


#### CITATION

Harun IŞIK, "Eş'ari Geleneğinde Bir Mütakallim Olan Gazzâlî'de Bilgi Teorisi", *Bozok University Journal of Faculty of Theology [BOZİFDER]*, 17, (2020/17) pp. 325-348.



## THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF AL-GHAZZÂLÎ, AL-MUTAKALLİM IN ASH'ARI TRADITION

Eş'ari Geleneğinde Bir Mütakallim Olan Gazzâlî'de Bilgi Teorisi

### Harun IŞIK

Doç. Dr.,

Erciyes Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi, Temel İslam Bilimleri Bölümü.

Assoc. Prof.,

Erciyes University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Basic Islamic Sciences.

[harun@erciyes.edu.tr](mailto:harun@erciyes.edu.tr), Orcid: 0000-0002-0818-6482.

#### Abstract

Ghazzâlî addressed the problem of knowledge systematically and for a purpose. Thus, his theory of knowledge has Allah-centered structure. Because, the source of the knowledge about the field of physics or metaphysics is Allah, and the main purpose of the knowledge is to know Allah. Senses, reason and intuition bestowed on man are appreciated as a means to reach this truth. Three elements come to the fore especially in the definition of knowledge. The first of these is the knowing (nafs), the second is the known (the truth of the goods) and the third is the knowledge (the imagination of the stuff in the nafs). According to him, there are two types of information fields, one related to physics and the other is related to the metaphysical realm. The way to get the first one is senses and reason. The second one is reached with inspiration. The knowledge reached through the heart's eye is superior to that obtained through senses and reason. Counting inspiration among sources of information is a stance that combines 'ilm al-kalâm and mysticism. The fact that he expresses the theory of knowledge in a metaphorical style both makes the issue more understandable and reveals his difference.

**Keywords:** Kalâm, Ash'arite, Ghazzâlî, Knowledge, Senses, Reason, Inspiration.

#### Öz

Gazzâlî bilgi problemini sistematik bir şekilde ve bir amaca binaen ele almıştır. Nitekim onun bilgi kuramı Allah merkezli bir yapıdadır. Zira ister fizik, isterse metafizik alana dair bilgilerin kaynağı Allah'tır ve bilginin temel amacı da marifetullahı elde etmektir. İnsana bahşedilen duyular, akıl ve sezgi bu hakikate ulaşmak için birer vasıta olarak takdir edilmiştir. Bilgi tanımlamasında özellikle üç unsur ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bun-

#### KAYNAKÇA

Harun IŞIK, "Eş'ari Geleneğinde Bir Mütakallim Olan Gazzâlî'de Bilgi Teorisi", *Bozok Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi [BOZİFDER]*, 17, (2020/17) ss. 325-348. **Makale Geliş T:** 11/04/2020 **Kabul T:** 30/05/2020

**Makale Türü:** Çeviri Makalesi.

lardan ilki bilen (nefs), ikincisi bilinen (eşyanın hakikati), üçüncüsü de bilgidir (eşyanın misalinin nefiste bulunması). Ona göre biri fizik âlemlerle, diğeri de metafizik âlemlerle ilişkili olmak üzere iki tür bilgi alanı bulunmaktadır. Birincisini elde etmenin vasıtaları duyular ve akıldır. Diğeri ise ilham ve keşf yoluyla ulaşılır. Kalp gözüyle ulaşılan bilgi duyular ve akıl sayesinde elde edilenden üstündür. İlhamı bilgi kaynakları arasında sayması kelamı ve tasavvufu mezceden bir duruştur. Metaforik bir üslupla bilgi kuramını ifade etmesi, meseleyi hem daha anlaşılır kılmakta hem de onun farklılığını ortaya koymaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kelam, Eş'arilik, Gazzâlî, Bilgi, Duyular, Akıl, İlham.

## INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

It is imperative that the proofs of 'ilm al-kalām (Islamic theology) are based on solid and precise information because it talks about the principles of Islamic belief. At the same time, it is necessary of knowing what, why and how should be believed earlier on the belief. Therefore the subject of epistemology extremely important in 'ilm al-kalām and the definition of knowledge, its possibility, source, limit, etc. issues are discussed 'ilm al-kalām books.<sup>2</sup>

When the history of Islamic thought is examined, it will be seen that the epistemology problem was addressed a few centuries ago before Ghazzālî (d. 505/1111). As a matter of fact, although epistemology was firstly discussed between the Mu'tazilite theologians, it was observed that the first Islamic theologian who handled the epistemology systematically was Abū Mansur al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). This means that the problem of epistemology was considered on a preferential basis as the first means (wasā'il) in basing and explaining the subjects that constitute the issues (masā'il) of 'ilm al-kalām shows that it was taken into consideration from the earliest periods.<sup>3</sup>

Following the footsteps of the tradition before him, Ghazzālî con-

<sup>1</sup> This article is a reorganized English version of the paper presented at the International Imam Ash'ari and Ash'arite Symposium held in Siirt on 21-23 September 2014 and published in 2015.

<sup>2</sup> Temel Yeşilyurt, "Bilgi Kuramı", *Kelam El Kitabı*, ed. Şaban Ali Düzgün (Ankara: Grafiker Yay., 2012), 305.

<sup>3</sup> Abu Mansur Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Mahmud Māturīdī, *Kitāb al Tawhīd-Kitabu't-Tevhid Tercümesi*, trans. Bekir Topaloğlu (Ankara: İSAM Yayınları, 2002), 9-17; Emrullah Yüksel, "Âmidi ve Bazı Kelamcılarda Bilgi Teorisi", *Kelamda Bilgi Problemi*, İlahiyat Fakülteleri V. Kelam Anabilim Dalı Eğitim-Öğretim Meseleleri ve Koordinasyon Toplantısı ve "Kelamda Bilgi Problemi" Sempozyumu Bildirileri (Bursa: Arasta Yayınları, 2003), 3.

sidered the problem of epistemology in a theocentric way. Because, according to him, Allah is the only source of knowledge regarding the visible and invisible world, and the ultimate goal of it will be to know Allah.<sup>4</sup> Hence, the whole world of existence is a mirror that reflects the existence of Allah, and all the sciences are a premise and means for knowing Him. Accordingly, human, with the knowledge sources bestowed upon him by Allah, in the mirror of the visible world, especially his essence will know Allah, who is the owner of absolute knowledge, will, power and judgment, on the one hand, and will realize his weakness and need on the other. Thusly, Allah said the following:

*“We will show them Our signs in the horizons and within themselves until it becomes clear to them that it is the truth. But is it not sufficient concerning your Lord that He is, over all things, a Witness?”<sup>5</sup>*

*“And in yourselves. Then will you not see? And in the heaven is your provision and whatever you are promised.”<sup>6</sup>*

The ways to lead people to such consciousness are senses, reason and inspiration, as we will speak of later. As stated in his work *al-Iqtisād fī al-İtiqāt* (Median in Belief), the only way for man to achieve the happiness of the world and the hereafter is to see his poorness and ruthlessness in the face of Allah’s divineness, magnificence, beauty and glory. After that, he surrenders to Allah by living a life that is in favor of the sake of Him sincerely, without any doubts and hesitations, both heart and mind.<sup>7</sup> He expressed the importance of the knowledge and action relationship in the following words:

*“If a man has read and learned thousands of scientific issues, he cannot see the benefits unless he applies them.”<sup>8</sup>*

*“If you study a hundred years of education and learn by heart thou-*

<sup>4</sup> Abū Hamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Ghazzālī, *Ma’ārij al Quds-Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, trans. Serkan Özburun (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2002), 8.

<sup>5</sup> Al-Fussilat 41/53.

<sup>6</sup> Adh-Dhariyat 51/20-21

<sup>7</sup> Ghazzālī, *Al-Iqtisād fī al-İtiqāt-İtikadda Orta Yol*, trans. Kemal Işık (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi, 1971), 45.

<sup>8</sup> Ghazzālī, *Ayyuhā al-Walad-Majmu’at ar-Rasāil al-Imam al- Ghazzālī* (Beyrut; y.y., 1996), 258.

sands of books, you will not be able to get the mercy of Allah unless it is deemed to be an act.”<sup>9</sup>

When these expressions are considered at the core of the knowledge of Allah, responsible for reasons (*musabbul ul asbab*) and gaining the happiness of the hereafter which they are the final goal of the knowledge, the information that does not give these results is considered to be far from beneficial in the epistemology of Ghazzālī because it is only for this world.

## 1. DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge, in the dictionary, means that “to grasp and realize the truth and nature of something”, “to grasp something in its real aspect, the exact belief that matches up with the truth, the formation of the shape of an object in the mind, to know the object as it is, the disappearance of the secrecy in the object, an adjective that ensures the comprehension of the universals and partials, the opposite of ignorance”. Knowledge is what derives from the relationship between the subject (human) who is wise, and the object (thing) to which he is directed. Regarding to knowledge as a divine attribute is defined as “Allah knows all objects and events belonging to both physical and metaphysical world.”<sup>10</sup> When the history of thought is examined, it is possible to mention the rationalism,<sup>11</sup> sensualism,<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Ghazzālī, *Ayyuhā al-Walad*, 258.

<sup>10</sup> Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, “İlim”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2002), 22: 108-109; İlhan Kutluer, “İlim”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2000,) 22: 109.

<sup>11</sup> Rationalism, advocated by Aristotle (384-322 BC), Descartes (d. 1650) in the 17th century, and Kant (d. 1804) in the 18th century, accepts reason and thought as the source of human knowledge. Orhan Hançerlioğlu, *Düşünce Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970), 216; Hüsamettin Erdem, *Bazı Felsefe Meseleleri* (Konya: Hüner Yayınları, 1998), 57-59; A. Kadir Çüçen, *Felsefeye Giriş*, 2. ed. (İstanbul: Asa Kitapevi, 2001), 104-105.

<sup>12</sup> Sensualism, represented by Epicure and his followers in the early ages, Hobbes (d. 1679) in the 17th century, and Condillac (d. 1780) in the 18th century, is the thought that accepts the sensations as the source and means of all the information we have. Bedia Akarsu, *Felsefe Terimleri Sözlüğü* (İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınları, 1998), 62; Süleyman Hayri Bolay, *Felsefi Doktrinler ve Terimler Sözlüğü* (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 1997), 126.

empiricism,<sup>13</sup> and intuitionism<sup>14</sup> currents as the source of information.

Different definitions of knowledge have been made in ‘ilm al-kalām from the time of predecessors (al mutaqaaddimūn) to late arrivals (al mutaahhirūn), however, a definition that has been allied on has not been reached. According to the first of these definitions, knowledge is believing something as it is.<sup>15</sup> This definition is considered insufficient because it does not make any difference between belief and knowledge, which is inadequate in terms of content and is included permissible taqlīd in the definition. Consequently, it is defined by al-Jubbāī (d. 303/916) as believing as it is because of obligatory information or positive proof being in the nature of the mind.<sup>16</sup> This definition has not also been accepted on the grounds that it does not contain all the parts of the definition and does not exclude the matters other than those described.<sup>17</sup>

In terms of al-Ash‘ari (d. 324/935-36) knowledge is something that requires anyone to be a scholar or to be given the name of a scholar. According to the third definition, knowledge is to be comprehended the known as it is.<sup>18</sup> Although the first two of these definitions are differentiated by calling “or”, both definitions have the same meanings. In addition, the cycle has occurred since knowledge “al-‘ilm (knowledge) is tried to be defined with knowing “al-‘ālim” (knowing) from the same root. In the third definition, the use of the word “ma‘lūm” (known) required the cycle. Besides, the “comprehension” in the definition is metaphorical and means knowledge (al-‘ilm). Therefore, making defi-

<sup>13</sup> According to the empiricism, which its representatives include Locke (d. 1704), Berkeley (d. 1753), Mill (d. 1873) and Spencer (d. 1903), the source of the information is the impressions which we perceive with our senses and ideas that constitutes a copy of the impressions. Macit Gökberk, *Felsefe Tarihi*, 13. ed. (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2002), 156.

<sup>14</sup> In intuitionism, which is characterised Ishraqiun in the Islamic world and became a philosophical discipline thanks to Bergson (d. 1941) in the 19th century in the West, the source of knowledge is internal illumination. Henri Bergson, *Metafiziğe Giriş*, çev. Barış Karacasu (Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Yay., 1998), 40.

<sup>15</sup> Abu'l-Mu‘īn Maymūn b. Muḥammad Nasafī, *Tabşirat al Adillah fī Uşūl al Dīn*, critical ed. Hüseyin Atay-Şaban Ali Düzgün (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yay., 2004), 1: 9.

<sup>16</sup> Muhittin Bağçeci, *Kelam İlmīne Giriş* (Kayseri: Netform, 2000), 42-43.

<sup>17</sup> Nasafī, *Tabşirat*, 1: 10.

