THIRD WORLD PRESIDENCIES IN THE GAMBIA, ZIMBABWE AND TOGO: THE RULE OF JAMMEH, MUGABE AND THE EYADÉMAS

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Abstract

Long lasting presidencies are one of the most significant characteristics of the postcolonial state nature in Sub-Saharan Africa. Presidents who ruled more than two terms with five years each by staying in power at least ten years justified their right to long lasting rule in two ways. In the first one, they claimed that it is their right to be the president by referring to the leadership role they assumed in the colonial struggle against colonizers. This was more valid for the first presidents of the postcolonial period in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the second one, they thought it was their right to long lasting rule because they regarded themselves as the leaders who ended the political and economic instability caused by the former government members. This was rather observed in the aftermath of the first presidential term in postcolonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Even though presidents in two situations pledges political and economic welfare to people, segments of authoritarianism in their administration appeared by time. This study tends to analyze the authoritarian administrations of Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Gnassingbé Faure Eyadéma in Togo by linking the concept of long lasting presidencies to the Third World state theory. In this context, this study regards these three long lasting presidents as the shapers of the Third world state in their own countries.

Keywords: Third World state, Yahya Jammeh, Robert Mugabe, Faure Gnassingbé, Sub-Saharan Africa

GAMBİYA’DA, ZİMBABVE’DE VE TOGO’DA ÜÇÜNCÜ DÜNYA CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI: JAMMEH, MUGABE VE EYADAMALAR YÖNETİMİ

Öz


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yonetimlerini incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda çalışma söz konusu üç uzun zamanlı Cumhurbaşkanı ülkelerindeki üçüncü dünya devletinin şekillenmesinde baş aktörler olarak kabul etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Üçüncü Dünya Devleti, Yahya Jammeh, Robert Mugabe, Faure Gnassingbé, Sahra Altı Afrika

Introduction

States in Sub-Saharan Africa are most famous for their long lasting presidencies. Either because of being the leader of the independence struggle against colonizers or keeping the power as far as possible after dissolving a military or civilian regime for the sake of stability, presidents with a civilian or military background who stayed in power more than two terms managed to justify their long lasting. The rule of Paul Kagame in Rwanda for 18 years, the rules of Isaisa Afwerki in Eritrea and Omar Hasan Ahmed al Bashier in Sudan for 25 years, the rule of Idriss Deby Itn in Chad for 27 years, the rule of Yaweri Museweni in Uganda for 27 years, the rule of Denis Sassous Nguesso in Democratic Republic of Congo for 34 years, the rule of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in Equatorial Guinea for 39 years and the rule of Paul Biya in Cameroon for 43 years are definite examples of long lasting presidencies in contemporary politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite particularly the illusionary stability rhetoric that presidents based their long lasting on, limited room was given to flourish democratization as a result of their authoritarian attitude. Strict policies that block assets of consolidated democracy such as freedom of speech, freedom of thought, right to union, rule of law and separation of powers contributed a lot to the labeling of states in Sub-Saharan Africa as Third World. Relatedly, this article is meant to discuss and compare the implementation of Third World state in the Gambia, Zimbabwe and Togo. By focusing on specific authoritarianism in these three states, I argue that long lasting Yahya Jammeh, Robert Mugabe and Gnassigbé-Faure Eyadéma presidencies were the shapers of the Third World state in the Gambia, Zimbabwe and Togo.

1. NATURE OF THE THIRD WORLD STATE

Third World states are defined as any or all underdeveloped countries of the world, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They are not aligned with the USA and the Soviet Union as superpowers, and have oppressed people who have come to identify with the struggles organically linked to their own attempts to obtain improvement in their conditions (Funk & Walles, 1971; Greene, 1980). Third World states are weak in terms of preventing the penetrations of their polities and regions by superpower rivalries conflicts. They are incapable of affecting the global political and military equation between the two superpowers and their alliances. All in all, they are secondary actors of world politics in contrast to the primary actors that include the superpowers in Europe and Japan (Ayoob, 1989:73).

The political underdevelopment at the fabric of Third World states is defined by the non-realization of free multiparty systems, the absence of people representation, and the lack of institutional proctoring for the government. A nepotism, uncontrolled and hedonist administration by local rulers in the postcolonial period of states in Asia,
Africa and Latin America is observed as a result of the colonial divide and rule administration which at the end led states not to be able to complete their nation-state process. Domestic conflicts, non-unification inside the state and the society, a non-legitimate government, a development dependent on the West, fraud elections, corruption and unjust policies have been among the very first characteristics of the Third World state (Ayoob, 1995; Tilly, 1985; Reno, 2002).

