

THE NEXUS BETWEEN TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME; GROWING THREAT?

(Terörizm ile Organize Suç Arasındaki İlişki; Büyüyen Bir Tehdit midir?)

İsmail SARI¹

ABSTRACT

Terrorism and organized crime are not new phenomenon. In the beginning, this nexus was relatively small-scale, temporarily and generally active within the national border. After the end of the Cold War, the increasing number of weak and failed states, improvements within the communication and technological world changed the nature of these relations. The nexus between terrorism and organized crime groups became large-scale, both at the national and international level. Today terrorism and organized crime groups are an important international challenge. This new reality became more apparent after 9/11 of 2001. The main aim of the organized crime groups is profit oriented; "business is business". Terrorism's goal is generally ideological, but also it needs to resources in order to sustain its activities. Illegal activities such as; drug trafficking, drug smuggling, are the lucrative way to gain more profit in short-run. This situation is one of the main reasons of the convergence of both groups. Both groups try to cooperate with each other. They change "know-how", train, support and protect each other. This relation created a huge amount of black/grey market profit. As mentioned above, due to the some facilitating factors, the nexus between terrorism and organized crime groups is a growing threat for international peace and stability. In the light of tangible examples in different terrorist and organized crime groups, this paper tries to indicate that there is cooperation and relationship between two groups and it develops into a global security threat.

Keywords: Terrorism, organized crime, PKK, drug trafficking, convergence,

ÖZ

Terörizm ve organize suç yeni bir olgu değildir. Başlangıçta, bu ilişki göreceli olarak küçük ölçekli, geçici ve genellikle ülke sınırlarında aktif-

¹ Rapporteur Judge of The Court of Jurisdictional Disputes, PhD Candidate, ismailsari58@gmail.com



ken, Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesinden sonra, ekonomik bakımından zayıf ve devlet otoritesinin yok olduğu toplumların sayılarının artması, teknoloji ve iletişim araçlarındaki gelişmeler bu ilişkinin yapısını değiştirmiştir. Terörizm ile Organize Suç grupları arasındaki bağ (rabita) geniş ölçekli, ulusal ve uluslararası seviyeye dönüşmüştür. Artık günümüzde, Terörizm ve Organize suç grupları uluslararası anlamda önemli bir problem olarak ortaya çıkar. Bu yeni durum özellikle, 11 Eylül 2001 saldırılarından sonra daha görünür olmuştur. Organize Suç gruplarının ana amacı kazanç iken; “iş iştir” ilkesinden hareketle, terörist gruplar genellikle ideolojik amaçlı, fakat faaliyetlerini devam ettirmek için kaynağa ihtiyaç duymaktadırlar. Yasadışı faaliyetler, örneğin, uyuşturucu ticareti ve kaçakçılık kısa yoldan gelir elde etmenin kazançlı yollarından birkaçıdır. Bu durum her iki suç grubunun yakınlaşmasının en önemli sebebidir. Bu sebeple her iki grup işbirliği yapmaya başlamıştır. Karşılıklı teknik bilgi paylaşımı, eğitim, destekleme ve koruma faaliyetlerini gerçekleştirmek gelmektedir. Bu ilişki inanılmaz derecede büyük bir miktarda kara para ticaretini yaratmaktadır. Yukarıda bahsedildiği üzere, bazı kolaylaştırıcı faktörlerin etkisiyle, terörizm ile organize suç örgütleri arasındaki bağ (rabita) uluslararası barış ve düzeni etkileyecek şekilde büyüyen bir tehdit olmuştur. Bu çalışmada, farklı terörist ve organize suç örgütlerinden somut örnekler verilmek suretiyle, her iki grup arasındaki ilişkinin küresel güvenliği tehdit edecek boyutlara ulaştığının gözler önüne serilmesi hedeflenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, Organize Suç, PKK, Uyuşturucu Trafiği, Yakınlaşma

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism and organized crime are not a new phenomenon. Especially in the last two decades, terrorism has become an international problem rather than just a national one. Improvements in communication technology and cheaper transportation are facilitating factors of this situation. Similarly, organized crime (OC) activities reached an international level in the last two decades.

The co-relation between terrorism and OC groups has blurred and it is difficult to distinguish these groups each other. Especially “when warlords utilize terrorist methods as well”² and both groups are using similar “modus operandi” and sharing their expertise in the field.³ Although the nature and aims of these two groups are entirely different, that is why

2 Frank Bovenkerk and Bashir Abou Chakra, Terrorism and Organized Crime, UNODC Forum on Crime and Society vol. 4. n. 1-2 2004, pp.6.

3 Christina, Schori-Liang, Shadow Networks; The Growing Nexus of Terrorism and Organized Crime, GCSP, 2011.

what is the common point of these groups? Answering to this question is very important.

Experts, scholars and the community of international organisations commonly accept the relationship. In 11 September 2001, The United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) clearly stressed this case when in noted with concern “the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime”⁴. However, there have been significant distinct evaluations about the quantity of the relationships. Is this relationship permanently or temporary? Is it in an alliance or a converging? Is there any evolution’s from one to another? Is this nexus a growing threat? The aim of this study is to find answers to these questions. The study will argue that the relation between two groups which are a growing threat for international peace and stability.

The study consists of three parts. In the first part, the definitions of terrorism and organized crime are handling to understand complex situations of two phenomenon’s better.

In the second part, we will try to focus on the questions of whether a nexus between terrorism and organized crime exist or not? If there is a nexus, which level is it? To find the answers of these questions, we will give some tangible examples in regards to different terrorist and OC groups.

The purpose of the third part is to prove of growing threat of the nexus between the terrorism and organized groups in the example of a terrorist group as a case study. PKK may be the best model of these types of terrorist group, who is deeply involved in all the OC activities and has close relationship with several OC groups.

I. DEFINITIONS;

A. Terrorism:

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon for society. Still there is not a commonly acceptable definition. Schmid and Jongman collected more than a hundred definitions of terrorism in their study. In addition, when we look at the national criminal law texts, we can find several definition of terror. These definitions related to the national interest, beliefs and understanding. As some writers have described, terrorism has many faces, it is subjective and it has many different dimensions.⁵

⁴ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm> accessed in 29 January 2012.

⁵ Col. Özden Çelik, “A General Overview of the Concept of Terrorism”, COE-DAT Newsletter, vol.4,issue.20-,2011,pp.14.



Firstly, when we look at the phenomenon of terrorism history, we can see different types of terrorist groups. Such as; separatist terrorist groups (ETA, IRA, PKK), revolutionary terrorists (Red Brigades, RAF, FARC), religious terrorist groups (Holly Warriors, Jihad, Boko Haram, ISIS) and transnational terrorist groups (Al-Qaida). Every terrorist group has different aims, purposes and targets. These various groups are also using different methods to achieve their goals.

Secondly, one main of the problems is defining terrorism is how people approach it. People's approaches close related to their positions. We can use different words for same event. In 2003, is the U.S-Iraq war an invasion/occupation or a part of the "war on terror"? Of course, people of U.S or of Iraq can give different answers. As I mentioned before, it is relate to our vision. In this regard, a well-known sentence "one man's terrorist is supposed another man's fighter of freedom" is showing us the problematic⁶

According to a writers⁷ "absence of a generally-accepted definition of terrorism constitutes the biggest obstacle in the fight against terrorism and that the definition of terrorism is exactly necessary in order to determine the proper method of fighting against terrorism so as to transform this fight into practice"⁸ According to some other writers, trying to find common definition about terrorism is a "waste of time" and we must focus on the struggle to terrorism.⁹

It is clear by understood that, there is a need for a "legal description of terrorism" in order to combat terror movement effectively.¹⁰

First attempt for common definition of terrorism done in 1999, in The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Art.2;

"a) an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex or;

b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do

6 Ibid.pp.12.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.pp.12.

9 Look at the debate on Celik, ibid. pp. 12.

10 Christian Walter, "The Notion of Terrorism in National and International Law" PowerPoint presented at the Max Planck Society Conference on Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law, Heidelberg, 24 January 2003.

or to abstain from doing any act.”¹¹

After 11 September 2001, the Sixth Committee of the UNGA embarks to define common definition about terrorism in Article 2(1) of the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism:

(1) Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:

(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or

(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or

(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an act.”¹²

This convention is still a draft and there is not any common acceptable definition of terrorism. But if we make a brief definition of terrorism as Yonah Alexander defined: “... as the calculated employment or the threat of violence by individuals, sub national groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic objectives in the violation of law, intended to create an overwhelming fear in a target area greater than the victims attacked or threatened.”¹³

What is the feature of terrorism? Is it also an important question for understanding terrorism? In regard of Alexander and other writers, definition of the feature of terrorism is; certain group of people, who have a political and ideological purpose for overthrowing the order by using constant, widespread and systematic violence or threat against innocent people or officers. It is a hidden organization supported by domestic people.¹⁴

B. Organized Crime;

Organized crime is also a well-known phenomenon for the entire world. Contrary to terrorism, there is a common definition of organized

11 Ben Golder and Georges Williams, “What is Terrorism? Problems of Legal Definitions” UNSW Law Journal v.27 (2), p 270-295, <http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm> accessed in January 2012.

