

The First and the Only Option: The War Analysis of Bush’s Personality and Decision Making Process of Iraq War

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Abstract

On March 17, George W. Bush declared an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein. In his words, he asked from Saddam to give up from Baghdad and he gave 48 hours to Saddam Hussein and his two sons in order to leave Iraq. He added the confrontation will be resulted with military conflict. On March 2003, a surprise invasion was started to Iraq by the US-led coalition. Investigating backstage of the war decision is important because Iraq War was the most important hard power policy of the US since the Vietnam War. While the paper has no intention to analyze the Iraq War in detail, it mostly deals with decision-making process of the invasion by focusing on Bush’s personality. The paper uses Leadership Trait Analysis as strategy in order to measure George W. Bush’s conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits to explore whether these traits lead the US to the war. Within this context, conceptual complexity, self-confidence and hard power discourse were analyzed through content analysis in QDA software program. While the analysis

Submission Date: 1/05/2020

Acceptance Date: 7/06/2020

Contemporary Research in Economics and Social Sciences Vol: 4 Issue: 1 Year: 2020, pp. 65-88

finds out that after September 11, Bush had low conceptual complexity and high self-confidence in along with increasing hard power discourse, Hermann's (2005) openness to information model was applied. The paper concludes that when self-confidence is higher than conceptual complexity, the leaders tend to be closed to information and they make decisions according to their images and truths.

Keywords: Foreign Policy Analysis, Iraq War, George W. Bush, Leadership Trait Analysis, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, Hermann

İlk ve Tek Seçenek: Savaş

Bush'un Karakter Analizi ve Irak Savaşı'nın Karar Alma Süreci

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Öz

17 Mart tarihinde, George W. Bush Saddam Hüseyin'e bir ultimatoma verdi. Sözlerinde Saddam'dan Bağdat'ı teslim etmesini ve iki oğluyla birlikte Bağdat'ı 48 saat içerisinde terk etmesini istiyordu. Ayrıca, herhangi bir meydan okumanın da askeri bir çatışmayla sonuçlanacağını eklemişti. Mart 2003'te ise Amerika Birleşik Devletleri önderliğindeki koalisyon güçleri tarafından sürpriz bir işgal başlatıldı. Savaş kararının arka planını incelemek önem teşkil etmektedir çünkü Irak Savaşı, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Vietnam Savaşından sonra izlediği en önemli askeri güç politikası sayılmaktadır. Bu çalışma Irak Savaşını detaylıca incelemekten ziyade, George W. Bush'un karakterine yoğunlaşarak savaşın karar alma süreci ile ilgilenmektedir. Makale, Lider Kişilik Analizi (LTA) stratejisi aracılığıyla Bush'un bilişsel kapasitesini ve özgüvenini ölçerek, bu özelliklerin ne derecede Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ni savaşa götüren etkenler olduğunu ortaya çıkarma eğilimindedir. Bu bağlamda, bilişsel kapasite, özgüven ve sert güç söylemleri içerik analizi metodu ile QDA yazılım programında incelenmiştir. Yapılan analizde Bush'un özellikle 11 Eylül sonrası bilişsel kapasitesinde azalma, özgüven özelliğinde ve sert güç söyleminde artma tespit edilmiş olup, Hermann'ın (2005) yeni bilgiye açıklık modeli uygulanmıştır. Ç-

lıřma, 6zgüven skorunun biliřsel kapasiteden yüksek olduęunda, liderlerin yeni bilgiye kapalı olması ve kararlarını kendi yarattıkları imajlara ve doęrulara göre verdikleri tartışmasıyla sonuçlandırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dıř Politika Analizi, Irak Savařı, George W. Bush, Lider Kiřilik Analizi, Biliřsel Kapasite, 6zgüven, Hermann

1. Introduction

On September 11, nineteen terrorists who are members of Al-Qaeda launched an attack to World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. The attacks resulted with nearly 3000 casualties including terrorists and over 10 billion U.S \$ damage. There is no doubt that the attacks were completely shocking and devastating for the US, which is considered as the superpower of the world politics. After one month, the US government decided to start an invasion to Afghanistan. The other crucial turning point was the starting meetings over Iraq between Bush administration and Defense Secretary. On November 27, Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld met in order to discuss the possible operation plan to Iraq, which was named OPLAN 1003-98 Unlikely to Afghanistan, there was no concrete evidence for Iraq and Saddam's network with Al-Qaeda that makes possible military operation acceptable in the eye of the US public and international community.

