

TYOLOGIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL PARTNERSHIPS*

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ABSTRACT

The widespread dissatisfaction with command-and-control approaches to environmental protection has led environmentalists, business, government agencies, and communities to identify and implement a set of new and more collaborative solutions to environmental problems. The use of environmental partnerships constitutes one example of such new approaches to environmental protection, and is the topic of this paper. The paper first reviews some of the existing typologies of environmental partnerships. It then proposes three new typologies of environmental partnerships. The first typology employs partnerships' standing vis-à-vis environmental regulation as its parameter. The second typology utilizes James Q. Wilson's (1989) description of four different political environments surrounding public bureaucracies. The third typology takes as its main dimensions the levels of public money and governmental authority involved in partnerships. The paper ends with a brief discussion.

Keywords

Environmental protection; environmental partnerships; typologies of environmental partnerships; multi-sectoral collaboration and partnerships; new forms of governance.

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ÇEVRESEL ORTAKLIK TİPOLOJİLERİ

ÖZET

Çevre koruma amaçlı kumanda ve kontrol yaklaşımlarından yaygın yakınmalar; çevrecileri, iş dünyasını, kamu kurumlarını ve yerel toplulukları çevre sorunlarına yeni ve işbirliğine daha yatkın çözümler belirlemeye ve uygulamaya yöneltmiştir. Çevre sorunlarının çözümünü amaçlayan ortaklıklar, bu tür yaklaşımların örnekleridir ve bu yazının konusunu oluşturmaktadırlar. Bu makalede ilk olarak mevcut çevresel ortaklık tiyolojilerinden bazıları incelenmektedir. İkinci olarak, üç yeni çevresel ortaklık tiyolojisi ortaya atılmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki, ortaklığın çevre ile ilgili düzenlemelere göre durumunu temel değişken olarak alırken, ikincisi, James Q. Wilson (1989)'ın kamu kurumlarını kuşatan dört farklı ortama ilişkin betimlemelerini kullanmakta; üçüncü tiyoloji ise, ortaklıklarda kullanılan kamu parası ve kamusal yetki düzeylerini temel yönelimler olarak denkleme katmaktadır. Yazı, kısa bir değerlendirme ile son bulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Çevre koruma; çevresel ortaklıklar; çevresel ortaklık tiyolojileri; sektörlerarası işbirliği ve ortaklıklar; yeni yönetim biçimleri.

INTRODUCTION

Environmental problems and the cost of environmental protection have increased significantly in the last three decades. So has the public discussion of environmental issues, such as global warming, air and water pollution, and new regulatory instruments. The attention paid to environmental issues by government agencies, members of business community, the media, environmentalists, and general public have rendered both new conflicts and opportunities regarding the design and implementation of environmental policies. On one hand, achieving consensus on goals and methods of environmental protection still remains difficult for several reasons, including the following:

"First, fundamental differences in the way the different players value environmental assets lead to conflicts over competing use and protection strategy. Second, significant scientific uncertainties remain about the nature of certain threats to the environment. Finally, even when consensus on goals exists, mistrust among the government, environmentalists, and companies leads to heated disagreement over regulatory approach." (Long and Arnold, 1995: 23).

On the other hand, some of the very same reasons that render conflict among various groups, coupled with a widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo, are pushing environmentalists, business, government agencies, and community groups toward adopting a less adversarial and more collaborative stand (cf. Long and Arnold, 1995). For instance, scientific uncertainties are bringing conflicting parties together to conduct a study on an environmental issue. Similarly, converging interests of different groups in the face of an emerging legislation are creating new alliances around certain issues (Arnold and Long, 1995; Oye and Maxwell, 1994).

