Diversity and Citizenship in Modern Military Organization

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Abstract
Nations attempt to reproduce their armed forces for the present and future in the way they were constituted in the past. However, the relationship between military service and citizenship—coupled with processes of globalization, migration, wartime mobilization, and the decline of conscription-based mass armies—has created pressures for the extension of the recruitment base to previously excluded or limited groups. The integration of the U.S. military on the bases of ethnicity, race, sex, gender, and sexual orientation exemplifies how obstacles to integration are raised and overcome, producing military forces that reflect the increasingly diverse populations they serve; thus, allowing excluded groups a greater claim to citizenship rights and allowing nations to draw on the human capital that they hold for purposes of national security. In the past, diversity was believed to mitigate against social cohesion and military effectiveness; however, more recently, emphasis has been on task cohesion and the contribution of diversity to effectiveness.

Keywords
Citizenship • Diversity • Closure • Race • Sex • Gender • Sexual orientation • Contact hypothesis • Integration • Military
The Citizenship Revolution and Military Service

As the modern state system evolved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and organized armed forces became a hallmark of statehood, one of the major issues that confronted societies was who may or must serve in the military, in what roles, and who will be excluded. Most early societies were ethnically and religiously homogeneous; however, they manifested economic and gender differences that shaped military service. Generally, military leadership was restricted to the upper classes, and the warrior role was restricted to men. Lower strata men, who were subjects, could serve in the lower ranks. Women, who were frequently regarded as property, and sometimes were spoils of war, were usually excluded from combat. Three historical events—an ongoing citizenship revolution, globalization, and war itself—have changed these relationships.

The experience of the United States of America—as the first nation to emerge on the basis of a war of national liberation against a colonial power (Lipset, 1963)—can be seen as a bellwether for the issues to be confronted more broadly by modern states. The American Revolution, and later the French Revolution, helped transform the role of subject to that of citizen; moreover, it defined participation in armed conflict in defense of the state as a component of citizenship (D. Segal, 1986). Limitations on citizenship manifested in different ways through exclusion from the military, segregation within the military, exclusion from some military occupations (particularly combat specialties), quotas, and limitations on access to leadership positions. As these obstacles were eliminated, frequently under the pressure of wartime needs, maintaining contact with the previously limited group led to greater acceptance by soldiers from the dominant group under certain conditions.

Diversity in the Military

Military manpower policy in democratic states has reflected the influence of two opposing organizational pressures which have implications for citizenship and military service. On the one hand, like most traditional occupational groups, the military has tried to reproduce itself for the present and the future in the way that it existed in the past; it has attempted to exclude or limit the participation of segments of the population that have been excluded or have not been full participants in the past. This process is referred to as occupational closure (Segal & Kestnbaum, 2002). However, demands for broad representation of the increasingly diverse democratic societies that the armed forces defend have created pressures to expand the recruitment base and treat all segments of the population equally in terms of eligibility for military service.

In Europe, the most dramatic manifestation of the citizenship revolution was the extension of citizenship rights and responsibilities to the historically repressed lower economic classes. As a result of urbanization, mercantilism, and industrialization,
the new middle-class and working-class groups had to be progressively incorporated into the citizenry. In America, the absence of a long history of repressive class politics made the extension of citizenship on bases other than class, such as race, ethnicity, sex, and gender, more pronounced (Bendix, 1964).

The conflicting pressures of closure and representativeness have been expressed in arguments regarding cohesion in the pursuit of military effectiveness. However, the tone of the argument has changed historically from a focus on social cohesion and homogeneity as a basis for exclusion and limitation to an emphasis on task cohesion and the value of more inclusive diversity to maximize human resources and capital.

**Ethnic Integration: The Easiest Task**

Unlike the old world, America was born a nation of immigrants. Nonetheless, early attempts were made to maintain some degree of socio-demographic homogeneity in combat units even among personnel of European origin through varying degrees of ethnic segregation (Segal & Segal, 2004). Some units were defined by ethnicity. The influx of immigrants in the mid-nineteenth century (with 2.6 million arriving in the 1850s) gave a particularly international flavor to the American Civil War. Approximately 22 percent of the Union Army and about one-third of the Navy were foreign born. The foreign born soldiers increased to about half in the decade following the Civil War. The principle of closure and the coupling of service and citizenship were expressed in discussions about the risks of having such a large “non-American” force in what was then a volunteer army; therefore, a law was passed in 1894 that limited enlistments to only American Indians, citizens, and men who made a declaration of intent to become citizens and could read, write, and speak English.

