compliance in turn resulted in only *fractional Europeanisation* (see Table 1) in the first period.

A PERIOD OF VIGOUR ON POLITICAL REFORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (2002-2005)

The beginning of this period is marked by the early general elections held in November 2002. The general elections took place soon after the collapse of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government due to the on-going political instability. In fact, the collapse of the government and consequent early general elections transpired in the context of a deteriorating economic crisis in the aftermath of a severe financial crash in 2001; and resulted in the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as the sole winner of the elections.

The general elections in 2002 were also noteworthy because of the fact that they denoted 'a real referendum on the [EU] and the country's modernisation implied with it' (Deloy, 2002). Taking over the portfolio of extensive political reforms from the preceding coalition government and soon after forming the single-party government, AKP set off a rapid harmonisation and alignment process in the Turkish political spectrum with

a clear hint on its social conservative yet pro-European stance on political affairs.

In the second period, externally the EU representatives were compelled to force the new AKP government to address Turkey's shortcomings in civil-military relations, as Turkey's efforts to reform the civilian control of the military in the first period was found to be insufficient. In fact, the EU's primary condition on civil-military relations in this period concerned the ways in which the NSC operated in practice (European Commission, 2002); the formation of an action plan on the adoption and implementation of the necessary legislation (Drent, 2006: 75); the introduction of additional clauses on the defence budget and the control of defence expenses (Müftüler-Baç, 2005: 27); and the abolition of the unrestricted access of the military to civilian agencies and the authority to check on the implementation of the NSC recommendations (Jenkins, 2007: 347).

Turkey's respective responses to the EU's formal requirements in this policy area involved the introduction of a number of harmonisation packages and the enhancement of the accountability and transparency of the Turkish armed forces. In fact, the amendment on the Law on Public Financial Management and Control aiming to dissolve the extra-budgetary funds of the Ministry of Defence by the end of 2007 (Greenwood, 2006: 35); the adoption of a new Regulation concerning the functioning and the composition of the NSC in January 2004 (Capezza, 2009: 14); and the abolition of the State Security Courts in June 2004 resulted in the successful institutional transformation and policy (re)formation on civil-military relations in Turkey.

Internally, when looked at the domestic factors, it can be seen that Turkey's compliance with the EU rules on civil-military relations has always been costly for the reasons mentioned in the previous period. However, certain changes at the domestic level in this period, i.e., the disengagement of the PKK from terrorist activities, the military's adoption of a more moderate stance on the prospect of EU membership – hence not acting as a veto player against the government and its policies – significantly lowered the *size of adoption costs* in this period.

Besides, the AKP, as a single-party government, was found to be more successful in terms of its self-identification with the EU. For instance, AKP's main foreign policy goals included the promotion of the EU's democratic principles in addition to its discourse on the importance of democratic consolidation in Turkey. The AKP government's pro-European stance by

utilising the prospect of EU membership as a tool to transform institutional structures and reform policies on the military proved that the *identity* factor showed a high value for the second period. In fact, by reducing the size of adoption costs, identity factor significantly contributed to the favourable domestic conditions necessary for domestic compliance.

On the other hand, when looked at the EU-level factors, it is observed that EU conditionality continued to be a key factor in shaping the process and policy outcomes due to the EU-level factors including *size of rewards* and *credibility*. Primarily, the EU's attitude towards Turkey has significantly improved and showed a positive stance due to the domestic political reforms and legal amendments on civil-military relations. In return, the EU, as a reward, presented a stronger accession strategy with clear benchmarks; and provided additional financial and technical assistance (Kirişçi, 2004b). Overall in this period, the EU found Turkey's efforts in aligning its policies on civil-military relations with the practices of the EU satisfactory; and in December 2004, as an important reward in return for domestic compliance, announced the opening of the accession negotiations with Turkey by October 2005 (European Council, 2004).