Ecological sustainability reaches to a larger audience as both desirable and viable an option (Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995). "Proactive corporate environmental management" is embraced by a large number of companies worldwide (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998). Durant et al. (2004: 643) observe that: "Dissatisfaction with conventional regulatory approaches has led to an emerging new governance paradigm (NGP) in environmental and natural resources (ENR) management." Raines and Prakash (2005: 3) submit that "an important feature of the new public management paradigm is the increasing reliance on voluntary codes rather than coercive mandatory regulation to achieve public policy objectives."* Busch et al. (2005) maintain that: "Since the beginning of the 1990s, regulatory patterns in environmental policy making have changed significantly. We observe a shift from a sectorally fragmented and largely legally based regulatory approach toward a greater use of voluntary, collaborative, or market-based regulatory instruments." According to Ebrahim (2004: 208):

"The ability of government agencies to manage natural resources in the public interest is increasingly under challenge in many parts of the world. Command-and-control forms of regulation governing water and land resources are facing demands by citizens, businesses, and nonprofit organizations for more participatory processes and access to public decision making."

In short, the amount of resources and attention devoted to more collaborative environmental policies and practices has increased in the past years, especially in situations "where problem-solving capacity is widely dispersed and few organizations accomplish their missions by

* See also, EPA, 1989, 1994; Manning, 1998; Parker, 2000.

acting alone.” (Imperial, 2005: 281).[†] The focus of the current paper is on environmental public-private partnerships, which constitute one example of the new and more collaborative approaches to environmental protection. According to Long and Arnold (1995: 6), environmental partnerships can be defined as “voluntary, jointly-defined activities and decision-making processes among corporate, non-profit, and agency organizations that aim to improve environmental quality or natural resource utilization.”

In the following pages, I shall first critically examine some of the existing typologies of partnerships. In doing so, I shall take Long and Arnold’s (1995) work as my starting point. Second, I shall propose three new typologies of environmental public-private partnerships and briefly discuss each. The first typology takes partnerships’ standing vis-à-vis environmental regulation as the parameter, yielding three categories of partnerships: *regulation initiating*, *regulation avoiding*, and *regulation abiding/implementing*. The second typology uses a work by Wilson (1989), who has identified *client politics*, *entrepreneurial politics*, *interest group politics*, and *majoritarian politics* as distinct categories of political contexts surrounding public bureaucracies. The third typology takes the levels of public money and governmental authority used in and around partnerships as its main dimensions, and identifies four different roles, namely, *governor*, *sponsor*, *regulator*, and *advocate/facilitator* that government organizations may play in different environmental partnerships. I shall conclude with some brief remarks.

1- A BRIEF REVIEW OF EXISTING TYPOLOGIES

Long and Arnold (1995: 50-55) review a couple of possibilities to create typologies of environmental partnerships. One way of developing a typology is to use the main environmental issue (e.g., pollution/resource degradation, natural resource utilization etc.) as the determinant dimension. The other is to analyze ‘environmental partnerships’ based upon their respective activity areas (e.g., conflict resolution, policy formation, research, etc.). Cited in Long and Arnold (1995: 52-54), McKinsey & Co. (1992) offers a typology, which identifies six different kinds of environmental partnership opportunities. There, three ‘public policy contexts’, (i.e., proactive stage, policy stage, and response stage) have been identified, and then these contexts have

[†] See also, Freeman, 1997; Hoffman et al. 2002; Kamieniecki et al. 1999; and Scheberle, 2000, for discussions regarding different aspects of utilizing collaborative forms of governance in dealing with environmental issues.

been analyzed with the help of three levels of 'solution development' (i.e., agenda setting, solution development, and implementation).

Long and Arnold (1995) offer a typology of their own, which is based on two parameters: level of conflict among participants on the environmental issue prior to formation of a partnership, and the degree of core relevance of the partnership's goals to each participant organization's goals and missions. While the first parameter, 'core relevance' goes from "all participants high" to "one participant high" horizontally, the second parameter "the degree of conflict" goes from high to low levels along the vertical axis. Four groups of 'partnerships', namely, preemptive partnerships, coalescing partnerships, exploration partnerships, and leverage partnership, are located along the line drawn from upper left to lower right (See, Long and Arnold 1995; Exhibit 4.5, p. 61).

