A MACRO LEVEL APPROACH TO THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION AND REGIME TYPES ON ETHNIC VIOLENCE

KÜRESELLEŞME VE REJİM TİPLERİNİN ETNİK ŞİDDET ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİNÉ MAKRO DÜZEYDE BİR YAKAŞIM

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ABSTRACT
This study examines the causes and trends of ethnic conflicts after the second World War. Globalization and the states’ regime types are the two main factors that are believed to have affected the trend and number of ethnic conflicts. It is argued that democratization for communal and ethnic conflicts mostly contribute more conflicts due to the opportunity provided by democratic openings. Such democratization movements justify protest and rebellions for individuals and ethnic groups. In the meantime, ethnic or nationalist conflicts in the post-Cold War era has been not only provoked many speculations, but also extrapolated by some scholars as the political fragmentation for the global system.

ÖZET

Keywords: Globalization, Ethnic conflicts, Regime types, Ethnic identity
Anahtar Kelimeler: Küreselleşme, Etnik çatışmalar, Rejim tipleri, Etnik kimlik

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1. THE CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The recent interest of international relations scholars in ethnic conflicts has been developed in the last two-three decades although it has been long studied by sociologists, comparative political scientists, and historians (Angstrom, 2001). Nature and significance of ethnicity in the contemporary societies have been paid more attention especially after the Cold War. Resurgence of ethnic conflicts in Balkans, Africa and Caucasus believed to have been affected by many factors such as economic development, migration of rural people to cities, state formation and revolution, and the efforts to democratize autocratic regimes. The predictions that greater political and economic interaction will break down peoples’ identities with ethnic kindred and replace them with loyalties to larger communities have not been occurred yet. Conversely, ethnicity centered conflicts showed significant increases all around the world (Fox and Squires, 2001). Therefore, it is important to understand the underlying factors that cause ethnic violence.

Ethnic violence emerges due to various cultural, socio-economic, political and structural factors. Among these factors, structural factors are related to the groups’ security environment and the stability of security environment in the long term. As it is known, many new nation-states emerged after World War II majority of which have been weak in the international arena. For example, the states emerged after the USSR (United Soviet Socialist Republics) showed weakness in totally controlling their territories and political legitimacy. Social and political institutions were not able to provide basic needs of their nations. This was a contributor of ethnic conflicts since it intensifies group’s grievances, and creates opportunity for ‘would-be leaders’ to pursue independence (Cotter, 2002).

Structural factors which perpetuate and produce ethnic conflict are a product of their political context. When structural systems which once worked well for a population, now falter, political actions such as discriminatory actions against insubordinate groups emerge. Thus, if the political system fails to equally distribute political rights to the groups or if some groups be treated unfairly, seeking an alternative political system will be inevitable for the insubordinate ethnic groups. This is an issue for not only authoritarian systems, but also a problem for the countries that are in transition to democracy (Cotter 2002). Another political factor that leads ethnic conflicts is the inter-group competition. According to Horowitz (2000) when some of ethnic groups are labeled ‘advanced’ and others are labeled as ‘backward’, there will be a challenge for those who are labeled backward to catch up the advanced groups. In the course of the time, this process will create fear and anxiety between the groups especially when the advanced group question the existence and worth of the insubordinate group.

Economic factors also influence ethnic group frustrations which can lead to a violent reaction. When different ethnic groups experience significant differences between income, unequal economic growth in their
community and unemployment disparity, combined with systematic economic discrimination, the group facing hardships are likely to shift blame onto the other and are therefore more susceptible to becoming more ethnocentric focused. In addition to local economic crisis, modernization or globalization can contribute the awareness of ethnic differences (Cotter, 2002). Economic crisis can have a unique way of exacerbating both cultural and perceptual factors but these factors can independently affect a population’s relationship with ethnocentricity. For instance, cultural discriminations such as unfairness in education, reaction to the use of native language and restrictions in practicing religious requirements can be incentive for ethnic conflicts. Historical grievances and past experiences of ethnic group, which can be also named as perceptual factors, can influence how ethnic group view out-groups (Cotter, 2002). Nations or ethnic groups tend to stress the pain of their history, their experiences as victims and the resulting justifications for their hostile behaviors more than individuals. One of the examples of how historical grievances affect ethnic conflicts is the case of Greeks and Turks on Cyprus Island. As Volkan mentions, there is a history of real hurts and atrocities. The archives and memories about these historical hurts can be an ample evidence for justification of conflict (Volkan, 1979).

2. GLOBALIZATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

It is a reality that advanced communications, transportation, and technology have created a global village. People found themselves interacting with numerous out-groups due to the increased contact with the people from other parts of the globe. Associated with these contacts have been conflicts, wars, and riots within societies. The following paragraphs will discuss the relationship between the two and explain why do ethnic differences persist and often turn into violence.

There are three main approaches in terms of the relationship between ethnicity and globalization. First, economic integration and globalization have activated latent ethno-political and cultural forces. This approach is labeled as ‘primodialist’ or ‘chaos’ perspective. The second approach contends that the increase in conflicts is not a result of globalization but a backlash against globalization’s encroachments on identity. The final approach focuses on the countries’ political, economic and social factors rather than globalization. This view supports the argument that domestic factors should be taken into consideration rather than globalization (Ishiyama, 2004; Giddens, 1990; Castells, 1996).

According to the ‘chaos’ perspective, economic integration intensified nationalistic and localistic sentiments. Uneven distribution of economic means among people or countries became more evident by globalization. People started to move easily from one place to another, and when they come across with Western capitalist values such as material success and aspirations they were frustrated. Globalization decentralized the large capital into smaller economic units which brought the challenge of creating new states. Economic growth provided more communication tools
for ethnic groups which gave the opportunity of acting together and goes it alone (Ishiyama, 2004). In this context, Appadurai argues that conditions of extreme and intimate violence in some parts of the world such as Central Africa, Europe, India and China may partly lie in the ‘deformation of national and local spaces of everyday life by the physical and moral pressures of globalization’ (Appadurai, 1998:4; Castells, 1996).

Another approach to the globalization’s effect on ethnic conflicts is that the increase in conflicts is not a result of globalization but a backlash against globalization’s encroachments on identity. Kotkin argues that increases in ethnic conflicts in the last decades can be explained by globalization since globalization brought ethnic awareness in reaction to homogenization. According to Kotkin “ethnic identity would promote prosperity for some groups, but for many others globalization would produce a ‘throwback to the kind of clannishness . . . increased emphasis on religion and ethnic culture often suggest the prospect of a humanity breaking itself into narrow, exclusive and hostile groups’” (Kotkin, 1993:3 in Ishiyama, 2004; see also Giddens 1991). Cultural hegemony of the powerful countries exalted the differences and local particularisms. Homogenization of Western values such as materialism created a serious opposition by the rest of the World.

In the final approach, Kinnvall argues that currently there are many people in the world that risking their lives to escape from the economic and political hardship of their countries in order to provide a better life for not only themselves, but also for their children. Examples can be given from Palestinians, Iraqis and Afghans. The aftermath of September 11 attacks continuously play a critical role in the world politics. The current problems with Afghans and Iraqis can be viewed as a part of the problems after 9/11 attacks. Many people from these people are usually denied to access Western societies. Governments heighten the security of their borders and adopt non-immigrant policies. So, what happens in the one part of the world affected many people in the other parts of the world. Even ordinary citizens felt the effects of globalization of economics and politics as they are compressed by time and space and becoming increasingly localized. Globalization seems to increase the gaps between those who have been left behind and those who have reaped the benefits of the global market. In many cases, democratizing forces are threatening traditional securities leaving uneasy feelings about the value of these forces. In this sense, as individuals feel vulnerable and experience existential anxiety, they attempt to reaffirm their threatened self-identity. Nationalism and religion are the two ‘identity-signifiers’ in this regard. According to Kinnvall, any collective identity that can provide such security is a potential pole of attraction. Attempts to secure their physical existence and their identities create conflict (Kinnvall, 2004; see also Beck, 1999 and Beck, 1992). However, Ohanyan (2003) challenges scholars such as Kinnvall that having the conventional conception of ethnic conflicts as a political and national security issue. He suggests that ethnic conflicts need to be more responsive to the rapid social change fostered by globalization rather than political and territorial security issues. Globalization limits ethnic
representation access to the newly emerged policy-making sources which is the core of element in the increase in ethnic conflicts. He suggests focusing on institutional changes that occur in global governance, such as an increase in the coalitions between state structures, the market and civil society while explaining increase or decrease of ethnic conflicts. Ohanyan also claims that the effects of globalization on ethnic conflicts depend primarily on how one defines globalization. A narrow definition of globalization emphasizes the spread of democratic institutions, consumer values and capitalist enterprises which effectively supports the claim that globalization plays no role in spreading ethnic conflicts; even it may restrain them. The line of reasoning is that the outbreak of ethnic conflicts cannot be linked to the global spread of cruel materialism via film, television, and radio. In the meantime, globalization does not relate to ethnic conflicts if it’s defined in terms of the free flow of technologically supported information and interdependent markets. The rationale behind this idea is that the primacy of territorial identity in exacerbating ethnic conflict (Ohanyan, 2003).