These developments point towards a direction that domestic conditions became more favourable in the second period. This is mainly due to the formation of a single-party government that successfully identified itself with the EU. The high level of identification due to the government's pro-EU stance, the low levels of rule adoption costs in relation to the absence of the military as a veto player and more suitable political environment for domestic change allowed the state's capacity and will for carrying out the necessary political reforms on civil-military relations. Besides, the substantial and credible rewards offered by the EU helped Turkey to comply with the EU rules through the making of necessary legal and constitutional changes and rule adoptions for the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation of civilian control of the military. Consequently, the combination of favourable domestic conditions and strong conditionality resulted in the best policy outcome of *positive Europeanisation* (see Table 1) in the second period.

A PERIOD OF STAGNATION AND SETBACKS (2005-2008)

In the third period, the reciprocal political disputes between Turkey and the EU brought forth the untimely down-turn of Turkey's institutional transformation and policy (re)formation. These mainly involved the dispute over the Cyprus issue (i.e., Turkey's reluctance to give access to the Republic

of Cyprus for the using of Turkish ports and airports) (Hakura, 2006); the EU's decision to suspend the opening of eight chapters in *Acquis Communautaire*; and the EU's reluctant attitude towards Turkey's accession negotiations due to the deficiencies in its 'absorption capacity' (Patton, 2007). Therefore, despite certain policy changes at the domestic level, these political disputes between the two actors undoubtedly slowed down the political reform process in this period.

It must be noted that due to the aforementioned disputes, Turkish public opinion on EU accession significantly deteriorated in this period. This sequel was followed by the AKP government's diminishing political will in continuing the political reforms soon after the opening of accession negotiations in 2005 (Çağaptay, 2009: 2). Furthermore, the military's profile in the political domain resurfaced in 2006; and this in turn, made domestic conditions unfavourable for rule adoption at the domestic level. In fact, the military's public statements stressing its role in Turkey illustrated that its political power was retained through internal mechanisms particularly concerning security related issues including the 'danger of weakening laicism, Kurdish separatism and Cyprus issue' (Narlı, 2009: 460). Besides, the so called 'e-memorandum' on 27 April 2007 proved that the military - despite all political reforms - remained intact and ready to step in the political affairs if they deemed that the foundation and the fundamental values of the Turkish Republic were under threat (BBC News, 2007).

Among the other internal factors causing an unsuitable environment for institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey in this period, was the closure case opened against the AKP on constitutional grounds. The party became highly defensive in its policy actions after this case; and started a prosecution process against nationalist and Kemalist circles (Capezza, 2009: 19). Nonetheless, the election victory of the AKP government in July 2007 period was interpreted as the public's remonstrance against the involvement of the military in political affairs (Toktaş, Kurt, 2008: 6). These internal dynamics in turn made the domestic adoption costs extremely high for the AKP government to proceed with the legal changes on civil-military relations; and in that respect, it is considered that the *size of adoption costs* showed a low value, thus became the main factor in contention for this period.

When looked at the political reforms aiming at the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation on civil-military relations in this period, it is observed that Turkey's inability to continue with the political reforms mainly due to internal dynamics was harshly criticised by the EU. In

fact, the European Council mainly addressed that there were remaining setbacks on the transparency of defence budgeting in relation to the ex-post auditing of military expenditures by the Court of Auditors and the strengthening of parliamentary oversight of the military budget were yet to be attained (European Commission, 2007). Furthermore, the continuing influence of the NSC and the military on political affairs and the legal shortcomings on the civilian oversight of the military were regarded as the main inadequacies in this period (European Commission, 2008).

As a response to these criticisms, Turkey leastwise intended to continue with the legal changes to align with the EU norms and practices. Among these legal amendments were the Law of the Court of Auditors and the bringing of the military expense report under the regulation of the Council of Ministers (Narlı, 2009: 455). However, Turkey failed to make changes on the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law and the Law on the NSC; and on the advancement of supervisory functions over the military (European Commission, 2008).