Preemptive partnerships (Long and Arnold 1995), or *Resolution partnerships* (Arnold and Long, 1993), involve parties who have reached, or are about to reach at a very litigious point over an environmental issue. Those partnerships basically aim to defuse the hostile situation surrounding the issue, and since both the level of conflict among participants and the "core relevance" for participants are high, some kinds of formal agreements have to be reached first on what each participant's position is, and how the partnership is going to proceed. *Coalescing partnerships*, on the other hand, bring together some existing or potential rivals, who have some disagreements over issues. They achieve to form a partnership to solve an environmental problem common to them mostly because their activities are interdependent. *Exploration partnerships* involve parties who may or may not have acted together or confronted with each other in the past. They come together to research on environmental issues of mutual interest. *Leverage partnerships*, on the other hand, are the most opportunistic partnerships; participants jointly invest some resources to benefit all of them, socially or financially.

These different typologies might be utilized by practitioners, policy makers, and researchers for different purposes. For instance, if one wants to analyze whether and why the use of partnerships as an alternative governance mechanism is more popular in some particular issue areas, then, an issue-based typology may help her/him identifying and discussing which issue areas are more conducive to the formation of partnerships, and why. The model developed by McKinsey & Co. (1992), on the other hand, allows participants to identify "where they fit into the

solution development process and the public policy process. To maximize success, partners must identify the appropriate type of partnership for the issue addressed." (Long and Arnold, 1995: 53). Yet, it only covers 'partnership' activities that have any intended impact on regulation (Long and Arnold, 1995), and it does not deal with the question of conflict among different participants. On the other hand, the typology used in Arnold and Long (1993), and Long and Arnold (1995) may further our understanding of how varying conflict levels and varying degrees of "core relevance" may interact with processes of partnerships.

Yet, it may prove to be inadequate for two reasons. First, the typology and subsequent analysis lack any explicit discussion regarding how conflict among participants has come to the existence in the first place. Second, there is no explicit discussion in above typologies of the government involvement in environmental partnerships. I think we need to know more about the sources of conflict over environmental issues as well as the actual or potential roles that government organizations play in and through environmental public-private partnerships. The first issue will be addressed through Typology II, while the second issue will be addressed with help of Typology III.

2- THREE ALTERNATIVE TYPOLOGIES

2.1 Typology I: Public-Private Partnerships' Standing vis-à-vis Regulation

In my view, there is a need for an explicit discussion regarding the relations between regulation and the use of public-private partnerships. The benefits of partnership approach to regulation have been noted by different authors for quite sometime. Reich (1981), for instance, argues that despite the substantial resources of money and management attention spent on the regulatory processes in the U.S., the result is more adversarial relationship between government and business than achievement. He argues for a "*regulation by negotiation*" approach to replace current "*regulation by confrontation*" approach. Similarly, Gilad (1984: 278), examines the negative consequences of an '*adversary approach*', and concludes that "the cost of regulation may be greater than is usually recognized due to, presumably, an unintended consequence of dulling the awareness of decision makers to profitable opportunities in the environment."

It seems that some of criticisms of 'confrontational' regulatory approach have been taken into account by the U.S. Congress when it

passed the Negotiated Rule Making Act (NRA) in 1990 (Freeman, 1997). The National Performance Review (NPR), Clinton-Gore Administration's reinventing agenda, also pays considerable attention to 'partnership' approach to regulation. As Clinton and Gore (1997: 15) describe vividly:

"In directives in March and April of 1995, President Clinton told regulators to do six things: cut obsolete regulations, reward results, not red tape, get out of Washington and *create grassroots partnerships, negotiate, don't dictate*, reduce regulatory burdens—don't require a report until it's really necessary, allow fines to be applied to fixes." (emphasis added).

Specially, Gore (1996) reports that the EPA has undertaken some changes to make it easy for business to comply with environmental regulations, such as waiving or reducing penalties for first-time violators if the business corrects the problem or comes into compliance with the law. While the full effects of 'partnership' approach to environmental regulation on the number, scope, and influence of environmental public-partnerships are yet to be studied and documented, a recent analysis suggests that collaborative governance may indeed produce more effective environmental protection under certain conditions (Freeman, 1997). An interesting question to ask is this: What functions should we expect from partnerships?

