

A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the UN and EU in Multilateral Development Cooperation in the post-2008 Era

2008 Sonrası Dönemde BM ve AB'nin Çok Taraflı Kalkınma İşbirliğindeki Rolünün Karşılaştırmalı Analizi

N.Nevra ESENTÜRK* 

Gonca OĞUZ GÖK** 

Abstract

There has been tremendous evolution in terms of both the institutionalization as well as the quantitative increase in multilateral development efforts since the end of the Second World War. Yet, the real qualitative progress of multilateral aid channeled through international organizations (IOs) has always been contested throughout history. Especially after 2008 financial crisis, neoliberal norms of development have been challenged by decreasing fate on democracy, multilateralism as well as competitive alternative models of development cooperation among developing countries of the Global South. In this context, this paper attempts to comparatively examine the policies of two main constitutive IOs, the UN and the EU in multilateral development efforts in the post-2008 era. To this aim, the paper will scrutinize official development aid statistics data from OECD between 2011-2017 in order to assess whether there has been a significant change in their aid efforts. The paper concludes that UN system has continued to be the main actor in the development cooperation funding in 2000s. While the EU still maintains the status of biggest core (direct/non-restricted) donor, the UN increasingly becomes a non-core (sector, program and region-driven) donor of the multilateral development system. Yet, crises of neoliberalism in the changing world order have an impact on the role of these IOs in terms of the implementation of a “rule-based” development cooperation system as well the sustainability of their “normative” actorness.

Keywords: Development Cooperation, Multilateralism, UN, EU, Crises of Neoliberalism

Öz

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından çok taraflı kalkınma çabalarında hem kurumsallaşma hem de miktar artışı yönünden önemli bir dönüşüm olmuştur. Ancak, tarih boyunca uluslararası örgütler tarafından sağlanan çok taraflı yardımların niteliksel gelişimi sorgulanmıştır. Özellikle, 2008 finansal krizi sonrasında, neo-liberal kalkınma normları bir taraftan demokrasi ve çok taraflılığa olan inancın azalması, diğer taraftan Güney ülkelerin yükselen alternatif kalkınma işbirliği modelleri gibi meydan okumalarla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışmada iki temel uluslararası örgüt olan BM ve AB'nin 2008 sonrası dönemde çok taraflı kalkınma çabaları karşılaştırmalı perspektifte analiz

* Yalova Üniversitesi, İİBF, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, E-Mail: nesenturk@yalova.edu.tr

** Marmara Üniversitesi, SBF, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, E-Mail: gonca.gok@marmara.edu.tr

edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu amaçla çalışmada 2011-2017 yılları arasında OECD'nin resmi kalkınma yardımı istatistikleri kullanılarak BM ve AB'nin kalkınma yardımlarında dikkate değer bir değişim olup olmadığı değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışma, BM sisteminin 2000'lerde kalkınma işbirliği yardımlarında temel aktör olarak devam ettiğini göstermiştir. AB çok taraflı kalkınma işbirliği sisteminde hala en büyük doğrudan yardım sağlayan donör iken, BM'nin sektör/proje ve program bazlı kalkınma yardımlarında artış gözlenmiştir. Ancak, değişen dünya düzenindeki neoliberal krizler, özellikle kalkınma işbirliği sisteminin "kurala dayalı" uygulamasında ve "normatif" aktörlüğün sürdürülebilirliğinde uluslararası örgütlerin rollerini etkilemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kalkınma İşbirliği, Çok Taraflılık, BM, AB, Neoliberalizmin Krizleri

1. Introduction

Multilateral development assistance efforts started with decolonization process after the Second World War and institutionalized in the post-Cold War era. The UN agencies, multilateral development banks and the EU have been the principal actors since the Cold War era. Multilateral aid was basically allocated from rich industrialized states to underdeveloped states through international organizations (IOs). As significant IOs, key constituent players of the language as well as the norms of multilateral development efforts have been the UN and the EU. Yet, since the 2000s, multilateral aid architecture has become very complex, with many types of organizations delivering assistance in a variety of forms (Kharas, 2007: 15-16). According to OECD, estimates around forty percent of total aid is channeled through an estimated two hundred multilateral donors and agencies (OECD, 2018a). Yet, donors have begun to rely less on official state channels and there is a growing number of NGOs and private donors such as businesses, foundations and religious groups on aid efforts (Keeley, 2012: 55-59). Furthermore, new rising powers from the Global South such as BRICS have become new rising bilateral donors. Development cooperation among the developing countries of the Global South (or South-South Cooperation) increasingly becomes a new alternative to traditional North-South model that relies on political conditionality for aid (OECD, 2013; OECD, 2015). Especially after 2008 financial crisis, there has been deterioration with regard to the normative appeal of the West and neoliberal norms of multilateralism; market liberalism, human rights and democracy are in sharp decline (Öniş, 2017: 4).

On the other hand, multilateral organizations continue to have a critical role in the development efforts, as they are still the *crucial sources of funding* for developing countries. According to OECD 2018 data, members' total use of the multilateral system reaches almost 70 thousand million US Dollars (OECD, 2018a). Secondly, IOs contribute to the multilateral cooperation system with efforts of *target-setting* and *establishing standards* that is required to create a favorable environment for the policies of multiple actors. In this regard, UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals that "sets" 17-targeted goals on development was adopted by all UN member states in 2015 (UN Sustainable Development Goals, 2015). OECD's The Busan Declaration of 2011 established for the first time an agreed framework on four principles (Busan Partnership Document, 2011) for an effective development co-operation that embraces traditional donors, South-South co-operators, the BRICS, civil society organizations and private funders. These developments then

reveal how at least a “normative consensus” could be reached on “development targets” as well as “shared principles” that underpin all forms of development assistance as a result of debate among various different actors in the changing multilateral aid architecture of 2000s.

