

Global Climate Governance between State and Non-State Actors: Dynamics of Contestation and Re-Legitimation

Devlet ve Devlet-dışı Aktörler arasında Küresel İklim Yönetişimi: Çekişme ve Yeniden Meşrulaştırma Dinamikleri

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Abstract

Global climate governance is one of the most complex global governance systems that is also ridden with divergent interests of states and non-state actors. Since the 2000s, the authority of UN-led global climate governance has been contested by the states declining their mitigation targets of the Kyoto Protocol and by those that find the international climate negotiations inefficient to ramp up climate action. These divergent views of states resulted in the counter-institutionalization apparent in the proliferation of minilateral forums and hybrid coalitions of climate initiatives oftentimes bringing states and non-state actors together. These non-UNFCCC partnerships have functioned to be strategic actions that put pressure on the global climate governance system to re-legitimize itself. Meanwhile, transnational actors have also contested the same system demanding a deeper cooperation that will keep the temperature goal below 2 degrees. This study argues that with its new mode of governance named hybrid multilateralism, the Paris Agreement was actually an institutional adaptation to the contestations by states and non-state actors in the forms of counter-institutionalization and politicization. It also discusses the problematic sides of the functions that non-state actors are expected to provide in this new governance mode. This paper is composed of four parts: firstly, the theoretical background that feeds into the analysis of empirical data with regard to global climate governance will be presented. Secondly, beginning from the Rio Conference, milestone developments in global climate governance will be examined by taking the contestation by the states into consideration. In the third part, the process of the politicization of climate change in which transnational actors and specifically the climate change movement demanded more decisive climate action will be explicated. In the last part, the existing legitimacy deficits with regard to non-state actors in post-Paris climate governance will be elaborated.

Keywords: Global Climate Governance, Paris Agreement, Legitimacy, Non-State Actors, Civil Society

Öz

Küresel iklim yönetişimi, devlet ve devlet-dışı aktörlerin farklı çıkarlarıyla dolu en karmaşık küresel yönetişim sistemlerinden biridir. 2000'lerden beri BM liderliğindeki küresel iklim yönetişiminin otoritesi, Kyoto Protokolü'nden gelen azaltım hedeflerini reddeden devletler ve uluslararası iklim

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müzakerelerini iklim eylemini geliştirmek için yetersiz bulan devletlerce sorgulandı. Devletlerin bu farklı görüşleri, minilateralist forumlar ve sıklıkla devlet ve devlet-dışı aktörleri bir araya getiren melez koalisyonların meydana getirdiği iklim inisiyatiflerinin artışında görülebilen bir karşı-kurumsallaşmayla sonuçlandı. Birleşmiş Milletler İklim Değişikliği Çerçevesi (BMİDÇ)-dışı bu ortaklıklar, kendini yeniden meşrulaştırması için küresel iklim yönetim sisteminin üstünde baskı kuran stratejik eylemler olma işlevi gördü. Diğer yandan, ulusötesi aktörler de ısınma artışını 2 derecenin altında tutacak daha derin işbirlikleri talep ederek bu sistemi zorladı. Bu çalışma, hibrit çoktarafılık adındaki yeni bir yönetim moduyla Paris Anlaşması'nın, aslında devlet ve devlet-dışı aktörleri tarafından ortaya konan karşı-kurumsallaşma ve politikleştirme şekillerindeki çekişmelere kurumsal bir adaptasyon olduğunu savunmaktadır. Ayrıca yeni yönetim itibariyle devlet-dışı aktörlerden beklenen işlevlerin sorunlu yanlarını tartışmaktadır. Makale dört bölümden oluşmaktadır: öncelikle, küresel iklim yönetimine dair ampirik verinin analizini besleyen teorik arka plan sunulacaktır. İkinci olarak, Rio Konferansı'ndan başlayarak küresel iklim yönetiminin dönüm noktası niteliğindeki gelişmeler devletlerin meydan okumaları dikkate alınarak incelenecektir. Üçüncü bölümde, ulusötesi aktörlerin ve özellikle de iklim değişikliği hareketinin daha kararlı bir iklim eylemi talep ederek iklim değişikliğini politikleştirme süreçleri anlatılacaktır. Son bölümde, Paris-sonrası iklim yönetiminde devlet-dışı aktörleri ilgilendiren meşruiyet sorunları ele alınacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Küresel İklim Yönetimi, Paris Anlaşması, Meşruiyet, Devlet-Dışı Aktörler, Sivil Toplum

1. Introduction

Climate change is perhaps the most pressing global challenge that has no borders, and requires all countries to work in coordination. Some even think that “managing climate change is the definitive test of global governance” (Beeson 2019, p. 49). Although there has been international cooperation with regards to climate change at the interstate and non-state levels, it is far from being enough. The amount of global greenhouse gas emissions continues to increase and the mitigations by the states will not suffice to keep the temperature rise well below 2 °C degrees that the post-Paris Agreement climate governance recommended. Scientific findings warn that depending on the aggregate calculation of countries' current Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), by 2100, global warming will be 2 – 4.9°C (median 3.2°C) compared to pre-industrial levels (Raftery et al. 2017). Thus, there is a huge emissions gap (Chan et al. 2019). After almost thirty years, the global governance of climate change has frequently stumbled, partly due to the structural deficiencies of global governance, and partly due to the complex nature of climate change. Yet, the 2015 Paris Agreement was hailed by many as a good way out from the climate crisis.

By utilizing empirical evidence, this paper aims to elaborate on global climate governance from Michael Zürn's theoretical perspective of contestation and change in global governance (2018a; 2018b). Departing from the authority-legitimacy relationship in global governance, Zürn identifies certain structural deficiencies of global governance systems (2010; 2013; 2018a). As a result of these challenges, obstacles to global governance can occur, causing it to begin to decline or to re-legitimate itself through institutional reforms depending on the direction of the contestations.