During the twentieth century, ethnic integration rather than segregation increasingly became the operational principle, largely on the basis of wartime pressures. Such pressures frequently drove the expansion of the recruitment base in the direction of diversity. Given the manpower needs of a World War, a conscription law made all male immigrants, who declared an intention to become citizens (other than those from Germany and the Central Powers), subject to the draft; thereby, producing a polyglot army. Similarly, when America mobilized for World War II, again through conscription, European ethnic groups were integrated throughout the army, with occasional exceptions.

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4 An example is the Congressionally authorized German Battalion, with companies drawn from Maryland and Pennsylvania.
5 State militias supplied to the Union Army such units as the First German Rifles (8th New York Infantry) and the Irish Brigade (drawn from the Massachusetts and New York militias).
6 For example, the commander of the 77th Infantry Division, manned by draftees from the New York area, claimed that 43 languages and dialects were used in his unit.
7 These included the 99th Infantry Battalion, which was all Norwegian-American and was trained for an invasion of German-occupied Norway.
Given the ethnic diversity upon which the nation was built, ethnic integration of both the citizenry and the military was a fairly facile process. However, integration by race, gender, and sexual orientation was more challenging.

Racial Integration: A Case of American Exceptionalism?
While the history of racial integration of the American citizenry is *sui generis*, contemporary transportation technologies and patterns of immigration are making many societies more racially and ethnically diverse. Many of the patterns of racial integration of the American military parallel those of ethnic, gender, and sexual orientation integration, which have been observed in other nations as well. Therefore, we feel that the American experience is useful for comparative purposes.

At the birth of the American republic, African-Americans were initially excluded from the military. Occupational closure tends to be reversed in the face of market needs and, after initial resistance, George Washington recruited African-Americans into the Continental Army. They fought in almost every engagement and contributed to the colonists’ victory. However, at the end of the war closure was imposed again on them. Congress prevented African-Americans from joining state militias in 1792, and the Navy prohibited their enlistment in 1798.

Almost a century later, President Lincoln, like Washington, initially did not want African-Americans in the Union Army. He feared that this would drive the Border States into the Confederacy. However, when it became clear that the war to preserve the union was to be a long one, he accepted the enlistment of African-American soldiers. Nearly 200,000 soldiers served in 163 “colored” federal regiments and two state regiments. Few were in the mixed race units, though the African-American units had Caucasian officers, reflecting the restriction of African-Americans from acquiring leadership positions. African-Americans participated in 449 engagements and experienced extremely high combat casualty rates: 35 percent greater than other troops (Foner, 1974). Unlike the Revolution, African-Americans were allowed to continue to enlist after the war and four segregated combat units were established. African-Americans also served in the lowest ranks of the U.S. Navy. From the Civil War through the first half of the twentieth century, the Army segregated and minimized the service of African-Americans, who challenged the traditional European background of the force.

The Army remained segregated and during World War I, African-Americans were largely used in non-combat roles. African Americans constituted about 10 percent of the American population at that time, one-eighth of the armed forces, one-third of the military manual labor force, however, only one-thirtieth of the combat strength (Franklin, 1948).

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8 These were the 9th and 10th Cavaliies (the Buffalo Soldiers) and the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments.
As it was seen in earlier wars, there was reluctance to allowing African-Americans to serve in World War II; however, manpower shortages led President Roosevelt to issue an Executive Order to the military services in 1943 to enlist African-American soldiers through military conscription. More than one million African-American men and women served, most in menial jobs. However, African-American service personnel did distinguish themselves in branches other than the infantry. Late in the war, under the pressure of Caucasian manpower shortages, African-American volunteers were sought to form platoons that would be included into the Caucasian infantry companies. African-American soldiers expected that after the war they would remain in their new divisions; however, the army reverted back to segregation.

During World War II, African-American women also served in the Army—in segregated units and with many discriminatory practices. African-American nurses could only treat men of their own race and prisoners of war. One Women’s Army Corps all-African-American unit served overseas in a postal unit, doing the important job of delivering soldiers’ back-logged mail from home (Moore, 1996).

