Orienting the Relevance of Unconventional Security Architecture and Emerging Urban Spaces in North-Eastern Nigeria

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Orienting the Relevance of Unconventional Security Architecture and Emerging Urban Spaces in North-Eastern Nigeria

Seun Bamidele*

Abstract

The sequences of political disagreements, of the twenty-first century, has produced several unconventional security groups that employ a variety of measures to combat crimes in urban spaces. Thus, unconventional security groups have emerged under a locally-based security architecture, and have shown that they can be applied in conventional security engagements. But while other issues in the area have attracted more research attentions, little is known about these unconventional security groups and their operations, especially in urban spaces. These groups have emerged as expedient arrangements, necessitated by insecurity in the urban areas. It often involves processes, including a call for volunteers in the localities, which was subsequently heeded by quite a large number of unconventional security groups, to align efforts to fight insecurity. Although the rate of insecurity has not mitigated in the urban localities, the group has remained intact, and has, sometimes constituted security challenges to the locals. On several occasions, they have also been fingered in various acts of human rights abuse. Nevertheless, the indigenous people still prefer to have them around. Hence, considering urban peace and security processes, there is need for the conventional security groups to seek to simplify and, at the same time, broaden participation to accommodate this initiative in the overall security design. This study seeks to interrogate the integration between conventional and unconventional security groups, as evident in north-eastern Nigeria.

Keywords: *Conventional Security Architectures, Unconventional Security Architectures, Hybridity, Security, North-eastern Region, Nigeria*

Kuzey-Doğu Nijerya'da Yeni Kentsel Alanlar ile Sıradışı Güvenlik Yapılanması Arasındaki İlişkisellik

Özet**

Yirmi birinci yüzyıldaki siyasi anlaşmazlıkların sonuçları, kentsel alanlarda suçlarla mücadele etmek için çeşitli yöntemler kullanan birkaç alışılmadık güvenlik grubu üretti. Böylece, geleneksel olmayan güvenlik grupları yerel tabanlı bir güvenlik mimarisi altında ortaya çıkmış ve geleneksel güvenlik görevlerinde uygulanabilirliklerini göstermişlerdir. Ancak bölgedeki diğer konular araştırmacıların daha fazla ilgisini çekerken, bu alışılmadık güvenlik grupları ve bunların özellikle yeni kentsel alanlarda yürüttükleri operasyonları hakkında çok az şey biliniyor. Bu gruplar, yeni kentsel alanlardaki güvensizliğin gerektirdiği, ona uygun düzenlemeler olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu düzenlemeler süreç işletimi, bu güvenlik yapılanmasının içinde çoğunluğu oluşturan yerel gönüllüler için çağrı ve güvenlik sorunlarıyla mücadele için gereken diğer uyarlamaları içermektedir. Kentsel bölgelerde güvensizlik oranı azalmamış olsa da, bu gruplar bozulmadan kaldı ve bazen yerel halk için güvenlik sorunları oluşturdu. Bu gruplar pek çok kez, çeşitli insan hakları ihlali eylemlerine karışmış olmalarına rağmen yine de yerli halk bu grupların etrafta olmalarını tercih ediyor. Bu nedenle, kentsel barış ve güvenlik süreçleri göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, geleneksel güvenlik gruplarını

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genel güvenlik tasarımına dâhil etmek için bir düzenlemeye ve aynı zamanda katılımı genişletme çalışmasına ihtiyaç vardır.

Bu kapsamda bu çalışma, kuzeydoğu Nijerya'da görüldüğü gibi, geleneksel ve geleneksel olmayan güvenlik grupları arasındaki entegrasyonu sorgulamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kavramlar: *Geleneksel Güvenlik Yapılanması, Güvenlik, Hibrit, Kuzey Doğu Bölgesi, Nijerya, Sıra dışı Güvenlik Yapılanması.*

1. Introduction

Within Nigeria, conventional security groups, in urban spaces, have been consistently recurring from the pre-independence to the independence era. These are deliberately annexed and entrusted to the federal government, which has operated and commanded all armed security services in the country since 1966.[1] The state's security monopoly does not only extend to the possession of forceful instruments, but also to all facets of the subject matters, including open speech, because it is considered to be a "top security secret" and is not discussed democratically, or perceived as part of the democratization program.[2] In the 1990s, security decision-making was termed as the exclusive domain of the state, which, presumably, lacked the ubiquitous capacity, and security response to adequately cover the whole country. This deficiency has resulted to creating a yawning void, which locals and localities quickly filled by adopting ways they consider to be in their best interests. In recent years, however, societies have witnessed a paradigm shift; safety and security issues are increasingly understood at different levels, ranging from the local to the state level. This means that the society has tended to employ local-led security architecture in micromanaging peculiar situational security challenges in their immediate setting. For instance, at the local level, households hire guards for their homes, streets are locked, and neighborhood patrols are conducted using broader community protection groups, leading to the creation of unconventional security groups. At the level of state security groups, the society has the national security groups, which includes: the Nigerian Military, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force, Nigerian Police, State Security Service, Nigerian

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[1] Constitutions of Nigeria, *Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria,* Section 214 (1), Abuja: Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999

[2] J. T. Lar, "Vigilantism, State and Society: A History of Plural Policing in Plateau State, Nigeria, 1950 to the Present," in *African History and Politics, Bayreuth International Graduate School for African Studies* (BIGSAS), (Germany: University of Bayreuth, 2015); Alemika and Chukwuma, *Police Community Violence in Nigeria.*

Immigration Service, Nigeria Fire Service, Nigeria Prison Service, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps, as well as the Federal Road Safety Corps, serving as the regulatory security architecture. Therefore, the prospect of mixing or coordinating of effort to the necessity for interdependence and intertwined sections between the conventional security groups and unconventional security groups, to create a hybrid concept. The federal government's monopoly of security institutions worked transparently during the military regime, when the other levels of government were subordinate to the head of state. However, upon the return to civil regime in 1999, the structural autonomy of the federating states became juxtaposed with the centralization of security infrastructures, and this became a major challenge, especially in the management of the safety and security of the Nigerian state. In a way, this began to fuel requests for state or community policing in certain localities.

Likewise, the understanding that conventional security architecture (conventional security groups) systems are codified and process-driven, while unconventional security architectures (unconventional security groups) lack systems and processes, remains highly debatable, because a hybrid practice is at the heart of conventional security groups (state security groups), and their rules, processes and standards guide the activities of unconventional security groups (non-state groups).[3] Such hybridity, therefore allows for a measure of overlap, exchange and even conflict between the conventional security groups and the unconventional security groups, while creating a hybrid in which the conventional and the unconventional are taken together.[4] Over the years, ethno-political changes in Nigeria's government and politics, as well as rapid urban sprawl, have dramatically changed the dynamics of security administration and arrangement, breeding multiple layers of groups.

Urban space, in Nigeria, present unique settings which tend to reinforce the call for the operationalization of the concept of hybridity in the security architecture, in micromanaging

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[3]B. Baker, "Linking State and Non-State Security and Justice," *Development Policy Review* 28, no. 5 (2010): 597–616; B. Baker, "State and Sub-state Policing in Africa and the Boundaries between Them," *Global Crime* 13, no.4 (2012): 276–292; B. Baker, "Hybridity in Policing: The Case of Ethiopia," *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 45, no. 3 (2013): 296–313.

