@article{article_1721053, title={Facts and Comments}, journal={Review of Armenian Studies}, pages={13–74}, year={2025}, author={Kılıç, Alev}, keywords={Pashinyan, Mirzoyan, Papikian, Karekin II, Putin, Lavrov, Dashnaktsutyun (ARF), Diaspora, Erdogan, Fidan}, abstract={This article covers the period of November2024-June 2025 of the internal developments in Armenia, the foreign dynamics shaping its international relations, the ongoing process of signing the peace agreement with Azerbaijan and the bilateral relations of Türkiye and Armenia in the light of the process of normalization of their relations.
The Armenian government has passed through a turbulent period. Internally, the preparations for changing the constitution, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement that the international recognition of the “Armenian Genocide” is not a priority for the government as well as the fact that he questioned, even challenged the “genocide” discourse was heavily criticized by the small but vociferous opposition as treason to the country. In fact, the opposition’s criticisms reached to such an extent that they denied the legitimacy of the government. The church also got actively involved in the campaign against the government. On the other hand, official words were not put into deeds as no concrete steps were taken to overcome the two major impediments to concluding the planned peace agreement with Azerbaijan: the changing of the constitution and the Zangezur corridor.
The two parties, Armenia and Azerbaijan, announced the conclusion of the final draft text of the peace agreement, meaning the text was ready for signing, which drew international acclaim as a positive development with the expectation that it would be signed and ratified shortly. However, it has been acknowledged that the signing will have to wait until the expressed impediments are overcome.
Developments have emerged in foreign policy where prudence and caution were needed for sustaining the policies of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds as well as trying to sit on two chairs faced challenges. The proclamation of a balanced and balancing foreign policy provided the justification of siding with the West, the EU, and the US, leading to the application for membership in the EU and signing of a strategic partnership agreement with the US. However, it soon transpired that relations with Russia should not be underestimated in view of the new US administration’s approach to Russia, as well as the surfacing fragility of the EU. Hence, Pashinyan yielded to the necessity of attending the Victory Day parade in Moscow despite the disapproval of the West. Shortly after, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs’s welcome in Yerevan revealed the deep ties between the two states.
Relations with Türkiye have kept their momentum, leading to an active period in bilateral contacts. The sobriety of the commemoration of 24 April caused pessimism and depression particularly in the Diaspora. Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan attended the Antalya Diplomacy Forum accompanied by officials and held a meeting with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan. The Armenian side underlined the need for opening the Türkiye-Armenia border for land and railroad connections and expressed dissatisfaction with linking the bilateral process of normalization with the normalization of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations.
At the Antalya Forum, three participating Foreign Ministers of the South Caucasus countries took part in a trilateral panel discussion, which inspired the initiation of a process of trilateral meetings.}, number={51}, publisher={Terazi Yayıncılık}