12 <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/62/Terrorism.shtml> accessed in Jan. 2012.

13 Yonah Alexander, “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses”, DePaul Bus. L. J., Vol. 12, 1999, pp.65.

14 Çelik, pp.14



crime has been accepted by the UN conventions and Council of Europe. In 2000, according to Transnational Crime (Palermo) Convention Art.2.a: *“Organized criminal group “shall mean a structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with aim of committing one or more serious crime or offences established in accordance with the Conventions, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”*¹⁵

The Council of Europe uses mandatory and optional criteria to define criminal groups as organized crime, *“Mandatory criteria as: Collaboration of three or more people, For a prolonged or indefinite period of time, Suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences, with the objective of pursuing profit and/or power.”*

*Optional criteria as; Having a specific task or role for each participant. Using some form of internal discipline and control. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, and law enforcement, the administration of justice or the economy by corruption or any other means. Using commercial or business-like structures. Engaged in money laundering. Operating on an international level.”*¹⁶

According to Interpol (1988) organized crime is *“Any enterprise or a group of persons engaged in a continuing illegal activity which has special purpose the generations of irrespective of national borders.”*¹⁷

In the literature, we can see different definitions and approaches. For instance, Finckenauer explains the elements of organized crime as: *“ideology, organized hierarchy, continuity, violence or use of force, restricted membership, illegal enterprises, penetration of legitimate businesses and corruption.”*¹⁸ Maltz also indicates common point of organized crime for identification as; using violence and corruption, complexity, continuity, hierarchical structure, obedience in a strict discipline, multiple enterprises and participation in legal or illegal businesses.¹⁹

One of the most important problems with the definition of organized crime is confusing it with *“mafia”*. Although *“mafia”* uses some of the

15 <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>. accessed in Jan 2012.

16 <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/Report1998E.pdf> accessed on Jan 2012.

17 Cited in Frank G. Madsen, *Transnational Organized Crime*, Oxon: Routledge, 2009, pp.16.

18 James O. Finckenauer, *“Problems of Definition: What is Organized Crime?”* Trends in Organized Crime Vol.8, No.3, Spring (2005), pp.64-65.

19 Cited in Murat Sever and M. Phil Roth, *Convergence of Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Case of PKK*, pp. 125, 2011.

same methods, organized crime has much more complicated, strict hierarchical structure and discipline.

In the light of all the definitions above, it is not easy to do a precise and summary of all aspects of definitions of organized crime. In this study, we will consider organized crimes as in the definitions of UN and the Council of Europe.

II. THE NEXUS BETWEEN TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME;

A. General Overview;

As already mentioned previously, there is of course no consensus on the definition of terrorism and organized crime, but there is a debate on whether a nexus exist between terrorism and organized crime or not. When we look at the literature, we can find different views and approaches. Nearly all of the writers accept the relationship between terrorism and organized crime. Main divergence among the writers is that, whether terror and organized crime has relationship permanently or temporarily. Whether this nexus is a growing threat or not?

One of the above-mentioned approach, there is not any nexus between terrorism and organized crime, emphasizes, “Until now, fears of international alliances between terrorists and criminals have proven to be exaggerated”²⁰ and Shelley in 2005, said that “the links between organized criminals and terrorists are much less frequent than the links between organized criminals and politicians”²¹.

Few writers believe in that, members of terror movement and of organized crimes are working together and as in Naylor’s words “at the end of their cooperation the two groups usually end up on opposite sides of the barricades”²². In contrast to other views, some writers emphasize that, the nexus between terrorism and organized crime became a growing threat to the entire world (Makarenko, Schori Liang, Madsen, Bovenkerk and Abou Chakra, Ciluffo).

For a better understanding of the “terrorism-crime continuum”²³, we must know the similarities and differences of both of them.

20 Cited in Alex P.Schmid, “Links Between Terrorist and Organized Crime Networks: Emerging Patterns and Trends”. Milan, ISPAC, 2004.

21 Louise I. Shelly and John T. Picarelli, “Executive Summary” *Methods and Motives: Exploring Links Between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism* June (2005), pp.5-6.

22 Robin Thomas Naylor, *Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 2002, pp.56.

23 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism” *Global Crime* Vol.6, No. 1, February (2004): pp.130.



Differences	Similarities
Terrorist groups are usually ideologically or politically motivated while organized crime groups are profit-oriented	Both operate secretly and usually from an underground network
Terrorist groups often wish to compete with governments for legitimacy, organized crime groups do not	Both use 'muscle and ruthlessness' on primarily civilian victims
Terrorist groups usually seek media attention; organized crime groups do not	Intimidation is the characteristic of both groups
Terrorist victimization is generally less discriminated than the violence used by organized crime groups	Both use similar (though not entirely overlapping) tactics: kidnappings, assassination, extortion ("protection money," "revolutionary taxes")
	In both cases, the control of the group over the individual is strong
	Both use front organizations, such as legitimate businesses or charities

As table²⁴ showed us, there are lots of differences and similarities of them. Terrorism and organized crime have different aims. Organized Crimes main goal is "money". They want less public attention to achieve their goals. On the contrary, terrorist group needs attention that is more public. However, money/financial resource allow terrorists to operate and this goal is the main reason of convergence.²⁵ In addition, we can add some extra data to the list. In both groups, if a member wants to leave, this is not acceptable for them. According to member of organized crime, terrorist group members see greater acceptance in society, if community accepts them as a "fighter of freedom".²⁶ Both of them try to challenge the state and rule of law; both have reciprocals, changeable recruitments pools and both of them present a threat to U.S and "friendly nations".²⁷

24 Cited in Alex Schmid, "Links between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: A Case of "Narcoterrorism"?" <http://english.safe-democracy.org/causes/links-between-terrorism-and-drug-trafficking-a-case-of-narcoterrorism.html> accessed in 28 Jan. 2012.

25 Ibid.

26 For more example look at, Sever and Roth, pp.126.

27 Peng Wang, "The Crime-Terror Nexus: Transformation, Alliance, Convergence" Asian Social Science Vol. 6, No. 6; June 2010, pp.12.

What is the main reason for convergence of terrorism and organized crime? Why are we discussing this issue lately? These questions are important to understand the phenomenon.

First, there is a need to clarify the causes of convergence of terrorism and organized crime. According to Schori-Liang, the main reasons of this convergence are “globalization, the communication revolution through the Internet, the end of the Cold War, and the “global war on terror””.²⁸ Moreover, we must add an important item on the list, the increasing numbers of failed or weak states.²⁹

After the Cold War, there is not any more state sponsorship for terrorist activities. Terrorist groups have begun to seek financial resources to sustain their activities.³⁰ Why is end of the Cold War important for this situation? As Bovenkerk and Abou Chakra said, “the end of the Cold War meant in many cases an end to the sponsoring of terrorist organizations by states from some actors in the two power blocks.”³¹ Secondly, enormous developments in information, communication, transportation and technology facilitated the convergence of both groups. Thirdly, well-communicated global market structures, Diasporas and geographical “safe havens” blurred the line between the terrorist groups and organized crime groups.³² Last but not least, the increasing number of failed or weak states. Ideal geographical situation, lack of effective authority, ineffective rule of law, corruptions of officers and porous borders are ideal “safe haven” for their existence.³³ Finally, after 11 September 2001 with the declaration of “war on terror”, many terrorist groups became in trouble to find sufficient resource for their activities.³⁴

On 28 September 2001, closely after the September 11 attack, the UNSC adopted an anti-terrorism resolution (SC res. 1373) in which it “notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials.”³⁵ UNSCR emphasized “close connection” with terrorism and organized crime. UNSCR did not give any detail about it.³⁶

We can find the answer for these questions by using Makarenko’s well

28 Schori-Liang, *ibid.*

29 Sever and Roth, pp.128.

30 Schmid, “A Case of Narcoterrorism”,

31 Bovenkerk and Abou Chakra. pp. 6.

32 Makarenko, pp.130.

33 Sever and Roth, pp.128.


34 Schori-Liang, pp.2.

35 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm> accessed in 29 jan 2012

