

Terrorist Attacks in Europe and Turkey: Securitization of Turkey in the 8th European Parliament Plenary Debates

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Abstract

This article focuses on the discourses of political party groups by analyzing the statements given by the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) about in Turkey the Plenary Sessions about terrorism during the Eight European Parliament. This study argues that during the period between 2014 and 2019, Turkey's otherness has been reinforced and discursively constructed especially by the right-wing populist political party groups. By doing so, we have utilized the Securitization Theory of Copenhagen School as our framework in which security is defined as a product of speech act. The statements from the MEPs were categorized as positive or negative statements. Then, these data were analyzed in detail to see if there are significant differences between the discourses of different political groups in the European Parliament on Turkey.

Keywords: Securitization, Copenhagen School, European Parliament, terrorism, Turkey

Submission Date: 01/05/2020

Acceptance Date: 07/06/2020

Contemporary Research in Economics and Social Sciences Vol: 4 Issue: 1 Year: 2020,
pp. 7-33

Avrupa ve Türkiye’de Terör Saldırıları: 8. Avrupa Parlamentosu Genel Tartışmalarında Türkiye’nin Güvenlikleştirilmesi

Öz

Bu makale, Avrupa Parlamentosu (MEP) üyelerinin Sekizinci Avrupa Parlamentosu’ndaki terörizmle ilgili Genel Oturumlarda Türkiye hakkındaki açıklamalarını analiz ederek siyasi parti gruplarının söylemlerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma, 2014-2019 yılları arasında Türkiye’nin ötekiliğinin özellikle sağcı popülist siyasi parti grupları tarafından vurgulandığını ve söylemsel olarak inşa edildiğini savunuyor. Bundan dolayı, güvenliğin bir konuşma eylemi ürünü olarak tanımlandığı Kopenhag Okulu Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi’ni çerçevemiz olarak kullandık. Avrupa Parlamentosu üyelerinin ifadeleri, olumlu ya da olumsuz ifadeler olarak kategorize edildi. Ardından, Avrupa Parlamentosu’ndaki farklı siyasi grupların söylemleri arasında önemli farklılıklar olup olmadığını görmek için bu veriler ayrıntılı olarak analiz edildi.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlikleştirme, Kopenhag Okulu, Avrupa Parlamentosu, terörizm, Türkiye

1. Introduction

The period between 2014 and 2019 was an era where terrorism became one of the central issues for the European Union (EU) and Turkey. The dozens of terrorist attacks in both Turkey and the European Union member states claimed many lives. According to the Global Terrorism Index that published in 2016, “in 2015 Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, and Turkey recorded the most deaths from terrorism in a single year since 2000”. In Turkey - the country with the largest increase in the attacks - the attacks of ISIL, and PKK terrorist organizations claimed many lives. In 2014, terrorist attacks killed 20 people whereas in 2015 claimed 337 lives in Turkey (Global Terrorism Index 2016, 2016). The rise in terrorist attacks and the threat of terrorism led to more debates about terrorism in the European Parliament. In the 7th European Parliament term (2009-2014) there were only 3 debates on terrorism, however, this number increased to 19 in the 8th European Parliament term (2014-2019).

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Scholars who delved in theorizing terrorism propose us different frameworks to understand the historical evolution of the concept. David C. Rapoport, in his 2004 article entitled “Four Waves of Modern Terrorism”, argues that there are four waves of terrorism in history, these are anarchist wave, anti-colonial wave, the new left wave and the religious wave (2004). Anthony N. Celso contributes the theory by claiming that with the rise of the Islamic State and Boko Haram, we are entering a fifth wave called “Jihadist” terrorism in the second half of 2010s (2015). This fifth wave overlaps with the time period of the 8th European Parliament term (2014-19) which is scrutinized in this research.

