Modernity and the Fragmentation of the Muslim Community in Response: Mapping Modernist, Reformist and Traditionalist Responses

AYDIN BAYRAM
İstanbul Üniv. İlahiyat Fakültesi
aydin.bayram@istanbul.edu.tr

Abstract
The encounter of the Muslim community with western modernity ushered in a new course of events involving multidimensional interactions and conflicts in economic, political, social and cultural areas. As a result of this eventful encounter, three different major reactions came about among Muslims towards modernity: the first one is modernism which aims at the western-type modernization and cracks a door to secularism. The second one was a movement which, harboring fundamentalist and reformist ideas, rejected modernity entirely and viewed the backwardness vis-à-vis the West in Muslims’ inadequate understanding of Islam. The third one was the (neo-) traditionalist approach. This study offers an account of the encounter with a little background and also an analysis of all three responses that Muslims held towards modernity. It finally presents whether or not these approaches brings in anything new in terms of Muslim sectarianism.

Keywords: Modernity, Modernist, Reformist, Traditionalist.

Öz
Modernite ve İslam Toplumunun Buna Tepkisinde Farklaşmaş: Modern, İslahçı ve Gelenekçi Tavrların Ortaya Konulması

Anahtar Kelimeler: Modernite, Modern, İslahçı, Gelenekçi.
**Introduction**

Modernity in the Muslim world has been a central phenomenon for all contemporary scholars interested in Islamic issues ranging from politics to theology. For the last three centuries, Muslims from different parts of the Islamic world have interpreted modernity within different ways and sought to implement it in societies in which social life is based on religious tradition. Modernity initially came to the fore, as we will see, as a realization of the backwardness of Islamic society in spheres such as politics and military. However, it soon came to encompass all areas of social life as an ideology. It can be considered to be a turning point in terms of a great deal of religious and social transformations in the Muslim world.

Muslims mostly perceive modernity in terms of Western modernity and vary in their views on its relevance and compatibility to Islam. There are at least three orientations towards modernity. The first is the modernist discourse. This orientation is divided into two groups: modernists and secularists. The former group argues that modernity is compatible with Islam and call for a new Islamic theology in order to justify this compatibility. In the past, Islamic theology was a methodological framework to deal with intellectual challenges. However, this old theology could not respond to challenges which modernity posed. It should be replaced by a new theology that can respond to the needs of modern times. As for the latter group, sometimes they are called ‘western modernists’ as they adored Western values and culture. They argue that the main cause of backwardness in Islamic community is its adherence to the tradition and religion.

The second orientation is the Islamist discourse. It refers to revivalist and reformist thinking that calls for the reform (ihyā‘) of the practices of the Ancestors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥūn), the first three generations of Muslims, and reform (islāḥ) of religious practices such as visiting graves for intercession, fertility, health, and prosperity, celebrating birth and death anniversaries of saints, and adherence (taqlīd) to schools of law.

And the third orientation is the traditionalist discourse, which refers to those who give less priority to modernity and at the same time have strong loyalty to religious faith and practices inherited from the past. For them, there is no need to change social institutions and existing methodology in jurisprudence. For example, the gate of ijtihād is closed as Islamic Law has reached its peak with four schools of jurisprudence (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi‘ī, and Ḥanbalī).
This paper mainly focuses on the impacts of global modernity on the Muslim community (umma) in terms of theological, juridical, political, and social issues. To this end, I will examine views of vigorous thinkers of Islamic modernism, including Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-1897), Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1845-1905), Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817-1898), Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935), Muḥammad ʿIqbl (1877-1938), and so on. With this study, I aim to illustrate Islamic modernism with its general episodes (origin, growth and end) and transformations in the Muslim world and then align the approaches towards modernity. And finally, I shall offer to present what changes took place in Islamic theology (kalām) and jurisprudence (fiqh) in terms of Islamic sectarianism in the light of these thinkers’ views.

Islamic Modernism

“Modernity is that which has created fundamental changes in behavior and belief about economics, politics, social organization, and intellectual discourse.”¹ For the last three centuries, the notion of modernity has been a crucial component of various discourses, from politics and economy to religious issues, developed around intellectual milieu. Global modernity has a deep influence on Muslim community that, apart from the entrance of Greek Philosophy, coincided with Islam’s Golden Age between the 8th and 12th centuries, to Islamic theology (kalām), Muslims have never experienced such a big challenge that produced a variety of responses from Muslim intellectuals in different parts of the world. It should be useful to look at political and sociological events which established grounds for the birth of Islamic modernism.

When Islam’s expansion in Europe was stopped at the frontier of Vienna in 1648, and moreover Napoleon landed in Egypt at the end of the eighteenth-century, it was a strong indication of the impotence of the Islamic world in international politics and military matters. Some attempts were made in the areas of military and education by Muslim rulers and intellectuals to reclaim the past and close the gap between the West and Muslim World. For example, the Ottoman Sultan Selīm III (r.1789-1807), introduced the Niẓām-i Cedīd (the New Organization) mainly in the military and administrative fields; it was followed by the Tanzīmāt of 1839-1876 which included economic, social and religious affairs.² However these

efforts were not successful because they were superficial and not in a position to compete with the western counterparts. For example, instead of changing the classical curriculum in education, students were sent to the West or teachers were brought from there.

The West was full steam ahead with the French and Industrial revolutions so much so that Europeans had already began to search markets for their industries and developing economies, and this situation led to colonialism around the world. Why did not Muslims catch the modernization train or why did they stay behind the developments of accumulative knowledge as a product of all humanity? Even in the pre-colonial era, European intervention had been felt amongst Muslim societies. By the eighteenth century, Muslims in different parts of the world managed to live as a community with their religious and social institutions by composing the Islamic civilization and having a number of different understandings as well as various implementations of Islam to social life. There was a representative of all Muslims: the Ottoman Empire. However, the empire had been experiencing splits and divisions in the military and social institutions, such as the Janissary institution. Not only the decline of the Ottoman Empire but also European intervention in diplomatic and commercial spheres had detrimental results for Islamic civilization.

Colonialism followed European intervention and as a result the majority of Muslim countries came under the direct influence of the West: the Dutch invaded Indonesia; the British established its rules in India and took the control of some parts of the Middle East and Africa; the French seized North Africa and western part of the Middle East; the Russians and Chinese absorbed inner Asia. The political and economic stagnation in the Islamic world and/or institutional inadequacy could be accepted as major reasons for why Muslims missed the modernization train. However European colonization and its profound effect on Muslim societies disabled Muslims to engage with modern developments. Instead, they challenged colonization, independence, struggles among groups (religious or ideological) politically, economically, and so on. In fact, European colonialism has two stages: one is geographical imperialism; the other what is called “cultural imperialism,” which becomes more important when the former has receded in the twentieth century. As Fazlur Rahman argued, the second kind of imperialism enters into Muslim lands via three channels:

1) Christian missionaries, 2) the modern thought of Europe, 3) and the study and criticism by Westerners of Islam and Islamic society itself. Of these three channels, the first was a professional attempt at descriptive criticism; while the last one was, intentionally or unintentionally, but in effect largely so.\(^4\)

A similar challenge was seen in the history of Islam between the eighth and tenth centuries: Hellenistic thought entered into the lands of Islam, but Islam welcomed this different thought with no fear as the Islamic world was powerful politically. At the age of colonialism, the situation has proved that political power, undoubtedly, plays a pivotal role in meeting these kinds of intellectual, social, political, and cultural interactions.