36 Bovenkerk and Abou Chakra, pp. 4.



formulated “the crime-terror continuum” table.³⁷



Makarenko’s thesis consists four main parts: alliance, operational motivations, convergence and black hole.³⁸

Alliance is the first step for the relationships of convergence. Terrorism and OC can change their know-how, and support the other with material and operational level.³⁹ This relationship depends on the nature of the goal. Sometime this alliance can be short, long or for one operation.⁴⁰ Some investigators declared that, Al-Qaeda members’ alliance with the Naples based on Camorro mafia was reach to “safe houses” inside Europe by using forged documents.⁴¹ Dawood Ibrahim, accused of terrorist bombing in Mumbai (1993), he shared his smuggling routes with Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups.⁴² The most tangible example of the terror and organized crime alliance is drug trafficking. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has close relationship with Afghan and Central Asian criminal groups to ensure the safe shipment of heroin.⁴³

PKK- Drug trafficking relation is commonly accepted. According to a Turkish Security expert, “PKK cooperation with Kurdish criminal clans has been similar to the cooperation among Sicilian mafia families. The PKK is a multilevel business organization that is involved in all phases of the narcotics trade, from production to retail distribution. The first phase is laboratory production from a morphine base, usually obtained from Pakistan; the final phase is sale on the street in Europe through pushers employed by the organization”⁴⁴

37 Makarenko, pp.131.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ron Chepesiuk, *Dangerous Alliance: Terrorism and Organized Crime*, 2007, pp.1. <http://www.globalpolitician.com/23435-crime> accessed in Feb. 2012.

42 Ibid,

43 Makarenko, pp.131.

44 Glenn E. Curtis, Tara Karacan, *The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, And Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe*, The Library of Congress, December 2002, pp.21.

Second level of terrorism and OC is operational motivations. As mentioned before, both of them have different aims, but also the state, law and public order are the common enemies of them. In this regard, OC groups use terrorist's tactics to ensure instability to their goals. On the other hand, terrorist groups commit some criminal activities to ensure the same goal like OC. The most famous example happened in Italy. The Sicilian Mafia groups had planned an incredible event to draw attention; "the Sicilian Mafia carried out a series of car bomb attacks in Italian mainland near historic sites such as the Uffizi Galleries in Florence and the church of St. John Lateran in Rome; plans were laid to blow up the Leaning Tower of Pisa. The aim was not to eliminate an enemy, but to intimidate public opinion and Parliament into abrogating recently passed anti mafia legislation".⁴⁵

The third level of the relation between terror and OC is convergence. The "Convergence thesis" states that terror organizations and OC converge into "a single entity that initially displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously".⁴⁶ In this stage, the groups cannot be defining as political or criminal groups anymore.⁴⁷ Main aim of OC is to get profit; on the other hand, aim of terror movement is to achieve to political or ideological success. In convergence thesis, both aims are entangle. Terrorist and OC groups attempt to gain political and territorial "safe haven". To establish for a "safe haven", terrorist groups perform purely criminal activities. In this sense, they gain independence through economical success and more profit. On the other hand, criminal groups have started with purely terrorist activities. The state becomes unstable and insecure. Thus, both of them have effectively extended their activities.

It could be seen a tangible example in Mexico and Albania. Albanian mafia and KLM terrorist groups are deeply intertwine in political and criminal activities.⁴⁸ Ralf Mutschke⁴⁹, stressed that the Albanian mafia is purely linked to 'Pan-Albanian ideals, politics, military activities and terrorism'.⁵⁰ Moreover, this explains how the KLM obtains the arms and other military equipment.⁵¹ In Mexico, as it already commonly known, there is an ongoing war between drug lords and the state. Organized groups killed high-ranking law enforcements and judges. These examples

45 Cited Makarenko, *ibid*, pp.133.

46 Makarenko, *Ibid.*, pp. 135.

47 *Ibid.*

48 Cited Makarenko, *ibid*, pp. 136.

49 Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, International Criminal Police Organisation.

50 Cited Makarenko, *ibid*.

51 *Ibid.*



show us that OC groups behave like terror group.

On the other hand some terrorist groups, such as; Abu Sayyaf, PKK, FARC are purely involved in criminal activities. Abu Sayyaf totally engages criminal activities such as kidnapping and extortion of drug traffickers.⁵² After their ideological leaders died, FARC acted like an OC group such as Abu Sayyaf. FARC deeply engaged in drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and taxation of drug traffickers. PKK is deeply engaged in organized criminal activities in order to fund terrorist operations. Drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, taxation, smuggling, money laundering, counterfeiting are just some of the illicit operation areas. These examples show, many terrorist groups directly involved in criminal activities.

Two significant examples must evaluate. Northern Ireland revolutionist terrorist groups and Dawood Ibrahim's D company. Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland struggled against the state more than 30 years until the 1998 Belfast agreement. However, some groups continue their campaigns⁵³. By the end of the political struggle, "Northern Ireland has seen a rise in organized crime, including counterfeiting, with former terrorists leveraging their expertise and networks to engage in crime full-time."⁵⁴ This example shows how terrorist groups used criminal activities to build an OC group.

However, Dawood Ibrahim's D company is one of the Pakistan-based Indian criminal syndicate. Since 1980, D company engaged with standard criminal activities, such as extortion, goods smuggling and contract killing.⁵⁵ He is one of the most wanted OC leaders. D-Company has established relations to numerous terrorist groups including Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). After 1993, ordinary OC group was change to terrorist group. He also accused of bomb attack in Mumbai in 1993. As Treverton and friends mentioned; "While the Northern Ireland terrorist groups aged into pure criminality, this case illustrates the crossing of the line in the opposite direction, as D-Company transformed into an organization not just passively supporting terrorists, but with close links to them."⁵⁶

"Black hole" syndrome refers to weak or failed states. Terrorist and OC

52 Ibid. pp.137.

53 The Real IRA, Continuity IRA, the LVF, Orange Volunteers, Red Hand Defenders, and the Ulster Defence Association/ Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF). Cited the list in Treverton, Matthies, Cunningham, Goulka, Ridgeway, Wong, "Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism" Rand Corporation, 2009, pp.84, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG742.pdf accessed in 23.01.2012

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid. pp. 91.

56 Ibid.

groups are strong enough to establish “safe haven”. After convergence, both groups became effective in the territory. Terrorist and OC groups easily continue their activities. There is no strength to fight against them in the state. According to Madsen in the “black hole” syndrome, “States that have been taken over by “hybrid groups”, whose are political and criminal activities are deeply intertwined.”⁵⁷

We can mention few some examples in past and current experience for some states that fall within this syndrome; Such as Afghanistan, North Korea, Pakistan (some provinces), Sierra Leone and Tajikistan. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, civil war started among different tribes in Afghanistan. Although, the main idea of this civil war was not tribal differences, the main goal is to establish their sovereignty in the same province where there is important drug trafficking and smuggling.⁵⁸ Drug lords supported some tribes to gain maximum profit. There was no real central authority to tackle with tribes and OC groups activities in that period.⁵⁹ Afghanistan became a kind of “safe haven” for terrorist and OC groups. After more than 7 years of struggle among tribesmen, Taliban group came in Afghanistan in September 1996. Afghanistan was in the weak state situation in the civil war era, but after Taliban regime Afghanistan became a “failed” state. Why we mention this? Taliban and drug trafficking relationship is a well-known truth for many experts and proved in many cases. Taliban has also been supported by one of the transnational terrorist groups i.e. Al Qaeda. Before the U.S invasion Afghanistan in 2003, Taliban, were supported by terrorist groups and had a direct relation with drug traffickers, ruled Afghan government. As Rollins-Wyler stressed that, “The Taliban is an example of an insurgent organization involved in extensive terrorist activity that has entered into coalitions with criminal networks”.⁶⁰ It is typical a “black hole” syndrome.

As Laqueur⁶¹ mentioned; “more recently this line has become blurred, and in some cases a symbiosis between terrorism and organized crime has occurred that did not exist before.” We must focus on structure of the nexus to better understanding of the partnerships of terrorist and OC groups. What are the methods of this convergence? Moreover, what are the toolboxes of this Nexus? Tangible examples will given to explain terrorist and OC group’s nexus in the following section.

57 Madsen. Ibid. pp.67.

58 Makarenko. Ibid. pp.138.

59 Ibid.,pp.139.

60 John Rollins, Liana Sun Wyler. CRS “*International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress*”. pp. 21. 2010 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf> accessed in Feb 2012.