Also, in this period, Turkey’s accession process to become an EU member came to a halt due to several reasons. In 2005, Turkey and EU began accession negotiations. Until today, 16 chapters are opened whereas one chapter is temporarily closed (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). In 2009, a public survey demonstrated that 55% of the EU citizens were against Turkey’s membership which is the largest opposition to any prospective EU member (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2013, p. 38).

According to Kaya, “the domestic political, societal, legal and cultural changes in Turkey, and the domestic issues within the EU” played a significant role in the transformation of Turkey-EU relations (2018, p. 2). Especially since 2007, the privileged partnership model -which is less than full membership- was suggested to Turkey instead of full membership. Türkeş-Kılıç, in her paper which analyzes the debates in the European Parliament, argues that the arguments supporting the privileged partnership are used by the members of center-right and right-wing political parties (2019, p. 19). In 2016, European Parliament voted to freeze EU accession talks with Turkey (European Parliament, 2016). According to Saatçioğlu, since the European Parliament resolution of July 2017 that suggests suspending the accession negotiations with Turkey, Turkey-EU relations have shifted through a more functional partnership (Saatçioğlu, 2019, p. 2).

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Given this political environment, the aim of this research is to analyze how Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) constructed discourse on Turkey during the European Parliament plenary debates related to terrorism. By using Copenhagen School’s securitization theory as a framework, we aim to scrutinize on the statements of MEP’s of the European Parliament and analyze how they constructed Turkey’s identity as a security threat. According to Wæver, the basis of state security is sovereignty, whereas the foundation for societal security is the identity (Wæver, 1995, p. 60). By relying upon his approach, we argue that during a period with a high degree of threat perception due to the extensive terrorist attacks from the Islamist extremist groups, Turkey’s identity as a predominantly Muslim country is more likely to be securitized. By analyzing the statements from different political groups we try to observe whether there is a linkage between the political ideology and securitization of Turkey’s identity. We also argue that right-wing populist political groups who are traditionally opposing culturally different others are more prone to the securitization of Turkey and emphasizing her otherness.

In the first part of the research, the European Parliament and the Political Party Groups are explained. In the second part, terrorist attacks in both the EU and Turkey are summarized. According to Europol, there

has been a surge of terrorist violence in European Union since 2014 (Europol, 2019). While gathering the statistics for the terrorist attacks between 2014 and 2019 in EU and Turkey, only the attacks which have resulted in a minimum of five casualties -excluding the deaths of the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks- are included.

In this research, 1722 debates in the period of “Eight European Parliament” between 2014 elections and 2019 elections are analyzed. To limit the scope of the research to the plenary debates about terrorism, out of these 1722 plenary debates, only the debates which have the word “terror”, “terrorism”, “terrorist” in the title are included. There have been 19 debates which have the word “Terror” in the title, and Turkey has been mentioned by MEPs in 10 of these debates. The research only takes the statements made by MEPs into account since the aim is to analyze the discourse of the Parliament members. The President, Members of Council, Members of Commission are not included because they represent the European Union instead and not Political Party groups. European Parliament’s Plenary Debates website is used for the source of the statements of the MEPs (European Parliament, 2020). For the statements in English, Verbatim reports are used. For statements in other languages, translations in the videos are considered.

After gathering the statements on Turkey, these statements are classified according to most commonly used patterns. For example, statements that imply that “Turkey provides a free passage to immigrants” are classified under the same group. These statements are then later coded as “positive” or “negative” statements. Neutral statements, such as reports or summaries are not included. The statements which emphasize the importance of the cooperation between EU and Turkey, and the condolences given by MEPs to the victims in Turkey are categorized as positive as they symbolize empathy towards Turkey. The statements which accuse, criticize Turkey and focus on “Turkey’s otherness” are classified as negative statements towards Turkey. Next, we conducted discourse analysis, a research technique involves in the analysis of language in a particular context. While analyzing the language, the encircling political, economic, and social circumstances should be taken into

account. Fairclough and Wodak explain the linkage between the context and the discourses as below:

Discourse is not produced without context and cannot be understood without taking context into consideration ... Discourses are always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997).