After years of gridlock in the international climate regime, the Paris Agreement was adopted at a universal level and institutionalized new modes of governance. Certain dynamics are evident, playing out for the embodiment of such novelty. Following Zürn, this paper aims to demonstrate that the Paris Agreement was an institutional adaptation to the contestations by states and non-state actors since the early 2000s. Additionally, the paper sheds light on the following questions: How should we evaluate non-state actors with their newly assigned role in the post-Paris era of hybrid multilateralism? Does the post-Paris global climate governance still suffer from legitimacy deficits and get contested?

In this paper, it is intended to evaluate the historical course of global climate governance before the Paris agreement through the analytical tools of contestation, namely *counter-institutionalization* and *politicization* (Zürn, 2018a; 2018b). This overview of global climate governance will discuss the contestation of policy actors at two levels: a) multilateral level that emphasizes the role of states, that can be discussed in the process of counter-institutionalization, b) transnational level that highlights the role of non-state actors in the form of politicization.

However, the paper also suggests that the homogenizing discourse of putting highly differentiated sectors, organizations and institutions, which sometimes consist of states, under the umbrella of non-state actors does not easily fit in the politicization process. I argue that some non-state actors contribute to the contestation of the global climate governance system in a differentiated way, allowing for strategies of both processes: counter-institutionalization and politicization.

This article proceeds in four parts. First of all, it is needed to discuss the theoretical background that feeds into the analysis of empirical data with regard to global climate governance. Secondly, an overview of UN-led climate governance will be given by describing a number of milestone developments from Rio to Madrid conferences. In this part, the analysis level will be the states challenging the UNFCCC's governance modes by promoting alternative or competing ones (counter-institutionalization). Challenges by non-state actors (such as public-private partnerships) will be mentioned as a differentiated contestation "in limbo". In the third part, the institutional and political developments with regards to the pressure from transnational actors on global climate governance (politicization) will be examined. Lastly, the post-Paris climate governance will be evaluated in terms of legitimacy so as to elaborate on the current and future dynamics of contestation on the part of non-state actors.

2. Dynamics of Contesting Global Governance: Between Fragmentation and Decline

Michael Zürn defines global governance as "the exercise of authority across national borders justified with reference to common goods or transnational problems" although global common goods are not necessarily served right in practice (2018b, p. 138). He also normatively defines global governance as a multi-level governance where the global level should be autonomous (that is, where consensual decision-making is less applied), and be part of a system occurring as a result of the interplay of different levels with stratified or functional differentiation (Zürn,

2010). Moreover, global governance addresses not only the states but also societal actors, so they make up a double constituency (Zürn, 2010, 2018b). Thus, it is normatively accountable to both national and transnational publics (Zürn, 2004, 2018b).

Relying on the notion of reflexive authority, Zürn conceptualizes global governance as a dialectical interaction between the holders of power and authority, and the affected parties that are bound by the exercise of that authority (2004, 2010, 2013, 2018a, 2018b). In doing so, global governance can be examined as a dynamic and contingent system, rather than a fixed and top-down regime. This conceptualization of global governance acknowledges the power and will of the parties vis-a-vis the global governance system. However, Zürn identifies two major legitimation problems that the current global governance “endogenously” generates: technocratic bias and power bias (2018a; 2018b). Firstly, since there is no centralized meta-authority in the global governance system, but rather, a loosely coupled issue-specific institutions, justifications for different institutions responsible for different sector-related, technocratic issue areas are limited. Furthermore, this raises questions of legitimacy, especially for the societal actors affected by global governance in the absence of a multi-level global governance (Zürn, 2010, 2013). Specific issue areas are more relevant to the interested publics in that area; however, especially in cases of disputes between areas, a central authority responsive to its public(s) through the accountability notion is needed for decision-making, which is not applicable to the inter – or transnational institutions of global governance. This technocratic bias is at alarming levels in the face of increasing proliferation of such institutions.

Second legitimation problem is about the separation of powers. Originating from the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, the formal equality of the constituent members is the building block of global governance. However, as inter – or transnational institutions are embodied and carried out through power dynamics affected by substantial resources, economically powerful countries might simultaneously make laws (enjoying greater leverage in the negotiations) and execute institutional decisions and procedures (international authorities lack the power of implementation themselves) (Zürn, 2018a, 2018b). This then leads to the reproduction of the existing structural injustices between developed and developing countries. Aside from the legitimacy problem, it also results in the compliance issues in global governance, as the powerful parties might be reluctant to show deference.

Thus, major deficiencies of global governance can be summarized as legitimacy, coordination and compliance problems according to Zürn (2010). Relating to these structural deficits, Zürn proposes that global governance can be contested in two ways: counter-institutionalization and politicization. Counter-institutionalization is the response of states within the global governance system, which, without overtly deviating from the institution or exiting it, tend to establish or support new institutions so as “to influence or replace existing ones” (Zürn, 2018b, p. 142). If the inter – or transnational institution has high authority level, efforts of counter-institutionalization increase. Both established and rising powers can apply counter-institutionalization for the purpose of either decreasing or increasing the ambition of international cooperation. Established powers

can contest the international authorities when dissatisfied with the formal equality of states due to the consensual decision-making in these institutions, because materially weak states can use veto power, leading to undesirable policy outcomes affecting the domestic policies of established powers. This may also result in negotiation gridlock. On the other hand, rising powers can also involve with counter-institutionalization by denouncing the international authorities for Western biasness.

Furthermore, the non-state/societal actors at the transnational level contest the global governance system through the politicization of global issues or authorities, which can occur in the form of either resistance or support (Zürn, 2004, 2018a, 2018b). The degree of politicization depends on the salience of the matter in public debates or protests. The higher the authority level of international institutions, the greater the politicization level (Zürn, 2018b, p. 141). Both the state and societal contestations of inter – or transnational institutions get a response in some form. The contested institution can continue its operations in business-as-usual, then the cooperation might lead to gridlock, and finally, decline. Alternatively, the institution can revise its institutional design, reform its governance mode, etc., in order to re-legitimate itself against delegitimation (Zürn, 2018a).

