Impact of mutual interaction between civil society and conditionality by an external actor on democratization: Cases of Turkey and Malaysia

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Abstract

With their functioning democracies albeit accompanied by various deficiencies, Turkey and Malaysia are often referred to as models in the Islamic world. This study aims to assess progresses and setbacks in democratization in Turkey and Malaysia since the early 2000s with a particular attention to their civil societies and conditionality by an external actor. In Turkey, civil society has had a positive impact on democratic consolidation through encouraging political reforms in line with the EU accession process. In addition, AKP government was highly motivated by EU conditionality in adopting remarkable political reforms particularly in its early years in power. Malaysian civil society has also played an effective role in voicing demands for democratic values as long as shared concerns enabled it to transcend ethnic and religious boundaries. Yet, democracy promotion through conditionality has not existed in Malaysia’s relationship with the ASEAN. It is argued that Turkey has had a more favorable internal and external environment to encourage democratization compared with that of Malaysia.

Keywords: Turkey, Malaysia, democratization, civil society, conditionality, democracy promotion

1. Introduction

With their functioning democracies albeit accompanied by various deficiencies, Turkey and Malaysia are often referred to as models in the Islamic world. This study aims to assess progresses and setbacks in democratization in Turkey and Malaysia since the early 2000s with a particular attention to their civil societies and conditionality by an external actor. In Turkey, civil society has had a positive impact on democratic consolidation through encouraging political reforms in line with the European Union (EU) accession process. In addition, AKP government was highly motivated by EU conditionality in adopting remarkable political reforms, particularly in the early 2000s. Malaysian civil society has also played an effective role in voicing demands for democratic values as long as shared concerns enabled it to transcend ethnic and religious boundaries. Yet, democracy promotion through conditionality has not existed in Malaysia’s relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This study attempts to provide answers to the following research questions:

- Are there any similarities among democratization processes experienced by Turkey and Malaysia, if not why?
- To what extent does an active civil society contribute to democratization?

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To what extent does conditionality by an external actor promote democratization in a target state?

Can we suggest that mutual interaction between a civil society willing to support pro-reform conditions proposed by an external actor and an external actor willing to sponsor a vibrant civil society to put pressure on the ruling regime has a positive impact on democratization in a given state?

Turkey and Malaysia are chosen for comparison because they share a number of similarities that may shed some light on the question of democratization in Muslim developing countries. First of all, Islam is the most widely practiced religion in both countries and they hold membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). On top of that, they have been regarded as dynamic models of moderate political Islam as they have proved that Islam is compatible with multi-party democracy. Yet, still there are shortcomings in both democracies particularly with respect to the rule of law and civil liberties. Secondly, Turkey and Malaysia are labeled as regional powers in their own regions, the Middle East and the Southeast Asia respectively; largely follow pro-Western policies and seek for greater regional and global role. Thirdly, on economic terms both are newly developing-industrialized countries (NIC) with a healthy economic growth and both are members of World Trade Organization (WTO). Lastly, Turkey and Malaysia are also successor states of old political entities, the Ottoman Empire (13/15-20th centuries) and the Malacca Sultanate Empire (15-16th centuries) respectively.

Notwithstanding these similarities, there are also differences between Turkey and Malaysia such as variances in demography, state structure and colonial legacy. Malaysia is a multi-ethnic state with an approximate population of 28.3 million of which Malays (61.3 %) constitute the predominant ethnic group alongside Chinese (24.6%), Indians (7.3%) and other Bumiputeras\(^1\) ethnics in Sabah and Sarawak (Malaysia, Department of Statistics, 2011). Meanwhile, Turkey has an approximate population of 76 millions of which is mainly comprised of the Turks (75%) and the remaining includes Kurds (18%) and other ethnic groups (17%) (World Population Review, 2015). With respect to state structure, while Turkey is a centralized state, Malaysia has a federal structure with administrative divisions. Another difference is that while Malaysia experienced rule by various colonial powers, Turkey was not ruled by a colonial power.

Being augmented with these similarities as well as differences, Turkey and Malaysia have been practicing democratization process since the day of their inception as modern states in the international political system. Turkey, for instance, founded its parliament, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, on 23 April 1929 and multi-party politics began by 1945. On the other hand, Malaysia held its first parliamentary elections in 1959. This democratization process has shaped domestic political structures of both countries until present. Therefore, time has ripened enough to compare and to assess progresses and setbacks in democratization in Turkey and Malaysia.

With respect to theoretical framework, a combination of two different approaches regarding democratization is adopted. Whereas most of the scholars in the field concentrate on domestic variables to explain democratization including modernization theory (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1968; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997), elite theory (Mills, 1956; Higley and Gunther, 1992), essence of civil society approach and political culture approach (Diamond, 1994a), few others

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\(^1\) Bumiputera means the sons of soil and this term is preferably used in Sabah and Sarawak.

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(Whitehead, 2001) focus on international variables to explain democratization or the lack of it in a given state. Among international variables to effect democratization, conditionality occupies a prominent place. As Schmitter (2001: 28) argues political conditionality is the most recent and rapidly expanding sub-context about international influence, involving attachment of “specific conditions to the distribution of benefits to recipient countries”. The EU has been an active implementer of political conditionality through its insistence on particular political reforms as a prerequisite for membership. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2010: 445) underline the impact of EU’s political conditionality on democratization by pointing out that the likelihood of democratization in the neighbouring countries of the EU rises “with the size and the credibility of the EU’s conditional incentives”.