<sup>18</sup> Nasafī, *Tabşirat*, 1: 15.

nitions with metaphors and common phrases is not appropriate for the purpose of the definition.<sup>19</sup>

In terms of Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), knowledge is to be acquainted with “ma’lūm” (known) as it is. The use of the concept of “al-ma’rifah” (cognizance) in this definition has excluded the knowledge of Allah from the definition. Because, while Allah is described as the Omniscient, it is not possible to be qualified as a wise (‘arif).<sup>20</sup> In addition, the use of the word “ma’lūm” caused the vicious circle. Likewise, it is unnecessary for the word “as it is” to be included in definition because the word “ma’rifah” (referred to) expresses it personally.<sup>21</sup>

According to another definition, knowledge is an adjective that makes al-mazkūr (i.e. everything that is within the field of senses and mind and that is possible to be said and expressed) precisely clear to anyone who is keen on it. It is a definition that is proportionate to Imam Māturīdī and accepted by both Māturīdī and some Ash‘arite scholars and is considered sufficient.<sup>22</sup> As a matter of fact, the word “al-mazkūr” in the definition is included existence and non-existence, possible and impossible, singular and plural. However, suspicion, composite ignorance (cahl al-murakkab) and even if it hits the truth, thaqlid are excluded from the definition.

As for Ghazzālī, existence has an important place in his definition of knowledge. He draws attention to the material and spiritual structure of human and the object regarding the definition of knowledge. The first of these is related to the earthly, material and exoteric, and the second is the otherworldly, spiritual and esoteric.<sup>23</sup> Human is the subject. While the material aspect of him rests on the soil in terms of his creation and acts depending on someone else, his spiritual aspect is ore intrinsically. Consequently, it is simple, perceiving, knowing and conceiving. The object is the article which is known, appears its form and image in mind. Knowledge is that the subject obtains the truths of

<sup>19</sup> Bağçeci, *Kelam İlmine Giriş*, 43-44.

<sup>20</sup> Nasafî, *Tabşirat*, 1: 13.

<sup>21</sup> Bağçeci, *Kelam İlmine Giriş*, 43-44.

<sup>22</sup> Nasafî, *Tabşirat*, 1: 19.

<sup>23</sup> Yaşar Aydınli, “Ghazzālī’nin İlim ve Düşünce Dünyası”, *İslâmi Araştırmalar* 13/3-4 (2000), 266.

articles and their copies isolated from matter.<sup>24</sup> For him, a connection must be established between knowing, known and knowledge in terms of nature, truth and word in the formation of knowledge. Nature is the existence of the universal concepts of the external being in mind. Truth is that something has an existence in the external realm. As for the word, nature in mind is to become a word. Here is the basic condition for knowledge to gain existence if the word connotes the nature in the self and nature in the outside world. Accordingly, the knowledge about the asset is the verbal expression of the similarity between the existence of the article in the mind and the outer world.<sup>25</sup>

We can say that Ghazzālī draws attention to three factors in this definition of knowledge. The first one is knowing (*nafs*), the second is known (the reality of the objects) and the last one is knowledge (the image of the reality of the object, its exemplification and form is situated in mind). However, it should not be assumed that knowledge will always occur in this relationship.

He gives the example of a mirror about the occurrence and non-occurrence of knowledge. When a person passes in front of a mirror without any deficiencies and defects in its structure, a copy of his color and shape appears in the mirror. However, if a mirror that loses its feature of being a mirror in one way or another, or any deficiency<sup>26</sup> between the mirror and the object, a complete image cannot be expected. Just like in the mirror, the manifestation of the image of the truth of the article in a perfect heart creates knowledge. Having some deficiencies in the subject or object will appear as obstacles to the formation of correct knowledge.<sup>27</sup>

Ghazzālī states that there are two kinds of knowledge fields on the

<sup>24</sup> Ghazzālī, “ar-Risālah al-Ledūniyyah-Ledünni İlim Risalesi”, trans. A. Cüneyd Köksal, *Yol, Bilgi ve Varlık*, ed. Esmâ Ürkmez (İstanbul: Sufi Kitap, 2007), 43-44.

<sup>25</sup> Süleyman Hayri Bolay, *Aristo Metafiziği ile Gazzalî Metafiziğinin Karşılaştırılması* (İstanbul: Kalem, 1980), 24.

<sup>26</sup> It is possible to express these shortcomings as follows: The face of the mirror has not been altered, shaped and polished; The face of the mirror is dirty and rusty; The object is not facing the bright face of the mirror; Finding a curtain between the object and the mirror; The object is out of view of the mirror. Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 78.

<sup>27</sup> Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 78-79.

basis of the material and spiritual aspects that constitute the basis of knowledge for human and the known articles. The first is the experiential knowledge that comes from the external realm (exoteric appearances of existence). The means of obtaining this knowledge are the senses and the mind. The second is knowledge of the internal (the inner side of the being, the essence of things). This is achieved through inspiration and afflation. Therefore, when the knowledge gained by the latter inspiration is compared with the first acquired by the mind, the first one (i.e. the knowledge gained by inspiration) is the precise knowledge that has never doubt in it and is far from the possibility of inaccuracy and misgiving.<sup>28</sup>

It is seen that Ghazzālī divided the knowledge into two parts, namely certain and suspicious by considering the accuracy and validity of knowledge. Certain knowledge is absolutely free from any suspicion and hesitation, inaccuracies and misgiving, and the mind precisely judges its righteousness.<sup>29</sup> Certainty in this knowledge is such a certainty that even if someone claims that this is wrong and makes the stone into the gold or the stick in hand to the dragon to verify his claim, there is no indication of any doubt in the owner of the certain knowledge.<sup>30</sup> The knowledge gained by imperatives (awwaliyyah), esoteric observation, exoteric senses, experience and continuously recurrent (mutawātirah) were evaluated in the category of certain (precise and reliable information) far from doubt.<sup>31</sup> For instance, with successive knowledge that is not impossible in mind, is based on the people who are not able to unite on lies and who are allies at the point of informing the case, human beings affirm certainly both Muhammad's prophethood and the Qur'an is sent down by revelation Muhammad (pbuh) in the light of the evidence. It is also accepted with the confirmation of his prophecy

<sup>28</sup> Ghazzālī, *Al-Munqidz min Al Dalāl-Dalaletten Hidayete*, trans. Ahmet Suphi Furat (İstanbul; Şamil Yayınevi, 1978), 39.

<sup>29</sup> Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 25.

<sup>30</sup> Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 25-26.