Before coming to the application of Zürn's theory of global governance on climate change, we need to clarify some definitions that will be used in further discussion. As a notion, the global governance of climate change is nowadays an empty signifier for many scholars due to the complexity and proliferation of climate institutions (Lederer, 2015). It is asserted that global climate governance is "not only highly complex but also strongly segmented and partially fragmented" (p. 6). As will be shown in the following section, global climate governance has had a fragmented character right from the beginning (Zürn, 2018a, p. 189). Zelli and van Asselt takes fragmentation as "the growing diversity and challenges to coordination among private and public norms, treaties and organizations that address a given issue area of international politics" (2015, p. 121). Yet, the fragmentation of global governance does not have to be a negative feature by default; it is just a functional reflection of complexity of modernity (in the sense of expertise in different issue-specific institutions) (Zürn and Faude, 2013, p. 126-127). However, if fragmentation of global governance leads to the failure to coordinate its mechanisms, it can result in an unpleasant situation for international cooperation and thus global governance as some actors can exploit it "to pursue their parochial interests through forum shopping and regime shifting" (p. 125).

Therefore, in the absence of effective coordination, fragmentation of global governance might eventually result in further fragmentation and decline of global governance. Counter-institutionalization of states then poses risks for global governance, unless the underlying objections to the institution are properly addressed by the authority holders. In the following part, the empirical evidence on global climate governance will be scrutinized through the theoretical and conceptual framework provided above. The following section will expose the milestone developments in global climate governance, while simultaneously discussing the state contestation through counter-institutionalization, then we will elaborate on the societal

contestation through politicization in order to evaluate whether the governance mode adopted with the Paris Agreement can be counted as an institutional response of the UNFCCC.

3. Global Climate Governance and Counter-Institutionalization

Global climate governance has developed through three succeeding models each of which was realized in a dialectical way: The Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen Accord and the Paris Agreement (Held and Roger, 2018). The institutional skeleton of global climate governance was laid in the first international climate convention, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. In 1994, it was ratified by 195 Parties. The Rio Convention stated the objective of the Parties as to “stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at a level that would avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2, UNFCCC). Countries signing the climate convention thus recognized the responsibility of the humankind in changing the atmospheric balances of greenhouse gases. However, from the beginning, the main subject of discussion was over who should take the responsibility for climate change (Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand, 2019, p. 27). Due to the consensual nature of decision making in the UNFCCC, such politically debatable issues were vetoed. After long negotiations, the notion of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) was accepted. However, the Convention has non-legally binding obligation for developed countries to return their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, without further substantializing the overall objective (van Asselt, Huitema and Jordan, 2018, p. 28).

The Kyoto Protocol (KP) was signed in 1997. Based on the CBDR notion of Rio Convention, the Protocol obliged the developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions because of their historical responsibility in causing climate change. Thus, the KP assigned legally binding emissions limitation or reduction targets to the developed countries. However, alongside the sticks (emissions reductions), a number of carrots were offered; in order to incentivize countries to meet their targets of reductions of national emissions, three flexibility mechanisms were presented for diverse market-based interests (van Asselt et al., 2018, p. 29). These are Emissions Trading (ET), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). Despite these incentives, some developed countries, such as the United States, refused to accept that the emissions by the developing countries were treated under different scheme. The former US president George W. Bush stated the US would not ratify the KP in 2001, arguing that the treaty’s emissions reduction targets excluded its greatest competitor China, risking the competition power of the US in global trade markets. Yet, ratified by 192 Parties, the KP entered into force in 2005 after a difficult eight-year ratification process.

Twenty years ago, the Kyoto Protocol was viewed as the “only game in town” (Dingwerth and Green, 2015, p. 153), just before the emergence of transnational climate governance. However, a significant number of bilateral or multilateral forums outside the auspices of the UNFCCC

emerged after the aforementioned announcement by the US. (Bäckstrand, Kuyper, Linnér and Lövbrand, 2017, p.563). The Cambrian explosion of climate governance occurred in the 2000s (Dingwerth and Green, 2015). In fact, states have created more than 60 non-UNFCCC climate institutions over time (Rowan, 2019). Since then, global climate governance began to be fragmented.

Alongside the “fragmenters”, i.e. states that advocate against mitigation targets due to its costs to the economy and therefore resist the UN-led climate governance, there are also “deepeners”, i.e. states that advocate ambitious climate action by opting for the decarbonization of their economies, and are therefore dissatisfied with the stalemate in the UN negotiations (Rowan, 2019, p. 7). Both of these sides challenged the UN-led global climate governance for their own reasons, and founded or participated in the non-UNFCCC climate initiatives in parallel with their climate policy (Rowan, 2019). These non-UNFCCC institutions consisting of public and private transnational initiatives reflected a general trend of multistakeholderism in the world (p. 89) (see following subsection). These initiatives do not apply to its members and partners legally binding obligations, and use soft law and instruments in the management of their goals (p. 89-90). Although the UNFCCC and its Conference of the Parties (COPs) remained as the central global climate governance institution because of its universal membership and the normative objective of fighting against the global challenge of climate change (p. 60), these new institutions decreased the authority of the UNFCCC and challenged its position “as the epicenter of climate regime” (Bäckstrand et al., 2017, p. 564).

With regard to the important venues of newly founded small clubs of climate governance on the side of fragmenters, Major Economies Meetings/Forum on Energy and Climate (MEM/MEF) and now defunct Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) can be given as examples (Rowan, 2019). The APP and the MEF were established in 2005 and in 2007, respectively, with the purpose of developing an alternative venue where the large economies were able to prioritize their national development programs and put in place the discourses on climate change, energy security and so forth. Initiated by Australia and the US, the APP was “an effort to destabilize the Kyoto Protocol before it established a tradition as the main international institution on climate change” (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee, 2013, p. 64). It was introduced in less than a year after the KP entered into force. Likewise, the MEM was established by the Bush administration “to provide an alternative negotiating forum outside the UNFCCC” (p. 64). Within these forums, the Parties advocated for a governance mode of voluntarism in dealing with climate change. Interestingly, despite the ‘small club’ character of the organizations, the APP and the MEM both attracted the major emitters of the developing world such as China and India, both strict advocates of the discourse of historical responsibilities of the developed countries in the UNFCCC negotiations. It can be argued that these countries also sought to obtain as much as possible from such high-level forums (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee, 2013, p. 71) by engaging with counter-institutionalization. Moreover, existing multilateral forums such as the Group of Eight (G8) and the Group of Twenty (G20) began to focus on climate change. Altogether, the highest polluting countries were gathered in many informal coalitions. Beginning from 2005, the

G8 Plus Five operated “a strategy to separate the rising powers from the G77 and China to bring down the Kyoto ‘firewall’ and to develop a new regime based on a bottom-up, ‘pledge and review’ approach” (Kirton and Kokotsis, 2015, p. 8).