While it is true that domestic variables are leading explanatory tools in analyzing democratization or lack of it in a given state, this study believes that employing merely domestic-level approaches may provide an incomplete understanding of democratization. International-level approaches such as impact of an external actor would help capture a more comprehensive analysis of democratization process. Through combining internal and external variables, this study departs from the existing literature by rejecting separation among internal and external dimensions of analysis. To this end, it attempts to assess impact of civil society along with impact of political conditionality by a relevant external actor over democratization in two developing states. To put it differently, the aim is to explain democratization in Turkey and Malaysia by adopting a more comprehensive approach, combining an essential domestic variable (civil society) with an influential external actor; the EU in the case of Turkey and the ASEAN in the case of Malaysia.

2. Political reform process in Turkey

2.1. Domestic political context

Following a decade under coalition governments, Turkey has been ruled by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP)1 since 2002. The party emerged victorious in the 2002 parliamentary elections by winning 35 percent of the votes and thus was able to form a single-party government. New in power, the party followed the roadmaps provided by the European Union (EU) and governed with relative stability and adopted a significant number of political and economic reforms (Freedom House Report, 2008). Yet, these progresses remained short of reducing the suspicion and fear among those secular elites and middle classes about the future of the secular constitutional regime (Keyman, 2010: 312).

Electoral victory of 2002 was just the beginning of a series of following successes. The party achieved electoral victories in parliamentary elections in 2007, 2011, and 2015, and municipal elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014. Particularly, during its first term in power, the AKP government paid strong commitment to accession negotiations with the EU and EU integration process highly contributed to democratizing reforms in this period (Öniş, 2013: 105). Political reforms in the early 2000s were introduced in three major fields including civil-military relations, legal regulations to accommodate religious and ethnic diversity, and freedom of expression.

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1 The AKP was established in 2001 by a reformist group of people, who disentangled themselves from the banned Islamist virtue party (Fazilet Partisi -FP).
The most remarkable change took place with respect to civil-military relations which led to a great decline in the involvement of the military\(^1\) in Turkish politics. Through a number of reforms, the AKP government removed the military tutelage over civilian politics. For instance, NSC reform\(^2\) increased the number of civilian members of the NSC from five to nine, extended meeting interval of the council from ‘every month’ to ‘once every two months’ and changed the characteristic of secretary general of the council from a military official to a civilian one (Müftüler Baç, 2005: 27). In consequence, there has been a deep structural transformation with respect to civil-military relations in Turkey in favor of “a more democratic, civilian-dominated system” (Aydınlı, 2012: 101).

Another set of visible reforms occurred to accommodate religious and ethnic diversity. In this regard, identity claims of divergent components of Turkish society were recognized. For instance, recognition of Kurdish identity took place through expansion of Kurdish citizens’ cultural and language rights (Öniş, 2013: 105). State television, TRT, began to broadcast in languages other than Turkish in accordance with a constitutional reform package adopted on August 2, 2002 (Müftüler Baç, 2005: 24). Attempts to ensure a more pluralistic approach also aimed at recognizing the more conservative, religious components of society.\(^3\)

Major constitutional amendments were also adopted to expand freedom of expression. For instance, the sixth adjustment package to meet the Copenhagen criteria of the EU amended article 8 of the anti-terror law which previously caused “the imprisonment of a number of journalists and publishers for crimes against the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic” (Ibid.: 26). Likewise, the eighth constitutional reform package, adopted on 7 May 2004, granted constitutional security to the freedom of the press and abolished state security courts (Ibid.: 27). Following the eighth constitutional package, a new and more liberal law on associations was introduced in July 2004 (Kubicek, 2005: 365-366). In addition, article 313 of the penal code, which particularly enabled accusations against Islamists and Kurds for “inciting ethnic or religious hatred”, was amended (Ibid.).\(^4\) Other political reforms included adoption of a new civil code to establish gender equality in marriage and divorce, removal of death penalty from the Turkish constitution and the adoption of a number of UN covenants about which Turkey had reservations before. Moreover; positive discrimination for children, the elderly, and the disabled were introduced and Turkish citizens’ rights were expanded “through the ombudsman and right of individual appeal to the constitutional court” (Alessandri, 2010: 26).

These accomplishments in the reform process were rewarded with an impressive victory, 47 percent of the votes, in the early parliamentary elections held on July 2007. This success not only reinforced the overall power of the party, but also strengthened its hand in sponsoring party’s candidate, foreign minister Abdullah Gül, to be elected as the president of Turkey in August 2007. By October 2007, constitutional amendments by the AKP government including electing the president by popular vote rather than by parliament, reducing the presidential term from seven years to five for a renewable term instead of a single term, reducing the term of a government in office

\[^1\] Traditionally, the military actively involved in Turkish politics referring to both its self-declared duty to protect national unity and secularism, and institutional duties such as the status of the chief of the armed forces and the National Security Council (NSC).

\[^2\] Reforms concerning the NSC were largely adopted through the seventh adjustment package of July 2003.

\[^3\] This attempt has contributed to the strengthening of conservative business elites of the Anatolian cities.

\[^4\] Accordingly, parliamentarians of the Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi-DEP) who had been jailed for almost decade, with a conviction of supporting terrorism and Kurdish separatism were retried and then released by June 2004.
from five to four years and reducing the quorum for parliamentary decisions from two-thirds to one-third, were approved by popular vote in a referendum (Freedom House Report, 2008).