When it comes to 2002, President Bush started to seek the ways, which enable him to justify an operation to Iraq. He imaged Iraq as the axis of evil and accused Saddam administration to have and hide weapons of mass destruction. He also added Iraq should not have WMDs or biological weapons, otherwise, the US strictly will not allow them to have these weapons. After one year from the terrorist attacks, President Bush started to give official signs of any possible militaristic operation to Iraq in his speech on the United Nations meeting. The NATO allies on the other side had no consensus about invasion of Iraq, while the US and the UK insisted on a militaristic operation, countries such as France and Germany demanded to seek policies, which indicate diplomacy or audit for weapons. Meanwhile, Saddam administration completely denied the claims of presence of the weapons of mass destruction or biological weapons within Iraq borders.

Resolution 1441 of the United Nations Security Council was accepted by the Iraqi government in 2002. Following acceptance of the resolution, a committee started inspections in Iraq and they reported that there is no adequate evidence for Iraq's WMDs and nuclear program. However, then secretary of state of the US Colin Powell claimed

that Iraq is hiding the weapons in his United Nations speech. He also provided several “evidences” which show Iraq’s network with Al-Qae-da. Afterwards of these negotiations, countries such as the UK, Poland, Spain and Denmark and the US started to preparations for the invasion in 2003. Furthermore, President Bush mentioned Iraq in his public speech and he gave 48 hours of duration for Saddam to leave from Baghdad. On March 2003, General Tommy Franks announced the invasion to Iraq with the ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ code name.

After one day from the invasion, the conducted public opinion surveys showed that 76% of the Americans support the operation on Iraq. There is no doubt that Bush’s role in mobilizing the masses was a significant turning point during the decision-making process of the invasion. Furthermore, he is marked as one of the pro-active presidents in American history, which can take public support for the hard power policy. In the decision making process of Iraqi War, President Bush’s personality and character have important effect as much as state-level decisions. In other words, personality, perceptions, beliefs or images of Bush have important effect in making decision of one of the significant wars in current world history and reshaping regional/international balances in international relations.

As Erişen (2012) indicates, examining psychological qualities of the leaders can provide insights about the foreign policy decision-making, thus analyzing personality holds crucial place in the foreign policy analysis because leader’s success intensely related with their personalities. Correspondingly, examining Bush’s personality is important in the analysis of Iraq War because of several reasons. First, Iraqi War is one of the important events that took place after September 11 under the justification of war on terror. In other words, the war is associated with efforts to prevent religious-motivated terrorism in the world. There is no doubt this justification is mentioned by Bush many times in his speeches. Secondly, although the war gained public opinion through Bush’s mobilization efforts in the first phase, it is understood that Bush’s and his administration’s choice about the war had many misperceptions and miscalculations which provide a broader perspective on misperception

studies in foreign policy analysis. At least but not last, the war was described as Bush's personal issue which was started by his father in first Gulf War that needed to finish.

This paper aims to investigate one of the crucial events of current world politics Iraqi War by analyzing Bush's personality. Within this context, the paper benefits from Hermann's leadership trait analysis. In this direction, the data provided from American Rhetoric website which includes Bush's public speeches, interviews, press conferences and announcements from 2000 (Presidential nomination victory speech) to 2020 in pdf and mp3 files. By analyzing traits of Bush between the periods of pre-September 11 and pre-Iraq War, the paper aims to answer the question of 'How President Bush's traits shaped the decision of Iraq War?'. In order to provide an answer to this question, I use content analysis as the method. Furthermore, one of the biggest purposes of the study is to show the changes in Bush's traits to foreign policy analysis literature by providing a comprehensive perspective.

2. Theoretical Framework

Image is described as under the complex and difficult circumstances, decision-makers seek the ways, which enable them to simplify the complexities. These created images help decision makers to solve the problems in the chaotic environment. The images, which are created in accordance with the individuals' needs affect their perceptions, beliefs, worldviews, even their decisions for war and peace (Erişen, 2015). Leaders, who create these images in order to explain the meaning of the circumstances and their environments in the first phase, believe that their images are real and they want to make them acceptable to other people. When the decision-makers feel under the pressure, they use these images to get rid of the stress. In some cases, the leaders behave in accordance with the images which they create, therefore images might call as reasons/motivated reasoning rather than reality.

