**Possible Impacts and Potential Benefits from Turkey in the EU’s Enlargement Process**

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**Abstract**

EU’s enlargement is a tool for extending the borders of European values and aiming to consolidating stability and security for the benefit of all across the continent. Turkey, on the other hand, has made significant steps to become a member in the EU’s enlargement process. However, reaching for a full member are remain unsuccessful, due to many self-limited dimensions and various arguments. The purposes of this study was to develop understanding of the arguments against Turkey’s membership and trying to answer questions, how enlargement to Turkey’s EU member is a great opportunity for the EU. This investigation focuses on various empirical studies which will analyze whether is it valid to agree that Turkey could be an asset. Based on the findings of this investigation, it was concluded that the EU may benefit if it accepts Turkey’s EU membership on social, strong economic, political and security matters.

**Keywords:** EU’s enlargement, Turkey’s EU membership, Role of Turkey, Dilemma of EU Accession, Islamophobia

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**AB Genişleme Sürecinde Türkiye’nin Olası Etkileri ve Potansiyel Faydaları**

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**Özet**

AB’nin genişlemesi, Avrupa değerlerinin sınırlarını genişletmek ve tüm kıtanın menfaati için istikrar ve güvenliği sağlamayı amaçlayan bir araçtır. Öte yandan Türkiye, üye olmak adına AB’nin genişleme sürecinde önemli adımlar attı. Fakat tam üyeliğe ulaşmak, birçok kendine özgü sınırlar ve çeşitli argümanlardan dolayı başarısız olarak kalmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’nin üyeliğine karşı argümanları iyi bir şekilde anlamak ve Türkiyenin Ab üyesi olmasının AB için ne kadar iyi fırsat olduğunu soruları yanıtlayarak göstermektir. Bu araştırmanın bulgularına dayanarak, Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğini kabul edilmesi halinde AB’nin sosyal, güçlü ekonomik, siyasi ve güvenlik açısından fayda sağlayabileceği sonucuna varılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** AB’nin Genişlemesi, Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliği, Türkiye’nin Rolü, AB’ye Katılım İkilemi, İslamofobi

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**Introduction**

Enlargement is one of the powerful policy tools for EU in expanding the security and increasing the power in the world. It helps the EU’s to enhance vital interests in stability, security, and conflict prevention for the EU. It has served to build accomplishment and growth opportunities and to secure essential transport and energy routes.”[[1]](#footnote-1)This opening announcement of the EU Commission report entitled “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008” makes clear the significance of expansion for the EU. Indeed, this can be obviously realized when the EU’s enlargement process is considered. Since its establishing, the EU has encountered six enlargement waves. As a result of these enlargement waves, the number of states participating in this integration process has increased from 6 to 28 country members. The European Commission has explained the recent situation of the EU with the following statement:

*“Today’s EU, with 28 Member countries and a population of close to more 500 million people, is much safer, more wealthy, powerful and more prominent than the initial European Economic Community during 50 years ago, with its just only 6 members and population of less than 200 million.”* [[2]](#footnote-2)

The contemporary EU enlargement plan, which includes the Western Balkans and Turkey, presents the EU’s aim to be stronger and to have a substantial influence and power on the international stage. Turkey, a nation that has had relationships with EU integration institutions since the 1960s and that began accession negotiations in 2005, holds a significant place in this plan. Moreover, its long-standing relationships with the EU, the prospect that Turkey’s accession would be different from preceding enlargement rounds grows the value of Turkey’s place in the agenda and makes its membership of the EU more provocative than some others have been.

The EU Commission report named “Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective”[[3]](#footnote-3) explains the factors that will deliver this accession process different from the previous enlargements as a “combined impact result of geographic location, Turkey’s population, size and demographic, economic expansion, military potential and security, as well as cultural and religious background characteristics of the European Union”[[4]](#footnote-4) Turkey, with its people of almost eighty million, the land cover 775,000 km² total area, has the geographical borders with the EU countries, and another part of Caucasus region nation like Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Syria, Iraq and Iran, and is also the one of vital area economical strategy in the world that expanding between Europe and Asia and culturally bridge connecting between the West and East.

 Turkey is a country that is developing economy; one of the biggest military powers benefits serve both the region and NATO that protecting the common interest and benefit for the Western world including the EU too.

**1. Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession**

Turkey has made great progress step towards EU integration. However, reaching for full member are remain unsuccessful, due to many self-limited dimensions and various arguments against Turkey by the members. This study focuses on various empirical studies and use of both the qualitative and quantitative methods. The result showed that various arguments surrounding Turkey’s projected accession revolve around a series of issues, ranging from the current debates in Turkey’s politics and democratic breakdowns, human rights abuses, Turkey’s demographic structure, economic dilemma and also, historical and cultural matter.

* 1. **Geographic and Demographics Debate**

Turkey is a country that is located between East and West, the gathering place of much more than two regions, Europe and Asia make Turkey become a great geopolitical country and winning strategy in the world. İf Turkey becomes a member; it will lead and reinvigorate Europe’s relations with fast evolving regions like the energy rich as Caucasus and Central Asia region. However, there has an argument that Turkey is not exactly a European country because more than 90% of Turkey’s territory lies in Asia. The country located close with conflict state as neighboring countries of Turkey like Syria, Iran, and Iraq, the EU does not need to be shared borders with these countries, Moreover, Turkey is too big for the EU to integrates and with the growing population increasing and changed in demographic from neighbor migrants. The country predicted to reach 95 million by 2050; it will affect on members of the EU in the future.