Although many scholars link ethnic conflicts with globalization, there is little empirical evidence. Scholars who support this approach claim that ethnic conflicts in the last fifty years increased due to some intrastate factors. Crawford and Lipschutz (1998) mentions that ‘while many analysts suspect that there is a link between economic globalization and the current round of cultural conflicts, few have investigated potential causal forces that might explain that relationship’ (p.4). They argue that intervening political variables accounts are more important in explaining ethnic conflicts. According to these scholars, globalization breaks the old rules and norms that govern access to economic and political resources but the critical element is the role of state institutions in ethnic conflicts. If the cultural identity of ethnic groups is not previously politicized when governmental institutions define the rules of political membership, representation and resource allocation, and if they allocate the resources properly, ethnic conflicts are less likely (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1998). Ishiyama tried to find empirical evidence between globalization and ethnic conflicts by using data from 102 minority groups across 34 different developing countries. Using a multivariate technique (ordinal logistic regression), he measured the effect of globalization on democratization, socio-cultural and economic variables. He concluded that globalization is not related to ethnic conflict, but rather to ethnic protest. In addition, contrary to the much of the literature, there is little evidence that greater cultural or economic differences drive protest and conflict. Obviously his findings did not support scholars like Appuradai who focused on cultural similarities and dissimilarities to explain ethnic conflicts (Ishiyama, 2004).

State weakness and intra-state security anxiety (Posen, 1993 cited in Cotter, 2002), is one of the pushing factors for ethnic groups for trying to provide their own security. As a balancing factor, when one group in the state become more secure than the other, a ‘security dilemma’ exists which creates or escalates (if currently there is a) tension between the groups. The group’s feeling of insecurity creates mistrust and fear, which in turn, becomes a
dangerous action-reaction spiral. This is exactly the case when multiethnic empires collapse. Posen also argues that a weak successor state which is unable to provide effective institutions for minority participation and fails to guarantee the minority’s freedoms and security, creates a climate prone to ethnic violence. The conditions after the collapse of empires leave fearful diasporas behind, requiring that these people groups make a quick and decisive decisions on how to rescue themselves and their communities (Cotter, 2002:46).

Sadowski makes one of the most valuable contributions to the discussion by mentioning that most ethnic conflicts are rooted in ancient tribal or religious rivalries. Although he states that the number of ethnic conflicts dramatically increased after the end of Cold War by the dissolution of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, it is essential to search the underlying reasons of ethnic conflicts in the past. The case of Spain, Rwanda and Turkey are typical. The historical background of ETA and the PKK goes more than a hundred years ago (Sadowski, 1998).