Images are the necessary tools for decision makers in order to solve the complexities during decision-making and decision-practicing processes. While there are lots of information that leader needed to know

or learn, images ease evaluating process of this information. On the other side images might be both positive and negative. In Iraq War, Bush's images on Saddam can be categorized as negative/enemy images. In the pre-war period, Bush imaged Saddam as enemy or evil, furthermore he had great efforts to prove the reality of his images to international community as well as his allies. He also imaged the invasion as war on terror in order to rationalize his policies. He not only organized self-image process but also he used the media as an effective tool in order to make his Saddam and Iraq's images reliable.

3. Review of Literature

International politics is consisted of various actors whose relations are quite complicated. In order to ease the analysis, international relations scholars have used different level of analysis, which were indicated as international level, state level and individual level by Waltz. After the Cold War, foreign policy analysis has attracted many scholars' attention in order to bring rational explanations to foreign policies of the states by using these levels of analysis. Furthermore, scholars of foreign policy analysis have benefited from multifactorial and multilevel researches while conducting a study however, in the first phase the researches in the FPA literature were limited with mostly state and system level of analysis by neglecting psychological characteristics of the individuals.

Examining foreign policy decisions and attitudes without considering leader/individual level may provide inaccurate information to the researcher. Remarkable numbers of studies have shown that foreign policy decisions are closely related with personality of the leader. By analyzing personality of the leader provide many evidences about his/her beliefs, perceptions, worldview etc. therefore, personality enables researcher to interpret next possible move of the states. According to Erişen (2015), personality has two types of effect during the foreign policy decision-making process: first, it reacts the leader's persona by exploring his/her perception and worldview; secondly, it provides perceptual and cognitional information about how a leader can benefit from his/her team and the organizational design.

Analyzing the leader holds significant place in the political psychology literature within foreign policy decision-making process. As Levy (2013) argues influence of the leader's desires and fears play significant role in decision-making process. In terms of cognitive view, these desires and emotions may create "motivated biases," or motivated reasoning, which is triggered by the leaders' emotional needs, by their desire to remain self-esteem, and by their interests—diplomatic, political, organizational, or personal. As Levy (2013) indicates, motivated reasoning provides to rationalize policies that support one's interests and emotional needs. Similar to Levy's statements, there is consensus about Bush's motivated reasoning enabled him to justify his hard-power policy towards Iraq by projecting the invasion as democratization of Iraq, war on terrorism or saving Iraqis from the authoritarian cruel leader.

There are remarkable number of studies which indicate that examining personality is a useful tool in analyzing foreign policy decision making in terms of providing predictions and clear explanations. Smith (2013) underlines that ideology and personal characteristics of the leader may intensely affect the way in which information is evaluated, therefore personality of the leader naturally affects the decisional outputs in foreign affairs. Besides ideology, cognition is another significant factor to perception, and the way in which a leader perceives the world, herself/himself or his/her enemy is crucial to explaining why some decisions are taken and others bypassed (Jervis, 1976). Furthermore, Margaret Hermann (1980) argues that by analyzing idiosyncrasies, features and personality traits, interpretations towards foreign policy decision-making process might be made because these explanations help to create a clear picture of likely personal behavior.

Regarding to the Iraq War, analysis of Bush's personality heavily relies on biographical studies in the foreign policy analysis literature. According to Lieberfeld (2005) Bush had personal motives for invasion of Iraq, he considered Saddam Hussein as a deadly rival which his family engaged in a war with him since first Gulf War. Correspondingly, "going to war with Iraq may have enhanced the younger Bush's sense of his own virility, given his sensitivity to the fact that his father had

been publicly labeled a wimp” (Lieberfeld, 2005; p. 14). Furthermore, Immelman (2002) uses Millon’s personological model in order to analyze Bush’s political personality. He concludes that “George W. Bush’s major personality-based leadership strengths are the important political skills of charisma and interpersonality — a personable, confident, socially responsive, outgoing tendency that will enable him to connect with critical constituencies, mobilize popular support, and retain a following and his self-confidence in the face of adversity” (Immelman, 2002; p. 19)

Besides biographical analysis of Bush, many studies have been conducted in order to explore President Bush’s operational code. Dyson (2010) as one of the scholars who commonly use operational code analysis finds out that George W. Bush’s distinctive characteristics and decision style prepared required circumstances for the hastily decision for invasion to Iraq. He concludes that President Bush’s individual personality had a significant effect on decisions which were made on the foreign affairs.