[4] M. Marks, W. Jennifer, A. Julian and T. Xaba, "Reconfiguring State and Non-State Actors in the Provision of Safety in (South) Africa: Implications for Bottom-Up Policing Arrangements and for Donor Funding," *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 43, no. 63 (2011): 49–72; S. Podder, "Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion," *Contemporary Security Policy* 34, no. 1 (2013):16–39.

peculiar, situational, security challenges of their immediate environment, which, in simple terms, require a combination, or use of multifaceted groups (both conventional security group and unconventional security groups), in ensuring peace and security in these urban localities. The heterogeneity of urban localities in the country makes its ethno-cultural norms and practices to be strongly influenced by different ethno-cultural groups, and therefore, difficult to define, as is the case in many distinct urban localities. Therefore, the responsibility of ethno-cultural groups, community groups, market groups and professional groups or unions is crucial in upholding peace and security in urban society. Saddled with the responsibility to protect urban localities such as Maiduguri, Bauchi, Gombe and Yola, the security operatives must take into account the codes that govern conduct between and among the locals, who are, first, members of the Nigerian state, and then, members of several local groups, which also exercise different levels of influences their conduct. In addition, urban localities have unique public spaces that are often prone to crime; take for example, markets, bus parks, garages or terminals, and poor downtown localities, etc.

In the long run, markets and bus terminals are austere economic spaces managed and regulated by the laws of supply and demand. Nigeria's urban space are constitutive of organized economic, social, cultural and political spaces that play a strategic and essential position, in the conservation and preservation of public order in the Nigerian state. The proper regulation, administration and management of trade and transactions, in these urban spaces, necessarily require internal security provisions for better or rapid preventive measures and response to crime. Nigeria, because of its dynamics, cleavages and vague perspectives, it is doubtful that any state security groups (conventional) can be productive in the security and administration of justice, to effectively resolve the skirmishes, in this case, the increase in informal settlements in urban slums, which are often a collection of huts, poorly constructed/secure, require internal crime prevention mechanisms in order to ensure peace and security, and guarantee the peaceful use of scarce public facilities. Clashes between urban slum settlers and road transport workers, in urban spaces, are first, subjected to internal settlement mechanisms, as part of an unconventional framework, with little or no recourse to the instrumentality of the state, perhaps due to the perception that the state has not assumed its responsibility in protecting locals in the localities. Therefore, the presence of the state is ineffective.

Studies in Nigeria, in the past, have established the central responsibility of unconventional security architectures, in meeting up with the peace, security and needs of majority of the poor people. Unconventional security architectures are used by the poverty-stricken locals for a diverse motives, which includes protecting them from criminal attack.[5] This is occasioned by the absence of the conventional security architectures, who should foster rapid peace and security services, and the fact that they are closer to the locals than the conventional security groups. Considering urban peace and security processes, there is need for the conventional security groups to seek to simplify, and, at the same time, broaden participation to accommodate the roles of unconventional local-based security component in conventional security prevention. Accordingly, the study is guided by the following questions: can a trend of embedding be identified between the conventional and unconventional security architectures? Considering the processes of "unconventional security architectures" through which conventional security agencies are seeking to simplify and broaden participation into the processes of protection and security, and other initiatives at the level of the confederating states to legislate and codify unconventional security actors through legislations and partnerships. Put differently; is the conventional security actors being embedded into the unconventional security actors and vice versa (in the conventional and unconventional security architectures) seek to operationalize and appropriate the respective security architectures? Furthermore, which prevailing actors can be mapped out on the Nigerian security sector? Are they interfacing with each other? What are the patterns and trends of between actors? Have the current processes of embedding formality in the informal and vice versa improved or impeded accountability and inclusivity? What are the likely impacts of the processes of hybridity on the current security order in Nigeria? Are there similarities and/or differences between hybrid actors providing security in different contexts? This article outlines the complex hybrid system of providing protection and security in the north-eastern region of Nigeria and raises questions for further study.

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[5]E. Alemika and I. Chukwuma, *Police Community Violence in Nigeria*, (Lagos: Center for Law Enforcement Education, 2000); S. Walklate, "Informal Crime Management in a Northern British City: Crime Fear and Locality," in *Informal Criminal Justice*, ed. D. Feenan, (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2002).

2. Study Area and Methodology

Fieldwork for this study was carried out in six months, between 2018 and 2019, in Borno State (*Durza Ka or Kato da Gora*), Adamawa State (*En Banga*), Bauchi (*Sarasuka Group or Vigilante Group of Wunti*) and Gombe state (*Kalare Youth*); there were no existing sampling lists that identified most of the sampling targets in the sampling population of the states. The study uses a single-layer approach to gathering and analyzes data.[6] The main thrust of the research utilized the following: desk review of extant literature on the theme including; government records, gazettes or documents; memoranda on security submitted to the government; workshop reports; and to better understand the specific cases, I shall deploy the following: questionnaires and desk research. Moreover, determining the sampling technique employed in the study was a crucial element of the overall sampling strategy. Considering the exploratory nature of the research on protection and security, a purposive, non- probability sampling technique was deployed in the research in view of the sampling criteria which does not necessary aim to produce a statistically representative sample of the entire or large number of responders. Judgmental sampling or purposive sampling allowed the researchers to choose the sample based on whom he/she thinks would be appropriate for the study. And this strongly supports the limited number of people that have expertise or are interested (or afraid of repercussions) in the subject being researched. In determining the sampling criteria, the characteristics of individuals such as socio-economic characteristics, behaviors, attitudes, vocation or knowledge, which reflects the diversity and breadth of the sample population, should be considered. To this end, market leaders, opinion, unconventional group members, members of Conventional Security Forces Community Relations Committee, traditional and religious leaders were chiefly targeted. A feature of qualitative sampling is the number of cases sampled is often small. This is because a phenomenon only need appear once to be of value. There is no need for scale as there is no need for estimates of statistical significance. Furthermore, because qualitative investigation aims for depth as well as breadth, the analysis of large numbers of in-depth interviews would simply be unmanageable because of a researcher's ability to effectively analyze large quantities of qualitative data. Hence, a total of

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[6] J. Ritchie and J. Lewis, *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, (London: Sage Publisher, 2003).

100 questionnaires per each of the 4 states under survey made a total of 400 questionnaires administered. Out of the 400 questionnaires administered, we have 364 (91%) duly filled and returned questionnaires. Some of the respondents participated in multiple stages of the data-gathering. In addition, there were no existing sampling lists (frames) that identified most of the sampling target within the sampling population of Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi and Gombe states. With the help of key stakeholders or gatekeepers such as the divisional offices of the Nigerian Security Agencies, Community Based Organizations such as the Nigerian Security Forces Community Relations committee, and the Nigeria Military, a semblance of a functional and operational list – representing the target population - was constructed at the moment for the purpose of the research in each of the state. This approach was helpful in the near absence of local civil society contacts, particularly in Borno, and Adamawa states, coupled with the prevailing insurgency and electioneering security challenges at the time of the field work. In Bauchi state, the researcher's contact, and knowledge of existing civil society organizations greatly helped in constructing a sampling frame. For Borno state, the rich working relationship, contacts and knowledge of CJTF in Borno, proved useful in constructing the sampling frame for Gombe state. Generally, our ad-hoc frame comprised of members of the civil society, community based organizations, market women and traders' association, the Nigeria Police, religious and traditional institutions. Research assistance were used in administering the questionnaires and participated in the analyses of same, while some of the questionnaires were self- administered.

