Analyzing and Resolving the Cyprus Conflict

Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz[*]
Balıkesir Üniversitesi

Abstract:

This article attempts to analyze the ongoing conflict on Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish ethnic groups from a broader perspective, based on historic facts. It is particularly a critique of the traditional analyses of the conflict that pay more attention to present legal or political problems. The study suggests that the Cyprus conflict is a complex one involving both relational and interest dimensions, most of which are rooted in past traumas, dominating the Greek-Turkish relations at large. Failure to understand this complexity is unlikely to produce a lasting peace. Based on the analysis of the conflict, the study tries to come up with some recommendations for the prospect as well. In this respect, especially many confidence building measures are proposed and discussed in detail.

Keywords: Cyprus Conflict, Cyprus, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Confidence Building.

Öz:

Bu makale, Kıbrıs'ta Türk ve Rum etnik grupları arasında süregiden uyuşmazlığı tarihsel gerçekler temelinde geniş bir perspektiften analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, aynı zamanda, uyuşmazlığı daha çok yasal ve politik açılardan ele alan geleneksel yaklaşımlara bir kritik niteliğindedir. Çalışmada, Kıbrıs'taki uyuşmazlığın hem ilişkisel, hem de çıkar boyutları içeren ve geniş anlamda Türkler ile Yunanlılar arasındaki tarihsel travmalara dayanan kompleks bir sorun olduğuna vurgu yapılmakta ve sorunun bu kompleks yapısının kavranamamasının kalıcı bir çözüm üretemeyeceği belirtilmektedir. Analiz temelinde çalışma, barışa yönelik bir takım önerilere de ulaşmaktadır. Bu bağlamda özellikle güven oluşturucu önlemlerin önemine değinilmekte ve söz konusu önlemler detaylı bir biçimde tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı, Kıbrıs, Kıbrıslı Rumlar, Kıbrıs Türkleri, Güven Tesisi.

[*] Muzaffer Ercan YlLMAZ, Ph.D. Balıkesir Üniversitesi, Bandırma İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi,Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, Bandırma - Balıkesir,
E-posta: muzaffer_ercan@yahoo.com

Introduction

The Mediterranean island of Cyprus, also known as the birthplace of Aphrodite, the goddess of love, ironically turned into a battle ground between the Greek and Turkish ethnic groups for decades. Particularly since the negotiated accession to independence of the Republic in 1960, the history of the island has been a sad and complex sequence of events in which promises have been broken, the lives of families and communities have been under grievous strain, and the various efforts of third-parties to mediate the parties to put Cyprus together again have as yet proved unsuccessful. The conflict is the second longest-lasting in the area of the Middle East after the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it still remains to be resolved.

No matter how difficult it is, the ongoing conflict on Cyprus somehow needs to be resolved. In its over forty-year stalemate, the issue not only weakens the credibility of the international community to deal with intra-state conflicts, which have gradually replaced the Cold War's ideological clashes as the principal sources of current conflicts, but also intensifies the pessimistic belief that two ethnic groups cannot co-exist under a single state. In that sense, Cyprus offers a "laboratory" for the so-called new world order. The new world needs a good exemplar for national building. Cyprus has an opportunity to resolve peacefully and justly what other nations and peoples are warring over or swinging wildly at elsewhere in the world. If it succeeds, it would be the model to which many other nations and peoples will look to guide the resolution of their own conflicts and ethnic tensions. If it fails, and the stalemate continues, then that will be as much a loss to the peoples of a turbulent new world as it will be to the Cypriots. The purpose of this article is to analyze the conflict from a broader perspective, particularly devoting attention to the issue of psychological barriers between the two communities based on historic facts, and try to come up with some recommendations for the prospect. The hope is that the study could somehow contribute to the overall peace process.

The History and Roots of the Conflict

Cyprus lies on the geo-strategic crossroad between Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Thus, historically it was regarded as vital strategic territory for many empires and civilizations. Following the arrival of the first Greek-speaking people, who are estimated to arrive about three

thousand years ago, the island subsequently came under the rule of the Assyrians (707-650), Egyptians (570-546), Persians (546-333), Ptolemies (320s-58), Romans (58 BC-330 AD), and Venetians (1489-1571) (see, Hill, 1948).

Cyprus was captured by the Ottoman Empire in 1570-71. The Ottomans brought in large number of settlers from the mainland to form a Moslem element in the local population. By the end of the seventeenth century, approximately 30,000 Turks settled on Cyprus, and a sizable Turkish community was formed, eventually composing more than 20 percent of the total population (Gazioglu, 1990).

In the beginning of togetherness, there was no sign of overt troubled relations, but differences over ethnic origin, religion, and customs inevitably led to a very low level of communal interaction. Both communities preferred to live in separate quarters in towns and mixed villages, and most villages were either completely Greek or completely Turkish. Also, each community set up its own system of education conducted in its own language. Cypriot children attended these separate schools where they were socialized as members of different groups.

The political system in the Ottoman Empire also encouraged this tendency toward separation. Under the *millet* system, the Greek and Turkish communities were institutionalized as distinct *cemaats* (communities), electing their own judicial and administrative officials, such as *muhtars* (village headmen). This exclusive political socialization over a long period of time contributed to the crystallization of separate ethnic identities and aspirations (Necatigil 1982: 1).

But such separation was mainly reinforced, especially after 1878 when Great Britain began to control Cyprus, by the tendency of both communities to identify themselves with the larger Greek and Turkish nations. This meant that the two communities' perceptions of each other, and their relations with one another, were greatly influenced by the historically adversarial relations between the Greek and Turkish nations. Although not all disputes between the motherland Greeks and Turks were replicated in inter-communal conflict on Cyprus, they, nevertheless, had the impact of perpetuating separate self-views and inhibiting any disposition to Cypriot national identity (see, Michael, Kappler and Gavriel eds. 2009).

The Period of British Rule

In 1878, Britain took administrative control of the island in return for supporting the Ottoman Empire against Russian threats to Turkey's eastern provinces. By the end of the century, some Greek Cypriot elite began to consider for the possibility of the island's union to the Kingdom of Greece, which gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829. However, viewing no reason to relinquish the territory and arguing that Cyprus was formally still a part of the Ottoman Empire, Britain refused the request. A reason to relinquish Cyprus arose in December 1912 and it was pursued until the island, which had been annexed upon the Ottoman Empire's entry into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, was offered to Greece in October 1915. Yet the Greek King rejected the offer (see, Varnava 2009: 265).

After the war, with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the new Turkish Republic formally gave up its right on Cyprus in favor of Britain. Two years later, in 1925, Britain formally declared sovereignty over the island, which became a crown colony. Greek Cypriot elite increased calls for the island to be united with Greece. In 1931, there were violent riots against the British authorities, in large part driven by pro-*enosis* Greek nationalism. This led to the introduction of new laws preventing further political agitation. But this did not end hopes for union. Instead the movement went underground (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 15).