The developed countries either made ineffective efforts to meet the emission reduction targets of the KP or failed to make such efforts (Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand, 2019, p. 29). Some, namely Canada, US, Russia, Japan and New Zealand (most are members of the APP and the MEF) declined to sign up for the second commitment period of the KP. Moreover, despite the emission reductions achieved to some extent (mainly resulting from economic stalemate in the post-Soviet transition countries), global emissions rose by 31% between 1990 and 2010 (Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand, 2019, p. 30). This was due to the economic growth rates of the rising powers of the developing world.

On the other hand, the deepener countries of global climate governance began their counter-institutionalization through other transnational institutions working for ambitious climate action. The countries more vulnerable to climate change allied with some developed countries (especially from the European Union), as well as subnational and private institutions, founded or participated in alternative institutions, due to dissatisfaction with the slow pace of climate action within the formal climate regime.

Counter-institutionalization yielded its first results in COP13 in 2007. Actually, just after the KP entered into force, negotiations for a new treaty started (Rowan, 2019). After two years of negotiations, it was decided by the Bali Action Plan of COP13 that the developing countries should submit until 2009 their NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) which were not legally binding, and that developed countries should be committed to meet quantified emission reduction targets. It was historic for the recalcitrant states such as US and China to converge on a common trajectory at last. It is also suggested that the Bali Roadmap can be evaluated as one of the foundations paving the way for the Paris Agreement (Cerit Mazlum, 2019).

COP15 held in Copenhagen in 2009 was expected to produce a new climate treaty, as the shortcomings of the KP had already become evident (Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand, 2019, p. 30). The discontent of the nation-states over legally binding obligations of the KP resulted in a gridlock in COP15. There, many states pushed for an impasse so as to avoid having to scale up their climate actions. Forum shopping carried out within other institutions by the fragmenters proved an efficient strategic action (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee, 2013, p. 73; Zürn and Faude, 2013, p. 125). Copenhagen Conference also witnessed a struggle on the part of the civil society organizations, which organized mass demonstrations and marches in the city. Nearly 100,000 people protested the climate negotiations’ exclusionary practices (Kuyper, Linnér and Schroeder, 2018, p. 3). At the very end of the conference, a small group of states led by the US drafted the Copenhagen Accord “as a last minute response to the UN’s failure” (Kirton and Kokotsis, 2015, p. 231), which was not accepted by the Parties on a consensus. However, it adopted the idea of countries’ voluntary reductions, which later paved the way for the pledge and review system

materialized in the Paris Agreement (van Asselt et al., 2018, p. 29-30). On the other hand, it should be noted that Copenhagen Accord did not consist of any role reserved for non-state actors despite their greater role in the global ecosystem of climate governance (Held and Roger, 2018, p. 532).

At COP16 held in Cancún in 2010, reporting and review processes for climate actions were substantialized for the first time. Yet, they were constrained by the divergence of developed and developing nations once again. It was agreed that developed countries would write biennial reports which would be subject to “international assessment and review” consisting of a technical expert review and “multilateral assessment” (van Asselt et al., 2018, p. 38). For their part, the developing countries would submit biennial update reports which would be subject to international consultation and analysis, which was agreed to be “non-confrontational and non-intrusive and respectful of national sovereignty” (p. 38).

Countries came to a more evident turnout before 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period was ending. While the developed countries increased their demands for applying the emission reduction targets for the rising economies, such as China and India, the developing countries insisted on their earlier position, holding on to the developed/developing country binary (van Asselt, 2018, p. 29). Thus, the third period starts with the Durban Conference (COP17) in 2011, when the Paris Agreement negotiations process also began. Later, the Parties submitted their pledges of emission reductions, namely Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in 2015. However, it turned out that the overall commitments of countries were not sufficiently ambitious to keep the global temperature rise below 2°C (Raftery et al. 2017).

At COP 21, the Paris Agreement was adopted by 195 countries in December 2015. In many circles, it is regarded as a successful agreement with the highest number of signatories. It entered into force on November 4, 2016 after 55 countries responsible for at least 55 % of the global carbon emissions ratified the treaty. While without stringent bindingness, its flexible structure, based on voluntary pledges of states for climate action, paved the way for higher participation. As there were many divergent and conflicting state interests about the climate action preventing common commitments earlier on, the Paris Agreement was intentionally crafted to be more flexible than the KP in order to lay the ground for achieving consensus in a much easier way (through voluntary pledges) (Cahill-Webb, 2018). With the Paris Agreement, global climate governance has seen a shift from “regulatory model” to “catalytic and facilitative” model (Hale, 2016).