In the context of above-mentioned rapid structural transformations in the last two decades, this paper attempts to comparatively examine the contributions of two main constitutive IOs, the UN and the EU in multilateral development efforts in the post-2008 financial crises era. To this aim, the paper will scrutinize the existing official development aid statistics from OECD between 2011-2017 in order to understand whether there has been a significant change in their multilateral aid efforts. Via critically engaging with the EU and the UN’s contributions in multilateral development aid efforts in the post-2008 financial crises era, the paper attempts to open up a discussion of the possible areas for further cooperation between the UN and the EU in development efforts despite limitations.

In order to do that, the first part of the paper will briefly analyze the evolution of the multilateral development system within the framework of the crises of neoliberalism in 2000s. The second part will specifically focus on the policies of the UN and EU in development efforts in order to better understand their specific role in the multilateral development system. The third part will comparatively analyze the UN and EU’s policies in development efforts in the post-2008 era in order to decipher their contributions to multilateral development efforts in the post-2008 era as well as their limitations. The paper concludes that UN system has continued to be the main actor and contributor in the development cooperation funding in the post-2008 era. While the EU still maintains the status of biggest core (direct non-restricted) donor, the UN increasingly becomes the largest non-core (program, sector and region-driven assistance) donor of the multilateral development system (UN ECOSOC Technical Note, 2015). Nevertheless, crises of neoliberalism in the changing world order have an impact on the role of these IOs in terms of the implementation of a “rule-based” development cooperation system as well the sustainability of their “normative” actorness.

2. Crises of Neoliberalism and Challenges towards the Multilateral Development Architecture in 2000s

The establishment of two Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1945 under the umbrella of the UN system laid the foundations of multilateral development efforts. With the end of the Cold War, multilateral efforts for development increasingly began to focus on liberal values such as “democratization” and “respect to human rights” as the key themes. The neoliberal practices that were developing since the 1980s such as free market mechanisms, mass-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises and trade liberalization to opening up to international competition increased their popularity in the 1990s (Colander, Holt and Rosser, 2004: 492). The so-called “Washington consensus” (WC), was based on a strong belief in hyper globalization and free markets to sustain economic growth. It

was the offered policy to developing countries by the IMF and the World Bank under the US-led international order in 1990s. Yet, the sustaining economic problems of developing countries in the post-Cold War era were interpreted as the failure of these neoliberal practices and the institutions that implemented them. 1997 Asian Crises was a turning point in terms of growing criticisms towards neoliberal principles. This led to the emergence of a new paradigm defined as “the post-Washington consensus” (PWC) in the early 2000s, an upgraded version of WC. PWC was based on the idea of strong regulatory institutions as well as a growing emphasis on “social policies” to increase the living standards of lower-income segments of the society. Yet, still the post WC has proved to be a continuation or edited version of the neoliberal practices of the WC, which further increased criticisms regarding these institutions and their policy tool-kits as well as their effectiveness (Öniş & Kutlay, 2020: 6-7).

2008 financial crisis has been a turning point in the sense that it has been the latest manifestations of the growing dissatisfaction with the neo-liberal economic paradigm as well as its institutions. Since then the international system has experienced a period of turbulent change in terms of the declining appeal of liberal democracy and the proliferation of populist, and authoritarian tendencies. China’s successful economic development experience in the 2000s has been the most noteworthy challenge to neoliberal dynamics by offering a new and authoritarian version of development model called “Beijing Consensus” (Yağcı, 2016: 30). This emerging development paradigm is argued to rely on two defining principles, namely the “sovereignty” and “flexibility”. The basic logic behind Chinese development model is that countries should not be subject to same set of development criteria, political conditionalities or institutional policies. They could experiment different development policy paths depending on their unique historical or cultural settings (Öniş, 2017: 5). In this new transitional era of the 2010s, mainstream liberal paradigm as well as new political economy paths co-exists together (Öniş & Kutlay, 2020: 7).

In light of the above-mentioned challenges towards neoliberalism, one can identify two main “challenges” towards the traditional Western-centric multilateral development cooperation paradigm since 2008. Firstly, multilateral aid architecture has been challenged by its “own” terms, regarding the problems connected to the both neoliberal norms as well as the practice of multilateral institutions. IOs like the EU is increasingly criticized in terms of their effectiveness as well as favoring political ends rather than development concerns in the allocation of funds. Accordingly, multilateral aid architecture is changing rapidly and there is an ever-increasing demand for private organizations and NGOs to deliver aid. NGOs and other private actors have been at the forefront of mobilizing funds from individuals, businesses and various private actors for a wide range of activities in developing countries (Kharas, 2007: 13-14). Citizens in rich countries increasingly prefer to channel their funds through private organizations, rather than through governments. According to 2018 OECD statistical data, private donors total is almost 7.5 thousand million USD compared to 2.8 thousand million USD in 2009 (OECD Stats, 2018). The shift from public towards private aid has significant implications. Private aid donors are more targeted and selective about the programs they are willing to support. They do not generally provide funds for multi-purpose development programs (Kharas, 2007: 13-14). States are also

becoming more “selective” about the programs they wanted to support compared to direct multilateral channels. In other words, donors increasingly select program specific and country specific aid-non-core contributions – compared to direct allocation to multilateral institutions – core contributions – like the UN. Therefore, there is also a growing demand for “non-core” development aid.

Secondly, there is a strong challenge in the form of emerging alternative model(s) of development cooperation emanated from the rise non-DAC bilateral donors like BRICS countries (Khoras and Rogerson, 2017). These donors are suppliers of international development aid that are outside the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) often referred to as “new”, “emerging”, “non-traditional”, “non-Western” or “non-DAC” (Smith, 2011: 1). Development co-operation from emerging donors significantly increased in 2000s, reaching 17% of total global development co-operation in 2014 (Luijckx and Benn, 2017). However, there is a significant lack of available information or transparent statistics regarding several emerging providers that are not reporting to OECD. Western development aid has generally tied to recipients initiating internal reforms towards the OECD-preferred market economies backed by democratic institutions. As compared to traditional Western donors, rising powers like BRICS prioritize economic ties, trade relations, and security interests, rather than democratic ideals. China differs from traditional Western donors in the sense that China deals bilaterally with central governments and does not give aid to NGOs (Quirk, 2014: 6-7). Another rising donor, for example Turkey’s development efforts are also different from both traditional and rising donors in the sense that Ankara tries to utilize direct contact with local populations. Having said that, although rising donors are not a homogeneous group in terms of their aid policies, they do not have political conditionality on aid as traditional Western donors and prioritize bilateral means. Multilateral aid channels like the EU and UN have increasingly been criticized on the grounds of being highly bureaucratic and slow compared to bilateral aid. Accordingly, the rise of non-DAC bilateral donors, accompanied with huge amount of shift to private aid, they not only add to the resources available for multilateral development assistance, but also to the complexity of the multilateral aid architecture (Kharas, 2007: 5).

