ISLAM AND POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE THEOLOGICAL POSITIONS OF THE EGYPTIAN 'ALI ABD AL RAZIQ (D.1966) AND THE SENEGALESE CHEIKH MOUSSA KAMARA (D.1945)

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İslam ve siyaset: Mısırlı Ali Abd al-Rāzik (ö.1966) ve Senegalli Şeyh Moussa Kamara'nın (ö.1945) teolojik konumlarının karşılaştırmalı bir analizi
Öz

20. yüzyılın ortaları, son Müslüman halifelik olan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun çöküşüne tanık oldu ve aynı zamanda Avrupa emperyalizmi, Müslümanların çoğunlukta olduğu toplumlarda yayılmaya devam etti. Avrupa ile Müslüman dünyası arasındaki çatışma aynı zamanda reformist fikirlerin ortaya çıkmasına da yol açarak demokrasi, kadın hakları, din ve iktidar arasındaki ilişki vb. konularda yoğun tartışmalara yol açtı. Buna ek olarak sömürgeleştirme, özellikle Sahra altı Afrika'daki köklü sistemleri de parçaladı ve kendi hegemonyasını dayattı. Bu bağlamda Müslümanların sömürgeci güçle sürdürmek zorunda olduğu ilişkiler de tartışma konusu oldu. Makalemizin amacı, İslam'ın siyasi doğasını ilk sorgulayanlardan biri olan ve şu anda ünlü olan El-İslam ve Uşûl el-Hukm (İslam ve Gücün Temelleri) kitabının yazarı Mısırlı Ali 'Abdurrazik'in teolojik düşüncesini analiz etmektir. Onun düşünceleri, sömürge Afrika'sında dinin iktidar amacıyla kullanılması üzerine bir düşünce olan Aktar al-rāġibīn kitabının yazarı olan Sahra altı yazar Cheikh Moussa Kamara ile karşılaştırılarak analiz edilecektir. Amaç, her ikisinin de manevi otorite ile dünyevi güç arasındaki ilişki hakkında nasıl düşündüğünü vurgulamak olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afrika'da güç, din, hilafet, cihad, laiklik, siyaset, İslam

Islam and politics: a comparative analysis of the theological positions of the Egyptian 'Alī Abd al-Rāziq (d.1966) and the Senegalese Cheikh Moussa Kamara (d.1945)
Abstract

The mid-20th century saw the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the last Muslim caliphate, and at the same time, European imperialism continued to develop in Muslim-majority societies. The clash between Europe and the Muslim world also led to the emergence of reformist ideas, sparking intense debate on democracy, women's rights, the relationship between religion and power, and so on. Added to this, colonization also dismantled well-established systems, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and imposed its hegemony. In this context, the relationship that Muslims had to maintain with colonial power was also the subject of debate. The aim of our contribution is to analyze the theological thinking of one of the first to question the political nature of Islam, namely the Egyptian 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq, author of the now famous book Al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm (Islam and the Foundations of Power). His reflections will be analyzed in comparison with those of a sub-Saharan author, Cheikh Moussa Kamara, author of Akṯar al-rāġibīn, a reflection on the use of religion for power purposes in colonial Africa. The aim will be to highlight how both think about the relationship between spiritual authority and temporal power.

Key words: Power, religion, caliphate, jihād, secularism, politics, Islam in Africa

Introduction

Speaking to the Jeune Afrique newspaper in 2014, the Tunisian historian of islam and thinker Mohammed Talbi (d.2017) provocatively asserted that "Islam was born secular" (Zouari, 2014). Pointing to the Koranic verse stating that there is "No coercion in matters of religion", he continues:

"The Koran is the only sacred book that says this sentence, so clear, so secular. Everyone practices the religion he wishes. The state has no business interfering in religious affairs. Its only function is to create an atmosphere of peace for all. But what have Islamic states done? They have exercised religious coercion. And the Koran says no to Islamic states" (ibid).