61 Walter Laqueur, “*The New Terrorism*”, Oxford University Press, 1999. pp. 211



B. Methods;

After developing relationships between terrorism and OC groups, it is difficult to distinguish these groups from each other. Especially “when warlords utilize terrorist methods as well”.⁶² Both groups use similar “modus operandi” and they share their expertise in the field.⁶³ They use criminal activities as an extension of their ideology. Some terrorist groups believed that, they use criminal activities as an extension of their ideology. By following this way, terrorist group reaches to their aims. On the other hand, with using criminal activities they gained more profit, destabilizing the political structure and damaging law enforcement.⁶⁴ Sharing of their information and techniques, make their activities much easier. For instance, terrorist groups are experts on bomb making, but OC groups are not. For instance, Columbian authority reported that, in 1993, the Medellin cartel hired ELN terrorists to plan a bomb attack. Because they had not have the capability to make it by themselves.⁶⁵ Terrorist and OC group used two different methods for nexus; 1-Logistics and Material Support, 2-Travel Support and Protections.

1. Logistics and Material Support:

Logistics and material supports are the “sine qua non” elements for terrorist activities. After the end of the Cold War, terrorist groups lost their state sponsorships and then they start to look for financial resource in order to sustain their activities. Firstly, they started criminal activities in small scales. Then, they noticed that, these activities are of the small portion of the cake and they wanted the big part. However, on the other hand, terrorist groups are not alone in this game. In that situation the convergence of two groups started. As mentioned before, there is no single form for relations between terrorist and OC groups. This relationships can take “many forms, differing motivations, challenges and based on the various actors”.⁶⁶ The main aim of using criminal activities for terrorist groups is finding resource. In addition, this criminal activity is also a way to fight against to “infidel”. However, according to U.S. Navy officials, there is no clear evidence to suggest that Al-Shabaab militants have financial or operational relations with pirates⁶⁷, some specialist⁶⁸ believed that there are close ties between Al-Shabaab and pirates. One of the senior Al Shabaab official, Sheikh Mahad` s refers to as “sea jihad”.

62 Bovenkenk and Abu Chakra. pp.6.

63 Schori-Liang. Ibid.

64 Makarenko. Ibid.pp.131.

65 Cited in Makarenko. Ibid.

66 Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.13.

67 Lauren Ploch, Congressional Research Service, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa” pp.20, 2011.

68 For more details, Schori-Liang. Ibid.

Terror and OC groups relations established for many different reasons such as, seeking expert knowledge (bomb-making and forgery documents) or materials support (arms trafficking).⁶⁹

All states are very careful about that threat of terrorism especially after 9/11 of 2001. States take precautions as possible to prevent this threat. Moreover, they have increased security services alongside their border security. Meanwhile, terrorist groups have found another way to reach to the target states; forgery documents. Collins stressed that: "Identity theft crimes undermine business and the economy of the entire U.S. and facilitate acts of terror against U.S. citizens. Identity theft is directly related to drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime".⁷⁰ Terrorists use different methods to get caught up such as; counterfeit passport and visas, immigration and identity fraud. As an example, the 9/11 Commission Report stressed that, "travel documents are as important as weapons" and in the 9/11 attack Al Qaeda terrorist groups, members had used forged documents.⁷¹

Supplement of weapons is an important part of convergence. The relationship between terrorist groups and OC groups in Colombia was a tangible example of convergence. FARC had mutually developed links with Colombian and Latin American OC groups based on the exchange of drugs for weapons. The FARC had established reciprocal linkages with Russian, Jordanian, Croatian OC groups, for the weapons and communications equipments.⁷² Also it is a well known reality that, FARC and IRA had established relations for exchanging bomb making technology between 1990's to 2000.⁷³ British intelligence reports stated that, the FARC has paid IRA nearly 2 million US Dollars for training in arms, explosives, and techniques of urban warfare, using offshore bank accounts.⁷⁴ Some Russian intelligence officers believe that, this money had probably been used to pay for a shipment of 20 highly efficient Russian AN-94 assault rifles in 2001.⁷⁵ Camorra (Italian criminal organization) supplied heavy weapons such as missile launchers and missiles to ETA in return for large amounts of cocaine and hashish in 2001.⁷⁶ After the Dayton Accords, in 1995, arm trafficking has increased in the Balkans. Former Yugoslavia became an important resource for arm dealers. Some

69 Makarenko. Ibid.pp.133.

70 J.M. Collins, "Business Identity theft. The Latest Twist", Journal of Forensic Accounting, Vol. IV, 2003, pp.303 <http://www.audit-net.com/articles/jfa-collins.pdf> accessed in 11 Feb 2012

71 www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec accessed in 12 Feb 2012

72 Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.10.

73 Look at footnote,Ibid.

74 Curtis and Karacan.Ibid.pp.6.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.pp.9.



investigation and report clearly emphasized that, ETA, IRA and Real IRA had close relations between Croatian OC groups for arm trafficking.⁷⁷ Some specialists emphasized that, some African OC groups use diamonds for arms trafficking.⁷⁸ Abu Ghadiyah and his family, one of the famous smugglers along to Iraq -Syria border, provided logistical and financial support to terrorist groups during the Second Iraq War against the US.⁷⁹

In the last decade, terrorist and OC groups, supply logistical and materially supported for each other. You can find many examples of that. Here are the just a few of them.

2. Travel Support and Protection;

There is also a nexus between terrorism and OC groups in travel support and protection. This related arm- drug trafficking and human smuggling. Terrorist groups involved in human smuggling and drug trafficking not only for financing their activities but also for tactical purposes.⁸⁰ For instance, terrorist groups used to way of human smugglers so that their members (militants) will be able to reach their targets easily. We can see this relationship especially in safe routes in trafficking (drug and smuggling) and counterfeit travel passport. As mentioned early, forged travel documents are used as a weapon by terrorist.⁸¹ They used these documents to plan, train and to reach their target.

Snakeheads, the Chinese smugglers had established a trade and protection relationship with the IRA.⁸² . The IMU had developed an important relationship with the Afghan and Central Asian OC groups to provide safe shipments for illegal drugs through Afghanistan to Caucasus.⁸³ Members of AQIM, ensure the protecting of cocaine shipments through the Sahara for the FARC.⁸⁴ The FARC's role in drug trade became important over time. The organization takes a tax on the harvesters and buyers of coca paste and cocaine base cultivated, and sold in territory under FARC control. They protected drug-processing laboratories from government forces.⁸⁵ Shining Path and FARC in South America, The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the Colombian leftist group M19, D-Company and Al Qaeda, the LTTE, LeT in India, PKK in Turkey, there is close cooperation among

77 For more details Ibid.pp.11-12.

78 Ibid. pp. 15.

79 Ibid. pp. 23.

80 Rollins and Wyler.Ibid.pp.10.

81 9/11 Commission Final Report, pp.384.

82 Shelly, "*The Unholy Trinity*", pp.109.

83 Makarenko.Ibid. pp.4.

84 Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.11.

85 Alain Labrousse, "*The FARC and the Taliban's Connection to Drugs*," *Journal of Drug Issues*, Vol. XXX, 2005.

all those terrorist groups and drug lords in travel support and personnel protection.

3. Toolbox;

For better understanding of the convergence of terror and OC groups, there must be a focus on the toolbox. The relationship between both groups can clearly be seen on crimes. As mentioned above, OC groups are involved criminal activities for profit. On the other hand, terrorists try to find enough sources for activities. OC groups think that less attention brings better profit. On the contrary, terrorist desires a wide-ranging public effect.⁸⁶ In this situation, moving together is beneficial for both of them. Terrorist and OC group threaten the rule of law, the state and the region by using criminal activities in this way.⁸⁷ Unstable, ineffective and weak governmental situations create a kind of “safe haven” for them. Terror and OC groups linked in different crimes. Such as; production, smuggling and sale of illegal goods and services: drug trafficking or arms smuggling or smuggling of people, trafficking in human beings, especially women, loan sharking, trading in exotic species of animals and tropical timber, dumping toxic waste and so forth.⁸⁸

It is fair to say that there is clear, sufficient and wide spread evidence between terrorist and OC syndicates especially in drug trafficking. Therefore, we will explain the cooperation of groups in two headlines, such as; drug trafficking and other crimes in the following section.

4. Drug Trafficking:

There is no doubt about that several terrorist groups participated directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of illegal drug trafficking. In 2004, a Canadian Foreign Affairs and UNODC report stated that 22 countries had observed a link between illicit drug activities and terrorism.⁸⁹ The US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reports that 60 percent of foreign terrorist organizations have links to the drugs trade.⁹⁰ In addition, DEA reports that the number of foreign terrorist organizations involved in the global drug trade increased from 14 groups to 18 in 2003-2008.⁹¹ On the literature, people who works on terror issues gives tangible example in various level of drug trafficking. “Narco-

86 Culiffo. Ibid.

87 Schori-Liang. Ibid.

88 Bovernkerk and Abu Chakra. Ibid. pp.7.

89 Yvon Dandurand and Vivienne Chin, “*Links between terrorism and other forms of crime*”, pp.13. 2004, http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/LinksBetweenTerrorismLatest_updated.pdf accessed in Feb 2012.