Survey research by social scientists came of age during World War II (Ryan, 2013). Early World War II surveys found that there was general resistance among Caucasian soldiers to the idea of serving with African-American soldiers; this was used by the army as an argument for closure on the basis of social cohesion and against racial integration. However, the major exploration of the impact of diversity and relations among soldiers in World War II surveys is found in the analysis of the early experience in racial integration in the army noted earlier, when African-American platoons were placed in Caucasian companies because of shortages of Caucasian replacements. Over 80 percent of the Caucasian soldiers surveyed by Samuel Stouffer and his research team felt that African-American and Caucasian soldiers “should be in separate units” (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949, p. 578). However, Caucasian soldiers who had more contact with African-American soldiers were less opposed to integration than those who had less contact with them. These findings served as one of the bases of Gordon Allport’s (1954) post-war “contact hypothesis” and this stated that interaction would reduce prejudice under certain conditions. The World War II research anticipated Bogart’s (1969) research on racial integration during the Korean War, which showed that integrated units were perceived to perform better than segregated units.

Racial integration began in earnest during the Korean War in 1950. The Far East Command found that it had African-American replacements for whom there were no positions in the segregated units, while there were personnel shortages in other units for which Caucasian replacements were not available. The command sought and received permission to assign African-American replacements to Caucasian units. The Army anticipated that after the war it would re-segregate, as it had after World War II.
Bogart’s surveys showed that the preference for segregated units was more than 10 percent lower among Caucasian infantry soldiers serving in all-Caucasian units than it has been in World War II and almost 20 percent lower among those serving in racially integrated units. By this time, leadership attitudes had changed. The results made re-segregation of the Army impossible after the war.

**Gender: The (Almost) Universal Exclusion**

Most modern societies have excluded women from their armed forces or minimized their roles, particularly in combat. Sometimes, the exclusion was merely a legal fiction. Germany conscripted women in World War II, put them in uniform and under military command, but they defined them as civilians. The United States also had women in uniform, subjected to military discipline, but they defined some—such as those who ferried aircraft as Women’s Airforce Service Pilots—as civilians. However, as with race, women have participated in every American war, although permanent military roles for women were not legally recognized until 1948 (Sandhoff & Segal, 2013). Women disguised as men fought in the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War. Some women openly took on combat duties as replacements for their wounded or slain husbands, while other women served in noncombat positions as nurses and spies and performed support roles such as cooking and laundry, albeit as civilians, not soldiers.

Women were first allowed official roles in the U.S. military as nurses in the Civil War and later in the Spanish-American War. In 1901, based on these experiences, the Congress formed the Army Nurse Corps, providing a model for incorporating the labor of women into wartime military activity. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps established women’s units in 1917 and 1918, respectively. These uniformed women were granted military status and were assigned to jobs that they normally held in civilian society, such as telephone operator and clerk; however, some were stationed overseas. As these units were created to meet specific personnel needs, they were temporary and the women were demobilized after the war.

A major shift occurred in the nature of women’s military participation during World War II. Not only did women serve in large numbers but their roles expanded. Congress created separate (segregated) women’s branches with their original designations implying their intended temporary nature (e.g., Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps [WAAC], later changed to Women’s Army Corps [WAC] and the Navy’s Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service [WAVES]). Although women were mainly assigned to traditionally women’s jobs such as health care and communications, some served in almost all specialties excluding direct combat.

The opening of military roles to American women has been a gradual process, opposed at every stage by people who argued that women’s presence in the military
would interfere with effectiveness, especially since their integration would degrade unit cohesion. The common wisdom was that units with higher cohesion would be more effective, especially in combat. However, recent research evidence has challenged these assumptions. Indeed, much of the recent research on cohesion and performance has been driven by gender integration. The accumulated evidence shows that there is sometimes a relationship between cohesion and group effectiveness; however, there are three very important qualifiers to this relationship. First, the direction of causality is not established. Some evidence indicates that causality works in the opposite direction to what is usually assumed—that is, it is group success that produces cohesion.

Second, the evidence for a relationship between cohesion and group performance shows that task cohesion, not social cohesion, is related to success (Mullen & Copper, 1994). Indeed, high social cohesion sometimes negatively affects performance (Winslow, 1999). Task cohesion is the extent to which group members are able to work together to accomplish shared goals. It includes the members’ respect for the abilities of their fellow group members. For combat situations, it translates into group members trusting each other, including having confidence that the group can do its job and thereby protect its members from harm. Task cohesion can be horizontal or vertical. The latter is the unit members’ respect for, and confidence in, their leaders’ competence. Social cohesion is a more affective dimension and includes the degree to which members like each other as individuals and want to spend time with them off-duty.