Despite these complexities and proliferation of multiple different actors in aid architecture, in the 2010s, at least a “normative consensus” on development targets culminated in some of the critical UN documents, most notably the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Accordingly, the OECD’s Busan Declaration of 2011 establishes for the first time an agreed framework for development co-operation based of the principles of inclusive development partnership, ownership of development priorities by developing countries, focus on results, transparency and accountability that embraces traditional donors, South-South co-operators, the BRICS, civil society organizations and private funders (Busan Partnership Document, 2011). These developments then reveal how a consensus was constructed on development cooperation with respect to multilateral efforts in the 2000s. Based on this background, the next part will specifically focus on the role and policies of the UN and EU in development assistance efforts.

3. The Role of the UN in Multilateral Development System


Throughout history, the UN has proved to be both the main actor in development cooperation field and the most criticized one in terms of its accomplishments and failures. The “actors” and also the “issues” of the UN’s development system have evolved to be a complex system. The UN’s development machinery today is composed of the intergovernmental mechanisms of states, specialized agencies, the UN staff and experts, academics, private actors as well as civil society organizations. UN’s Development System is composed of the 34 entities that receive contributions for operational activities for development. There are 12 funds and programs, 13 specialized agencies and 9 other entities (Report of the UN Secretary – Economic and Social Council, 2015). It is in fact a “system” encompassing not only states, but also increasingly different and diverse web of actors. Not only the widening base of actors, but also the issues regarding development has deepened. From the idea of helping the poor and providing aid, the development agenda has evolved to a complex web of interrelated policy areas crosscutting humanitarian emergency aid, long term political and social development, security, climate, environment, trade and investment (Odén, 2010: 269-279).

In this context, the UN’s contributions to multilateral development efforts could best be explained in terms of both normative and material terms. Firstly, in normative terms, the world organization could be described as an “actor” in itself who creates, shapes and redefines ideas on development and set targets since its establishment (Weiss, 2010: 9-13). The opening paragraph of the UN Charter talks about the employment of “international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples” as the world organization’s main aim among others (UN Charter, 1945). The creation of a sub-commission on Economic Development in Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1946 was the first attempt to set standards regarding economic development. The UN appears to have made a difference, especially normatively in its contributions to “ideas” on development since 1945. Among others, the formulation of statistical norms and guidelines for development has been one of the crucial contributions of the UN in terms of quantifying the world (Weiss, 2010: 9). UN also has shaped and widened the concept of development to encompass sustainable development, human development, and gender development. Some examples among many are the works of UN Statistical Commission, United Nations Development Programs and the initiation of Human Development, Gender Development Indexes. (UN Human Development Reports) The UN also has tried to bring its ideas and influence by *setting targets goals* to bear on national and international action. The best examples to these are 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 2015 SDGs. According to Weiss (2010:10-11) setting internationally agreed targets to foster development has been a singular UN achievement. New ideas have also led to the creation of new institution such as UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for trade, UN Environment Program (UNEP) for sustainability, UN Development Fund For Women (UNIFEM) for gender. Although UN has made a difference in terms of shaping the norms of development and setting the universally agreed development targets, creating new institutions, the results still have been far from success in “materializing” all these development targets (Weiss, 2010: 10-15).

3.1. UN as a Non-Core Donor of the Multilateral Development System in 2000s

The UN has been one of the main “funders” of development efforts throughout its history. The world organization’s operational activities for development are funded by a combination of core and non-core resources. Until the early 1990s, the UN’s funding was in the form of core funding, but in 1997, non-core funding exceeded core contributions for the first-time (ECOSOC, 2015). Especially from the early 1990s on, the UN’s funding on development began to increase rapidly. As seen in Figure 1 below, the growth in funding for the UN was generally positive from 1998 to 2013 for both development-related activities and humanitarian assistance-related activities. The growth in core resources was, however, minimal compared with the growth in non-core resources. In other words, the increase in UN’s funding was almost entirely due to a significant increase in its *non-core* resources. The arrival of the MDGs in 2000s further accelerated the trend towards *non-core funding* of the UN development system as donors exhibited greater preference to earmark their contributions to specific development goals (ECOSOC, 2015). As seen in Figure 1, the 2000s also witnessed a major increase in funding for humanitarian assistance, which was mainly again non-core in nature.

Figure 1: Funding of UN Operational Activities (1998-2013)



Source: Report of the UN Secretary-Economic and Social Council (2015), <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/70/62>

As Figure 1 illustrates, the relative weight of non-core contributions of the UN denotes a changing “actorness” in 2000s as playing the role of *implementing agent* since it is used for the purpose the donor states’ preferences. In fact, such non-core funding tends to be earmarked to specific projects, thereby argued to be limiting the *flexibility* that UN entities have on the use of the funds they receive. According to OECD, non-core funds can also increase the

overall envelope of resources available to multilateral entities, allowing them to engage in a wider range of activities through existing institutional structures (OECD, 2010). In fact, UN specialized agencies have seen this as an opportunity to become *more operational* (Odén, 2010). Yet, the supply of non-core funds can also shift a multilateral organization's overall balance of activities, potentially carrying the risk of weakening its core policies as well as its "multilateral" character. Decreasing core resources has already raised concerns that the UN system is already beginning to lose its *multilateral character* and becoming bilateralised. This in turn makes coordination and coherence of the multilateral development cooperation system more difficult (Muttukumara, 2015: 9). In fact, in terms of non-core contributions, there is a huge change in UN's funds in 2010s and the world organization leads the members' use of the multilateral system with USD 14.127 Million in 2017 (see Table 1).