Nevertheless, the Paris Agreement has “a weak legal status” in terms of effectiveness (Bäckstrand et al. 2017, p. 573). Unlike the Protocol that had emissions reductions obligations on countries, the Paris Agreement is not legally binding in terms of the voluntary pledges of states (NDCs). However, according to the Paris Agreement, the signatory states are obliged to prepare, communicate and maintain their successive NDCs (p. 573). Thus, an element of “top-down” governance in the post-Paris architecture is the procedural obligation to submit NDCs and “subject their implementation

to technical expert and peer review” at the international level (van Asselt et al., 2018, p. 31). The pledge and review structure allows for constant reviewing on the basis of five-year global stocktakes, and then submitting the renewed NDCs towards the global goal of 2°C degrees. The first global stocktake will be conducted in 2023 to evaluate the collective progress. Following this, it is intended that the Parties will be informed on how much they may ratchet up their NDCs for successive periods in a nationally determined manner (UNFCCC, 2016, Article 14). Regarding the framework for reporting and review, the Paris Agreement transformed it into a more flexible and equalizing form. It obligated all Parties with the enhanced transparency framework but presenting ‘built-in flexibility’ to account for the different capacities of the Parties (van Asselt et al., 2018, p. 39). Since the Parties have previously submitted their NDCs, they have to submit annual inventory reports as well as biennial progress reports to determine the action needed to reach and ratchet up their NDCs. Effective reporting is however still at stake, despite the elements of transparency framework. It is asserted that compared to the developed countries, developing countries are facing difficulties in reporting (p. 39). In the Katowice Conference (COP24) in 2018, it was decided that common reporting rules were applicable to all Parties. Moreover, there were heated debates in the last COP25 about how the Paris Agreement should be implemented as the Paris rulebook is still being negotiated. Specifically, the implementation rules for Article 6 will be negotiated at COP26, as agreement on these rules was not reached at COP25.

Furthermore, through the mode of hybrid multilateralism, the role of non-state actors increased. Consequentially, a new governance mode consisting of two different governance traits arose: (1) State-led action (NDCs) and (2) UNFCCC to orchestrate NDCs and transnational climate efforts. Firstly, in the current absence of legally binding commitments “much of the accountability and watchdog role of NDCs will fall to non-state actors both internationally and domestically.” (Bäckstrand et al., 2017, p. 571). In their role with respect to the NDCs, non-state actors will be “enhancing transparency, facilitating the stocktakes, and pressuring for the ratcheting up of NDCs every 5 years” (Kuyper et al., 2018, p. 2). Second governance trait, the mode of orchestration, functions through three elements: Orchestrator, Intermediary and Target group. Thus, the UNFCCC as an orchestrator will use various intermediaries such as transnational networks, or international cooperative initiatives that will inspire, encourage or push the target groups (i.e. countries, companies, municipalities, etc.) to take more ambitious climate actions (Hickmann, Widerberg, Lederer and Pattberg, 2019). Thus, the Paris Agreement has “consolidated the UNFCCC as the central orchestrator of non-state actors and transnational initiatives in global climate governance” (Bäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017, p. 765).

Overall, this part argued that the Paris Agreement is the act of re-legitimation or institutional adaptation to the delegitimations by two counter-institutionalizations. If it can be argued that the counter-institutionalization of fragmenters were justified when the voluntary (non-binding) national climate actions were adopted by the Paris Agreement, the counter-institutionalization of deepeners also succeeded to a certain extent, albeit more controversially. The latter’s achievements by the Paris Agreement might be exemplified with the mode of orchestration of the UNFCCC, increased role for non-state actors (see the following subsection) and the ratchet-up mechanism

through global stocktakes in the new climate governance system. With the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC aspired to move a fragmented global governance towards a less fragmented, more coordinated system. Yet, there are doubts over the effectiveness of this new governance mode in achieving the objective of 2 degrees.

3. 1. Non-State Actors in Limbo: Contesting by Counter-Institutionalization or Politicization?

Although Zürn identifies two major contestations to the international institutions, namely counter-institutionalization by states and politicization by non-state/societal actors, this paper suggests that classifying the contestations by non-state actors as politicization is misleading, and obscures the links between its dynamic relations with counter-institutionalization. Non-state actors include businesses, companies, investors, cities, regions, civil society organizations/NGOs and epistemic communities. Especially due to the presence of public-private partnerships or international cooperative initiatives within the umbrella of non-state actors, such a classification is not explanatory. There are many non-UNFCCC climate initiatives where states are members alongside companies, civil society organizations, and transnational networks of cities. Yet again, states' decision to create or sign up for these initiatives can be evaluated as strategic action that functions as counter-institutionalization, which then leads to the re-legitimation of global climate governance in the post-Paris period. In other words, the Paris Agreement has responded to the proliferation of cooperation between states as members or partners and other transnational actors (counter-institutionalization) under the title of non-state actors by bringing new roles for non-state actors in its hybrid multilateralism.

Climate actions of non-state actors first began to be woven into the UNFCCC policy outreach in 2011 in order to raise global ambition levels for climate action. The UNFCCC sought to do so for three reasons: firstly, the gridlock in Copenhagen required new approaches in multilateral climate regime; secondly, subnational and non-state actors could not wait any more “for guidance from national governments”, and thirdly, the UNFCCC Secretariat was keen to work with other actors rather than sticking to the Parties in order to create a positive vibe for global climate action (Hickmann et al., 2019, p. 12).

The UNFCCC began to work more closely with subnational and non-state actors. Three initiatives are significant to mention in this regard: The Momentum for Change Initiative, Lima Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) and Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) (Hickmann et al., 2019). The UNFCCC took various private funds to realize the Momentum for Change Initiative in 2011 in order to make itself a lively forum for the participation of subnational and non-state actors. Then it launched LPAA during the COP in Lima in 2014. The hosting government of Peru and the UNFCCC secretariat launched the NAZCA platform, which takes the registers of the commitments by non-state actors. NAZCA has been transformed into a portal, “Global Climate Action”, that displays climate actions of both state and non-state actors on the world map. As of June 2020, over 18 thousand actors have almost 27 thousand climate actions (Climate

Action). This strategy aimed to make the national governments to sign a more ambitious climate agreement by showing them the numbers and actors of climate actions undertaken by subnational and non-state actors; in other words, ensuring them that their national climate policies would be supported by the people (Widerberg, 2017).

The number of UNFCCC-accredited non-state actors was 163 in 1995, became 2133 in 2017 (Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand, 2019, p. 26). During the Paris conference (COP21), almost eight thousand non-state observers were registered (Hofferberth and Lambach, 2018, p. 31). A close look at the discussions during the climate negotiations will suffice to reveal that the non-state actors independently undertake a number of endeavors such as “emission trading systems, carbon markets, company-to-company standard setting, greenhouse gas accounting and disclosure and project implementation” (van Asselt et al., 2018, p. 30).