Against these positive developments, a number of new developments raised concerns about the future of democratic consolidation in the country. Starting with the summer of 2007, Ergenekon trials, which involved accusations against military officers, journalists and professors, had its mark on Turkey’s political agenda. By July 2008, Ergenekon operations reached such a level including higher ranking figures such as former commander of the gendarmerie, former commander of the first army and chairman of the Ankara chamber of commerce (Aydınıl, 2011: 233). Ergenekon trials were followed by Balyoz trials which included detentions and arrests of many members of Turkish armed forces based on a number of documents and digital materials related with coup plans against the AKP government. Both trial processes were handicapped by “appalling breaches of due process and judicial procedure, years of pretrial detention, and simple logical incoherence” (Freedom House Special Report, 2014: 7). In the meantime, both Turkish nationalism and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) activism were remarkably on rise paving the way to a number of assassinations and human rights violations.

After 2007, it is argued that AKP government failed to follow a consistent and coherent policy in a number of critical issues including the Kurdish problem, deepening of individual and group rights, impartiality of the media, regional disparities, unemployment and problems of the organized labor (Taşkın, 2013: 294). But, this did not have a negative impact on electoral gains of the party. In the parliamentary elections held on 12 June 2011, the ruling AKP once again gained an electoral victory winning almost 50 percent of the vote. This victory granted the AKP a third term in power. In its third term in office, there was not any remarkable achievement of the government underlying its commitment to democratization and EU accession, and polarizations in the country increased. This fostered concerns particularly among liberal/secular segments of the society.

These concerns reached to its peak during Gezi Park protests which took place in the summer of 2013. The harsh crack down on protesters through extensive use of tear gas and disproportional power fanned greater participation to the protests from all over Turkey. Following the Gezi protests, a corruption scandal emerged out on December 17, 2013, which involved money laundering by people at the highest levels of the government. With the corruption charges against dozens of individuals including the sons of three ministers and an AKP mayor filed by prosecutors affiliated with the Gülen movement, the alliance between the government and the Gülen movement came to an end. Prime Minister Erdoğan blamed the movement for establishing a ‘parallel state’

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1 The charges included establishing, aiding and being a member of a terrorist organization which was responsible for the killings of dissident kords and organizing plans to overthrow the government. See the economist, 2013.
2 By September 2013, 275 defendants were convicted within the framework Ergenekon trials even including İlker Başbuğ, the former chief of the armed forces.
3 Balyoz trials curbed military’s role in politics to a large extent.
4 The protests started with a small group of environmental activists, who opposed the government’s plan to destroy the Gezi Park in order to build a shopping complex.
5 These prosecutors affiliated with the Gülen Movement also worked and played major role in the Ergenekon trials.
6 Also known as the ‘Hizmet Hareketi’ (Service Movement), gülen movement is a worldwide civic initiative rooted in the spiritual and humanistic tradition of Islam and inspired by the ideas and activism of fethullah gülen.
7 In fact, the seeds of the split between the AKP and the Gülen Movement were sown as the two sides had diverging views with respect to the Kurdish issue. Adopting a more hard-line nationalist approach to Kurdish issue, the Gülen movement reacted to secret negotiations between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the PKK in Oslo as prosecutors affiliated with the movement accused intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, for collaborating with the PKK for the establishment of a Kurdish State. See Tol, 2014.
with its own officials within the police and the judiciary. With the unfolding of the scandal, the
government proposed changes in the internet regulation law to allow government officials to
block websites without any court order, which was evaluated as a contraction in the freedom of
expression (Freedom House Special Report, 2014: 15).

The election of Erdoğan as the president by August 10, 2014 for the first time through direct
vote confirmed his dominant position in Turkish politics. In the recent parliamentary elections
held on June 7, 2015, AKP, for the first time in 13 years, did not win enough votes to form a
government on its own and a number of attempts to establish a coalition government took place.
This loss in AKP’s votes was evaluated as the party’s failure in meeting people’s expectations in
its third term in power. As the attempts for a coalition government proved unproductive, parlia-
mentary elections were re-held on November 1, 2015. Unlike the previous result, this time AKP
surprisingly won a landslide victory and became the ruling party for a fourth term. AKP’s recent
electoral victory has been viewed as Turkish electorate’s prioritization of stability over democra-
tization as this electoral preference came following a period of instability in the country that was
cased by conflicting interests of political parties, disappointment with the performance of oppo-
sition parties, economic problems, increasing PKK terror and a series of terrorist attacks by the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) including suicide bombings in Reyhanlı, Diyar-
bakır, Suruç and Ankara. Under the leadership of current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, it is
too early to comment on the future of democratic consolidation in the country. Yet, it is fair to
suggest that there are urgent issues to be addressed in order to achieve a truly democratic order.