<sup>31</sup> Ghazzālī, *el-Mustafā min Ilim al-Usūl wa bi Zaylihi Fewātih ar-Rahāmūt bi Sharh Musellemu as-Subūt* (Egypt: Dār as-Sadr, 1322), 1: 44-46; Ghazzālī, *Mihakk al Nadar-Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, trans. Ahmet Kayacık (İstanbul: Ahsen Yayıncılık, 2002), 99-105.



that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is faithful in the words he has said.<sup>32</sup> As for suspect knowledge, it is information that it has hesitation, probability and uncertainty. It is possible to evaluate dubious (wahmiyyah) and well-known (mashūrāt) judgements in this category.<sup>33</sup>

## 2. THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE

The person was created as mind and will. He has the potential to know and learn with these abilities. Thus, in many verses of the Qur'an<sup>34</sup>, people are asked to use their mind and senses bestowed them as a blessing and to meditate and consider the evidence of the existence, unity, and the attributes of Allah positioned in the universe. All these prove the existence of knowledge and its possibility. For this reason, the determination of the truth of the article and the epistemological possibilities of the human to achieve this truth in terms of 'ilm al-kalām has given the opportunity to speak about divinity, prophethood and the hereafter, and also to examine and evaluate the principles and beliefs that are related to them. Acceptance of the possibility of knowledge is an indication that the truth of the articles exists and the knowability of this truth is possible. Being aware of this reality, Ghazzālī emphasized in his works the possibility of knowledge that will be the basis for the knowledge of the human and the acceptance and approval of the subjects such as the knowledge of the Divine (ma'rifat Allah), faith, creation, the existence of the realm when it disappeared and so on.<sup>35</sup>

When Ghazzālī's writings on the theory of knowledge were carefully read, it will be seen that he uses methodical suspicion as a tool with a natural habit favored by Allah to get exact information (yaqīn). He had a critical perspective view in putting the truth value of thoughts about himself and others, in learning the reality of events, in researching the truth of science and what it is. He emphasized that it is

<sup>32</sup> Ghazzālī discusses the topic of mutawatir in a broad way in terms of his knowledge and conditions in his work *al-Mustasfa*. See: Ghazzālī, *el-Mustasfa İslam Hukukunun Kaynakları*, trans. H. Yunus Apaydın, 2. ed. (İstanbul: Klasik, 2017) 294-316.

<sup>33</sup> Ghazzālī, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, 53.

<sup>34</sup> See: Al-Baqara 2/269; Ali 'Imran 3/190; Ar-Ra'd 13/4.

<sup>35</sup> Yeşilyurt, "Bilgi Kuramı", 308-310.

necessary to have knowledge in the degree of certainty so as to leave no room for imitation (taqlīd), inaccuracy and suspicion. With these explanations, he accepts the possibility of correct knowledge on the one hand and states that the possibility of correct information may occur based on research and examination contrary to dogmatic perception on the other. It has tied the source of this research and investigation effort that Allah created man at this nature. What needs to be done after accepting the possibility of correct knowledge is to answer the question of how this information can be obtained. Is the knowledge of the senses a means of reaching the right information? Can the mind be seen as a port to shelter in reaching the right information if the senses do not give confidence? Or is it possible to speak of the presence of another tool, the “heart’s eye”, which makes it possible to obtain clear and true information above both? This quest entailed Ghazzālī to spiritual and psychological depression for about two months and caused a septic posture. As a matter of fact, considering the insufficiency of the senses in the formation of the information alone, although the senses are one of the ways of obtaining knowledge, he emphasized the theoretical mind, which has an ability to know above the senses and the heart’s eye beyond it.

### 3. SOURCES AND VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE

We can state that the point to be emphasized in determining the approach of Ghazzālī to the sources of information is the method of doubt. Hence, he stated that he approached everything with suspicion and started to analyze the sense data, then the mind and finally the ways of inspiration in obtaining the real knowledge. Therefore, with this stance, he allocated three ways of obtaining knowledge: senses, reason and inspiration.

#### 3.1. Senses

Senses are the forces that enable human beings and other creatures to receive signals from both inside and outside, and the first impressions of the forms and information of objects are obtained through them-

selves. The senses are divided into two. The first is the five senses that perceive the outside world, and the other are the forces of inner perception. Although the external senses that we have knowledge about by obtaining some impressions about the physical realm are important for him, that need to be taken into consideration are the inner senses which they are real realizer.<sup>36</sup>

Especially the person who acts completely under the management of the external senses in the process up to the age of seven perceives, recognizes and realizes the external world with them. The external senses, which constitute the first of the information sources, are listed as touch, sight, hearing, tasting and smelling in terms of their creation and importance. Each sensory has its own organ, the task of each of them is different and limited. While the eye can see the presence at a certain distance, the ear can hear sounds of a certain frequency. Therefore, with senses, only the things that fall into their own fields can be perceived under certain conditions, compatible with external reality, but isolated from this reality.<sup>37</sup>

Although man obtains his first information about the outside world through his external senses, for some reason they are not free from faults and mistakes when transferring information to us. We can list these reasons as follows: illusions of perception, sensory disorders and loss of the previous strength and force of the senses in the flow of life, especially with old age. Therefore, sensory information cannot be relied on permanently.<sup>38</sup> Ghazzālī expressed this situation as follows:

“How can you trust yourself with the information obtained through the sense organs? I asked myself. The strongest of them is the sense of sight. The eye looks into the shadow, when it sees that it is stagnant and immobile, it judges it is immobile. After a while, he realizes that it has moved as a result of experience and observation. Again, the eye looks at the stars and sees them smaller than a coin. However, astronomical evi-

<sup>36</sup> Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 33-38; Ghazzālī, *Tahāfut al Felāsifah-Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, trans. Bekir Sadak (İstanbul: Ahsen Yay., 2002), 193.

<sup>37</sup> Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 33-38; Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 67.