The massive literature on the Third World state is far from bringing a general consensus about its common characteristics at once and in a static manner. The orthodox development theory, for instance, defined the Third World state as modernizing and developmental by emphasizing its strong, overdeveloped, autonomous and postcolonial characteristics in the 1960s and 1970s. Literature of the development theory used the terms rentier state, peripheral state and bureaucratic authoritarian state in the 1980s compared to the one of the 1990s that came up with the terms of vassal state, predator state, vampire state, receiver state prostrate state and the collapsed state (Graf, 1995:142). The terms of failed state and shadow state were used by the 2000s and highlighted the lack of a centralized state and the state where rulers take personal decisions by not binding written laws and constitution which undermine the formal government (Reno, 2000:434-5). In addition, liberal and Marxist theories are referred to explain the nature of the Third World state. Liberal theory points out the non-implementation of neutral arbitration and the lack of general interest in the nature of the Third World state by the elites who were westernized and have had the goal of transforming the agrarian society into a modern industrial one. Marxist theory, on the other hand, perceives the Third World state as entities with a colonial past, formations that completed their statehood before nationhood, overdeveloped, enjoy autonomy from dominant classes and protect the interests of the bourgeoisie in their communities (Kosh, 1999).

The neocolonial identity of the Third World state with political independence but economic dependence on the West is inevitable while talking about the Third World state. The states in Africa that come into being and operates under conditions of neocolonial dependency have therefore a low level of growth and productivity, a weak class and civil society, an unorganized functioning in the political community, high military intervention to state affairs and an intensive amount of nationalization (Olugbade, 2010:65). This dependence creates a hybridity at the Third World state, which actually creates reaction to the West as their former colonizers and a wish to have a similar modernization level as the West has had at the same time. Speaking of the reaction, the anticolonial attitude is quite widely observed in the Third World state which has been used as a basis to create a unity through its emotional force (Young, 1982; Miller, 1966).

Rather than this political hybridity, economic hybridity is also one of the fundamental characteristics of the Third World states that adopt capitalism as a western notion. However, quite a few of them managed capitalism fairly well in terms of growth rate and per capita production. Even though the state might perform well in macroeconomics, policies especially in health and education are quite disappointing and poorly managed. Income distribution is also very weak (Sanyal, 1988:29). Capitalism adopted in the Third World states is therefore far from being central as in the West, rather peripheral, which means it has more than one mode of production and implies its own model. Overdeveloped state machinery that was created by the metropolitan to
control the local people in the colonial times was inherited in the postcolonial episode, and the state opts to collaborate with domestic or international capital whenever it needs due to the weak infrastructure of its economic institutions which leads to state capitalism in the end (Koo, 1984:44). States that adapted peripheral capitalism are categorized into newly industrialized ones, the ones in which economic growth rate exceeds the overall population growth rate, the ones in which the economic growth rate equals the overall population growth rate, and the ones in which economic growth rate is below the overall population growth rate (Magyar, 1995:707).

All in all, literature shows that leaders of the Third world states in Sub Saharan Africa tend to monopolize political power. The monopolization is committed through creating a strong bureaucracy that renders the leaders very able to rule the state without a proper check and balance system. This includes the lack of a consolidated independent judiciary system and also a strong electoral system which allows citizens to decide from whom they would be ruled. Apart from this, military is regarded as an institution to get its support against internal and external factors that could threaten the political survival of the leaders. All these factors at the end majorly cause a weak or failed state, which of course increase the dependency ratio to the former colonial actors or globalization defender rising or established powers. A non-developed economy is one of the consequences of this dependency, which subsequently necessitates the entrance of foreign direct investment and aid to provide a considerable amount of growth.