Talbi's statements would not be a provocation if they were not made in a context where political Islam was developing in several countries of the Arab world, and if the author did not claim to belong to a religion where the majority of theologians consider Islam inseparable from politics. It is the famous triptych Dīn (Religion), Dunyā (worldly life) and Dawla (State) from which the theoretical orientation of contemporary Islamism derives. It is this kind of theological guidance, based on the aforementioned triptych, that inscribes Islam in what Muslim sociologist and reformist Omero Marongiu-Perria calls "the hegemonic paradigm" (Marongiu-Perria, 2017).

However, the relationship between religion and politics, or the use of religion for the purposes of power, has been the subject of debate in the Muslim world, especially in the first half of the ٢٠th century. This period corresponded not only to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which marked the end of the caliphate, but also to a context in which many countries in the Arab world were living under Western colonization and/or protectorate. It was also a time when Muslim reformist ideas were developing in many countries, notably Egypt and Lebanon. This made it a favorable environment for questioning the traditionally accepted model of power in the Muslim world, namely the caliphate, and the application of legal principles derived from Muslim law (fiqh). It's also worth noting the paradox that, at around the same time, political Islam was developing. Islamization or de-Islamization of politics becomes the subject of debate in the Muslim world. The purpose of our contribution is to analyze the theological thought of one of the first to question the political nature of Islam, namely the Egyptian ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq, author of the now famous work Al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm (Islam and the Foundations of Power). His thought will be analyzed in comparison with that of an author from sub-Saharan Africa, still little studied today for his theological thought: Cheikh Moussa Kamara,

author of Ak̲t̲ar al-rāg̲ibīn, which Prof. Amar Samb wrongly translated into French as "Condamnation de la guerre sainte (Condamnation of the Holy War)".

We will use content analysis methodologies to highlight the theological thinking of both authors on the relationship between Islam and power. The conclusion will provide an opportunity to consider how far their thoughts are dictated by ideals of universalism or by a simple realism imposed by the context of Western domination. But first, let's take a look at the contexts of both men's work.

Crossover of two contexts

The production contexts of Ali 'Abd al-Rāziq's work and that of Cheikh Moussa Kamara have some points of similarity. Both authors come from countries that have experienced Western domination. Senegal lived under French colonization and Egypt under British protectorate. Their theological writings were produced after the First World War. Both authors were in close contact with European authorities. Indeed, Cheikh Moussa Kamara was a close friend of many French Africanists such as Henry Gaden and Maurice Delafosse, to the point that much of his work was produced "during the colonial period, and often with the encouragement of the French authorities themselves" (Robinson, 1998, p.89). For his part, after obtaining a doctorate at Al-Azhar University in 1912, Rāziq enrolled at Oxford University for studies in economics before returning to Egypt in 1915 with the outbreak of the War. Apart from these points in common, other elements of context differentiate the two authors.

Let's start with Ali 'Abd al-Rāziq's. The context of Rāziq's birth, in 1887, corresponded to the emergence and development of reformist ideas carried by scholars who, from their contact with Europe and France in particular, wanted to bring about reforms that would enable the Muslim worlds to catch up with the West in terms of its economic development. However, the challenge was to follow Europe's path in material terms, while preserving the spiritual dimension of Islam. To achieve this, Islam had to be stripped of all the superstitions added to it over the centuries. It was this return to the original Islam of the pious predecessors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ) that marked the birth of Salafism, which in its early days had a modernist orientation. The most illustrious of this current were, among others, Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī (d.1873), author of the classic Or de Paris, Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d.1905), initiator of the Salafiyya reform movement, Qāsim Amīn (d.1908), known for his writings on women's liberation, and Ṭaha Ḥusayn (d.1973), one of the main precursors of historical criticism of Muslim tradition in the Arab world. It is in this continuity that the work of 'Ali 'Abd al-Rāziq fits.