In conclusion, it is controversial whether the spread of democratic values as a result of globalization trigger ethnic violence. Sadowski (1998) mentions that worst ethnic conflicts occur in countries where the regime types are unstable such as Bosnia, Lebanon, and Liberia. Conversely, Latin American and East Asian countries which may be classified as third wave of democratization, in fact, experienced reduces in forms of political violence during the 1980s. Interestingly, societies that are developed, economically open, and receptive to globalization are less likely to experience lethal ethnic conflicts. In such countries, ethnic conflicts are argued civilly or limited to the political violence of marginal groups. Among the examples are provisional IRA in United Kingdom and Ku Klux Klan in the United States3. Gurr partly supports Sadowski and mentions that the expectations that the growth of communication networks would break down people’ “parochial” identities with ethnic kindred and replace them with loyalties to larger communities has not worked out in the way that many scholars predicted. He mentions two reasons: The first reason may be the ‘primordial’ structure of ethnic identities which is genetically based, and therefore it is persistent. Another reason may be salience structure of ethnic identities. In this sense, ethnic identities become significant only when political leaders invoke for the pursuit of material and political benefits for a group or a region. Thus, factors affecting the proliferation of ethnic conflicts are either searched in the nature of ethnic identity or external factors such as political factors (Gurr, 1994).

Tabulations for 1945-89 are based on analysis of 233 politically active groups in the Minorities at Risk dataset. Groups are tallied for each decade in which they participated in serious, widespread political rioting, local rebellions, guerilla activity, civil war, or intercommunal warfare. Groups participating in more than one type of conflict in a decade are counted only once.

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3 Compared to LTTE and PKK these groups are less violent and argued civilly. Numbers of casualties are considered as well.
A Macro Level Approach to the Impact of Globalization

Table 1: Numbers of Ethnopolitical Groups Involved in Serious Conflict 1945-1994 by Region (Gurr, 1994:350)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Europe (a)</th>
<th>Middle East (b)</th>
<th>Asia (c)</th>
<th>Africa (d)</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-59</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-89</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-94</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Including the USSR, Eastern and Western Europe, Canada, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand
(b) Including North Africa, Turkey, Israel, Afghanistan, and Pakistan
(c) Including South, Southeast, and Pacific Asia
(d) Excluding the Maghreb, Libya, and Egypt; including South Africa

3. REGIME TYPES AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

There is a close relationship between regime types and ethnic violence, and there are clear differences between them while dealing with ethnic conflicts.

First of all, it should be mentioned that different regime types experience different types of ethnic conflicts. This became evident after the end of the Cold War. Fox (2003- See Figure 1-2-3 cited from Fox, 2003:61) found empirical evidence that protracted civil wars and guerilla warfare are the least common types of conflicts in democracies after the Cold War era. Most violent ethnic conflicts under democratic regime types take the form of terrorism. However, even this trend showed a significant drop after the Cold War. The number of minorities that using terrorism have decreased from 14 to 5 between 1980 and 1998. In democratizing states, it was observed that guerilla warfare and terrorism are clearly the most common types of conflict. There were no occurrences of protracted civil wars between the studied time periods. In autocratic states, the most common type of conflict is guerilla warfare. This type of conflict rose in autocracies with the end of the Cold War. It is interesting that number of groups that using terrorism and civil wars under these regime types only slightly changed.

Each regime type react ethnic violence differently. Democratic countries are more able to deal with ethnic demands due to the institutions that are designed to allow grievances to be heard and addressed through
media and power-sharing arrangements and coalition politics. But ethnic conflicts still may occur in democracies because of the failure of conflict resolution methods available to the ethnic group. However, according to Fox (2003), democracies are vulnerable to low intensity conflicts. There are three reasons for low intensity conflicts in democracies. First, democracies are usually powerful and their challengers are relatively weak which turns the conflict into a low intensity conflict due to the low chance of accomplishment. Second, inflated exceptions of success by strong actors usually do not occur in a short time which causes domestic pressure to end the conflict. So, democracies become more vulnerable to domestic pressure to end a conflict. Third, one of the few decisive strategies against guerilla warfare and terrorism is barbaric repression by the state which is likely to result in an opposition within the polity. Based on these structural factors democracies have structural pressures on both increasing and decreasing the duration of ethnic conflicts and its countering strategies.

Ethnic conflicts occur in democracies in transition due to several reasons. First, regime is inherently unstable which creates the opportunity for groups to increase or retain their advantages under the new system. Second, democratization brings new freedoms that allow groups to mobilize and address grievances and demands. And finally, groups demand more resources whereas the state does not have much. So, democracies in transition become volatile of increased demands for a shrinking pie. In fact, minorities in these states engage in the highest level of conflict according to several empirical studies (Fox, 1999; Fox, 2003).