Renshon (2008) argues that Bush’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs have significant changes between the different times of his political life. He observed that there are statistically significant changes in two operational code features: “Nature of the Political Universe and Realization of Political Values” changed along with Bush’s role changed from candidate to president (Renshon, 2008). He concludes that September 11 as a traumatic event causes these changes in Bush’s operational code.

While many strategies have been used by foreign policy analysts, leadership traits analysis of Hermann is commonly used one among them. Hermann defines the leadership style as “the ways in which leaders relate to those around them – whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders – and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions” (Hermann, 2005, p. 181).

According to Breuning (2007), Leadership Trait Analysis provides necessary information about the leader’s personal features, which are

related with foreign policy decision making through set of questions. These questions have been used by many FPA scholars to predict decision-makers' attitudes and behaviors in the literature. Furthermore, methodologically strong characteristics of the LTA have provided foreign policy scholars the tool which they need to find out answer for significant theoretical questions, for instance why there is difference among leaders and their tendency to follow risky policies.

Foreign policy analysis scholars have long discussed and empirically observed that, among the seven leadership traits, cognitive complexity has a critical effect on decision-makers' information processing and their reactions to environmental factors. For instance, Schafer et al. (2010) observed that George W. Bush's conceptual complexity score is higher than the other presidents such as Carter, Clinton, or G. H. W. Bush. However they argue that using the words 'maybe, possibly, perhaps' might not mean that Bush is a complex thinker, these words might be also related with confusion, his uncertain feelings, or some doubts about the issue. In addition to this, the study underlines that Bush's conceptual complexity does not necessarily mean that this feature has an effect on foreign policy decisions (might be related with domestic issues).

The other study which was conducted by Shannon and Keller (2007), finds out that Bush's conceptual complexity score is relatively low from Clinton and the other world leaders' average by analyzing George W. Bush's 74 interview responses. Correspondingly, Yang (2010) argues that George W. Bush's low-complexity score also indicates that the way of his information processing is heavily relies on black and white. He is also more tend to describe the contextual factors and the environment in certain terms by intensely stereotyping the concepts or terms. On the other side, Preston and Hermann (2004) interpret that relatively low score of conceptual complexity leads President Bush to being intensely depend on the inner circle of the advisory group who are like-minded advisors during the foreign policy decision-making process.

In the foreign policy analysis literature, investigating conceptual complexity among personality traits holds significant place due to its

intense effect on foreign policy decisions. While high conceptual complexity is associated with high level of openness and being open to the new information, Breuning (2007) argues that low conceptual complexity might be associated with more aggressive state behavior, including less tendency on diplomacy and high tendency to take action in foreign policies. He observed that George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair who corporate during the Iraq invasion in 2003, both had low conceptual complexity. At least but not last, Dille (2000) observed that while conceptual complexity of Reagan changes in accordance with the contextual factors, George W. Bush's conceptual complexity remains low and it does not change from one event to another.

In the literature, one of the studies, which analyzes President Bush's traits before and after September 11 belongs to Schuring (2018), she argues that George W. Bush's traits remained approximately same except 'in-group bias' and 'distrust towards others'. She observed that George Bush become more biased towards his group after September 11 and his distrust to others score relatively increased compare to the pre-September 11 period. In the literature of foreign policy analysis, leaders whose scores are high in distrust to others and in-group bias traits, are more likely to be closed to information. Moreover, these leaders are more tend to make the decision according to their own concepts, beliefs or experiences (Hermann, 2005).

By considering these studies and strategies, which are mentioned above, the following hypotheses are designed in order to analyze George W. Bush's leadership traits analysis between the years 2000 and 2003 (till beginning of the Iraq War. The reason behind the determination of these periods is to show how Bush's traits changed and lead him to make decision of invasion to Iraq.

H1: Decrease in conceptual complexity trait of Bush after September 11 eased decision of Iraq war.