The other element to take into account is the context in which the book was published. Although there is every reason to believe that the author "began working on the question of the foundations of justice in Islam as early as his return from England in 1915, ten years before the publication of his book" in 1925 (Ansary, 1994), the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924 gave it added resonance in that Muslim thinkers, notably those at Al-Azhar, were working behind the scenes for a return of the Caliphate (Ḥusayn, 2012, p.36). Moreover, when his book was published, he, who was a Muslim judge in Egypt, was the subject of a lawsuit whose ruling on September 17, 1925 led to his dismissal. It was only later, when his brother Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Rāziq became the Grand Cheikh of Al-Azhar that ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq recovered his civic rights.

We thus see that the context in which he lived was conducive to the emergence of new debates on democracy, power or even women's rights.

The geographical and temporal contexts in which Cheikh Moussa Kamara evolved were no less chaotic. Born around 1863 in Goûriki Samba-Diom in the canton of Damga in Matam, Senegal, his name is more closely associated with Gangel, in Elhadji Oumar's Fouta Toro, where he settled at the age of 20 (Djenidi, 1976, p.309). It must be said that this region of Fouta was the scene of several armed mobilizations. The end of the 19th century also saw the forced exile or "death under the banner of jihād of famous chiefs: Lat Dior (died 1886), Mamadou Lamine (died 1887), Samory (captured 1898), Al-Buri Ndiaye (died 1891)" (Djenidi, 1984, p.228). In addition to having witnessed the consequences of the Umarian conquest, whose "traces were fresh in the minds" of Fouta at the time of Kamara's birth, our author was also in his youth, as Abdallah Djenidi recalls, a witness to the fall of the Almamis in 1881 and the installation of the colonial administration in Fouta (Djenidi, 1976, p.311). The Damga area also saw many of its children enlisted in the Umarian conquest. It is in the light of this geographical as well as temporal context, which saw the passage of armed wars and the installation of colonial administration, that Kamara's theological thinking concerning the use of political affairs in the name of religion and, above all, the use of jihād in the name of Islam in a context of French domination must be read. Our cross-reading of the two contexts gives us the tools to analyze the theological positions of our two writers closely. More importantly, it allows us to grasp the motivations of the two authors in writing their two works, both of which have been subject to controversy.

Alī ʿAbd al-Rāziq's theological position

Published in 1925, the book by Rāziq Al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm (Islam and the

Foundations of Power), is in itself an innovation insofar as it proposes a reflection, not on power, but on the foundations of power (uṣūl). He thus operated an interpretative mobility of the concept of uṣūl (foundation) previously used in Muslim terminology in normative disciplines. Thus, we spoke of uṣūl al-fiqh (the foundations of normative theology) and uṣūl al-dīn (the foundations of dogmatic theology). In this sense, Al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm is a revolution primarily epistemological before it is theological. In terms of theology, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq maintains that there is no objective link between a religious belief, here Islam, and the management of power. The former is of divine order, the latter the fruit of human reflections and strategies. For the purposes of his demonstration, the author has put the issues of the caliphate and power in Islam to the test of his analysis. And the context is given right from the introduction:

"I've been a judge in Egyptian Muslim courts since 1915. This prompted me to research the history of Islamic justice. Since Islamic justice, in all its facets, is part of power, and the two histories are closely linked [...], it is incumbent on anyone studying the history of Islamic justice to begin with its first pillar, namely power in Islam. And since the caliphate, sometimes called the supreme imamate, is the basis of all power in Islam, we are obliged to look at it" (Rāziq, 2012, p.3).

Lets start with the caliphate, which he defines as managing the affairs of Muslims in replacement of the Prophet (ibid, p.9). In his view, this heritage leads Muslim traditionalists, the object of his criticism, to say that the caliph is thus governed by religion, whose rules frame his actions. As a result, the caliph could not, in theory, deviate from the right path. It is on the basis of these rules that fix the caliph as different from royalty (al-mulk) (ibid, p.14). This theoretical framework leads traditionalists to derive the caliph's legitimacy first from God (istimdāduhū al-walāya min Allāh) (ibid, pp.16-20), then from the people (istimdād al-walāya min al-umma) (ibid, pp.20-22). The consequence of this legitimacy was to make the caliphate obligatory and necessary for the progress of the community (ibid, pp.23-24).