90 Cited in Schori-Liang. Ibid.

91 Rollins and Wyler. Ibid. pp.2.



terrorism” is a well-known word, because of the tight relationships between terrorist and drug trade. The term “narco-terrorism” was firstly using to describe activities of drug traffickers using terrorist methods against anti-narcotics police in Colombia and Peru.⁹² DEA defines narco-terrorism as a “subset of terrorism, in which terrorist groups, or associated individuals, participate directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of controlled substances and the monies derived from these activities. Further, narco-terrorism may be characterized by the participation of groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing security for, or otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavours in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities.”⁹³ Narco-terrorism has two aspects; narcotics and terrorism. This aspect seen as a middle-way convergence of two phenomena.⁹⁴

In this convergence, ideological differences can easily settle. Ultranationalist Turks OC groups (the Grey Wolves) and Left wing separatist terrorist groups (the PKK) were publicly each other’s fiercest enemies in Turkey as well as in the European and American Diasporas. Yet when it comes to drug trafficking, they are happy to work together.⁹⁵

Although beliefs strictly forbid, some religious based terrorist groups to be directly involved in drug trafficking. Taliban⁹⁶, AQIM, Hezbollah, IMU and so forth are directly involved in drug trafficking. One of the Hezbollah fatwa stressed that, for justifying their criminal activity in 1980’s: “If we cannot kill them with guns, so we will kill them with drugs.”⁹⁷ Another example in this view recently, one of the Afghan Taliban terrorist was sentence in U.S, states that, “Whether it is by opium or by shooting, this is our common goal.”⁹⁸

92 Emma Björnehed, “Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror” Global Crime, Vol.6, August-November (2004): pp.306. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2005/Emma_Narcoterror.pdf accessed in Feb 2012.

93 Asa Hutchinson, Statement of Drug Enforcement Administration Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, 13.03.2002 <http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031302.html> accessed in Feb 2012.

94 Björnehed. Ibid. pp. 307

95 Boverkerk and Yesilgoz, cited in Boverkerk-Abu Chakra. Ibid

96 “While core Taliban fighters are not believed to directly cultivate, process or distribute opium.” Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.7. And also Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar in one international press release in 1997, stressed that, “One thing, at least, is clear: we will permit neither opium nor heroin to be sold in Afghanistan itself. It is not up to us to protect non-Muslims who wish to buy drugs and get intoxicated [...] Our goal for ourselves is to gradually eliminate all drug production in the country so as to safeguard our youth.” Cited in Alain Labrousse “The FARC and the TALIBAN’S connection to drugs” The Journal of Drug Issues. 2005. pp.174. http://www.archido.de/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=1388 accessed in March 2012.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

Financing is important for terrorist activities to succeed. In this sense, drug trafficking is the most valuable crime activity that convergences terrorists with OC groups. Casablanca in May 2003 and the March 2004 in Madrid; hashish was the major source of funding for these terrorist attacks.⁹⁹ For instance in the 2004 Madrid attack, terrorists sold narcotics to pay for cars, safe houses, phones, and so forth, furthermore they exchanged drugs for the explosives used in the attacks.¹⁰⁰

According to experts, drug trafficking profits estimated per annual nearly between 500-600 billion dollars. It has believed that the global trade in drugs is larger than the global trade in oil. According to recent press reports, The UNODC and the IMF estimate profits derived from illicit drug trafficking worldwide at about 7.6% of global trade.¹⁰¹

In the case of Afghanistan, according to UNODC survey in 2011, “The seven southern and western provinces that contributed to 85% of Afghan opium cultivation and production. This clearly highlights the strong link between opium cultivation and the lack of security.”¹⁰² Moreover, all these areas are under the control of Taliban. Although the Taliban banned poppy cultivation in 2000-2001, clear evidence showed that the Taliban was itself involved in drug trafficking for financing.

According to press reports, the CIA and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated that the Taliban gains nearly \$70 million a year from drug activities.¹⁰³ Taliban is not only directly involved in drug trafficking but also charged poppy farmers a 10 percent tax (known as an USHR) on the crop.¹⁰⁴ Taliban also supports drug traffickers with safe routes. IMU heavily involved in drug trafficking. Some specialist believed that, nearly the group routs 70% of drug trade¹⁰⁵. IMU have also close relationships with al Qaeda, Chinese and Central Asian OC groups.

Hezbollah, one of the Shia political and paramilitary organizations based in Lebanon, obtains money from drug dealers, who are operating in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.¹⁰⁶ According to the U.S. law enforcement

99 Schori-Liang. Ibid

100 Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.19.

101 <http://en.rian.ru/world/20100530/159275376.html> accessed in 19 February 2012

102 UNODC “Afghanistan: OpiumSurvey2008,”November 2008, pp.2. http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf accessed in Feb 2012.

103 Jamens Risen “U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords Tied to Taliban” 9.08.2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/world/asia/10afghan.html>

104 Catherine Collins with Ashraf Ali “Financing the Taliban: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan” 2010. pp.5.http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF_FinancingtheTaliban_TracingtheDollars.pdf accessed in Feb 2012.

105 Cited in Audrey Kurth Cron, Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones, CRS “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”. pp.38. 2004.

106 Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.28.



agencies, many people, who have a relationship with Hezbollah, arrested for drug trafficking in Colombia.¹⁰⁷

Colombia, Peru and Bolivia are the largest exporter of cocaine in the world, despite the decline in coca cultivation between 2007 and 2010. Colombia is producing nearly half of the global market.¹⁰⁸ Nearly 40% territory of Colombia is under control of the FARC and ELN. Both groups are directly involved in coca cultivation and earn billion dollars in these activities. FARC has close connections with the Russian, Ukrainian, Croatian, and Jordanian OC groups. These contacts are not limited with the drug trafficking. There is a barter agreement effectively implemented in both groups. Drug versus weapons/communications equipments.¹⁰⁹ Turkey is transit country in drug trafficking. There are many different OC groups linked with the PKK in this crime activity. PKK is the foremost actor of the illegal European drug trade. Authorities stressed that, 70-80 % of the illegal drugs captured in Europe had been linked directly to PKK.¹¹⁰ The PKK is financing their terrorist activities by drug revenue. It helps explain why the PKK can continue to exist after more than three decades.

5. Other Crimes

There is no doubt about that arm and human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, robberies, credit card fraud; smuggling also became important sources for financing of terrorist organizations.

Members of terrorist groups do not fear the prosecution of ordinary crimes because they have already been struggling against authority. Being a prisoner or accused of crimes therefore will enhance their rank in the groups. Therefore, level of the punishment is not important for them. They can commit crime easily. In some cases, terrorists are uses prisons as an educational centre or recruited their members. The terrorists, who executed the Madrid train bombings on March 2004, were significant examples of this situation.¹¹¹ On other hand, OC groups looks at criminal activities as businessman. They do not want to be caught for their crimes. That's why; OC groups would appear to have moved from "same profit less punishment" crimes. Today unfortunately, most of the national penal codes have different magnitude of punishment on some serious crimes. For instance, there is a huge gap in the level of punishment between human being trafficking and drug trafficking, but profit is nearly same.

107 Ibid, pp. 26.

108 The UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, Vienna: UNODC, 2010 pp.65.

109 Schori-Liang. Ibid. Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.10.

110 Sedat Laçiner, "Drug Smuggling As Main Source of PKK Terrorism" <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=702> accessed in Feb 2012.

111 Schori-Liang. Ibid.

This profit is also the main reason of the convergence of the both groups.

In 2004, Canada Foreign Affairs and UNODC's reports that, 17 countries had observed link illicit arms trafficking- 17 countries had found a link kidnapping, robberies and extortion- 23 countries had observed smuggling of illegal migrants and falsifications document- 22 countries had observed money laundering, fraud and other economical crimes- 33 countries had observed other forms of crimes with terrorism.¹¹²These numbers shows us there is clear evidence of nexus between terrorist and OC groups.