On the other hand, certain tensions were observed in this period with regards to the AKP government's identification with the EU. These were mainly caused by the aforementioned political disputes among the two actors that hampered the political reforms in the area of civil-military relations. Although these adverse developments negatively affected the AKP's political willingness on continuing with the political reforms, the AKP government nonetheless managed to preserve its pro-European stance as the EU was still regarded as the aspirant group in this period. As a result, it is considered that the *identity* factor did not alter, thus remained high for this period.

Furthermore, in stark contrast to the previous periods, the EU-level factors including *size of rewards* and *credibility* showed low values in this period. The EU's diminishing absorption capacity due to the previous enlargement round and its changing attitude towards Turkey's membership prospect in this period caused an obstruction that consequently worsened the strength of EU conditionality. In fact, a number of EU Member States including Germany, France, Austria, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Denmark suggested alternative solution of a 'privileged partnership' instead of Turkey's bid for full membership (Kramer, 2006: 26).

It can be argued that this period was particularly disappointing both for Turkey and the EU. In fact, Turkey failed to comply with the EU conditions; and the EU failed to provide a credible and strong conditionality. In that

respect, it can be asserted that the most striking divergence in the direction and the pace of domestic change is observed in the third period. In fact, neither a strong conditionality nor favourable domestic conditions were present at that time.

The absence of sizeable and credible rewards and high adoption costs; further diminishing resonance of Turkey with the EU straight after the opening of accession negotiations in 2005; and the government's struggle to cope with deteriorating political environment have negatively affected the institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in Turkey on the whole. These negative developments coupled with the internal political conflicts in Turkey eventually resulted in no significant progress or policy outcome in this period, which subsequently can be identified as a process of *negative Europeanisation* (see Table 1).

CONCLUSION

In recent years, the EU has made significant efforts to transform itself into an important IO in the political domain by giving a greater emphasis on democratisation in its wider region. As part of its enlargement policy, the EU incrementally introduced new political conditions into its policy towards candidate states; and made conditionality principle an indispensable aspect of its influence mechanisms on domestic change in candidate states. In the meantime, Turkey has presented itself as a complex case study when analysing the impact of the EU on institutional transformation and policy (re)formation in the context of democratisation.

In order to provide a thorough examination of the extent of the effectiveness of EU conditionality on Turkey's democratisation process, this article aimed to systematically analyse the civil-military relations in Turkey in the period of 1999-2008. In the framework of Europeanisation, the analysis hereof has taken into account and scrutinised the interaction between different domestic-level and EU-level factors in accordance with the external incentives and social learning models in order to identify the conditions that decisively define domestic change and policy outcomes.

Throughout 1999-2008, the EU has engaged in a lengthy, public and political deliberation with Turkey to align its policies on civil-military relations with that of the EU. Turkey on the other hand, have had the access to expending variety of political, economic and social opportunities to change the embedded state character, institutional structures, policy reforms. This in turn, created a complex interdependence between Turkey and the EU

throughout Turkey's accession negotiations; and provided the EU an asymmetrical power to induce political reforms which has been thought to help consolidating democracy at the national level.

The key factor that underlined Turkey's democratisation in the process of EU accession was identified as 'conditionality'. By carrying out extensive reforms on civil-military relations, Turkey considerably accommodated the EU rules and conditions, but failed to fully transform its institutions and reform its policies. Nonetheless, the analysis of the policy processes behind the change in civil-military relations revealed that unfavourable domestic conditions such as the historical legacies, strong and centralised state, lack of political will to concede all the EU rules and conditions distorted the ways in which main political actors approached EU conditionality and pursued unremitting domestic change. This ultimately affected the policy outcomes as well as the institutional transformation in Turkey.