<sup>38</sup> Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 27-28; Ghazzālī, *Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, 208. See that the knowledge of the senses cannot always be trusted: Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 15; Ghazzālī, *Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, 207.

dence reveals that they are many times larger than the earth. Here, the judgments made by the eye that one of the sense organs, mind arbitrator showed itself and denied them in a way that could not be defended. Upon this, my trust in the sense organs was destroyed.”<sup>39</sup>

Even though Ghazzālī has a problem of trust in the data of sensory information for some reason, it accepts exact information like “the sun is round” and “snow is white” obtained through the senses as right and certain. In addition, due to incidental causes such as illusions of perception or sensory disturbances, the data obtained by senses and situated the possibility of wrongness can be corrected by intellectualising.<sup>40</sup>

As for the inner senses, it is possible to find detailed information about them in *Ma’ārij al-Quds* (The Ascent to The Divine). These senses, which are functional thanks to the data of the external senses, but have different information from the impressions of the external senses, are also divided into five like the external senses. These are common sense (al-hiss al-mushtarak), the faculty of imagination (al-quwwat al-khayyilah), the faculty of ideation (al-quwwat al-mutakhayyilah), the faculty of apprehension (al-quwwat al-wahimah), the faculty of memory (al-quwwat al-hafizah) and each has its own duty.<sup>41</sup>

The common sense (al-hiss al-mushtarak) is a center of perception that perceives the image that the subject has acquired about the article, the knowledge of the impressions of each external sense is realized, it is turned into a meaningful whole and all other sensory impressions are collected in itself.<sup>42</sup> The faculty of imagination (al-quwwat al-khayyilah) is the force that ensures that the copies of objects perceived through the five senses are preserved in our minds, both qualitatively and quantitatively, as if fixed by observation. It is possible to learn some

<sup>39</sup> Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 422.

<sup>40</sup> Hüsamettin Erdem, “Gazālī’de Bilgi Meselesi”, *İslâmi Araştırmalar* 13/3-4 (2000), 296.

<sup>41</sup> Ghazzālī, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, 100; Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 37-40.

<sup>42</sup> Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 37; Ghazzālī, *Ihya al-Ulûm al-Dîn-İhyau Ulumi’d-Din*, trans. Ahmet Serdaroğlu, 3. ed (İstanbul Bedir Yayınları, 1974), 3: 15; Ghazzālī, *Maqâsîd al-Felâsîfah-Felsefenin Temel İlkeleri*, trans. Cemalettin Erdemci, 2. ed. (Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 2002), 280.

difficult works and art thanks to this force.<sup>43</sup> As for the faculty of ideation (al-quwwat al-mutakhayyilah) is the power that realizes situations such as combining, increasing, decreasing and combining some of the copies of the images and meanings that are the subject of the senses and reason being in common sense and the faculty of apprehension to some.<sup>44</sup> The faculty of apprehension (al-quwwat al-wahimah) is the force that enables the comprehension of particular meanings, which cannot be perceived by the senses with reference to the particular things perceived by the senses, and that is abstracted from the situations such as quantity, quality and being in a space, as in the case of hostility and friendship.<sup>45</sup> The faculty of memory (al-quwwat al-hafizah) is a force in which the meanings of the particular perceived by the faculty of apprehension (al-quwwat al-wahimah) is kept together by preventing its lost completely, and these meanings that are preserved over time are revived by the recall.<sup>46</sup>

With the repetition of sensory impressions more than once and intellectualising, experience knowledge comes into existence. The burning of the fire, the fall of the thrown stone to the ground, drinking water to quench thirst, the wine getting drunk, etc. can give as examples.<sup>47</sup> As a result of the repetition of the senses of such and similar events, people have certain knowledge without any doubt and hesitation through a hidden syllogism.<sup>48</sup> However, the knowledge based on experience should not be perceived as a necessary cause and effect relationship like in the philosophical tradition. Because the proof of one of the cause and effect does not necessitate the proof of the other. Additionally, one's banishment does not require the other's exile. Therefore, it is possible that the thirst of a person who drinks water, the toughness of a person

<sup>43</sup> Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 38; Ghazzālī, *Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, 193; Ghazzālī, *Felsefenin Temel İlkeleri*, 281

<sup>44</sup> Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 39; Ghazzālī, *Felsefenin Temel İlkeleri*, 281; Ghazzālī, *Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, 194.

<sup>45</sup> Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 38; Ghazzālī, *Felsefenin Temel İlkeleri*, 281; Ghazzālī, *Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, 193.

<sup>46</sup> Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 39-40; Ghazzālī, *Felsefenin Temel İlkeleri*, 280-281; Ghazzālī, *Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, 194.

<sup>47</sup> Ghazzālī, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, 101.

<sup>48</sup> Ghazzālī, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, 101; Ghazzālī, *Felsefenin Temel İlkeleri*, 88.

who eats, and the burning event when cotton approaches the fire do not occur. For example, the fire did not burn Abraham (pbuh) and Moses (pbuh) turns his wand into a snake.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, the occurrence of the events between the things in the form of certain causes and consequences attached to them is not the necessity of nature, but the result of Allah's appreciation and creation.<sup>50</sup> The universe is not a big machine that operates depending on the necessary cause-effect relation. It is a structure that constitutes the place of knowledge, will, power and creation of Allah.

### 3.2. Reason

Ghazzālī has taken into consideration the insufficiency of the senses in the formation of knowledge alone though they are one of the ways of obtaining information and emphasized the reason. According to him, the reason is a more complete and superior ability to know than sense. He has devoted a wide place to the reason, its status and function in his different works.

In the dictionary, reason, which is the second of the knowledge sources, means preventing, blocking, connecting, and retaining. As for the terminology, it is defined that it is a simple ore that realizes the truth of being, affects matter, although it is not material; it is an ability that realizes the truth of existence, is a power that abstracts the shapes from matter and makes suggestions by making relations between these concepts, making comparisons, separating the truth from the wrong, the good from the bad and the beautiful ugly in all kinds of human activities.<sup>51</sup>

Ghazzālī showed the place and importance of reason in the theory of knowledge with his explanations about its role in gaining the world and hereafter happiness in his works *al-Mustasfa* and *Ma'ārij* and by using a title such as "Supremacy of Reason and Its Nature" in *Ihyā*.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Ghazzālī, *Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, 181; Ghazzālī, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, 101.

<sup>50</sup> Ghazzālī, *Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*, 182.

<sup>51</sup> Süleyman Hayri Bolay, "Akıl", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1989), 238.

<sup>52</sup> Bkz: Ghazzālī, *Ihyā*, 1: 209-221; Ghazzālī, *Mustasfa: İslam Hukuk Metodolojisi*, trans.

According to him, the reason is a skill that realizes the truth and essence of existence and their causes, separates the good from the bad, the beneficial from the harmful, and provides theoretical information.<sup>53</sup> With his mind, the human realizes what is imperative, possible and impossible. Reason is the most basic quality that distinguishes man from other living things.

Establishing a relationship between reason and knowledge such as tree-fruit, sun-light, Ghazzālī presented it as the source and place of knowledge by making an analogy between tree-sun-reason and fruit-light-knowledge.

