

Jerusalem and Christian-Muslim Relations: the Contemporary Context

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This paper examines the relationship between Christianity and Islam in the context of Jerusalem. The two Faiths find a natural meeting place in Jerusalem. The Scriptures of Christianity give a centrality to Jerusalem for its place in the Hebrew Scriptures (the Christian Old Testament), and also because of its locus as the scene of the final drama of the trial, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ. For Muslims, Jerusalem, *Al-Quds al-Sharif*, is associated primarily with the offering of Ishmael as a sacrifice by Abraham and also, by commonly-agreed tradition, with the furthest *Qibla*, the destination of the prophet Muhammad on his miraculous night journey. There are many other associations with the prophets of Islam: beginning with Adam, who is said in one Hadith to have been the founder of the *Al-Aqsa*, later renovated or rebuilt in turn by Jacob, David, and Solomon.¹ Many of the pious associations associated with Jerusalem and with sites in and around The city are shared by followers of the two faiths.

Two points to be stressed in examining relations between Islam and Christianity in the context of Jerusalem there are. The first is the distinction between Christian-Muslim relations at the international level and those between indigenous Christian and Muslim believers at the local level. The second is that in Jerusalem, as elsewhere Muslim-Christian relations are never purely bilateral. The need to dialogue with Jews, religious or secular, can never be excluded from the agenda of Muslim-Christian conversations.

Both these points are important for making a balanced assessment of Muslim-Christian relations during the period from

the advent of Islam up until the twentieth century. It is clear that both points are valid for discussion of the modern period also. The international relationship may find its focus on Jerusalem, but it is also influenced by wider issues affecting relations between the two faiths. These issues in turn are determined by political factors which do not arise directly from religious differences. Both at the international and at the local level, however, the relationship is never merely bilateral. Judaism remains the essential third party to any encounter between Christians and Muslims. This is true whether the encounter focuses on Jerusalem or not. The fact that such a trilateral discussion seems to be difficult in the present climate of discussion over the future of Jerusalem serves to remind us of the way in which inter-faith relationships have always been influenced by political conflicts.²

Jerusalem remains a sacred symbol for all three religions. Some Western Christians have allowed a desire to improve relations with Judaism to be at the expense of both the Muslim and the Christian inhabitants of Jerusalem. By contrast the leaderships of the major Christian Churches have insisted on the special status of Jerusalem for all three religions and have protested against the attempt of one of the three to claim a special monopoly over it. At the local level the common cultural roots of Palestinian Christians and Palestinian Muslims have always underpinned strong links between the two communities. As we shall see, the experience of the Palestinian *Nakba*, the catastrophe of 1948, and its aftermath have led to a still stronger solidarity between Christians and Muslims. They have also given rise to a genuine and innovative dialogue between the two faiths. In the event of a serious movement towards the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict it is to be hoped that the new openness between Christians and Muslims can include Judaism in the conversation to the benefit of all. This development would strengthen relations between the three Abrahamic faiths not only at the local but also at the international level. However without a

resolution of the political conflict over Jerusalem this ideal is no realisable.

Jerusalem and Interfaith: the International Forum

At the international level Christian reposes have not been uniform. Large numbers of American and other western Evangelical Christians of a particular type have interpreted the 1967 Israeli conquest of Jerusalem as the fulfilment of Biblical prophecy and as a presage of the second coming of Jesus. In response to the refusal of the international community to recognise the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem or to establish embassies there, this group has set up a "Christian Embassy" in Jerusalem. Other western Christians, primarily influenced by the desire to improve Christian-Jewish relations, are apparently indifferent to the judaising of Jerusalem.³ Such attitudes take no account at all of the rights of the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem, Muslim or Christian. At the official level however, as we shall see the leaderships of the major Christian Churches have joined with authoritative Muslim voices in arguing for the rights of the local Palestinian population of Jerusalem and have urged a solution to the future of the City that would be acceptable to all three religions. Moreover the integrity of Jerusalem for Christianity, Islam and Judaism has been repeatedly spoken of in relation to *religious dialogue between the three faiths*. Special status has been demanded for the two peoples and for the three religions in the hope that Jerusalem would become a cross-roads of reconciliation and peace.