Seen increasingly as actors of “scaling up ambition” for climate action, non-state actors have been in the spotlight of intergovernmental discussions of the UNFCCC since 2011 (van Asselt et al., 2018, p. 30-31). It is asserted that non-state actors may “help states gain the technology, expertise and confidence to formulate and implement more ambitious contributions, and to build interest group support to pursue them” (Chan, van Asselt, Hale, Abbot, Beisheim, Hoffmann and Widerberg, 2015, p. 2). The role and actions of non-state actors have been given increasing importance with an optimism that hails the presence of non-state actors in climate governance as leading to “replicable, apolitical, win-win solutions” (Chan, Boran, van Asselt, Iacobuta, Niles and Rietig, 2019, p. 5). However, some non-state actors, such as businesses, adopt conflicting stances and practices, ranging from greenwashing to advocating low-carbon economy (Nasiritousi, 2017). It should be noted that every non-state actor has taken climate action for a different reason (ranging from private interests to public good) and there is no coordination among them (Chan et al., 2015).

4. Transnational Politicization for Deepening of Climate Governance

Zürn defines politicization as showing resistance or support for an issue about global governance in various forms of debate, protest, publicization, media coverage, and or problematization (2004, 2010, 2013, 2018a, 2018b). Societal actors (individuals, networks, NGOs, etc.) might undertake those activities at either local, regional, national or transnational levels. Jacobs (2016) contends that the Paris Agreement was accepted by the governments after five years of pressure from “a broad coalition of forces from global civil society”. Although this is partially true in the context where the COP15 (2009) failed to generate a new, long-awaited climate treaty in Copenhagen, it is important to acknowledge the existence of a climate movement that began to politicize global climate governance long before Copenhagen.

For two decades or so, global warming was only one of the issue areas on the agenda of environmental movement, as there was not a separate climate advocacy per se. The climate change movement, consisting of many actors, differentiated in terms of policy orientation,

organizational structure and type of mobilization, emerged in the 2000s. Two of these actors are remarkable. One of the oldest climate network is Climate Action Network (CAN), established as early as 1989, and attended world climate conferences since its early years (Dietz and Garrelts, 2014). CAN advocated for low-carbon transition and technological solutions by following a professional structure in their organization (Dietz and Garrelts, 2014). They publish reports, engage lobbying and advocate climate action in the UN's climate meetings. CAN was criticized as being reformist in the climate movement, most strongly by another important climate movement, Climate Justice Now! (CJN!). Gathered under the CJN!, networks all over the world advocated for deeper climate action, taking the notion of climate justice as their common cause and preferring not only expert-based activism but also street demonstrations, etc. (Hadden, 2015) The CJN! aimed to include in its agenda cross-national injustices ranging from economic development, North-South divide, ethnicity, gender and discrimination against indigenous communities. These two transnational networks were strong in mobilizing societal politicization during the Copenhagen conference, which provided the climate activists with an "important opportunity for networking and mobilization with potentially enduring consequences for the development of a transnational climate movement" (Wahlström et al. 2013, p. 3). Among the participants of the protests during COP15, the majority were those who framed the climate issue as a matter of global justice (Wahlström et al., 2013). Hence, the climate justice movement emerged after Copenhagen (Fisher, 2010). This was a turning point for the NGOs as they changed their campaign tactics in the following period.

In the run-up to the Paris Agreement, it can be claimed that the formerly antagonistic groups such as the business community and the environmental NGOs, were brought together for a global aim. Thus, Jacobs (2016) asserts that the four groups of actors contributed to the pressure on the governments signing the Paris Agreement: the scientific community, the economic community, the businesses, and the NGOs (Jacobs, 2016, p. 314). Firstly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was influential. It is actually scientists who have politicized global warming since the 1970s, but thanks to the impact of environmental movements around the world their voices were heard. Thus four years before the emergence of an international climate politics, the IPCC was founded (Dietz and Garrelts, 2014). Again, the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report published in 2007 demonstrated unequivocally that climate was changing at a catastrophic degree. Their Fifth Assessment Report in 2014 revealed that the global temperature increase should be kept at maximum of 1.5°C degrees, a target in line with emitted greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. They introduced the concept of "carbon budget", and advocated the policies that would bring net zero emissions.

Secondly, the economic community presented various studies such as the UK government's Stern Report in 2006 that advocates that the costs of preventing climate change are cheaper than the costs of dealing with the future consequences of climate change. Due to the world financial crisis of 2007-2008, climate action was downgraded in the political agenda of financial authorities (Jacobs, 2016). An NGO called Carbon Tracker published the situation of global fossil fuel reserves online, arguing that the latter would not be cost competitive in the near future with the

decreasing prices of renewable energy. That would then lead to the financial investments in fossil fuel to turn into stranded assets, leading to the “carbon bubble”. In 2014, the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate published a report titled “Better Climate, Better Growth” that argued that the reduction of emissions would ensure better conditions of an economic growth with healthier communities, less air pollution, and greater energy security (Jacobs, 2016).

Thirdly, the business community or the capitalist class is both the cause of the climate change problem and part of the solution (Beeson 2019, p. 49). Business circles increasingly agreed to the notion of green growth in the global markets. There was also the call of over 1,000 global companies to the governments to introduce carbon pricing. The business community mobilized thousands of companies under the coalition of “We Mean Business”. There were three major components of this shift in communication that was initiated before Paris: “low carbon transition is already underway; it presents unprecedented economic opportunities; its successful implementation rests on the cooperation of actors from all sections of society”. (Aykut, Morena et al. 2020, p. 12). Thus, such positive messages were important in bringing out both the outcome (the Paris Agreement) and its implementation by Parties (Aykut et al. 2020, p. 13).