As mentioned early, according to UNODC and IMF estimate, profits derived from illicit drug trafficking worldwide are at about \$600 billion (or 7.6% of global trade). One of the most important threats in fighting against drug trafficking is laundering the drug money. Researchers estimate that, nearly 1.5 trillion dollars in drug money laundered through legal enterprises, accounting for 5% of global GDP.¹¹³ Common methods for both terrorist and OC groups include the use of alternative remittance systems; such as hawala, bulk cash smuggling and trade-based money laundering.¹¹⁴

However, according to military authorities there is no evidence to suggest that Al-Shabaab militants have financial or operational links with Somalia pirates. Nevertheless, some experts claimed that, "Al- Shabaab receives at least 20% of ransom money from some pirate groups in exchange for training and weapons."¹¹⁵ Al Shabaab received 1 million quarterly in port-use charges in Kismayo port, which is under their control.¹¹⁶ One of the significant examples about illegal activities for financing terrorism is the tri-border area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The city, in the TBA commercial district of Ciudad del Este, has become a "symbol for the nexus of organized crime and terrorism".¹¹⁷ Kidnapping-for-ransom money is also an important source for financing terrorism. It has estimated that, in the Sahel region alone, AQIM gained at least \$65 million since 2005. This amount is more than 90% of the group's total budget.¹¹⁸

112 Dandurand and Chin. Ibid.pp.14,15,16.

113 "Drug-trafficking profits" Rianovosti, 30.05.2010. <http://en.rian.ru/world/20100530/159275376.html> accessed in Feb 2012.

114 Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.11.

115 Cited ibid.pp.30 and also look at for more detail: "Somali Rebels Detail Several Pirate Gang Leaders," Reuters, February 17, 2011; "Somali Rebels Agree Ransom Deal with Pirate Leaders," Reuters, February 22, 2011.

116 Lauren Ploch, Congressional Research Service, "Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response". 2010.pp.21.

117 Treverton et all.Ibid.pp.75.

118 Jean-Charles Brisard "AQIM kidnap-for-ransom practice: A worrisome challenge to the war against terrorism financing" 27.09.2010.



In 2011, AQIM is demanding at least €90 million for four French hostages to release.¹¹⁹ In 2011, the Abu Sayyaf kidnapped several individuals for ransom.¹²⁰

Authorities believe that, 50% of the FARC revenues come from the extortion of businessperson and farmers in territories it controls and from kidnapping ransoms. FARC established even a special team for the operations of the hostage taking. In 2003, the ransom paid for the release of 673 hostages. As of April 2009, 29 people including a former governor and Member of Parliament are among those still held a hostage by FARC.¹²¹ In 2002, the U.S arrested “Chawki and Mohamad Hammoud, who are accused of using a cigarette smuggling operation to generate funds for Hezbollah.”¹²² Abu Ghadiyah and his family, one of the smuggler along to Iraq -Syria border, provided logistical and financial support to terrorist groups during the Second Iraq War against the US.¹²³ These examples show that, there is clearly a growing and still actively working relationship between terror and OC groups.

III. CONVERGENCE OF TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME: CASE STUDY

A. Overview;

As G. Andreopoulos stressed that, “individual cases rather than a series of abstract assumptions can credibly constitute the building blocks of theory formation”.¹²⁴ This section will focus on the PKK, to understand better the convergence between terror and OC groups and the PKK handled as a topic of case study.

There are different reasons to choose this terror group. PKK has close relations with transnational organized crimes (TOC) groups.

PKK is a secular, leftist, Marxist-Leninist insurgent group that “aimed to establish an independent Kurdish homeland in the ethnically Kurdish regions of the Middle East, which overlap the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.”¹²⁵ PKK is fighting against governmental order more than 35 years. The PKK directly and purely involved in ordinary crimes such

http://www.terrorfinance.org/the_terror_finance_blog/2010/09/aqim-kidnap-for-ransom-practice-a-worrisome-challenge-to-the-war-against-terrorism-financing.html accessed in Feb 2012.

119 <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html> accessed in Feb 2012.

120 Ibid.

121 Cited in Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.18.

122 Cited in Kurth et all.Ibid.pp.21.

123 Rollins and Wyler. Ibid.pp.21.

124 Boverkerk and Abu Chakra.Ibid.pp.12.

125 Kurth et all.Ibid.pp.53.

as; drug trafficking, goods smuggling, extortion and kidnapping beyond their main objective (to find funding for activities). According to Islam, using, selling and cultivating drug banned. This religion rule is a dilemma for PKK. PKK has many supporters whose are Muslim Kurdish people. They have difficulties to explain their drug activities to their supporters. Therefore, they did not accept their relations with drug trafficking officially. PKK well organized and has a huge number of members and the somewhat richest terrorist groups like an “international consortium”. The PKK is also an ethnical-base ideological insurgent group.

In the following sections, each group examined one by one, according to their histories, ideologies and illegal activities with OC groups.

B. PKK (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party)

1. Historical Background;

There is a huge debate about Kurds and there is not any consensus about Kurdish people’s origin, histories and languages¹²⁶. Therefore, we start to explain the Kurdish and the PKK problem in the 1970’s.

In 1970’s, PKK first occurred as a leftist, Marxist student group but with different names. PKK was founded by Abdullah Ocalan (mostly known as Apo), who was born in a small town of south-eastern Turkey, and his friends in 1974. In 1974, the main goal of the group was to establish a Marxist Kurdish state in Southeast Turkey.

In the beginning, Marxist ideology was more dominating than Kurdish identity and its aims were to struggle against government like Mao. In 1978, the group first changed their name to PKK. They decided to use the method of armed struggle and changed their “aimed to establish an independent Kurdish homeland in the ethnically Kurdish regions of the Middle East, which would overlap the borders of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.”¹²⁷ Ocalan escaped to Lebanon so as not to be prosecuted and also in order to find support and a “safe place” for armed struggle against Turkish authority.

PKK’s first attack was against one of the politicians in Şanlıurfa province in 1979.¹²⁸ After the military coup in 1980, martial law implemented in Turkey until 1983. In this period, members of PKK went abroad, mostly Lebanon and Syria, for ideological and military training in Palestine

126 For further discussions look at, Bekir Cakar, Mahmut Cengiz, Fatih Tombul, “The *History of the PKK*”, in *The PKK-Financial Sources, Social and Political Dimensions*, ed.. Charles Strozier and James Frank(Saarbrücken. VDM.2011)

127 Kurth et al.Ibid.pp.53.

128 Cakar et al.Ibid.pp.12.



Liberation Front (PLF) camps at Bekaa valley. First large scale violent operations happened in the two small towns, Eruh and Şemdinli, in August 1984.¹²⁹

Until this violent action, the Turkish authorities did not really care this terrorist group. Nevertheless, authorities became aware of the “real” PKK threat and then the government started an armed struggle against the PKK.¹³⁰ Since its inception, PKK and government officials have continued the struggle. In this period, sometimes terrorist group announced unilateral ceasefire (unfortunately it was never implemented exactly) and sometimes they didn't attack a target and they took their camp abroad to Iraq and Syria. Öcalan, who is the founder leader of the terrorist group, captured at Nairobi/Kenya in 1999. From 1999 to 2004, PKK announced unilateral ceasefire and they were gone from their camp in Northern Iraq. Öcalan was found guilty of struggling against Turkish government and he was sentenced to life imprisonment by the court in November 1999.

From 1984 to 2011, there has been ongoing “low-intensive war” between PKK and the Turkish authorities. In their thirty years bloody campaign against Turkey, over 31,000 people killed and according to authorities more than 75 billion USD was spent.¹³¹

Is not it easy to have an armed struggle against to a state for more than 30 years for a terrorist group. How the PKK manages to continue to this struggle? What are their resources? There are several reasons for that. Firstly, until the end of the Cold War, PKK, who is leftist and Marxist insurgent group, supported by Soviet bloc's states because of their similar ideologies. Secondly, especially during and after the first Iraq War, an unstable situation in the Northern Iraq was useful for PKK. They could easily find arms equipments and they established several terrorist bases in the Kandil Mountain and near the Turkish border. Thirdly, the support of some of the Kurdish people, who lived in east Anatolia and abroad (Diaspora) was present. Lastly, but most importantly their valuable transnational organized crime activities such as; drug trafficking, smuggling, taxations, extortion, kidnapping and money laundering, which was the “last step of their illegal activities in order to legitimize their funds.”¹³²

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 Look at for further discussions; http://www.21yyte.org/tr/yazi6265Ayrilikci_PKK_Terorunun_Ekonomik_Maliyeti.html accessed Feb 2012.

132 Murat Sever and Mitchel P. Roth, “Convergence of Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Case of PKK”, in *The PKK-Financial Sources, Social and Political Dimensions*, ed.. Charles Strozier and James Frank(Saarbrücken. VDM.2011).pp.124.