Overall, in its first term in office, the AKP government followed a determined policy of de-

mocratization. Commitment to EU accession process was strong which in return motivated polit-

cal and economic reforms. However, since 2007 there has been a stall in accomplishing EU-
orientated institutional reforms both in political and economic fields. As the AKP reinforced its
political position through elections, there was a decline in the ruling party’s commitment to de-
mocratization and EU accession process. As a result, it is fair to suggest that democratic consoli-
dation needs a more consistent approach by the ruling government.

2.2. Development of civil society

In this section, the focus will be on civil society because a dynamic and strong civil society is
seen as crucial in checking the power of democratic governments and thus preventing their poten-
tial abuses and violations of the law (Diamond, 1994b: 7). Starting with the early 2000s, Turk-

ish civil society has had a positive impact on the reform process. Through exerting pressure on
the ruling regime, it has encouraged democratic consolidation ‘from below’. Pressure from below
was especially visible in the case of business associations, which have played significant role in
sponsoring political reform and EU accession process (Başkan, 2010: 399) including TUSIAD
(the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), MUSIAD (Association of Independ-
ent Industrialists and Businessmen), TOBB (the Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Ex-
changes) and TISK (the Turkish Employers’ Confederation). Among them, TUSIAD has led an
impressive campaign in favor of democratization through publications, public pronouncements,
reports and active lobbying in the EU capitals (Türkmen, 2008: 150-152). The underlying reason
behind this strong support is that liberalization of the system is in the interest of business elites as
it avoids “the ever-present possibility of arbitrary state intervention” (Ibid.: 151). Other than
TUSIAD, Anatolian Businessmen\(^1\), a middle class which has grown remarkably since the coming power of the AKP, supported democratic consolidation and the EU accession process.

The civil society in Turkey has grown and became more active since the early 2000s. It particularly exhibited a dynamic picture during the Gezi Park protests and related protests across Turkey in the early summer of 2013. The EU-Turkey civil society dialogue, initiated by the EU and involved more than 1600 civil society organizations (CSO) in Turkey, has also contributed to development and increase in the capacity and visibility of individual CSOs (Turkey, Progress Report by EU Commission, 2013: 11-12). Like elsewhere, civil society will seem to play an essential role in for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. However, there are a number of obstacles which limit the functioning of civil society organizations in Turkey. One of them is the weakness of government-civil society and parliament-civil society relations (Ibid.). To overcome this obstacle systematic, permanent and structured consultation mechanisms on all levels of administration are needed. Another obstacle is related with the legal framework and the extensive bureaucracy concerning the functioning of CSOs (Ibid.). Finally, problems in the public funding for CSOs such as lack of transparency and well-established rules also limit the functioning of CSOs in Turkey.

2.3. External dynamics

The EU has been influential in encouraging democratization in Turkey as aspiration for the EU membership has contributed to the accomplishment of a series of democratizing reforms in the country. EU’s decision to accept Turkish candidacy for membership during the Helsinki Summit of December 1999 was an irresistible carrot for political reforms in the country. Turkey would have to meet Copenhagen Criteria to gain formal entry into the organization and this required progress on numerous political reforms including “political and civic freedoms, minority rights, abolishment of the death penalty and torture, and stripping the military of its political prerogatives” (Kubicek, 2005: 365). In the aftermath of this critical decision, Turkish governments adopted new laws and made a number of amendments to the constitution and the existing laws accelerating Turkey’s Europeanization process. By the end of 2004, nine reform packages were passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, six of them under the AKP government (2002-04) (Ibid.).

The EU has given large support to CSOs in the country including financial aid, projects, training programs, conferences, seminars and partnerships. Among these instruments, certainly, the EU-sponsored projects have contributed the most to raising consciousness among CSOs with respect to democratic values and principles. Various leading CSOs such as İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association), liberal thinking society and ARI movement took place in a number of EU-led projects (Ibid.: 368). Other than CSOs, the EU has sponsored training programs for different public sectors. For instance, the EU sponsored training programs in human rights for judges, prosecutors, and police (Ibid.: 369).

Despite the earlier progress in democratization, from 2005 onwards, AKP government’s enthusiasm to deal with political reforms has slowed down. There were mainly two reasons behind this slowdown. One of them was the “perceived European double standards towards Turkey”

\(^1\) Also known as the “Anatolian Tigers” of central Turkey, Anatolian businessmen has been the key constituency of the AKP.

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which fuelled emotional reactions and rise of nationalism in the country mainly in 2006 and 2007 (Freedom House Report, 2008: 7-8). Religious and nationalist intolerance reached to its peak through a number of events including the killing of a Catholic priest in Trabzon in February 2006, the assassination of Hrant Dink\(^1\) by a seventeen year old Turkish nationalist in January 2007, and the killing of three Protestants in April 2007 in the province of Malatya (Ibid. :8). These events constituted an infertile context for cultural diversity and further democratization in the country. Another reason behind Turkey’s declined impetus for political reforms was the diminishing attractiveness of the EU project due to the rise of Islamophobia and anti-immigration sentiments across the European states and the economic crisis threatening the member states (Öniş, 2013: 110-111). There had also been claims that Turkey was shifting its foreign policy axis from its traditional Western orientation to the Middle East/Islamic world accompanied by critical addresses by the Prime Minister Erdoğan regarding the West.