This thesis is contested by Al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm. Rāziq's criticism is primarily based on scriptural texts. According to him, no text of the Koran or hadith of the Prophet decrees the obligation to have a caliph. If the caliphate were obligatory, the Koran would speak of it, according to him, unless it were an incomplete book, which is theologically indefensible (ibid, p.27). This leaves the proponents of the obligatory nature of the caliphate with the argument of the consensus of scholars (ijmāʾ) on the necessity of a caliph for the running of the community (imtināʿ ḫuluw al-waqt min imām) (ibid, p.33).

Although recognizing consensus as a source of jurisprudence, the author of Al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm disputes the existence of any consensus on this point:

"The consensus they evoke is baseless since the Kharidjites say that it is not oblig-atory to have a caliph. The Mutazilite al-Aṣamm says the same thing [...]. This is enough for us to deconstruct the consensus thesis" (ibid, p.48).

Another argument against the consensual character put forward by the author is that most of the caliphs were challenged or fought by their opponents, who were themselves Muslims. Let's recall in this sense that three of the four so-called "right-guided" caliphs were assassinated. And Rāziq says: "This contestation of the caliphate is as old as the caliphate itself" (ibid, p.35)

Another argument advanced by 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq is philosophical. He argues that Islam is a religion of equality and the preservation of dignity, whereas the caliphate, as a political instrument, is based on terror and force (ibid, pp.38-43). This means that, for the author, linking the caliphate to Islam is the same as linking Islam to ter-ror and violence. He states that the use of violence by caliphs was justified by their love of power, which turned them into tyrants:

"If there's one thing in this life that drives man to tyranny, injustice and easy ad-versity, it's the position of caliph. The heart quickly becomes attached to it and even jealous of it. But when excessive love is combined with great jealousy, and strength accompanies them, only violence remains, and the only power becomes that of the sword. [...] What else but the love of power to be jealous of it and the abundance of strength drove Yazīd ibn Mu'āwiya to spill the pure and sanctified blood of Ḥusayn, son of Fatima daughter of God's Messenger? Was it anything else that drove Yazīd ibn Mu'āwiya to desecrate the first capital of the Caliphate, the city of the Prophet? What else but love of the caliphate and strength led 'Abd al-Malick ibn Marwān to occupy God's sacred house and violate its sanctity? [...] This is the same way the Abbasids killed each other [...] The Mamlūks used to kill their kings after deposing them. All this is the fruit of a love of power and jealousy, combined with a dominat-ing force. The same could be said of the Ottomans» (ibid, pp.42-43) [1].

This criticism of the caliphate does not mean that the author is against all forms of power. On the contrary, for him, nothing in religion stands in the way of men estab-lishing forms of governance. However, governance differs from the caliphate for Rāziq in that the former is a human form decided upon by men, whereas the latter is

1 We will see later that Cheikh Moussa Kamara uses the same argument to denounce jihād in Africa.

an enterprise sacralized through the centuries. While a form of governance for the management of power is a necessity, the caliphate, according to the author of Islam and the Foundations of Law, is necessary neither for the march of religion nor for the management of the affairs of life (lā ḥāja bi-l-dīn walā bi-l-dunyā ilā-l-ḫilāfa) (ibid, p.51). It could then be said that Rāziq is an advocate of the regime of separation between religion and politics.Questioning the Islamic nature of the caliphate irreducibly leads us to examine the status of the Prophet. Was he simply a messenger, or a prophet and head of state at the same time? This question is addressed in the second part of the book devoted to the question of power, which he began with a provocative question: "Was the Prophet a king?" (ibid, p.69).