The growing non-core contributions are also the result of governments' choices to *bypass the multilateral organization* and send aid predominantly through *bilateral* channels. Donors increasingly chose non-core and private funding to exert influence on the activities financed by a multilateral organization in a possibly less bureaucratic way than through its board or equivalent decision-making body (Oden, 2010: 269-279). Bilateral aid and aid through private actors and NGOs are increasingly becoming more welcome as they also increase their expertise and institutionalization in humanitarian field. Regarding the UN, due to highly technical nature of UN's approach to provide inadequate answers to complex problems of developing countries, it is increasingly criticized in terms of its slowness regarding bureaucracy of proving aid. Furthermore, the fragmentation of the UN Development systems with 34 semi-autonomous entities limits its effectiveness in delivering change and creates inefficiencies. Attempts to bring "unity" to the UN Development system through reforms have so far been so slow (Baumann, and Weinlich, 2018: 1-4). There is also the problem of *decreasing belief in the legitimacy* of the UN and its institutions in the last two decades. These most serious failures have taken place in places like Sub-Saharan Africa because of past experiences as well as abuses and crimes of UN personnel experienced by local population.

Therefore, as the UN increasingly becomes an "implementation" agent of development efforts, the "normative" role of it necessarily decreases. In other words, when the donors transform the UN agencies into a "franchising" operation with funds with agendas of their own and more money than the core budget of the agency, it becomes even harder to focus on a set "normative" agenda of its own. In fact, there is an ongoing discussion regarding the balance between the normative vs. operational role of the UN in development field as well as its effectiveness and legitimacy in multilateral governance of development (Odén, 2010: 269-279). In spite of all this, in the economic and social arena, the UN appears to have made a difference, especially in its contributions to ideas on development especially by being a "norm shaper" as well as its actorness in terms of "setting the targets" for both states as well as multilateral organizations like the EU. Yet, ironically the development has been one of the UN's least successful fields in terms of concrete achievements (Weiss, 2010: 10).

4. The Role of the EU in Multilateral Development System

The European Union as a *sui generis* international organization is a formidable aid provider, as it channels around USD 15 billion in aid each year to developing countries, 10% of all the official aid provided globally (OECD, 2018a). Along with the EU member states, United States and the World Bank, the EU as an IO is among the world's largest donors and can have significant effects on developing countries. The EU also has direct cooperation with the UN in development cooperation.

In historical perspective, unlike the UN, EU development policy initially was narrow in scope in that the policy was intended merely to supplement the development policies of individual Member States in 1957. De-colonization, which primarily took place in the EU's early years, sparked demands for a redefinition of the relationship between the Union and the former colonies (Holland, 2002: 3). As a consequence, the First Yaounde´ Convention of Association was agreed as the legal framework governing the relationship between the Union and the so-called Associated African and Malgache Countries (EAMA). Along with subsequent Lome´ Conventions, which together covered the period up until 2000, the First Lome´ Convention of 1976 marked both a geographical widening of the Union's development policy and the inclusion of new areas of cooperation such as trade and aid (Broberg, 2011: 542). Lome´ I was replaced by Lome´ II in 1980 (OJEC L347/1 (1980)), by Lome´ III (OJEC L86/1 (1986)) in 1986, and by Lome´ IV in 1990, which expired in 2000 (OJEC L229/1 (1989)).

Lome´ III and IV provided further widening of the scope of the Union's cooperation with developing countries. In addition to trade and development aid, new policy fields were included in the framework of cooperation. Moreover, a new political dimension was introduced into the framework of EU development policy in that respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law was made an integral part of the Union's relations with developing countries. With the inclusion of political conditionality to the development policy, the EU placed particular attention to Latin America and the non-European states having borders with the Mediterranean (Broberg, 2011: 543). But the Hence, the Union concluded broad development agreements with these countries, as well as with India, Pakistan, and the then five ASEAN states of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Thus, EU ODA proceeds globally, but in the context of targeted regional agreements and programs.

Since the late 1990s, EU development policy has been strongly influenced by the Union's attempts to define and establish itself as a strong global actor. The EU's increased attention to security issues has spilled over on to its development agenda in that greater attention has been given to conflict prevention and political emergencies taking place well beyond Europe's borders. This is clearly reflected in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which replaced Lome´ IV in 2000 (Carbone, 2007: 33; Olsen, 2004: 81). Moreover, with respect to trade, the Cotonou Agreement constituted a marked change from the unilateral trade preferences of the Lome´ conventions in that EU products must also benefit from preferential treatment in African, Caribbean and Pacific

(ACP) countries. The Cotonou Agreement remains in force until December 2020, but subject to revision by the parties every five years.

Recently, EU development policies are guided by the principles of external action, which are set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on the EU of 2009, also known as the Lisbon Treaty. It stipulates that any external action undertaken by the EU as well as the related policy framework shall be guided by the very same principles that were at the core of the EU's own creation: democracy, rule of law, universality, indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, as well as respect for principles of the UN Charter and international laws (EEAS, 2016). Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU further narrows down the framework for EU development policies. It defines the primary objective as the reduction and complete eradication of poverty worldwide. It also calls for complementarity, coherence, and mutual reinforcement of development policies of both the EU itself and its member states. Article 210 reinforces the latter by obliging the EU and its member states to coordinate their ODA actions (Art. 208, 210 TFEU, Lisbon Treaty). The above regulations also validate the EU's core targets of poverty eradication in accordance with the UN SDGs and promotion of the EU's democratic values globally. These recent dynamics reveal how the normative dynamics of EU development policy has had the potential to facilitate the use of the multilateral development system.