Western encroachment in the Muslim lands and its direct influence over the government rules as well as social institutions led to a challenge, ‘Islamic modernism’, which aimed to reform Islamic tradition and re-establish social institutions in order to meet the needs of modern society. What went wrong? Why were Muslims defeated? And what had to be done? Muslim thinkers tried to answer these questions and sought effective solutions to existing problems. In the past, Muslims were triumphant, but the wheel began to roll toward the opposite direction. An important diagnosis to this stagnation comes from Fazlur Rahman, who put forward new methodologies in Islamic thinking:

Muslims have to face a situation of fundamental rethinking and reconstruction, their acute problem is precisely to determine how far to render the slate again and on what principles and by what methods, in order to create a new set of institutions.\(^5\)

In a changing world with changing life conditions, the West managed to use the accumulative knowledge (i.e., positive sciences) developing it further; while the Islamic world had to borrow the products of the West and eventually became a consumer society dependent on the Western countries. “Fundamental rethinking and reconstruction” in the passage above are the keywords of Islamic modernism. The following quote briefly reflects the aims and objectives of that challenge: “Islamic modernism wants Islam to be the basis of political life as well as religious, but it perceives a need to reinterpret those structures in the light of contemporary needs, frequently

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with a clear and unapologetic adoption of Western notions.” In the past, a number of reform movements or attempts were made to update social institutions. These movements can be traced back into the post-Hellenistic age. For instance, al-Ghazālī (d.505/1111) tried to systematize religious sciences in his well-known book Ḥiyā’ Ulūm al-Dīn, and Ibn Taymiyya (d.728/1328), who, with his reformist ideas, influenced pre-modern reform movements such as Wahhabism. In modernity, beginning from the early 19th century to date, the situation seems not so different from the past already discussed. What are the features of the modern age? What are the characteristics of Islamic modernism? And how and to what extent is Islamic Modernism distinguished from pre-modern reform movements?

First of all, it can be said that previous attempts at reform were the result of internal reasons; however, in modern attempts they are more external than internal: The reign of stagnation in Islamic thought and art, the weakness of religious intelligentsia and institutions, the recession of scientific studies, and so on. In addition to these, the threat of European political domination over the Muslim lands made modern reformation necessary. Thus, the main challenge for activists is to re-form existing social institutions as well as establish new ones: “Islamic modernism pioneered the reformation of the educational institutions; agitation for liberalization and decolonization; and the establishment of a periodical press throughout the Islamic world.”

Secondly, modern values such as rationality, science, constitutionalism, and certain forms of human rights came to the fore with this modernism. Activists not only used Islamic discourse self-consciously, but also adopted above values as modern, at the same degree. This distinguishes Islamic modernism from previous reform movements in that they did not identify their values as modern.

Thirdly, the modernist Islamic faith includes controversies: Encompassing both mysticism and its abhorrence; strategic use of traditional scholarship and its rejection; return to a pristine early Islam and updating of early practices in keeping with historical change. And finally, we will see later in this paper, modernists are distinguished from their successors in the

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6 Rippin, Muslims, p.198.
7 Charles Kurzman, Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Source Book (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.3-27. Henceforth referred to as Modernist Islam. (This book includes articles from various modernist intellectuals throughout the Muslim world whose editorial process the editor explains in his introduction. Hence, in this article when I refer to Modernist Islam, I benefit from the content of this book, not necessarily primary writings of the modernist intellectuals.)
8 Kurzman, Modernist Islam, pp.5.
twentieth-century: “secularists and revivalists,”9 who respectively minimized the importance of Islam in the modern world, privileging nationalism, socialism, and who downplayed their modernity privileging authenticity and divine mandates although they advocated modern values.

**Episodes and Discourses**

Muslims perceived modernity as a concept of Western community (with its historical development), and regarded this development as a threat to their religious and cultural identity. It was necessary to explain that modernity was not in conflict with Islam. In order to meet this phenomenon successfully, they showed two main concerns: “reform in education and the need for a new theology.”10 Muslim intellectuals began to reform the Islamic tradition by reinterpreting its fundamental sources, the *Qur’an*, the *Sunna* (the prophetic tradition), *ijmā‘* (consensus), and *qiyyās* (analogical reasoning), in order to meet the needs of modern society and solve problems which Muslim society experienced in religious institutions in terms of theory and practice. Initially, modernist thinkers appeared to be advocating Islam’s compatibility with modern science and technology claiming that “the adoption of modern science and technology, actually meant reclaiming the Islamic heritage, since modern European science had its origins in classical Islamic learning,”11 and subsequently answering the arguments of orientalist thinking. We can see typical samples of this in the writings of al-Afghānī as an answer to the orientalist Ernest Renan (d.1892).12

Al-Afghānī criticized the educational policy of the Ottoman government and the Khedivate of Egypt. Even though these governments had opened schools for a period of sixty years, they never benefited from them because of the absence of philosophy. In al-Afghānī’s ideological reflections, three elements played leading role: “the idea of Islamic unity against Western political domination; a consciousness of decadence; and a positive philosophical exposition of the rational sciences and critique of the orthodox ulama.”13 Moreover, he strongly emphasized that “the Islamic religion is the

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closest of religions to science and knowledge, and there is no incompatibility between science and knowledge and the foundation of the Islamic faith.”

Sayyid Ahmad Khān, one of the prominent modernists from the Indian subcontinent, demythologized Qur’anic interpretation presenting in harmony with science and reason, criticized the hadith corpus, and called for renewed *ijtihād*. According to him, doctrines of Islam should be based on: 1) revelation, and 2) *ijtihād*. If a doctrine of second kind should be contrary to nature or human nature, then this does not bring any reflection upon Islam. When we carefully examine the writings of S. A. Khān, we definitely see from his point of view that Islam is nature and nature is Islam. Another well-known modernist from this area, Muḥammad Iqbāl with his rhetoric language has a great deal of influence over Muslim intelligentsia and university students. He advocated that the predominantly Muslim regions of the North-West India should be governed autonomously under an Islamic system, inspired the Pakistan movement. He proposed an ‘Islamic state’ model that within this political constitution: a) the law of God is absolutely supreme, b) the absolute equality of all members of the community (equalitarianism) are essential. The Islamic state must have absolute equality among all members, with no aristocracy, no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system, and so on. His views illustrated that he was obviously against sectarianism and division.

In the Middle East, it could be argued, the most influential modernist was Muḥammad ‘Abduh, for him, moderation was the only alternative. He gave priority to education. When Islamic law is fully understood and obeyed, society, he believed, will flourish; when it is misunderstood or rejected, society will decay. Reason and revelation are parallel in competence and there is neither separation nor conflict between them.