2. THE JAMMEH STATE IN THE GAMBIA

The Third World state was not founded but was shaped by Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia. His rule that started by deposing General Dawda Kabira Jawra with a military putsch took off from July 1994 to December 2016. While doing so, he actually broke the Gambia’s characteristic of being one of the longest standing multiparty democracies in Africa with Botswana and Mauritius (Edie, 2000: 182). When he came to power with the motto of “soldiers with a difference”, Jammeh asked all actors inside and outside of the Gambia to support, at least not to oppose, his regime (Saine, 2008: 62). Jammeh who pledged the Gambian people a new era of freedom, progress, democracy and accountability was so energetic at first that he thought he would rank the Gambia as one of the three most developed nations of the world (Wiseman, 1996: 919). For this purpose, Jammeh presented a Vision 2020 proposal that aimed at transforming the Gambia into a financial center, a tourist paradise, and export-oriented agricultural and manufacturing nation thriving on free market policies and a vibrant private sector with a well-balanced eco system in twenty five years (Edie, 2000: 183).

Jammeh’s vision for a strong Gambia, nonetheless, was shortly cut by his non-democratic attitudes and authoritarian administration. The introduction of the Decree 57 in 1995 gave the Minister of Interior unlimited power to arrest and detain without charge any person in the interest of security, peace, and stability of the Gambia. In addition, the introduction of the Decree 45 that set up the Secret Police under the name of Secret Intelligence Agency and the Decree 52 that brought the death penalty severed his rule. In the very same year, a group of elites including him monopolized sensitive security related cabinet portfolios such as Defense, Local Government and the Interior...
the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction Party (APRCP) was founded (Wiseman, 1996: 924).

When the media criticized Jammeh’s decrees, it was openly threatened. The Daily Observer journalist Alieu Badara Njie reported that the Gambian soldiers told him not observe the government. The editors of the journal called Fooyaa; Halifa Sallah and Sidia Jatta, were arrested and charged under Decree 4 because of illegal publishing. In October 1995, Kenneth Best as the Liberian managing director and director of the journal Observer was deported because he criticized the government. Several journalists who also criticized the Jammeh administration were beaten by the army over the next weeks. Abdullah Savaga of the journal Observer, for instance, was hospitalized after a particularly violent attack by the soldiers who kicked and punched him. Another journalist called Ebrima Sankareh of the journal The Point was also arrested and held in detention for periods. Three reporters from the same journal; Pap Saine, Alieu Badara and Brima Ernest, were taken into custody and charged with publication of false news with intent to cause fear and panic. The violent attitude of the government to the Gambian press was protested by the Gambian Press Union and the West African Journalist Association (Wiseman, 1996: 925). Passing of the National Media Bill in 2002 from the Gambian Parliament was also used by the government to repress the journalists who criticized the Jammeh administration (Saine, 2008: 63). Similar pressure was also present in Gambian politics. The 1996 Constitution that was drafted to replace the 1971 one did not include any term limit for the presidency. In addition, Jammeh announced in the 1999 Budget Speech that his government was involved in the reorganization of the Armed Forces and the expansion of its roles and functions in the areas of defense and security maintenance (Edie, 2000: 187). Later on, three executive members of The National Alliance for Democracy and Development Party (NADDP) founded in 2005 were arrested since they criticized Jammeh of political intolerance; mismanagement and corruption. In 2006, the critiques led to unsuccessful military coup attempt against Jammeh who banned 280.000 Gambian citizens from voting in the 2007 election that he thought would vote for the NADDP (Saine, 2008: 73-77).

Jammeh’s authoritarianism was also followed in health sector. Having stated that he had found a treatment for AIDS, he forced 200 HIV positive patients to live in a camp to test his hypothesis. Jammeh was so sure about his treatment that he even expelled the UN resident representative when he was asked how to provide a certainty of that treatment. By claiming that health problems only come from the West to Africa, Jammeh insisted on offering his own medication for AIDS as an outcome of an anti-colonialist comprehension (Rebecca& Melissa, 2009:563-569). Jammeh tightened rules and regulations about his AIDS program in 2008, and asked the Gambians who were forced to live in that camp not to have sex, to use alcohol, to smoke, to eat any pork, and not to accept any food or drinks from outside into the camp (Rebecca& Melissa, 2009: 578). In the same year, he took the decision to deport gays and lesbians from the Gambia and forced 1000 Gambians to drink hallucinogenic potions because he thought they were witches.1

The level of Jammeh authoritarianism intensified following years, by giving specific emphasis to long lasting. In an interview he gave in 2011, he said that he would

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rule the Gambia for a billion years and that his fate was in the hands of almighty Allah. To show his power not only in domestic affairs but also in foreign affairs, he suspended the Gambia’s membership to the Commonwealth in 2013 and to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2016. Jammeh who had won all elections so far, went to the polls in December 2016 amid huge public protests. In the end, he lost the elections to Adama Barrow, who was supported by the Gambian people and ECOWAS. Jammeh did not accept the defeat week after the elections results. Once he left the Gambia, he was given asylum in Equatorial Guinea that refused to be a part of the ICC too.