3. Setting the Context: Unconventional Security Groups

Below, I present a summary of the preselected unconventional security groups, which are examined in this study.

3.1. Case1: Borno State - 'Durza Ka' or 'Kato da Gora'

Durza Ka, as they are called, in Kanuri language, '*Kato da Gora,*' has emerged as one of the major unconventional security groups in urban spaces in Borno State, Nigeria. The *'Durza Ka'* was formally established by the Borno State government in June 2013 in apparent dissatisfaction with the police and military's ineffectiveness or inability to protect its locals

against Boko Haram assaults.[7] The *Durza Ka* simply fortified the existing traditional security system, which had been set up by the locals. It subsequently assumed numerous roles, from acting as the discrete surveillance network, in the northeastern region, to military combat auxiliary or semi-autonomous fighting forces. Unlike the military, *Durza Ka* group speaks local languages (Kanuri, Shuwa, Hausa and Arabic); understand the local cultures; share similar religion or geographical landscapes; and are dominantly made up of youths, age 15 to 35. Most of them are mainly from victimized localities, affected by insurgency. The atmosphere of violence, orchestrated by Boko Haram insurgents in the North-eastern Nigeria, occasioned a precarious civil and humanitarian situation in that region, which necessitated the involvement of the local communities, in an unconventional security response. The serious security challenges posed by the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-eastern Nigeria, vis-à-vis the glaring underperformance of the conventional security architecture (national security architecture), led to the emergence of the *Durza Ka*, as an interventionist-security strategy, to deal with the insurgency. The inadequacy of the conventional security architecture, as well as its operational and organizational challenges, especially as regards intelligence, in the face of escalating insurgency, led to the civilian collaborative strategy called the *Durza Ka*. It is believed that the local security groups are better sensitive and equipped, to identify the enemy; added to this is that they know the terrain more, and have a unique intelligence gathering capability. However, the decision by the federal government to incorporate the *Durza Ka* to the security system in the Nigeria opened up a new line of thinking of security calculus, which supports community self-defense and tactical unconventional-conventional synergy that is an unconventional, locally-based security component, engaged in conventional security operations in North-east Nigeria. Following its recorded success, the police and military began to have working-relations with the *Durza Ka*. The collaboration did not go unnoticed by the insurgents, who, in response, promised to deal with the *Durza Ka* in one of its periodic broadcasts.

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[7] J. Maignawa, *The Role of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Combating Boko Haram Violence in Borno State and the Implications for Peacebuilding,* Paper presented at Ife-Oxford International Early Career Workshop Programme, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, 2017; Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP)/UNICEF Nigeria, *Perceptions and Experiences of Children Associated with Armed Groups in Northeast Nigeria*, http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Research-Report-Children-Associated-with-Armed-Groups.pdf (21.03.2017), 1-50.

3.2. Case 2: Adamawa - En Banga

En Banga, as envisaged was a post 2014 initiative, involving a group of hunters, who later formed a counter-Boko Haram insurgency operation recognized by the Adamawa State government. It was meant to monitor the security situation in the axis of Adamawa, along its border with Borno State, while complementing the already existing urban security provisions.[8] The *En Banga's* (Group of Hunters') pattern of gathering or mobilizing locals, principally local hunters, to be responsible for urban security encountered several challenges, especially in their operations. *En Banga* is a local security initiative introduced to man the borders of Borno and axis of Adamawa State. In the North-eastern region of Nigeria, the *En Banga* enforced the laws of sharia in leu of the conduct of 'Almajiri.' These laws include, among other things, the prohibition of the consumption of alcohol, and indecent clothing. They also saddled with the duty to arrest perpetrators petty crimes and petty thieves, etc. as well as the enforcement of sanctions for all offenses ordered by a Sharia court. The *En Banga* was set up as an urban security force, operating as an unconventional security group, emerging from the need to fight urban crime, hooliganism, and thuggery among the (Alimajiri) migrants – Quranic scholars in the urban localities in the state.[9] It is also separate from the traditional security group, which is constitutionally defined in the country. Yet it is unconventional, because it was created by a confederating state government, with enabling legislation, and it fulfills the function of ensuring compliance of law and order in the state, in order words, the obligeance of the state law. The *En Banga* group's operation aroused the concern of the national security forces, who demanded a legal interpretation of *En Banga* and the Adamawa State government's intention, for creating or allowing it. This is based on the grounds that the new security outfits were not only unconstitutional, but also usurped part of its exclusive national security powers. Challenging the accuracy of the state-owned *En Banga* led to lengthy litigation, in which the national security forces sought to outlaw the operation of *En Banga,* without agreeing to apply state law. Between the litigations, a light drama, on the use and control of the national security forces was reinforced to be lump-sided at the central, while they are its detached the public and their basic

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[8] S. Bamidele, "Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and Counter-Insurgency (CI) in the North-Eastern Region of Nigeria," *Unpublished PhD Thesis, Institute of Peace, Security and Governance,* (Nigeria: Ekiti State University, 2020).

[9] Bamidele, "Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and Counter-Insurgency (CI) in the North-Eastern Region of Nigeria."

interests. However, the emergence of Boko Haram, in Adamawa State, considered *En Banga* as a bastion of the then opposition group, and the belief among the *En Banga* members were different from Boko Haram opposition group then. It is widely believed that the federal government has ordered the removal of national security protection from the Emir of Yola's palace, and the offices/residence of the former governor of Adamawa State. In his response to the withdrawal of the national security forces, the state governor called on the *En Banga* group and other protection groups of the locals. The impasse lasted for some time, before the national security forces were restored back; many of them had been chased away by the Boko Haram sect. The field study on *En Banga*'s role as an unconventional security group was carried out in Yola, in the North-eastern region of Nigeria.

3.3. Case 3: Gombe –The Kalare Youth

In the north-eastern region, the Kalare Youth was born out of the controversy that followed the state's elections in 1999. Since 1999, the group has functioned as a pressure group, and has been mobilized to back politicians within the localities. According to Kwaja, et al., (2017) "the growing reactivity of young people, economic difficulties, social tensions and insecurity that the Kalare Youth has formed a vigilance wing to deal with the issue of urban security".[10] The Kalare Youth soon became more feared than the criminals for whom it was set to combat. They also challenged the police, the military, and the federal government over the cancellation of many local government's election in the state; they were considered untouchable, even by the federal government. Rumor has it that they have charms and traditional powers not only to resist bullets, but also to magically find suspects and solve difficult crimes. Kalare Youth members travel frequently with charms and amulets. When the country returned to democratic government, in 1999, the Kalare Youth leader, Mohammed Abubakar was arrested and charged to court. The Kalare Youth is a cultural and security group with self-determination as its agenda; it has remained as a very vocal political actor in the politics of the North-eastern region of Nigeria. But its security services have become less pronounced, as other unconventional security groups such as vigilantes have emerged. For instance, the confederate government created the Gombe Vigilante Group (GVG) to fill the

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[10] C. M. A. Kwaja, K. Okenyodo and V. Ahmadu-Haruna, *None State Security Actors and Security Provisioning in Nigeria,* (Abuja: Rule of Law and Empowerment Initiative Also Known as Partners West Africa Nigeria (PWAN), 2017).

unconventional security vacuum created by the backtracking of the Kalare Youth. The study focuses on the successors of the GVG and probed the possible relevance of the security of the GVG. The primary data on the successor to the GVG were collected in Gombe state.