After the Second World War, the Greek Cypriots once again became politically active. The very intensification of the *enosis (union with Greece)* campaign came in the wake of the election of Makarios III as Archbishop in 1950. In that year, the Greek Orthodox Church organized a referendum on union with Greece. The result was amazing as 96% of eligible Greek Cypriots voted for *enosis* (Bahceli 1990: 33). Encouraged by this result, in 1954, Greece's United Nations (UN) representative formally requested that the subject of self-determination pertaining to the people of Cyprus be included on the agenda of the General Assembly. However, the UN General Assembly decided that it did not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus. Thereupon, the Greek Cypriot leaders called for a general strike. Makarios returned from New York, where he attended UN meetings, and founded an underground guerrilla organization, with the acronym EOKA (*Ethnici Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*- National Organization of Cypriot Combatants).

In the mid-1950s, the EOKA started its campaign of violence against the British. Many Greek Cypriots left their jobs in the government and police as well. In response, the colonial authorities were forced to rely more and more on Turkish Cypriots. For example, at a time when all Greek-speaking political parties were banned, the British authorities allowed the Turkish Cypriots to establish a political party called "Cyprus is Turkish" (Mallinson 2009: 23). This contributed to the increasing of accusations against Britain for their usual policy to "divide and rule" in Cyprus as they had done elsewhere. Regardless of whether this was true or not, tension between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots grew further. In December 1956, a set of proposals –the Radcliffe Plan- was presented to the Greek Cypriots. This, basically, granted full internal self-rule to Cyprus, under the authority of a legally elected legislature. However, Britain would keep control of foreign and defense policy, as well as internal security. The proposals were rejected by the Greek Cypriots. Meanwhile, in a statement to the House of Commons, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd said that the Turkish Cypriots have a separate right of self-determination.

At this point, the Turkish Cypriots moved beyond their traditional desire to see continued British rule over the island and instead started to call for partition between Greece and Turkey, namely *taksim*. They argued that since Cyprus was made up of two national groups, each with its distinct language, religion, and national identification, the Turkish community was entitled to exercise the right to self-determination as much as the Greek Cypriot community. At the same time, as a reaction to the EOKA activities, they founded their counter underground organization called *Volkan*, which would later be replaced by *TMT* (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı -* Turkish Resistance Organization).

The increasing violent clashes between the Cypriot communities were leading to growing tensions between Greece and Turkey, the "motherlands". This, in turn, raised the possibility of a war in the Eastern Mediterranean between two NATO allies. In December 1958, Greece, Turkey, and Britain, hence, decided that the best course of action would be to give Cyprus independence. The Cypriot leaders were forced to accept this in early 1959, with agreements signed in Zurich and London. On August 16, 1960, the British rule over the island ended and Cyprus became an independent state, with Makarios, its first president.

The constitutional system of Cyprus, which was designed mainly by outside powers, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, attempted to create a

balance between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In most areas of the government, power was split between the two communities, 70:30 in favor of the Greek Cypriot community, which represented 78 percent of the population. In the security forces, however, the balance was 60:40. As for the political structure of the new state, a presidential system was chosen instead of a parliamentary form of governance. Under this model, the president would always be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president would be Turkish Cypriot. Both had a right of veto over vital legislation. At the same time, Britain, Greece, and Turkey were given constitutional responsibility for ensuring that the sovereignty and independence of the island remained intact. In order to further this, Greece was allowed to station 950 troops and Turkey was allowed 650 on the island (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 12).

"**The Reluctant Republic**"

When Stephen Xydis called the Republic of Cyprus "the reluctant Republic" in his study (Stephen 1973), perhaps he was not wrong. The Republic was born in the midst of inter-communal violence and against the real wishes of the Cypriots. Cyprus was perhaps the only post-colonial country that was "forced" into independence, representing a compromise between the Greek demand for union with Greece and the Turkish counter-demand for partition between the two communities.

Although the birth of the Republic brought about a temporary halt in inter-communal violence, "there were no festivals, no ringing of church bells, no parades, no dancing people in the streets of Cyprus celebrating independence", as it is described by Markides (1977: 25). Particularly the mood of the Greek community was somber, almost depressed. The absence of enthusiasm on the part of the Greek Cypriots was, first of all, the result of the constitutional arrangements. Very few Greek Cypriots, including both supporters and opponents of President Makarios, viewed the constitution as legitimate. The Greeks felt that the "imposed constitution" by foreign powers discriminated against them and it was basically in favor of the Turkish minority. Among the more objectionable features of the constitution were the ratio of parliamentary and governmental representatives assigned to the two communities, and the veto powers of the president and the vice-president. Further, since Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey guaranteed the preservation of the status quo, as the signatories of the agreements, the Greeks complained that the Cypriot parliament was denied the right to amend its own constitution without prior consent from the guarantor powers.

Accordingly, from the very inception of independence, the Greek Cypriots never concealed their unhappiness with the constitutional set up or their readiness to proceed with its amendment in due time.

The practical difficulty from the beginning of independence remained the implementation of the constitution, particularly the 70:30 ratio in the public service, on which the Turkish Cypriots insisted for the necessity of putting into effect immediately, whereas the Greek Cypriots urged a more gradualist approach. Quarrels over the basic taxation, over the establishment of municipalities, and over the insistence of the Turks that the police and the army should constitute ethnically separate organizational units brought the governmental machinery to a virtual standstill. In short, successive constitutional crises eventually spilled over into inter-communal fighting. In early 1963, large-scale violence broke out again and the Cypriot state *de facto* collapsed (see, Sonyel 1997). In November 1963, President Makarios proposed a number of constitutional amendments that, as he argued, these would ease the running of the state. They were as follows:

1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned.
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or in capacity to perform his duties.
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House as it was current.
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
6. Unified municipalities to be established.
7. The administration of Justice to be unified.
8. The division of the security forces into police and gendarmerie to be abolished. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a law.
9. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the public service and the forces of

the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots.

10. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.

11. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.

12. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.

This move was, indeed, part of the Akritas Plan. The Akritas plan was drawn by Polykarpos Yorgadjis, the minister of the interior, who was a close associate of President Makarios. The plan's course of action was primarily to convince the world community on the fact that too many rights had been granted to the Turkish Cypriots and the constitution had to be re-written so as to create a more practicable and efficient government system. The next step of the plan was to cancel international treaties that existed to safeguard the Republic. They wanted to find a way so as to legally dissolve the treaties so as it could then be possible to gain the opportunity for the union with Greece.

Expectedly, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey quickly rejected the proposals. Afterwards, in late December 1963, inter-communal fighting broke out once again. A buffer zone marked by "the green line" was drawn between the opposing groups, and in 1964, UN peacekeeping forces were sent in, most of which still remain there.

The period between 1963 and 1974 can be described as the period of Turkish suffering. The Turkish Cypriots were forced to live enclaves on their own and during that period, they controlled no more than 5 percent of the island's territory, whereas they had owned about 30 percent at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994: 140).

