@article{article_653773, title={Subjective Physicalism as a Response to the Knowledge Argument}, journal={MetaZihin: Yapay Zeka ve Zihin Felsefesi Dergisi}, volume={2}, pages={199–211}, year={2019}, url={https://izlik.org/JA49NE23KE}, author={Kıymaz, Tufan}, keywords={subjective physicalism,the knowledge argument,physicality,phenomenal knowledge,consciousness,subjectivity}, abstract={ According to Frank Jackson (1982, 1986), phenomenal knowledge, our first-personal knowledge of subjective experiences, cannot be reduced to objective knowledge that can be expressed in physical/functional terms, and this shows that there are non-physical facts that can only be known from the first-person perspective. This is Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism. In this paper, I first give a brief survey of the standard responses to the knowledge argument in the literature and, next, I critically evaluate a relatively less commonly defended response, namely subjective physicalism. I consider two versions of subjective physicalism, namely inclusive subjective physicalism and exclusive subjective physicalism. The former, as I argue, is not a clear and coherent enough theory to be acceptable, and the latter, as I argue, is not plausible since an intuitively acceptable definition of the physical, which would also allow fundamentally subjective/phenomenal properties to be physical, is yet to be proposed. }, number={2}