3. THE MUGABE STATE IN ZIMBABWE

Unlike Jammeh in the Gambia, Robert Mugabe was not only the shaper but also the founder of the Third World state in postcolonial Zimbabwe. As the founder of the Zimbabwe African Nation Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Mugabe became President in 1980 just after the independence. Being the leader of 1972-1980 independence war against the white minority in Zimbabwe, Mugabe openly stated that he would run after the two eyes and all teeth of the ones who would try to get his one eye and one tooth.

Human rights violations were more numerous under the Mugabe presidency than the Jammeh one in the Gambia. The massacre of thousand people in Matabelaland in 1982 since they were considered as a threat for the Mugabe rule was a good illustration. In 1983, Mugabe ordered his special forces that were trained in North Korea to attack the Ndebele tribe for the same reason. The slaughter of the Ndebele people was so dramatic that soldiers forced the survivors to dance on the graveyards of the ones who died. In 1989, the secretary of ZANU-PF declared that “democracy in Zimbabwe would be an intensive care unit”, in addition to Mugabe who said that “democracy was a contingent on the exercise of consensual power but consent is a factor that could be organized”. More than 2000 civilians who were supporting the opposition Movement for Democracy Party (MDP) under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai were executed in less than six weeks after these statements. Mugabe openly declared that the ZANU-PF would rule Zimbabwe forever with no other party as clear as day follows night (Muvingi, 2008: 80-86). In every election period, Zimbabwe National Union-Patriotic Front was reporting complete subversion of the democratic electoral process. In the 2008 elections, for instance, women who supported Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democracy were raped by Mugabe supporters and more than dozens of the MDC members were jailed in 2009. (Hassman & Rhoda, 2010: 912).

Mugabe’s human right violations continued after 2000 as well, when he first decided to confiscate the lands of the white farmers without any compensation and

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distributed them to the locals as he promised in his 1980 Presidential campaign (Dashwood, 2001:93). In the context of land reform in post-colonial Zimbabwe where he tried to pacify the impacts of the colonial rule, confiscations reached such a level that the white farmers were forced to leave their farms immediately by even being forbidden to cultivate their own crops in 2002. In addition, Mugabe tried to silence the press that was criticizing his land policies, as did Jammeh in the Gambia. The Daily News was bombed twice in 2000, the Daily Tribune and Weekly Times were shut down in 2004 and 2005 respectively (Muvingi, 2008: 92). As also did Jammeh in the Gambia, Mugabe suspended membership of Zimbabwe in the Commonwealth as a reaction to Britain that condemned the land confiscation in 2003. In 2006, Mugabe implemented a harsher policy against white farmers, 60 of which were killed by the government officers during confiscation. Between 2000 and 2006, 200.000 farmers and 2.000.000 people who were working with these farmers including their families lost their jobs. Tragically, these lands were not distributed to the local Zimbabweans or veterans but to the inner circle and relatives of Mugabe. As a result of all these confiscations, the majority of Zimbabwe’s population had food crisis, except for the regime supporters in specific areas. Mugabe even restricted the food aid to the population in case the opposition got stronger and resisted him. In total, 17 % of the population had no food to eat in 2008 according to IMF (Hassman& Rhoda, 2010: 900-901). Mugabe was also notorious for the Operation Murambatsine that was organized to remove 700.000 poor people as they were found inconvenient for the economy (Muvingi, 2008: 81).

Mugabe was also following an aggressive foreign policy. In 1998, he sent his troops to Democratic Republic of Congo to protect Joseph Kabila from Rwanda and Uganda who attacked to pacify the Hutu militias. Zimbabwe spent 25 million USD for this war in 2000, whereas many people were having food problems in the country. In addition, the war veterans threatened Mugabe to revolt if he would not keep his promise to land reform. In return, Mugabe tied them to a monthly 2000 Zimbabwean dollar, and 50.000 Zimbabwean dollar cash once (Muvingi, 2008: 87). The economy was also suffering from the clientalist business links of Mugabe. Large construction contracts, including those of Harare’s new international airport, were controlled by Robert Mugabe’s nephew Leo Mugabe. In 2000, friends of the president created a diamond harvesting scheme in the Congo and attempted to float stock on the London market (Shaw, 2002: 92).

