@article{article_1785849, title={Does Metaphorizing the Mind Dethrone It?}, journal={Temaşa Erciyes Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü Dergisi}, pages={265–281}, year={2025}, DOI={10.55256/temasa.1785849}, author={Esen, Melinda G.}, keywords={Eliminativism, Fictionalism, Folk Psychology, Mental Fictionalism, Metaphor, Mind}, abstract={This article contributes to ongoing debates in the philosophy of mind concerning the ontological status of mental states by examining mental fictionalism. Within a pragmatic and naturalist framework, mental fictionalism reconsiders the tension between the Cartesian legacy, which treats mental states as metaphysically and ontologically serious entities, and strict behaviorism, which entirely neglects this inner dimension. Drawing on the work of analytic philosophers such as Sellars, Ryle, and Quine, mental fictionalism suspends commitment to the ontological status of mental states. Instead, it legitimizes the functional role of folk psychology. On this account, mental states are grounded not in inner representations but in patterns of behavioral regularity and social norms. The article consists of three sections: the first outlines the theoretical framework of mental fictionalism; the second discusses the place of folk psychology within this framework; and the third examines the epistemic and pragmatic implications of these two lines of inquiry. The aim of this paper is not merely to describe mental fictionalism, but to show that metaphorizing the mind may offer a way to reconsider its epistemic and pragmatic function. Within this framework, metaphorizing the mind is understood not as a form of reduction, but as a strategy for preserving the epistemic strength of mental discourse.}, number={24}, publisher={Arslan TOPAKKAYA}