* 1. **Political Debate.**

Turkey is one of the perfect and successful Muslim democracy countries in the world. The prospect of EU membership makes Turkey has a good democracy system, good governance and increasing aware of human rights issue. Moreover, as Turkey is a strong member of NATO ally is also part of super regional power over the Middle East. Nevertheless, Turkey is not a mature European-style democracy. Turkish political system remains affected by using heavy military force against minority and political parties still look Islamists party. Violating the declaration of the human rights issues continue. A large number of journalists who published media anti- government side remain arrested by the government, free speech in public was controlled, and the minority rights are unfair, especially, Kurdish issues in Eastern part of Turkey, the Cyprus problem are continue

* 1. **Economic Debate**

Turkey’s economy had grown every year, and it seems much better than most EU nations. Per capital, income has increased, and the average Turk is now better off than his neighboring countries such as Romanian and Bulgarian counterparts in the EU. However its recent growth, Turkey remains a weak economy. Turkish’s GDP remains less than half the EU average. Turkey’s wealth is unequally between the wealthy and poor people in their country, its mean if accepted Turkey as a member poor immigrants from other parts of Turkey will be heading and move to the west. Also, even though Turkey’s economic has increased significantly but unemployment is also still rising.

* 1. **History, Culture, and Religion Debate**

Turkey has been fully a part of Europe’s history since the Ottomans era in the 14th Century, whose rich cultural heritage and traditions are unique, EU membership is also an opportunity for solving the Kurdish issue as well as relations with Cyprus and Armenia. Moreover, as Turkey in contemporary shows as a prosperous Muslim democracy, this model would send a clear sign that Europe is open to the Islamic society. EU membership would be representative of Turkey’s success as a secular Islamic nation and a model for others Muslim nations. Nevertheless, many Western scholars had to criticize Turkey’s historical and cultural roots lay in Central Asia and the Middle East more than to share experiences with Europeans together, from the cultural legacy of Renaissance and Enlightenment, Turkey’s cultural traditions are fundamentally different from that of Christian Europe. Turkey’s actual interaction with Europe has always been as an outside invader. Also, many of people, especially the scholars from Turkey believe that EU is not accepting Tukey as member easily because of “EU is the Christian club.” Much of people agreed with this statement particularly, Turkish’s scholars because of the prove that many member countries of EU try to against Turkey to access to the EU member. This argument established by the fact that Europe as a region of the Christian country.

**2. Possible Impacts and Potential Benefits of Turkey’s EU membership**

Membership could have on the EU in the future. This carries up the questions, “How would this prospective membership change the EU, and what are the possible advantages and drawbacks of Turkey’s accession to the EU?” The possible benefits of Turkish membership exceed the potential disadvantages for the EU. This article investigates benefit from Turkey’s prospective membership on the EU’s Common Foreign policy and how Turkey can contribution to the EU on common security dimension, the EU’s economic performance, Finally, this study analyses the possible impacts of Turkey’s membership on the EU institutions, economics, politics, social and future challenges for the EU.

**2.1 The Possible Impacts and Potential Benefits of Turkey’s Membership on EU’s Common Foreign Policy and Security Policy**

Since its founding, the EU has increased its power in the international stage both economically and politically. Its eagerness to join into new strategic sectors and play more significant diplomatic, economic, and military roles in the international arena has given the EU one of the important foreign policy players in the world. In this circumstances, the EU’s expansions have played crucial roles in foreign policy formulation and its attempts to be an influential global actor. Enlargement means will have the new member countries, different security issues, increased neighbors, different markets, new political problems, and new possibilities to use political power over new and broader geographical stages in the international policy of the EU.

Turkey’s EU membership would affect the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFPS) of the EU since it is straight concerned with all of the problems above. Turkey is geographically located at the joining of three continents: Europe, Africa, and Asia. This strategic position makes Turkey as a linking among Europe, the Middle East, and the Transcaucasus, as well as a gathering position for collaboration and engagement concerning different historical cultures.[[5]](#footnote-5)

As a result, Turkey’s position has caused the attention of many countries for a heterogeneity of economic, military purposes and political. While the official visit to Turkey in April 2008 by the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, he highlighted the significance of Turkey’s geographic position, MÖ-Morever, forty years ago, during the French President General de Gaulle visited Turkey, he said:

*“Here is Turkey, Master of the Straits Guardian of various of the doors through which, in this region of the globe, goes peace, into which can go war, and, as a result, holder of great and productive possibilities, but also shown to the worst and serious opportunities.”*

General de Gaulle had indeed grasped Turkey’s key position and value for Europe[[6]](#footnote-6) Barroso’s statement illustrates that Turkey’s value for Europe has been increasingly recognized, especially since the beginning of the Cold War era. Even though according to some, the importance of Turkey for the EU has decreased since the end of the Cold War. Turkey’s importance has actually increased due to new, emerging threats; Turkey’s contributions to regional stability efforts; and Turkey’s increasing geostrategic significance in terms of economic, military, and political aspects of globalization.

Today, the implications for CFSP hold a prominent place in the analysis of the potential effects of Turkey’s membership upon the EU. The EU’s CFSP would experience both positive and negative effects if Turkey joined the EU. In the event of Turkish membership, the EU would become a direct neighbor of the Caucasus to the east, Iran to the southeast, and Iraq and Syria to the south. Considering the latest developments in these regions, it can be clearly seen that these are turbulent areas.[[7]](#footnote-7)

The evaporation of the regions in Turkey’s neighborhood has been represented by the following factors; the Second Gulf War and subsequent continuing conflict in Iraq concern originating from declarations of Iran developing nuclear weapons. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia due to Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the recent Georgia-Russian armed conflict. Having a close border with this conflict neighborhood would force the EU to face significant new security challenges and new issues in the future and waiting to be settled in the EU foreign policy plan. Additionally distributing with these problems, the EU would have to discuss it is newly developed outside borders, which would ask the EU to reshape and reformulate its foreign policy. New policy operations could raise the possibility of different views and perspectives within the EU. This situation could make it challenging to define and perform a common policy. EU members might be divided on the general agreement, as the Iraq crisis during 2002-2003. On the other hand, Turkey’s accession to the EU could also have positive outcomes for the EU’s in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Turkey’s membership would improve “the probability of EU policies in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean regions.” The EU’s new boundaries would require the EU to take new actions and join with new political challenges due to the result of the force for a common foreign policy. Consequently, Turkey’s membership would offer the EU a more powerful foreign policy maker.[[8]](#footnote-8)