2. Copenhagen School and the Securitization Theory: The Societal Sector

Securitization theory has attracted significant attention since it was first initiated by the so-called 'Copenhagen School' (Leonard & Kaunert, 2011, p. 57). Wæver, in 1995, inducted an alternative understanding to the concept of security by broadening its scope beyond the military threats. According to Wæver, "it is possible that any sector, at any particular time, might be the most important focus for concerns about threats, vulnerabilities, and defense" (1995, p. 49). In other words, no issue is a security problem by nature. They become security concerns when people label them as security issues. Actors such as state officials or communities securitize issues through their speeches and statements. An issue is securitized when it is posited as an existential threat that requires emergency measures and actions outside the normal bounds of the political procedure (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 23-24). The purpose of the securitization studies is to explain "who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions" (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 32). Wæver proposed a reconceptualization of the notion of security by "a duality of state security and societal security" (Wæver, 1995, p. 60). According to him, the foundation of state security is sovereignty; where as the basis for societal security is the identity. In both usages, the main concern is survival. The societal sector is related to all kinds of problems such as immigration, integration, language and culture change and famine that can harm the 'we' feeling of societies. (Akgül-Açıkçeşme, 2011, p. 59).

Wæver stated that this duality emerged as a result of the changing nature of the modern state system in which political authority “dispersed across multiple levels”. The emergence of overlapping authorities and weakened territorial state resulted in the increasing salience of “societal (in) security” (Wæver, 1995, p. 60). Wæver argued that due to the internationalization of Europeanization, significant groups within a society feel threatened. In other words, developments such as European integration, immigration, and loosening restrictions for border controls lead to a perception of threatened identities. As a result of this perceived threat due to internationalization or Europeanization, the existing identities gain strength, thus culture becomes a security issue (Wæver, 1995, p. 60). Türkeş-Kılıç in her paper which examines the securitization of international migration in the European Neighborhood Policy within the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School argues that after the remarkable increase in the number of refugees in 2015, the “refugee crisis” expression is widely used in the statements. Designating the word “crisis” characterizes immigration as a security threat and criminalizes the immigrants. (Türkeş-Kılıç, 2018, p. 16)

Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, in their book published in 1998, discussed the three main approaches that make up the core of the Copenhagen School - securitization, sectoral analysis, and regional security complexes. In their chapter upon the societal sector, they elaborate on whether societal security issues produce regionalizing dynamics. They analyze the linkages between the patterns and regions focusing on the different regions in the world. They underline “the historically conditioned religious suspicion” among Europeans towards the Middle East (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 132).

This article adopts his notion of “societal insecurity” as a framework to analyze the debates on terrorism and the image of Turkey in the 8th European Parliament. We aim to analyze societal insecurity towards Turkey by focusing on discourses of the European Parliament, because, its members are directly elected by the voters in the member states and functions as a forum for political debates (European Parliament, n.d.). Aydın-Düzgüt argues that the discourses of the EU bodies such as the

European Parliament (EP) also should be considered to examine and understand the various junctions of European culture built up in the EU discourse (2015, p. 155).


3. The Fifth Wave of Terrorism and Terrorist Attacks in Europe and in Turkey (2014-2019)

The period between 2014 and 2019 overlaps with the Anthony N. Celso's classification of the "fifth wave of terrorism" which he claims to be Jihadist (2015). The term Jihadist is also adopted by the European states given that the majority of verdicts in the EU Member States concerned jihadist terrorism confirming a trend that started in 2015 (Europol, 2019).

When the terrorist attacks in both the EU and Turkey considered, only the attacks which have resulted in five casualties have been included in this research. In total, 37 incidents are included in the analysis.¹ Indeed, all attacks took place in the EU and Turkey between years 2014 and 2018 with a minimum of five casualties. In total, the deadliest year was 2016 with 748 deaths. With 147 casualties, the deadliest year for EU was 2015, while with 618 casualties; the deadliest year for Turkey was 2016. In total, most attacks were carried out in 2016 where there were 23 attacks in total. Six terrorist organizations were the perpetrators of these attacks.