3.4. Case 4: Bauchi State – 'Sarasuka Group' or 'Vigilante Group of Wunti'

This group was formed in 2009, as hunters' association, as a result of cattle rustlers in the rural and urban localities of the state, but later launched by the Bauchi State government, in 2013, as a military combat auxiliary or semi-autonomous fighting force to fight against Boko Haram in Burra and Falgore forest, very near to Kaduna State, which is the hide-out of Boko Haram insurgency group.[11] In Bauchi State, in the North-eastern region of Nigeria, the Sarasuka Group or Vigilante Group of Wunti are based in the urban city of Bauchi State. The objective of the Sarasuka Group was to patrol the cattle markets and prevent crime as a result of cattle rustling, as well as to investigate criminal acts inside the cattle markets and the localities. The success of the Sarasuka Group resulted from its vicious activities, and this were propelled by rumors. This has sparked fear and led to a drastic reduction in crime rate in the urban localities. Their success quickly led to the spread of the group to communities in the State and beyond, even to Kaduna State. The Sarasuka Group was armed with lethal weapons, even without the permission of the national security forces, which was considered to be a violation of the laws of the national security's law, or the basic principles of the United Nations, relating to the use of small and light weapons. They often perform routine display of captured suspects, who are paraded naked, and often treated cruelly, inhumanly or killed. Although the Sarasuka Group has succeeded in controlling crime and insurgency in the North-eastern region, it has failed to create an atmosphere of security, as locals live more in fear of the Sarasuka Group than regular crime. Likewise, Sarasuka Group is feared for its alleged use of charms and supernatural powers. Over time, the states of Bauchi, Jigawa, Adamawa, and Borno have created laws supporting the operation of this group. However, complaints about neutrality have again pitted the Sarasuka Group against the national security forces. The federal government is not really in support of the operations of the Sarasuka, and its activities as a completely unofficial (unconventional) security group. Thus, there was a void. But, as in the case of Borno State, with

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[11] Kwaja, Okenyodo and Ahmadu-Haruna, *Non State Security Actors and Security Provisioning in Nigeria*.

the *Durza Ka*, the void that emerged was quickly filled by the state government, creating other unconventional security groups, which this study has identified in its mapping exercise.

The data collection and field work, on the Sarasuka Group, were collected in the capital of Bauchi, where the group was initially founded, as a hunters' association.

4. Bottom-Up Security Approach

This involves peace and security measures in Nigeria. National security groups take a top-down security approach; but this has failed to effectively penetrate and protect the locals. The understanding that security was better organized from the bottom-up approach was clear to the colonial administrators, who built the security architecture for the modern-day Nigerian state. The colonial authorities established the Colony of Lagos Constabulary in 1879, which has morphed into what is now the national security group; but they also strengthened local security forces, within traditional institutions, and created 'warrant leaders' in the localities, where the traditional institutions available have not availed themselves of its use.[12] For years, after the independence on October 1, 1960, decision-making power over security, in localities, became concentrated on the federal government; and this was vastly supported by an extended military regime. The unification of decision-making powers, in matters of security, to the center, therefore, forced the traditional institutions and the security forces they controlled, during colonial domination, to the margins of decision-making in matters of security.[13] However, in terms of providing immediate security services at the local level, the localities and, in some cases, the traditional institution did not back down, providing preventive strategies against crimes in their localities, and investigating and punishing crimes alone, or jointly with the national security groups. Although the federal government is endowed with constitutional powers, and is responsible for ensuring the security of the locals, the security problems faced by the country can no longer be comprehensively addressed or dealt with by the national security groups alone. The sources and drivers of insecurity in the country today are diverse and innumerable at the cultural, political, ethnic, socio-economic, environmental, health levels and other factors such as, drug addiction, insurgency, organized crime, get-rich-quick

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[12] S. Bamidele, "The Settler has nowhere to Feed and the Indigene has all the Pastures: Re (visiting) the Indigeneity-Settler Crisis in Nigeria," *Journal of African Political Economy & Development*: 3 (2018): 49-67.
[13] Bamidele, "The Settler has nowhere to Feed and the Indigene has all the Pastures," 49-67.

syndrome, and political assaults. Consequently, unconventional security groups appear as corrective or complementary strategies to the conventional security groups' effort, which is deemed insufficient. Emerging unconventional security groups, at the local level, benefit from their proximity to rural and urban localities, the understanding of the locals' norms and practices, and the mutual trust established between them and the local leaders. This is because they provide tailor-made security strategies at both the rural and urban level.

What the four case studies, cited from the North-eastern region of Nigeria, have in common is their mention as unconventional security groups, who share security spaces with national security agencies in the country. These unconventional security groups function as vigilantes or night watch groups. Based on a more than superficial observation of the case studies, a typology of the evolution of vigilantes has been suggested, in which three distinct stages of progression manifest, namely the populist phase, consolidation phase, and abuse and demise phase.[14] These stages are inevitably preceded by a setting of uncertainty, insecurity and perceived inadequacy of existing security mechanisms. This tripartite typology is well illustrated by the inconsistency in the activities of the *Durza Ka* in Borno State of the North-eastern region.

In the populist phase, there is a broad social acceptance of the self-help and unconventional security approach to crises management. Based on the submission from Lar, (2015), "the popularity of vigilantism is a response to the widely shared feeling that recent political and economic reforms have led to greater inequality and injustice - a lack of accountability."[15] Lar, (2015) found that despite the group's reported atrocities that surpassed those of the criminal groups, they have fought against the enthusiastic polity, which was unwavering in supporting the insurgents as they continued to flock to attend the executions of criminals by the group.[16]

In its second phase, although perceived as the greatest crime-related evil, the *Durza Ka* has spread beyond Maiduguri, Borno State, to other localities in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, where they have received the state governments' approval and protection. They have even been

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[14] N. Bagayoko, E. Hutchful and R. Luckham, "Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice and Legitimate Public Authority". *Conflict, Security, and Development* 16, no.1 (2016): 1–32.
[15] Lar, "Vigilantism, State and Society".
[16] Lar, "Vigilantism, State and Society".

co-opted into the government's apparatus and renamed as "Gombe State, Kalare Youth" and "Bauchi State, Sarasuka Group' or 'Vigilante Group of Wunti'. Although media coverage of the group's activities, and the support they received from states, have largely reached the country. There was, initially, a conspiracy of apparent silence regarding the issue. Indeed, other states like Yobe and Kastina called for the group to operate in their urban localities against armed bandits and cattle rustlers respectively. Slowly, Amnesty International and other human rights institutions began to document and draw attention to cases of abuses. By this point, the *Durza Ka* managed to consolidate on impacts on Borno, and Adamawa; but respondents say that the fame of their abuse is unprecedented, as it became troubling. Their involvement as thugs, in the service of their political masters, has been reported in that regard.