Turner, Pearce and Bateman (1993) discuss two types of regulatory approaches as alternatives to relying solely on market mechanisms for environmental protection. The first is the direct or '*command-and-control*' regulatory approach, "which involves the setting of environmental standards (e.g., for air quality or water quality) enforced via legislation without the aid of market-based incentives." (p. 144). The second is the *market-based incentives approach*, which encompasses regulatory measures that use such economic instruments as fees and taxes to protect environment. I think the real value of environmental public-private partnerships may lie in their positioning between market and command-and-control approaches to environmental protection. They may inform the design and implementation of market-based incentives approach while reducing some of the costs and unintended consequences associated with command-and-control regulatory approach. For partnerships to effectively serve to those purposes, however, their varying roles vis-à-vis regulation need to be carefully analyzed.

First, it should be acknowledged that public-private partnerships may or may not seek regulatory ends. Hence, two categories of public-

private partnerships; regulation partnerships, and non-regulation partnerships. While the second group involves many of the partnerships analyzed by Long and Arnold (1995), the first category encompasses those partnerships described by McKinsey & Co. (1992). We can further clarify subcategories of each. Regulatory public-private partnerships can be put into three broad categories based upon what kind of regulatory ends are sought by the participants. Hence, regulation initiating, regulation abiding/implementing, and regulation avoiding public-private partnerships (cf. McKinsey & Co., 1992).

Regulation avoiding public-private partnerships bring together organizations from different sectors in the face of an emerging regulation. Different groups try to find mutually satisfying solutions to an environmental problem in order to avoid the undesired consequences of an emerging regulation. For instance, in 1989, twenty-four organizations representing natural resource management agencies, the forest products industry, American Indian tribes, and environmental groups in Washington State have established an agenda, and produced recommendations on various environmental issues as an alternative to the impending amendments to the Forest Practices Act. (Long and Arnold, 1995; Case #3, pp-201-213)

Regulation abiding/implementing partnerships aim to create better solutions within an existing regulatory framework without challenging it entirely or substantially. For instance, Kogan (1995) describes how Schering-Plough, a pharmaceutical manufacturing company, has volunteered to participate in a pilot public-private partnership with the state of New Jersey to 'reinvent' the state's environmental regulations. The company has been allowed to use a facility-wide environmental permit to replace more than 60 individual permits regulating air emissions, wastewater discharges, and solid waste management (p. 48). The EPA's 33/50 program is another example of the use of regulation abiding/implementing partnerships. Through this program, 1,300 companies have committed to reduce emissions of 17 highest priority toxic chemicals by 33 percent in three years, and 50 percent in five years (Clinton and Gore, 1997).

Regulation initiating partnerships, on the other hand, are formed to make amendments to an existing law, or rule, or to initiate a new regulation concerning an environmental issue. There is this main difference between partnerships in this category and those in the first category: while the latter directs participants' attention to exploring alternatives to a proposed regulation with a desire to avoid it, the

former mobilizes various groups to support a change in the existing regulatory stature.

2.2 Typology II: Political Context of Public-Private Partnerships

While some of the new approaches to regulation described in previous pages may actually encourage to the establishment of new public-private partnerships to provide better environmental protection, the question of broader institutional arrangements remains. Moe and Caldwell (1994), for example, compare the presidential system of the U.S. with the British parliamentary system, and argue that in these two systems different political actors (e.g., legislators, interests groups) have varying incentives to control bureaucracy. While these incentives result in a more informal, cooperative, and effective bureaucracy in the British system, often conflicting incentives of the President and legislators create an excessively rule governed bureaucratic structures in the U.S. In a similar vein, Wilson (1994: 670-671) argues that:

American constitutional system, "which fragments authority and encourages intervention, produces two opposed bureaucratic effects: compared to that of other democratic nations,... (it) makes agencies that serve people more responsive and agencies that regulate people more adversarial. Opportunities for legislative and judicial intervention are used in... (the U.S.) to make citizen-serving agencies more friendly and citizen-regulating agencies more rigid."