¹The terrorist deaths are not counted as casualties.

Table 1: Number of terrorist attacks in the EU and Turkey²



3.1. Terrorist Attacks in the European Union

In this research, 10 attacks in EU member countries were included. All of these attacks were Jihadist attacks. Seven of them were made by Jihadist terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. Three of them were made by “Jihadist lone wolves”. Attacks by jihadist terrorists have followed three patterns: indiscriminate killings (London, March and June 2017; and Barcelona, August 2017); attacks on symbols of Western lifestyle (Manchester, May 2017); and attacks on symbols of authority (Paris, February, June and August 2017) (Europol, 2018, p. 5).

² The statistics for the terrorist attacks have been gathered from numerous news articles.

Table 2: List of terrorist attacks in the European Union³

Date	Place	Casualties	Perpetrator
7-9 January 2015	Paris, France	17	Al-Qaeda
13 November 2015	Paris, France	130	Islamic State
22 March 2016	Brussels, Belgium	32	Islamic State
14 July 2016	Nice, France	86	Islamic State
19 December 2016	Berlin, Germany	12	Islamic State
22 March 2017	London, UK	5	Khalid Masood
7 April 2017	Stockholm, Sweden	5	Rakhmat Akilov
22 May 2017	Manchester, UK	22	Salman Abedi
3 June 2017	London, UK	8	Islamic State
16-21 August 2017	Barcelona, Spain	16	Islamic State

3.2. Terrorist Attacks in Turkey

In this research, 27 attacks in Turkey between 2014 and 2019 are included. These attacks were committed by four different terrorist organizations. These are the *Islamic State*, *PKK* and *TAK*⁴ and *FETÖ*⁵. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2017) The majority of the target cities for the terrorist attacks are the big cities in Turkey and provinces in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions (Ocal & Yıldırım, 2010). Islamic State attacks were mostly in metropolitans or the provinces on the border with Syria. Kurdish insurgent groups PKK and TAK committed the majority of terrorist attacks. PKK attacks were in Southeast Turkey while TAK attacks also included metropolitan cities outside Southeast Turkey.

³ The statistics for the terrorist attacks have been gathered from numerous news articles.

⁴ Kurdish separatist groups which aim to create an independent Kurdish state in the Southeast region of Turkey

⁵ A terrorist organization which led a Coup d'état attempt in July 15th 2016

Table 3: List of terrorist attacks in Turkey⁶

Date	Place	Casualties	Perpetrator
5 June 2015	Diyarbakir	5	Islamic State
20 July 2015	şanhurfa	34	Islamic State
19 August 2015	Siirt	8	PKK
6 September 2015	Hakkari	17	PKK
8 September 2015	Igdir	13	PKK
10 October 2015	Ankara	109	Islamic State
12 January 2016	Istanbul	12	Islamic State
13 January 2016	Diyarbakir	6	PKK
17 February 2016	Ankara	29	TAX
18 January-2 October 2016	Kilis	25	Islamic State
13 March 2016	Ankara	38	TAX
31 March 2016	Diyarbakir	7	PKK
7 June 2016	Istanbul	5	TAX
8 June 2016	Mardin	5	TAX
28 June 2016	Istanbul	45	Islamic State
15 July 2016	Istanbul, Ankara	249	FETO
29 July 2016	Hakkari	8	PKK
1 August 2016	Bingol	7	TAX
10 August 2016	Diyarbakir	5	TAX
16 August 2016	Diyarbakir	7	PKK
18 August 2016	Elazig	5	TAX
20 August 2016	Gaziantep	56	Islamic State
26 August 2016	şimak	11	TAX
5 November 2016	Diyarbakir	12	TAX
10 December 2016	Istanbul	46	Islamic State
17 December 2016	Kayseri	15	TAX
1 January 2017	Istanbul	39	Islamic State

⁶ The statistics for the terrorist attacks have been gathered from numerous news articles.