At the final stage, that is, the demise stage, the national security forces of Nigeria began to act against the *Sarasuka* Group and *Durza Ka*. The national security forces launched series of arrests of members of the groups, after a deadly confrontation with them in Borno and Bauchi states, and the widely publicized scandal of the murder of innocent locals.[17] In addition to the typology of the *Sarasuka Group* and *Durza Ka*, the conventional security groups and its state security architecture have responded to the proliferation of unconventional security groups, engaged in security affairs, in four distinct ways, namely: the opposition (*Sarasuka* Group and *Durza Ka*); incorporation (*En Banga*); codification (legislative support at state level); and competition (*Kalare* Youth). Some states have incorporated unconventional security architectures into their national security order, granting them legality and legitimacy. For example, the state of Borno has adopted the neighborhood watch bill, which has institutionalized and codified or even localized safety measures. Likewise, vigilante laws have been passed in the states of Adamawa, Bauchi and Gombe, among others. In Yobe State, the state has created a hybrid institution called "*Informants or Yobe Vigilante Group,*" which is basically made up of vigilante members. But, at the top, this is represented by all the national security forces. It is an interesting hybrid body that is not unconventional, as a security group. It is state-sponsored, and works with the national security forces; but it is also not official, because the security forces of State have to operate alongside the vigilantes. At the national

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[17] Kwaja, Okenyodo and Ahmadu-Haruna, *Non State Security Actors and Security Provisioning in Nigeria.* ; Bamidele, "The Settler has nowhere to Feed and the Indigene has all the Pastures," 49-67.

level, the National Assembly has passed a law on unconventional security agencies, which, although aimed at unconventional security agencies, provide a useful framework for conceptualizing partnership and collaboration between conventional and unconventional security groups.

5. Between Conventional and Unconventional Security Architectures

I can identify, from the literature, four compelling reasons why the distinction between conventional and unconventional security groups is generally misleading, but more specifically, allied, within the context of Nigeria.

Unconventional security groups may not necessarily have an informal character, as they are often fairly official in their organization and activities. For example, the so-called unconventional security architectures, which generally consist of watchmen of localities and vigilantes, are well developed into well-organized security architectures that are officially registered and recognized by the government. The persistent misconception and labeling of these groups as 'unconventional' is partly responsible for the failure of proper integration into the security decision-making climes in urban spaces in Nigeria. Take the example of *Durza Ka* and *Sarasuka Group*, which have leadership and operational structures, in the states of Borno and Bauchi, and are recognized for their successes, even when the national security forces have failed. As their name suggests, they are rather addressed as 'locals' than "unconventional".

Some local security arrangements are not official, in particular the security forces against insurgency, some of which operate underground using informal local security-based strategies and unorthodox modalities. This was particularly the case in the military regime in the country, when it used various security strategies, including death squads for counter-insurgency operations, particularly in the North-eastern region of Nigeria. More recently, the formations of the joint national security architectures, called Joint Task Forces (JTF), which is often deployed to crisis localities, have been accused of partisanship and neutrality in the exercise of their functions. Recent unorthodox strategies, by the security forces, have included ban of protest marches, seizing of newspapers and restriction of journalists, as well as alleged summary and extrajudicial killings and the destruction of localities.

Defining unconventional security agreements as unofficial suggests that they are ad hoc and occasional in nature. This does not take into account the fact that many of them are old and traditional, sometimes, prior to the urban security architecture, as is the case in the religious and chiefdom institution, classifying security forces as "unofficial" does not help us to distinguish what is legal from illegal, since many unconventional security architectures are recognized by law, and regulated by law.

When examining the National Crime and Security Survey (2018), from 2012 to 2018, I find that the level of locals' confidence in unconventional security groups is significantly higher than that bestowed on the conventional security architectures.[18] This trend continued from 2012 to 2018, and then sharply experienced lower level of trusts, like that of the conventional security architectures from 66 to 51, and that of unconventional security architectures from 87 to 51.

Figure 1: Trust in Conventional Security Groups vs. Unconventional Security Groups

It is true that the locals trust unconventional security groups more than the conventional security groups, but the perception of the unconventional security architectures (*Brown line*) has been declining since 2016. This suggests that something may be wrong with the relationship between the locals and the conventional security architectures (*Blue line*). The decline in confidence, in the unconventional security architectures, is not compensated for by an increase in conventional security architectures' confidence. The question then arises of who the locals in Nigerian state could trust.

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[18] National Crime and Safety Survey, *Federal Government of Nigeria, White Paper on National Crime and Safety Survey*, (Abuja: Federal Government of Nigeria, 2018).

6. Security Management Challenges in Nigeria

From the above, it is clear that peace and security, in urban spaces, in Nigeria, cannot be managed in an exclusive, conventional security architecture's chore, or as an unconventional security architecture's task. Most importantly, it cannot be managed by disconnected conventional security groups and conventional security groups. Hybridity therefore becomes a necessity for Nigeria. Concrete challenges remain to be met, to ensure harmonious relations and effective security coordination between the conventional and unconventional security architectures in the country.[19] In terms of capacity, the unconventional security architectures have been marred by real and perceived shortcomings of the conventional security architectures. Although the federal government is responsible for ensuring the safety of locals, the security concerns of which the Nigerian state alone can no longer comprehensively address, because of the diverse sources and drivers of insecurity, which are linked to political, social, economic, environmental, health and other factors, Including insurgency, and other organized crimes and ethno-political violence. In this regard, conventional security groups are to take corrective actions, when preventive measures fail. Therefore, it can be argued that unconventional security groups are more capable than conventional security groups, in meeting the increasing security challenges in rural and urban localities. Another challenge is that of transparency or accountability in urban localities, where traditional standards are increasingly disseminated by the trend of cosmopolitanism and modernity. It is practically difficult to link the responsibility of unconventional security architectures to urban locality standards. At the local level, they benefit from proximity to the locals' areas, sowing great understanding of the local norms and practices, and mutual trust between them and the native leaders to provide tailor-made security measures at the local level.

The response of the conventional security groups and their formal security architectures, to the proliferation of conventional security groups, who are often armed and constitute

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[19] K. Meagher, "The Strength of Weak States? Non-State Security Forces and Hybrid Governance in Africa," *Development and Change* 43, no. 5 (2012): 1073–1101; R. Luckham, "Who's Security? Building Inclusive and Secure Societies in an Unequal and Insecure World," *Institute of Development Studies Evidence Report*, no. 151 (2015); R. Luckham and T. Kirk, "Understanding Security in the Vernacular in Hybrid Political Contexts: A Critical Survey," *Conflict, Security & Development* 13, no. 3 (2013): 339–359; R. Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 4 (2010): 391–412.

disturbances to urban peace and security, is mixed. For example, the *Durza Ka* members were arrested and the organization's activities were limited by the national security forces, during the military regime; the members of Sarasuka Group, led by the North-east, were also dismantled by the national security forces. These approaches were aimed at completely eliminating the unconventional security groups, and maintaining security as the exclusive reserve of the conventional security groups. The confederate states reacted differently, while the state of Borno adopted the neighborhood watch bill, which institutionalized and codified locality's safety measures. Likewise, vigilante laws have been passed in the states of Gombe, Bauchi and Adamawa. At the national level, the National Assembly has adopted the law of private security agencies, which addresses private security institutions, and has provided a useful framework for conceptualizing partnership and collaboration between the conventional and unconventional security groups.