In July 1974, the National Guard of Greek Cypriots, with the support of Greek military regime governing Greece since 1967, staged a successful coup. The common plan was to realize *enosis*. President Makarios fled to London and Nikos Sampson, a former EOKA member, proclaimed himself new President. Fearing of *enosis,* Turkey invaded northern Cyprus and justified its action based on its guarantor-state status (see, Asmussen 2008). The Turkish forces seized about 38 percent of the island's territory, dividing the island into two as well: southern section is Greek, northern section is Turkish.

Cyprus After 1974

Following the Turkish invasion, in April 1974, Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary General, launched a new mission of good offices. Over the following ten months, serious discussions were held regarding a number of humanitarian issues. Yet no progress was made on the substantive political problems, such as territory, refugees, and the nature of the government.

The talks fell apart in February 1976. Once more in January 1977, the UN managed to organize a meeting in Nicosia between the two parties and on February 12, the two leaders, Archbishop Makarios and Rauf R. Denktash, signed a four point agreement confirming that a future Cyprus resolution would be based on a federation consisting of two states and two communities. The central government would be given power to ensure the unity of the state. Other major issues, including freedom of movement and freedom of settlement would be settled through discussion (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 15).

But in spite of the apparent agreement between the two sides on the general nature of a resolution, the negotiations clearly showed that the two sides were an ocean apart on the specifics. The Greek Cypriot side presented proposals on territorial issues that took little notice of the principle of bi-zonality. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots presented ideas on the role and functions of the central government that were more confederal, rather than federal, in nature. The discussions soon came to an end without any result.

In November 1978, in an effort to resolve the Cyprus conflict, the US, the UK, and Canada drafted a twelve-point proposal, which was presented to two sides by the UN Secretary General. In line with the 1977 agreement, the proposal envisaged a federation of two states. One would be predominantly Greek Cypriot and the other mainly Turkish Cypriot. The central government would deal with foreign affairs, external defense, currency and central banking, inter-regional and foreign trade, communications, federal finance, customs, immigration, and civil aviation. Any issue specifically not covered by the government would be the responsibility of the states.

A bi-cameral parliament would be established as well. The upper chamber would consist of equal members of representatives from the two communities. The lower chamber would be proportional to the size of the two communities. The system of a Greek Cypriot president and a

Turkish Cypriot vice-president would be maintained. The number of Greek and Turkish troops on the island would be reduced to 1960 levels; that is, 950 and 650, respectively. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots would re-settle Varosha (Maraş).

Even though this initiative was basically in line with the 1977 agreement, the Greek Cypriots did not accept it. They objected on the ground that the agreement did not enshrine the three fundamental questions that they insisted must be part of any agreement: the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement, and the right to own property anywhere on the island (Mirbagheri 1998: 96-97).

The UN remained undeterred. In May 1979, UN Secretary General Waldheim made a visit to Cyprus, securing a further ten-point set of proposals from the two sides. These proposals not only re-affirmed the 1977 agreement, but also included a number of new provisions, such as de-militarization and a commitment to refrain from de-establishing activities. It was also agreed that the issue of Varosha would be addressed as a matter of priority and that the two sides would deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects of the conflict. Following that, a new round of discussions began in Nicosia. Yet they were short lived. First of all, the Turkish Cypriots did not want to discuss Varosha, a key issue for the Greek Cypriots. That aside, the two sides failed to agree on the concept of "bi-communality". In the end, instead of calling a complete halt to the negotiations, the UN decided to put them on hold (Richmond 1998: 106).

In the following summer, Waldheim tried to resume the process by putting forward a proposal for an interim agreement. The interim agreement included some measures to promote a more positive atmosphere on the island, such as returning Varosha to civilian control, and lifting the economic embargoes placed on the Turkish Cypriots. It also called for the opening of Nicosia International Airport, which, indeed, had been agreed by the two sides before. On August 9, new talks opened under Hugo Gabbi, the Secretary General's special representative. The new talk focused particularly on four areas: increasing levels of confidence between the two sides, the return and re-settlement of Greek Cypriots in Varosha, constitutional matters, and territorial issues.

Yet this time the talks ran into difficulties over the term "bi-zonality". The Turkish Cypriots interpreted this in terms of a confederation, arguing that the two states should have their own sovereignty. The

Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, insisted that sovereignty must rest with the central state, in line with more generally accepted negotiations of a political federal system (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 17).

With the talks ended without any solution, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots made a unilateral declaration of independence as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC). The declaration of independence was condemned by the UN Security Council, declaring that the move represented a setback to efforts to reach a resolution.[1] But Turkey recognized the "TRNC" and in April 1984, full diplomatic ties were established between Turkey and the "TRNC", only exacerbating bilateral tensions on the island further.

Although the illegal declaration of independence naturally harmed the negotiation process between the two sides, the UN continued its efforts to find a solution. In this respect, in early 1984, steps were taken to resume the peace process. In March, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar presented the two sides with a five-point suggestion for confidence building measures. New negotiations began in September. After three rounds of discussions, a blueprint was reached. According to this, Cyprus would become a bi-zonal, bi-communal, non-aligned federation. The Turkish Cypriots would retain 29 per cent for their federal state and all foreign troops would leave the island. In January 1985, the two leaders met for their face-to-face talks since the 1979 agreement. While the general belief was that the meeting was being held to agree a final agreement, Kyprianou insisted that it was a chance for further negotiations. Then the negotiations collapsed and Kyprianou was heavily criticized. Denktash, on the other hand, won a public relations victory. He also made it clear that he was unlikely to make so many concessions again (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 18).

Despite the setback, de Cuellar continued his attempt to broke an agreement. In March 1986, he presented the parties with a "draft framework agreement". Once again, the plan envisaged the creation of an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, and bi-zonal federal state on Cyprus. Yet the Greek Cypriots were unsatisfied with the plan, arguing that the issue of removing Turkish military forces from Cyprus was not addressed, nor was the repatriation of the increasing number of Turkish settlers coming to the island from mainland Turkey after the invasion. The Greek Cypriots also objected on the ground that there were no guarantees to protect the three freedoms.

Afterwards, further efforts to produce an agreement failed as the two sides remained attached to their positions. In the meantime, increasing Greek-Turkish tension in the Aegean Sea reduced hopes for a solution. However, a thaw in relations between Greece and Turkey in early 1988 opened the way for de Cuellar to start a new mediation effort in August that year. At a series of meetings in Geneva, the two leaders agreed to give up the March 1986 Draft Framework Agreement and return to the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements (Richmond 1998: 193).