It could be argued that the abovementioned intellectuals tried to establish grounds for necessary reforms in Muslim community. They emphasized the necessity of reformation on fundamental principles of society, religion and education systems in order to meet the needs of the age. If stagnation exists in political and social institutions in the Muslim community, the causes of it must be sought within social institutions. The first thing that comes to mind, when we think the Muslim world, of course, is the religion of Islam since the

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social life is based on religion. Thereby, modernist thinkers firstly looked at theological issues in order to supply theoretical bases for reformation. This may be called the first phase of Islamic modernism. In the second phase, Muslim thinkers developed a high regard for “modern concepts of liberty and constitutionalism. Despite their hesitations about territorial nationalism, most [of them] appealed to a territorial idea of the homeland (watan).”

However, this homeland idea then played a vital role in partition of Muslim community to nation states. Subsequently, “the modern concepts of liberty (hurriya [sic]), republicanism and democracy (jumhuriyya), and constitutionalism (mashrutiyya) … were validated by relocating them in Islamic tradition.”

These notions were not alien to Islamic principles, especially the notions of democracy and constitutionalism. But these two have been overlooked in government forms throughout Muslim lands for recent centuries. Khayr al-Dīn al-Tūnīsī (d.1889) justified the necessity of parliamentary government and free press on the basis of the Islamic principles of public interest (maṣlaḥa). In Iran, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Nāʾīnī (d.1936) argued that constitutional government provides an Islamic solution, as it removes tyranny and promotes the well-being of the community. It is important to note that the principle of democracy solves a crucial political problem in Shiʿī theology, which believed that a legitimate rule is impossible in the absence of the Imam.

In the last two centuries, throughout the Muslim lands, the place of religion in public life became an origin point of various debates: social, political, legal, economic, and intellectual. While fundamental changes in social life taking place, different approaches emerged towards modern changes. Before taking up the approaches, it would be useful to remember what kind of transformations took place in short:

The transformations resulted mainly from the incorporation of the region into the expanding capitalist markets dominated by the European powers. This was not merely European domination, but transformations of economy and society, creating new spheres of activity, classes of the population and relations of power. Political, military and administrative reforms were responses of ruling groups to new situations.

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New classes developed in service and industrial fields as well as government bureaucracy and education. Religious classes began to disappear. Their main functions in law and education were being bureaucratised at the hand of state and the bureaucratic staff were trained in modern education in state schools. Having direct contact with the European nations, intellectuals, poets, journalists, writers and so on, widely read European literature and translated many works of Western to their mother tongues. Furthermore, nationalism has been welcomed within Muslim community. It has great effects on Muslim societies that various examples of this ideology can be seen throughout the Muslim World, and it could be accepted one of the most influential agent in the division of Muslim community into nation states. In Iran, pre-Islamic symbols were reintroduced; for example, “the celebration of 2500th anniversary of Cyrus the Great at Persepolis in 1971; in Egypt, Pharoanism, a significant pre-Islamic history and an effort,” was revived and Arab nationalism was particularly stressed by the government of Nāṣir.

The twentieth century had become a scene for the establishment of nation-states throughout Muslim lands. The dominant political ideology was borrowed from M. Kemal Atatürk (d.1938), founder of the Republic of Turkey, and the effects of his views were seen until the last quarter of the century. “[T]he regimes that emerged from colonial control were organized around the principles of … Kemalism.” However, there was a public hegemony in the Muslim world when applying the secular reforms. S. Sayyid evaluates this as a weakness of Kemalism:

First, the Kemalist regimes were not able to impose Kemalism totally. ... [T]he incompleteness of Kemalism manifested itself in the politicization of the role of Islam, and the inability of the Kemalists to make their interpretation of Islam appear natural or sedimented. Second, the weakness of Kemalism varies, not only from country to country or from region to region, but also from institute to institute. In some countries the army remains the main bulwark of Kemalism; in others the professional associations have become Islamized.

Conversely, in some regions, leaders used Islamic discourse in order to justify their policies. For example, “secular Arab nationalism (Ba’thist ideology in Syria and Iraq, and the thought of Colonel Qadhdhafi in Libya)

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22 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” p.68.
24 Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear, p.86.
has a tendency to subordinate Islam itself, making Islam an aspect of
Arabism and Arab history.”25 This tendency gained more importance and
influence upon the society in the works of the secular intellectuals who gave
their attention to Islamic heritage, dealing with the people and important
events of the golden ages of Islam. Thus, secularist ideas have come close
with ethnicity, religious identity via nationalist thinking, as well as staying
within secularist agenda. For instance, in Egypt, there was seen nationalist
and Islamic political orientation in shaping the twentieth century Egypt’s
politics. The liberal elites were removed from the power and replaced by a
new generation of Arab nationalist military officers who instituted the
military and socialist regime, which governs Egypt to the present day.26
These military officers, later called the Free Officers, with professional and
technical education were only candidates to establish an Arab Union despite
some attempts of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1952, the Free Officers, led by
Muḥammad Najīb, Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir, and Anwar al-Sādāt, overthrew the
King and brought the parliamentary regime to an end.

Ideologically, the Free Officers’ government turned from liberalism to
socialism, from collaboration to anti-imperialism, from nationalism to Pan-
Arabism to define the objectives of the Egyptian national movement.27 Jamāl
ʿAbd al-Nāṣir seemed to be worthy of the leadership of Arab communities
with his determined stance against Western states in the Suez crisis. Arabs in
Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine looked to him for the leadership
in the struggle against Israel. Even Nasserite parties were founded in several
Arab countries. As a result, in 1958, a union was formed between Egypt and
Syria, which, it was hoped, would be the basis for a single Arab state.
However, in 1961, it was broken up. The defeat of the 1967 war with Israel
discredited Nāṣir’s claim to Arab world leadership, again labeled a secular
Egyptian state as a failure, and opened the way to a revival of Muslim
loyalties.28 The situation in the Arab world is clearly described below:

Nasserism in Egypt (1952-70) and Ba’thism in Iraq and Syria (1968-, 1963-)
were the most cogent expressions of radical nationalism. In each case, the
goals of independence and of building socialism, this latter defined as state
control of society and economy, were combined with an appeal for Arab
unity: the term used to denote this Arab community was umma. … the Arab

26 Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, p.613.
27 Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, pp.627-628.
28 Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, p.628.
world should unite into one state, and that its failure to do so was intimately linked not only to external manipulation, and partition, but also to the internal weakness of Arab society.29

During both colonialism and post-colonialism, Muslims in each territory engaged its indigenous problems, and pragmatically searched new ways to solve them. Although al-Afghānī, with covert support of the Ottoman Sultan ʿAbdulḥamīd II (d.1918), made general summons for establishing political unity against Western domination, he was sent to exile from country to country while trying to do so. It is obvious from the above statements that perhaps the Arab leaders noticed this, but it was too late to re-establish again a union or a community. Though absolute principles rejecting racism and divisions in the community exist both in the Qur’ān and the prophetic tradition, Muslims have been making the same mistakes from time to time.