4.1. EU as a Core Donor of the Multilateral Development System

Given its colonial history and the fact that the EU is collectively the world's largest donor of ODA with over 50 percent of global ODA disbursement, it is important to figure out how the EU and its member states promote norms within development policies internationally and how the EU cooperates with the UN specifically in the area of development. The material contributions of the EU as a significant donor of the multilateral system has brought fore the geopolitical aspects as well. Recently, the EU's internal and external crisis mode has pushed it to consider these aspects strongly.


Specifically, at the country level ODA disbursement of EU countries in the period between 2011-2017 can be seen in Annex. In a comparative perspective, it is seen that there is steady increase in EU member states' contribution of ODA in the multilateral development system, except the year 2017. In 2017, while in the overall countries of the EU, there is a small decrease, in the Central and Eastern European countries of Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania, Malta, as well as in Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, France, Sweden and UK, we see a small increase in their amount of ODA disbursement. ODA disbursement of Portugal can be mentioned as a specific case in which there has been a continuous decrease in its amount of ODA since 2011. According to the data, Cyprus did not provide any ODA in the years 2016 and 2017. This data reveal how the crisis of neoliberal dynamics have has an impact on EU member states' contribution to the multilateral development cooperation system.

On the financing side of EU development policy, the EU has set up targeted funds and programs, which operate regionally and under a multi-annual framework that stretches from 2014 to 2020.

The main financial channels of EU ODA are the European Development Fund (ca. € 30.5 billion for the period 2014–2020), which targets ACP countries, the Development Cooperation Instrument for Latin America and Asia (ca. € 20 billion) as well as the European Neighborhood Policy, which covers 16 Southern and Eastern European states and is worth around €15 billion (Beringer, et al., 2019: 8). These figures indicate the importance of the EU as a significant player of international development, providing core funding to the multilateral development system. Not surprisingly, the EU is also highly engaged in multilateral fora and efforts, actively supporting *inter alia* the fulfillment of the former UN MDGs and likewise the agenda-setting for the development of a follow-up framework, adopted in the form of the SDGs in 2015 (European Commission, 2016a). With the implementation of a new Consensus on Development in 2017, the EU aligned its development policy with the SDGs and reaffirmed its commitment to a rules-based global order. At the same time, the EU announced that it is seeking to replace traditional donor-recipient relationships with partnerships that will be based on common interests and shared principles. This indicates EU's commitments to the multilateral development cooperation system.

At the operational level, the EU has direct engagement with UN, which is significant for EU's legitimacy and its engagement on matters related to EU's strategic interests and operational priorities in line with 2016 Global strategy of the EU (Medinilla, et. al., 2019). Once the EU and member states' funding for the UN system is analyzed, it is seen that the EU is often put as being the single largest financial contributor to the UN system, including both the EU institutions and EU member states. The OECD's 2018 Multilateral Development Finance Report notes the increasing importance of multilateral institutions as significant funders to other multilateral organizations (OECD, 2018a: 21). Overall, one should note that the EU institutions and its member states provide almost one quarter of all financial contributions to the UN funds and programs. On the other hand, unlike the DAC members, *the EU institutions do not provide core funding to UN bodies*. The EU channels a significant proportion of its bilateral ODA through multilateral organizations (OECD, 2018b). Below Figure 2 indicates that the UN funds and programs benefit the most from the EU's contribution to multilateral organizations.

Figure 2: Core and Non-Core Contributions from the EU to Multilateral Organizations by cluster (2016)



Source: OECD (2018a), <http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-topics/Multilateral-Development-Finance-Highlights-2018.pdf>

Beyond the overall funding to the UN, according to the 2018 OECD-DAC peer review of the development cooperation, EU member states can provide core or multi-funding to the same organizations like the UN with respect to the added value for the EU institutions (OECD, 2018b: 61). For instance, within the perspective of the external action instrument part of the Multi-annual financial framework 2021-27, some member states such as Belgium proposed to include the possibility of giving core funding contributions to UN entities.

The discussion above reveal that the EU is not only a main driver in the renewal of the multilateral development agenda and a significant contributor to the UN system, it also continuously modernizes and redesigns its own ODA policy framework in response to the changing global context, which is characterized by the new geography of poverty, the emergence of donor countries from the Global South, additional financing options provided by private funds, as well as new global threats to development, such as climate change. The EU's Agenda for Change, implemented in 2011, introduced yet another new framework that significantly changed its ODA policy development and disbursement (European Commission, 2016b). Curtailing the policy priorities of human rights, democracy, and good governance, as well as inclusive and sustainable economic growth, the new guidelines stipulated a stronger differentiation of partner countries' actual needs leading to a concentration of EU ODA on the support of the most fragile of developing countries. Thus, the EU has become pragmatic in its choice of partner countries and organizations that offer the optimum added value on the ground.

5. The UN and EU's Contributions to Multilateral Development Efforts: A Comparative Analysis

According to OECD 2018 Development Cooperation Report, currently, the total use of the multilateral system (core as well as the non-core resources) represents USD 41.679 million while the bilateral projects USD 75.883 million (OECD, 2018a). Over these flows, in 2017 EU Institutions corresponds to nearly USD 13 millions of core contributions, while the WB follows with USD 7.6 million, and the UN agency, fund and commissions corresponds to USD 5.7 million-core funding (OECD, 2018a) (See Table 1). On the other hand, in terms of non-core contributions, UN leads the members' use of the multilateral system with USD 14.127 million in 2017. The arrival of the MDGs in 2000 and later SDGs in 2015 further accelerated the trend towards non-core funding of the UN development system as donors exhibited greater preference to earmark their contributions to specific development goals, therefore preferred non-core contributions.