All these spending caused a severe economic crisis at the end. Public protests against the Mugabe presidency began when he was declared as the winner of the lottery that was run by a state owned bank in 2000. Angered at these protests, Mugabe confiscated lands of white farmers whom he thought were mainly responsible for. When he sacked all the Zimbabweans who were working on these lands of the white farmers, the unemployment rate jumped to 80 % in 2005. Agriculture collapsed as a result of a weakened economy with almost no cultivation. Mugabe decided to solve this crisis through printing money, hyperinflation reached to 11.2 % million in 2008 since he did not take care of the supply-demand equilibrium. The very same year, Gideon Gono who later became the governor of the Central Bank printed more money into the market upon Mugabe’s order by confessing that traditional economics do not fully apply Zimbabwe. Whereas the consumer price change percentage was 25 % average between 1980 and 2000, it became 500.000.000.000 % between 2000 and 2010. Zimbabweans had to use the USD as national currency between 2009 and 2013 since the value of the Zimbabwean dollar against US dollar was so low. In 2010, the head of Zimbabwe
Central Bank Tendai Biti said that a direct contribution of 1 or 1.7 billion USD would be made to the GDP from the 60000 hectare diamond mine discovered in the Marange region if it would not be used by the wrong hands. However, Robert Mugabe confessed in an interview in 2016 that 15 billion USD worth of diamonds were stolen from the mining. The very same year, Mugabe celebrated his 92nd birthday with a 92 kg cake. In April 2017, he passed a law that allowed families to pay their kids’ school fees with chickens, goats and corn, and a law in October that banned 100,000 salesmen who were selling half bread, one usage of toothpaste, a pair of shoes, and sugar within a teaspoon from the market. In November 2017, the military under the control of Emmerson Mnangagwa organized a coup and overthrew Mugabe who was planning to transfer the presidency to his wife Grace Mugabe. The army that toppled Mugabe was actually the body language of the Zimbabwean people who started to protest the Mugabe presidency a month before the coup.

4. THE EYADÉMA STATE IN TOGO

Different from the Gambia and Zimbabwe, shaping of the Third World state in Togo was by two presidents; Gnassingbé Eyadéma and his son Faure Eyadéma. Having seized power by toppling the former President Sylvanus Olympio in 1963, Gnassingbé Eyadéma dissolved the government and he declared himself as the head of state in 1967. He founded the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) in 1969. Being called as “le patron”, Eyadéma was highly inspired by the Congolese President Mobutu Sese Sekou and launched the program of authenticité in which he nationalized key sectors of the Togolese economy (Stephen, 1993: 463). By a decree in 1976, he forced all the government officials to join his party. The very same year, he issued a decree that forced all government officials, even those working in television programs for kids, to wear suits (Stephen, 1993: 465).

Gnassingbé Eyadéma’s increasing authoritarianism was reacted by four students groups. These were the Youth Action Group for Democracy (GRAD), the Movement of Students in Fight for Democracy (MELD), University Organization of Fight for Democracy in Togo (OULDT), and the Association of the Young Togolese (AJETO) (Iwata, 2000: 144). They actively involved in a mass public protest in May 1990 when Eyadéma declared that he would reject transition to multiparty politics because he thought the Togolese people were not ready for democracy. Upon the army’s attacks on students in the protests, professors in Togo universities assembled and founded the Togolese Human Rights League to support these students (Iwata, 2000:143).

The National Conference of the RPT in 1991 was critical for the long lasting presidency in Togo. The civilian military junta as described by Eyadéma for the state regime in Togo did not only consolidate his presidency but also opened the way to distribute key positions in the government to his close circle (Heilbrun, 1993: 280). To appease protesters and calm down students who criticized his regime, Eyadéma launched a very limited democratization in Togo unlike Jammeh and Mugabe did in their own states. For instance, the ban on founding political parties that was brought in

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1969 was lifted. Nevertheless, more democracy emands of the people in Togo led to a clash with the state. Military attacked the protesters and killed 100 of them in 1992. The bodies were thrown to the Be Lagoun.