UN Secretary's *Set of Ideas* in 1989

The talks resumed in August 1988, following the election of George Vassiliou, a moderate political voice, as the new president of the Republic of Cyprus in that year. In June 1989, the UN Secretary General presented a new document to the parties, the "Set of Ideas".[2] Denktash rapidly objected to it, disagreeing with the substance of the proposal. He also argued that the Secretary General had no right to present formal plans to the two communities. Following a failed attempt to open direct negotiations with the Greek Cypriots, the two sides met again in New York in February 1990. Yet the talks were unsuccessful as Denktash demanded that the Greek Cypriots recognize the existence of the two people in Cyprus and their basic right to self-determination. Issues were further complicated in June 1990, when Cyprus officially applied to join the European Community. Furious at the move, Denktash called off all talks with UN officials. Although de Cuellar tried to restart the process, he was unsuccessful as Denktash demanded that the communities should have equal sovereignty and a right to succession.

In January 1992, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali took over as the new UN Secretary General. He continued to work on the *Set of Ideas* and in April 1992, he presented the Security Council with the outline plan for the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation that would prohibit any form of partition, secession or union with another state.

While the Greek Cypriot side accepted this as a basis for negotiation, Denktash refused to engage in substantive discussion on the plan and again criticized the Secretary General for exceeding his authority. Instead, the Turkish Cypriot leaders called for direct negotiations, free from UN involvement. This offer was rejected, however. When Denktash eventually returned to the negotiation table, he complained that the proposals failed to recognize his community. In November, Ghali called a halt to the process. Even though the Turkish Cypriot side

had accepted 91 of 100 of the proposals, Denktash's unwillingness to engage in substantive talks on the remaining nine areas of difference meant that further progress was unachievable. After that, the plan fell by the wayside, as the new Greek Cypriot government, formed under Glafcos Clerides in 1993, also sought to move away from the Set of Ideas (Ker-Lindsay 2009: 19).

The Annan Plan

In the years to come, Denktash became more and more hard line. By the middle of the 1990s, he decided that he would no longer accept a federation as the model for a settlement. He, instead, insisted that any settlement must be based on a loose confederation in which the two states would each be fully sovereign. Yet the parameters of the Cyprus conflict began to change. In 1998, formal accession negotiation started between the EU and Republic of Cyprus. At first, the government of Turkey assumed that there was no chance that the EU would risk provoking a crisis with Turkey. Also Turkey threatened to annex northern Cyprus if the Republic of Cyprus was admitted as an EU member.

Despite Turkey's contrary expectations, however, by 2001, it was clear that the EU was serious about accepting Cyprus as a member. In December 2001, the Turkish Cypriot leader, therefore, proposed the opening of new talks and these started in January 2002. Yet, soon it became clear that the move was basically a delaying tactic aimed at trying to stop the EU from admitting the Republic of Cyprus. However, the EU repeatedly made it clear that it is their wish to see a united Cyprus, but if that was not possible, a divided island would still become a member. This policy might have led to a serious crisis between the EU and Turkey had it not been for a change in Turkish government in November 2002. The hard-line coalition government, supporting Denktash, was replaced by a new administration formed by the *AK* Party, the Justice and Development party.

The new government saw Turkey's EU membership as a national priority. It clearly rejected the notion put forward by other Turkish administrations that Cyprus conflict had been "solved" in 1974 and accepted that the island needed to be re-unified (see, Bahcheli and Noel 2009). Just two weeks after the election in Turkey, the UN presented a comprehensive peace plan for the island, which immediately became

known by the name of the UN Secretary-General who presented it, Kofi Annan.

"The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem", or the Annan Plan, had changed five times and reached its fifth version by the time Annan presented it, at Burgenstock, on 31 March 2004. The first version had been presented to the parties on 11 November 2002. Subsequent versions were made on 10 December 2002, 26 February 2003, and 29 March 2004.

The people of Cyprus were called upon to approve three constitutions, namely the federal constitutions and the constitutions of the two constituent states, 122 federal laws and 1134 international treaties, namely a total of 10,000 pages, out of which only 178 had been translated into Greek and Turkish (Emilianidies 2009: 95).

According to the final version of the plan, the eleven fundamental issues of the Cyprus conflict and their resolutions are as follows:

Political System: United Cyprus Republic comprising of a bi-zonal structure of a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot constituent states. (This was a hybrid between federation and confederation without a specific name). Belgian and Swiss models are used for the external relations of the state and for the internal relations between the central government and the two constituent states, respectively.

Political Power: Weak central power, but strong state power. Extensive power is also given to both states on certain areas (i.e., education, religion, etc.).

Sovereignty: Single shared sovereignty (prohibition of both *enosis* and *taksim*).

Representation: Rotational Presidency and 50:50 ratio in upper house (Senate) to symbolize the bi-communality/nationality; population ratio in lower house (Chamber of Deputies) and the council of ministers (Presidential Council) and in federal institutions.

Guarantorship: 1960 Treaty of Guarantee will remain in force *mutatis mutandis* (to make it compatible with the current realities of the island).

Freedoms: Three different freedoms have to be ascertained.

    i. Freedom of Movement: No restrictions on the freedom of movement.

ii. Freedom of Settlement: Restricted freedom to respect the bi-zonality of the new state. A quota in a moratorium of X years (or until Turkey becomes an EU member).

iii. Freedom of Property: Restricted freedom to respect the bi-zonality of the new state. A quota in a moratorium of X years (or until Turkey becomes an EU member).

Territorial Adjustment: 72:28 ratio.

Military Buildup: A time-table of foreign troop withdrawal in X years or until Turkey becomes an EU member. Lightly armed separate police force for each state and a police force for the federal state.

Displaced Persons and Properties: A complex formula where some of the displaced persons will be settled according to the territorial adjustment and the rest will be either reinstated to their previous property or financially compensated.

Settlers/Immigrants: A fixed number (45,000) of Turkish immigrants/settlers will remain based on a list prepared through certain criteria (marriage, a certain period of employment and/or residency etc.). The rest will have the option to ask for resettlement in mainland Turkey. A similar list (of 45,000 people) is also designed for the Greek Cypriot side.

EU Membership: EU membership after a solution where the arrangements of the overall solution would be incorporated into the *acquis communautaire* (see, Sözen and Özersay 2007: 130).

The Annan Plan was submitted for approval in separate and simultaneous referendum on 24 April 2004 with an intended aim to establish a new state based on above-mentioned points. The Turkish Cypriots approved the plan (64.9 percent said "yes" with an 87 percent turnout) and the Greek Cypriots rejected it (75.8 percent said "no" with an 88 percent turnover). For sure, this result was emotionally shocking for the international community.

Following the rejection of the Annan plan, Mehmet Ali Talat was elected as the new president in the north on 17 April 2005. Talat's administration showed, in general, more willingness to resolve the long-standing conflict. The pro-Annan coalition remained a well-organized group as well, working for a mutually-acceptable resolution.