6.1. Security in Nigeria: Urban Space

In the past, conventional security groups in Nigeria were primarily concerned with crime prevention and resolution of crimes that have an immediate and visible impact on the locals in urban localities, which could affect their quality of life, leading to such acts as burglary and theft. In recent times, the country is faced with challenges in terms of heinous crimes such as kidnappings, armed robbery, insurgency, organized crime, and violent protests. One of the most significant threats to human security, in the country, is internal armed insurgency, which often involves one or more unconventional armed groups. This leads to a widespread violation of human rights.

Urban spaces in the country are unique settings that require separate approaches to peace and security. The heterogeneity of urban localities is such that its socio-cultural norms and practices are often strongly influenced by different socio-cultural groups, and therefore, difficult to define, as is the case in certain urban localities. In addition, urban localities have unique public spaces that are often susceptible to crime, such as markets and motor parks or fleets. The proper organization and conduct of business in these spaces makes it important to have internal security provisions, for prevention and rapid response to crime. In addition, the creation of urban slums, which are often agglomerations of huts and poorly constructed/secure

structures also require internal crime prevention mechanisms to ensure security and cohesion as well as the proper functioning of possible public facilities.

To address the causes and reduced fear of crime in the localities, conventional security agencies have begun to seek to create effective partnerships with the locals, and other public and private sector resources for problem solving strategies, to limit security issues. This was also response to some of the self-help measures by localities that were seen to have been mismanaged, and the challenge, resulting in human rights abuses or violations, as was the case in the members in *Durza Ka.* Peace and security are crucial, especially in Nigeria's urban space. It is important to note that Nigerian localities host members of unconventional security groups, whose livelihoods depend on trade and day jobs to earn a living. Therefore, for personal security, livelihood security, and the eradication of corruption, and conventional security groups brutality, localities need to assess speed, flexibility and familiarity, in dealing with security matters.

6.1.1. Section Two Study Findings: Section A

Table 1: Socio-Economic Features of Respondents: Gender

	Total	Male	Female
Total	364	264	100
Male	264	264	0
Female	100	0	100

Figure 1: Gender of the Respondents

To understand the physiological and psychological composition of the respondents' knowledge, orientation and experience, in terms of peace and security, I considered it essential to study their socio-economic characteristics. In regarding to the variable of gender, 88% of the respondents were men and 31% were women. This indicates a huge gap between the men and women who were interviewed during the fieldwork. This can be attributed to a number of factors, including socio-cultural cleavages in the North-east region, sensitivity and fear factor among the subject, and patriarchal domination in our urban spaces, as observed in the study.

Table 2: Age of the Respondents

	Total	Male	Female
Total	364	264	100
Below 18yrs	4	4	0
18 - 25yrs	74	47	27
26 - 35yrs	114	71	43
36 - 50yrs	105	86	19
51 - 65yrs	56	46	10
66yrs and above	11	10	1

Figure 2: Age of the Respondents

The age grades, between 26 and 50, represent a total of 62% of the respondents. These age groups constitute the most dynamic participants, engaging in peace and security activities. Only 2% of those interviewed, during the fieldwork, are not eligible to be involved in conventional security groups, or any form of confrontation with conventional security architectures, because they are still legal adults.

Table 3: Level of Education

	Total	Male	Female
Total	364	264	100
No formal Education	39	26	13
Primary	22	14	8
Secondary/ senior/ high school	178	124	54
College/ university (graduate)	103	81	22
Post graduate studies (post graduate degree)	22	19	3

Figure 3: Level of Education

10% of the respondents have no basic literacy. However, a preponderant proportion of respondents attend schools beyond the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education; 84%, 49% of 53% have one way or the other attained secondary education. This indicates a good knowledge or an appreciable level of knowledge of subjects among the respondents.

Table 4: Religion

	Total	Male	Female
Total	364	264	100
Traditional	4	3	1
Christianity	177	120	57
Islam	182	141	41
Other	1	0	1

Figure 4: Religion

There is balance in terms of religious bias, between the two main religions, in Nigeria. The respondents are equally split between the two religions, that is, 49% and 45% Islam and Christianity respectively, while traditional religious worshipers are just about 6%.

Table 5: Profession

	Total	Male	Female
Total	364	264	100
Civil Servant	101	77	24
Private Sector Employee	56	38	18
Entrepreneur / Business man and woman	89	62	27
Farmer	23	16	7
Artisan	20	18	2
Student	40	28	12
Un-Employed	27	18	9
Clergy	8	7	1

Figure 5: Profession of the Respondents

More than half of the total respondents, that is, 55% are civil servants/civil servants - (government employees) (30%) and entrepreneurs - (businessman and businesswoman) (25%), while others are 12%, 8%, 7%, 6% and 4% respectively, for private sector employees, students, farmers, artisans and the clergy. Only 5% of our respondents indicated that they were not working.

Table 6: Do you hold any leadership position in the locality?

	Total	Male	Female
Total	364	264	100
Yes	130	104	26
No	228	156	72
About to	6	4	2

Figure 6: Leadership Position in the Locality

Only 36% of the respondents, or 1/3 of the total population of respondents, indicated that they hold leadership positions in their various localities. The Majority, among the 63%, indicated that they do not occupy leadership positions in their locality.

6.2. Section B: Models, Trends and Similarities

Table 7: How long have unconventional security groups been in your locality?

	Total	Male	Female
Total	364	264	100
Pre-colonial	143	106	37
Colonial	42	26	16
Post-Colonial	32	28	4
Post-Republic	16	11	5
1970 – 1984	10	8	2
1985 – 1999	16	13	3
1999 - till date	100	69	31
D/K	5	3	2

A preponderant proportion of 39% of the respondents indicated that unconventional security groups existed in their localities before the colonial period. This indicates that unconventional security groups have been parts of our customary and traditional peace and security system, regardless of their current nomenclature. 11.5%, 8.7%, 4.3%, 2.7% and another 4.3% indicated that they existed in their localities during the colonial, post-colonial as well as post-republican periods, and the the parity of periods between 1970 and 1984, and 1985 and 1999 respectively. However, with the return to democratic system of government, an additional 27.4% indicated the existence of unconventional security groups from 1999 to date.

Table 8: How long have conventional security groups been in your locality?

	Total	Male	Female
Total	364	264	100
Post-Colonial	106	74	32
Colonial	94	65	29
Pre Colonial	58	39	19
Post-Republic	21	16	5
1970 – 1984	16	14	2
1985 – 1999	14	11	3
1999 - till date	51	41	10
D/K	4	4	0

More than half of the respondents, with 54.9%, indicated that the conventional security groups are creations of the colonial and postcolonial periods; this is split between 29.1%, those who indicated that the conventional security groups were created after the colonial period, and 25.8% who indicated that the conventional security groups were created in the postcolonial period.