Last but not the least, it is highly important to acknowledge the role of NGOs in challenging global climate governance. Activists used the Copenhagen narrative in the run up to and during the negotiations of the Paris conference. The climate justice frame advocated by alliance between vulnerable countries and NGOs was valuable in securing strong bargaining so that the notion of loss and damage was adopted in the Agreement (Allan and Hadden, 2017). Furthermore, a “broad coalition of groups” in global climate movement prioritized their campaigns on the issue of coal (Jacobs, 2016). They launched worldwide campaigns to halt and prevent coal-fired power plants, and succeeded in stopping the plans of many plants and diverting investors away from fossil fuel investments in the US and Europe. Furthermore, as the workers employed in the coal sector will be unemployed in a transition period to low-carbon economy, the discussions about ‘fair transition’ started to emerge on the part of global labor movement in general, and in the International Trade Union Confederation in particular. In the US, there was a huge protest against the building of Keystone XL Pipeline planned to connect the oil produced in the tar sands of Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, passing through the US. While 350.org launched a successful campaign against it, Barack Obama, former US president, also announced that the pipeline was not in line with the nation’s climate policies. Moreover, 350.org mobilized student groups and universities, and called on the major universities in the US to withdraw their investments from coal industry.

Furthermore, prior to the Paris Conference, an online petition posted through Avaaz reached 42 million supporters worldwide. In the New York Climate Summit of 23 September 2014, nearly 400,000 marched against coal production. In December, the French government declared a state of emergency and banned civil society demonstrations during the COP21 in Paris under the pretext of the terrorist attacks two weeks previously. Despite the governmental ban, a number of

protests were held by different groups of climate activists in various zones of Paris (Wahlström and de Moor, 2017).

The politicization of transnational societal actors compelling national governments and international institutions to take ambitious climate action contributed to the acceptance of the Paris Agreement and the emergent watchdog role of non-state actors therein. While the pledge and review dimension of the post-Paris architecture owes to the counter-institutionalization of the “fragmenter” states formalized in the Copenhagen Accord, the increased mission of the non-state actors for the accountability of states, which is an important aspect among other changes introduced with the Paris Agreement, was a proof that the politicization by societal actors worked out well. Nevertheless, global climate governance is challenged by its own issue; that is, climate change requires more ambitious and decisive action that should bring radical transformation. Moreover, its legitimacy is still at stake despite its re-legitimation with the Paris Agreement. The following section will point out some of the legitimation problems of post-Paris global climate governance. Then, it will scrutinize the place of non-state actors within the new governance mode and discuss which additional legitimation problems were brought to the fore.

5. Legitimacy Deficits of Global Climate Governance in Terms of Non-State Actors

Due to the power bias of global governance in general, the structural deficiency with regard to legitimacy cannot easily be overcome. This deficiency of global climate governance causes some “deepeners” to be affected by climate change in a much more serious way. The future of vulnerable countries with climate risks lies in the hands of the powerful states, yet the significant number of the latter continues to avoid ambitious mitigation of emissions. That said, as the legitimation issue facing non-state actors remains more complicated, this last section will point out those legitimacy deficits related to non-state actors. An exception is to be made on the discussion about justice where the intergovernmental debate is exposed to some extent.

Legitimacy can be generally described as justification of authority (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee, 2013). In this part, normative legitimacy of global climate governance will be evaluated mainly through the components of process-based input legitimacy and output legitimacy such as participation, representation, accountability, transparency and justice (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee, 2013; Kuyper et al. 2018). As regards input legitimacy, one can examine the participation and representation of non-state actors in global climate governance negotiations. The involvement of civil society functions to increase the “popular legitimacy”, i.e. the public support given to the global climate governance (Bernauer and Gampfer, 2013). However, as is said, civil society participation has been limited for the purpose of increasing efficiency of the bargaining process in the negotiations. After the Copenhagen Conference, when the climate negotiations came to a political gridlock along with huge NGO protests, the UNFCCC brought certain limitations to the NGOs. Most important of all, the members of NGOs have to apply for registration months before a conference. To that end, the UNFCCC Secretariat implements institutional control and

then only permits each NGO a small number of the observers (Orr, 2016). The “observer” NGOs can join in the negotiation rooms also through the delegations of countries. However, in that case, their contesting potential to the national authorities is severely undermined (Kuyper et al. 2018, p. 10). In COP25 in Madrid, arguably influenced by the emergent Fridays for Future (FFF) movement, the Nordic delegation brought several youth representatives to the conference. Yet, other than inviting a small number of young activists to speak at events, such as Greta Thunberg, the founder of the FFF that mobilized millions of people around the world in the last two years, together with another new climate organization called Extinction Rebellion (XR), young climate activists officially prohibited from entering the halls. After activists began protesting by chanting for climate justice during the conference, they were dismissed from COP25 halls by security guards. On the other hand, however, the climate negotiations continued to take the global polluter companies as its sponsors, encouraging “greenwashing” (Atkin, 2019). The representation of non-state actors is even more problematic. In order to be allowed into the halls and rooms, the NGOs must be accredited representatives. Accordingly, it is an issue who decides on which activists would be accredited. Therefore, the input legitimacy of the COP25 remains deficient, as was the case for the previous COPs.

Other intertwined elements of process-based legitimacy are accountability and transparency. Governance mode shifting from monocentrism to polycentrism in the post-Paris governance architecture raises the questions of “who will be accountable to whom?” and “what will be the hierarchies of accountability?” (Widerberg and Pattberg, 2017). Article 15 of the Paris Agreement involves a “mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance of the Agreement”. Compliance in that regard should be expert-based and it lacks punitive measures (Bäckstrand et al. 2017, p. 571). The Agreement also brings in a five-year global stocktake element which does “look at state contributions on an aggregate level”. In so doing, the Agreement does not leave room for the states’ contestations of accountability. The major informal instrument of pressure for compliance to NDCs is ‘naming and shaming’, which is mostly carried out by the civil society sector from non-state actors. However, the role of civil society in revealing the status of countries in relation to their climate commitments is very much dependent on transparent reports and efficient reviewing. Climate Action Tracker and Civil Society Review are leading examples for the tools of monitoring and pressing countries for compliance (Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand, 2019, p. 33).