Third, there is evidence that vertical cohesion (i.e., effective leadership) affects both horizontal cohesion and performance. Groups in which members have confidence that their leaders are competent and care about what happens to them are more likely to be successful in various ways. Good leaders, by definition, organize task activities within the unit in ways that foster task effectiveness, respect, and caring among group members. Thus, even if performance is enhanced by cohesion (and the evidence is not clear on this), it is likely to be task cohesion, not social cohesion, that provides positive effects. There is no research evidence showing that gender-integrated units have lower task cohesion.

In 1948, the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act officially created a permanent place for women in the U.S. military, though women’s roles were highly constrained. Women could constitute no more than two percent of the force, they could not be permanently promoted above the rank of lieutenant colonel/commander, and were barred from service aboard Navy vessels (with the exception of hospital ships and transports) and from service in aircraft on combat missions (with exceptions for some non-combat professionals).

In 1967, Congress modified the laws concerning women’s military service. The two percent ceiling was removed, and limits on women’s promotion were lifted. Limits
on women’s career opportunities remained, as did a policy of automatic discharge for pregnancy; husbands of service women were required to demonstrate dependency to receive family benefits automatically granted to wives of servicemen. This inequality was judicially struck down in 1972.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, gender roles and norms in American civilian society were undergoing dramatic transformation; these shifts set the stage for even more changes in women’s military roles as the military underwent structural change in the 1970s. Abolition of the U.S. draft in 1973 led to sharp increases in women’s military involvement.

Facing personnel shortfalls with the end of conscription, the military abolished segregated women’s branches such as the WAC and opened new occupations to women. Women became (non-combat) aviators in all services and in 1976 the Congress opened the service academies to women. In 1978, following judicial intervention, women were allowed permanent assignment to noncombatant ships, and the Navy instituted the Women in Ships program, which opened up additional positions for women.

Between 1971 and 1981, women’s share of the force jumped from 1.6 percent to 8.9 percent. In 2011, women comprised 14.5 percent of the U.S. military, 7.3 percent of general/flag officers, and 10.9 percent of the senior enlisted force. In the 1990s, following military women’s participation and performance in the first Persian Gulf War, Congressional legislation opened combat aircraft and combat ships to women. Women remained between 10 and 15 percent of military personnel throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.

However, although legislation has granted equal employment rights to civilian men and women, the armed forces remained the only employer in America that could legally discriminate in job assignment on the basis of gender. In 2011, U.S. military policy allowed women to serve in all positions except enlisted submarine jobs and—as gender integration was assumed to undermine cohesion and effectiveness in combat units—offensive ground combat units below the brigade level. Almost 80 percent of active component positions were open to women, though with substantial variation by branch. The Air Force was the most accessible, with 99 percent of positions open to women and women comprising 19 percent of the force. However, the Marine Corps was the least accessible, owing to its emphasis on ground combat and its reliance on the Navy for support services, to which women gravitate. Only 68 percent of positions in the Marines were open to women, and women comprised only 7 percent of the Marine Corps. On February 9, 2012, the Department of Defense announced changes in assignment policy that would open over 14,000 additional positions to women, increasing the positions open to women to 81 percent.
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan made it clear that formal restrictions on women’s service do not always match the realities of service in a war zone. Unlike conventional wars, these engagements witnessed no clear distinction between rear and forward positions in the battle space. Women in combat support jobs were routinely exposed to risk. For example, many deaths and severe wounds of service members resulted from improvised explosive devices planted on or near the roads. Women often served as truck drivers and were passengers in vehicles traveling on dangerous roads.

Additionally, a mission dedicated to “winning the hearts and minds” of the local people requires cultural sensitivity to indigenous gender norms and that women soldiers be available to interact with (and sometimes search) local women. Of necessity, military women served on missions with combat units. Despite the policy prohibiting women from being “assigned to” combat units, the practice developed of servicewomen being “attached to” combat units. Outspoken civilian opponents of military women’s expanded roles seized this opportunity to expose what they saw as a violation of policy and thereby further exclude women from support roles in the combat theater. The outcome of the policy reevaluation, however, went in the other direction: the military ground services recognized the essential functions of women in these situations and established new jobs.

The new positions in the war zone included the Female Engagement Teams in the Army and the Marine Corps (the latter beginning with the “Lioness” units of women Marines). These teams of specially trained women soldiers and Marines accompanied combat units (including Army National Guard units) and worked with Afghan women, serving various functions. U.S. military women met with the local women to discuss many topics, including issues of women’s rights, education, security, health care, and violence against women. These women’s units were important sources of information about the local population, and their work led to medical and social service delivery to respond to unmet needs. Their presence contributed to the ability of the unit to perform its mission. The creation and use of women’s units called “Cultural Support Teams” in the army places them in “special operations” and co-located them with male Special Operations Forces. The reality of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a driving force in the creation of these women’s units and the evolution of policy regarding women serving with ground combat units.