Figure 7: Similarities between Existing Conventional and Unconventional Security Groups

A resounding 68% of the respondents indicated that there are similarities between the conventional and unconventional security groups. Only 14% believed that there were no similarity between them.

Figure 8: Similarities between Conventional and Unconventional Groups: Goals/Objectives/Operating Methods

To better aid the understanding of the extent or areas of similarities between the conventional and unconventional security groups, I have isolated their goals, objectives and methods of operation. 83.7% and 75.8% of respondents clearly indicated similarities between the conventional and unconventional security groups, in terms of goals and objectives. In view of their method of operations, only 42.8%, although preponderant, but relatively weak, indicated that there is similarity between the conventional and unconventional security groups. This drop, from previous notes on goals and objectives, raises a certain level of concern about the difference in the methods deployed by the conventional and unconventional security groups.

Figure 9: Unconventional Security Groups Performing the Functions of Conventional Security Groups

I also sought to know, in this research, if there were similarities in terms of functions and activities of the two security groups. 59% indicated that the unconventional security groups perform the functions of conventional security groups. Only 16% indicated that the unconventional security groups do not act as conventional security groups.

Figure 10: Equal Perception of Trust in Conventional and Unconventional Security Groups

Remarkably, 43% of the respondents signified equal perception of trust for the conventional and unconventional security groups, but 34% believed that the perception of trust between them are not equal.

6.3. Section C: Creation, Management and Responsibility

Figure 11: Putting on Unconventional Security Architecture

Who is likely to initiate and set up an unconventional security group?

Local associations, with 19%, are the most likely to set up unconventional security groups, followed by native authorities, with 16%. The government also can intervene, with a

14% chance of creating a local night watch group. An indication of 8% show that criminal groups are the least likely to establish unconventional security groups in Nigeria.

Figure 12a: Political Influence on Unconventional Groups

Local Politicians influence the decision making process of unconventional groups

Majority of the respondents, with 41%, indicated that politicians influence the decision-making processes of unconventional security groups. It is instructive to note that a large number of respondents, with 33%, indicated that politicians do not influence the decision-making process of unconventional groups.

Figure 12b: Unconventional Groups are Controlled and Resourced by Political Elites

However, when asked if the political elites controlled or managed the unconventional security equipment, 38% of the respondents indicated that they do not fund and control the non-

state security actors, while almost 31% reported that they control and manage the unconventional security groups.

Figure 13a: Sociocultural Influence on Unconventional Groups

Informal social bond, cultural identities and network affect unconventional security groups

In addition to the political influence, on the non-state actors, I also sought to know whether there were socio-cultural links that influence the unconventional security groups. A majority of the respondents, with 65%, indicated that informal social ties, cultural identities and networks affect the unconventional security groups.

Figure 13b: Informal Social Bond, Cultural Identities and Networks and Conventional Security Groups

On the other hand, I also sought to find out whether the conventional security groups were affected by socio-cultural ties. 58%, less than 65% attributed to the unconventional

security groups, indicated that informal social ties, cultural identities and networks affect the processes and standards of the conventional security groups.

Figure 14a: Public Surveillance and Redress

Does the unconventional security group have a structure open for public oversights?

46% of the respondents indicated that the unconventional security arrangements have a public surveillance agreement, while 32% indicated that there are no arrangements for public surveillance.

Figure 14b: Are there structures within the unconventional groups for members of the public to seek redress against unconventional groups?

In addition to the opportunities and organization of public supervision of the work of unconventional security groups, I also sought to know whether there are structures allowing members of the public to specifically request redress against the unconventional groups. 41%

of the respondents indicated that there are processes for requesting compensation and redress against members of an unconventional security group, even within the group. In particular, 37% indicated that there was no process or platform for seeking redress against members of the unconventional security setup.

Figure 14c: Organizational Process and Activities of the Unconventional Security Groups are not open for Public Security

Informatively, I asked, differently, if the organizational processes and activities of the unconventional security groups were not open to public scrutiny. 30% of the respondents said it was open to public scrutiny and review, with a 'no' response, while majority, that is 46% of the respondents, indicated that the organizational processes and activities of unconventional security groups were not open to public scrutiny, with a 'yes' response.

Figure 15a: Communication Channels

There is no clear cut communication channel among members of the unconventional security groups

Almost half of the total respondents, with 48%, indicated that there is a clear communication channel between members of an unconventional group, with a 'no' response, while 36% indicated that there is no clear communication channel between the unconventional groups, with a "yes" answer.

Figure 15b: There is no clear Cut Communication Channel Between Locals and Members of the Unconventional Security Groups

Likewise, 47% indicated that there is a clear communication channel between members of the public and the unconventional security groups, with a "no" response, while 36% indicated that there is no form of clear communication between members of the public and the unconventional security groups, with a "yes" answer.

6.1.4. Section D: Existence and Impact

Figure 16: Duration of Existence

How long have conventional security groups existing in your locality?

Respondents, with the highest record of 29%, indicated that the conventional security groups have existed since the colonial period. Another 26% indicated that the conventional security groups have existed since the post-colonial period. A combination of these two categories of respondents shows that more than half of the respondents, with 55%, think that the conventional security groups are associated with the colonial period, during or immediately after.

Figure 17a: Protection of Life and Property

Conventional and unconventional security groups works to protect life and properties of the locals in the localities

A resounding number of the respondents, precisely 91%, said there is no doubt about the essence of the conventional and unconventional security groups in the protection of life and property in localities.

Figure 17b: Do You Think Unconventional Security Groups Have Helped in the Confronting the Security

By extension, and beyond the protection of life and property, I also sought to know whether the unconventional security groups had contributed, in addressing the security problems in Nigeria. Up to 74% of those surveyed said that the unconventional security group have helped in dealing with security problems in Nigeria.

**Figure 18a: Appearance, Conduct and Approach**

Unconventional security groups appearances, conduct and approach and styles of operations hinders the provisions of peace and security

Over half of the respondents, with 52%, indicated that the appearance, conduct and approach of the unconventional security groups do not affect their provision of peace and security, although 1/3 of the respondents indicated that the appearance, conduct and approach of the unconventional groups affect their provision of peace and security services.

Figure 18b: Conventional Security Groups Appearances, Conduct and Approach and Styles of Operations Hinders the Provisions of Peace and Security

With a higher indication of 63% of the respondents, there is indication that the appearance, conduct and approach of the conventional security groups do not affect their provision of peace and security services.

Figure 19: Organizational Capacity

Unconventional security groups do not have organizational capacity and management skills to engage in the complex task of providing peace and security

Despite the long existence and long lifespan, there is still reservation in the unconventional security groups' ability to protect life and property, and generally contribute in addressing security challenges in urban spaces in Nigeria. For instance, 62% of the respondents indicated that the unconventional security groups lack the organizational capacity and skills necessary to be engaged in the complex task of providing peace and security in urban spaces.

This is also independent of the 27% respondents who indicated that unconventional security groups have the organizational capacity and skills to engage in the complex provision of peace and security.

6.1.5. Section E: Legality and Legitimacy

Figure 20: Knowledge of the Law

Is there any knowledge of the law within the unconventional security groups?

Majority, with 48%, indicated that members of unconventional security groups are aware of the law.

