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Abbrundungen zu machen), nach dem Krieg ergeben die relativ zuverlässigsten Zahlen 880.880 Armenier als Flüchtlinge in verschiedenen Ländern (Tabelle S. 130). Damit ist von einem armenischen Bevölkerungsverlust von 584.262 Personen auszugehen, für ganz Anatolien. Das ist immerhin noch weniger als die muslimischen Verluste - 612.610 Männer, Frauen und Kinder allein in den drei Ostprovinzen Bitlis, Van und Erzurum.

In Westanatolien war die Situation nur wenig besser. Von 1.229.492 kalkulierten anatolischen Griechen 1912 blieben 916.000 Flüchtlinge übrig, rund ein viertel ging verloren. Die muslimischen Bevölkerungsverluste sind wegen der bald folgenden Wanderungsbewegungen schwerer für Westanatolien abzuschätzen, immerhin zeigt die Karte Fig. 7.2, dass bei der übriggebliebenen türkischen Bevölkerung über 30% Witwen ziemlich genau das Gebiet der griechisch-türkischen Kämpfe bezeichnen.

Diese Seite der Geschichte ist bisher kaum bekannt gewesen. Natürlich befällt den Leser ein gewisser Schauer, wenn Millionen grausamer Einzelschicksale schlicht und neutral zu «population losses» aufsummiert werden. Aber ein Statistiker kann das nicht anders. Wer künftig noch von Massakern und Genozid reden will, der wird die Sache mindestens zweiseitig sehen müssen. McCarthy zieht es deshalb vor, von «civil war» zu reden, der den «offiziellen» Krieg der Staaten begleitete. Wahrscheinlich trifft das den Sachverhalt besser.

Für die internationale Akzeptanz dieser Ergebnisse ist es wohl angemessen, dass nicht ein Vertreter der damaligen Konfliktparteien diese Untersuchung gemacht hat, sondern ein neutraler Ausländer. Seine Ergebnisse stehen und fallen mit der Glaubwürdigkeit der Osmanischen Statistik, die er verwendet. Es liegt im Interesse der Geschichtswissenschaft, dass möglichst alle denkbaren weiteren Quellen zugänglich gemacht werden. Der zeitliche Abstand ist inzwischen so gross, dass auch die Nachfahren der damaligen Betroffenen unbefangener über ihre Geschichte reden und forschen sollten.

Wolf Hütteroth

Cornell H. FLEISCHER, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600)*, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton, 1986).

Much of the appeal of this book may be due to the fact that the author, as well as most of its present and future readers including the present reviewer, are themselves bureaucrats and intellectuals in a varying combination of ingredients. In itself, this objective fact might not have made a great deal of difference; many specialists in Middle Eastern studies may in fact complete a voluminous work on an Ottoman author without even noticing the underlying community of fate. Fleischer is not very explicit about this matter either; but

that he is aware of the implications becomes obvious from certain passing remarks such as when toward the end of the book, he expresses 'respect' for Āli as an intellectual (p. 307). After all, respect presupposes some kind of common ground, and the awareness of common perplexities is as good a precondition for respect any.

Thus what could have become either a dry-as-dust biography or a piece of exoticism is neither of the two. Even Mustafa Āli's very personal gripes about his lack of promotion become quite comprehensible once one considers analogies from more contemporary periods; tenure proceedings and professorship applications most easily come to mind. But in addition, one needs to take into account that in the sixteenth century Ottoman Empire, options were more restricted than they are in most contemporary contexts. A scholar of that period could scarcely decide to live as an independent intellectual disdaining all involvement with state apparatus. In the medieval Middle East, certain options of that kind do seem have existed¹. But by Āli's time, the state bureaucracy had become so allpervasite that to make claims to intellectual eminence and to seek employment and/or patronage in the state apparatus practically meant one and the same thing. It is true that an occasional Ottoman gentleman might 'opt out' of the system and decide to live the life of a mendicant dervish, but it was rare indeed that such an individual then continued to be intellectually productive. If these conditions are taken into account, then Āli's concern with his career does turn out to be more significant that it appears at first glance, even though the twentieth-century bureaucrat and intellectual may sometimes be inclined to shrug his/her shoulders at Āli's preoccupations. Again Fleischer alludes to the problem (compare particularly pp. 135-138) more than he explicitly discusses it; perhaps this avoidance is due to the philologist's caution. But it is the great merit of his work that the biographical material is organized in such a fashion that considerations of the type outlined here easily present them selves to the reader.

In one sense, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual* represents the revival of a nineteenth-century genre which in recent decades has become quite rare; one might describe this format as 'The man and his time'. It may not be out of place in this context to remember that Fernand Braudel originally conceived his book on the Mediterranean as 'Philipp II and his times'; the title of this work still bears some trace of the fact². However in the writing, what came to dominate was the analysis of structures and how they changed in the long, middle and short run; Philipp II ultimately turned out to be no more than an extra in the 'film' depicting the history of a great region. Fleischer's work

¹ Compare the ulema biographies analysed in Richard Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur, A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History*, Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, 16 (Cambridge, Mass. 1972), Ch. 4.

² Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranéen au temps de Philippe II*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1966).

by contrast, makes Mustafa Âli into a major actor, not an extra, and the weight given to the context is correspondingly less. But even so, the impact of what we might call the history of structures is so pervasive that it informs even a study which at first glance seems oriented toward narrative and intellectual history of a fairly traditional type.