In this respect, an agreement occurred in 2006 to restart substantive negotiations through the establishment of technical committees dealing with day-to-day issues and working groups designed to prepare proposals

for the leaders on substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem. Yet the initiative remained deadlocked. In spite of regular meetings under United Nations auspices of the Director of the Diplomatic Office of the Cyprus President, Tassos Tzonis, almost no progress could have been achieved on constituting the committees and determining their respective agendas.

In the following years, negotiations intermittently continued between the leaders of both communities and some progress was made, indeed, in terms of narrowing the differences. Yet the parties were unable to reach a resolution (see, Cowell 2010).

On 18 April 2010, hard-liner Dervish Eroğlu of the right-wing National Unity Party (UBP) was elected president of Northern Cyprus. Critics of the newly-elected president feared that he would halt the ongoing peace talks with the Greek Cypriots. However, in his victory speech after the election, Eroğlu gave assurances that he would not be the one to walk away from the negotiating table (*Hürriyet*, 19 April 2010).

Major Issues and Possible Ways of Resolution

Since the Turkish invasion of 1974, the conflict over the issue reunification has revolved mainly around the problems of state structure, displaced persons, territory, and security guarantees. In this regard, the Greek Cypriots basically argue that:

i. The unity of the country should be preserved. Thus, a unitary state structure is preferred. But the Republic would be federally organized, composing of two regions called provinces.

ii. The president should be elected by voters of the Greek Cypriot community and the vice-president by voters of the Turkish Cypriot community. Participation in public services, including the government, should be proportional.

iii. All non-Cypriot military forces should withdraw. The Republic of Cyprus, as a sovereign independent state and member of the UN, can only have security guarantees in accordance with the UN charter. There should be guarantorship and no unilateral intervention right for Turkey.

iv. Displaced persons and the resettlement of Varosha should be considered as priority issues.

v. The three freedoms, freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and freedom of property ownership, should be exercised without any restrictions.

vi. All Turkish settlers coming to the island after the 1974 Turkish military invasion should go back to Turkey.

vii. The island should be demilitarized. There should only be lightly armed police force to maintain order.

The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, argue that:

i. A federation should come about through the expression of the free will of the two equal peoples based on the right to self-determination, to be exercised through separate referenda. If there is going to be a federation, this federation should be bi-communal and bi-zonal, built on the political equality of the two constituent republics representing the Turkish Cypriots in the north and the Greek Cypriots in the south.

ii. The presidency of the federal republic should rotate, and the federal government should contain equal members of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers.

iii. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and of Alliance should be maintained and updated.

iv. The issues of displaced people and the resettlement of Varosha are not urgent problems, since no agreement has yet been achieved on the whole integration.

v. The three freedoms should be exercised in principle. Yet there ought to be certain limitations. For example, as for freedom of movement, there should be restrictions for EOKA terrorists. As for freedom of settlement, bi-zonality should be respected. As for freedom of property ownership, there should be strong restrictions and bi-zonality must be preserved.

vi. All Turkish immigrants should stay in Cyprus.

vii. There should be separate forces of defense and police for each community.

It is believed that some of these major differences, such as those on political equality, residual powers, rotating presidency, and security and guarantees have been narrowed during the inter-communal talks during Talat's administration. Yet the conflict still seems to be far away from resolution.

What Can Be Done in the Short Run?

Three fundamental problems had to be overwhelmed in the short run for the possibility of further positive progresses towards a resolution. First, the Turkish government must stop treating the "TRNC" as an independent state. There can be no Cypriot settlement on the island as long as Turkey maintains that northern Cyprus can have an independent identity as a separate state. The attitude of the mainland Turks -that Turkish Cyprus has been isolated, and hence *de facto* independent, for nearly forty years- is a position the Turkish government must abandon. Although with the *AK* Party government, Turkey has softened its position and encouraged a resolution, it is continuing to recognize "TRNC". This attitude should change.

Second, Turkey must also withdraw its troops from northern Cyprus. While the presence of approximately 30,000 Turkish troops provides the Turkish Cypriots with the guarantee of security, they make the Greek Cypriots feel insecure. The Greeks fear that the Turkish troops would invade the whole island someday. Due to this fear, they implemented an arms-purchasing program in the mid-1990s (see, Kurop 1998, Kollias, 2001). They now have missiles capable of inflicting considerable damage on the Turkish troops and of even hitting targets in southern Turkey. This has resulted in a new potentially lethal spiral in the conflict as the Turks tried to match the Greek purchases by deploying more troops and equipment, and continually updating their existing stocks on the island.

Regarding the security issue, one possible solution would involve a reduced number of Turkish troops with a matching number of Greek troops, a plan that was actually envisaged in the 1992 Vasiliou-Denktash set of agreements. Yet whether Greek-Turkish mixed forces can provide security without any bias, and also without conflicting with each other, is rather uncertain.

A better solution would be increasing the number of UN troops, accompanied by the withdrawal of the Turkish troops. Since its initial deployment, the UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) has been gradually reduced and currently stands at eight hundred sixty troops.[3] This number is not very likely to deter any large-scale Greek or Turkish aggression, particularly given the fact that Cyprus is now an "armed camp".

However, UN officials have repeatedly complained about the financial burden of UNFICYP, which has cost to the organization about

$3 billion since 1964. The chronic nature of the conflict makes most UN members rather reluctant to support UNFICYP. Currently, one-third of UNFICYP's budget is financed by the Government of Cyprus, while the Government of Greece contributes $6.5 million annually. The rest is financed from contributions assessed on the entire membership of the UN.[4] Hence, although an increased number of UN troops would be an ideal alternative to the Turkish military presence in the North, yet it is also uncertain whether UN members are going to support such an idea.

Given these, a more realistic solution to the security issue would involve utilizing NATO troops as peacekeepers. NATO has the strength and credibility to create security, especially now that it is being transformed into more of a peacekeeping organization. NATO troops can replace the 30,000 Turkish troops as the latter is slowly withdrawing. Compared to the UN, NATO would have more incentives to provide security on Cyprus, since both Greece and Turkey are members of this regional organization. It is clear that, any serious friction on the island may have, actually does have, implications to the organization itself. Moreover, NATO forces would be more legitimate, and psychologically more acceptable, in the eyes of the Cypriot communities, for they will inevitably include Greek and Turkish troops. This denotes that they will not be totally "foreign" forces. One may worry about the possibility of biased attitudes of Greek or Turkish troops, but the existence of other national forces will likely to prevent this through providing a "check".

Indeed, once a security solution is reached, the new Cyprus needs no army. The island can be effectively demilitarized. Doing so would contribute to long-term harmony on the island, and enable the new state to develop itself without preparations and expenditures. The two communities would employ a police contingent and the Cypriot state itself a police force. Beyond these lightly armed groups, Cyprus would be able to prosper without major arsenals.

The third fundamental issue that needs to be overcome is that the Greeks must accept that they cannot have the whole island; they must give up something in return for a settlement. There must be some portion of the island where the Turks feel secure and free. As John Burton (1990, 1997) argues, geographic separation is particularly important in situations of ethnic conflicts, as it provides a sense of security for minority groups, allowing the creation of political institutions on a regional basis that would be more sensitive to open cultural expression.