Figure 21: Respect for the Rule of Law

Decision making in the unconventional security groups is no regards to the rule of law

With 41%, majority of the respondents, with a "no" response to the statement of decision-making among the unconventional security groups, showing the lack of regard to the rule of law, there is indication that there are considerations for the rule of law, because only 34%, which is lower, indicated a "yes" to the assertion of non-respect of the rule of law among

the unconventional security groups' decision-making. Respect for the rule of law supports or reinforces knowledge of the law among unconventional security groups.

Figure 22a: Credibility

Do unconventional security groups have credibility in your locality?

72% of the respondents, overwhelmingly, indicated that the unconventional security groups have credibility with localities.

Figure 22b: Members of the public support unconventional security groups out of fear and coercion?

To probe the high percentage of credibility among unconventional security groups, I have postulated that members of the public give such ratings and support to the unconventional security groups out of fear and coercion; but almost half of the respondents, with 46% responded to this with a "no" response, while a lower percentage of 38% indicated a "yes" response.

Figure 22c: In your opinion, are the services of unconventional security groups prefer to the conventional security groups?

To lay more emphasis, I also decided to test the credibility of the unconventional security groups, directly, as against the credibility of the conventional security groups, and by extension, which, between the conventional security groups, on the one hand, and the unconventional security groups, on the other hand, is preferred by respondents. The margin of responses was narrow, 41% and 40% in favor of the unconventional security groups.

Figure 23: Public Support

Logically, respondents indicated that unconventional security groups receive public support, up to 66%.

Figure 24: Operating Methods and Law

*Are the mode of operation of unconventional security groups accountable for with legal backing?*

The first question, on similarities, in terms of goals, objectives and methods of operation, saw a sharp drop in the percentage of the methods of operation. Once again, I decided to examine, specifically, the methods of operation of the unconventional groups, placing them against the principles of the law. Critically, 39% of the respondents indicated that the methods of operation, of the unconventional security groups, receive legal support. But this is a close index to those against to the notion. For instance, 36% of the respondents remarked that the working methods of the unconventional security groups have no legal support. What this means is that, whatever the trends, the working methods of the unconventional security groups do not command much communion, not without worrying about its acceptance.

6.1.6. Section F: Relationship between conventional and unconventional security groups

Figure 25: Cordiality

Is the relationship between the conventional and unconventional security groups cordial?

60% of the respondents indicated that the relationship between the conventional and unconventional security groups is cordial, thereby ending the hostility, especially in terms of approval or acceptance, often perceived between them. This also posits an outright suggestion as to an advanced form of relationship between the conventional and unconventional security actors.

Figure 26a: Collaboration and Partnership

Is there collaboration between conventional security groups and unconventional security groups?

67% of respondents also averred to collaborations between the conventional and unconventional security groups.

Figure 26b: Are the unconventional security groups informed on conventional security groups operational facilities?

52% of the respondents indicated that they had, at one time or the other, exchanged information on the operational activities of the conventional security groups with the unconventional security groups.

Conversely, 64% of the respondents indicated that they had exchanged information on the operational activities of the unconventional security groups with the conventional security

groups. Overall, there is a significant degree of information sharing activities between the two security groups. However, information trafficking, from unconventional groups to conventional security groups, is more important.

Figure 27: Rivalry

Is there competition between the unconventional security groups and unconventional security groups?

Even with a strong 1/3 of the respondents, with 33%, indicating competition between the conventional and unconventional security groups, 50% of respondents, or half of the total of respondents, indicated that there is no competition between the two groups.

Figure 28: Harmonization and Coordination

Do you suggest the harmonization, coordination and supervision of unconventional security groups by the guidelines of the constituted authority?


For information, 77% of respondents said, or rather feel, that the operations of the unconventional security groups should be supervised, coordinated and harmonized, in accordance with the directives of an established authority.

6.1.7. Section F: Gender mainstreaming

**Figure 29: Taking Gender into Account**

Is there gender consideration in the formation of the unconventional security groups?

48% of the respondents indicated that there is gender consideration in the training of the unconventional security forces, while 38% of the respondents indicated that there is no gender consideration.

Figure 30: Membership

*Do you have female membership among the unconventional security groups?*

47% of the respondents indicated that there is no female affiliation among the unconventional security groups. But this was, keenly and closely, contested with 45% of the respondents, who indicated that there are female affiliations among unconventional groups.

Figure 31: Specialized Treatment by Sex

Are there specialized treatment for female offenders?

When asked if there was any specialized treatment for suspected women offenders, 47% of the respondents indicated that there was not, while 36% indicated that there was specialized treatment for them. Such treatments include: manipulation, treatment and separate custody, privacy of identity, and the recognition and provision of other essential female needs, such as sanitary napkins, etc.

7. Conclusion

From the above, it can be concluded that unconventional security uniforms are not foreign to us in Nigeria. Regardless of the current nomenclature, some of the mapped unconventional architecture had adopted a form and structure, known to us traditionally, and which existed, even before colonization. When something happens, they only re-emerge after the explosion of contemporary crimes and criminality that challenge the activities of the conventional security groups, after the colonialism. There are obvious and verifiable similarities between the conventional and unconventional security groups, especially as regards to their goals and objectives. Consequently, they both strive, within their limits, to exercise complementary functions in protecting the life and property of the locals who they choose to serve. However, it is absolutely necessary to review the strategies deployed by the unconventional groups. Though they are useful, they do not seem to enjoy as much popularity and level of acceptance as the conventional security groups. In addition, the unbalanced and constantly diminishing perception confidence gap between the conventional and unconventional security groups, in studies, prior to its current balanced position, also validates the perception and understanding of the existing similarities of their goals. Unconventional

groups have good affiliations and relationships with, virtually all, layers of the locality, including: government, political parties, pressure groups, local groups, market associations, ethnic groups, traditional and religious groups, all of which are desired by conventional groups, as part of the contemporary national security's philosophy of local protection initiatives. All these social affiliations are strongly known to have points of interrelations, penetrations, and a good reputation between the conventional and unconventional security architecture. Dissociation from such affiliations and/or resistances, from one or the other, between the two peace and security architectures, even if it is the simple socio-cultural ties or affinities, may, very well, become counterproductive to the order or quest of providing robust peace and security strategies that are locally oriented. Considering that the conventional security groups are working diligently to exploit and reap the fruits of these civil-military relations, it is still desirable that the unconventional groups initiate specific processes to begin to benefit from the relationship in order to improve their local outreaches, thus obtaining more support and cooperation from the public.

I also conclude that, regardless of the existing structure and arrangement, which are open to surveillance by locals, the conventional security service should direct on this very request. By doing so, the existing cordiality and collaboration, as well as communication channels between the two security groups will be strengthened and better developed; and this will not only improve service delivery of the two security groups, but also could, just as well, begin the process of harmonization and coordination of the activities of the unconventional groups, and further eliminate all forms of dysfunctional-operational methods, while retaining the complementary roles. In addition, although they are taking off, unconventional security groups should prioritize having a comprehensive review to their gender perspective. The level of female membership, and the application of gender-based differential treatment that takes into account the needs of women, should be a major concern for the unconventional security members as well as members of the conventional security groups. Therefore, I hope that some of the findings, from this research, will lead to more detailed studies in areas of interest.

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