As did Jammeh, Gnassingbé Eyadéma violated human rights all the same. The witchcraft campaign in the Gambia took place also in Togo (Stephen, 1993: 468-471; Heilbrun, 1993:297). In the same year, Eyadéma started to implement two different long term privatization programs where 48 state institutions were sold to the private sector. The conditions of privatization were so harsh that he banned the trade unions, and right to strike in the first RPT Congress in 1973. Many workers who opposed Eyadéma’s ban on trade unions and strikes were jailed (Heilbrun, 1993:284). Eyadéma’s authoritarianism reached to peak in 2002 when he declared in the RPT Conference that he abolished the two term limits for the presidency. Upon this decision, the European Union decided to halt its trade relations and the bilateral trade agreement with Eyadéma’s Togo in 2003 (Banjo, 2008: 38).

When Gnassingbé Eyadéma died in 2005, the military declared Fauré Eyadéma, his son, who was the Minister of Equipment Post and Telecommunication as the new President (Brownlee, 2007: 616). Upon criticisms of the African Union and the local media of this hereditary succession, Faure shut down Radio Carré Jaunes and Television Zion, as did Jammeh in the Gambia and Mugabe in Zimbabwe (Banjo, 2008: 43). Once he intervened in the media, he changed the Togolese Constitution of 1992. The article 65 in the old constitution was pointing out that the presidents functions are exerted temporarily by the president of the National assembly and the organization of a presidential election within sixty days of opening of the vacancy in case of the vacancy in the presidency of the republic by death, whereas the new constitution’s article 65 removed the word “temporarily” and did not mention about organizing a presidential election anymore (Banjo, 2008: 40). In 2006, an opposition group against Faure Eyadéma’s constitutional violations was founded under the name of the Union of Forces for Challenge, but faced massive state violence. Faure’s presidency was later criticized even academically with references from Samuel Huntington for instance who said that hereditary authority and plebianess in modern autocracies occur in regimes where rulers do not depend on regular, free and fair elections, and Samer Sherata once said that hereditary succession is more likely specific to a particular type of authoritarianism, centralization of power in the person of the leader, a small ruling elite, a cult of personality, and long serving rulers who have been able to eliminate potential rivals (Brownlee, 2000: 600-603). Since December 2017, people in Togo have constantly been protesting his administration. Limited success has been achieved till now, with the decision of Faure Eyadéma going for a referendum for some constitutional changes in December 2018 and some mediation service from Ghana and Guinea to solve the conflict between the people and the government.

Assessment

The postcolonial state in the Gambia, Zimbabwe and Togo were shaped by the long lasting presidencies of Yahya Jammeh, Robert Mugabe and Gnassingbé-Faure Eyadéma. Ayoob’s, Tilly’s and Reno’s premises of being a state in Africa, nepotic, uncontrolled and hedonist leadership with different policies each, high level of corruption and fraud elections are the symbols of Third World state in these three states. Kosh’s peripheral and bureaucratic state model, lack of general interest and the colonial past premises also fit to the Third World state formation in these states all the same.
David’s and Olugbade’s high level military intervention to the civilian rule is also typical in the Gambia by the military background of Jammeh, Mugabe and Eyadéma. Mugabe’s policy of expropriation of the white farmers’ lands and the decision to leave the Commonwealth, as did Jammeh in the Gambia for the Commonwealth, are the typical behaviors of the anticolonial attitudes described by Young and Miller for the Third World states. Sanyal’s peripheral capitalism showed itself with the hyperinflation in Zimbabwe that emerged upon the Mugabe government’s decision to print money without necessary production in the market and the collaboration of the Togolese state with the French Businessman Vincent Bolloré for the management of the ports within the context of collaboration with the foreign capital as Koo claims.

The Presidencies of Jammeh, Mugabe and the Eyadémas that shaped the Third World state in the Gambia, Zimbabwe and Togo were challenged by different actors before their expiry. In the Gambia where Yahya Jammeh did not accept the defeat he had in the 2016 elections, ECOWAS explicitly warned him that it could intervene into the Gambia if he does not respect Barrow’s victory. In Zimbabwe, a military coup in December 2017 led by Emmerson Mnangagwa ended the Mugabe presidency. In Togo, protests are still going on against the Eyadéma presidency that will be voted in the December 20th referendum for a continuum of his authority until 2030.