In this regard, an essential question has to be asked to explain the basic effective of the CFSP. “Does the EU aim to become a dominant actor in the nearby southern and eastern neighborhoods?”[[9]](#footnote-9) The response to this topic will be essential in explaining the positive and negative consequences of Turkey’s membership on the EU’s CFSP. The objective of the European Neighborhood Policy of the EU (ENP), which was formed in 2004, was the restraint of “the emergence of new separating lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors, and alternately extending the prosperity, security, and stability of all concerned.”[[10]](#footnote-10)As part of this effort, the EU’s negotiations and attempts involve the quest for political and diplomatic resolutions to the Iranian nuclear problem. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) also endeavors to resolve the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as the contemporary struggle between Russia and Georgia. These are just a few samples of the EU’s interest in being a dominant actor in the nearby eastern and northern neighborhoods of Turkey.

The military procedures conducted by the EU (not only in its neighborhood but including in countries distant from Europe, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo) and its diplomatic relations and economics in several parts of the world are also important evidence of its desire as a global actor to exercise influence in international politics arena. Given the EU’s interest in exercising influence in Turkey’s eastern and southern regions, it is necessary to explore Turkey’s surroundings and analyze in larger depth the possible effects of Turkey’s membership of the EU interms of foreign and security policy dimensions.

**2.1.1 Foreign Policy Dimension: Turkey and Its Neighborhood**

Turkish policy toward its neighborhood has been significant not just for Turkey itself but also for the whole region. As a result of Turkey has established a dominant role in the region. In this context, Turkey’s relationships with its neighbors’ countries and the concentration of Turkey and EU foreign policies, and mutual of these policies obtain importance in understanding the positive offerings that Turkey could carry to the EU’s common foreign policy. The Balkans constitute an essential geographic territory of both sides for Turkey and the EU.

**2.1.1.1 Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans**

Nowadays, there are three Balkan nations in the European Union including; Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania. The remaining Balkan countries, known as the Western Balkan nations and continue their relations with the EU in the candidateship and possible candidateship frames. In remembering, it can be obviously recognized that both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey have performed important roles in the inhibition of conflict and trouble and have made giving to security and stability in the Balkans countries.

Turkey remains to make efforts for the social improvement and stabilization of the area. Turkey has played actively in the EU’s police purposes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in The Republic of Macedonia. It also encouraged the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), the United Nations Protection Force(UNPROFOR), and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.[[11]](#footnote-11) Turkey is also a supporter of the EU’s “Stabilization and Association Process” and the EU policies promoting the acceptance of the Western Balkan nations to the EU and is a member of the Stability Pact intended at conflict stopping in southeastern Europe.[[12]](#footnote-12)These are noteworthy implications of Turkey’s attempts in the region. Turkey’s prospective membership in the EU could serve various positive consequences. It could promote the resolution of mutual Turkey-Greece dilemmas. Regarding Turkey’s relations with the Western Balkan countries, its attempts for stabilization of that region, and provider for the Balkan nations’ membership in Association for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, it can be assumed that it could supply to the region’s combination with the EU.[[13]](#footnote-13)

**2.1.1.2 The Black Sea Region in Turkish Foreign Policy Strategy**

The Black Sea is another major issue in the EU’s foreign policy. Bulgarian and Romanian membership (which occurred in 2007) enlarged the EU’s boundaries to the western coast of the Black Sea. Besides Turkey’s membership, the EU would control the whole western and southern coastline of the Black Sea. By doing this would allow the EU to extend its influence and power beyond the Black Sea region, which is essential concerning of energy links, transportation, fisheries, illegal immigration and combating organized crime ”. Turkey, which represented a key role in the founding of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Moreover, was an initiator in formulating the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group or Blackseafor, would provide to the implementation of the EU’s policies strategies both in economic and security dimensions.[[14]](#footnote-14) Thus, the EU would expand its influence in that region.

**2.1.1.3 Turkey’s role and interests in Caucasus and Central Asia**

Regarding the southern Caucasus region, by Turkish accession, the EU would reach a border with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Regarding Turkey’s enthusiasm to resolve conflicts, as well as its attempts to bring security and stability to the region. Turkey recently aimed a “Caucasia Stability and Cooperation Platform” to bring Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, and Turkey unitedly to discuss their territorial dilemmas and concerns. If achieved in the context of Turkey’s EU membership, such a debate stage could give the EU a crucial role in the region. Also, thanks to Turkey’s membership, the EU could improve its relations with countries that are placed nearby the oil-rich Caspian Sea, which is important concerning energy security.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Looking at Central Asia region, following the Central Asian Republics obtained their independence and autonomy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkey became significantly engaged roles in connecting Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan with the rest of the world. Religious, linguistic, cultural, and historical bonds between Turkey and the Central Asian nations and bring to promote the establishment of political, economic, and military relations. Turkey has carried them in participating in international organizations such as the United Nations, the Economic Cooperation Organization, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as in participating NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Turkey has also assisted these countries in many other platforms.( Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry State Planning Organisation, “The Likely Effects of Turkey’s Membership Upon the EU,” 14.) Turkey could, therefore, be a channel for enhancing the EU’s policies in Central Asia.[[16]](#footnote-16)

**2.1.1.4 Role of Turkey and EU-Russia relations**

Turkey’s membership would also be significant concerning EU-Russia relations. Notwithstanding historical, political struggle issues, such as being on the opposing sides during the Cold War, and extending interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkish and Russian relations are currently seemed positive. Economic signs show the flourishing relations connecting the two countries. Russia is the second biggest trading partner of Turkey, after Germany. Following Turkey’s accession, EU relationships with Russia might well become more important regarding in fighting energy interests and expansions in Caucasus and Central Asia region.”[[17]](#footnote-17)