Although transparency is cited as the most effective trait of the Paris Agreement (Bäckstrand et al., 2017; Cahill-Web, 2018), there are studies pointing out various problems of transparency, monitoring and reporting. Especially when data is not always quantifiable, or overlaps with another data and leads to double counting, the issue of accountability arises because sanctions cannot be applied thoroughly (Widerberg and Pattberg, 2017). Gupta and Mason (2016) challenge the overestimated discourse of transparency, which was celebrated by state-led and private climate governance “as a way to monitor and/or reward various actors’ climate mitigation actions and performance” (p. 2). In their analysis where they examine three flexibility mechanisms, the first two being formal mechanisms within the regime – Clean Development

Mechanism (CDM), Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), and Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) – they observe that although there are four rationales driving (or influencing) the politics of transparency, namely, democratization, marketization, technocratization and privatization, only the latter two are presently considered. The authors conclude that the potentials for public-good of transparency regulations and procedures are not operated as such. Rather, these mechanisms often respond to the private-good of multi-stakeholders that promote and carry out transparency for the purpose of their private interests, such as the evolution of carbon markets. For example, the data on climate risks is collected for investment companies rather than for the people who will be affected by those risks (p.19).

These studies prove that transparency in its own right is not a single parameter of evaluation in a governance architecture. “What is transparent for what and whom” is a more relevant question, which should raise additional questions about legitimacy and justice. Nor do the increased role and interference of non-state actors suffice to legitimate global climate governance. Besides, non-state actors cannot be classified as a homogenous unified front, since not all of the stakeholders categorized as non-state actors pursue similar goals. It is important to ask who is empowered through these formal processes. Currently, the UN-led climate governance lacks mechanisms to empower NGOs’ monitoring capacities that will investigate the accountability of the actors. The less the civil society takes participation and monitoring, the more the states’ parochial interests together with private actors’ interests can be taken care of. As mentioned, the UNFCCC has become the orchestrator, facilitator and coordinator of non-state climate action in the post-Paris governance architecture. But in case of “weak accountability and transparency mechanisms and inadequate coordination”, post-Paris climate actions will be inefficient (Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand, 2019, p. 42).

Justice is another important element of normative legitimacy, and it begs the questions of “who gets what, when and how?” Even though “climate justice” is oftentimes mentioned in the negotiations of the Paris Agreement, it is “not elaborated in its substantive provisions” (Kuyper et al. 2017, p. 8). It was only cited once, in the introductory passage in the Agreement. Justice has three subcomponents: agency, access and allocation (Kuyper et al. 2018). Agency is about “who makes decisions on behalf of whom” (Kuyper et al. 2018, p. 8). There are procedural injustices over inadequate representation of the views of the adversely affected, for example the indigenous communities of the Amazon, or the inhabitants of the low island countries whose land will soon be under water due to global warming. As stipulated by the COP21 decision, International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) was established. Later in COP23 in 2017, an open multi-stakeholder dialogue to develop the platform for local communities and indigenous peoples was convened. Though promising, these developments still remain shallow. There is also the issue of intergenerational justice that the FFF problematizes. A related pillar of justice is linked with the issue of access to benefits and rights. Similar to other UNFCCC decision, the Paris Agreement is mainly “driven by technocratic and market oriented rationales”, and thus hardly represent equity issues (p. 8). Accordingly, civil society participation is encouraged to remedy this deficit.

Finally, the issue of justice goes hand in hand with the issue of allocation of “climate-related responsibilities and financial compensations”. The issue of allocation was quite different in the KP because there were Annex I and Annex II countries with their CBDR. However, NDCs after Paris were based on countries’ voluntary pledges. Furthermore, after Copenhagen, the notion of climate justice became more common (Hadden, 2015). This led to equity concerns’ being discussed more frequently in climate negotiations, which paved the way for the notion of loss and damage to be established in the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) in 2014, and then integrated into the Paris regime. The Paris Agreement was the first international climate treaty that addresses this concept, but it does not materialize it into strong provisions (Pekkarinen, Toussaint and van Asselt, 2019, p. 34). Nevertheless, the notion is readily applied in customary international law, as in the claim for compensation for loss and damage that a party is responsible for (Streck, von Unger and Greiner, 2020, p. 144). Moreover, it is directly concerned with finance (p. 145). Kuyper et al. (2018, p. 8) asserts that post-Paris climate governance will reproduce the “harm done and human rights violations of local communities” if the real reasons behind the continuing inequality are not addressed.

6. Conclusion

It is widely accepted that post-Paris climate governance has problems of effectiveness and compliance. Nevertheless, the global community in general, and NGOs in particular have no option but to press for more ambitious actions from all stakeholders to stop climate breakdown. In the post-Paris climate governance architecture, since its main pillar was the voluntary and non-binding NDCs of countries, the transparency framework became immensely critical because it provides the only tool to assess compliance. In it, formal ways of advocacy (monitoring and disclosure) is the key to name and shame the actors in question through national and transnational networks. In order to expose the laggard countries, reporting of the mitigation actions by the Parties became crucial for the global civil society. However, some states seek less intrusive rules for the implementation of transparency framework.

This study demonstrated that the Paris Agreement has been gradually adapted institutionally to the already existing fragmentation of climate governance since the 2000s. The new governance mode adopted by the Paris Agreement has resulted from the combining factors of pressures from states’ counter-institutionalization, which was evident in UN-led conference gridlocks as well as the establishment of alternative forums alongside the UNFCCC, and the politicization of non-state actors under a broad coalition. In the light of the ongoing negotiations about certain important issues with regard to the implementation of the Paris Agreement such as international cooperation mechanisms, however, it can be argued that it is still in transition even after the Paris Agreement (Aykut, d’Amico et al. 2020). This shift is “not a completed event, but an ongoing, conflicted and open-ended process” (p. 2). Therefore, the Paris Agreement should not be seen as the last stop in climate governance, but should be understood as only one of the stops in the

course of climate governance. With its enduring legitimacy deficits elaborated above, it seems that global climate governance will have to re-legitimize itself in the face of future challenges.

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