Although the Greek Cypriot governments have long acknowledged the need for a new federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal state structure, along the lines of the Makarios-Denktash (1977) and Kyprionu-Denktash (1979) guidelines, the reason why an agreement has not yet been reached is that the Greek Cypriot definition of a Federal Cyprus is the one where the authority of central government would extend over the whole island. The Greek Cypriots are adamant that a new federal arrangement would not create an exclusive Turkish Cypriot federated state in the North; thus, their emphasis is on the "three freedoms": the freedom of movement, the freedom to own property, and the freedom to settle anywhere on the island.

In contrast, the Turkish Cypriots prefer a federal plan that creates two politically equal and loosely connected states. The Turkish Cypriot plan can be comparable to the French Canadian nationalist idea of "sovereignty association" that has enjoyed considerable support in Quebec. After years of haggling, the gap between the two sides on the nature of a federation has not been substantially narrowed. At present, it seems that so long as the Greek side insists on a strong federal government, the Turks will not likely to sign an agreement, since for them, this would eventually lead to Greek Cypriot domination.

Once the Turkish Cypriots are allowed to have a "space" on their own within a federal Cyprus, the issue of refugees would be solved automatically. Both sides have already agreed that all Cypriots should have the right to settle and own property wherever they want on the island. It is quite unlikely that the Greek Cypriots would choose to reside in a Turkish Cypriot zone of a federal Cyprus, and a similar situation will likely to be the case for the Turkish Cypriots. Yet unless the major difficulty of the nature of a federation is overcome, the Turkish Cypriots tend not to see the problem of refugees as an urgent issue, as opposed to the Greek Cypriots, and will likely to continue their position in this direction.

In order to discuss these three fundamental problems, negotiations must go on between the Cypriot leaders. Besides, an international conference, under the UN's auspices, at which all the four key actors, the Cypriot leaders, as well as Ankara and Athens, to be presented is recommended. As disagreements occur over the issues, "a third-party", says the UN Secretary General, "could intervene and make the efforts continue". The importance of such a conference, if organized, is that all of the actors in the conflict can explicitly express their ideas and discuss

key problems face-to-face, since unilateral efforts excluding the other actors will likely to be subject to misinterpretation, as happened in the past. There is, of course, no guarantee that such an opportunity will be used effectively and produce a settlement, but at least it may mitigate most of the major issues.

What Can Be Done in the Long Run?

Beyond these, a climate of confidence between the two Cypriot communities must be somehow established. This necessity is so absolute that it is rather doubtful whether a solution could be reached in the absence of it. In fact, even those three key problems- the recognition of the "TRNC" by Turkey, the security issue, and the nature of a federation- are closely related to, if not the byproducts of, the issue of deep mistrust. In view of the past experience of hostilities, the Turkish Cypriots demand a formula that will close the door to a repetition of the 1963-74 period and not allow the Greek community to become masters of the island by using their majority in the organs of the federal republic. That is why, in the Turkish Cypriot view, bi-zonality (which should not be diluted by the so-called three freedoms), strong regional governments, rotating presidency, and effective guarantees for security are the basic elements of a possible Cyprus settlement.

For the Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots are the strategic minority in case that the mainland Turks are exempted. Turkey uses the Turkish minority on Cyprus to secure its southern ports. Throughout the Greco-Turkish history, furthermore, the Greeks have been victimized by the Turks so many times and Cyprus is the latest example. Turkey is still governed by its military and that "aggressive power" would invade the whole island someday; therefore, an armament campaign is necessary to deter it. Accordingly, as former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali astutely observed during the summit meetings between the two Cypriot leaders in 1992, "it is difficult to envisage any successful outcome from the negotiation efforts as long as this situation (of deep crisis of confidence) prevails."[5]

Confidence building is, of course, not an easy task. It requires a great deal of time, as well as great efforts from many directions. But under the existing realities on the island, it should be done somehow. In this respect, the followings can be suggested.

i. Transitional Justice: It is beyond doubt that building trust between the hostile communities neccessitates at least some degree of

justice, and justice requires the punishment of the guilty. Thus, though opening up old wounds is always problematical, a starting point would be the establishment of an investigative committee or a truth commission to discover individuals who were responsible for acts of violence in the 1960s and 1970s. Who did what to whom? - just the facts- and where and when? Such a useful record can best be compiled by a variant on truth commission process called a historical clarification commission. It would be a bi-communal exercise, with members being politicians, historians and jurists. Such a commission's task would enable to shift the tragedies of the past and assign appropriate responsibility to governments and related others. The commission's staff would scrutinize the available public evidence and search the non-public records of the Republic of Cyprus and the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The commission would hold public hearings and compel testimony from persons with evidence concerning ethnic cleansing and other incidents.

In addition, a social reconciliation committee would be established. The task of such a committee would not be a revisitation of the historical narratives and events, but rather to focus on the current state, causes, symptoms of inter-communal suspicion, and ways to overcome these. This move would build confidence in two ways. First, the very act of forming such a joint initiative would help build inter-communal social capital on the island, which would, in turn, be critical to achieving reconciliation. Second, by focusing this enterprise on the discussion and identification of solutions to joint and reciprocal suspicions, this measure would help tackle and potentially reduce mistrust (see, Kaymak 2007).

ii. Track-Two Diplomacy: Inter-ethnic friendship on Cyprus can also be developed from the bottom-up and one way to do that would be track-two diplomacy. Joseph Montville (1990: 162) defines track-two diplomacy as "an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations aiming to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict". Indeed, people-to-people meetings and discussions, oftentimes working through problem-solving workshops mediated or facilitated by psychologically sensitive third-parties, may provide an opportunity for the Cypriot parties to examine the root causes of their conflict, to explore possible solutions out of public view, and to identify obstacles to better relationships. What is more, by allowing face-to-face communication, they may help them reduce the dehumanization process, overcome psychological barriers, and focus on

relation building. As a result, reason, rather than emotion, would become the dynamic factor of their interaction. Best of all, any success in informal meetings would spill over into formal ones because those who change their negative images about the other side would push the formal negotiation process with a new perspective, or they may become formal negotiators in later life.