**2.1.1.5 Turkey’s power in the Mediterranean region**

Concerning the Mediterranean region, Turkey’s potential accession would be a major factor in the increase of the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Dialogue,[[18]](#footnote-18) Which proposes to improve collaboration between the EU-28 and Southern Mediterranean countries on political, cultural, social, economic, and migration matters. [[19]](#footnote-19) Furthermore, it could provide to achieving the goals of the EU as mentioned above Neighborhood Policy, at the core of which is Turkey

**2.1.1.6 EU-Turkey Relations in the Context of the Turkey's Model Role in the Middle East and Muslim World**

With its continuing conflicts, the Middle East is one of the most unsteady areas of the world. It is evident that the EU and other global players can not neglect this region. Within Turkey’s membership, the EU’s borders would sprea influence to Iran, Iraq, Syria and the other Muslim countries in the Middle East. Turkey and the EU agree on the necessary for a diplomatic clarification to the Iranian nuclear dilemma and a promote the democracy in Iraq. According to the European Commission, “Turkey has a major role to play in the stabilization and restoration of Iraq.” [[20]](#footnote-20) Despite the EU members opposed on whether to help the U.S.-led alliance in the Second Gulf War, they realize that their economic and security concerns rule out being impervious to developments in the region. In this circumstances, as an important player of Turkey working for the stabilization of the region. Turkey could be an important agent in the promotion of the EU’s concerns. These interests include spread democratic values to the region, energy security, fixing the Israeli-Palestinian relation dispute and the Iranian nuclear dilemma.

Turkey’s accession would be essential for the EU’s relations with the Islamic Society countries all over the world. Over the years, Turkey has managed to build solid relationships and integrated with both Western and Eastern countries to more cooperations. On the one hand, Turkey has membership in organizations such as NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Council of Europe.[[21]](#footnote-21)On the other hand, it has membership in organizations such as the Economic Cooperation Organization and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). These memberships have created close bonds with both Western nations and Islamic countries and have permitted Turkey to serve as a bridge between West and East worlds. In this regard, Emerson and Tocci particularly highlight Turkey’s membership in the OIC and how this membership “has been and is increasingly an asset to the European countries when it becomes to deepening and regulating its relations with the Muslim world.”[[22]](#footnote-22)

Additionally, a World Economic Forum paper entitled *“World Economic Forum in Turkey, Connecting Regions, Creating New Opportunities”* recognizes Turkey’s acting as a “bridge between civilizations,” and explains Turkey’s possible role in the future prospect. The country can simply distribute the knowledge it has obtained over time concerning the differences separating East and West, and also the connections. It can support a culture of dialogue, both political and religious. If Turkey, the secular democratic country with a predominantly Muslim community, became a member of the EU, it would confirm that Western values and Islam are agreeable, as argued to Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory, and demonstrate that the EU is not merely a “Christian Club” This membership would prove that “Western countries have no overwhelming bias against Islam,”and offer to raise balances between the West and the Islamic world and developing economic, political and, cultural relations.

**2.1.2 Turkey and the European on Common Security Dimension**

As remarked previous, Turkey’s membership in the EU would involve with new borders with the Middle East countries and the Caucasus region for the EU. Since this neighborhood is unstable and conflicts still going on, this could give security challenges for the EU. Across the several years, Turkey has achieved in improving safety and stability of this neighborhood and its own. From this prospect, Turkey would be a protection asset for the EU. During the Cold War, Turkey played an active role and position in the security of NATO against the Soviet Union. After the ending of the Cold War, Turkey has remained to play significant roles by joining in military actions proposed to solving dilemmas in the Balkans and different parts of the world, such as in Afghanistan.

The resolve of the problems regarding the “modalities of collaboration between NATO and the EU” and “the agreement terminated in October 2002 for supporting the participation of non-EU NATO allies in European security and defense policy joined Turkey closer to the EU-led security operations.”[[23]](#footnote-23) As Sinan Ülgen has written entitle, “Turkey has participated in some military and civilian ESDP missions containing Concordia and Proxima (Macedonia), and EUFOR RD Congo. It is currently joining in Althea (Bosnia), EUPM (Bosnia), and EUPOL Kinshasa.”[[24]](#footnote-24)

Regarding Turkey’s great defense funds and its experienced, skilled and well-equipped of military troops, the biggest in NATO’s European uncertain by a number of officers. Turkey’s accession to the EU would make vital increases to the EU’s military capacities and the development of the ESDP. [[25]](#footnote-25)Also, Turkey’s membership would be valuable concerning the EU’s attempts to stand present threats. According to the European Union’s European Security Strategy, the effort toward global threats such as terrorism, the increase of weapons of mass disruption, and regional struggles require the EU to be “more efficient, more consistent and more capable.”[[26]](#footnote-26)

This goal stands in contradiction with the anti-expansionist. The argument that the EU would become more defenseless to these threats if it enlarged to the east part of the EU by embracing Turkey as a member. Certainly, these threats illustrate the significance of Turkey’s membership in the EU on security territories. As discussed above, Turkey’s accession would implement the EU geographically closer to the active regions which may be an expert on these kinds of threats. From this prospect, Turkey’s membership increases concerns among EU members. It should not to ignored that those warnings are global. Any of these threats, such as terrorism and illegal migration, already create serious security threats in the EU. Also, Turkey has struggled against these threats, particularly terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking, over the years and has earned experience in handling them.