Thus statements by the World Council of Churches⁴ in 1974 affirmed that Jerusalem was a holy city for three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.⁵ Tendencies to minimise Jerusalem's importance for any of these three religions should be avoided. Furthermore the question of Jerusalem could never be reduced to the matter of the protection of the holy places. It was also linked with the living faiths and communities of people in the holy city. Any solution over Jerusalem would have take into account the rights and needs of

the people who lived there and would need to be seen within the context of the resolution of the conflict as a whole. For this reason it was recommended that a solution should be worked out with member churches of the WCC, particularly with those most directly concerned, and in consultation with the Roman Catholic Churches (which are not full members of the Council). These should also become subjects for *dialogue* with *Jewish* and *Muslim participants*.

The Holy See has been involved in the discourse on Zionism from the time that Theodore Herzl visited the Pope in 1904. On the question of Jerusalem it has consistently urged the maintenance of the status quo with full rights for the three faiths. Thus in the statement of the permanent observer of the Vatican to the United Nations in 1979, he warned that failure or delay in finding a solution to the question of Jerusalem might bring into question the settlement of the whole Middle East crisis. also considered it important that there should be no irreversible situations created which would prejudice the ultimate resolution of the conflict.⁶

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2nd 1979,⁷ Pope John Paul II urged the importance of international guarantees over Jerusalem. Echoing his predecessor Pope Paul VI the Pope asked for a solution which recognised the special nature of Jerusalem as a heritage sacred to the believers of the three monotheistic religions. This would preserve the special status of the Holy City and its identity as a religious centre, unique and outstanding in the history of the world, in such a way that it would be a place of *encounter and concord for the three great monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam)*. To this end the Holy See argued that Jerusalem be given special status guaranteeing parity for the two peoples, Israelis and Palestinians, and freedom of worship and of access to the Holy Places for the three religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam.

In 1980 in total disregard for mainstream Muslim, Christian and other responsible world opinion the Israelis

annexed Jerusalem characterising it as "the eternal capital of Israel". In the same year the World Council of Churches responded.⁸ On the basis of previous WCC statements the Central Committee opposed Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and the unification of the city as its "eternal capital" under its exclusive rule. The decision was contrary to UN resolutions and undermined the prospects of peace in the region. The WCC affirmed the destiny of Jerusalem as a city including Christians as well as Jews and Muslims, which could not be considered in isolation from the destiny of the Palestinian people. It urged that possibilities be explored for consultation with the Muslim and Jewish communities concerned with the future character of Jerusalem so as to seek ways to consolidate justice and human coexistence in the "City of Peace".

Although the Pope was criticised for not protesting about other actions of the Begin government affecting Palestinians' rights, the Holy See protested in a downright fashion against the Israeli annexation of the old City of Jerusalem: "It must be understood that the declaration in 1980 that Jerusalem is the "central and indivisible capital of Israel" is contrary to international law, based as it is on military occupation without the consent of the interested parties or the United Nations and condemned as it immediately was by the Security Council; the fact that almost no countries have moved their embassies to Jerusalem is further proof that the international community rejects the legitimacy of the unilateral declaration."⁹

Meeting with President Carter on June 21, 1980, the Pope again laid emphasis on the importance of Jerusalem as embodying interests and aspirations that are shared by different peoples in different ways and expressed strong opposition to any unilaterally imposed solution in Jerusalem which did not include international legal protection of the rights of *all* communities in the Holy City. Despite the suggestion that the Holy See might be prepared to accept Israeli sovereignty with certain guarantees from the Israeli Government, Israel was not prepared to compromise on this issue.¹⁰ On July 30, 1980, the Knesset

passed the Ceula Cohen law to annex Jerusalem and declare it to be the *de jure* capital of Israel. The Pope, together with other Roman Catholic leaders expressed their dismay at this step which, in fact, represented a rejection of the Holy See's attempts at compromise.