4. The Analysis of Discourses on Turkey in The 8th European Parliament: The Debates on Terrorism


4.1. Political Groups and Parties in the European Parliament

European Parliament began as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. It is one of the seven institutions of the European Union. European Parliament and Council of the European Union make up the legislative body of the European Union. Since 1979, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are directly elected by EU citizens older than 18 every five years. The parliamentary term between the elections in 2014 and 2019 is called the Eighth European Parliament (European Parliament, 2020). The Members of the European Parliament do not represent their own countries in the European Parliament instead they represent their own supranational political party group. They are not organized by nationality but political affiliation (European Parliament, 2020). Political party groups in the European Parliament have a variety of political positions and ideologies. In the 8th European Parliament, there were 8 political party groups. In addition to these 8 political party groups, there are also Non-Inscribed MEPs. These members sit in the European Parliament independent of a political party group. To form a political group, at least 25 Members are needed.

Table 4: Political Party Groups in the 8th European Parliament

Party Group	Ideology	MEPs
EPP	Conservatism, Christian Democracy, Pro-Europeanism	217
S&D	Social Democracy, Pro-Europeanism	189
ECR	Conservatism, Right-wing Populism, Euroscepticism	74
ALDE	Liberalism, Pro-Europeanism	68
GUE/NGL	Democratic Socialism, Soft Euroscepticism	52
Greens/EFA	Green politics. Minority politics, Pro-Europeanism	51
EFDD	Euroscepticism, Right-wing populism	45
ENF	Nationalism, Euroscepticism, Right-wing populism	37
NI	Independents	18

Table 5: Number of MEPs from each Political Party Group. The colors of the columns represent the official colors of the political party groups.




In the 8th European Parliament period between 2014 and 2019, there have been 1722 plenary debates. Out of the 1722 plenary debates, 19 of them included the word “Terror” in the title.

Table 6: List of all the debates which include the word “Terror” in the title. The debates where Turkey was mentioned are highlighted.

Number	Debate Date	Debate Title
1	28/01/2015	Anti-terrorism measures
2	11/03/2015	Relations between the EU and the League of Arab States and cooperation in countering terrorism
3	25/03/2015	Recent terrorist attacks in Tunisia
4	29/04/2015	Persecution of the Christians around the world, in relation to the killing of students in Kenya by terror group Al-Shabaab
5	19/05/2015	Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing - Information accompanying transfers of funds (debate)
6	08/06/2015	Recent terrorist attacks
7	24/11/2015	Prevention of radicalization and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations
8	25/11/2015	Recent terrorist attacks in Paris
9	14/12/2015	Protection of victims of terrorism
10	21/01/2016	Increased terrorism threat
11	12/04/2016	Counterterrorism following the recent terrorist attacks
12	08/06/2016	Improving data sharing and the use of European information systems and databases in the fight against serious transnational crime and terrorism
13	22/06/2016	Preventing radicalization leading to violent extremism and terrorism
14	14/12/2016	Europol data breach on terrorism investigation files
15	15/02/2017	Combating terrorism
16	16/11/2017	Terrorist attacks in Somalia
17	01/03/2018	Cutting the sources of income for Jihadists - targeting the financing of terrorism
18	18/04/2018	Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing
19	11/12/2018	Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on Terrorism

Out of these 19 debates, Turkey was mentioned in 10 debates. In this research, all of the statements made by MEPs about Turkey have been collected. They were categorized into 14 different titles. Later, they were categorized as “positive” and “negative” statements, 2 of them being positive and 12 of them being negative. Out of the 79 statements in total, 13 have been positive and 66 have been negative statements. In percentage, out of the entire statements, %16.5 of them has been positive and %83.5 of them has been negative.