Table 1: OECD Members Total Use of the Multilateral System (USD-Millions)

	2011		2017	
	Core	Non-Core	Core	Non-Core
Multilateral Organizations	36 254.935	14 457.275	39 684.379	22 624.993
UN agency, fund or commission	4 832.347	8 538.454	5 789.839	14 840.357
Food and Agricultural Organization	178.108	337.249	180.014	371.007
United Nations	284.334	20.843	340.990	36.055
United Nations Children's Fund	478.764	1 208.007	611.130	2 094.775
United Nations Development Program	630.675	1 190.992	517.812	1 502.342
UN High Commissioner for Refugees	341.623	1 204.713	385.884	2 296.882
World Food Program	282.604	2 380.114	293.987	4 631.814
European Union Institutions	12 335.066	562.139	13 127.071	1 013.825
World Bank Group (WB)	8 729.281	2 545.695	7 646.663	2 964.175

Source: OECDStats (2018), <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MULTISYSTEM>

As illustrated in Table 1, the UN system has continued to be the main actor in the development cooperation funding in the 2000s with its share of over twenty thousand million USD. Among its contributions, the share of non-core contributions almost doubled from 2011 to 2017, while there has been a slight increase in terms on core contributions. Among the UN's contributions, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and (United Nations Development Program (UNDP) got the largest funding in both core and non-core contributions. Therefore, UN increases its role as a non-core donor; while EU institutions continue to be the core donor of the multilateral aid system in 2000s. There has been a slight increase in EU's non-core contributions, compared to 2011. Yet the biggest share continues to be core findings in EU's multilateral development efforts. On the other hand, as illustrated in Table 1, the United Nations development system accounts for more than thirty percent of the total (core+non-core) multilateral funding, as reported by OECD/DAC and followed by European Institutions.

In the light of systemic changes and challenges towards neoliberalism, the strength of the UN's role continues to be its universal character compared to other actors in the development field. In this regard, this "universality" also gives the UN a special "legitimacy" as well as a perceived neutrality vis-à-vis national power politics as a global governance institution. As Stokke points out, that the biggest contribution of the UN to development and development cooperation was "to generate and successfully promote globally a holistic development concept, almost consistently keeping the social and human dimensions of development at the core" (Stokke, 2009: 510).

Yet, decreasing "core contributions" challenges the UN system's flexibility to act as well as its multilateral character (Fues et. al., 2007). In other words, the world organization's development efforts have become *highly dependent upon* the specific program and policy choices of its member states. This constitutes a de facto bilateralisation of the UN development system whereby the

UN acts as “short-term contractor” for donors rather than being a development actor in its own right and agenda (Baumann and Weinlich, 2018: 1-4). Furthermore, South-South cooperation has become one of the top priorities of the UN in development field. The UN system as a whole has also been challenged by the latest crises of Coronavirus pandemic. UN agencies like World Health Organization (WHO) is increasingly criticized and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has yet to take a unified action together towards the pandemic. Therefore, increasing criticisms towards the UN’s legitimacy and effectiveness in general has the potential to affect its “normative” power role in multilateral governance of development. The lack of a sufficiently forceful mechanism to implement the UN declarations and commitments as well as resistance to UN reform continues to be core problems. As UN increasingly becomes an “implementation” agent of states that seek status in global governance, the intended “normative” role of UN agencies necessarily decreases. This increases the crucial role of further cooperation between core contributors like the EU and the UN for the fate of multilateral development system as well as its norms.

The discussion of EU development cooperation policy centers on the nexus of norms and geopolitical dynamics in its evolution. Although the EU has expanded its development cooperation policy as a distinct instrument of its external policy supporting the EU’s global ambitions, the policy area is strictly challenged by external and internal challenges and geopolitical dynamics. This overall limits EU’s role in multilateral development cooperation. The evolution of EU development policy and the related figures in the paper reveal that EU development policy has emerged to be an expression of the EU’s “actorness” with its normative alignment with the multilateral cooperation system. The figures indicate the importance of the EU as a significant player of international development, providing core funding to the multilateral development system, and non-core funding to the UN system. The EU increasingly channels funding to specific purposes in line with its internal and strategic interests. This trend towards more earmarking can also be observed in individual EU member state contributions (OECD, 2018a).

On the other hand, there are certain limitations of the EU in its development cooperation policy such as coherence, effectiveness and complementarity. The significant increase in refugee and migration streams, terror attacks, and the rise of populist tendencies income have led to a reevaluation of the policy priorities. There is no doubt that these contextual challenges and the recent crises of neoliberal dynamics of the EU have made the picture more complex with respect to the governance of multilateral development cooperation. The EU in an evolutionary process has increased its commitments towards the MDGs and SDGs, this overall complements UN’s universal role in multilateral development cooperation system. Thus, SDGs can be seen as a common ground for the EU and the UN to work together. This normative alignment between these two organizations would likely to further EU’s continued commitment to a rules-based multilateralism provide a strong principled basis for its engagement with the UN.

6. Conclusion

This study aims at understanding the contributions of the UN and the EU in multilateral development efforts in the context of the crises of neoliberalism in 2000s in a comparative perspective. The paper concludes that there has been a shift from core (direct) to non-core (program and country specific) aid channels, and these changes have been the defining characteristics of multilateral development efforts in the 2000s. The EU still maintains the biggest core donor of the multilateral development system, while the UN keeps its role as the largest non-core donor of the development system. The crises of neoliberal dynamics in the changing world order have an impact on the role of these IOs in terms of the implementation of a “rules-based” development cooperation system as well the sustainability of their “actorness”. At a time of decreasing fate on multilateralism as well as the fortunes of neoliberal values, rising authoritarianism and competitive successful alternatives for development from the global South increasingly challenges multilateral efforts on development.