3. Political reform process in Malaysia

3.1. Domestic political context

Malaysian political setting has been dominated by Barisan Nasional (BN) or formerly known as Parti Perikatan, an alliance which is initially led by United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its two political counterparts, namely Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). They came up with a formula to form an alliance or a coalition based on the main component of races in Malaysia. This alliance currently includes 13 component parties relatively representing the Malays (UMNO), Chinese (Malaysian Chinese Association or MCA and Malaysian People’s Movement Party or Gerakan), Indians (Malaysian Indian Congress or MIC) and some other Bumiputeras ethnicities both in Sabah (Parti Bersatu Sabah or PBS) and Sarawak (Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party or SPDP).\(^2\) In this regard, Malaysian political parties are largely based along the races lines or prevalently called as ‘communal politics’ (Kheng, 2002: 52-53; International Crisis Group, 2012).

This formula, has to some extent been working very well for BN in order to maintain its power since winning the first general elections in 1959 after independence. From 1959 (including the first elections in 1955 before independence) until 2004, BN never lost its customary two-thirds majority in general elections with the exception of the 1969 elections. Simply to say, the Malaysian election script is effortlessly readable where BN will come out on top against opposition parties in every election held during this period.

The 1999 general elections could be considered as among the hotly contested elections in Malaysia, and undeniably it created new phenomenon for Malaysian voters as well as political analysts for the years to come. Despite BN’s success in retaining its two-thirds majority by winning 147 seats out of total 192 seats, its popular vote was reduced to 56.51 percent in contrast with 65 percent in 1995. Even, some BN leaders who usually gained most of the votes got the lowest vote this time including the current Malaysian prime minister Dato’ Seri Mohd Najib, who only ob-

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\(^1\) Hrant Dink, Turkish journalist of Armenian origin, was the editor of bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos in Turkey.

\(^2\) The other component parties are People’s Progressive Party (PPP), Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Parti Bersatu Rak yat Sabah (PBRS), United Pasokomomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (UPKO), and Sarawak People’s Party (PRS).

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tained 241 majority votes compared with 10,793 majority votes in 1995 (Malaysia, Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). Meanwhile, the opposition parties under the banner of ‘Barisan Alternatif’ (BA) were closing the gap by obtaining 40.3 percent of the popular vote (Lin, 1999). The outcome of the 1999 elections could be linked to several issues. Nonetheless, Anwar Ibrahim’s issue was the major cause that immensely influenced the result of the election.

Anwar Ibrahim was the former deputy prime minister as well as Malaysian finance minister, and was highly regarded as the almost-sure successor for Tun Dr. Mahathir. He was relinquished from his posts by Mahathir, the prime minister then, amid on the allegations of sodomy cases and having differences in economic policies, especially in driving Malaysian economy out of financial crisis in 1997. The former was in favor of high interest rates and austerity measures to control Malaysia’s sliding currency whereas the latter and his chief economic aide, Daim Zainuddin, had pushed through a policy of greater government spending and lower rates to boost the economy. The Anwar’s sacking from the government cabinet and his expulsion from UMNO party drove him and his supporters to launch a Reformation Movement (‘Reformasi’) calling the Mahathir’s government to be transparent and to implement democratic reforms, particularly in economic agenda. In fact, Anwar’s call was based on the IMF’s policies which urged for the tearing down of all obstacles to the free movement of capital and profits, and the exploitation of the cheap labor of the working masses. Following Anwar’s bold reaction, this led to his arrest and imprisonment of nine years in June 1999 for the charge of bribery and sodomy cases. The arrest of Anwar failed to ‘switch off’ the ‘Reformasi’ as more and more of his followers and NGOs took to the streets to demonstrate against the government (Teik, 2003: 101-102; Mahathir, 2011: 664-698; Symonds, 1998).

Several Malaysian political analysts have started debating about new political developments in Malaysia or ‘new politics’ since the post-1999 elections. This new politics connotes the existence of non-formal sector of participatory politics vis-à-vis formal electoral politics involving the political parties which have been dominated by BN for ages. It challenges the old dogma of political ethnicity that has been haunting Malaysians as well as portrays open contestation of the ruling BN. The new politics discussed above is purely linked to the pattern (or tendency) of the results of the 1999 elections where both BN and the opposition, BA received almost equal support (almost 50-50 per cent) from the Malays and the Chinese voters in their own majority areas (mostly in Malay Peninsula, except Sabah and Sarawak) respectively (Loh, 2003). This probably may point out that Malaysians are now more ‘adeptly selective’ and less zealous with their ethnicity. From another angle, it also suggests that the way the BN government is handling the Anwar’s issue has an adverse effect upon the perception of the Malays which make them to conclude that the former deputy of prime minister is being victimized by the UMNO political agenda.