The case of Togo is different from the Gambia and Zimbabwe in terms of given challenges. The Eyadéma government is facing neither ECOWAS nor military but the public protests to survive. At that point, it is possible to talk about significant impacts of the Arab Spring over Togo if to review how the Arab Spring was defined. A political protest including social media for the search for political freedom, economic opportunity, no corruption, legitimacy and accountability, employment, political participation, power sharing, evolving forms of social consensus, popular culture, socioeconomic marginalization, aspiration for freedom and efficient use of natural resources with an unprecedented scope and ambition against the repression the authoritarian regimes that include monarchical structure without meritocracy and neoliberal capitalism in the Middle East and North Africa which reflected the dynamics of defection the logic of social mobilization with the aim at setting up the relationship between authoritarian break down and democratic transition in the region for was regarded as crucial in the Arab Spring (Bellin, 2012; Jones, 2013; Adjami, 2012; Jones, 2012; Doomen, 2013; Avina, 2013; Aras&Falk,2015). In this sense, the nature of the public protests fits into the literature of the Arab Spring and it also challenges other long lasting Presidents too in Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of them already left power by December 2017, with one difference from the Northern African and the Middle Eastern Arab Spring. Presidents who left power did so not by street protests as it was in Tunisia, Libya or Egypt, but as a result of official political events such as elections or military coups. Public protests in Togo just increased the vehemence of the elections because the ballot results were very closely monitored later, maybe more than ever compared to the pre-Arab Spring ones, or they triggered, or influenced, the view of the military on the Presidents who are known that the military-President coalition and confrontation have been a connotation of the politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. If to consider the recent power shifts in Sub-Saharan Africa, Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Angola left power after the August 2017 elections and he accepted the defeat unlike Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia, because the military warned him to accept the results, Sirleaf Ellen Johnson left power...
in Liberia in January 2018 elections because she lost it in the ballots, Robert Mugabe left power after Emmerson Mnangagwa organized a military coup that supported the public protests in Zimbabwe in January 2018. Pierre Nkurunziza in Burundi barely survived a military coup d’état in May 2016 again triggered by the public protests, Joseph Kabila has been trying to keep power in the Democratic Republic of Congo by leading the state into a brutal civil war, which he agreed to for elections at the end of 2018.

Apparently, the post-Jammeh period in the Gambia, the post-Mugabe period in Zimbabwe and the recent struggle against the Eyadémas in Togo are far from getting a deliberate success to neutralize the impacts of the former presidents. After all the outposts of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, President Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia are very important for the future of Sub-Saharan Africa, but very few have been achieved so far. In the Gambia, Barrow gave great hope to the Gambian people by stating that he would provide a functional institutional democracy. First, he ended the isolation of the Gambia from the West by rejoining the Commonwealth and the International Criminal Court which Jammeh left because he thought they were neocolonial organizations. Second, he drafted for the very first time a National Development Plan that includes, at least in theory for now, good governance, accountability, social cohesion, reconciliation, transformation of the economy and harmony with the African Union’s 2063 Agenda policies. Third, he managed to arrest the two generals, Umpa Mendi as Jammeh’s principal protection officer and Ansumana Tamba as the former head of state guards Battalion who fled to Equatorial Guinea with Jammeh, and who implemented Jammeh’s decision to torture political opponents. Fourth, he established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the political and economic violations during Jammeh’s presidency, and he appointed an academician, Dr. Baba Galleh Jalla, as its head. Last but not least, he suspended the death penalty from the political agenda and promised to restore the justice system in the Gambia when two young protesters in an anti-pollution rally were shot by the police in June 2018. In economics on the other hand, Barrow restructured bank interests, lending rates, and treasury bills that had increased 25% compared to one year before

during the last four years of the Jammeh period. Moreover, the infrastructure of several factories that would provide employment to at least 20,000 people was prepared.