Subsequent to the annexation papal statements became more overtly pro-Palestinian. In a speech delivered in Otranto on October 5, 1980 the Pope spoke of "the painful condition of the Palestinian people: a large part of whom are excluded from their land."¹¹ Speaking of Jerusalem the Pope characterised it as "today the object of a dispute that seems without a solution, tomorrow -if people only want it- tomorrow a cross-roads of reconciliation and peace."¹²

More recently, in 1998 the World Council of Churches Conference in Harare stressed once more the interests of the indigenous Christians in Jerusalem. It went on to condemn the disregard on their basic human rights which was contributing more and more to a Christian exodus from the city. The resolution of the question of the final status of Jerusalem could only be resolved within the context of comprehensive peace settlement for the region. This included: the continuing negotiations that had taken place between the various parties since 1991; the issues of peace and security, justice, equal rights, the welfare of the Churches; the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO and the rights to statehood and self determination of the Palestinian people. It then goes on to recapitulate the historic framework of international law which relates to the issue of Jerusalem.¹³

Jerusalem and Interfaith: the local Palestinian Forum

Despite some vacillation on the part of Pope John Paul II before 1980 it is clear from these and other statements that from the beginning the Holy See has had the perspective shared by the World Council of Churches. The issue of Jerusalem should not only be seen as a major issue of justice and peace. It also merits consideration as a unique locus of dialogue between Christianity

and its sister religions of Islam and Judaism. The fact that the majority of Jews have supported the exclusively Jewish claims for Jerusalem means that, in the short term at least, inter-faith dialogue linked to the future of the holy City has been chiefly a matter between Muslims and Christians. The difficulty of including Judaism in this dialogue is illustrated by the statement of Rabbi A. James Ruben who asserted that Christian recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was a *sine qua non* for dialogue between the two religions.¹⁴ This is particularly true at the local level where Muslim-Christian solidarity has been built upon the shared experience of the Palestinian *Nakba* in 1948 and its aftermath in the Israeli conquest of Jerusalem in 1967. This shared suffering has led to a strengthening of ties between Christian and Muslim Palestinians. This solidarity had its roots as early as the beginning of the British Mandate in Palestine when Palestinian Christians were actively involved in anti-Zionist Palestinian politics. In 1918 The Muslim-Christian Society (*Al-Jam'iyyah al-Islamiyyah al-Masahiyyah*), had been formed to develop a common front against the encroachment of Zionism on Palestinian rights. Christians generally made up some 20% of the membership despite constituting less than 8% of the population of Palestine as a whole. At the First Congress of Muslim Christian Societies, half of the Jerusalem delegates were Christian, predominantly Roman Catholic.¹⁵

In the post 1967 period the local leadership of both Muslims and Christians maintained this tradition of mutual support and solidarity. For example in April 1990 the Higher Council For Islamic *Waqf* Affairs And Holy Sites issued a statement expressing its profound anxiety over the take-over of Christian Holy places by Jewish settlers supported by the Israeli government in the Christian Quarter of the Old City.¹⁶ The Higher Council characterised such aggression as aimed at the holy places and rights of all Palestinian Muslims and Christians in the Holy Land, and as an attack on the Christian world and its right to worship in the Holy Land.

In an expression of Muslim solidarity with their Christian counterparts the Council decided to close the door of *al-Haram al-Sharif* (*Al-Aqsa* Mosque area) to all foreign visitors and tourists for one day. It called on "people of conscience and believers in God throughout the world... to join hands and take active, effective steps to stop these flagrant aggressions and return order to its proper place and restore the rights of the (*building's*) owners".

Statements from the local Church leadership exhibited the same sentiments of solidarity between Christians and Muslims over Jerusalem. Thus the Middle East Council of Churches, in its rejection of the formal annexation of Jerusalem by Israel in 1980,¹⁷ emphasised the rights of the Christian and Muslim inhabitants of Jerusalem, "who for centuries imprinted the character of the holy City with their religious and cultural heritage". The Christians and Muslims of Jerusalem, along with all the peace-makers of the world, reject the Judaisation of the character and features of the City... Jerusalem was the meeting place of the three monotheistic faiths which would lose its significance and role should the Israeli occupation persist. A statement by local Christian bishops published in November 1994 asserted that Jerusalem was "a city holy for the people of the three monotheistic religions: Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Its unique nature of sanctity endows it with a special vocation: calling for ... harmony among people, whether citizens, pilgrims or visitors..." Unfortunately, the city had become a source of conflict and was at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab disputes. It was a matter of regret that the question of Jerusalem had apparently been side stepped in the Peace Process. Jerusalem cannot belong "exclusively to one people or to only one religion. Jerusalem should be open to all, shared by all. Those who govern the city should make it humankind."