Yet, these challenges to neoliberalism and its norms also have the potential to bring “new ideas” and areas for cooperation and push for a reform for a more “egalitarian” development cooperation system. In fact, both the both UN and the EU stated their commitments to the 2015 UN SDGs as well as 2011 Busan Partnership principles. There is no doubt that development funding will continue to increase; however, the success of the UN and EU will depend on how they adopt to the changing dynamics, invest more in their cooperation strategically. Furthermore, in a context of changing power dynamics towards rising powers, decreasing willingness on the side of the US to support the UN, and a decreasing fate on multilateralism in general, the EU and its member states seems to have an interest in financing the UN as well as pushing for more stronger autonomy of the UN system as a whole (Baumann and Weinlich, 2018: 1-4). The EU needs to strengthen its role a normative player in the international system and deepen its cooperation with the UN in the area of development. In fact, in her speech before a 2017 UN Security Council Meeting, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy contended “European Union’s voluntary contributions to the United Nations funds and agencies amount to half of its total budget. This means we proudly and smartly invest in them as much as the rest of the world combined. We believe that it is in our best interests to do so” (Medinilla, et al., 2019). The EU can support UN autonomy by stepping up its “core contributions” and therefore slowing down *de facto* “bilateralisation” of the UN Development System (Baumann and Weinlich, 2018: 1-4).

All in all, the UN with its universal character could serve as an important platform for opening up a “contestation” or broader global debate over the weaknesses of Bretton Woods institutions and the norms of WC in creating a more egalitarian system. That might also help the UN to revitalize its authority and legitimacy as a normative actor in general and multilateral development efforts more specifically. Considering the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, the UN has an important potential role to play in order to facilitate cooperation among the parties of development cooperation (Manservisi, S., 2020). Yet, the pandemic is both an opportunity and a test for the relevance of

the UN's leadership when the world is in urgent need of multilateral solutions. This study has attempted to open up a discussion on the roles of EU and the UN in multilateral development efforts in a transition period to a post-liberal era. Further studies might focus on quantitative comparative analyses by incorporating other regional organizations and development banks to decipher a complete picture of the changing dynamics of multilateral aid architecture.

References

- Baumann, M. O. and Weinlich, S. (2018), "Unfinished Business: An Appraisal of the Latest UNDS Reform Resolution", *DIE Briefing Paper 13/2018*. https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_13.2018.pdf (Accessed 10 September, 2020) 1-4.
- Beringer, S. L., Maier, S. & M. Thiel (Eds.) (2019), *EU Development Policies: Between Norms and Geopolitics*. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Broberg, M. (2011), "What is the Direction for the EU's Development Cooperation after Lisbon? A Legal Examination", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 16 (4), 539-557.
- Busan Partnership Document (2011), *Busan Partnership For Effective Development Cooperation*, 4th High Level Forum on aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 Nov.-1 Dec. 2011. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf> (Accessed 23 May, 2020)
- Carbone, M. (2007), *The European Union and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Colander, D., Holt, R. & Rosser Jr., B. (2004), "The Changing Face of Mainstream Economics", *Review of Political Economy*, 16(4): 485-499.
- Holland, M. (2002), *The European Union and the Third World*, 1st edn., Houndmills: Palgrave.
- ECOSOC – Support and Coordination Department for Economic and Social Affairs United Nations, Workshop 2, Funding, 4 May 2015 https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/qcpr/pdf/desa_paper_funding.pdf (Accessed June 25, 2020)
- EEAS (European External Action Service) (2016), *Human Rights and Democracy*. http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/about/index_en.htm. (Accessed 16 May 2019).
- European Commission (2016a), *2015 Annual Report on the EU's Development and External Assistance Policies and Their Implementation in 2014*. Brussels.
- European Commission (2016b), *EU Communication on the Agenda for Change*, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/agenda-change_en. (Accessed 16 May 2019).
- European Union (2007), *Treaty of Lisbon, Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (2007/C 306/1)* http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/688a7a98-3110-4ffe-a6b3-8972d8445.325.0007.01/DOC_19 (Accessed 15 August 2019)
- Fues T. Li Dongyan, Vatterodt, M. (2007), "The Role of the United Nations in the Global Development Architecture: Steps towards Greater Coherence", Paper presented to the Annual Meeting 2007 of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), June 6-8, 2007, New York City, https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/Download_the_full_text__74_kb__01.pdf (Accessed 18 June, 2020)
- Keeley, B. (2012), "What is Aid?", in *From Aid to Development: The Global Fight against Poverty*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

- Kharas, H. (2007), “Trends and Issues in Development Aid”, Wolfensohn Center for Development, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_development_aid_kharas.pdf (Accessed March 15, 2020)
- Khoras, H. and Rogerson, A. (2017), “Global Development Trends and Challenges: Horizon 2025 revisited”, Overseas Development Institute Report, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11873.pdf> (Accessed August 25, 2020)
- Luijckx Willem and Julia Benn (2017), “Emerging Providers’ International Co-operation for Development”, *OECD Development Cooperation Working Paper*, 33 <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/15d6a3c7-en.pdf?expires=159.937.1393&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=225DB08FC84AAE18A6B31E5881C3AD80> (Accessed September 2, 2020)
- Manservisi, S. (2020), “COVID-19: A Stress Test for International Development Cooperation”, *IAI Commentaries*, 20-23 April, <https://www.iai.it/en/publicazioni/covid-19-stress-test-international-development-cooperation>, (Accessed September 10, 2020)
- Medinilla A., Veron, P. and Mazzara, V. (2019), “EU-UN cooperation: Confronting Change in Multilateral System”, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 260 <https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/EU-UN-Cooperation-Confronting-Change-Multilateral-System-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-260.pdf> (Accessed August 25, 2020)
- Muttukumar, R. (2015), “The Funding and related practices of the UN Development system”, ECOSOC Dialogue on the longer-term positioning of the UN Development system in the context of the post-2015 Development Agenda. https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/qcpr/pdf/ie_muttukumar_paper_funding.pdf (Accessed August 20, 2020)
- Odén, B. (2010), “Review Essay: Olav Stokke ‘The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation’”, *Forum for Development Studies*, 37 (2): 269–279.
- Olsen, G. R. (2004), “Changing European Concerns: Security and Complex Political Emergencies Instead of Development”, in *EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol*, ed. K. Arts & A.K. Dickson, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 81.
- OECD Stats (2018), <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MULTISYSTEM> (Accessed March 12, 2020)
- OECD (2010) Multilateral Aid, 2010, <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/978.926.4046993-6-en.pdf?expires=159.173.9810&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=0B4D15EA0594D1F893CEF61676080C9F>, (Accessed 18 April, 2020)
- OECD (2013), *Enabling Effective Development*, Multilateral Aid Report, The Development Assistance Committee, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-topics/2013-Multilateral-Aid-Report.pdf> (Accessed July 2, 2020)
- OECD (2015), *Multilateral Aid 2015; Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World*, OECD Publishing, Paris. <https://www.oecd.org/dac/multilateral-aid-2015.978.9264235212-en.htm> (Accessed July 2, 2020)
- OECD (2018a), *Multilateral Development Finance: Towards a New Pact on Multilateralism to Achieve the 2030 Agenda Together*, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-topics/Multilateral_Development-Finance-Highlights-2018.pdf (Accessed March 25, 2020)
- OECD (2018b), *OECD Development Cooperation Peer Reviews: European Union 2018*, *OECD Development Cooperation Peer Reviews*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/978.926.4309494-en> (Accessed July 2, 2020)