Notwithstanding the arguments of Moe and Caldwell (1994), and of Wilson (1994), I would argue that environmental public-private partnerships may still serve with some effectiveness even within American constitutional context, provided that those who want to encourage more effective and frequent use of these collaborative forms have a clear idea of varying political contexts surrounding different environmental issues and of the constraints facing public partners in each context. In this sense, theoretical frameworks examining the interactions between interest groups and bureaucratic behaviors may prove to be very helpful. They may enable us to better understand environmental public-private partnerships by analyzing such questions as which groups are most likely to initiate partnerships, and what actions public partners might or should take in different contexts.

One such framework has been provided by Wilson (1989). Based upon how costs and benefits of public agencies' actions are distributed among various interest groups, Wilson describes four different types of political environments within which public bureaucracies function.

Although this framework has originally been employed to predict the behaviors of a range of bureaucratic organizations, it is applied here to analyze varying political contexts of environmental public-private partnerships.

Client politics. According to Wilson (1989), client politics refers to political environments, where costs are borne by many while benefits go to a single organization, or to a small group of organizations. This constitutes an example of what Oye and Maxwell (1994) call "*Stiglerian*" situations, where rent-seeking behavior by beneficiaries is common practice. In these situations, beneficiaries have a strong incentive to influence agency policies, while the public agency tries to avoid such an influence. I would argue that more likely scenario is such that beneficiaries first attempt to use more direct means to influence agency behaviors (e.g. lobbying), rather than trying to get what they want through initiating, or joining in an environmental public-private partnership. But, as Oye and Maxwell (1994) have suggested, "*coalitions of the green and the greedy*" (p. 607) can be created and sustained through public-private partnerships with initiatives coming from environmentalists. Alternatively, to avoid undue influence of business groups, public agencies may initiate a partnership or may selectively support coalitions created between environmentalists and community groups. As Oye and Maxwell (1994) remind us, in these kinds of situations, public partners should be concerned with protection of general welfare and equity as much as solving environmental problems.

Entrepreneurial politics. It refers to those contexts, where costs are highly concentrated on some industry, profession, or locality, while benefits are diffused over many. These are what Oye and Maxwell (1994) call "*Olsonian*" situations. Wilson (1989) argue that affected groups in these situations would have strong incentive to oppose bureaucratic actions, while Oye and Maxwell (1994) maintain that policy makers may create a system of compensation to promote the stability of environmental regulation, and to form coalitions between negatively affected interest groups and environmentalists. I would argue that the initiative to form a public-private partnership would most likely come from interest groups if their attempt to influence agency behavior seems less likely to produce desired outcomes.

Interest group politics: According to Wilson (1989), interest group politics refers to those political contexts, where both beneficiaries and those who might carry the burden would have strong incentive to

organize and influence the agency. Thus, agencies would have difficult times to meet the conflicting demands of various groups. In these kinds of situations, initiatives to cooperate through public-private partnerships might come from organizations from either sector. Some of the case studies in Long and Arnold (1995) under the category of "preemptive", or "resolution" partnerships may be read as examples of these situations.

Majoritarian politics. It refers to political contexts where no important interest group exists, and where actions of public agencies result in widely distributed benefits and costs. According to Wilson (1989), agencies in these kinds of situations are in a relatively relaxed position; they might use more discretion. Examples provided in Long and Arnold (1995) pertaining to leverage and exploring partnerships fit well into this category. When working in this kind of political context, a public organization may strike some initiatives of its own to opportunistically explore collaborative potential in its task environment.

2.3 Typology III: Varying Roles for Public Organizations in Partnerships

It goes without saying that a partnership may involve more than one public organization, and as such, various government organizations may play different roles in any given environmental public-private partnership. Moreover, a government organization may find itself in a very different position at different stages of a partnership (i.e., formation, structuring, and sustaining). It is also plausible to argue that an agency's role may vary from one partnership to another. Thus, it is not only difficult but also counterproductive to prescribe a single set of behaviors for public organizations to follow in all partnerships at all times.

