@article{article_617779, title={THE PHENOMENAL CONTINUITY CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IS UNWARRANTED IN THE CASE OF FISSION}, journal={FLSF Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi}, pages={85–98}, year={2015}, author={Erdenk, Emre Arda and Williams, Bernard}, keywords={Zihin Felsefesi, Metafizik, Görüngüsel Tözler, Köprü Problemi, Bernard Williams, Kişinin Özdeşliği, Görüngüsel Devamlılık.}, abstract={In this paper, I will concentrate on the phenomenological view concerning the problem of personal identity. My intention is, first, to articulate the phenomenal continuity criterion of personal identity and, second, focus on its ontological claims about the self. I will first argue for the phenomenal continuity thesis, but then I will claim that its metaphysical commitment to the view of phenomenal substances create substantial problems. I will show that in Fission thought experiment, this view falls into the contradictory conclusion that a part is identical to its whole. I will claim that the condition of indirect streamal linkage for the phenomenal substances view makes the whole account unwarranted}, number={19}, publisher={Hamdi BRAVO}