In this particular case, Fleischer defines the context in which Âli operated as that of later sixteenth century *kalemiye* officialdom. This was not a well-established, slowly evolving structure of the kind that comes to mind when we pronounce the word 'bureaucracy'. Rather, and Fleischer emphasizes this fact, the *kalemiye*, and its subdivision the financial bureaucracy, were largely innovations first instituted during the reign of Kanuni Süleyman. Thus Âli entered this relatively new branch of the Ottoman administration because he perceived career opportunities in it; and a sizeable part of Fleischer's biography is concerned with the contrast between opportunities such as Âli perceived them, and the actual operation of the bureaucracy which was defining its recruitment and promotion procedures at exactly this time. Thus almost inadvertently, the format of the book is redefined: from 'the man and his times' to 'how an individual operates within an evolving structure'.

Obviously the manner in which a given author relates to the structures that by choice or necessity, he is obliged to operate in, will have some impact upon his writing. In fact it is this relationship between an author's oeuvre and his social and cultural environment which forms the topic for intellectual biographies when undertaken, for instance, by a historian such as Lucien Febvre³. Concerns of a similar kind are treated in the last section of *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, subtitled 'The Making of Ottoman History', and more particularly in the last chapter on the history of Murad III. For Âli, whose disappointments for the most part took place during the twenty-one year reign of this latter monarch, developed a critical vision of his times, beginning from such trivial occurrences as the personal shortcomings of Murad III on the one hand, and his own career-related frustrations on the other. Particularly toward the end of his life, Âli attempted to answer the question to what extent the individual behaviour of a sultan or vizier was able to influence events, and to what extent overall developments, such as the old schema of the cyclical rise and decline of all empires, remained beyond the grasp of even a powerful political figure. At least this more or less intuitive grasp of the dialectic between structural constraints and personal initiative is what Fleischer sees as the peculiar greatness of Mustafa Âli as a historian. (Compare pp. 300-307).

That this is very much a late twentieth-century vision is beyond all doubt. Lucien Febvre has a share in shaping this way of seeing things, and so have most major novelists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Perhaps it is the most significant merit of *Bureaucrat and Intellectual* that,

3 Lucien Febvre, *Amour sacré, amour profane, Autour de l'Heptaméron de Marguerite de Navarre* (Paris, 1971).

while treating Āli as very much the product of sixteenth-century Ottoman bureaucratic culture, his peculiarities are used as a means for making him a figure of interest even across cultural boundaries-such as those, for instance, which divide Āli's culture from our own. After all, twentieth century Ottoman historians have tended isolate themselves from broader historical currents for quite some time now; and maybe books like the present one will have some share in reversing the trend.

Suraiya Faroqhi,

Diplomaten und Wesire. Krieg und Frieden im Spiegel türkischen Kunsthandwerks. Hrsg. von Peter W. Schienerl unter Mitarbeit von Christine Stelzig. München: Staatliches Museum für Völkerkunde 1988. 187 S.

Nachdem im Jahre 1697 eine kaiserliche Armee unter Prinz Eugen - ein starkes brandenburgisches Kontingent kämpfte unter dem Kommando Otto von Schlabberndorfs - die Türken bei Zenta vernichtend geschlagen hatte, entschloß sich die Pforte zu Friedensgesprächen. Kaiser Leopold I. schickte daraufhin den Präsidenten des Reichshofrates (seit 1683), den Grafen Wolfgang IV. zu Oettingen-Wallerstein (1629-1708) zu den Friedensverhandlungen, welche beim Dorfe Karlowitz anberaumt waren. In der Heimat des kaiserlichen Chefunterhändlers, im schwäbischen Oettingen (jetzt zu Bayern gehörig), veranstaltete das «Staatliche Museum für Völkerkunde München» eine sehr beachtenswerte Ausstellung, zu der das oben genannte Begleitbuch erschienen ist.

Das reichlich illustrierte Werk beginnt mit einer ausführlichen biographischen Studie über den Grafen aus der Feder Volker von Volckamers. Dabei werden sowohl die Friedensverhandlungen selbst als auch die sich anschließende Botschaftsreise des Grafen Wolfgang nach Istanbul in lebendiger Weise dargestellt. Dies geschieht nach meist deutschsprachigen Quellen. Türkische Berichte wurden nicht herangezogen. Einen weiteren Beitrag widmet Margareta Lindner dem Thema «Ungarn zwischen Habsburg und den Osmanen». Auch hier wird - wie des öfteren besonders in türkischen Publikationen - in Anlehnung an die von Sultan Süleyman I. damals selbst verbreitete Propagandaversion vorgetragen, der Sultan sei im Jahre 1532 durch die Belagerung von Güns/Köszeg am Vormarsch auf Wien aufgehalten worden. Der Sultan zog es aber in Wahrheit deshalb vor, nicht weiter vorzurücken, weil ihn bei Wien ein kampfstarkes kaiserliches Heer von etwa 100 000 Mann erwartete, welches Reichsstände des Römisch-deutschen Reiches bestand. Die im Buch enthaltene Karte (S. 37) gibt die «Eroberungen Süleimans des Prächtigen» nicht ganz korrekt wieder. Das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen, dessen wichtige Rolle in den Auseinandersetzungen im Text des Beitrages ja beschrieben wird, erscheint gar nicht als politische Einheit auf der Karte. Der Beglerbeg von Buda ist keinesfalls «ermächtigt, Kriege zu eröffnen». Auch wurden die Steuereinnah-