It is worth here to mention an aspect of Islamic sectarianism, which is the Caliphate institution. Politically, it was the origin of Sunnī-Shīʿī-Khārījī debate on the division of Muslim community after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Then, what happened to this institution? The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 had important impacts on Muslims around the world. It had been a crucial institution in legitimacy and governance since the death of the Prophet in 632. The weakness of this institution in the Ottoman Empire brought some ideas to the fore such as transferring it to the Arab nations. Three contenders already emerged among the Arabs: “King Fuad I in Egypt; Sharif Hussein b. Ali in Makka; and the Bey of Tunis.”30 Undoubtedly, the issue of caliphate was one of the most important challenges among Muslim thinkers in the last century: some advocated its preservation and some called for its abolition.

Abū al-Kalām Āzād (d.1958) launched a movement in India for the preservation of the Ottoman caliphate. In his Masʿāla-i Khilāfat (The Issue of the Caliphate) published in 1920, Āzād defined caliphate as an essential Islamic institution that ensured the unity of the Muslim umma and guaranteed democratic governance against tyranny and absolutism.31 He proposed some revisions in the classical doctrines by analyzing the sayings of the Prophet frequently cited in the old debates according to which a

Muslim ruler must be from the tribe of Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet. Āzād argued that this hadith was not prescriptive and it only stated a fact of history.32 Rashīd Riḍā (d.1935) also supported its preservation by writing a treatise called *al-Khilāfa aw al-Imāma al-‘Uẓmā* (The Caliphate or the Supreme Leadership) in 1923, just before the abolition of the caliphate. Like Āzād, Riḍā made some amendments in the classical doctrine. As a similar point to Āzād’s view, he condemned ethnic and racial prejudice, and criticized Ibn Khaldūn for glorifying ʿasabiyya, or group solidarity and clan partisanship, as motivating force of polities, dynasties, and even prophetic missions.33 The universal caliphate was no longer possible and it was imperative to transform it into a democratic consultative system of government that can modernize the *sharīṭa*. Riḍā believed that the caliphate is necessary for political and spiritual independence of Islam, but proposed to locate it in the core regions of the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. With his modernist ideas on the necessity of *ijtihād*, he revised this independent judgment for a ruler and the concepts of consultation (*shūrā*) and authority (*ahl al-ḥall wa ‘l-‘aqd*), transforming them into democratic principles of checks and balances on the caliphal authority.34

By contrast, another Muslim thinker Muḥammad Iqbāl (d.1938) endorsed the abolition of the caliphate and its transformation into a republican government. From his point of *ijtihād* in his *Khilāfat-i Islāmiyya* (Islamic Caliphate), written in 1908, Iqbāl argued that the political sovereignty belonged to the Muslim people, not to a specific individual since the caliphate shifted the right to govern from an individual to an institution. He believed that a universal caliphate was no longer possible. In the past, the *Khawārij* did not consider *khilāfa* as a universal institution. The *Muʿtazila* accepted a universal caliphate as a matter of expediency only. The majority of the Sunnis believed that the universal caliphate was a religious necessity. The Shīʿa accepted universal caliphate as a divine principle. In Iqbāl’s view, modern Turkey had shifted to the view of *Muʿtazila*.35 In Egypt, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq (d.1966) also supported the abolition, arguing that the Qur’an and the Sunna provide no specific instructions about this subject.36

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To conclude this section, it could be argued that the weakness of the
Ottoman Empire or absence of any leading country in the Muslim world and
the division of Muslim community into nation-states have played a pivotal
role in shaping current maps of Muslim states. Additionally, if there was a
unity among modernist intellectuals and politicians; the situation would be
totally different.

After this short history about the last two century’s politics, let us
examine the characters of the approaches already mentioned. Many analysts
have generally suggested a tri-part division of religious ways of interacting
with the modern age: namely, “Traditionalist (sometimes termed Normative
or Orthodox), Islamist (sometimes termed Fundamentalist, Neo-normativist
or Revivalist), and Modernist (sometimes termed acculturating or
Modernizing).”

Modernist Discourse (Islamic Modernists and Secularists)

Modernists appealed that religious institutions be re-examined by giving
new meanings to classical Islamic concepts. For example, the four sources of
Islam were reinterpreted, the *ijmāʿ* and the *qiyyās* were fundamentally
transformed into public opinion and analogical reasoning, respectively, the
door of *ijtihād* was pushed open as human reason competed with the
prophetic revelation, *maṣlaha* turned into utility, *shūrā* (consultation) into
parliamentary democracy, and Islam itself became identical with civilization,
and so on. “To formulate an alternative method of Quranic exegesis, these
thinkers reinterpreted the scripture in terms of the normative and cognitive
standards of the Enlightenment.” Moreover, modernists issued a general
summon for absolute *ijtihād* that would seek its guidance directly from the
basic sources, not being bound by the consensus of the existing schools of
jurisprudence (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfīʿī, and Ḥanbali).

Many modernists, including Rifāʿa Rāfīʿ al-Ṭaḥtāwī (d.1873), Chirāgh
ʿAlī (d.1895), and S. A. Khān argued that there was not much difference

37 See the works of some analysts including Fazlur Rahman, *Islam: Modernist, Fundamentalist, and
Reformer*; William Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought: Towards a Typology”; Secularism,
Islamism, and Traditionalism; John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press, 1991); Secularists, Conservative, Neo-traditionist, and Islamic reformer); Youssef M. Choueiri,
*Islamic Fundamentalism* (London: Continuum, 1990); Revivalism, Reformism, and Radicalism; John O.
Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
1994): Adaptationist, Conservative, Fundamentalist, and the personal and individual); and Charles
Revivalist Islam, and Liberal Islam.
39 Moaddel, *Islamic Modernism*, p.84.
40 Moaddel, *Islamic Modernism*, p.86.
between the principles of Islamic law and those of natural law on which the codes of modern Europe were based. They believed that it was necessary and legitimate to adapt the Islamic law to new circumstances in changing life conditions. Closing the gate of *ijtihād* was no longer acceptable. Furthermore, some modernists, for example Chirāgh ‘Alī, rejected the Hadith as a source of Islamic law by arguing that the only Muhammadan law is the Qur’an; and the Muhammadan common law cannot be called immutable; on the contrary it is changeable and progressive. There is no legal or religious authority that says the four madhhab are final and no mujtahid who could do as four imams did.\(^\text{42}\) Then, what should be done to reconstruct religious thinking, or cure the general problem of Muslim societies? We can see in many modernists’ agenda that education has priority over other attempts. ‘Abduh challenged to change and bring in new curricula to the policy of al-Azhar; he also affected with his ideas the oldest and largest modernist organization in the world, the Indonesian Muḥammadiyya founded in 1912. \(^\text{43}\) In addition to this, another modernist Sayyid Aḥmad Khān established the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in North India, offering English-medium higher education, and emphasized the importance of education in his journal *Tahdīḥ al-Akhlāq* (Refinement of Morals).\(^\text{44}\)