Notwithstanding these precautions, I would argue for a close examination of the roles that government organizations might play in and around environmental public-private partnerships in different contexts. For example, four different political environments described in the preceding pages may call for qualitatively different roles for public organizations. In a political context resembling Wilson's (1989) description of *interest group politics*, for instance, an appropriate role for government organization(s) would be one of a *broker*. For both beneficiaries and those negatively affected would be more than eager to get organized around their group interests. An agency might decide to bring competing parties together in a partnership and might act as a broker thereafter. In a similar vein, government organizations facing a

political context akin to Wilson's (1989) *majoritarian politics* would more likely to take an *activist* stand in terms initiating collaborative projects. For an agency in such a context is in a relatively relaxed position to use more discretion.

In addition to analyzing what roles public organizations should or might play in and around public-private partnerships in various political contexts, we need to know more about what leverages public organizations might have vis-à-vis partnerships. As argued earlier, existing typologies do not have much to say about the issue. I submit here a typology to highlight a number of roles that government organization(s) might have in and around public-private partnerships. The typology takes the level of involvement of governmental authority and the level of involvement of government money as its parameters.[‡] Two subcategories for each parameter are offered: high and low. Thus, the typology yields four distinct categories concerning the role of government organization(s) in environmental public-private partnerships (See, Figure 1 below).

Figure 1. Typology III: The Role(s) of Public Organizations in Partnerships

		Involvement of Government Authority	
		High	Low
Involvement of Government Money	High	Governor	Sponsor
	Low	Regulator	Advocate/Facilitator

Governor. It refers to the position of a government agency in an environmental public-private partnership, wherein both the levels of government authority and involvement of public money are high. The role of organization(s) from private and/or non-profit sectors is minimal when compared to that of government partner. In short, in these types of environmental partnerships, government organization(s) is both running the show and paying for the show.

[‡] See, Bozeman, 1987, for the use of these dimensions in proposing a typology.

Regulator. In this category of partnerships, the use of public authority by the public partner is high. Yet, the involvement of public money is low. In these kinds of public-private partnerships, the government partner utilizes its legal and/or administrative clout (e.g., giving waivers to companies involved, or monitoring and/or enforcing agreements reached by the participants), but uses little or no money out of government coffer. The financial cost of the partnership is borne by the private, and/or non-profit organizations, not by public organizations.

Sponsor. It refers to the role of a government agency in a situation where the use of public money is high while the use of government authority for the purposes of partnership is low. Basically, the public partner either covers the operational cost of a partnership, or provides financial and economic incentives to different participants, or does both.

Advocate/Facilitator. Sometimes, a government agency may lack both monetary resources and legal/ administrative clout to play an effective role in an environmental partnership. As such, neither public money nor government authority can be freely used by government partner(s) to initiate or support an environmental public-private partnership. In a sense, this category represents the lowest involvement by public partner(s) in terms of the use of formal authority and public money. Nonetheless, representatives of a government partner might still have some leverage other than legal/administrative authority and money (e.g., their involvement in some formal or informal networks) to initiate the partnership, or to help selling collaborative ideas to potential partners and the general public.

DISCUSSION

In the preceding pages, I have first reviewed some of the existing typologies of environmental partnerships. The review has revealed the need for an emphasis on political and institutional contexts of environmental partnerships. Accordingly, I have proposed three typologies that take the contexts and "public" aspect of environmental public-private partnerships into consideration. Before going any further about the typologies, however, I should emphasize two important limitations of the current paper. First, none of the typologies developed here has any claim toward completeness. They have been proposed to highlight the need for identifying some avenues for future research on environmental public-private partnerships. Thus, all three typologies need, albeit with varying degrees, further revision and elaboration.