The Anwar’s issue had given tough challenge for BN and it affected its popularity, despite retaining two-thirds majority vote. Realizing this scenario, before the 2004 elections, Tun Dr. Mahathir decided to step down in 2003 and simultaneously paved the way for his deputy Datuk

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1 For most of the Malay community in Malaysia, anwar ibrahim is always portrayed as a religious and pious man for his long commitments to Islam both at domestic and international level. He used to be the president of Malaysian Muslim youth movement (abim), the former president of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), members in several international Islamic organizations such as Rabithah al’alam al-islami of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic council of Europe and others. See Idris 2006.
Seri Abdullah Badawi to be the fifth Malaysian prime minister. Dr. Mahathir’s decision proved fruitful for BN when it regained its customary two-thirds majority vote in the 2004 elections and even considered as one of the most successful result in the party history. BN won 198 seats of the total of 219 parliamentary seats, and obtained much improved percentage of popular vote with 63.9 percent. Not only that, it recaptured the state of Terengganu from the Islamic party which it won in the 1999 elections. The BN’s outstanding result under the new prime minister seemed to send a clear signal to the people and the opposition that BN was back on track and would continue its dominance in Malaysian politics. Yet, out of the blue, the BN’s old tradition script looked gloomy and cloudy as from then on the Malaysian political scenario was gradually welcoming for a change.

After the 2008 elections, BN’s hegemony was shaken by losing for the very first time since 1969 its customary two-thirds majority vote. Thus, most people believed that Malaysian politics was hit by the so-called ‘political tsunami’. The opposition successfully rose to the occasion by capturing more seats and controlling several states which were under BN administration before. Declining popularity of BN in 2008 could be linked to a number of factors including charisma of Anwar in leading his pact, Pakatan Rakyat (PR), problems of good governance and corruption under the rule of BN and the rising influence of social media (Facebook, Twitter and others). BN’s disappointing performance forced Tun Abdullah Badawi to resign and paved the way for Dato’ Seri Mohd Najib (Najib Razak) to step in.

As soon as coming to power, Najib undertook a number of political reforms including repealing the Internal Security Act (ISA), relaxing the media laws and liberalizing freedom of assembly laws (The Economist, 2011). Those reforms were materialized just within 18 months prior to 2013 elections meaning that they aimed at increasing votes for the BN. Under the leadership of Najib, however, BN’s poor performance continued in the 2013 elections. Even it lost more seats to the Anwar’s pact, ‘Chinese tsunami’ (the swing of the Chinese voters to opposition) was the first comment made by the Malaysian Prime Minister to explain the result of the election. Dato’ Seri Najib also stressed for a national reconciliation to strengthen the Malaysian unity. Even though BN lost its two-thirds majority vote in the 2013 elections, it still clings on to power. Most of the Malaysians still believe that BN can look after their social well-being. Most of the votes are from the rural areas as it suits to the BN’s theme of socio-political developments. In addition, the total of 133 seats obtained in the 2013 elections, 47 seats come from the state of Sabah (22 seats) and Sarawak (25 seats) respectively, where there is still hunger for development. BN only won 86 seats in the Malay Peninsula compared to PR with 89 seats. Any political changes occur in both states may unseat BN from forming a government in the future. For some political analysts, they claimed that the ability of BN to sustain its winning melodies are due to its ‘unhealthy political tactics’ such as gerrymandering (re-delineation of state electoral that assumed to be in favor of BN), fake identity cards (given to illegal immigrants), money politics, state-controlled media and others (Loh, 2003; Loh, 2005; Puyok, 2013; Chin, 1999 and 2004).

Whatever comments made, the reality is Malaysians nowadays badly want a change, not exactly to change the government, but a better government that can take care of their social welfare, practice transparency and trustworthiness, and also free from any political wrongdoings and scandals. If the ruling government is unable to fulfill their demands, new generation of Malaysians may pose a visible challenge to BN political hegemony through their electoral preferences.
3.2. Development of civil society

CSOs in Malaysia have increasingly taken part in electoral politics as opposition forces since the late 1990s through pro-reform campaigns (Weiss, 2009: 743). Particularly, popular dissatisfaction with the Mahathir government and Anwar’s imprisonment encouraged the rise of civil society in the country. The demands of Anwar’s supporters quickly moved beyond concern for Anwar’s well being to issues such as rule of law, justice for all, curbs on corruption, cronyism and nepotism, repeal of the ISA and other coercive laws, etc. i.e. the issues championed by the NGOs (Loh, 2003 and 2005). Vibrancy of civil society was visible during the 1999 election campaign, in which political movement such as ‘Reformasi’ and political opposition coalitions such as BA played an effective role in transcending ethnic divergences (Bowie, 2004: 194). Under a multiethnic platform, they voiced their demands for democracy, justice, freedom of speech and good governance in terms of accountability, transparency, separation of powers and lack of corruption (Weiss, 2000: 423; Bowie, 2004: 195). It seemed that political ethnicity was gradually diminishing because Malaysians were then more curious on the issue of good governance, transparency, trustworthiness and human rights as well as religious demands.