Turkey’s membership would mean the complete harmonization of its aims with those of the EU in the struggle against these threats.[[27]](#footnote-27) Consequently, Turkey’s accession would give positively to the EU’s attempts in approaching global threats. Additionally, Turkey is positioned between the EU and its southern neighborhood part of the EU and serves as a gate in road, rail, naval, marine and pipeline links. Turkey’s accession would empower the EU to manage these transportation modes,[[28]](#footnote-28) especially for energy, which has gained importance as a critical issue on the EU’s security agenda. Concerns about possible oil price shocks and energy supply interruptions cause countries to search for new energy sources to reduce their dependence on any one supplier.

The EU is concerned about these issues. Turkey, with its geographical closeness to a region holding an enormous amount of the world’s oil and gas resources, has active operating pipelines crossing through its territory for carrying gas and oil resources to the west, such as the Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline,[[29]](#footnote-29) which has enhanced and significant energy channel for European Union countries. Continuing projects prove that Turkey will expand its importance in energy transport in the future. Under this context, Turkey’s access to the EU would offer a great deal to the EU’s energy security.[[30]](#footnote-30)

**3. Possible Economic Impact and Potential Benefits of Turkey’s EU accession**

Another perspective of Turkey’s accession to the EU would be the economic dimension. The possible effects of Turkey's membership have been widely debated throughout the EU's government officials and citizens in the EU. Since Turkey started full accession negotiations on 4 October 2005, investigations about the possible economic advantages and values of this membership have highlighted. Evaluations have been regularly focused on macroeconomic and budgetary impacts on the EU economy, as well as Turkey’s young country in the EU, dynamic population and possible migration from Turkey flow into other EU countries following Turkish accession into the EU. Consequently, these three most significant perspectives of Turkey’s possible accession must be examined and the potential economic consequences for the EU must be considered.

**3.1 The Macro-Economic Impacts of Turkey’s Membership**

According to World Bank 2015 statistics data, Turkey, with its 717,880 million dollars Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is the eighteenth highest country in the world. In the table list, it follows five EU member nations: Germany with its 3,363,447 million dollars (4th on the list), France, 2,418,836 million dollars (6th), Italy,1,821,497 million dollars (8th), Spain,1,199,057 million dollars (14th), and Netherlands, 750,284 million dollars (17th).[[31]](#footnote-31)

Considering its large population of Turkey, its GDP per capita is low comparative with the other EU-28 countries. According to The World Bank’s 2015 data, Turkey’s GDP per capita at nominal values ($9,125.7) is only larger than those of the two latest EU entrants such as Romania ($8,972.9) and Bulgaria ($6,993.5)[[32]](#footnote-32). Due to economic uncertainty, Turkey’s growth rate has been erratic in the past. However, the Turkish economy has started a transition period and follows a country “which is just going away from a highly distorted boom-and-bust economy to a stable market economy.”[[33]](#footnote-33) During this transition period, Turkey has become more accessible to international trade and foreign investment and has reached sustainable increase and macroeconomic stability. [[34]](#footnote-34)

Also concerning income per capita Turkey will not be affected in the foreseeable future for the EU. However, this should be no reason to be concerned about the EU membership of Turkey because the modern history of the EU and also The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has clearly shown that “small is beautiful.” Thus, strong “core” member countries with very low growth rates, such as Italy, Spain and Greece with its ongoing failure to hold to the stability and growth in economic expansion, have caused signiﬁcantly more difficulties than poorer but more quickly spreading and more powerful “peripheral” states such as the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).

Several points prove that Turkey is likely now be on the edge of a more prosperous period during which the actual income per capita differential compares with some the EU countries that will be reduced to a signiﬁcantly lower level. So, the economic debate on Turkey will give Turkey’s accession to the EU politically weak debated. The nation begun fundamental reforms in 2001, is now enduring inﬂation rates at lower levels than for decades and envisions an accession negotiation process which might describe a reliable anchor for politics (including policies provided towards the choosing of the euro) Further, prevent populist politicians from withdrawing and spraying down the reformations. Nevertheless, the main challenge is the remarkable heterogeneity of the Turkish economy.

**3.2 Demographic Impact of Turkish Labor Migration to the EU**

On demographics, the welcome growth of demographic structure with a growing proportion of working age is a definite benefit and increasing significant opportunities for both Turkey and The EU. Additionally, the underemployment of workers that all in the rural areas and amongst women group can be changes on a large scale into higher productivity actions in the EU industry and services. This factor may consider a further expansion in Turkish GDP per capita close to one per cent per annum and, consequently, is a typical example of the great beneﬁts of combining two regions both Europe and Asia with signiﬁcantly various factor benefits. Finally, there is also a possible for the forward of total factor productivity using an increase in technology changes, i.e. by larger Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the EU.

İf using all three growth-enhancing factors, the consensus view emerges to be that Turkey has the possible to grow in economic activity faster than the several EU's member countries and especially, Turkey will quicker than the new EU member countries. Viewed, on the whole, the economic prospect for Turkey is rather encouraging, and the start of accession negotiations might be self-enforcing. On the one hand, Turkey is a slightly emerging country. On the other hand, its economy is signiﬁcantly larger than that of the now EU countries.

Turkey is characterized by demographic dynamism. Turkey’s labor force will continue to encounter increased rates of more than one per cent p.a. for at least one more generation. In opposition, the labor force currently tends to be narrowing in many CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries).[[35]](#footnote-35) This large difference gives Turkey probably much more dynamism and freedom for growth. Moreover, Turkey’s working age people is currently rising 1.5 percentage points faster than the total population. That means Turkey was experiencing the same demographic change to lower demographic as was encountered by the EU countries several decades preceding.