The question is not an innocent one. It has theological consequences in that, to argue that Islam is both religion and state, would be to say that the Prophet was both prophet and king. If, after his death, prophecy came to an end, kingship was to continue. This is what the author disputes, pointing out that the Prophet had appointed no successor after his death and that Abū Bakr's eventful election was a human decision (ibid, p.123). 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq sees that if Islam encompassed the realm of power, the Prophet would not have left a vacuum insofar as his mission was to convey the entire Islamic message (ibid, p.116). So where does Islam fit into all this? Islam is a "message and not a power, a religion and not a state", replies 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq (ibid, p.87), who sees that the Prophet's authority over his companions was spiritual and not political (ibid, pp.92-93).

Consequently, the power established after his death was "a new state invented by the Arabs; an Arab state and an Arab power" (ibid, p.124). As the first ruler of this state, Abū Bakr, the Prophet's first successor, is called "the first king in Islam (fa kāna huwa awwal malik fī-l-islām)" by 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq (ibid, p.123).

We may note that for 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq, the caliphate is an invention subsequent to the death of the Prophet and has no Islamic foundation. Linking Islam to the caliphate is thus a theological heresy under his pen. Power management, on the other hand, is a matter for men, who have the responsibility to think for themselves and by themselves.

Cheikh Moussa Kamara's theological position

While the criticism of the use of power in the name of Islam is unambiguous in 'Alī 'Abd Rāziq's writings, in Kamara's, it is rather the consequences of the politicization of Islam that are indexed and not the political or non-political nature of the religion.

In other words, Cheikh Moussa Kamara's thinking is not concerned with whether or not Islam is political. What interests him is analyzing the consequences of the recourse of men of religion to politics. Having established this theoretical framework, we propose to look at its practical consequences in one of Cheikh Moussa Kamara's major books, written towards the end of his life (Robinson, 1988, p.106), namely his work with the long title: Akṯar al-rāġibīn fī-l-jihād baʿd al-nabiyyīn man yaḫtār al-ẓuhūr wa milk al-ʿibād[2] wa lā yubālī bi man halaka fī jihādihī min al-ʿibād . A French translation by Amar Samb was published in 1976 (Kamara, 1976).

Let's emphasize from the outset that Kamara's text is essentially concerned with the consequences of jihād in Africa, particularly the one led by Elhadji Oumar, and not with the legality of jihād per se. Instead of questioning war in the name of Islam, he points to the motivations of warriors and, by extension, produces a reflection on the exercise of power based on his observations in the Fouta (Djenidi, 1976). We can begin with his reflections on the exercise of power, remembering that Kamara is primarily interested in its motivations and consequences. Right at the start of his book, he states that the first consequence of the politicization of Islam is the loss of interest in science that it can provoke in scholars and their descendants. The Almami election system of Fouta served as a theoretical framework. In this sense, he recalls two specific features of the Almami choices. Firstly, the leader is always chosen from among pious scholars, without any ethnic discrimination. Secondly, the choice of Almami is always made electively, which precludes any possibility of hereditary power. The consequence, according to Kamara, is that "if they elected Almâmy a scholar among them, if they made him a king, his son (even an ignorant one) would think only of acquiring kingship" (Kamar, 1976, p.61), which would de facto lead him away from the paths of knowledge and piety. Continuing his reflections in a comparative perspective, Kamara contrasts the Almami system with that of the Moors, where the sons of scholars devote themselves to the pursuit of knowledge, given that royalty was the exclusive preserve of a few particular families (ibid, p.162). The same system observed among the Moors is valid, in the words of Cheikh Moussa Kamara, for the Soninkés, the Sarakholés, the Zaghâwî and "the inhabitants of Fouta Djallon, where royalty is reserved only for certain families and not others [...], which enables the children of the learned to devote themselves solely [...]