H2: Increase in self-confidence trait of Bush after September 11 eased decision of Iraq War.

4. Conceptualization and Operationalization

For the first hypothesis, Hermann (2005) defines conceptual complexity as “the degree of differentiation which an individual shows in describing or discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things” (Hermann, 2005; p. 22). Through this trait, I assume that Bush’s conceptual complexity decreased after September 11 terrorist attacks, and he made more certain categorizations. For instance, he labelled the countries, which he thinks they have bond with Al-Qaeda as enemies, he categorized the countries, which condemned the attacks and announced that they are with the US in this war on terror as allies or friends. I conceptualize the second concept of the first hypothesis: decision of Iraq War as his mentions or implications, which include hard-power policies towards Iraq during his speeches (the UN meeting). The first concept of the second hypothesis, self-confidence is described as “Self-confidence indicates one’s sense of self-importance, an individual’s image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment” (Hermann, 2005; p. 20), on the other side, the dependent variable’s conceptualization might be considered as same with the first hypothesis.

For the operationalization of the concepts within the hypotheses, Hermann (2005) makes clear distinctions. She argues that when a leader’s cognitive traits are analyzed, the researcher should avoid of focusing on too narrow time period, because it might provide misinformation or miscalculations about the traits. Secondly, she discusses that LTA should be analyzed at least fifty interviews/resources which include minimum one hundred words. In this context, both traits in the hypotheses might be analyzed through interviews, responses or speeches which were performed by George W. Bush. In order to measure conceptual complexity, the words such as “approximately, possibility, trend, and for example” (high conceptual complexity) or with the words: “absolutely, without a doubt, certainly and irreversible” (low conceptual complexity) may help us (Hermann, 2005; p.22). Self-confidence can be measured through the words such as “my,” “myself,” “I,” “me”,and “mine” rather than we, ours, our plan etc.” (Hermann, 2005; p.20).The second concept of the both hypotheses can be measured through the interviews or speeches of

Bush as well such as threatening, ultimatum to Iraq etc. Therefore, for this variable, I try to interpret the decision of Iraq war with the discourse which includes hard power words such as: 'army, strike, operation, security, enemy'. Furthermore, because the decision related with Iraq, I also add 'Iraq' into the analyzed words. At least but not last, the other counting word will be 'weapons'. The reason why I add this word into the analysis is George W. Bush accused Iraqi government to have or hide WMDs and biological weapons, therefore in the decision making process, I assume that he might mentioned 'weapon' word in his discourse intensely. To conclude, in order to measure hard-power discourse of President Bush, these following seven words will be analyzed: 'army, strike, operation, security, enemy, Iraq, weapon'.

5. Method

In order to measure President Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits, 'at-a-distance method' is used within content analysis by using QDA software program. According to Schafer and Walker (2006) psychological traits of a leader can be analyzed from a distance because of inability to official access to the leader. While I have no any official evidence and access to Bush, I use this method in order to interpret his conceptual complexity, self-confidence traits and hard-power discourse.

6. Data Collection

The data, which measures President Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits, is collected from American Rhetoric.com (see detailed list of the speeches in Appendix A). It covers public speeches, interviews, responses in press conferences or in radio programs of George W. Bush from December 13, 2000 presidential nomination victory speech to 2020 in script and audio versions. However, in order to measure my hypotheses, I use three phases:

First phase: From December 13, 2000-, presidential nomination victory speech to September 11, 2001- Remarks on WTC Attacks at Booker T. Elementary School

Second phase: From 11 September 2001- Remarks on WTC Attacks at Booker T. Elementary School to January 8, 2002- No Child Left Behind Act Signing Address

Third phase: From January 8, 2002- No Child Left Behind Act Signing Address to 17 March 2003- Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein Address to the Nation

While the first phase includes seven speeches, the second phase covers 15 and the third phase is formed by 12 scripts. In the third phase, 3 speeches of Bush were excluded because their script versions were not available (only audio form). Unit of the content analysis is word counting by looking at the frequencies of the words (see the codebook in Appendix B). Furthermore, during the collection of the data, some sentences were excluded from the collected scripts. For instance, during the Bush's visit to workers, the sentences of workers, or during a press conference, sentences of the journalists were excluded.