According to the results of the cross-temporal analysis, the first period (1999-2002) portrays the process outcome of *fractional Europeanisation*. This outcome of partial adjustment instead of full transformation is explained through the presence of strong conditionality (sizeable and credible rewards) combined with unfavourable domestic conditions (high adoption costs and lack of self-identification). The second period (2002-2005) however proves that domestic conditions became more favourable (drop in the size of adoption costs and successful self-identification). This, combined with continuing strong conditionality thus resulted in the shift from partial adjustment to complete transformation in the second period, which is identified as *positive Europeanisation*. In the third period (2005-2008), no significant change took place at the domestic level due to the presence of unfavourable domestic conditions (high adoption costs and lack of political will in relation to self-identification) and weak conditionality (absence of sizeable and credible rewards). This turn did not produce any process or policy outcome, which is referred to as *negative Europeanisation*.

Overall, in relation to the model of interaction of variables, it can be asserted that only in the presence of these conditions and in combination with strong conditionality materialised through legitimacy along with credible and sizeable rewards, a complete institutional transformation and policy (re)formation could be achieved. Therefore, starting from the presumption that the most decisive factors that lie in the heart of democratisation are positioned at the domestic political domain, it can be claimed neither the external incentives nor the social learning models can account well to explain this outcome. Rather than choosing one model over the other, a

more balanced approach on theoretical grounds should be adopted; and the focus of theoretical investigation on Europeanisation and EU conditionality should be on the interaction among the domestic-level and EU-level factors.

As a policy implication, it can be asserted that the EU has been an important actor for Turkish democratisation, irrespective of the extent of its impact. Accordingly, the dynamics of domestic transformation of Turkey cannot be fully understood if the ways in which the EU generates incentives for political reforms at the domestic level in relation to its pre-accession framework are not considered. However, as the theoretical findings suggest, the EU's current conditionality strategy is not making the anticipated external impact. Thus, there is a need for the EU's policy review on conditionality which will enable diversification to work for target states by taking into consideration of their unique political culture and historical legacies.

To conclude, these policy implications certainly generate further questions for policy-makers both at the EU level and domestic level on the dynamics of institution-building and policy (re)formation as well as dispersion of EU level practices on democracy as rule adoption in national settings. The findings also point to different avenues of research for academics who investigate the emergence and development of new policies and institutional set-ups in specific national contexts as a result of direct exposure to the EU's impact through its conditionality strategy.

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ÖZET

Türkiye'nin demokratikleşme süreci, AB'nin aday ülkelere uyguladığı koşulluluk ilkesi nedeniyle dışsal bir biçimde tetiklenmiştir. Bu kapsamda, demokrasinin temel dayanaklarından biri olan sivil-asker ilişkileri, Türkiye'nin AB'ye uyum sürecinde ve AB koşulluluğu altında farklı düzeylerde kurumsal dönüşüm ve politik (re)formasyona tabi olmuştur. Bu çalışma, sivil-asker ilişkilerini 1999-2008 döneminde inceleyerek, AB koşulluluk ilkesinin Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesi üzerine olan etkisini analiz etmektedir. Çalışma, Avrupalılaştırma çerçevesinde yer alan dış teşvikler ve sosyal öğrenme modelleri ile bağlantılı olan iç ve dış faktörlerin ölçülmesiyle, Türkiye'nin politik sistemi içinde yer alan aktörler, kurumlar, kültürel norm ve değerlerle ilgili değişimlerin temel sebeplerini irdelemektedir.

Teorik çerçeve, AB'nin Türkiye'deki içsel değişimler üzerindeki etki seviyesini değerlendirmek ve demokratikleşme sürecine katkı sunma biçimlerini anlamak amacıyla Avrupalılaştırma üzerinden kurulmaktadır. Kurumsallaştırma olarak Avrupalılaştırma, AB düzlemindeki politikaların ulusal ölçeğe aktarılma ve ülkelerde kurumsallaştırma biçimleri üzerinde durur. Tedrici olarak ülke politikalarını, Avrupa'daki politika üretme sürecine bağlı kılan bir süreci ele alır. Bu çerçevede hipotezler, sırasıyla rasyonel ve sosyolojik kurumsallıktan beslenen dış teşvikler ve sosyal öğrenme modellerinden hareketle çıkarılmıştır. Dış teşvikler ve sosyal öğrenme modellerinin öne çıkardığı ulusal ve AB düzeyinde oluşan bu faktörler; ülkenin uyum sürecinden doğan maliyetlerin boyutu, koşulluluk ilkesinin inanılabilirliği, ödüllerin boyutu, meşruiyet, özdeşlik ve karşılıklı anlayış olarak tanımlanmaktadır.