Second, in the absence of any first-hand empirical data, I have had to rely on secondary sources to substantiate my arguments. The use of more examples from already existing as well as newly conducted case studies, for instance, would certainly enhance the analytic and illustrative value of the proposed typologies.

The first typology has meant to highlight the relations between regulation and partnerships. The main premise of the typology is that a better knowledge about various types of interactions between environmental partnerships and regulation is needed and when it is available such knowledge would enrich our understanding of these collaborative undertakings. One broad research question worth posing is how many of the environmental partnerships currently under use would define their main focus as the initiation of a new regulation, as opposed to those bringing different groups together to work on an environmental problem within the framework of an existing regulation without aiming to challenge it substantially or entirely. Another question, which also relates to the second and third typology, has to do with the involvement of government partner(s) in partnerships: How effectively government organizations use their regulatory power to encourage collaborative solutions for environmental governance? In other words, under what circumstances it is more appropriate for government organizations to resort to or refrain from using regulatory policies to solve an environmental dispute?

The second typology, which basically attempts to apply Wilson's (1989) theoretical framework about political environments surrounding public bureaucracies to the issue at hand, has aimed to underlie the importance of varying institutional contexts for environmental public-private partnerships. It implies that policy makers and government managers need to pay attention to how the distribution of benefits and costs stemming from their very decisions and actions would encourage or discourage different groups to search for more collaborative solutions to environmental problems. An interesting research question to pursue is the extent to which existing environmental partnerships are products of coalitions between "the green and greedy", and what kinds of facilitative roles, if any, government representatives have played in creating and sustaining those coalitions.

The third typology has a more direct intent on analyzing the role of public partner(s) in and around public-private partnerships. Although the four categories identified are far from being seamless, the typology could be utilized as an analytical tool to better understand the leverages

that various government organizations may use in different policy contexts and under different circumstances. As explained earlier, this typology in part supposes easily identifiable role(s) for government organization(s) involved in partnerships. A logical question to ask is whether and how we can precisely gauge the extent to which "government authority" and "public money" are used to support any given partnership endeavor. Still another question has to do with the participation of public organizations from all levels of government: Are there significant variations between federal, state, and local government organizations in terms of their roles in and around environmental public-private partnerships? If yes, then, in which ways and to what effect do these variations determine the formation and functioning of these collaborative entities?

Although they have not so far been discussed in relation with the typologies offered in this paper, two research topics seem worth pointing out here. The first topic concerns the similarities and dissimilarities of environmental public-private partnerships vis-a-vis partnerships formed in such other issue areas as education and local economic development. This can be investigated, for instance, by identifying a couple of dimensions, such as varying roles played by organizations coming from different sectors (i.e., public, private, and non-profit) in the formation and functioning of public-private partnerships in those different policy arenas, and then comparing typical cases from each policy domain on those dimensions. A typical question may read like this: What roles and functions non-profit organizations do frequently carry in educational public-private partnerships (e.g., 'service provider', 'trouble-shooter') compared to those in environmental public-private partnerships (e.g., 'activist', 'lobbyist')?

Alternatively, some selective issues common to most organizational settings, such as information asymmetries can be targeted for further research within and across different policy domains. For instance, Turner et al. (1993) submit that one of the inefficiencies associated with command-and control (CAC) environmental policies is the existence of information asymmetries between regulators and regulated. They state that "CAC requires the regulator to use up resources to acquire information that polluters already possess. For example, polluters know far better than government what it will cost to abate or clean-up waste emissions. Yet, under the CAC approach, governments must obtain this information" (p. 144). In a similar vein, Cummings et al. (1988) provide arguments for the existence of

information asymmetries in public-private partnerships pertaining to urban development. They submit that "the partners do not have equal access to information. A firm's operations and locational requirements are only selectively shared with the outside world, whereas local government provides virtually complete information about its state. The corporation knows just what is necessary for a city government to provide in order to attract the facility, while city officials are not privy to that information." (p.36). Thus, it can be worth investigating how information asymmetries play out in different policy domains, and what kinds of leverages public partners have to meet the challenges stemming from their existence.

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