7. Data Analysis

In order to analyze George W. Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits, three phases were investigated separately. As it is mentioned above, "absolutely, without a doubt, certainly and irreversible" words were coded under conceptual complexity trait in accordance with Hermann's (2005) manual. On the other side, "my, myself, I, me and mine" words were counted and coded in order to measure Bush's self-confidence trait.

For conceptual complexity, the word 'absolutely' is used by Bush for the one time, without doubt/there is no doubt words were used two times. 'Certainly' word has the highest ranking among other coded words with six times. Furthermore, certainly word, which indicate completely opposite meaning from his self-confidence, were excluded for instance, "Many people are finding that the more they know about stem cell research, the less certain they are about the right ethical and moral conclusions". When self-confidence trait was analyzed in the first phase, it is observed that frequencies of 'my' is 73, 'myself' is 0, 'I' 141, 'me' is 23 and 'mine' is 2. Furthermore, for this step, it is also

observed that Bush intensely uses 'my administration' instead of 'we' which might increase more his self-confidence.

In the second phase, the words of conceptual complexity "absolutely, without a doubt, certainly and irreversible" were counted. According to counting, frequencies of 'absolutely' is 2, 'without doubt/no doubt' is 3, 'certainly' is 9, 'irreversible' is 0. About conceptual complexity, besides certainly words, some of the words such as 'it is certain' were also coded under conceptual complexity. In the analysis of self-confidence in the second phase, the frequencies of 'my' is 70, 'myself' is 2, 'I' is 238, 'me' is 19 and 'mine' is 0.

In the last phase, while the word 'absolutely' was not used by George W. Bush, the frequencies of the words 'without doubt/there is no doubt' are 6, 'certainly/it is certain' is 10 and 'irreversible' is 0. When self-confidence trait words were analyzed, it is observed that the frequencies of 'my' is 77, 'myself' and 'mine' are 0, 'I' is 257, and 'me' is 13. When all of these three phases were analyzed, frequencies of the conceptual complexity's and self-confidence's words turned into percentage in order to provide more clear numbers in comparison of the phases.

In order to analyze the dependent variable of two hypothesis, decision of Iraq War 'army, strike, operation, security, enemy, Iraq, weapon' words counted. In the first phase the frequencies of army, strike, enemy, Iraq words are 0, operation is 1, security is 18 however, none of them is included under hard power discourse because while he mentions security, he refers to Medicare social and health security. The frequency of weapon word is 2. In the second phase which includes September 11 terrorist attacks, frequencies of army is 1, strike is 11, operation is 3, security is 25, enemy is 17, Iraq is 6, weapon is 28. In the last phase, the frequencies of army are 2, strike is 10, operation is 10, security is 106, enemy is 9, Iraq is 220, weapon is 125. For the first insight, I assume that President Bush made Iraq war decision in the last phase, between the years 2002 and 2003, rather than post-September 11 period.

Table 1: George W. Bush’s conceptual complexity and self-confidence scores by percentage

PHASES	<i>Conceptual complexity</i>	<i>Self-confidence</i>	<i>Hard-power discourse</i>
<i>Phase 1</i>	% 0.05	% 1.15	% 0.02
<i>Phase 2</i>	% 0.06	% 1.4	% 0.43
<i>Phase 3</i>	% 0.07	% 1.9	% 1.6

Although it is recognized that there has been little room for possibility of change in the leadership traits of a leader, I believe that contextual factors might trigger the changes within their characteristics. Correspondingly, Van Esch and Swinkels (2015) argue that the scores in traits of some leaders might be more changeable, due to this change, a leader’s leadership style might not remain same through the time. By considering this feature of LTA, these little changes among traits between the phases were the expected outcome (I did not assume major changes within Bush’s traits).

When Table 1 is analyzed, conceptual complexity of George W. Bush increased from .05 to .07. By considering the words of ‘low conceptual complexity’ were analyzed, it means that George Bush uses the words of low conceptual complexity more through the phases. In other words, President Bush uses more low conceptual complexity words between the years January 8, 2002 and March 17, 2003 compare to the years between 2000 and 2002. On the other side, self-confidence score of President Bush from December 2000 to September 11, 2001 increases gradually between the time period of 11 September 2001 - January 2002 and January 2002- March 17, 2003.