A further example of Israeli Jewish exclusivity in its attitude to Jerusalem was evident in September 1996 when a tunnel was opened beside the Al Aqsa Mosque. Seizing the opportunity to express Christian Palestinian solidarity with the

Palestinian Muslim community the Latin Patriarch, Michel Sabah, issued a statement in which he prayed that all the parties to the dispute might be given "wisdom and prudence so as to go out of the tunnel of fear."¹⁸

It is evident that much of the rhetoric of Muslim and Christian statements about Jerusalem has turned on the idea that Jerusalem is not just a place where human and religious rights must be protected but also that it is a place where the three religions should find common ground. Evidently there has been common ground between Muslims and Christians at the official level. At the popular level too, there has been considerable evidence of a sense of common cause arising from shared suffering. However this sense of common cause has not only expressed itself in solidarity but also in inter-faith dialogue. In the 1980s a small but significant and influential group of Palestinian Muslim and Christians formed *Al-Liqa'* (literally "The Meeting"), with the aim of discovering more about each other and building upon solidarity to make new openings in inter-faith dialogue between Christianity and Islam.

Al-Liqa' was launched after a conference on *Christian-Muslim Arab Heritage in the Holy Land* at Bethlehem University in 1983. Spokesmen for the organisation emphasise that the initiative was no just a Christian initiative but a joint Muslim-Christian Palestinian one. Jerusalem has been a major question for *Al-Liqa'* but figures as one reason among several in the setting up of the organisation. These reasons included the need to respond to the apparently religious dimension to the civil war in the Lebanon and to the war between Iran and Iraq. There was a general perception among Palestinians that the Israelis had attempted to force a wedge between the Muslim and Christian communities as an exercise of "divide and rule tactics". This tactic often involved Israeli propagation of the myth that the Israeli forces protected the Christians from extreme Islamic elements. As they spread this version of reality the Israeli authorities, often at the same time, encouraged and indirectly

sponsored extremist Islamic groups in an attempt to undermine the mainstream Palestinian leadership.

In response to such machinations the founders of *Al-Liqa'* considered that Muslim Christian relations which were already strong needed to be strengthened still further. Unlike the situation in the Gulf or the Maghreb where the Christian communities were foreign, the Christians of the Levant had always been integral to the mainstream Muslim culture. This was particularly true in the case of Palestine where, apart from the terrible period of the Crusades, the two communities had benefited from the generally enlightened policies of Muslim rulers from the Caliph Umar until the end of the Ottoman Empire. One Muslim spokesman for *Al-Liqa'* emphasised that as a Palestinian Muslim he felt stronger ties with a Palestinian Christian than he ever could with a fellow Muslim from Malaysia or Pakistan.¹⁹ The two communities had shared each their respective celebrations and had often been brought together by shared aspects of popular folk religion. The Occupation had attempted to split Christians and Muslims but Muslims had demonstrated that they shared fully in the Christian concern over the decline in the numbers of Christians in the historic Holy Land of Palestine. Nevertheless, the strong sense of unity between Muslim and Christian had not been matched with real insight by members of each community into what members of the other community really believed. The time had come for a mutual discovery going beyond mere tolerance and friendship and opening up a real dialogue between Muslim and Christian which might ultimately be extended to include Judaism.

Jerusalem: the Trilateral Dimension

On the issue of Jerusalem *Al-Liqa'* sees the city as part of Palestinian territory occupied since 1967. The implementation of UN resolutions is the only reasonable basis for the resolution of the conflict. Sovereignty should be shared but could never be abandoned. In the words of Geris Khoury, one of the chief architects of *Al-Liqa'*, "The problem of Jerusalem isn't only

religious. In this time, which I call "the Time of Jerusalem", "the Kairos of Jerusalem", all of us are invited to work together in order to save the city and to let it be a holy city for ever. There is no theological justification for the Jews to claim it as the undivided and eternal capital of Israel." This is a position shared by all the mainstream Christian and Muslim groups, opposed only by fanatical fundamentalists (Christian Zionists and Islamic rejectionists). The resolution of the conflict would open up the possibilities for inter-faith dialogue not only between Christians and Muslim but also with Jews. In fact Jews who recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinians have been participating in events organised by *Al-Liqa'* since 1994 and *Al-Liqa'* has been a participant in discussions with the Israel Inter-Faith Association. Whether the focus has been on Jerusalem or on other topics, the main difficulties in the tri-lateral conversation have been political rather than religious. Experience demonstrated that it was better to start the discussion with religious questions and to end with the political ones.