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2 Literally: Most of those who wish to lead jihād after the prophets are driven by the quest for popularity and dominance over God›s servants and care nothing for those among God›s servants who perish because of his jihād. A copy of the book›s manuscript is available at IFAN. The book also benefited from a 2003 edition by Khadim Mbacké and Ahmed Choukri. Cf, Cheikh Moussa Kamara, 2003, Akṯar al-rāġibīn fī-l-jihād ba›d al-nabiyyīn man yaḫtār al-ẓuhūr wa milk al-›ibād wa lā yubālī bi man halaka fī jihādihī min al-›ibād, Rabat, Manšūrāt Ma›had al-Dirāsāt al-Ifrīqiyya. We'll see later why we take issue with some of Mbacké's and Shukri's editorial choices.

to the study of the sciences" (ibid, p.163). In addition to causing a loss of interest in knowledge, the political appetite of scholars was, according to Kamara, one of the main causes of their exile or death. In Mauritania, in Fouta Djallon, among the Soninké and in Kayor, any scholar who wanted to reign was "fought to the death" (ibid, p.164).

This reflection by Cheikh Moussa Kamara proves Abdallah Djenidi right when he judges that Kamara "would therefore, in theory, be a kind of monarchist, more favorable to the dynastic form of power of the Déniankobé pagans, than to the theocratic republic of the Almamis" (Djenidi, 1976, p.315).

His regret at seeing men of knowledge and religion taking an interest in the affairs of power is followed by his denunciation of the jihād undertaken in Fouta. An interesting fact is that he himself said to have been solicited by jihād entrepreneurs hoping for his support. He cites Mamadou Lamine, his nephew Soulé Samba Dioum and also Cheikh Mahfouz, nephew of Cheikh Sad Bouh and Elhadji Malick Sy from Tivaouane. Kamara's response to each of these requests is more pragmatic than theological: "The French administration is now well established. It's strengthened. At present, no one can fight the colonizers" (Kamara, 1976, p.165). Thus, we can see that it is more the context that dictates Cheikh Moussa Kamara's political stance. In this sense, he is far from the radicalism of 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq, who believes that Islam is in itself an anti-political religion.

In addition to the context of colonial domination, unfavorable to any jihād undertaking, Cheikh Moussa Kamara's position also seems to be influenced by the trauma left in Fouta by the Umarian conquest. It is on this basis that Kamara takes a principled theological stance: "among the reasons that must determine one to renounce jihâd is the fear of killing a Muslim" (Kamara, 1976, p.168). But according to Cheikh Moussa Kamara, the war launched by Elhadji Oumar caused the death of thousands and thousands[3] of Muslims and led to forced emigration. Kamara reports scenes of "horror" that could justify his judgment. The following extracts are illustrative of this fact:

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3 Amar Sambe made a mistake in translating ālāf alf as "a few million". This prompted him to point out, in a footnote to the text (p.171), that the number was slightly exaggerated by Kamara. This may well be the case. However, the translation error also amplified the phenomenon.

"...He forced the inhabitants to emigrate with him to Soudan Jomboghou, Nioro and other regions. Most of those who emigrated against their will died of hunger; others perished because of his wars, others were reduced to slavery [...].During this emigration [...], hundreds of people would be tied together with thongs tied around their necks, one following the other. This is how long lines of people, men and women, would form, reluctantly heading for a destination desired by the Cheikh [...]⁴.

There was the case of Siré Adam [...] whom the Cheikh had put in charge of watching over those who tried to escape from the army and return to Fouta. It was said that Siré Adam would gather the fugitives in a hut and, after filling it, he would set fire to it and everyone would burn alive [...].

Bôkar Binta Alfimbé of Guriiki told me: "Omar son of Mouhammed Moujtabâ also told me that Cheikh Omar's army was so hungry that people ate each other, that they killed and devoured all those who weakened or were inattentive" (ibid, pp.171-172).