- Öniş, Z. (2017), "The Age of Anxiety: The Crisis of Liberal Democracy in a Post-Hegemonic Global Order", *The International Spectator*, 53 (3), 18-35.
- Öniş, Z., & Kutlay, M. (2020), "The New Age of Hybridity and Clash of Norms: China, BRICS, and Challenges of Global Governance in a Postliberal International Order", *Alternatives*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/030.437.542092108> (Accessed March 20, 2020)
- Report of the UN Secretary – Economic and Social Council (2015), 13 January 2015 A/70/62–E/2015/4, <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/70/62> (Accessed April 27, 2020)
- Smith, K. (2011), "Non-DAC Donors and Humanitarian Aid: Shifting Structures, Changing Trends", Global Humanitarian Assistance Briefing Paper, <http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/GHA-non-DAC-donors-humanitarian-aid.pdf> (Accessed September 3, 2020)
- Stokke, O. (2009), *The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. (cited in) Odén, B. (2010), "Review Essay: Olav Stokke 'The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation'", *Forum for Development Studies*, 37 (2): 269–279.
- Yağcı, M. (2016), "A Beijing Consensus in the Making: e Rise of Chinese Initiatives in the International Political Economy and Implications for Developing Countries", *Perceptions*, Summer, 21(2): 29-56, p. 30.
- Quirk, P. W. (2014), "Reemerging Aid Donors in the Reshaping World Order", *Transatlantic Academy*, USA: Washington, DC.
- UN Charter (1945), <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/> (Accessed: 10 September, 2020)
- UN ECOSOC Technical Note (2015), https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/qcpr/pdf/technical_note_on_funding.pdf (Accessed June 12, 2020).
- UN (2015), *Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E (Accessed 18 August 2019).
- UN (2015), *UN Sustainable Development Goals*, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org> (Accessed: 15 August 2019)
- UN Human Development Reports, <http://www.hdr.undp.org>, (Accessed 15 August 2019)
- Weiss, T. (2010), "How UN Ideas Changed History", *Review of International Studies*, 36, 3–23.

ANNEX

EU Countries ODA-USD Million (2011-2017)

Location	• 2011	• 2012	• 2013	• 2014	• 2015	• 2016	• 2017
Austria	1 001.8	1 056.4	1 065.9	1 100.3	1 381.0	1 687.9	1 251.3
Belgium	2 469.1	2 159.7	2 055.1	2 172.6	2 002.9	2 383.9	2 196.2
Bulgaria	43.6	36.9	45.5	44.4	41.4	68.9	62.2
Cyprus	33.9	23.2	18.7	16.9	18.5	-	-
Czech Republic	207.5	198.3	187.9	195.7	215.0	275.9	304.1
DAC Countries	121 876.1	117 311.4	123 496.4	125 475.9	133 233.5	147 554.8	147 160.3
Denmark	2 547.7	2 469.2	2 581.5	2 622.1	2 669.6	2 449.6	2 448.0
Estonia	23.0	23.1	28.6	33.9	36.3	46.0	43.0
Finland	1 264.0	1 246.6	1 279.9	1 434.2	1 326.9	1 088.4	1 083.8
France	11 021.1	10 906.4	9 877.1	9 204.3	9 264.6	9 873.0	11 330.9
Germany	12 634.2	12 358.8	12 902.9	14 774.4	18 764.7	25 603.6	25 005.1
Greece	328.9	275.3	199.3	210.2	243.4	377.9	313.6
Hungary	119.9	110.1	115.2	130.2	165.5	211.6	148.7
Ireland	818.8	767.2	767.4	742.2	727.2	821.3	838.0
Italy	3 721.7	2 512.6	3 011.8	3 489.2	4 128.7	5 218.6	5 658.0
Latvia	17.3	20.0	21.4	22.4	24.5	31.7	31.9
Lithuania	46.7	49.6	45.9	41.0	51.7	60.8	59.2
Luxembourg	364.9	375.3	384.5	369.3	380.2	407.1	424.2
Malta	18.0	17.2	16.7	18.6	16.8	20.9	25.0
Netherlands	5 426.0	5 037.3	4 738.7	4 850.0	5 913.6	5 121.3	4 958.4
Poland	347.9	376.3	421.8	388.7	449.8	705.4	679.5
Portugal	620.7	553.1	440.3	385.3	323.4	355.1	380.7
Romania	147.8	131.5	122.6	194.9	160.1	206.6	219.5
Slovak Republic	71.3	70.6	73.4	71.2	87.0	109.4	119.2
Slovenia	54.1	54.3	54.5	54.1	65.8	84.2	75.8
Spain	3 460.6	1 826.4	2 030.7	1 627.4	1 441.2	4 358.8	2 560.3
Sweden	4 688.3	4 528.9	4 795.4	5 309.3	7 266.8	5 006.7	5 563.3
United Kingdom	12 227.7	12 232.4	15 656.9	15 757.0	16 281.8	17 574.7	18 103.4

Source: OECDStats (2018), <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MULTISYSTEM>