Pressure of the NGOs on the government continued in the aftermath of elections as they presented petitions to eliminate restrictions on freedom to assemble and to abolish ISA which allows for detention without trial (Martinez, 2001: 196). However, cooperation among the Malay pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) under the umbrella of BA did not last long. Pressure of the civil society on the UMNO-led coalition’s hegemony also saw an interruption in the March 21, 2004 parliamentary elections. This time, civil society could not be instrumental in overcoming the division in the opposition front and the ruling BN coalition was able to re-secure two-thirds majority in the parliament. Civil society which was proactive during the 1999 elections was marginalized by the Malaysian state during the 2004 elections (Liow, 2005: 923). BN’s massive victory in the 2004 elections led to the dissolution of BA due to its poor performance and political differences among its coalition members, especially between the DAP and PAS over the issue of Islamic state and Islamic Hudud laws. Besides Tun Abdullah Badawi, a moderate political figure, became both the chairman of the ruling BN coalition and prime minister. In his early years in office, Abdullah took a number of measures against corruption in government, political, and corporate sectors including the arrest of some high-ranking officials by the Anti-Corruption Agency (Ibid.: 912). However, there was a decline in his attempts for good governance in the following years.

Mobilization of the civil society was impressive once again prior to March 8, 2008 parliamentary elections. Civil society organizations and activists played an important role in organizing the opposition around a unified pro-reform vision free from ethnic and religious boundaries. They highly contributed campaigns at presenting an alternative to BN coalition and its dominance “through protests, media events, and other activities” (Weiss, 2009: 743). Among them activist coalitions including the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) and Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil (Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections, BERSIH) and ‘People’s Parliament’ stood...

Involvement of civil society organizations in the electoral campaign helped newly formed opposition coalition the PR\(^1\) to gain a relative success and the ruling BN coalition to lose its two-thirds majority\(^2\) in the parliament. BN for the first time since 1969 lost its two third customary majority vote in the 2008 elections to another new opposition pact, the PR.

The discouraging BN’s performance had caused Tun Abdullah Badawi to vacant his position as Malaysian premier. By April 2009 Dato’ Seri Najib took over and began his thorny mission to reclaim BN’s two-thirds majority for the 2013 elections. The urgent need to win back lost voters led him to introduce a number of political reforms under the slogan of ‘One Malaysia’ which underlined national unity disregarding communal boundaries (Singh, 2010: 175). His remarkable acts in the respect included releasing of 13 persons who were detained without trial under the ISA and lifting “the ban on two newspapers that had been closed by officials earlier in the year” (Ibid.: 176). Despite these measures, under Najib’s leadership BN lost even more seats to Anwar’s pact. BN only managed to win 133 seats, while PR, the opposition, obtained 82 seats, and to make matters worse the popular vote swung to the latter with 50.87 percent whereas the former with only 47.38 percent. After all, the result of these two elections have re-ignited the wave of new politics, and also to indicate that BN’s approach in facing the oppositions needs fresh tactics if it intends to win back more hearts of the Malaysian people (Malaysia Factbook, 2014).

Overall, the result of the last two elections, 2008 and 2013, had clearly stated that most of the Malaysian voters wanted change and political reform. Based on the BN’s recent performances, which is commonly labelled as ‘Malaysian political tsunami’, it is visibly argued that the concept of ‘new politics’ has been re-instated. Many political analysts have also had the same lyrics that Malaysian politics have entered new chapter of political developments. BN has considerably lost its hegemonic grip over Malaysian elections. Various issues associated with the dismal performance of BN ranging from the issue of inefficient governance, corruptions, money politics, the division of Malay voters between UMNO, PAS and PKR, the swing of non-Malay voters (especially the so-called ‘Chinese tsunami’\(^3\)) to the opposition parties, BN’s wrong political strategies and others (Teik, 2003; The Star, 2003). Apart from that, the release of Anwar from jail in 2004 where he made a political comeback in 2008 further injected new breath of life for the opposition to face BN in the 2008 and 2013 elections.

### 3.4. External dynamics

It is difficult to suggest that external dynamics have had an encouraging role on Malaysia’s democratization process. A potential regional organization to promote political reforms in Malaysia is the ASEAN. Realizing the importance of political stability, continuous socio-economic development and regional security, ASEAN was established by the leading Southeast Asian democracies including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines on August 8, 1967. Critical security issues encouraged the Southeast Asian nations to come together in one

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\(^1\) Pakatan Rakyat (PR), formed in 2008, was led by Anwar himself as de facto leader of the opposition. This loose pact composes of three component parties, namely People’s Justice Party (PKR), Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and Democratic Action Party (DAP).

\(^2\) in the 2008 election, BN’s total seats were only 140 (50.6 percent of popular vote) whereas the opposition took 80 seats (49.4 percent popular vote) indirectly defied the former’s two-third majority.

\(^3\) This is referred to Dato’ Seri Mohd Najib’s comment on BN’s performance in the 13th general elections in 2013. See Daily Express, 2013: 1.
single organization and thus the initial founding principle of the organization is to solve security
dilemma of the Southeast Asian region in order to accelerate political democratization and good
governance.

The second founding principle of the ASEAN is its ‘non-intervention policy’. The non-inter-
vention policy connotes, as stated in the 1967 ASEAN declaration, the determination of the coun-
tries of Southeast Asia “to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any
form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals
and aspirations of their peoples”. It has been further cemented in the second declaration of
ASEAN concord in October 2003 which reaffirming “the fundamental importance of adhering to
the principle of non-interference and consensus in ASEAN cooperation” and proclaiming the
member-countries’ determination to “exercise their rights to lead their national existence free
from outside interference in their internal affairs…” (Severino, 2006: 87-88).