While religious questions might be the best starting point for dialogue with Jews it is inevitable that from the perspective of Palestinians the question of Jerusalem is dominated by outstanding political questions. Christian and Muslim Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are currently denied the right to enter Jerusalem for family, business or religious reasons. Travel for Palestinians from Jerusalem to the West Bank and Gaza is also subject to restrictions.²⁰ Meanwhile the economy continues to get worse and high unemployment rises further.

Conclusion: What can be done?

Whatever is decided over the heads of the people of Jerusalem by the "final status talks" between the new Israeli administration and the Palestinian Authority it is important to ask what can be done by concerned individuals irrespective of their religion or their country of origin. For those who care about Jerusalem as a focus of dialogue and unity the agenda divides

between the issues of human rights, political rights and spiritual encounter.

The human rights which believers of all faiths must demand for the peoples of Jerusalem include the right of Palestinians to travel freely with in the West Bank, and to and from Jerusalem. Associated with this right are the fundamental rights of every person: the right to receive an education, the right to religious worship, the right to receive health care, and the right to work. All these rights must be restored if Jerusalem is to fulfil its spiritual and moral potential for the world. Such fundamental human rights are integrally linked with the political rights which they imply.

In the words of Dr. Thiab Ayyoush: "Jerusalem our Palestinian capital, has its unique significance for Christian and Muslim Palestinians. However we cannot separate this religious significance from the political one. Jerusalem, as you know, was and still is a non-separated part of the Palestinian territories of 1967."²¹ In the words of the Latin Patriarch Michel Sabah: "In Jerusalem live two peoples, the Palestinian and the Israeli, and three religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Hence the necessity to find a way of guaranteeing this sovereignty to each of the two peoples, Palestinian and Israeli, in order to guarantee religious freedom on behalf of each of the two sovereignties, and then to all the faithful of the three religions, whether they are inhabitants of Jerusalem or pilgrims."²²

Political rights require that the Peace Accords should be honoured and implemented immediately. The final status negotiations on the future of Jerusalem should involve acceptance that Jerusalem become a centre for three faiths and two nations. Unstinting agreement by all parties to these fundamental human and political rights is a *sine qua non* for a spiritual encounter between religions in which religious issues are not obscured by injustice.

Jerusalem was the meeting place of the three monotheistic faiths. It will lose its significance and role if the Israeli occupation persists. This occupation denies the Arab

character of Jerusalem and deprives the Arab Palestinians of Jerusalem of their national identity. In the words of a resolution from the Middle East Council of Churches: "The City is inseparably tied to the Palestinian people. No resolution on the issue of Jerusalem can be accepted unless the Palestinian people are reassured of their freedom and prosperity, and their deliverance from subjugation and bondage."²³

Israeli propagandists frequently isolate the question of the undivided unity of Jerusalem from the more basic issue of harmony and justice. In the words of Archbishop Lutfi Laham "The real question for the future of Jerusalem is not whether the city will be united or divided, as Jewish propaganda has it, but whether the harmony of all peoples living here for centuries will be achieved, or permitted- this is the meaning of the future. Here we have the meaning of Psalm 121:3: "Jerusalem is built as a city bound firmly together". The harmony of different parts, not a closed exclusivity, gives the true sense of unity."²⁴

The centrality of Jerusalem to both Christianity and to Islam does not deny its importance to Judaism any more than its centrality for Christianity denies its importance to Islam, or its centrality for Islam denies its importance for Christianity. The common ground between international Islamic and Christian organisations is impressive. Likewise the solidarity and dialogue between Christian and Muslim Palestinians provides a model worthy of imitation by Christians and Muslims in Britain and elsewhere. Where the common ground is based on demands which are consistent with justice it is evident that genuine interfaith dialogue becomes possible. To the extent that the followers of the religion of Judaism can come to share such common ground in relation to the question of Jerusalem it can be expected that the conversation will include all three Abrahamic faiths. When this happens Jerusalem can begin to achieve its potential as a symbol of unity for all the peoples of the earth.