**3.3 Estimating the potential migration from Turkey to the EU**

**Many studies focusing on the estimations of possible migration flows from candidate countries or new member nations to the EU regularly apply indeed changeable such as income and wage differentials, demographic indicators, unemployment rates, etc. to make a comparison between the two and prognosticate migration trends. When examining the economic impacts of Turkey's accession to the EU, Lejour et.al. Consider migration responses to the free movement of labor as one of the major points in the membership process. Taking the economic and demographic indicators into account, they made a migration estimation of 2.7 million in the long term (by 2025). They also indicate that the predicted amount of migrants would be focused mostly in countries (mainly Germany, France, and Netherlands) where there is an extraordinary level of a migrant population who have already resided.**

**Krieger and Maitre provided a study on possible migration from Turkey together with the EU-10, Romania, and Bulgaria. Based on Eurobarometer data, their study included same studies conducted in each of these countries to have an idea about the trend of the respondents to migrate, i.e. general intention, and also about the firm purpose. Amongst the countries involved in this surveys, Turkey has the biggest share for general purpose to migrate (6.2%) while it has the lowest level with regards to the specific intention (0.3%).**As the certain economic developments and the establishment of full freedom of movement in the EU for Turkish workers, it is anticipated that provisions stated in those legal documents should have been performed in a way to ease the free movement of Turkish workers.According to the legal backgrounds stated the dynamic nature of the EU approach to the free mobility of workers is of great significance for Turkish workers, in the case of when they became a full membership.

There has some information shown by the previous experience in the EU expanding that the level of workers immigration expected before the enlargement was not realized and not definitively true as the EU expected. Because the labour markets were not severely affected by the free movement of labour, but, the EU member countries rather enjoyed on various economic benefits for them. Although, the internal debate within the EU, regarding enlargement, forced EU members to have a stringent attitude towards future enlargement waves which Turkey could also be a part of this possible reason too.

**3.4 Potential impacts on agricultural commodity markets**

**The agricultural sector continues a great player in the Turkish economy. Turkey is strongly comparable to other CEECs countries in that a significant portion of the workforce is formally employed in agriculture and farming sector. One-third of the Turkish labor force is employed in this area, but it accounts only for about 12% of GDP. As in other EU countries, this shows the low labor productivity performance of this sector and to a certain range – also some potential labour-shedding and moving.(Ansgar Belke, 2004).**

However, a marked variation in other candidate countries consists of the fact that Turkey runs a signiﬁcant trade excess vis-à-vis the EU in agricultural goods. The main reason is that Turkey – due to its favorable weather – is one of some countries which specialize in products for which the EU does not signiﬁcantly control imports (i.e. fruits, vegetables, and nuts). Also, in contradiction to the CEEC case, some Turkish agricultural products have been protected even more extremely than by the EU member countries. In the case of Turkish EU accession, the protection of this section would be eliminated and would, for instance, mean growing farm sizes.(Ansgar Belke, 2004). Consequently, human capital dilemmas in this area will become even more destructive in the future. The dualistic construction of the Turkish economy becomes visible again in the field of agriculture.

**4. The Possible İmpacts of Turkey’s Membership on EU İnstitutions**

The possible consequences of Turkey’s membership of the several EU institutions create another set of issues increasing concerns among existing EU members countries. The size of Turkish population would define the scope of these consequences. In 2015, Turkey could have almost the same population as Germany, that already has the highest a number of population in the EU. Turkey’s membership would adjust the allocation and position of important seats in the European Parliament; this could involve a smaller quantity of seats for existing members countries in the EU.[[36]](#footnote-36)

Additionally, the Lisbon treaty would place adequate majority voting into impact, and this would base on the double majority system both 55% from the EU countries and 65% of the EU’s population. Decisions could be prevented by a minimum of four nations.[[37]](#footnote-37) Because this system would reduce the power of the profoundly populated countries, Turkey could not use much power and strength in the decision-making method owing to its huge population.

Its demographic influence would be more significant when and if it combined with other profoundly populated nations in the blocking minority.[[38]](#footnote-38) According to the Lisbon Treaty since 2014, the commissioner would be equal to two-thirds of the member countries, and they would be determined according to a similar rotation scheme including all member nations.[[39]](#footnote-39) İts would mean that Turkey’s membership would have no major influence on the European Commission than that of any another member countries.

**5. The Impact of Islamophobia on Turkey’s Candidature of European Union**

The EU must accept Turkey as a member country to prove and show that they are not an Islamophobic “Christian Club.” [[40]](#footnote-40) The question of If Turkey becomes a member of EU is a great opportunity for the EU to prove that EU is not a Christian club? Moreover, this remains one of the interesting questions to several people and many countries. According to Turkish news from website Today’s Zaman. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey, discussed that if the EU not allowed Turkey to join the EU, its will be a failure of opportunity for EU to go success together as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish politician who has been the President of Turkey since 2014 said,

*“Turkey is included in NATO, OECD… Moreover, why don’t you admit it into the EU? Then, the problem is elsewhere,”* [[41]](#footnote-41) Turkish President also said that the EU must accept Turkey as a member to prove that EU is not a “Christian club.”

*“We are testing Europe and see will Europe be able to digest and to accept Turkey, whose main population are Muslims? If you oppose Islamophobia, then you must accept Turkey into the EU,”* [[42]](#footnote-42)

However, several of European Union countries leader attempting to say “European Union a is not a Christian club” but one key of issues is the accession of Turkey to the European Union that shows the EU can not prove themselves.Moreover, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was also spoken in the Republic of Djibouti where he presented remarks on a range of foreign policy concerns, that Turkey’s future did not depend on membership, but he claimed that the future of relations between Christianity and Islam did. This is reported by Hurriyet Daily News.[[43]](#footnote-43) Therefore, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan imply that the EU “must admit Turkey” as a member state to prove that the EU rejects “Islamophobia” as Erdogan asserted

*“Will Europe be able to digest and accept Turkey, where people are Muslim, İf you are opposed İslamophobia, then you must admit Turkey into the EU, and İf EU not accepts Turkey as a member, their status as a İslamophobic Christian club remains unquestionable.”*

**6. Turkey and the EU: Current Challenges and Challenges**

It is an underestimate to claim that in 2016 Turkey-EU relationships went into difficult times. Following a hopeful start in March 2016 when the two sides reached a final deal on refugees attempting to access Europe from Turkey, the relationship between Turkey and the EU turned sour after the unsuccessful 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt in July.[[44]](#footnote-44) Turkey considers its concerns are not being taken severely by the EU. Several European politicians are fed up with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's that are increasing authoritarianism. However, despite all the difficulties on both sides, most analysts would recognize that neither Turkey nor the EU is willing to remove the plug on the accession negotiations that began in 2005.