There are several facilitating factors for the PKK involvement in TOC activities. First, significant facilitating factors the location of Turkey. Turkey is a located at the crossroads of Asia, Middle East and Europe, has a border with the 8 countries. From past to present Turkey has always been a gateway of Europe for Asians. Even ancient the “silk road” passed in Turkey’s borders. As a consequence of this strategic location, Turkey has always been a main route for Asian, Middle Eastern people, even also for South Asian people, to Europe. Due to this location, Turkey is a bridge country for illegal immigrations, human smuggling, drug and arms trafficking.

Turkey is not a heroin producer country. Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran are the main producers of opium in Asia. According to experts, approximately 80% of produced drugs in “Golden Crescent”¹³³ pass through Turkey to Europe (Figure 1).¹³⁴

Secondly, Kurdish people live on the borders of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Kurdish people, who speak the same language, same ethnic background but also share the same ideologies with the PKK, has been a significant facilitating factor for them to play an active role in TOC.

Thirdly Kurdish diasporas, who lived in abroad generally refugees status, have also another facilitating role in TOC activities. Most of the Kurdish Diasporas have people who must have moved from Turkey, to escape under the pressure of investigation because of being a member of the insurgent group. Generally associated under PKK organizations, used by PKK as a street dealer in drug business.¹³⁵

2. Drug Trafficking and PKK

Drug trafficking is the most obvious area for convergence of PKK and OC groups. This relations are commonly accepted by international organizations, such as; UNODC, national reports, such as; CRS reports and also in academic level.

As mentioned earlier, PKK is deeply involved in all the phases of drug trafficking, from producing to smuggling for sale. According to NATO Reinforced Economic Committee meeting in November 2007, “the illicit

133 The region of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran are named Golden Crescent in terms of drug trade.

134 Sedat Laçiner, “Drug Smuggling As Main Source of PKK Terrorism”, <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=702> accessed in Feb 2012. Figure 1 cited in: Michele Steinberg, “PKK Terrorists Named ‘Drug Kingpins’; Nations Move Against Narcoterrorism” http://www.larouchepub.com/eiv/public/2008/2008_30-39/2008-31/pdf/48-52_3530.pdf accessed in March 2012.

135 Sever and Roth. *ibid.* pp.131.



narcotics industry is the PKK's most profitable criminal activities."¹³⁶ The NATO Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) report estimates that, "the group raises a total of \$50 to \$100 million per year. Although the bulk of this amount comes from criminal operations in Europe, approximately \$12 to \$15 million is raised through legitimate or semi-legitimate commercial activities and donations."¹³⁷

In the previous section of this article, travel protections and support which were explained as one of methods of the convergence of terrorism and OC groups, is obviously acceptable for PKK. Turkish National Police Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Dept. (KOM) reports stressed that, "according to statements of arrested members of the PKK, group established an illegal "customs check-point" on the Iranian side of the Iranian-Turkish border, providing guidance or courier service for drug traffickers"¹³⁸, and also extorting protecting money from Kurdish mafia and other drug traffickers as "taxes".¹³⁹ PKK- Drug trafficking relations was accepted by senior leader Ocalan and former high ranking member (deputy leader of the PKK until 1998) Şemdin Sakik, who is currently in prison. Abdullah Ocalan's statements in the court: "Osman Ocalan (his brother and also member of the PKK) is collecting money from people who conduct drug trafficker...On the borders a certain amount of money is collected from traffickers as a tax... Despite this fact, I learned that some people in the organization, in particular my brother, Osman Ocalan, were trafficking drug to Europe through Iran, Zagros and Romania..."¹⁴⁰ and also "taxing is not limited to the drug trafficking, my brother taxes all kinds of trafficking activities"¹⁴¹ Şemdin Sakik's interview with the Human Right Commission of Turkish Grand National Assembly, in his statements: "The source of our money was drug trafficking. The PKK and Apo always have a big share from the drug trafficking on the drug route of Turkey-Middle East. We used the money generated from drugs to purchase weapons"¹⁴²

The U.S. designated PKK; as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker terrorist organization on March 2008, under the framework of Foreign

136 Abdulkadir Onay, "PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe".21 Feb 2008. http://www.turkishcoalition.org/files/news/pdf/PKK_Criminal_Network_in_Europe.pdf cited in March 2012.

137 Ibid.Steinberg. Ibid.

138 Sever and Roth. Ibid.pp.131

139 Ibid. And also, Behsat Ekici,Phil Williams,Ayhan Akbulut, "The PKK and the KDNs: Cooperation, Convergens or Conflict" in *The PKK-Financial Sources, Social and Political Dimensions*, ed.. Charles Strozier and James Frank (Saarbrücken. VDM.2011). pp. 155

140 Cited in Sever and Roth. Ibid.pp.133.

141 Ekici et al.Ibid.pp.150.

142 Sever and Roth.Ibid.pp.134.

Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. And also in November 2009, US Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated the three high ranking leaders of PKK; Murat KARAYILAN, Ali Riza ALTUN, and Zübeyir AYDAR, as significant foreign narcotics traffickers.¹⁴³ U.S. State Department's Annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, was released in March 1998, estimates that "between four and six tons of heroin transit Turkey each month and that, three-quarters of the heroin abused in Europe transits Turkey."¹⁴⁴

Another investigation report was released in Germany where significant number of Kurdish people lives. According to German Federal Criminal Investigation Office (BKA) reports in March 1997, "80% of the heroin' used in Western Europe, reaches its destination via Turkey."¹⁴⁵ The director of the Italian Police Force's Central Operations Service, Alessandro Pansa, stressed that "Thirty percent of the laboratories for refining heroin scattered around Turkish territory are currently in the hands of PKK Kurdish rebels; the remainder, on the other hand, is allegedly run by the Kurdish mafia."¹⁴⁶ According to KOM reports in 2010, "807 suspects have been apprehended so far since 1984 through a total number of 359 operations against illicit drug trafficking linking to terrorist organizations such as PKK/Kongra-Gel, ASALA, TKP/ML and DHKP/C."¹⁴⁷ Most of them are members of PKK. One of the convicted drug criminals gave some details in his statements about PKK's role in drugs, "the PKK was forcing us to plant cannabis in rural areas of Diyarbakir. I am rendering much of the money to PKK operatives. They come and supervise the harvesting process. It is almost impossible to divert some of the crops"¹⁴⁸ Many drug traffickers or members of PKK confessed in their statement that, several heroin laboratories are working on the behalf of PKK in the mountainous regions of Iran. According to one of them, "The PKK has established several drug labs in Urumiye - Aliabat District of Iran under the control of Osman Ocalan. The chemist received 40.000-50.000 Toman (Iranian money) per kg for producing heroin. After the production, the heroin is transferred to Banya village (Iran) to be transferred to Yüksekova (Turkey) under the control of Osman Ocalan's militants"¹⁴⁹

143 KOM 2010 annual report, pp.116. http://www.kom.gov.tr/Tr/Dosyalar/ulusal_rapor_en.pdf, accessed in March 2012, Look at also: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg318.aspx>

144 Steinberg, Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid.

147 KOM reports. Ibid. pp. XVII

148 Cited in. Ekici et al. Ibid. pp.156.

149 Ibid.



As a result, the PKK- drugs trafficking relations is commonly accepted by literature (Makarenko, Laçiner, Sever-Roth, Ekici et al, Dandurand and Chin, Steinberg, Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz etc), international organizations (UNODC, INTERPOL, NATO) and national (CRS report, Turkish, Germany and Italian etc.) intelligent service reports. Definitely, you can find more than a thousand tangible examples in the sources.

3. Other Crimes and PKK;

Many investigation reports show us PKK is deeply involved in other crimes such as; smuggling, arms trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and money laundering. There are several reasons for that. The main reason is money for financing their activities. Also there are some specific aims to involve each crime. For instance, arms trafficking are lucrative crimes for PKK, they can easily find weapons for armed struggle against government. They used their produced drugs to buy weapons as a “barter” agreement with the other insurgent groups or the OC groups.

Smuggling is another more specific reason other than money. First of all, drugs traffickers and smugglers use the same routes. Therefore, it is easy to engage in this crime. The specific aim of human smuggling is to gain more members in abroad and travel facilitating for members in their operations. Specific aims of kidnapping and extortion are to show the existence of themselves and public fear for unstable situation. Money laundering is the last step of other crimes. They used money laundering as a curtain in order to show their loyalty to the founding principles and they did not want to appear as organized criminals in the eyes of their supporters.