Reason uses both external and internal senses as a tool to make judgments on the field of each.<sup>54</sup> As a matter of fact, he likens the human body to a city, the reason for its ruler, and the external and internal senses to the soldiers and assistants of the ruler.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, the reason is administrator, and the senses The senses, however, comprise the ruled and servant class. The rulers and servants under it constitute the class. The external and internal senses are the means of the reason in acquiring knowledge.

Ghazzālī divides the reason into two: natural and acquired. The first is the mind that exists from birth and creation. This is the highest and most precious thing that Allah has created in man. Hence, human has a priori information called obvious (*badihiyyah*), which is not sensory and experimental but comes from a pure mind. The fact that one knows his own existence and that number two is greater than number one and the whole is larger than its piece can be given as an example of this kind of information.<sup>56</sup> The acquired mind is directly proportional to what is known and learned.<sup>57</sup>

According to Ghazzālī, the mind is not fixed and stationary. From

Hacı Yunus Apaydın (İstanbul: Klasik Yay., 2006), 38; Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 17-18.

<sup>53</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhya*, 3: 209; Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 68.

<sup>54</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhya*, 3: 22.

<sup>55</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhya*, 3: 17; Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 18.

<sup>56</sup> Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 67; Ghazzālī, *Felsefenin Temel İlkeleri*, 87; Ghazzālī, *İhya*, 1: 216; Ghazzālī, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, 100.

<sup>57</sup> Ghazzālī, *Mizān al Amal-Amellerin Ölçüsü*, trans. Remzi Barışık (Ankara: Kılıçaslan Yay., 1970), 245.

the age of adolescence, especially until the age of forty, it is constantly and gradually in development. The difference in the speed of people realizing an issue and making the right decision reflects this situation.<sup>58</sup>

Ghazzālī gives four meanings to mind and determines different functional areas for each. According to the first definition, mind is a feature that distinguishes man from animal. With this mind he has, he becomes ready to obtain the sciences that are the subject of thought. Second, he distinguishes the things that fall under the category of impossible and possible. Gazālī presents this as an example of the fact that the number two is larger than the number one and it is impossible for a person to be in two places at the same time. In the third definition, the mind is a tool that gets experience from the past and helps people shape the moment and future accordingly. For this reason, people who show a healthier approach to facts and events with the experiences of the life which he has lived are called smart in society. The fourth definition of mind removes the lust that drags into temporary flavors by taking into account the benefits that Allah's commands will provide in terms of the hereafter.<sup>59</sup> From these definitions, it can be seen that Ghazzālī pointed out that it is possible in terms of reason to obtain the necessary, experience and demanding information and to understand the truth of the things.

According to Ghazzālī, the mind is an important tool that saves people from ignorance and has the knowledge, and that makes the devil's tricks noticed and stay away from them. He expressed this meaning that he gave to mind with the following words:

“The mind is an army from the armies of Allah who will be asked for help against the devil enemies and one of the soldiers given to man.”<sup>60</sup>

Ghazzālī expressed these words in the context of the verse 82-83 of as-Saad<sup>61</sup>. As a matter of fact, the devil will appear in front of man's effort to seek the truth, haunt him, confuse the facts, and cover them. He

<sup>58</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhya*, 1: 222.

<sup>59</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhya*, 1: 215-216.

<sup>60</sup> Ghazzālī, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, 125.

<sup>61</sup> “[Iblees] said, “By your might, I will surely mislead them all. Except, among them, Your chosen servants.”



emphasizes that the strongest and most powerful weapon in the face of the devil's occasion is theoretical intelligence.<sup>62</sup>

Although he sees the mind as an extremely important resource in correcting the mistakes of the senses, in terms of the religious and moral responsibility of the individual, in obtaining the precise information on the subjects in its own field, his trust in mind is shaken in overcoming all questions because he coincides with contradictory provisions on some of the information reached through the mind. He expresses this with the following words:

Although he sees the mind as an extremely important source in correcting the mistakes of the senses, making it responsible for religion and morality, and obtaining precise information on the matters that fall within his field, it is believed that he came across contradictory provisions on the basis of the information reached through the mind and overtook all questions. He expresses in words:

“Then I said: ‘Ten is more than three,’ and ‘One and the same thing cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied,’ and ‘One and the same thing cannot be incipient and eternal, existent and nonexistent, necessary and impossible.’ Then sense-data spoke up: “What assurance have you that your reliance on rational data is not like your reliance on sense-data? Indeed, you used to have confidence in me. Then the reason-judge came along and gave me the lie. But were it not for the reason-judge, you would still accept me as true. So there may be, beyond the perception of reason, another judge. And if the latter revealed itself, it would give the lie to the judgments of reason, just as the reason-judge revealed itself and gave the lie to the judgments of sense. The mere fact of the nonappearance of that further perception does not prove the impossibility of its existence.”<sup>63</sup>

After this inquiry, Ghazzālī states that the mind is insufficient and limited in understanding and solving all the problems. It is unable to comprehend *ghayb* (all that is hidden), the events that will occur in the future and the entirely reasonable things. The mind cannot grasp the

<sup>62</sup> Ghazzālī, *Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*, 125.

<sup>63</sup> Ghazzālī, *Dalalekten Hidayete*, 41.

beauty and ugliness of the article in all its aspects, nor can it understand the inner face of the orders and prohibitions of religion. This is only possible thanks to prophethood. In the prophet-mind relationship, the role of the mind is to admit the helplessness, to approve the prophethood and to accept what the prophet said.<sup>64</sup> As a matter of fact, he says:

“Understanding of revelation after hearing is only possible with the mind. Because hearing without reason and mind without hearing is not enough. Both are required. Therefore, a person who works in pure imitation by pushing the mind aside is ignorant. A person who tries to take advantage of the light of the Qur’an and sunnah only by mind is proud and deceived. Avoid being one of these two groups. Be the one who has two originals together. Because mental sciences are like food, religious ones are like medicine. The treatment of diseases of the heart is possible only with medicines benefiting from sharia. These medicines are also the duties of deeds and worship that are made up by the prophets worship of the prophets, made to correct the hearts to rehabilitate the hearts. This means that these mental sciences will harm to someone who does not treat the sick heart with religious worship and only compliments them with mental sciences.”<sup>65</sup>

According to him, just as man needs light and sun to find his way in a dark environment, the mind’s realization of the truth of the things can only be realized with the guidance of revelation.<sup>66</sup>

With this approach, he makes it clear that there will be no contradiction between reason and revelation. In addition, he also states that the doubt of those who think that mental sciences contradict the revelation and that it is not possible to compile these two together is a suspect that is blinded by the blindness of his clairvoyance.<sup>67</sup> Understanding religion is possible with reason, and it is possible for the mind to obtain both general and specific information about things with revelation. Mind and religion are similar to a building and the foundation of this

<sup>64</sup> Ghazzālī, *Dalalekten Hidayete*, 61, 78, 79, 83.