However, in the in March in 2016 is a good start for both side when the EU and Turkey achieved to elaborate their agreement on refugees in November 2015 that refugees are trying to enter Europe from Turkey. Both sides are happy that supported a plentiful decrease of refugees reaching in Greece and promised financial assistance for Turkey in refugee deal, visa liberalization and a restart of accession negotiations with Turkey again.

Nevertheless, after the Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, was displaced from his position by President Erdogan, the dilemmas began again. To be a capacity to lift the visa requirements, the EU emphasized all conditions already in 2013. Numerous of these are technical, and Turkey was ready to meet most of them before summer. The EU needed to develop its anti-terrorism legislation but did not go down well in Turkey. While the Europeans kept stressing that the goal was to stop the use of these laws to charge political domestic, people who critics of the President Erdoğan and his ruling party. So, the Turkish governments made it apparent they were not willing to treat this legislation at a time when the country was experiencing from terrorist attacks by the Islamic State (IS) and the Kurdish PKK. This unwillingness to amend the anti-terror legislation only increased after the July 15 putsch and the elimination targeting supposed perpetrators and other antagonists.

**6.1 The Erdogan Presidency and Turkey’s Political Future What to expect?**

In the article published on website of Heinrich Böll Foundation by Joost Lagendijk named “Moving Closer to a Reset Turkey and the EU in 2017”, Lagendijk argued and sugeested that there are several of important schedule events in the first half of 2017 that are of major significance for the further development of Turkey-EU relations (as cited in Lagendijk, 2016).

1. Elections in key EU countries, where radical right populism is on the rise as Parliamentary elections will be in the Netherlands in March, presidential elections in France in April or May and parliamentary elections in France in June.

2. A Turkish constitutional referendum in April 2017 is one of a major change for Turkey to the Turkish constitution that will lead Turkey to a Turkish style presidential system. Also, an amendment on reintroducing the death sentence issue that If Turkey would decide to reintroduce the death penalty back to use again, the EU accession negotiations will be discontinued promptly and also Turkey's membership of the Council of Europe will be endangered too.

3. A decision before June on a resolution was y to resolve the Cypriot issue based on a UN-sponsored agreement between the two communities on the island. So, If accepted by both sides between Turkey and the Cypriot became to reunification this will lead to removing a significant bone of contention between Turkey and the EU.

4. The start of negotiations between Turkey and the EU on modernizing the Customs Union. In December, the European Commission urged the EU Member States for a mandate to start talks with Turkey to improve and upgrade the existing 20-year-old agreement between Turkey and the EU. A successful modernisation would carry substantial economic advantages for both partners by including commerce and trade in agricultural products, service sectors and its would further strengthen the already strong economic relation between Turkey and the EU.

5. Finally, before the summer of 2017, Turkey and the EU have to find and will get a way to keep the March agreement 2016 on refugees crisis going to a great deal between both sides. The most crucial and questionable element of that deal is the promise of the EU to lift the visa obligations for Turkish nationals if and when Turkey meets a long list of conditions, including a change to its anti-terror legislation.

According to Joost Lagendijk (1957), the political analyst he guessed is that before June 2017, we will not see any significant breakthrough in Turkey-EU relationships. Because we need to wait to see the result and see how radical right populist parties and candidates in the Netherlands and France will achieve. If both countries do not win the presidency in France and do not enter the government in the Netherlands. İt will be easier for both countries to discuss the different elements of the Turkey dossier. That means, for example, that before June talks on the visa/refugee matter will remain but there will not be a final answer. In Turkey, Erdogan will most seemingly take his presidential system with no limits, control, and balances. However, the ongoing economic difficulties will prevent the reintroduction of the death penalty in Tuırkey. Turkey cannot take the danger of a sudden and complex Turxit.

As a result of its military operations in Syria facing both IS and the Syrian Kurds, Turkey will continue extremely unprotected to continued terrorist assaults. This uncertain security environment will only make the doubts among European investors about Turkey's long-term security and stability.

**6.2 The Future of EU-Turkey Relations**

After June 2017, however, some things may begin shifting fast. France and the Netherlands will be capable of committing themselves to new resolutions to old dilemmas. In Germany, where parliamentary elections are will be in September, Merkel will be happy to start up a discussion on new relations with Turkey beyond the unsuccessful full EU membership.

In Turkey, Erdogan will come to a high position and come up with new plan and projects. For some time now, there are considerations that Turkey is working on a new design for its relations with the EU, however, is waiting for the right time to show it. The Turkish president recognizes that accession is not in the cards anymore ─ at least not in the next ten years. However, Turkey demands Europe’s support to overcome the existing problems and return to a new period of economic security and stability. From a Turkish view, an upgraded Customs Union might be the suitable alternative that would, together with guarantee Turkey’s economic lifeline and would considerably soften Europe’s attack in Turkish internal politics that has provoked Erdogan for several years.

The result of this unification of European and Turkish hospitality to look for alternatives to full membership additionally the availability of a realistic choice might drive to a difference between the privileged partnership that Merkel has been giving Turkey for a long time. No EU country will oppose to such a generous way out when it is Turkey comes up with the proposal. The backbone of such a new partnership agreement will be an upgraded Customs Union that would secure Turkey economically to the EU. Part of the trade negotiation would be visa-free travel for Turkish businesspeople, increased by a European promise to point in other Turks in the future regularly.