ASEAN’s non-intervention policy has given full recognition for member countries’ sover-
eignty. Each country is sovereign and no external power can intervene into their internal matters.
Hence, when a crisis emerges violating global norms and human rights, this policy will become
the stumbling block for any international interference. Based on this, it simply can be argued in
the words of Sukma (2009) that ASEAN rejects the notion of a supranational power that could
impose compliance on member states. This policy certainly contradicts with the spirit of democ-
racy and it also dampens the process of building good governance for member states.

Malaysia was closely watched by ASEAN members in her treatment against the head of op-
position, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim. However, due to ASEAN’s non-intervention policy, Malay-
sia as a sovereign nation has retained every right to determine its own political directions without
succumb to any external pressures. Overall, in the external context, membership in ASEAN has
not had any visible impact on Malaysia’s democratization, largely due to the non-intervention
policy of the ASEAN to its member states’ internal affairs.

5. Concluding remarks

In light of the analyses of political contexts in Turkey and Malaysia in the last one and a half
decade, it is fair to suggest that democratization in a given state has the best result when internal
pressure by civil society and pressure by an external actor are simultaneously exerted on the ruling
regime. In the case of Turkey, AKP has been in power since 2002 and in its early years in power,
the party undertook remarkable political reforms in three major fields: civil-military relations,
legal regulations to accommodate religious and ethnic diversity, and freedom of expression. This
progress largely owed to a combination of pressure by civil society and the EU which in return
provided a fertile environment for a series of political reforms to take place. On one hand, Turkish
civil society had a positive impact on democratic consolidation through encouraging political re-
forms in line with the European Union (EU) accession process. In this regard, CSOs particularly
business associations like TUSIAD has had a positive impact on democratic consolidation in Tur-
key since the early 2000s. On the other hand, AKP government was highly motivated by EU
conditionality in adopting remarkable political reforms. However, ruling regime’s commitment
to democratization in its following terms in office, (2007-11) and 2011-5, was not as strong as it
was in its first term in office.
In the case of Malaysia, civil society has also played an effective role in putting pressure on the ruling regime to democratize. However, pressure of the civil society on the BN’s hegemony has been on and off as it saw various interruptions. Ethnic and religious boundaries have had their mark on CSOs in the country and thus performance of the Malaysian civil society has depended on the power of common concerns to transcend these boundaries. Popular demand for political reform, in general, rose prior to parliamentary elections as it happened in 1999, 2008 and 2013 electoral campaigns. Common aim to place pressure on the ruling regime for democracy, good governance and justice led fading away of ethnic divergences within Malaysian civil society. Pressure by the civil society persuaded the ruling BN to materialize a number of political reforms in order to win back hearts of the electorate. But, limitations on civil society have been greater in Malaysia when compared with that of Turkey. In addition, while civil society in Turkey has taken divergent forms, civil society in Malaysia has consisted mainly of political movements such as ‘Reformasi’, BERSIH (heavily influenced by opposition parties) and political opposition coalitions including BA and PR.

With respect to impact of external dynamics on political reform, it can be suggested that Turkey has a more favorable external environment to encourage democratization when compared with that of Malaysia. EU accession process has highly motivated AKP government to adopt a various political reform packages. Particularly, during its first term in office (2002-2007), AKP government paid strong commitment to accession negotiations with the EU which in return necessitated democratic consolidation in the country. However, EU integration process was not as powerful as instrument for democratization in the following terms of AKP as there was a visible decline in the party’s commitment to EU membership. Unlike the Turkish case, democracy promotion through political conditionality by an external actor has not existed in Malaysia as the country’s membership to ASEAN has not led to a visible contribution to its democratization process. In Malaysia, a potential regional organization in the external environment to encourage democratic values is ASEAN. However, this organization has fallen short of acting as a normative external actor due to two reasons including prioritization of security issues by the organization and adoption of non-intervention policy which has retained the organization to punish member states for any violation of democratic norms. Thus, it can be argued that prospect of EU membership has been an efficient motivator for Turkey to materialize political reforms which was absent in the case of Malaysia’s relationship with the ASEAN.

Overall, variances in internal and external dynamics have had a differentiated impact on Turkey and Malaysia’s prospects for democratization. Turkey has been noticeably more successful than Malaysia with respect to the steps taken towards democratization particularly in the early years of 2000s (Table 1 and 2). In the light of this comparative analysis, it is fair to suggest that mutual interaction between a civil society willing to support pro-reform conditions proposed by an external actor and an external actor willing to sponsor a vibrant civil society to put pressure on the ruling regime has a positive impact on democratization in a given state. Thus, Turkey’s relative success with democratic consolidation when compared with that of Malaysia largely owes to its flourishing civil society which has supported political reforms along with the EU accession process. In return, the EU contributed to democratization in Turkey through presenting political reforms as a condition to be fulfilled to become a member state and accordingly sponsored civil society organizations in the country.
Table 1. Turkey’s freedom house ratings over the years (2002-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Status</th>
<th>Freedom rating</th>
<th>Civil liberties</th>
<th>Political rights</th>
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(1=best, 7=worst)


Table 2. Malaysia’s freedom house ratings over the years (2002-2015)

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(1=best, 7=worst)


References