According to KOM Dept. reports between 1992-2008, 25 arms trafficking cases observed, were related with PKK.¹⁵⁰ Şemdin Sakik admitted these relations in his statement, “The PKK has made enormous amount of money from its drug business. We bought weapons with this money. For example, we bought 50 stinger missiles from Greece. We bought some weapons from Iran too.”¹⁵¹

The failed or weak states situation is the best suitable place for arms trafficking. Especially lack of governmental order in Northern Iraq played an important role in arms trafficking. Former Saddam regime`s weapons are easily found in the region. U.S`s open/close arms support to regional Kurdish people and also other regional states` support to different ethnic

150 Mahmut Cengiz and Ilkay Akyay, “PKK in Arms Smuggling: Methods and Motives” in *The PKK-Financial Sources, Social and Political Dimensions*, ed.. Charles Strozier and James Frank (Saarbrücken. VDM.2011).pp.198.

151 Ekici et al.Ibid.pp.157.

tribes is the main reason of huge amount of arms easily found in the region. Therefore, Iraq war was game changers for the PKK in terms of arms trafficking. According to KOM reports, arms smuggling activities has increased three times after the Second Iraq War.¹⁵² Iraq's oil reserve transfers with tankers is also a facilitating factor of arms trafficking. Investigations showed us, nearly all the arms trafficking case traffickers used oil transporter tankers to hide arms and munitions.

According to NATO Reinforced Economic Committee meeting in November 2007, it said that "human trafficking as the PKK's second most profitable illicit activity."¹⁵³ PKK use same routes for drugs and human smuggling. Turkey's eight borders with different states and nearly 5000 miles coasts are facilitating factors for smuggling.

According to a news agency, in January 2002 Italian officials discovered an OC group, which has connection with PKK. Authorities estimate that, this group transported nearly 9.000 Kurdish people illegally from Turkey to Italy.¹⁵⁴ Another case in March 2005, Romanian officials arrested one of the human smuggling group members, who accused of working on the behalf of the PKK.¹⁵⁵

Diasporas donations or extortion plays a highly important role in supporting PKK activities in Turkey. European Union's Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2011, states that, "The PKK collects money from its members under the rubric of 'donations and membership fees' in lieu of extortion and illegal taxation. In addition to organized extortion campaigns, there are indications that the PKK is actively involved in money laundering, illicit drugs and human trafficking, as well as illegal immigration inside and outside the EU."¹⁵⁶ Huge amount of Kurdish population live in abroad. We can handle them in two different groups. First group is mostly in the refugee or asylum status. Huge parts of them were transported by the PKK or the PKK affiliated OC groups, who left Turkey in the beginning of 90's. Because of their legal status, they cannot easily find job. Therefore, they have to assemble under the umbrella of PKK affiliated organizations. In this situation, they must give "voluntary donations" to PKK. The second group is generally workers, who came to Europe late 60's for work. This group is mostly ethnically Turkish and

152 Cited in Cengiz and Akyay.Ibid.pp.200.

153 Onay. Ibid.

154 Cited in Sever and Roth.Ibid.pp.135.

155 Ibid.

156 Cuneyt Yilmaz, "The U.S. Interest in Addressing Germany's PKK Problem" 30 December 2011 http://cesran.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1379%3Athe-us-interest-in-addressing-germanys-pkk-problem&catid=61%3Aamakale-ve-raporlar&Itemid=310&lang=en accessed in March 2012.



somewhat ethnic Kurdish people, who eventually became small business owner. PKK used threat, racketeering and kidnapping methods against them for extortion money. According to experts, in 1996, PKK extorted money for protection from a restaurant owner as an “insurance fee” or face retaliation in the Green Lanes in Northern London.¹⁵⁷ Belgian authorities during the operation of Sputnik found a list of Kurdish origin businesspersons and companies who are extorted money by PKK in 1996. Authorities estimated that the extortion money was around 300.000 Franc each month.¹⁵⁸ PKK used extortion, threat and kidnapping as a method also in Turkey, especially in east part of Anatolia and in the big cities.

The last step of their criminal activities is money laundering. PKK also has an effective and huge propaganda and fundraising network in Europe.¹⁵⁹ The media agencies and broadcasts are important tools for the money laundering system for the PKK. Some experts estimated that, between 2004 and 2008, nearly 25 million Euros of illegal money laundered by the use of Roj TV by PKK.¹⁶⁰

In April 2007, TE-SAT report stressed that, “Two PKK members were arrested in France in 2006 for money laundering aimed at financing terrorism.”¹⁶¹ Some of the news agencies were shut down by authorities due to fact that they supported and financed the PKK.¹⁶²

As is evident from the explanations above, PKK is an insurgent group, is deeply immersed in all the organized criminal activities and is working closely with OC groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Terrorism and Organized Crimes have always been important issues in the security field. Especially due to the development of new technology and transportation techniques, both of them reached international dimension rather than national and have become a growing threat.

After the end of the Cold War, because they lost state sponsorship, terrorist groups became engaged in criminal activities in order to sustain their activities. Improvements in the communications and transportation industries and huge numbers of worldwide Diasporas are also the

157 Cited in Sever and Roth. Ibid.pp.136.

158 Ibid.

159 Two news agencies, four television stations, thirteen radio stations, ten newspapers, nineteen periodicals and three publishing houses (Roj TV in Denmark, Firat News Agency in the Netherlands) List cited in Onay.Ibid.

160 Sever and Roth.Ibid.pp.138.

161 Onay.Ibid.

162 19 September 2005, Welat Press Verlag, Roj Online and Mezopotamia-Nachrichtenagentur news agency(MHA)in Germany. Cited in Sever and Roth.Ibid.pp.138.

significant facilitating factors for the terrorist groups. The increasing number of failed or weak states is the suitable situation for them to expand. Lack of effective authority, ineffective rule of law, corruption of police officers, border guards and porous borders are ideal “safe havens” for their existence. Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia and Iraq etc. are the tangible examples for this situation.

Although the nature and aims of the terrorism and organized crime groups are widely different, these facilitating factors are also suitable for organized crime groups. Organized Crimes’ main goal is in gaining profit, “business is business”. But financial resources are also important for terrorism. This common point is the main reason of the convergence of two groups.

In terms of the relations, between terrorism and organized crime have been blurred, it is difficult to distinguish these group from each other, in practice we can observe several level of the liaison. This liaison is sometimes strong and permanent as a convergence; sometimes weak and temporary as an alliance; and in some case metamorphose into a single entity. Terrorism and organized crime now works hand-in-hand. They share tactics, use the same methods, and logistically supported each other in getting equipment. This is an understandable and a mutually beneficial circumstance for both. Growing concern is, if this liaison reaches a convergence or evolution level or not. Unfortunately, in the last two decades especially, the world has faced a growing threat. Dawood Ibrahim’s D Company and Northern Ireland’s insurgent groups are past examples of this phenomenon. Examined in this study, the FARC and PKK are the most striking examples of this growing threat.

The PKK long-standing insurgent group, which is well-equipped group also has a close nexus with the organized crime and other terror groups and is deeply involved in criminal activities. The PKK effectively involved in all stages of drugs trafficking, from production to sales, kidnapping, extortion and other types of smuggling, arms trafficking and money laundering are some of the other types of the criminal activities used by them in order to gain profit.

Initially, the PKK established the ideological foundations now this insurgent group has begun criminal activities in order to continue their own operations. Then, the group discovered a lucrative way of the being rich and became purely involved in criminal activities. To gain more profit, the group established several liaisons with different terrorist and organized crimes groups. Especially in the last decade, the PKK established different units to sustain their criminal activities, such as; kidnapping and



extortions teams, drugs cultivating laboratories and street dealer crews. The group also continued their arms struggle against the government, sometimes in small scales sometimes somewhat larger. When we compare the level of their arms struggle and the criminal activities, the question comes; what is the main priority of these groups? Ideological background or money oriented activities?

As regards with examples of the PKK is on the verge of the evolution. Eventually, it will be an organized crime group rather than insurgent group. When we look at the several past attempts to establish a mutual peace with terrorist groups and the governments, nearly all of them failed because of simple reasons. What is the main reason of this failure? Did they sincerely want to establish peace?

Before answering these questions, we must look at the structure of the terrorist groups' members. Several surveys showed that, generally terrorist groups' members are young, un-educated and have low-level of standards of living family members. Maybe they live in a bad situation at the terrorist camps, but on the other hand, they choose this situation in order to send money to their families. If peace is established, they will lose their money resources. In the light of this explanation, terrorist groups want to protect the status quo. Therefore, PKK is on the verge of evolution.

It is obvious that, the fight against organized crime groups is very expensive and dangerous. On the other hand, the fight against terrorism is not effective, if we cannot succeed in cutting their resources out.

The nexus of terrorism and organized crime is dangerous of because of their growing wealth, increased access to arms and their growing global networks. The International community must focus more on this growing threat.

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