In brief, modernists tried to purify Islam from innovations and accretions, reform the education system in order to re-establish Islamic principles in society, and make re-formation of Islamic doctrine to eliminate the increasing influence of the secular world. While doing so, they have given greater emphasis on *ijtihād* rather than *taqlīd* observing the differences: climate, history, character, politics, and social circumstances. As regard to the practice of *ijtihād*, “which is supposed to open the way to modernization, it is not open to anyone but should be restricted to competent religious scholars.”\(^\text{45}\)

Islamic modernism existed advocating an integration of modern ideas and institutions with the basis of Islam, and tried to wake the Muslim world from stagnation. It could be said that the modernists were successful in providing a basis for later generations in spite of the opposition of ruling

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\(^{43}\) Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” p.74.


class. This attempt must be carried forward to compete with Western ideas, which already existed in the Muslim geography, and what is more, it will perpetuate its existence unless the Muslim community makes progress in social, economic, and political spheres. Who should carry the Islamic modernism forward, and how? Fazlur Rahman explains thus:

The ulama were incapable of this task; this is why modernism, in so far existed at all, has been the work of lay Muslims with liberal education. The result was that the movement split into two developments moving into different directions: one in the direction of almost pure Westernism; and the other gravitating towards fundamentalism or what has been called ‘Revivalism’.46

Modernist thinking was thus transformed into a process that included both ‘western secularist’ thought and ‘revivalist’ attempts challenging each other since that time. ‘Abdulh and Aḥmad Khān can be seen as pioneers of revivalist attempts for modernization. However, this line was blurred with more fundamentalist approaches later. Westernism on the above quote refers to certain segment of society that they generally took roles in ruling posts. The secularist approach roughly rejects the claim that Islam is a total way of life: “Most or all areas of public life are to be governed not by the Islamic Sharia but by human reason and initiative.”47 In this approach, religion is accepted as an obstacle for development, and it is accused of having held back Muslim societies. Consequently, the method of the West should be borrowed in order to confine religion to rituals and private life. Thus, if Muslims follow the path of the West, they would progress in the way in which the West has. It seems an absurd suggestion that we are talking about different cultures, religious background, historical experiences, context, worldviews, and so on. The Muslim world did not experienced what the West did with the Church or religion against its scholastic thought and abusive role in social life. Therefore “secularism came as a relief from the encroachments of the Church on the State [establishing] its philosophic basis, not only in reason, but in the earlier Christian formula of a division of a labor between Caesar and God.”48

On the contrary, historically speaking, Eastern communities developed when they embraced the religion firmly and reached their golden age, but

46 Rahman, Islam, p.222.
now they are accusing the religion of becoming un-developed, and embracing secularism without any basis. As a result, “secularism was perceived as one of those effective prescriptions to be applied to societies where religion controlled all the happenings and gestures of daily life.”

It is possible to see the implications of above characters of the secularist ideas in the Muslim world, and how they have constructed or planted Islamist approach against these ideas. Let us first look at what changes were brought in the Muslim regions for the sake of secularization or progress, and then we can reach an overall conclusion concerning Muslim countries. Borrowing or adoption of the Western social institutions began in the nineteenth century slowly, “commercial and civil codes in Egypt in the 1870s, some fully fledged and intentional secularism, however comes with the Turkish reforms of the 1920s and 1930s.” In Turkey, many secular changes were brought in social and economic spheres not often in politics, single-party policy continued until the middle of the century. In 1916, the CUP (Community of Union and Progress), the constitutional government, reduced the powers of Shaykh al-Islām, transferred the jurisdiction of Muslim courts to the Ministry of Justice, and control of Muslim colleges to the Ministry of Education. In 1917, a new family code based on European principles was promulgated. The Shari’a law was replaced with a civil code adopted from the Swiss code, the adaptation of the Western calendar; and length-weight measurements, western style clothing for men and women. Education was taken from the hands of the ulamā through the law of the unity of education (tevḥīd-i tadrīsāt). In brief, it can be said that after the Independence War, Mustafa Kemal carried the principles of the CUP into action.

In Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi was as ambitious as M. Kemal Atatürk to make the country secular. He thus introduced secular law and education, and supported nationalism and Persian identity. However, the ‘ulamā’ were not brought under full control of the state like in Turkey. Egypt, after gaining independence in 1922, adopted a constitution giving all authority to the nation, but made Islam the religion of state. “The substance of Sharia law has been applied in ‘personal status’ cases, but this does not violate secularism since a significant area of public life is clearly removed from

50 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” p.64.
Sharia control.”52 In Indonesia, and some parts of Africa, for example Nigeria, strong Christian presence played a pivotal role in favoring secularism.

**Islamist Discourse (Revivalist or Fundamentalist)**

Having established some secular ideas in politics and economy, the newly-emerged nation-states had problems applying Islamic law in social institutions. In the modernist approach, intellectuals advocated Islam’s suitability to modern needs. They emphasized the rationality of Islam and its encouragement of science and knowledge, compared to other religions. This is a tendency what Shepard terms as “the less extreme forms of Islamism.”53 We can see the hallmark of the Islamist approach as a starting point with the same modernist approach that Muslims must return to the basic sources, *nasṣ* (the Qur’an and the Sunna), and the practice of the successors of the Prophet (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥūn*). Later on, the modernist approach gradually moved to fundamentalist position in the hands of Rashīd Riḍā, the most influential successor of ‘Abduh, and found its first large scale manifestation in “the Muslim Brothers organisation in Egypt, in 1928 founded by Hasan al-Banna (d.1949) who had been influenced by Ridha.”54 The journal of *al-Manār* was “the leading organ of Islamic reformist ideas, and major factor in shaping Muslim thought from North Africa to Southeast Asia.”55

Riḍā emphasised the basing modern Islam on the faith of Muhammad and his immediate companions, and the word *salaf* (predecessors) came to be the name by which this school is known, the *Salafīyya*. He tried to establish the middle ground between the old Muslim universities (traditionalist ‘ulamā’) and the excessive secularism of the westernizers. In so doing, the *Salafīyya* movement moved in the direction of a more rigorous rejection of modernizing adaptationism and supported the Wahhabi revival.56

Islamists insists that Islamic law (*sharī‘a*) must be followed as a guidance for all areas of life, public and private. Today they commonly call for an Islamic state and the application of the *sharī‘a*. It is useful to mention some organizations and influential Islamist activists. First, the Muslim Brothers, initially, it emerged as an educational and cultural organization; then it became involved in politics, and by the late 1940s it was the largest

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52 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” p.68.
53 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” p.70.
54 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” p.74.
mass political and social organization in Egypt and was spreading to other Arab countries. It called for an Islamic order in society, and was banned in Egypt in 1954; however, later it has become active again. The most important ideologue of this organization was Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966) who championed the idea of return to “pure Islam” and a move away from the materialism of the West, which he perceived to be contaminating Islam. Allegiance should be to Islam alone, for that provides the perfect social system for all humanity, one which will cure all the ills of the modern world. Once a truly Islamic state is established, all aspect of life will fall into their proper place. For him, social justice is more important than technological, economic, or administrative issues. Therefore, return to Islamic principles will restore all spheres of social life. In the 1970s, a group called “Jamaat al-Islamiyya, which were student associations dedicated to Islamization carried on the principles of Muslim Brothers. Their aim was to recreate an Islamic society on the basis of a restored caliphate.”