A closer look at these extracts suggests that Cheikh Moussa Kamara was more concerned with the consequences of jihād than with jihād itself. In other words, he was not questioning the legitimacy of jihād or the use of religion in politics. He is, however, subtle enough to urge readers to pass unfavorable judgment on the politicization of religion. For this reason, we think Amar Samb was wrong to translate the book's title into French as "Condamnation de la guerre sainte (Condemnation of the holy war)". Kamara does not condemn the jihād but its apostles. Moreover, this war, in his eyes, is anything but holy. Instead of sanctifying the jihād, he desacralizes it.

Was Cheikh Moussa Kamara a secularist and supporter of the welfare state? Two isolated parts of the book help to answer this question. In his second chapter, he judges that "most jihad-makers are those who live in distant and weak kingdoms, or in countries that do not have great kings or a strong state organization" (ibid, p.166). This means that, for the author, it is the absence of the state, its weakness and lack of organization that fuel religious ideologies of contestation. As far as the relationship between religion and the state is concerned, the title of Chapter VII of the book is unambiguous: "A state does not rely solely on religion and piety," he says, "but must also rely on politics, diplomacy, cunning and a sense of honor" (ibid, p.186). This is an original way of calling for the separation of the two spheres. Before concluding our contribution, an analysis of Kamara's thinking on Islam and power requires a brief digression. Was Cheikh Moussa Kamara sincere in his criticism?

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4 Kamara goes on to say that this forced emigration caused the loss of nine villages.

Doubtless, considering the violent scenes he recounts. But it's safe to assume that he was simply a realist, as French domination doomed any attempt at revolt to failure. Was he a follower of an Islam that could be described as liberal? Nor can this hypothesis be dismissed. Works on him state that, in addition to smoking tobacco, he "neglected the Ramadan fast and took liberties with certain obligations of Islamic law" (Robinson, 1988, p.98). He also "had ten wives, perhaps nine at a time" (ibid).

What if he was simply an opportunist? Nor is it unthinkable if we know that he was a close collaborator of the colonial administration and that, moreover, the very last chapter of his book in question is entitled "L'amour que me vouent les autorités de France" («The French authorities› love for me»). This is the right place to question Amar Samb's decision to remove this chapter from his translation of the book, and to focus solely on the other chapters. The same criticism applies to the 2003 edition by Khadim Mbacké and Ahmed Choukri, in which this chapter does not appear. Moreover, in an article published in 1984 based on the manuscript of the book available at the laboratory of islamology of the Institut fondamental d'Afrique noire (IFAN), Ceikh Anta Diop University, Djenidi noted that "a skilful hand has moved this chapter to the end of another writing" autobiographical of Cheikh Moussa Kamara (Djenidi, 1984, p.237). This choice of cutting Kamara's text and isolating the last chapter not only undermines the integrity of the book, but also prevents us from asking another central and crucial question: what if Kamara's book was commissioned by the colonial administration?

Conclusion

In view of their production contexts, Al-Islām wa uṣūl al-ḥukm by ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq and Akṯar al-rāǧibīn by Cheikh Moussa Kamara can be described as subversive and contrary to the majority theological thinking of Islam, which sees it taking charge of the religious, social but also political lives of the faithful. Indeed, reactions and refutations of the two works have been quick to appear here and there. We also see that Ali Abd al-Rāziq is critical of the caliphate, which he considers to be a dogma that has become universal. For his part, his Senegalese counterpart, more pragmatic, without directly criticizing the political commitment of religious figures, finds shortcuts dictated by the context in order to condemn the consequences of politicizing men of knowledge and religion. In other words, one might think that Rārziq is a convinced secularist, whereas Kamara would be more pragmatic and inclined to adapt his theological position according to the context. In terms of the doctrinal production of Islam, the theological orientations of the two authors, Cheikh Moussa Kamara and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq, represent a minority. However, their existence prevents us from falling into any essentialism on the political or non-political nature of Islam or on the compatibility between Islam and secularism.

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