Post Script

Reflection on the dynamic of the *Al-Liqa'* initiatives provides example and inspiration for initiatives in Muslim-Christian co-operation and dialogue on a wider stage. Too often the experience of so-called dialogue is of a formalistic exchange of preconceived ideas. It is too rarely that one gets the impression of Muslims and Christians approaching each other in a way that they could genuinely learn from and even be surprised by what they discover about each other. Co-operation over the issue of the rights of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians, in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine, has provided a new dynamism to Muslim-Christian relations among a small group of Palestinian intellectuals. It seems likely that it could have wider relevance for Muslim and Christian at the international level. Indeed while the issue of Jerusalem and the rights of the Palestinians is a sound basis for such dynamism wider issues of human rights could engage Muslims and Christians to the same effect. Members of the two faiths who share a common hunger for justice and an end to discrimination can work together for their common godly goals. Out of such co-operation can arise a new respect and comradeship from which genuine and open-hearted dialogue can arise. Here at last is a *Jihad*, a spiritual warfare, that can unite the followers of all three religions of those who claim to be followers of the God of Abraham. Let battle be joined!

¹ Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, *Jerusalem a Holy City for Three Religions. A Muslim Perspective*, Living Stones Spring 1999, p. 12

² A striking example of this fact is illustrated by the influence of Middle Eastern politics on discussion of relationships between Christians and Jews and of Christians and Muslims at the Second Vatican Council. See Duncan Macpherson, "The Second Vatican Council and the Future of Christian-Muslim Dialogue", *University Lectures in Islamic Studies*, volume 2, (Altajir World of Islam Trust, London, 1998).

3 For an authoritative overview of this subject see chapter 5 of M. Prior, *Zionism and the State of Israel, A Moral Enquiry* (Routledge, London and New York, 1999)

4 The World Council of Churches was founded in 1948 and represents most of the mainstream non-Roman Catholic Christian denominations

5 Statement of World Council Of Churches central Committee on Jerusalem, West Berlin, August 1974

6 Statement received from the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations ,3 December, 1979, Documents on Jerusalem, (Passia, Jerusalem, 1996), P. 19

7 Andrej Kreutz, *Vatican Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, (Greenwood, New York, 1990), P. 154

8 Statement by east Jerusalem, West Geneva, 20 August 1980 Documents on Jerusalem, P. 20

9 Address by the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations, Archbishop Renato R. Martino, concerning Jerusalem, 10 April 1989, Documents on Jerusalem, P. 24

10 Andrej Kreutz, *Vatican Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, p. 154

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p. 156

13 These details affect the Holy Places and religious communities specified in 1922 ion the League of Nations Mandate to Britain; the UN General Assembly of 1947 which designated Jerusalem as a separate entity; UN Resolution of December 1948 on the status of Jerusalem and the right of Palestinian return; the UN General Assembly Resolution 303 of 1948 reasserting that Jerusalem should be placed under international authority and administered by the UN; and UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 which demanded Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem and the other occupied territories

- 14 See M. Prior, *Zionism and the State of Israel*, *A Moral Enquiry*, p. 124
- 15 Andrej Kreutz, *Vatican Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, p. 39
- 16 Statement of Solidarity with the Christian Churches in Jerusalem by the Higher Council for Islamic Waqf Affairs and Holy Sites, April 1990, Documents on Jerusalem, P. 15
- 17 Documents on Jerusalem, p. 21
- 18 Documents on Jerusalem, p. 34
- 19 Musa Darwish together with Dr Adnan Mussalam also of Bethlehem University in a conversation with the author in the offices of Al-Liqa', July 1999
- 20 For a detailed breakdown of the legal issues involved in Israeli policies towards Jerusalem, see Riziq Shuqair, *Jerusalem: Its Legal Status and the Possibility of a Durable Settlement* (Al-Haq, Ramallah, 1998)
- 21 *Jerusalem Between Religious Freedom and Sovereignty* (Al-Liqa', Centre for Religious and Heritage Studies in the Holy Land, Jerusalem, 1995), p.23
- 22 Ibid
- 23 Documents on Jerusalem, 1980 (mecc), p. 21 emergency meeting on Jerusalem, August 1980 [excerpt]
- 24 Archbishop Lutfi Laham Words of Welcome *Jerusalem Between Religious Freedom and Sovereignty* (Al-Liqa' Centre for Religious and Heritage Studies in the Holy Land, Jerusalem, 1995), p. 11