Second, Jamaat-i Islami, was founded in 1941 by Abū al-A‘lā Mawdūdī (1903-1979). His call was for a return to the Qur’an and a purified Sunnah so that Islam might be revitalized. This could only truly happen if Islam became the constitution of the state, and this was the political goal towards which he worked in Pakistan. It has been active both in India and Pakistan, but particularly Pakistan after the partition. As a political party it has not been successful at the polls, but Mawdūdī’s writings have been extremely influential throughout the Muslim world and among Muslims living in the West. It has ideological connections with the Muslim Brothers.

Third, Fedā’iyān-i Islām in Iran, in the 1940s and 1950s participated violently in the Iranian politics of the time and had contacts with the Muslim Brothers. Later, the reformist view was crystallized in a speech by Mahdī Bāzargān in 1962, in which he strongly suggested to go to back to the Qur’an and to Shi‘ī religious traditions to justify an active political role for the ‘ulamā’. No longer should the ‘ulamā’ wait passively for the return of the Imam, but actively pave the way. Between 1967 and 1973 the reform movement took a new direction under the leadership of Dr. ‘Alī Shari‘atī (1933-1977), who established the Ḥusayniyya-i Irshād. Eventually, the
Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 has become the religious establishment, not in the name of socialism but in the name of Islam. The revolution has been accepted as the most dramatic and significant victory for radical Islamism so far. The event has shaken the relations between state regimes and religious movements and cast doubts about the future, not only of Iran, but also of all Islamic societies. Finally, Dar al Islam movement and Persatuan Islam (Persis) in Indonesia, the former was founded in West Java where it rebelled against the central government in the 1950s; and the latter, unlike Dar al Islam movement, was a social and cultural organization far from political issues.

Islamists expounded Islamic ideology based on the supremacy of Shari’a and the sovereignty of God against secularism and democracy. They opposed reform, especially in family laws. The Muslim Brotherhood, Jamā’at-i Islāmī, Maysumi (Indonesia) and PAS (Malaysia) all called for the Islamic state and gained popularity by opposing modernity as materialism and secularism. In Turkey, the late 19th century and early the 1900s, the idea of Islamism (İslamcılık) gained momentum for a while but remained as a theory among intellectuals. From the 1960s, it showed itself in the discourses of National Thought or ‘Milli Görüş’, especially during the time of Refah Party.

**Traditionalist Discourse**

Many Muslims have given less priority to modernity and at the same time held strong loyalty to religious faith and practices inherited from the past. Generally speaking, traditionalists are comprised of both “conservative Ulama and members of Sufi orders.” In fact, nobody can deny that all Muslims have been traditionalist on fundamental principles, since Islam today is still based on traditional sources and whole gamut of Islamic knowledge. This can be explained with the belief in the validity and universality of the Qur’an. Additionally, as the best explainer of the Qur’an, Hadith tradition should be the second source when Muslims apply religious

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63 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” p.77.
64 Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, p.591.
65 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” p.75.
66 In this regard, for instance Yusuf Akçura discussed in his seminal work, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Modes of Politics), three possible politic solutions in order to provide an intellectual proposal for politics to save the Ottoman Empire from collapse. One of those three is Islamism that, in addition to Caliphate institution, having established the holy book, Qur’an, as canonical code in legacy, it could keep Muslim countries under Ottoman rule together. However, already some revolts against the Ottoman rule, such as Wahhabism, proved the difficulty in the implementation of this idea. For more discussion about these three notions, see Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yaynevi, 1976).
rules to social institutions, from prayer to transactions and moral issues. Consequently, traditionalists believe that there is no need to change social institutions or educational systems since the gate of *ijtihād* is closed as Islamic law has reached its peak with four imams of jurisprudence, and so on. In short, traditionalists and their extension, neo-traditionalists, are those who keep the traditions of learning and popular customs as a wealth of the past’s heritage. From the Indian subcontinent, the Deobandis and Barelvis fit best with this group.

From the beginning of the twentieth century, with the effect of the other groups, traditionalists have preferred to be silent in political issues, and they are better described as adaptationist neo-traditionalists; for example, “Azhar ulama in Egypt and most of the grand ayatullahs in Iran.” 68 Generally speaking, traditionalists are those who adopted Sufism as a life style and do not want to interfere with secular issues like politics as in the example of the Ḥāmidiyya Shādhiliyya in Egypt. In South Asia, Muslims learned Islam via Sufi orders that they managed to blend Islamic elements with indigenous culture and current economic systems. One example of this is an Indonesian group called Permai combined Marxism with original Javanese practices purified of Islamic elements.69

Another Indonesian group is the Nahdatul Ulama, which is today the largest Muslim religious organization founded in 1926 by the ‘ulamā’ at least partly in reaction to the activities of the modernist Muhammadiyya. They explicitly accept the traditional madhāhib in *fiqh*, which the Muhammadiyya rejects, and also many local practices that the Muhammadiyya considers non-Islamic.70 In Malaysia, a similar reaction was experienced between UMNO, the dominant secularist party, and the Malaysian Political Party PAS (Pan Malaysian Islamic Party). PAS began in 1951, in opposition to UMNO, calling for an Islamic state but also pushing Malay ethnic concerns. We can see how texts became prior to context in the works of some of its well-known writers such as Nik Abdul Aziz Nik and Usman Hadi Awank.71 Another Malaysian group called *Dar al-Argam*, banned by the government in 1994, had Sufi-like rituals and Mahdist tendencies.72 On state level, Saudi

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68 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” p.81.
70 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” pp.82-84.
72 Shepard, “The Diversity of Islamic Thought,” pp.82-84.
Arabia is the best example of traditionalism. Its government is heir to an extremely rejectionist pre-modern movement, Wahhabiyya.⁷³

New Theology and the Reconstruction of the Shari’a

In modern age, Muslim intellectuals such as S. A. Khān and ‘Abduh were convinced that Muslims needed religious reform, especially in theology and jurisprudence. Khān criticized the old theology and argued that “old theology founded on Greek metaphysics was no longer sufficient, because, unlike the old, the new sciences relied on experiment and observation.”⁷⁴ Khān’s Principles of Exegesis (1892) proposed a new theology that discarded the notion of conflict between science and the Qur’an, because science stands for nature and its laws, which are the creation of God. The Qur’an as the word of God cannot be in conflict with the nature as the work of God.⁷⁵ Khan inspired new issues in Islamic theology, like whether miracles are supernatural or not. He held that miracles may be extraordinary, but they are not supernatural: “first, because the Qur’an declares specifically that Divine Laws do not change; secondly, because modern scientific discoveries have demonstrated that these events were not supernatural.”⁷⁶ He emphasized the nature in the explanation of miracles and attracted the ‘ulamā’s bitter criticisms in India and the Middle East. For example, Masud states:

The reformist Deoband School, established in 1867 as a centre of revivalist discourse, was foremost in this opposition. In 1886, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (d. 1943), a mufti associated with this school, issued a long fatwa condemning Khan as a heretic (mubtadi’) and his associates as a ‘new naturist sect’ (firqa muhditha nechariya) on the basis of fifty ‘heretical’ statements in their writings.⁷⁷

⁷³ In recent years, the term of Wahhabiyya has been used synonymously with Salafism. At the beginning of the 20th century, the movement sowed itself in two versions of Salafi thought: Saudi Salafism and Jihadi Salafism (Ikhwanī). The former can be traced back into 1744 Dar‘Iyya alliance between Ibn Abd al-Wahhāb and Ibn Sa‘ūd, since that time the ‘ulamā’ have always supported the royal family. The Ikhwanī or Jihadi Salafism is a product of King Sa‘ūd’s ikhwan project in the late 19th and early 20th centuries for the expansion of Wahhabism outwards of Hijaz region. See Mehmet Ali Büyükakar, “11 Eylül’le Derinleşen Ayrılık: Suudi Selefiyye ve Cihadi Selefiyye,” Dini Araştırmalar 7:20 (2004), pp.205-234. More recently, with the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and so on, in 2011, the term of ‘Political Salafism’ has also been used in academic milieu. See Ramazan Yıldırım, “Cemaatten Partiye Dönüşen Seleflilik,” Analiz 73 (2013).


⁷⁷ See Masud, “Islamic Modernism,” p.243: “…al-Afgānī wrote a fatwa against Khan and his followers, branding them as materialists. This fatwa was first published in Persian in Hyderabad in 1881 with the title Haqīgat-i Madhab-i Nechari wa Bayan-i Hal-i Necharīyan (Truth about the Naturist Sect and a Description of their Views); its Urdu translation was published in 1884 from Calcutta ... Its Arabic
Khan tried to bring a new theology offering a harmony between nature, science, and the Qur’an. In addition to the Deobandis, existing ‘ulamā’ and the political modernists like al-Afghānī opposed the new theology, because it taught harmony between religion and science but separated religion from politics. As a result, Khān was accused of being an extreme naturalist.

Despite their different approaches to reform, Khān and ‘Abduh both offered rational explanations of Islamic beliefs and practices, revived the importance of human intellect and logic, called for reforms in education, language and legal systems, and deeply influenced respectively Urdu and Arabic language and literature. “‘Abduh developed a new theology in *al-Islam wa al-nasrāniyya ma’a al-‘ilm wa al-madaniyya* (Islam and Christianity in Relation to Science and Civilisation) published in 1897, and *Risala al-tawḥīd* (Theology of Unity) published in 1902.” For him, in contrast to other scriptures, the Qur’an gave authority to human intellect as humanity had reached maturity and prophecy had ended with Muhammad. Thus, reason and revelation came together in the Qur’an for the first time in human history. From his point of view, theology as a science deals with the belief in the existence of God, His attributes and His prophets, and examines what must be confirmed and refused. ‘Abduh, like S. A. Khān, stressed the importance of reason. However, unlike Khān, who was inclined to the Mu’tazilite thought, ‘Abduh remained closer to the Ashʿarīs in his view of the limited capacity of human reason. Man should believe only in those Divine attributes whose knowledge is revealed; it is sufficient to believe that He exists. It should be noted that ‘Abduh’s juridical works and views are more dominant over Khān’s. ‘Abduh and Khān both held that the laws of nature are unchangeable.

For ‘Abduh, *ijtihād* is that of independent and objective Muslim thought against imitation, *taqlīd*, or authoritative tradition. According to his understanding of *ijtihād*, religion must become an ally with modern scientific and critical thinking in order to reform Islamic civilization. His *ijtihād* has two phases:

I have raised the call for two great causes: first, for the liberation of thought from the fetters of imitation (taqlid)..., the second is the reform of the

_translation by Muhammad Abduh (published in Beirut in 1885) had a more threatening title: *Risala fi iḥtāl madhhab al-dahrīyyin wa-bayān mafāsidihim wa-iṭḥābat anna al-dīn asas al-madaniyya wa-l-kufr fasad al-‘umran* (A Treatise in Refutation of the Materialist Sect, an Account of their Evils and the Proof that Religion is the Basis of Civility and Disbelief destroys Society), shortened in later editions to *al-Radd ‘alā al-dahrīyyin.*”

78 Masud, “Islamic Modernism,” p.244.
methods of the Arabic written language, whether in the official communications or in correspondence between people.  

*Ijtihād*, for ‘Abduh, pervades the religious issues as much as the social ones. Moreover, his version of *ijtihād* embodies his awareness that only the scientifically disciplined use of reason would enable Muslims to cope with the present and prepare for the future, and that this use is to be cultivated and defended on Islamic premises so that it would bear fruit with time.  

What kind of methodology is applied in ‘Abduh’s and, more comprehensively, reformist thinkers’ agendas to the questions of individual Muslim’s attitudes towards religious beliefs, duties and obligations under the law? In changing circumstances, what is it to be an appropriate and authentic Muslim?  

‘Abduh inspires Muslims about what should be done in this age by saying that religious identity is to be constructed afresh to revert to the sacred texts of the Qur’an and the Prophet and his early followers (*al-salaf*) in search of the truth of the faith which has been deformed by the accretions of the centuries. He emphasizes the importance of the practices of the predecessors of the community (*salaf al-umma*) in order to be true Muslims.  

As Arabi has pointed out, ‘Abduh’s call for the restoration of the original Qur’anic norms has a dual function: “1) securing authenticity for his reform project via the indisputable sources of the faith, and by the same token, 2) allowing modern state law-making a large margin of action.” Furthermore, ‘Abduh evaluates the segments of Islamic tradition as the building blocks for the reconstruction of Muslim identity, and uses them for this purpose:  

a) The Mu’tazili commitment to the capacity of human reason in discerning the foundations of faith and legal obligation; b) Qur’anic universal norms of justice and utility; c) And the concept of ‘novel intellectual effort’, *ijtihād*, landmark of the creative episodes in Islamic law and jurisprudence.  

In so doing, ‘Abduh aims to invert historically dominant structure of the Muslim’s attitude toward the religious and legal obligations developed by Sunni methodology, which privileges belief through acceptance of revelation over autonomous reason. He stresses that the revelation and the prophecy came to end with the last prophet, Muhammad. Therefore, reason, as a source of knowledge in Islamic theology, is in equal distant with revelation.

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80 Arabi, *Studies*, p.25.


82 Arabi, *Studies*, p.27.
to use and interpret it in changing life conditions. His objective is to redefine the subject of legal obligations in Islamic law (\textit{al-mukallaf} or legally accountable person) in line with the demands of modernity, a circumstance which makes him antipodes with the basic postulates of orthodox Islam or Sunnism.\textsuperscript{83}

Three major ideologies appeared as important determinants of legal development in the Muslim world, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 1) the model of the Modern Western territorial state, 2) wholesale adoption of European land, penal, and commercial codes, and 3) Arab-Islamic identity seeking reaffirmation.\textsuperscript{84} The entrance of European law lacked existing cultural foundations. Tibi stresses that “the unsuccessful modernization resulted in the call for shari’atization… This return of the sacred in the shape of a shari’ata-based political Islam has in fact been going on since the 1980s.”\textsuperscript{85}

The modern process of positivization of Shari’ata, i.e. its ongoing transformation into a law of state leaves in mind a number of questions: What is the relation between Shari’ata and modern judicial state functions? What is the place of the sacred texts in the implementation of them to social life? What is new in Islamic jurisprudence? What happened to the dominant four schools of \textit{fiqh}?