Although track-two diplomacy has many weaknesses (see, Yılmaz 2005: 447-449), if well organized and exercised for a reasonably long time, many positive effects would be seen on Cyprus. Benjamin J. Broome, as a Fulbright scholar from George Mason University, held a series of problem-solving workshops on the island, facilitated by himself, over a nine month-period in 1995-1996 with a bicommunal group of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. He observed that participants addressed peace building efforts during three phases of group work in which they (a) explored the current situation surrounding such efforts, (b) developed a collective vision for the future, and (c) created an integrated set of activities that they would lead over the next two to three years. Broome added that the approach particularly proved itself useful as a way of overcoming what the group members themselves identified as a characteristic of Cypriot culture by both communities) that stands in the way of peace (see, Broom 1997). The Chairman of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, John McDonald, who also organized several problem-solving workshops between Greek and Turkish Cypriot teenagers on Cyprus, as well as in the United States in the late 1990s, similarly told me, during a personal interview, that they made certain progress in terms of creating a climate of confidence between the two sides' younger generations.

iii. Creating "Superordinate" Goals: The idea of creating superordinate goals, the goals that can only be achieved by cooperation between the conflicting groups, to overcome mutual hostility was invented by Muzaffer Sherif in the course of a series of experiments conducted in the 1950s on children who were attending summer schools in the US (Sherif 1967). In their experiments, Sherif and his colleagues divided a group of boys into two groups, and conflicts between them were then encouraged. As inter-group hostility increased, so did intra-group solidarity. The mutual hostility was only overcome when the two groups were brought together to engage in cooperative acts for common ends that they could not obtain on their own. This led Sherif to conclude that "only the pursuit superordinate goals can overcome stereotyping and reduce hostility" (Sherif 1967: 64).

Can this insight into group dynamics be applied to the Cyprus conflict? It is certainly advisable to avoid over-optimism, for the differences separating the Cypriot communities are deeper than differences created by artificially dividing up school kids in an American summer camp. But nonetheless, having and working on common goals would enhance bonds between conflicting parties in a number of ways. One would be reducing the salience of group boundaries; people who are working towards common goals are in some sense members of the same group, and thus are not so likely to be antagonistic towards one another. Another would be by a reinforcement mechanism; as the two parties work together, each of them rewards the other and produces a sense of gratitude and warmth in the other. Pursuing superordinate goals also means that each party sees itself as working on behalf of the other, a view which is likely to foster positive attitudes (Pruitt, Kim, and Rubin 2004: 136-137).

On Cyprus, there were actually several examples of micro-level superordinate projects. One was in the early 1970s. The Cyprus Resentment Project, made up of volunteers from the American Friends Service Committee and the Shanti Sena,[6] developed a project in collaboration with the International Peace Academy to rebuild villages destroyed by intercommunal warfare so as to allow refugees to return their homes. It was hoped that work camps involving Greek and Turkish Cypriot young people could be created to do the actual construction work. But unfortunately, this phase of the project started in July 1974, and had to be abandoned following the overthrow of President Makarios by the Athens-engineered junta and the subsequent Turkish invasion.

Another attempt was made in the early 1980. That was a joint sewerage scheme and municipal development plan for Nicosia sponsored by the UN Development Program (UNDP). This plan involved continuous cooperation between the city's two civic administrations and ensured that Nicosia could be readily reintegrated following a settlement (see, Souter 1988). Although George Vasiliou, former Greek Cypriot leader, strongly endorsed this attempt, Turkish Cypriot leaders were rather reluctant, and hence the plan was largely unsuccessful.

Currently, the old and damaged buildings on the Ledra Street crossing, which was reopened in April 2008 after years of contention, can be renovated with the joint efforts of both communities. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities broadly agree that these buildings on

the buffer zone should be restored and used for joint activities. These activities would include the social reconciliation committee, as well as more contentious civil society work, such as the revisiting of historical narratives or discussions on the more challenging issues of the conflict, alongside more ordinary day-to-day activities, like socializing or enjoying a meal together in a safe and natural space.

As a result, many joint projects are not new to Cyprus. Crucially, what needs to be demonstrated is the ability to cooperate bilaterally and instill a sense of mutual respect for each other's culture, tradition, and history-an essential step on the way toward a unified and multicultural federal Cyprus.

iv. Revising Formal Education: Formal education is one way, perhaps the most important one, that national culture and historic enmities are transmitted. Textbooks do not just convey knowledge. They represent what generations of pupils will learn about their own past and futures, as well as the histories of others. In textbooks, we find what a society wishes to convey to the next generation. On Cyprus, education has been a main vehicle of transferring inter-communal hostility, as well as separate identities, from generation to generation. For centuries, Greek and Turkish Cypriot children have attended separate schools where each community had its own system of education conducted in its own language. The curricula and standards of Greek and Turkish Cypriot schools have been tailored to correspond respectively to the Greek and Turkish educational school systems. In a comparative study of "History of Cyprus" textbooks used in Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot schools, Yiannis Papadakis (2008) found that the official historical accounts of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities mirror each other in the ways in which they construct blame, silence the pain of others, de-legitimize the historical existence of others, similarly to how each community claims that Cyprus "belongs" to them on historical grounds in official and popular discourse. The same study shows that the general emphasis of formal education on Cyprus allows Greek and Turkish Cypriot narrative to focus more on the past, rather than the future, on the causes and who is to "blame", rather than on solutions and ways forward. A study carried out by Stavroula Philippou and Andrekos Varnava (2009) confirms that the social studies curricula on Cyprus do not seem to prepare Greek and Turkish Cypriot citizens for the bi-zonal, bi-communal state aimed at a political level as a solution to the Cyprus problem.

The leaders on both sides have so far failed to find creative solutions to this problem, hindered by a good dose of insufficient political will. Yet somehow, formal curricula and textbooks need to be revised so that they better meet the realities on the island and encourage inter-communal friendship. The revisions should also involve making more emphasis on universal knowledge, critical thinking, skepticism, and respectful assimilation of differences.

Another idea would be arranging student exchange programs so that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot youth can learn about each other's culture and language. Since both communities have been physically separated since 1974, the new generations have not seen each other for over thirty years. The older generations of Cyprus may still remember the horrors of inter-communal violence, and hence may not prefer inter-communal relations, but at the youngster level, at least, the conflict seems to be "ripe". Hence, student exchange programs would be a good opportunity for both sides to initiate a process of distilling their differences and overcoming chronic hostilities through generational change. Perhaps students may in the short-run show no gains or may twist the facts to serve their prejudices. However, in the long-run, accurate information will probably be an ally of improved interactions.

Currently, the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots is particularly felt in the domain of higher education. A strategic goal for universities in Northern Cyprus is to join the emerging higher education area in the EU and partake in ERASMUS (The European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students), as well as other ERASMUS-related programs. Although mainland Turkish universities (thus students) and academic institutions in the Greek Cypriot community are part of the "Bologna Process" that aims to create a European Higher Education Area by 2010, Turkish Cypriot institutions remain excluded and face significant disadvantages.

Yet Cypriots do not fundamentally disagree on the way forward. Indeed, both communities accept that the ways should be found to integrate Turkish Cypriot higher education institutions in European Higher Education system (Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci, 2008, 59). This would allow for Turkish Cypriot participation in the Bologna process, Erasmus Mundus, Leonardo, and the EU's Research Framework Programs.