It appears that American civilians have been ready not only for American women to be in these kinds of military roles but also for them to be a part of direct combat units. A definitive 73 percent of respondents to a 2011 Washington Post public opinion poll supported giving women direct combat roles, an astounding figure that may be attributed to media coverage of the situations and successful performance of U.S. military women in the recent combat theaters (O’Keefe & Cohen, 2011). These developments show that the needs of military missions drive changes in women’s military roles.
In their various roles, military women have been exposed to combat, even though officially barred from being assigned to offensive combat positions. Women’s combat exposure has increased since the 1990s due to changes in military policy and the nature and length of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While about 7 percent of pre-1990 women veterans reported combat exposure, for post-1990 women veterans this has risen to 24 percent (Patten & Parker, 2011). Combat not only brings forth the threat of physical injury or death but also stress and trauma, which can take a mental and emotional toll on service members. As women’s military roles change, the effects of combat-related trauma, and possible gender differences in coping with trauma, become increasingly relevant. Overall, women are more likely than men to experience post-traumatic stress following military experiences. While both men and women can be victims of sexual assault in the military, women are much more likely to be assaulted (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2013). There are serious and long-term negative effects on the well-being of military women who are victims of military sexual trauma, including physical, mental, and behavioral.

In January 2013, the Department of Defense officially rescinded the direct combat exclusion policy that had been in place since 1994. The process of integrating women is to follow “guiding principles developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” including “preserving unit readiness” and “validating occupational performance standards, both physical and mental, for all occupational specialties, specifically those that remain closed to women.” For those “specialties open to women, the occupational performance standards must be gender-neutral” (Department of Defense, 2013). Although some branches might request that certain positions remain closed to women, such closures would be regarded as exceptions to policy and require the personal approval of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and must be based on empirical data. This process was completed on January 1, 2016.

The U.S. armed forces have been conducting studies and moving towards integrating women into previously closed specialties and units. Some Army positions that were closed to women because they were located in closed units have already opened to those in the specific specialties. Moreover, some of the services are using scientific task analyses on combat jobs (focusing on the physical demands of each job) and testing male incumbents to see if the standards are valid. They are also testing women service members (often after some special training) to see how many can meet the requirements and to measure the physiological effects (Cone, 2013, pp. 29–32).

Despite some resistance in specific components of the armed forces, all combat specialties and positions are being opened to women, although only a minority of military women are likely to opt for such jobs. The services have been ordered to develop implementation plans for this process.
Gender integration has been a more recent ongoing process than racial integration in the American military. However, there have been periods of notable policy change, including the recent move to allow women to be assigned to ground combat units.

Recent data from large surveys conducted by the Army showed that those soldiers who have worked with women soldiers are more positive toward allowing women to serve in the ground combat positions that were previously closed to them (Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, 2013). Some of these soldiers are in offensive ground combat jobs that are closed to women, but have still worked with them as have many of the soldiers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. This shows that getting to know women soldiers, as well as seeing them perform effectively in a combat theater (task cohesion), has led to more positive attitudes toward them being allowed to serve in their specialties. While we do not know the extent to which the conditions of their service meet those of the contact hypothesis, these results do lead to confidence that gender integration in the newly opening positions—under the right conditions—will be successful. Optimum conditions include those specified in the contact hypothesis, as well as others identified in recent surveys of both male and female soldiers and analysis by social scientists: support from leaders, leadership emphasis on discipline and respect, acceptance and respect from male peers, scientifically valid and gender-neutral standards, and adequate specialty training of men and women. It will also be advantageous to have some women with a higher status (such as military rank) than most of the men in the units.

While the U.S. has led the way in women’s participation in the military by incorporating large numbers of women and increasing the percentage representation of women in its armed forces, other nations have opened combat specialties to women before the U.S. The U.S. military has gradually opened positions to women over time, while some nations have made more sudden changes (M. Segal, 1995). In some cases (such as Belgium and Germany), the policies went from almost complete exclusion to opening all roles to women (Sandhoff, Segal, & Segal, 2010). However, the actual representation of women has increased gradually. In the U.S., the opening of Navy ships to women was gradual, beginning with hospital ships and transports, later adding temporary duty on other non-combat vessels, with the last step being combat ships (and with some policy arguments remaining the same and others changing over time) (Iskra, 2007). However, the United Kingdom’s policy opened all classes of ships at the same time, deciding that all ships are combat ships (due to the high casualty rates on supposedly non-combat ships in the Falklands/Malvinas War) (Dandeker & Segal, 1996).