Figure 1: Number of Ethnic Conflicts in Long-Term Democracies other than India, 1985-98 (Fox, 2003:61)
Conflicts in democracies tend to take long time since the groups can find access to address their grievances. Democracies are often hampered by moral concerns in cases of violent oppositions. On the other hand, it is more likely that group conflicts in democracies turn into terrorism since democracies are powerful and leave no place for them. A powerful state can easily track violent groups and deter the supporters. Hence, group conflicts are more likely to turn into terrorism form. On the other hand, ethnic terrorism is much more conducive under authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies than totalitarian dictatorships. Since autocracies are weak, groups find more places to rebel or apply guerrilla warfare. The advantage of autocracies, however, is that they are freer to use repressive tactics to quell violent opposition. For example, the former dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, didn’t hesitate to use chemical weapons to quell Kurdish opposition. Such regimes are more likely to have preconditions for radicalization of political and nationalist protest into terrorism. For example, ETA was formed as a terrorist organization during the 1960s after Franco’s dictatorship but its violence dramatically increased when Spain underwent a transition from authoritarian rule to liberalization. So, democratic transitions from authoritarian or totalitarian rule often create fertile conditions for violent ethnic conflicts, including terrorism (Wilkinson, 1986; Snyder, 2000).
Unlike autocratic regimes which are freer to use repressive tactics to quell violent oppositions, liberal states have many difficulties in countering terrorism. Immediate action demands against terrorism by public and media, limitations of the laws and legal processes are some of them. It is a struggle for them to respond terrorism in a consistent manner with their own norms of legitimacy and acceptability. Manner of the state’s response to terrorism cannot undermine liberal democratic way of life, rule of law etc. It should be the primary objective of a liberal democracy to protect and maintain rule of law and constitutional rights (Bal, 2002; Chalk, 1998). Liberal states have choices to overcome terrorism that vary from concession to military retaliation. Although it depends on the characteristic of the terrorist organization, it is among the response choices to response by domestic legal actions, regular counter-terrorism forces, special courts, high penalties and so forth. But choosing the type of action against terrorists in these states is a dilemma. In one hand, terrorists provoke an overreaction to make the government appear repressive. In the other hand, a weak response would be considered as a weak government and disappoint the public. Nevertheless, pursuing regular civil liberties and courts is expected from the liberal state in such cases (Wilkinson, 1977).

Chalk (1998) mentions that initiations of counter-terrorist measures should be guided by three over-arching principles of action. First, limited and well defined response is needed. State response should not go beyond what is demanded by the exigencies of the immediate situation. It should be also directed to terrorists themselves, not anybody else. Second, it needs to be credible. The general populace has to be convinced that what the state is doing is necessary and it will have effective results in terms of protecting...
civil liberties and combating terrorism. And finally, it should be subject to constant parliamentary supervision and judicial oversight. That is to say, the state should have constitutional accountability.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICIES TO MEDIATE ETHNIC CONFLICTS

As a generally accepted concept, state should be the promoter of equality among ethnic groups of its own. However, sometimes such equalizing policies may create the formation of new identities among various categories of groups within the state. By the same token, some government policies may affect the identity, cohesion, and mobilization of particular ethnic groups (Brass, 1985). The quests of ethnic groups for greater autonomy or access to power within state institutions often lead violent conflicts or challenge the state existence. Although it is very difficult to prevent them all, it is possible to manage or transform them to less destructive forms. In this regard, it is the general principle to balance the interest of communal groups and state elites (Mikesell and Murphy, 1991). In addition, the process of conflict management should begin as soon as the problem emerges. Tracking minorities in Western Democracies between 1950s and 1980s, Gurr observed that these groups eventually used violent protests or terrorism in the course of the time. There was an average of thirteen years elapsed between the first occurrence of violence and the political movement. Government response was critical for continuity or discontinuity of these conflicts. Late accommodations will make more restraints and more violence (Gurr, 1994).