AB koşulluluk ilkesinin, sivil-asker ilişkileri alanında yaşanan kurumsal dönüşümler ve politik (re)formasyonlar üzerindeki etkisine tesir eden faktörler, 1999-2002, 2002-2005, 2005-2008 olmak üzere üçe ayrılan dönemler kapsamında sistematik ve karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz edilmektedir. Söz konusu tarihsel aralığın dönemlere ayrılması, Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinde yaşanmış temel hadiseler incelenerek belirlenmiştir. Türkiye'deki içsel değişimlerin (veya değişimin olmayışının) arkasında yatan sebep-sonuç ilişkilerini açığa çıkarmak amacıyla, bu dönemlerin her biri için süreç takibi yönteminden yararlanılmaktadır. Bu yöntem sayesinde, AB koşullularının etkisi altında yaşanan demokratikleşme süreciyle bağlantılı olarak Türkiye'de yaşanan değişimleri tasvir eden sebep-sonuç ilişkileri, alınan zaman aralığı içinde ortaya çıkarılmaktadır.

Çalışmanın sonucunda elde edilen bulgular göstermektedir ki Türkiye'nin Avrupalılaştırma sürecine açılması ve bu kapsamda yürüttüğü demokratikleşme süreci öncelikli olarak AB koşulluluk ilkesi çerçevesinde gerçekleşmektedir. AB koşulluluk ilkesi tek başına Türkiye'nin ulusal düzeyde tam bir dönüşüm içerisine girmesinde yetersiz kalmış, eksiksiz ve başarılı olarak nitelendirilebilecek bir ulusal dönüşüm sürecini beraberinde getirememiştir. Analiz sonuçlarına göre; AB koşulluluğu sadece tetikleyici bir faktör olmuş, Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesi üzerine olan etkisi ise AB stratejisinin Türkiye'deki politik ortamda anlaşılabilir hale gelmesine yol açan belirli içsel faktörlere bağlanmış ve tarihsel olarak belirli dönemler içerisinde sınırlı kalmıştır.

Nitekim 1999-2002 yılları arasında gözlemlenen olumsuz ulusal faktörlerin güçlü bir koşulluluk ile birleşmesiyle Türkiye, kısmi Avrupalılaşıma süreci içerisine girmiştir. Bu durumu açıklayan faktörler; Türkiye için uyum maliyeti ile başarısız olarak nitelendirilebilecek özdeşlik; AB düzeyinde ise güçlü bir koşulluluğun sağlanmasına imkan tanıyan meşruiyet ve büyük boyutlardaki teknik ve mali yardımlar olarak belirlenmiştir. 2002-2005 döneminde ise ulusal faktörlerin daha uyumlu ve olumlu gelmesi ve ilk dönemde görülen güçlü koşulluluğun devam etmesi sonucunda Türkiye'nin sivil-asker ilişkileri alanında pozitif Avrupalılaşıma süreci içerisine girdiği gözlemlenmiştir. 2005-2008 dönemine bakıldığında ise bu durum tamamen değişmiştir. Nitekim hem ulusal düzeydeki faktörlerin olumsuzlaşması (artan maliyet, AB üyeliğine yönelik zayıflayan siyasi iradeye bağlı özdeşlik sorunu) hem de AB koşulluluğunun oldukça zayıflaması (AB üye devletleri arasındaki fikir ayrılıkları, Türkiye ile yaşanan siyasi sorunlar ve ödüllerin yetersiz kalarak meşruiyetini yitirmesi), Türkiye'nin bu dönemde negatif bir Avrupalılaşıma sürecine maruz kaldığını ortaya koymuştur.