**Sexual Orientation: The Latest Iteration**

The American military has historically regarded sodomy as a military offense, with a focus on homosexual behavior rather than gay identity (Berube, 1990). As military screening became more medically-oriented during World War II, the military adopted...
the then-current psychiatric definition of homosexuality as a pathology and a basis for exclusion from service. However, as was the case with race and gender, when personnel needs were not being met through the induction of young heterosexual Caucasian males, screening was relaxed, closure was reversed, and many gay men and lesbians were allowed to enlist and serve. There was no evidence that cohesion and performance were negatively affected. However, after the war, closure was reestablished, homosexual personnel were discharged, and acknowledgement of homosexuality was a bar to service in the 1950s and 1960s, although homosexual men and women did continue to enter the services. In 1982, the military attempted to impose a standard policy across service branches that made “homosexuality… incompatible with military service,” and defined homosexuality in terms of homosexual conduct or verbally demonstrating propensity to engage in such conduct.

During the decade of the 1980s, approximately 17,000 personnel were involuntarily discharged for homosexuality. Interestingly, while most of the concerns voiced addressed impacts of cohesion on ground combat units, those discharged were disproportionately Caucasian women (20 percent of those discharged), who could not serve in such units, and Navy personnel (51 percent of those discharged) (DeAngelis, Sandhoff, Bonner, & Segal, 2013). In the early 1990s, President Bill Clinton attempted to lift the ban on gays serving openly; however, the military services and the Department of Defense resisted the change. The Clinton Administration and the Congress suggested a compromise position: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue (DADT). This policy distinguished sexual orientation from propensity to engage in homosexual acts, eliminated questions about sexual orientation from enlistment screening, permitted military personnel to associate with gay people, and provided military commanders with discretion in separating gay men and lesbians from military service.

Hearings in the U.S. Senate largely dealt with the role of unit cohesion in combat effectiveness (Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, 1993, pp. 248–349), and with the experience of allied military forces (Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, 1993, pp. 349–453). There was some discussion of the parallel between the historical exclusion of African-American soldiers from Caucasian units and the exclusion of openly gay soldiers (Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, 1993, pp. 403–404), although subsequent experience did not show racial integration to undermine effectiveness. The Secretary of Defense, accompanied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to the Senate committee in favor of DADT (Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 1993, pp. 700–705).

With the passage of DADT, the number of discharges for homosexuality increased from 1994 (the year after passage of DADT) to 2001 (the beginning of the Global War on
Terror). 1,273 service members were discharged in 2001; it was the most DADT-related separations since the codification of DADT in 1994. However, during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, manpower needs increased, closure was reversed, and the number of gay individuals discharged from the military dropped to 906; in the following year, the number dropped to 787 (De Angelis et al., 2013). In an interesting example of intersectionality of characteristics, although the debates about gays in the military focused on men, women were discharged under DADT at higher rates than men.

During his first presidential campaign, Barack Obama advocated for the repeal of DADT, as Bill Clinton had done eight years earlier. On January 27, 2010, in his first State of the Union address, he announced that he would work with the Congress and military to achieve repeal. In contrast to the position taken by the Defense Department and the military in 1993, in April 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that they fully supported the Obama administration’s decision to work with Congress to repeal DADT. Admiral Mullen went further stating that it was his personal opinion that “allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly would be the right thing to do” (Korb, Duggan, & Conley, 2010). They indicated that they would undertake a high-level comprehensive review of the issue.

Six days after the State of the Union address, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen announced that the review would be led by Jeh Johnson, the DOD General Counsel, and General Carter Ham, the Commander of the U.S. Army in Europe. The most important missions of the review were to assess the impact of repeal on readiness, effectiveness, cohesion, recruitment, retention, and family readiness, and to develop recommendations of how to implement repeal if that were to be the policy outcome. Among the mechanisms of information collection was a survey of service members, to be discussed below (Lee, 2014). The review panel also called upon social scientists both within and outside the defense establishment to determine what research knowledge existed. One of the major questions was what the impact of sexual orientation integration had been on factors such as cohesion in allied military forces that had already been through the process. The major finding was a lack of impact (D. Segal, 2010).