Finding solution to this issue is by no means impossible and need not get entangled in intractable issues of sovereignty and recognition. Under

the 1960 framework, issues such as culture and education were already foreseen as being separate communal competences. Implicit reference to the 1960 Constitution was precisely the way in which trade across the Green Line was agreed by both communities, given the establishment and status of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce in 1960 which has, since 2004, been entitled by the EU to certify Turkish Cypriot products. Similar solutions could also be found in the field of higher education.

Overall, education is an important component of grass-roots peace building process and its role in the peace process should not be underestimated. The whole process of child raising has a critical impact on attitudes and beliefs in later life. If the hostile attitudes and perceptions of one generation are not passed on to the next, then the younger generation may be able to deal with inter-ethnic problems in a more constructive atmosphere.

Conclusion

As the above arguments attest, the conflict on Cyprus is a rather complicated one, involving both contending interests and relational problems, rooted in mutual past traumas. Failure to understand this complexity is not likely to result in a durable peace.

Frustrating in its efforts and being concerned about the expenses of the UN peacekeeping forces on the island, the international community tends to push the Cypriot leaders, as well as the communities, to reach a compromise as quick as possible. But given the existing realities on the island, as discussed in this work, an immediate solution is neither feasible nor desirable. Both sides have outstanding claims against one another, and deeply mistrust one another. It is no secret that the Turkish Cypriots celebrate the anniversary of the Turkish military action of 1974 as their "national holiday", despite the fact that the whole world, including the Greeks, call it an occupation. The dominant group wish on the Turkish side is still not to be a minority but a separate community which should have all the legal, political, and economic privileges the Greeks have. On the Greek side, on the other hand, the dominant group' wish still is to "own" the whole island, which, in the Greek Cypriot view, is "historically-*Hellenic*". There are certainly some individuals on both sides who wish one or another type of future togetherness. But those individuals cannot easily act against the dominant group wishes.

Hence, without a proper infrastructure, a pushy solution on Cyprus would bring nothing but bloodshed again. What can be done, however, is to help the parties to create an infrastructure that sustains present and future peace efforts. Although the UN has been relatively successful in keeping the conflict calm by deploying peacekeeping forces for more than four decades, very few initiatives to promote inter-communal understanding have so far taken place. Future peace efforts should particularly focus on this area.

Notes

[1] See UN Security Council Resolution 541, 18 November 1983.

[2] For details, see http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_setofideas.html (03 June 2010).
[3] For details, visit www.unficyp.org (03 June 2010).
[4] For details, visit www.unficyp.org (03 June 2010).
[5] Quoted from *Denktash's' Proposals of January 20, 1995,*
http://www.access.ch/turkei/grupf/proposal.htm (12 May 2010).
[6] The Indian peace brigade inspired by Gandhi.

References

Asmussen, Jan. *Cyprus At War: Diplomacy and Conflict During the 1974 Crisis.* London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008.

Bahceli, Tosun. *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955.* Boulder, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990.

Bahcheli, Tozun & Noel, Sid. "The Rise of AK Party and Ankara's Changing Role: Paving the Way for the Yes". In *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond.* Varnava, Andrekos and Faustman, Hubert (eds.). London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009.

Broom, Benjamin. "Designing a Collective Approach to Peace: Interactive Design and Problem Solving Workshops with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities in Cyprus". *International Negotiation.* No. 2, 1997.

Burton, John W. *Conflict: Human Needs Theory.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

_____. *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime, and Their Prevention.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

Emilianides, Achilles C. "Constitutional Structure of the Annan Plan". In *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond.* Varnava, Andrekos and Faustman, Hubert (eds.). London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009.

Gazioglu, Ahmet C. *The Turks in Cyprus: A Province of the Ottoman Empire (1571-1878).* London: Rustem & Bro., 1990.

Hill, George. *A History of Cyprus. Vols. II and III: The Frankish Period.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948.

Hürriyet, April 19, 2010.

Kaymak, Erol. "Does Cyprus Need a Truth and Reconciliation Commission?". *Cyprus Review.* Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007.

Kaymak, Erol; Lordos, Alexandros and Tocci, Nathalie. *Building Confidence in Peace.* Brussel. Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008.

Ker-Kindsay, James. "A History of Cyprus Peace Proposals". In *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond.* Varnava, Andrekos and Faustman, Hubert (eds.). London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009.

Kollias, Christos. "Military Expenditure in Cyprus". *Defense and Peace Economics.* Vol. 12, No. 6, 2001.

Kurop, Marcia. "In Missiles' Shadow: Cyprus Progress". *Christian Science Monitor.* Vol. 90, Issue, 173, 1998.

Mallinson, William. *Cyprus: A Modern History.* London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009.

McDonald, John. *Personal Interview.* Washington, DC, May 12, 2002.

Michael, Michalis N; Kappler, Matthias and Gavriel, Eftihios. *Ottoman Cyprus: A Collection of Studies on History and Culture.* Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009.

Mirbagheri, Farid. *Cyprus and International Peacemaking.* London: Allen and Unwin, 1998.

Montville, Joseph V. "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy". In *The Psychodynamics of International Relationship.* Volkan, Vamik D. et al (eds.). London: Lexington Books, 1990.

Necatigil, Zaim M. *The Cyprus Conflict: A lawyer's View.* Nicosia: Tezal, 1982.

Papadakis, Yiannis. "Narrative, Memory and History Education: A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the 'History of Cyprus'". *History and Memory.* Vol. 20, No. 2, 2008.

Pruitt, Dean G., Kim, Sung H. and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement.* 3rd Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004.

Richmond, Oliver. *Mediating in Cyprus.* London: F. Cass, 1998.

Sherif, Muzaffer. *Group Conflict and Cooperation.* Routledge: London, 1967.

Sonyel, Ramadan S. Cyprus: *The Destruction of a Republic.* Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, England: Eothen Press, 1997.

Sozen, Ahmet and Ozersay, Kudret. "The Annan Plan: State Succession or Continuity". *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 43, No. 1, 2007.

Stavroula, Philippou and Varnava, Andrekos. "Constructions of Solutions to the Cyprus Problem: Exploring Formal Curricula in Greek Cypriot State Schools". In *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond.* Varnava, Andrekos and Faustman, Hubert (eds.). London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009.

Stephen, Xydis. *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic.* The Hague: Mouton, 1973.

UN Security Council Resolution 541, November 18, 1983.

Varnava, Andrekos. *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878, 1915*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009.

Vassas, Karageorgis. *Early Cyprus: Crossroads of the Mediterranean*. Los Angeles, CA: J. Paul Getty Museum, 2002.

Volkan, Vamik D. and Itzkowitz, Norman. *Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict*. Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 1994.

Yılmaz, Muzaffer Ercan. "Interactive Problem-Solving in Inter-communal Conflicts". *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*. Vol. 14, No. 4, 2005.

Webpage References

http://www.access.ch/turkei/grupf/proposal.htm (12 May 2010).
http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_setofideas.html (03 June 2010).
http://www.unficyp.org (03 June 2010).