The post-Mugabe period with the presidency of Mnangagwa is also limited in Zimbabwe as it is in the Gambia. In his first hundred days in office, Mnangagwa managed to keep certain numbers of his promises about stimulating the economy, attracting foreign investment, stopping corruption, and promoting human rights. Accordingly, he has introduced free, state medical care for children and adults, a temporary reduction in fuel prices, removed police roadblocks and spot fines for traffic offences, established special anti-corruption courts, issued a three months amnesty in order to get the stolen money back to the state treasury 250 million USD went back out of 1.3 billion USD under the Mugabe period, made new trade agreements with China, Belarus, and Russia, and persuaded a South African company to construct the Zimbabwean railways. Politically speaking, Mnangagwa said that foreign observers from the European Union or United Nations would be able to observe elections in Zimbabwe whose entrances to the country were banned by Mugabe. He also said that opposition would not be punished as it was during the Mugabe era, even though he so far did not mention any electoral reforms. Nevertheless, once he won the polls in August 2018, a serious decrease in his performance is being observed. The lack of Ministers with sufficient technical knowledge and expertise to steer the country from the Mugabe based economic crisis, fuel shortages despite the government’s assurances, no effort on corruption made in the Mugabe period, dramatic increase in the prices of goods and services because of the increasing fuel costs, the new Finance minister’s decision to increase taxes, Mnangawga’s busy schedule that keeps him away from Zimbabwe to Europe, the very high salaries the ZAN-PF members are earning have been at the center of people’s complaints in nowadays’ Zimbabwe.

In Togo where nothing about the post-Eyadéma period is clear yet, protests against the Faure Eyadéma presidency have been intensifying since August 2017. Together with 14 political parties inside, Ghana and Guinea have been trying to persuade Faure Eyadéma to respect the 1992 Constitution and to limit the presidency with two terms. The situation is far from being certain unlike the Gambia and Zimbabwe. Voters in Togo will go to ballots for the local elections and the referendum in December 16th 2018, and the legislative elections in December 20th 2018. Accordingly, the article 59 on bringing back the two terms limit for the presidency in December 16th 2018, and the constitutional referendum on December 20th 2018. It is nevertheless, unknown whether the decision of the government to hold the local elections on December 16th and the constitutional referendum on December 20th 2018.

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are positive steps for the preview of the post-Eyadéma period in Togo. But The Ghanaian President Nana Addo Dankwa’s meeting with the government and opposition sides in Lomé in February 19th 2018 is a clear example of how Ghana wants a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Togo17. It is highly assumed that the protests since December 2017 would come up with a change in the Eyadéma rule by the December 16th and 20th 2018 elections and two terms limit for Presidential term18. However, the probability of Faure Eyadéma’s Alliance for Reconstruction and Construction Party winning the elections might automatically mean a victory for the Referendum as well in which he will rule the state until 2030. Military and the police have long been trying to suppress reacting protesters in Lomé and Sokodé, and also a high level of crackdown is recently witnessed against the opposition.

Conclusion

Yahya Jammeh, Robert Mugabe, Gnassingbé-Faure Eyadéma were not only three symbols of the long lasting presidencies in Sub-Saharan Africa but also the shapers of the Third world state by their authoritarian characters in politics. The three leaders both tried to monopolize power as soon as they became president. They all aimed at attaining a positively different state and country than the previous administrations that includes more freedom, progress, democracy, accountability and development. Nevertheless, they deviated from their vision by time and collected the power in their hands through restricting institutions and rules that could audit them. Media is one of these institutions that were harshly restricted, which actually showed how the tolerance for any criticism was low for their administrations. In Zimbabwe, the low tolerance situation also caused state violence organized specifically against classes such as white farmers and ethnic groups such as the Ndebele people. Suitable to the nature of the Third world state literature, the long lasting presidencies in the Gambia, Zimbabwe and Togo which is harmonious with authoritarianism at the end led to the non-development of the economy and a high level of dependence. That is why the new president of the Gambia Adama Barrow and the new President of Zimbabwe Mnangagwa Emmerson called for foreign direct investment to their states just after they came to power. In Togo too, Faure Eyadéma tries to calm down the people protests with economic reform packages. Current developments in the Gambia and Zimbabwe monitors that the new Presidents will have serious difficulties to surpass the impacts of Jammeh and Mugabe. Barrow is relatively more successful than Mnangagwa so far, but a charming development both in politics and economics was not achieved in the last two years in the Gambia. In Togo, however, public protests seem to have the ability to change the Eyadéma rule. Inspired from the Arab Spring, a success that would be obtained in the local elections and the referendum that ends the Eyadéma presidency could influence all other people in Sub-Saharan Africa who are trying to surpass the authoritarian long lasting Presidents. In contrast to the Gambia and Zimbabwe where the post-Jammeh and the post-Mugabe administrations are not effective as it was expected, the potential post-

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Eyadéma administration in the mid December 2018 gives more hope to this picture in Sub-Saharan Africa.

References