When hard power discourse was analyzed, there is significant increase in hard-power discourse after second phase which covers September 11 terrorist attacks. However, when their frequencies are considered, it is observed that George W. Bush uses hard power discourse in the third phase approximately five times more than the second phase (frequencies of hard power words: second phase 91, third phase 482). To conclude, from the content analysis, it is observed that George W.

Bush's low conceptual complexity discourse and self-confidence trait increased gradually with his hard power discourse from 2000 to March 17, 2003 speech - Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein.

8. Discussion

While leaders whose conceptual complexity is low highly associated with trusting their intuition and they are more tend to choose the option, which presents itself first. Moreover, these leaders evaluate the information according to their stereotypes and categorizations. Correspondingly, leaders who have high self-confidence are less likely to seek more information or less likely to evaluate different options during the foreign policy decision-making process. Following Hermann's (2005) footsteps, she argues that conceptual complexity and self-confidence are intensely interrelated items, which are linked with openness to information.

Table 2: Hermann's Rules for Determining Openness to Information

Scores on Conceptual Complexity & Self-confidence	Openness to Contextual Information
Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence	Open
Self-Confidence > Conceptual Complexity	Closed
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence both high	Open
Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence both low	Closed

While my analysis indicated that President Bush's self-confidence is higher than his conceptual complexity in the third phase, I can interpret that during decision-making process Bush was closed to information. Similarly, Hermann (2005) describes these leaders as follows.

“Such leaders are fairly unresponsive or insensitive to cues from the environment. Instead, they reinterpret the environment to fit their view of the world. Moreover, they are not above using coercive or devious tactics to ensure that their views are adopted by a group. Indeed, they are highly active on behalf of their cause, eagerly pursuing options they believe will succeed. These leaders are more likely to organize the

decision-making process in a hierarchical manner in order to maintain control over the nature of the decision”.

Hermann, 2005; p.18

To sum, by considering the outcome of the content analysis, I assume that while Bush’s conceptual complexity decreases, self-confidence increases during the third phase. Correspondingly his hard power discourses also increased from 2000 to 2003. Therefore, I assume that low conceptual complexity and high self-confidence lead to Bush’s closeness to information and possible alternatives. He made the decision of Iraq War, which is considered as a mistake by both Bush administration and the US public later.

I believe that through this analysis, I could explain the decision-making process of invasion to Iraq by focusing on openness to information in addition to conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits. In other words, openness to information might be considered as the last piece of my puzzle, which tries to view decision-making process of Iraq War.

9. Conclusion

There is little doubt that September 11 terrorist attacks to World Trade Center and Pentagon might be considered as a milestone, which has changed world politics in significant manner. Afterwards the attacks, which had nearly 3000 casualties, American foreign policy has radically changed. American foreign policy not only changed in terms of priorities and goals but also Bush and his administration started to follow more aggressive and expansionist policies in foreign affairs. One of the significant decisions that indicate aggressiveness of the US foreign policy was certainly Iraq War. Remarkable number of studies have proved that role of President Bush cannot be underestimated during the decision-making process of the invasion. The way of his justification the invasion and his ability to mobilize the media and public opinion enabled him to make the decision the most important war in current American history since the Vietnam War.

There are increasing number of studies that focus on individual level in foreign policy analysis literature and analyzing George W. Bush's personality took many researches' attention. While various strategies has been used by foreign policy researchers, leadership traits analysis is one of the most common methods which provides detailed information through its seven items. This study also used LTA and tried to provide insights about George W. Bush's conceptual complexity and self-confidence traits by considering his power discourse in order to analyze the decision making process of Iraq War through content analysis. In this direction, the years between 2000 and 2003 are divided into three different phases. While the first phase starts with his first presidential nomination victory speech in 2002 to 11 September 2001, the second phase was analyzed from September 2001 to January 2002. The last phase covers the years between 2002 and 17 March 2003 (his ultimatum to Saddam Hussein).