Table 7: Number of positive and negative statements towards Turkey



4.2. Positive Statements

During the debates, positive statements towards Turkey came from MEPs of 4 parties. These parties were center-left/ left-wing parties (S&D and GUE/NGL) and center/center-right parties (ALDE and EPP). Three of those four party groups are Pro-European parties who make up the Commission (S&D, ALDE, and EPP). There were no positive statements from MEPs of Greens/EF, NI and right-wing parties (ECR, EFDD, and ENF). Positive statements were about two themes and first one was about increasing European Union-Turkey cooperation.

For example, PPE member Zver by emphasizing the significance of cooperation with Turkey stated that;

“In an effective fight against terrorism, we need to improve cooperation with third countries, not only with the US and Canada, but also with Turkey, the countries of North Africa and the Middle East.”- Milan Zver (PPE) (European Parliament, 2016)

Another PPE member Zdechovsky points out the need for cooperation with third parties by arguing that;

“Not only within the European Union itself, but also in cooperation with third countries. Connect and work with countries in Africa, work with Turkey, work with other states to fight radicalization, extremism and violence.” - Tomas Zdechovsky (PPE) (European Parliament, 2016)

Even though aforementioned statements classified as positive statements, it should be noted that both statements regard Turkey not as a candidate country but an outsider who belongs to outer circle of the EU. The second theme of the positive statements was the condolences to the victims of terrorist attacks in Turkey. Hadjigeorgiou, a member of GUE/NGL condemns the terrorist attacks in Turkey by stating;

“Madam President, first of all I want to condemn most strongly all the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Europe and Turkey. There can be no excuse for them.” - Takis Hadjigeorgiou (GUE / NGL) (European Parliament, 2018)

Fajon, a member of S&D extends her condolences and messages of solidarity by stating;


“I express my sincere condolences to all the victims, wounded and sympathy with the victims. Not only with those in Belgium, but with everyone in Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and elsewhere.”Tanja Fajon (S&D) (European Parliament, 2016)

Table 8: List of positive statements about Turkey

	GUE/NGL	S&G	Greens/EF	ALDE	EPP	ECR	EDD	ENF	NI	Total
EU should cooperate with Turkey	2	1	-	3	3	-	-	-	-	9
Condolences to victims of terrorism in Turkey	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4
Total	3	2	0	5	3	0	0	0	0	13

Among the 14 positive statements, 9 of them were about *increasing the EU-Turkey cooperation* and 4 of them were *condolences for victims of terrorist attacks in Turkey*.

Table 9: Comparison of numbers of positive statements towards Turkey



4.3. Negative Statements

Except for Greens/EF, there were negative statements about Turkey made by MEPs from every political party group. Out of the 66 negative statements, 48 of these statements, a majority of them, were made by MEPs from Eurosceptic, right-wing party groups, with ECR MEPs making 28 of these statements. These 66 statements fit into 12 categories.

Table 10: List of negative statements about Turkey

		GUE/NGL	S&D	Greens/EF	ALDE	EPP	ECR	EFDD	ENF	NI	Total
1	Turkey ignores Jihadists	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	3
2	Turkey supports Jihadists	2	4	-	-	-	16	-	1	3	26
3	Turkey allows terrorists to pass through her border to Syria and/or EU.	1	2		2	3	1	1			10
4	Turkey should be held accountable	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	-	6
5	There are terrorists of Turkish origin	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
6	Immigration from Turkey should stop								1	2	3
7	Turkey uses Counter-Terrorism as an excuse to repress human rights				1						1
8	Turkey threatens the EU	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
9	Turkey prefers to fight Kurds rather than ISIS	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3
10	Turkey destabilizes Syria	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3
11	Turkey shouldn't be a member of the EU	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	5
12	Turkey shouldn't get funds from the EU	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1		3
	Total	6	6	0	3	3	28	6	7	7	66