<sup>65</sup> Murtaza Korlaelçi, “Gazzâlî’ye Göre Felsefe ve Bilgi Nazariyesi”, *Ebu Hamid el-Gazâlî* (Kayseri: ERÜ Gevher Nesibe Tıp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1988), 156.

<sup>66</sup> Ghazzālī, *İtikadda Orta Yol*, 8.

<sup>67</sup> Korlaelçi, “Gazzâlî’ye Göre Felsefe ve Bilgi Nazariyesi”, 156.

building. Reason is the foundation, religion is the building. Just as there is no building, the existence of the foundation is meaningless. Likewise, when it is not a foundation, there is no existence of the building. Again, the relationship of mind and religion with each other is similar to that of eye and light. The mind is in the eye position, and religion is in the light. How it is not possible for the eye to see when there is no light, and the presence of light is meaningless without the eye. The mind is an oil lamp, and religion is the oil of this oil lamp. The oil lamp is useless unless it is oil. Because the oil lamp does not light without oil; It is not possible for the oil to shine without an oil lamp.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, the mind is in need of revelation to reach the right information, to illuminate its path, to build its building on solid foundations. Revelation also awaits the understanding and interpretation of the person at the center of religious thought. This means that being on the right path will be possible by giving the right to reason and revelation, which are complementary to each other. Because the mind has the capacity to grasp the universal principles of things such as faith in Allah, righteousness and justice. However, it does not comprehend particular principles such as unlawfulness of carrion, blood, pork, marriage between siblings and their provisions. Reason needs guidance in revelation, and it is not possible to be in the direction unless it is based on this guidance.

### 3.3. Inspiration

Considering the insufficiency of the senses and reason in the formation of knowledge alone, Ghazzālī emphasizes the heart eye, which lies beyond both. He expresses this point of view with the following words:

“Know that the place of knowledge is the heart. What we mean by heart is our luminous and spiritual self, which drives and manages all our organs, and that all our organs serve and obey it.”<sup>69</sup>

Ghazzālī's intention from the heart is a secret from the secrets of

<sup>68</sup> Ghazzālī, *Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*, 49; Hüsametdin Erdem, “Gazâlî’de Akıl Bilgisi ve Değeri” *Diyanet İlmî Dergî* 47/ 3 (2011), 63.

<sup>69</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhya al-Ulūm al-Dīn-İhyau Ulumi'd-Din*, trans. Ali Arslan (İstanbul: Yayıncık Matbaası, 1971), 3: 39.

Allah, who cannot be grasped with feelings. It is a divine and spiritual latitude and delicacy. It is the ability to cognizance, know and grasp. It is the addressee, punished, condemned and responsible.<sup>70</sup>

The heart is a force that makes it possible to obtain information about the truth of the things, (divine) secret, the events that will occur in the future and the things that the mind is unable to realize.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, with the eyes of the heart, the human sees and knows (divine) secret, what will happen in the future, and somethings that go beyond the limits of reason.<sup>72</sup> The heart is a light and intuition inspired by Allah to the heart that allows Ghazzālī to get rid of his suspicion and is the key to the knowledge of truth.<sup>73</sup>

He gave an example to the occurrence of heart information as follows:

“Water will come to a pool either from the flowing streams or from a well drilled under it. This pool is the heart of man, and knowledge is like the water in the pool. As the information coming from outside fills the heart of the human, hearts are filled with knowledge through al-mukhashafah (inner illumination), which is coming from the well under the pool.”<sup>74</sup>

He states that true knowledge is possible thanks to the intuition that is the grace of Allah and His beneficence. Ghazzālī stated that thanks to this knowledge, it will be learned about the (divine) secret, future and metaphysical fields outside the knowing area of the senses, reason and experience. This area is prophethood and sainthood. First one is innate, the second one is gained. This information sometimes occurs in the heart without any evidence and without knowing where it comes from. This is an inspiration. What is clear from where it comes is a revelation. Inspiration is for saints, and revelation is for the prophets. Another type

<sup>70</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhyau Ulumi'd-Din*, 1: 291; 6: 8.

<sup>71</sup> Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 68.

<sup>72</sup> Hüsamettin Erdem, “Gazālī’de Bilgi Meselesi”, *İslâmi Araştırmalar* 13/3-4 (2000), 297.

<sup>73</sup> Ghazzālī, *Dalaletten Hidayete*, 28-29; Ghazzālī, *İhyau Ulumi'd-Din*, 3: 29.

<sup>74</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhyau Ulumi'd-Din*, 3: 40-42.

of heart information is acquired and evidence-based. This is specific to scholars.<sup>75</sup>

There are some negative situations arising from the subject in accessing the heart information. Some of the obstacles in the subject are: it is not yet complete development as in the child's heart; contamination of the heart as a result of plunging into rebellion and sins; the heart's not trying to become the foundation of the truths of divine secrets; there is a curtain between the truth of the article and the heart because of the intuitive desires and stereotypes; the heart does not know what, where and how it will be obtained, and the problem of method.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, Therefore, it is possible for a person to reach such information, to purify himself from all kinds of bad things, to give up everything other than Allah. When a man reaches such a level, Allah will convey the truths that not everyone can know to the heart of this servant.<sup>77</sup>

Except for al-Ghazzālī and some subsequent Ash'ari theologians, inspiration is the product of an individual experience, a subjective inner experience that cannot be proved, according to almost all of the theologians belonging to Mu'tazilah, Māturīdī and Ash'ari schools. Due to its subjective structure, inspiration is not generally valid, and it does not possess precise information and evidence that can be used in the religious field.<sup>78</sup>

## CONCLUSION

When Ghazzālī's writings on the theory of knowledge are carefully read, it will be seen that he used methodical suspicion as a tool to obtain precise information as a result of a fitting habit that Allah favored. With this method, he had a critical perspective in revealing the true value of the thoughts of both himself and others, in learning the truth of events, in researching the truth of knowledge and what it is. With this method,

<sup>75</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhyau Ulumi'd-Din*, 3: 41; Erdem, "Gazālī'de Bilgi Meselesi", 297.

<sup>76</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhyau Ulumi'd-Din*, 3: 30-31.