Such a prospect would break the deadlock on the need for Turkey to shift its anti-terror legislation to get through free travel for all Turkish citizens. The refugee deal would remain to exist, ensuring Europe that its most critical security risk can be handled in collaboration with Turkey. Such a newly way of alliance agreement would give both sides what they need most: active economic relations with Europe for Turkey, strategic bonds with Turkey for Europe. It will be accepted by many in Turkey and Europe. With populists on both sides who never desired Turkey to enter the EU. However, also with realists in the EU and Turkey who gave up on Turkey's EU membership numerous years ago.

There is, nevertheless, a massive problem for Turkish Democrats and European progressives if this scenario is performed. The rebuilding of Turkey’s to democracy system will be moved to the Turkey. The EU will regularly recommend Turkey support its standards but will not make more cooperation dependent on the characteristic of Turkey’s democracy or the strengthening of the rule of Turkish law. The main economic and security interests on both sides will block any certain invasion by the EU into Turkey's internal politics. Till a few years ago, Liberals, European Social Democrats, and Greens were among the greatest advocates of Turkey’s EU membership because they considered it was the most efficient way to assist Turkish Democrats of all convictions in their struggle for a further democratic Turkey.

The challenge for reformist forces in Europe is no continued to keep defending this traditional pattern of engagement that worked pretty well till 2010 but has failed its attractiveness since. It does not make sense either to oppose the movements in Turkey and the EU to look for a new kind of partnership. What means in 2017 and beyond to the future will be the creativity to effective ways for European progressives to help Turkish Democrats oppose the increasing authoritarianism in their country.

**Conclusion**

Turkey has made great progress step towards EU integration. However, reaching for full member are remain unsuccessful, due to many self-limited dimensions and various arguments against Turkey by the members. This study focuses on various empirical studies. The result showed that various arguments and revolve around a series of issues, ranging from the current debates in Turkey’s politics and democratic breakdowns, human rights abuses, Turkey’s demographic structure, economic dilemma and also, historical and cultural matter of Turkey. The research was studied and discussed on “the potential benefits, possible impact and challenges” wherever accept Turkey as a part of the EU membership. Turkey, presents the EU’s aim to be more powerful and to have a substantial influence and power on the international stage.

Turkish policy toward its neighborhood has been significant not just for Turkey itself but also for the whole region. In this context, Turkey’s relationships with its neighbors’ countries and the concentration of Turkey and EU foreign policies, and mutual of these policies obtain importance in understanding the positive offerings that Turkey could carry to the EU’s common foreign policy.Regarding the southern Caucasus region, by Turkish accession, the EU would reach a border with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Turkey’s enthusiasm to resolve conflicts in these regions, as well as its attempts to bring security and stability to the area. Looking at Central Asia region, Turkey became significantly engaged roles in connecting Central Asian countries with the rest of the world. Religious, linguistic, cultural, and historical bonds between Turkey and the Central Asian nations and bring to promote the establishment of political, economic, and military relations. Turkey could, therefore, be a channel for enhancing the EU’s policies in Central Asia. Furthermore, Turkey’s membership would also be significant concerning EU-Russia relations, EU relationships with Russia might well become more important regarding in fighting energy interests and expansions in Caucasus and Central Asia region.

Lastly, the most significant prospects for EU is the Context of the Turkey’s Model Role in the Middle East and Muslim World. With its continuing conflicts, the Middle East is one of the most unsteady areas of the world. In this circumstances, as an outstanding player of Turkey working for the stabilization of the region. Turkey could be a major factor in the promotion of the EU’s concerns. These interests include spreading democratic values to the region, energy security, fixing the Israeli-Palestinian relation dispute and the Iranian nuclear dilemma.Morever, it would confirm that Western values and Islam are agreeable and demonstrate that the EU is not merely a “Christian Club.” and offer to raise balances between the West and the Islamic world and developing economic, political and, cultural relations.

The possible economic advantages and values of this membership have highlighted. Evaluations have been regularly focused on macroeconomic and budgetary impacts on the EU economy. Several points prove that Turkey is likely now be on the edge of a more prosperous period during which the actual income per capita differential compares with some the EU countries that will be reduced to a signiﬁcantly lower level. So, the economic debate on Turkey will give Turkey’s accession to the EU politically weak debated. Furthermore,even Turkey will need more to implement wide-ranging economic reformations. The accession process will strengthen to support of reform in various of industrial and economic groups in Turkey and help push through further growth-enhancing reforms, as wide-ranging reforms have to succeed established interests and compositions of both Turkey and the EU.

The potential consequences of Turkey’s membership of the several EU institutions create another set of issues increasing concerns among existing EU members countries. The size of Turkish population would define the scope of these consequences. According to the Lisbon Treaty since 2014, the commissioner would be equal to two-thirds of the member countries, and they would be determined according to a similar rotation scheme including all member nations. İts would mean that Turkey's membership would have no major influence on the European Commission than that of any another member countries.

During 2016, It is an underestimate to claim that Turkey-EU relationships went into difficult times. Following a hopeful start in March 2016 when the two sides reached a final deal on refugees attempting to access Europe from Turkey, the relationship between Turkey and the EU turned sour after the unsuccessful 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt in July. However, in the in March in 2016 is a good start for both side when the EU and Turkey achieved to elaborate their agreement on refugees in November 2015 that refugees are trying to enter Europe from Turkey. These strong anti-European attitudes were used by the Turkish president to frequently bash the EU and present Russia as a viable and attractive choice and ultra-nationalist reporters in the pro-Erdogan media. Despite pressures rising and difficulties growing, neither Erdogan nor the EU has been willing to pull the plug on the accession agreements. The decreasing foreign direct investments (FDİ) particularly, from European countries, the major devaluation of the Turkish currency (Turkish Lira) and, in general, the loss of trust from outside of Turkey in the reliability of the Turkish institutional foundation, particularly the rule of law and the separation of authorities power.

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