Nuttel a member of EFDD group securitize Turkey by arguing as follows;

“We must also deal with the thorny issue of Turkey. It is the same Turkey which turns a blind eye to extremist Muslims hopping over the border to fight in Syria for ISIS. It is the same Turkey which idly stood by and did almost nothing whilst the border town of Kobane was under attack. It is the same Turkey which has received nearly EUR 1 billion from this place in pre-accession funding, and it is the same Turkey that all of the British political parties, except my own, want in the European Union.” Paul Nuttall (EFDD) (European Parliament, 2015)

With his speech he portrays Turkey as country that turned a blind eye to Islamist terrorist organizations. By emphasizing “it is the same Turkey” he expresses that his skepticism towards Turkey is not something new. As Buzan aptly puts, “the historically conditioned religious suspicion among Europeans towards the Middle East” (Buzan et al., 1998: 132) is evident in this speech. In some of these statements, Turkey’s both demographic structure, which is made up by a Muslim majority population and Turkey’s membership application to EU is mentioned. Graaf with the following speech labels Turkey as “backward Muslim country” and securitize Turkey’s identity on the grounds that Muslim faith poses a threat to the survival of Europe.

“What does the European Commission do? She argues for more immigration from Muslim countries, more immigration from backward cultures, more Turkey. Enough is enough! Schengen must stop, immigration must stop, Islamization must stop. Jihadists out, hate preachers out, terrorists out!” Marcel de Graaff (NI) (European Parliament, 2015)

As Buzan states, an issue is securitized when it is posited as an existential threat that requires emergency measures and actions outside the normal bounds of the political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24). Here, by asking the abolishment of the Schengen zone, the MEP demands an action outside the normal procedures and Turkey’s identity is represented as an existential threat to Europe. Theocharous, a member of ECR group portrays Turkey as a “terrorist state” by her following statement;

“Turkey is not at the forefront of the fight against terrorism, because it is itself a state terrorist. And, unfortunately, Turkey is establishing in European territories, namely in the occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus, mosques of fundamentalists and Islamic schools which are the greenhouses of Islamic terrorism and extremism” Eleni Theocharous (ECR) (European Parliament, 2016).

She securitizes Turkey by emphasizing Turkey’s Islamic identity and associating Islam with violence and terrorism. She rejects the idea of EU’s cooperation with Turkey to fight against terrorism as Turkey has been perceived as a significant threat to Europe.

Some statements were followed up by criticisms towards the European Union itself, and these statements were also made by Eurosceptic political party groups. These criticisms included “Turkey should not be a member of the European Union” or “Turkey should not get money from the European Union”. The following statement of Dzhambazki, a member of ECR group clearly shows the skepticism towards Turkey and its identity.

“Sanctions should be imposed on a country that supports terrorism, such as Turkey; a country that uses European funds; a country that organizes trafficking in human beings; a country that finances, organizes and heals ISIS fighters; a country that threatens neighbors like Bulgaria and Greece, transferring dozens of illegal migrants.” Angel Dzhambazki (ECR) (European Parliament, 2015)

Dzhambazki securitizes Turkey by depicting it as “the country finances ISIS”. Despite the fact that Turkey has suffered from ISIS terrorist attacks severely, it is portrayed as a supporter of ISIS due to the historically suspicion towards its identity as the “other” of Europe. In another speech in below, he openly calls Turkey “as a terrorist organization”. He calls the EU to take an action against Turkey by imposing sanctions.

“A number of European leaders continue to recklessly reject the policies that openly fund, organize and cure terrorist organizations such as Turkey... Countries that finance terrorism that treat and train terrorists should not be paid a ransom, as the European Union has done with

Turkey, but membership talks should be discontinued and sanctions imposed. Those who organize it, such as Saudi Arabia, should be punished with commercial sanctions and not being hypocritically traded with them.” Angel Dzhambazki (ECR) (European Parliament, 2016)

Here, the arguments of Copenhagen School help us to understand how the securitization takes place. Turkey is securitized by being presented as an existential threat to Europe and its collective identity and has to be controlled with extraordinary measures. In the following statement, Dzhambazki presents Turkey as “a threat to all countries of Europe”.