The political views and public opinion for full acceptance of gay men and lesbians in the military were certainly different in 2010 from what they had been in 1993. In the years leading up to repeal, several members of Congress expressed interest in amending or repealing DADT, as did some military officials. Equally different in 2010 were the contextual conditions in which the military—and specifically the Army—existed. The Army had been at war since 2001, where front and rear area fights were blurred. Combat arms and combat support troops were often engaged in the same type
of combat environment. Arguably, this combat environment fostered a greater degree of respect and acceptance among troops regardless of race, gender, or sexuality.

Since 2002, there had been a sharp decline in discharges for sexual orientation violations. Analysts and activists have cited three alternative explanations for the current trend (Rostker et al., 1993). First, some have argued that commanders are becoming increasingly accepting of gay men and lesbians, having served alongside known gay men and lesbians in the U.S. and foreign militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as from other departments of the U.S. government. Second, some have said that commanders did not have the time and resources to implement and enforce DADT during wartime. Under this explanation, commanders at war have high-priority requirements and are deciding not to deal with administrative matters. Finally, some have argued that commanders are reluctant to give up otherwise qualified soldiers during wartime as gay soldiers had demonstrated their ability to contribute to the task at hand. In 2005, the Congress had asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study the extent to which the policy had resulted in the separation of service members with critical occupations and important foreign language skills. This reflected the growing concern over mission-critical service members being discharged under DADT.

Views toward gay people serving openly in the military have been split in American society, and the military has been less supportive than the civilian population. Polls conducted during the 1990s (before 9/11/2001) showed that civilians’ attitudes were evenly split on whether or not gay people should be allowed to serve. Miller and Williams (2001), analyzing survey data from the late 1990s, found that by the end of the decade, public opinion was leaning toward tolerance: more than half of civilian respondents agreed that gay soldiers should be allowed to serve openly. After 9/11/2001, public opinion shifted further away from closure, with over 80 percent of civilians feeling that gay men and women should be allowed to serve, and over 70 percent feeling that they should be able to serve openly (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). A 2010 Washington Post poll revealed that 75 percent of Americans supported openly gay people serving in the U.S. military. The same poll found that majorities across party lines favored repeal, with support among Democrats (82 percent) and independents (77 percent) higher than among Republicans (64 percent).

Although the Army led American society in the direction of racial integration in the 1950s (Moskos & Butler, 1996), this was not the case with gay people in the military. Almost three-quarters of military officers surveyed in the late 1990s felt that they should not be allowed to serve openly. More than a quarter of military officers said they would leave service if gay men and lesbians were allowed to serve openly, and two-thirds said they would feel more confident with a straight commander than a gay commander.
The Pentagon’s 2010 Comprehensive Working Group did not survey service members on whether they felt that DADT should be repealed. However, the panel did survey over 115,000 personnel to assess the anticipated impact of repeal of the policy, if it occurred, on readiness, effectiveness, cohesion, recruiting, and retention. Building on current trends in cohesion research, the survey distinguished between social cohesion and task cohesion. With regard to task cohesion, 70 percent of respondents said that the effect on their immediate work group of having a unit member who was gay would be very positive, positive, mixed, or no effect. The responses were similar when service members were asked about the effect on the ability of their unit to get the job done. Moreover, similar results appeared when the focus was on social cohesion: for example, on how service members in the unit would really care about each other.

Questions regarding the impact of repeal on unit effectiveness varied by deployment experience after 9/11/2001, and this created a natural field experiment. When personnel who had not been deployed to a combat environment after 9/11/2001 were asked how repeal would affect their unit’s effectiveness at completing its mission on a day-to-day basis, almost 80 percent said it would have a positive, mixed, or no effect (20 percent were negative or had no opinion). However, when service members who had been deployed to a combat environment were asked how repeal would affect their units’ effectiveness in a field environment or at sea, almost 45 percent gave negative responses. However, when specifically asked about the effect of repeal when a crisis or negative event happens that affects the unit, or when the unit is in an intense combat situation, negative responses dropped to 30 percent.

Only 16 percent of the Army sample anticipated that serving with an openly gay/lesbian service member would negatively/very negatively impact their own job performance. This group was disproportionately in combat arms (42 percent), male (95 percent), and NCOs (62 percent in E4 to E6 pay grades). Within this demographic, 76 percent with no post-9/11 deployments anticipated a negative impact on unit effectiveness, while 89 percent of those with post-9/11 deployments anticipated a negative impact on unit effectiveness.