Separation of citizenship from nationality is one of the policies that multi-ethnic states can apply for their existence against ethnic conflicts. When citizenship is defined as both a process of constructing identity and a framework for individual participation in the public sphere, it results discriminatory treatments towards some minorities such as in the case of Germany. Citizenship in Germany is defined by the law of ethnic descent. Unlike Ottomans’ "millet" definition, the modern Turkish State also made a definition of citizenship which is adopted from French system that created a ‘hierarchy’ of desirable citizens ranging from ethnic Turks, to non-Turkish Muslims to Armenians, Jews and Kurds. Territory of Turkey was interpreted ethnically by the imposing residency (Cagaptay, 2006). One of the best examples that can be given from the history that successfully managed diversities can be the Ottoman Empire. Karpat makes this point by arguing that nation-state and ‘the ethnic problem’ are Western and European inventions which have been arisen due to the establishment of one dominant language and ethnic group in the state. He mentions that unlike European states in the 19th century, the Ottoman system recognized cultural rights and religious diversities in which ethnic and cultural differences did not become a problem until the invention of nation state. In the Ottoman system, the ruling elite were Muslim and the administrative language was Turkish, but Turks
did not become the dominant ruling elite. They recruited the ruling elite from various ethnic groups (Karpat, 1985).

Successful policies on regional autonomy, integration, and pluralism can prevent most ethnic protests from escalating into rebellions. Among the examples are the Western Democracies that experienced a one-third decline in magnitudes of ethno-political conflicts in the 1980s. Canada’s management of Quebec is, perhaps, one of the best examples as well. If Canada fought to keep Quebec part of the country, violent actions might have happened. As the case of Basque shows, negotiation of regional autonomy has prevented most violent conflicts. Although exceptions such as Miskitos in Nicaragua and Nagas in India exist, settlements prevented continuous fight (Gurr, 1994).

Democratic means can also be helpful in reducing potential ethnic terrorism cases. Although democracy often backfires in highly divided societies it may reduce violence if implemented properly. India is one of the best examples. The central government was willing to devolve power to the local level and did not seek to impose an identity on disparate ethnic groups after the independence of India. Proportional representation system in elections and cross-ethnic parties brought communities together and polarized them. Government satisfied the linguistic and cultural demands of many groups. Ethnic insurgency in India started when the Indian government sought more central control over Kashmir in 1980s (Byman, 1998).

International community can also play an important role in reducing ethnicity related violence. Gurr (1994) mentions that rights of communal groups to autonomy such as rights of self-determination and related international laws and policies should be clarified in the international laws. These policies and laws should also be consistently enforced within the states. Policy makers or government officials should search for early warnings of ethnic and humanitarian crises. Global powers such as United States and United Nations should consistently enforce preventive diplomacy and back up these diplomatic efforts with established doctrines of humanitarian intervention. Although they are rare, United Nations diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts has ended some conflicts in some of Soviet and Yugoslav successor states. UN efforts in Croatia and United States’ efforts in Macedonia have prevented civil wars in these countries.

Byman claims that the ideal way of countering ethnic terrorism is ‘in group’ policing, in which the ethnic group as a whole ‘identifies, ostracizes, and suppresses radicals” (Byman, 1998:162). This tactic is far more effective and causes less resentment in the community as a whole. It is recommended by Byman that authorities should encourage groups to police themselves. The first step of ‘in group’ policing is to recognize and protect the forces of moderation. Among the examples can be the radical nationalist Kurds versus moderate Alevi Kurds in Turkey, the moderate Basques versus radical Basques etc. In Basque region, the conflict is almost entirely between the moderates and radicals. Moderate Basques are satisfied with the high level of autonomy they have gained. Terrorism in Spain has steadily declined in
recent years in part due to moderate Basques. Governments should also consider fostering an identity that competes with that promoted by the terrorists. During 1990s in Turkey, the Turkish government began to foster a distinct identity among Turkey’s Alevi community who are Kurdish in nationality. Actually, if the Turkish government officials, especially the ruling party, could allow and support a “moderate Kurdish party” against the unofficial secretariat of the PKK, the Democratic Turkey Party, much of the political violence could be reduced. In fact, Alevi Kurds can be organized under such moderate parties in order to combat ethnic violence in Turkey. Another state that used in group policing is Israel. Israel has used Druze and Christians from the Israeli Arab population in an attempt to weaken the community as a whole. It should be noted that such divide-and-rule polices are risky, but they can internecine violence and diminish any hope of nation-building.

REFERENCES