“I have to point out that because of territorial losses and oil trade, an Islamic state is already reoriented to the proliferation of drugs and weapons. These goods mainly come via channels from Africa and Asia. We should note the funding of jihadist groups from the Republic of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. We must put in place firm conditions for ending this funding because it is a direct threat to national security for all countries and Members of the European Parliament.” Angel Dzhambazki (ECR) (European Parliament, 2018)

In the aforementioned statement, Turkey, a candidate state of the EU, is presented as Islamic state involves in drug trafficking and supports jihadists together with Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. Here, there is an attempt for constructing a linkage between Turkey’s identity and terrorism.

Some MEPs claim that Turkey functions as a gateway from Europe to Syria for foreign jihadists. The statements on Turkey’s role during the Syrian Civil War included “Turkey destabilizes Syria” and “Turkey prefers to fight Kurds rather than ISIS”. In the following statement, a member of GUE/NGL, Ernst indirectly claims Turkey’s support for Jihadists.

“Turkey prefers to bomb the PKK rather than Da’esh.” Cornelia Ernst (GUE/NGL) (European Parliament, 2016)

Table 11: Comparison of numbers of negative statements towards Turkey





Table 12: Political party groups and the number of positive and negative statements from MEPs



5. Conclusion

In this study, we adopted the Copenhagen School's securitization theory as a framework to analyze the statements of MEP's in the 8th European Parliament towards Turkey. The period of the eighth EU parliament coincides with the period of intense terrorist attacks in Europe and Turkey by jihadist terrorist groups. The attacks in Europe have facilitated the increase in Islamophobia and the construction of Islam and its followers as a security threat. Turkey who has historically been labeled as Europe's "other" is frequently characterized as a threat to European collective identity by referencing the terrorist activities in this period. Even though Turkey has been one of the most significant victims of the terrorist acts, in the European Parliament discourses, it was presented as "a country harboring terrorists and cooperating with the Islamist terrorist groups. As a part of the securitization of Turkey, "taking measures that would not normally be implemented" was requested by the MEPs.

Terminating accession negotiations with Turkey, the abolishment of the Schengen zone, dismissing the financial support to Turkey has been demanded. It is stated that if these measures are not taken, the Islamization of Europe and the backward Islamic culture would dominate Europe. Thus, Turkey and its identity are presented as a major threat to the European collective identity. Turkey, instead of being recognized as a candidate country to the EU has been portrayed as a country that should be avoided to secure Europe. According to the Copenhagen School, securitizing actors make political choices to construct security threats by discourses. Issues that characterizes as security threats become the priority, thus require extraordinary responses. As a result of the securitization, these exceptional measures can easily be justified and gain public support.

Based on our analysis, we claim that there is a correlation between the political positions of the party groups and their statements towards Turkey. Out of the eight political party groups, three of them are the right-wing populist political party groups; ECR, EFDD, and ENF. We argue that right-wing populist political groups who are traditionally

against “culturally different others” are more prone to the securitization of Turkey and emphasizing its otherness. Except for Greens/EFA, MEPs from every political party group made negative statements about Turkey. When the number of statements is considered, except for ALDE, every political party group made more negative statements than positive statements. Right-wing MEPs did not make any positive statements on Turkey. Center-left, center, and center-right MEPs mentioned Turkey less and their statements included both negative and positive statements. EPP made both negative and positive statements, while ALDE was the only political party group that made more positive statements than the negative ones. Greens/EFA MEPs didn’t make any statements related to Turkey. Since Members of the European Parliament are elected directly, we can argue that the European public opinion on Turkey during the period between 2014 and 2019 have been generally negative.

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