TY  - JOUR
T1  - Converse Tournaments
TT  - Ters Turnuvalar
AU  - Keskin, Kerim
PY  - 2019
DA  - January
Y2  - 2018
DO  - 10.21121/eab.2019148773
JF  - Ege Academic Review
JO  - eab
PB  - Ege University
WT  - DergiPark
SN  - 1303-099X
SP  - 33
EP  - 43
VL  - 19
IS  - 1
LA  - en
AB  - This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis(1998b)’s sequential model of nested multipleprize contests. First, we considerwinning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second, weextend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfectNash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies withthose in the original model.
KW  - Converse tournaments
KW  - Nested multipleprize contests
KW  - Tullock contests
KW  - Endogenous prizes
KW  - Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
N2  - Bu makalede Clark ve Riis (1998b)’in iç içe geçmiş çoködüllüyarışma modelinin dinamik versiyonuna iki alternatif önerilmiştir. İlk olarak,kazananların alacağı ödüllerin sarf edilen yarışma eforları tarafından endojenolarak belirlendiği bir model çalışılmıştır. İkinci olarak, modelgenişletilerek bir sonsuz ufuk modeli elde edilmiştir. Önerilen modellerinalt-oyun mükemmel Nash dengeleri karakterize edilmiş olup, ilgili dengestratejileri temel alınan modeldeki denge stratejileri ile karşılaştırılmıştır.
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UR  - https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.2019148773
L1  - https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/633539
ER  -