The Department of Defense did not conduct a post-repeal survey. However, a team of nine scholars—including several who advised the Comprehensive Working Group, and faculty members from West Point, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, and the Marine Corps War College—assessed the impact of repeal one year after DADT was lifted. The assessment involved interviews (including with flag officers who had signed a March 2009 letter opposing repeal), surveys (including a before repeal/after repeal quasi-experiment), and observations of military units. Although the design did not allow for analysis of the relationships among deployment, cohesion,
and effectiveness, it did cast a broad net to capture what had happened after repeal. Given the tens of thousands of personnel who had been deployed during that year, it is not likely that major impacts would have gone unreported.

The major finding of the assessment was that repeal of DADT was a non-event. It had no overall effect on military readiness, or its supposedly related dimensions, including cohesion. The pre- and post-repeal survey showed no change in readiness. Those units that had openly gay members serving after repeal showed no decline in cohesion. The negative effects on recruiting, retention, and morale that had been anticipated by some opponents of repeal did not occur. Indeed, the interviews pointed to positive effects of repeal on interpersonal relations within units. For example, a Marine sergeant said “it has been a lot better since we now know with whom we serve…we get along better and we accept our unit members as they are…” Additionally, an army sergeant said that allowing people to be who they are strengthened relationships between straight and gay troops (Belkin et al., 2014, p. 349). All of the factors that allowed for the successful integration of women and African-Americans in the past were at work with the successful repeal of DADT. This result is consistent with what has been found in other Western industrial democratic nations that have lifted restrictions on openly gay service members.

Conclusion

Analysis of the roles over time and across nations of women in the military has revealed that there are enabling and driving social forces that affect these roles (Sandhoff et al., 2010). Enabling forces steadily facilitate the participation of women in the military over time and act fairly consistently across cases, while driving forces are case-specific and dramatically affect women’s participation in the short-term. Many of these forces apply to the participation of other groups in the military. Enabling factors include the general direction of social change (including wider social participation of various groups and social norms of acceptance in the wider society of the groups) and general trends in the security situation and missions of the military. Driving forces include the political climate (including legislation and judicial rulings), the end of conscription, and other reasons (such as war) for manpower needs.

Social change is not linear: the processes of closure and representativeness can be seen as a pendulum, with closure against non-traditional sources of military personnel being periodically imposed and justified on the basis of social cohesion. This happens particularly during times of peace. It is then likely to be reversed under the manpower demands of war, and sometimes re-imposed in the post-war period. However, the conflict periods give the newly incorporated groups an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to make a contribution to mission fulfillment. Task cohesion, over time, displaces social cohesion in the quest for effectiveness and leads to greater acceptance.
Opposition to increased inclusion of formerly excluded or limited groups can still be expected. Today, outstanding issues in the United States still include transgendered people, who do serve (Parco, Levy, & Spears, 2015) but were not admitted to open service by the repeal of DADT. Their condition is still medically defined as a pathology (Elders, Brown, Coleman, Kolditz, & Steinman, 2015), although other nations have accommodated them (Okross & Scott, 2015). Also excluded from service are people with physical disabilities (many of whom could make contributions to national security) and immigrants who are currently not eligible for employment in the United States.

However, unlike the past, when opening of the ranks was sometimes temporary, we can now anticipate that once change has become a fait accompli, norms of military professionalism will dominate. The military professional will not only obey and implement all legal, moral, and ethical orders, but will make that order his/her own. It is this internalization of the order that ultimately impacts the culture and an acceptance of the change. Moreover, as was the case with racial integration during the mid-twentieth century and with the conversion to an all-volunteer military after the Vietnam War, opposition to policy change is likely to evolve to acceptance once the new policy is in fact in place.

Thus, we are not surprised by the acceptance of openly gay men and lesbians in the American armed forces. We foresee greater gender integration, with some women entering the newly opened ground combat arms, and gradually increasing numbers of women choosing these roles. The process of opening more jobs to women will also be gradual: the first Army units to be gender-integrated are those whose specialties have had women in them, but from which women were barred due to the “collocation” prohibition that now has been repealed. Now that gender integration is policy, few exceptions to policy are likely to be granted to the services; although there will be some specialties for which most women and men will not qualify due to their physical requirements.

Most nations have used the experiences of other nations in developing policies on exclusion and inclusion of diverse groups. While cultural and social variables play major roles in policy and practice, the processes of successful integration in different countries are likely to be similar. Some aspects of human behavior transcend the cultural context and it is likely that cross-national comparisons will reveal similarities. Such has been the case with other analyses of issues in military sociology, such as military family issues, including deployment effects on families (Moelker, Andres, Bowen, & Manigart, 2015). We hope that this paper will encourage such cross-national research.
References