As result of conducted content analysis of these three phases, it is observed that President Bush's low conceptual complexity score increased between the years 2002 and 17 March 2003 compare to the other phases. Furthermore, it is detected that Bush's self-confidence traits gradually increased through the three phases. When George Bush's hard power discourse is examined, the analysis proved that after September 11, his words related with hard power increased, hence it reaches peak point between the years 2002 and 17 March 2003 among all the phases. When I found out that between the years 2002 and 17 March 2003 George W. Bush's conceptual complexity decreases and his self-confidence increases, I added Hermann's openness to information model into the analysis. I conclude that, during the third phase, his openness to information trait diminished and by doing so, he made invasion decision more easily because perhaps he did not evaluate other options or possibilities. In other words, as Hermann (2005) argues leaders whose self-confidence traits are higher than their conceptual complexity, they tend to choose the first option according to their stereotypes. To sum, because of his low conceptual complexity and high self-confidence, George W. Bush closed himself to more options, and he chose the first and the only option that came to his mind: the war.

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APPENDIX A (Analyzed list of George W. Bush's speeches)

First Phase (13 December 2000 - 11 September 2001)

13 December 2000	Presidential Nomination Victory Speech
20 January 2001	First Presidential Inaugural Address
22 January 2001	White House Staff Swearing In Ceremony Address
29 January 2001	Faith Based Initiatives Executive Order Signing Speech
01 February 2001	First National Prayer Breakfast Address
27 February 2001	Joint Session of Congress Address
09 August 2001	Stem Cell Research Address to the Nation

Second Phase (11 September 2001- 8 January 2002)

11 September 2001	Remarks on WTC Attacks at Booker T. Elementary School
11 September 2001	Remarks on the WTC Attacks at Barksdale AFB
11 September 2001	Address to the Nation on the WTC Attacks
14 September 2001	Bullhorn Address to Ground Zero Workers
14 September 2001	9/11 Prayer and Remembrance Ceremony Address
15 September 2001	First Radio Address Post 9/11
17 September 2001	Address at the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C
20 September 2001	Post 9/11 Address to a Joint Session of Congress
07 October 2001	Operation Enduring Freedom Address to the Nation
11 October 2001	Pentagon Memorial Ceremony Address
11 October 2001	Prime Time News Conference on War on Terrorism
26 October 2001	USA Patriot Act Signing Address
10 November 2001	First Address to the United Nations General Assembly

11 December 2001 Address to Citadel Cadets
11 December 2001 “The World Will Always Remember 9/11”

Third Phase (8 January 2002- 17 March 2003)

08 January 2002 No Child Left Behind Act Signing Address
29 January 2002 First Presidential State of the Union Address
30 April 2002 Address on Compassionate Conservatism
01 June 2002 U.S. Military Academy Commencement
Address
24 June 2002 Israel-Palestine Two-State Solution Address
12 September 2002 Second Address to the United Nations
General Assembly
07 October 2002 Speech in Cincinnati on the Threat of Iraq
28 January 2003 Second Presidential State of the Union
Address
01 February 2003 Space Shuttle Colombia Tragedy
Announcement
04 February 2003 Space Shuttle Colombia Memorial Address
26 February 2003 Address on the Future of Iraq
17 March 2003 Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein Address to the
Nation

· See the whole list of speeches on <https://www.americanrhetoric.com/gwbushspeeches.htm>

APPENDIX B (CODEBOOK of the Content Analysis)

Codes (Conceptual Complexity)	Examples
Absolutely	I am absolutely determined, absolutely determined to rout terrorism out where it exists and bring them to justice.
Without a doubt/ there is no doubt	And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons.
Certainly/it is certain	This nation respects and trusts our military, and we are confident in your victories to come. This war will take many turns we cannot predict. Yet I am certain of this
Irreversible	
Codes (Self-confidence)	Examples
My	As a symbol of America's resolve, my administration will work with Congress
Myself	Baby boomers such as myself, were used to getting caught in a quagmire of Vietnam where politics made decisions more than the military sometimes
I	I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty.
Me	I ask the House and Senate to join me in the next bold steps to serve our fellow citizens.
Mine	And that's why two administrations -- mine and President Clinton's
Codes (Hard Power Discourse)	Examples
Army	With all in the United States Army, you will stand between your fellow citizens and grave danger.
Strike	Military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world
Operation	I've talked to many countries that are interested in making sure that the post-operations Afghanistan is one that is stable, and one that doesn't become yet again a haven for terrorist criminals.
Security	Our security will require transforming the military you will lead.
Enemy	The man and women of our Armed Forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the United States
Iraq	Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.
Weapon	By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.