In the reformers’ eyes, Orthodox Sunni jurisprudence with its intractable disagreements between the four schools and their multiple, opposed, and yet tolerant interpretive venues on many points of law, discouraged Muslims from religious zeal and imagination, and caused stagnation in \textit{ijtihad}, leading them into disunity. In modern times, Arabi states, a vital condition for efficient political organization is the promulgation of a single and unified legal code for the Muslim state which should no longer be retained, either by the principle of juridical pluralism (\textit{ikhtilāf}) or even by adherence to any of the four schools:

This is what Islamic scholars (ulama) ought to convene and put a book of rulings based on assured principles of the Law (shar’), which would be in conformity with the times, accessible to the understanding, and allowing no differences of opinion (la khilafa fihi). Then the leader of the community

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{83} Arabi, \textit{Studies}, p.27.
\bibitem{84} Arabi, \textit{Studies}, p.21.
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(al-imam al-a’zam) is to command the governors of Muslims to implement it: this is his function.\textsuperscript{86}

Judicial unity and efficiency was one of the biggest issues in ‘Abduh and his disciples’ agenda. Islamic law should be reformed in order to answer the needs of modern society. For this, the state must not have any priority to any jurisprudent school of law, like Hanafī madhhab, which has been codified by the Ottomans and Egyptians in the nineteenth-century, or any of the other three Sunni schools. It can easily be understood that the main source of judicial unity in modernists’ method is the Qur’an and the authentic sunna. Thereby, the reconstruction of new Shari’a would be receptive to the objective human and social reality and would not be bound by the shackles of the past. The implementation of ‘Abduh’s approach to Islamic law has three key elements that constitute guidelines:

1) The restitution to the sacred texts of their original and universal import (usul al-shari’a wa kulliyatiha), irrespective of the provincial and more particular applications that accrued to it in history; 2) The delimitation of a category of textual rulings that follow from a conclusive evidence (dalil qat’i), and therefore not subject to interpretation or alteration; 3) The determination of a category of changing rulings, in accordance with human interests and conditions (hukman yuwafiq al-maslaha wa’l-hal).\textsuperscript{87}

Methodological distinctions and new \textit{ijtihāds} in the body of Islamic law revived by ‘Abduh, came to be very recently enshrined in Egypt’s constitutional structure by virtue of a number of crucial decisions by Egypt’s highest judicial authority, the High Constitutional Court, in the 1990s, approximately a hundred years later; they were also put to work in the making and promulgation, in January 2000, of the first law in Islam which permits divorce at wife’s request alone.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{86} Arabi, \textit{Studies}, p.22.
\textsuperscript{87} Arabi, \textit{Studies}, p.35.
\textsuperscript{88} See Arabi, for example: Hanafi law became the official legal doctrine of Egyptian state early in the nineteenth century, to the exclusion of the Shafii and Maliki laws which were, until then, implemented in different parts of Egypt. This had dire consequences for the lot of many Egyptian women who had been serious reasons to seek divorce, whether due the husband’s desertion, bad treatment, non-provision of financial support, or unwholesome physical and mental condition of the prospective husband, which was sometimes concealed from the bride, and revealed only after the conclusion of the marriage contract. By Hanafi law, divorce is a very exclusive privilege of the husband, and consequently these wives could not obtain judicial dissolution and were left officially married, with no possibility to escape their unhappy fate. Yet Maliki and Shafii family laws contained provisions which would allow women to seek judicial divorce in the court in all aforementioned cases; but as a consequence of the exclusive implementation of the Hanafi rules of divorce due to centralisation reform, the rights of women to seek divorce were drastically (severely) reduced. The counter-reform had to wait for about a century, when Laws No.25 of
In summary, the reformers tried to re-construct the Islamic law in order to meet the needs of modern society. While establishing theological grounds for reformation, as happened in the past: For example, al-Afghānī accused S. A. Khān of being *mubtadi‘* (innovator) due to his extremist views on nature. ‘Abduh also criticized the works of Khān, but it seems that there is not much difference between Khān’s views and ‘Abduh’s. It is unclear what they introduced uniquely in Islamic tradition in terms of theology and jurisprudence. However, if these reformers were supported by the governments or ruling class, and if a kind of unity were achieved among them, they would advance a new theology and re-construction of the *sharī‘a* in a more effective way.

**Conclusion**

The nineteenth century became a scene of conquest of Muslim lands by Western imperial powers, British, French, and Dutch. There were two formidable tasks for Muslims: the preservation of the religious identity and reformation of social, political, educational, military, and religious institutions. These interests, in predominantly Sunni societies, have been focused by college and university educated Islamists, rather than the ‘ulamā‘. Mass education and modern technologies have made available the religious texts and sources to all people, thereby destroying privileged access to these bases. This, probably, explains why Muslims have showed different responses towards global modernity.

Modernity is seen as an “enlargement of human freedoms and an enhancement of the range of choices as people begin to take charge of themselves.” Modernization is generally accepted as a process that reduces the role of religion in society, not in private matter. Therefore, the importance of traditional religious institutions must be devalued and the place of religious figures must be discredited. When we consider Islamic society, whose social life is based on religion, modernization seems a destructive task for Muslims. Nobody can deny the importance of the circumstances of Muslims in these dire times where the majority of Muslims were weak militarily, politically, and economically and dependent on the developed countries. On the one hand, Muslim society was struggling with western hegemony; on the other, this society was searching ways of

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1920 and 1929 reintroduced, as law of State, the more generous Maliki provisions for judicial dissolution of marriage at wife’s request (p.35).

reformations in its inactive social institutions such as education and army. This situation contributed to the diversity of Muslim responses to modernity too.

When Muslims met with the phenomenon of modernity, they were not intellectually ready to face such a big challenge. As a result, it has been an unsolved issue in the center of social, economic and religious matters throughout the Muslim world. Muslims can be classified into groups in terms of their responses to modernity, i.e. the Modernist, Secularist, Islamist, and Traditionalist; however, this does not entail their inclusion among Islamic sects. This study shows that these groups are, in fact, not so much different from each other. It could be further argued that the Islamists are the extension of the Modernist line. Contrary to Western stereotypical depictions, the groups have been classified according to the content and style of their message: the modernists represent the liberal thinking within Islamic revival, the Islamists are puritanical revivalists who refuse blind and unquestioning adherence to the legal rulings of theologians-jurists of the medieval Islamic era, and the traditionalists emphasize Islamic scholarship, teaching and preaching. Unlike modernists and Islamists, the traditionalists follow the rules of the schools of theologian-jurists of the medieval age.

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