<sup>77</sup> Ghazzālī, *İhyau Ulumi'd-Din*, 3: 41. 81

<sup>78</sup> For extensive information on how inspiration cannot be used as a source of information in 'ilm al-kalām generally, see: Abdülğaffar Aslan, "Kelam'da İlhamın Bilgi Değeri", *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 1/20 (2008), 25-45.

he emphasized that it is necessary to stay away from taqlid, and on the other hand, to have an accurate degree of knowledge without leaving any doubts, inaccuracies and misgiving.

All these explanations reveal that Ghazzālī has addressed the problem of knowledge systematically and for a purpose. He has introduced a theory of knowledge gathering up the tradition of theological, philosophical and mystical tradition by counting inspiration as a source of knowledge. As it is known that it is not a definitive source of knowledge by the theological tradition. It is also remarkable that the emphasis on human development from the mother's womb to death during the formation of knowledge. The fact that he provides a better understanding of the information theory with his metaphoric language about information theory is another aspect that makes him different. It is also important that Ghazzālī, who takes into account the purpose of creation, expresses the ultimate purpose of knowledge as "Knowing Allah and thus achieving happiness in the world and the hereafter."

#### REFERENCES CITED

- AKARSU, Bedia. *Felsefe Terimleri Sözlüğü*. İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınları, 1998.
- ASLAN, Abdülğaffar. "Kelam'da İlhamın Bilgi Değeri". *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*. 1/20 (2008), 25-45.
- AYDINLI, Yaşar. "Gazâlî'nin İlim ve Düşünce Dünyası". *İslâmi Araştırmalar* 13/3-4 (2000), 265-281.
- BAĞÇECİ, Muhittin. *Kelam İlmine Giriş*. Kayseri: Netform, 2000.
- BERGSON, Henri. *Metafiziğe Giriş*. trans. Barış Karacasu. Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Yay., 1998.
- BOLAY, Süleyman Hayri. "Akıl" *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. 2: 238-242. İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1989.
- BOLAY, Süleyman Hayri. *Felsefi Doktrinler ve Terimler Sözlüğü*. Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 1997.
- BOLAY, Süleyman Hayri. *Aristo Metafiziği ile Gazzalî Metafiziğinin Karşılaştırılması*. İstanbul; Kalem, 1980.
- ÇÜÇEN, A. Kadir. *Felsefeye Giriş*. 2. ed. İstanbul: Asa Kitapevi, 2001.

- ERDEM, Hüsamettin. "Gazâlî'de Bilgi Meselesi", *İslâmi Araştırmalar* 13/3-4 (2000), 293-297.
- ERDEM, Hüsamettin. *Bazı Felsefe Meseleleri*. Konya: Hüner Yay., 1998.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. "ar-Risālah al-Ledüniyyah-Ledünni İlim Risalesi", trans. A. Cüneyd Köksal, *Yol, Bilgi ve Varlık*. ed. Esmâ Ürkmez. İstanbul: Sufi Kitap, 2007.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Al-Iqtisād fî al-Prîqâd-İtikadda Orta Yol*. trans. Kemal Işık. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi, 1971.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Ayyuhâ al-Walad-Majmu'at ar-Rasâil al-Imam al-Ghazzâlî*. Beyrut; y.y., 1996.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Al-Munqidz min Al Dalâl-Dalâletten Hidayete*. trans. Ahmet Suphi Furat. İstanbul: Şamil Yayınevi, 1978.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *el-Mustasfa min Ilm al-Uşul wa bi Zaylihi Fewâtih ar-Rahâmut bi Sharh Musellemu as-Subût*. Egypt: Dâr as-Sadr, 1322.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, *el-Mustasfa İslam Hukukunun Kaynakları*. trans. H. Yunus Apaydın. 2. ed.. İstanbul: Klasik, 2017.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *İhya al-Ulûm al-Dîn-İhyau Ulûmi'd-Dîn*. VI Volume. trans. Ahmet Serdaroğlu. 3. ed. İstanbul Bedir Yayınları, 1974.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *İhya al-Ulûm al-Dîn-İhyau Ulûmi'd-Dîn*. X Volume. trans. Ali Arslan. İstanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1971.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Maqâsîd al Felâsifah-Felsefenin Temel İlkeleri*. trans. Cemalettin Erdemci, 2. ed. Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 2002.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Mîzân al Amal-Amellerin Ölçüsü*. trans. Remzi Barışık. Ankara: Kılıççalan Yay., 1970.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Tahâfut al Felâsifah-Filozofların Tutarsızlığı*. trans. Bekir Sadak. İstanbul: Ahsen Yay., 2002.
- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Ma'ârij al Quds-Hakikat Bilgisine Yükseliş*. trans. Serkan Özburun. İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2002.

- GHAZZĀLĪ, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad. *Mihakk al Nadar-Düşünmede Doğru Yöntem*. trans. Ahmet Kayacık. İstanbul: Ahsen Yayıncılık, 2002.
- GÖKBERK, Macit. *Felsefe Tarihi*. 13. ed. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2002.
- HANÇERLİOĞLU, Orhan. *Düşünce Tarihi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970.
- KUTLUER, İlhan. "İlim" *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. 22: 109-114. İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2000.
- KORLAELÇİ, Murtaza, "Gazâlî'ye Göre Felsefe ve Bilgi Nazariyesi". *Ebu Hamid el-Gazâlî*. Kayseri: ERÜ Gevher Nesibe Tıp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1988.
- MĀTURĪDĪ, Abu Mansur Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Mahmud. *Kitāb al Tawhīd-Kitabu't-Tevhid Tercümesi*. trans. Bekir Topaloğlu. Ankara: İSAM Yayınları, 2002.
- NASAFĪ, Abu'l-Muṭn Maymūn b. Muḥammad. *Tabşirat al Adillah fī Uşūl al Dīn*. critical ed. Hüseyin Atay-Şaban Ali Düzgün. 2 Volume. Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yay., 2004.
- ŞEVKİ, Yavuz Yusuf. "İlim" *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*. 22: 108-109. İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2002.
- YEŞİLYURT, Temel. "Bilgi Kuramı". *Kelam El Kitabı*. ed. Şaban Ali Düzgün. Ankara: Grafiker Yay., 2012.
- YÜKSEL, Emrullah. "Âmidi ve Bazı Kelamcılarda Bilgi Teorisi". *Kelamda Bilgi Problemi*. İlahiyat Fakülteleri V. Kelam Anabilim Dalı Eğitim-Öğretim Meseleleri ve Koordinasyon Toplantısı ve "Kelamda Bilgi Problemi" Sempozyumu Bildirileri. Bursa: Arasta Yayınları, 2003.