

HAS THE PERIOD OF 'CIVILIAN POWER EUROPE' COME TO AN END?

Res.Assist. Sinem Akgül AÇIKMEŞE*

ÖZET

Avrupa Birliği'nin uluslararası bir aktör olarak oynadığı rolün niteliğinin tespit edilmeye çalışıldığı bu makalede; Birliğin Soğuk Savaş sırasında ve sonrasında, Avrupa'da ve dünyada meydana gelen gelişmelere karşı askeri bir güç olarak değil, sivil unsurlarla bezenmiş bir politika izleyerek müdahale ettiği vurgulanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede; Atlantik ötesi ilişkilerdeki hassasiyeti ve NATO'nun Avrupa güvenliğinin sağlanmasındaki önceliğini gözönünde bulunduran üye devletlerin Maastricht, Amsterdam ve Nice Antlaşmaları'nda Birliğe askeri bir kuruluş görünümü vermekten kaçındıkları ifade edilmektedir. AB'nin sivil karakterinin, 1998 tarihli St.Malo Bildirisi ile temelleri atılan Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikasının oluşumuna rağmen ve 11 Eylül sonrasında terörizme karşı global bir mücadelenin başlatıldığı bir dönemde bile değişmediğini kavramsal, kurumsal ve operasyonel gerekçeleriyle ortaya koyan bu çalışmada; diplomatik ve ekonomik nitelikteki dış politika araçlarının kullanılması suretiyle sivil bir gücün de Avrupa'da istikrarın ve güvenliğin sağlanmasına katkıda bulunabileceğinin ve askeri imkan ve kabiliyetleri bulunmasa dahi uluslararası ilişkilerde söz sahibi olabileceğinin altı çizilmektedir.

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, to the extent that it performed at the international stage, the European Community was portrayed as a 'civilian power', because it lacked the relevant military instruments and relied on 'economic and diplomatic means' to try to influence other actors.¹ However; the myth of Europe as a civilian power was challenged with the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War security context; the withdrawal of many US forces from Europe, the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis demonstrated that the EU should back up its diplomatic and economic instruments with military capabilities. The Maastricht Treaty, which proclaimed the creation of the Common Foreign and Security

* Ankara University Institute of Social Sciences, Department of European Union Studies.

¹ Karen Smith, 'The Instruments of European Foreign Policy' **Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy**, ed. Jan Zielonka, London, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p.67.

Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the European Union, included the aspiration of common defence with the quoted formulation of 'the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in turn lead to a common defence'. According to John Roper, the concept of common defence implies the organization of the armed forces of member states; including common procurement, logistics, budget, communications, intelligence and command structures.² Therefore, the notion of a 'civilian power' is obviously in contrast with the definition of 'common defence', which reveals the characteristics of a 'military power'. In other words, the establishment of a common defence policy leading to a common defence is closely knitted with the concept of military power. Neither the Treaty of Maastricht, nor the Treaty of Amsterdam succeeded in translating aspiration into action in terms of introducing the EU as a military power in international affairs. By the end of 1990s, with the launch of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), Europe's vision as a civilian power was challenged more than ever. In Howorth's wording, 'genie was out of the bottle and the common defence project had begun to take on a life of its own'.³

Obviously; exploring whether the EU still remains as a civilian power or not, is mostly dependent on the conceptual analysis of the terms 'defence' and 'security'. In 1970s and 80s, within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), these two formerly interchangeable concepts became to be differentiated at the EU level. The term of *security* has been transformed into a notion which means 'reducing or eliminating threats, risks and uncertainties in a number of activities- political, economic, environmental as well as threats of military nature-; whereas the concept of *defence* which refers to the 'use or threatened use of organized military force' was unchallenged.⁴ In other words; it won't be wrong to claim that while security can be maintained by economic and political instruments that the EU wield; defence can only be ensured by the projection of military power. The main axis of the present study is based on the assumption that maintaining a distinction between security and defence has always been useful to national policy-makers because of the delicate relationship between defence and national sovereignty.

Within this framework, the main purpose of this article is to assess whether the period of 'civilian power' Europe has come to an end. In order to evaluate the EU's role at the international stage as a civilian or a military power; firstly

² John Roper, 'Defining a Common Defence Policy and Common Defence' **Towards a Common Defence Policy**, eds. L.Martin and J.Roper, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1995, p.8-10.

³ Jolyon Howorth, **European Integration And Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?**, Paris, WEU Institute of Security Studies, Chaillot Paper no 43, November 2000, p.31.

⁴ Brian White, **Understanding European Foreign Policy**, New York, Palgrave, 2001, p.143.

the performance of the EU during the Cold War, secondly the challenge to Europe's vision as a civilian power in the post-Cold War security architecture, thirdly the CESDP project which is well under way since 1998, and finally the vision of the EU in the post September 11 era are analysed. After demonstrating that the notion of the EU as a civilian power has not been challenged despite all the efforts, this research will seek to answer the two most controversial questions in this context: 'Why does the EU still perform as a 'civilian power' at the international stage' and 'is being a military power as an alternative to a civilian one, a panacea if the EU wants to assert its influence in international relations'?

I. THE COLD WAR PERIOD

The idea of a common defence policy in Europe in an integrationist strand can be stretched back to the Paris Treaty of May 1952 which established the European Defence Community (EDC). The Pleven Plan of October 1950 calling for 'German remilitarization under the aegis of a supranational European defence community' as a response to US demands for German rearmament following the Korean War, constituted the basis of the EDC.⁵ After the rejection of the EDC Treaty by the French Assembly in 1954 owing to French obsessions about supranationalism, defence became a taboo subject within the integration process. However; the US demands for German rearmament and French fears about constraining German military power had to be reconciled. It was a British diplomatic initiative that filled the vacuum left by the EDC. In 1954, Anthony Eden took the lead in the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) from the former Western Union.⁶ WEU, which is an intergovernmental actor without any supranational features, remained dormant during the long years of the Cold War owing to the fact that the territorial guarantees of the Treaty were operationalized through NATO and that it possessed no integrated military structures.⁷ As a result of these desperate initiatives, 'transatlanticism became the overarching framework for defence and European integration was channelled to the economic sphere'.⁸ In other words; the Community started to operate as a civilian power, leaving defence issues under NATO's responsibility because of the determination to prevent a nascent

⁵ Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, 2nd edition, New York, Palgrave, 1999, p.26. For detailed information on EDC, also see; P.M.R. Stirk, *A History of European Integration Since 1914*, London, Pinter, 2000, p.126-133.

⁶ The Brussels Treaty that formed the Western Union was signed in March 1948 by Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom. The Treaty provided mutual defence guarantees among the signatories.

⁷ G.Wyn Rees, *The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration*, Oxford, Westview Press, 1998, p.9.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

European identity from encroaching into the areas that might bring into conflict with the USA.

By the late 1960s, it was agreed that Europe needed to speak with a more unified voice if it wanted to project its influence on the world stage. This culminated in the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, which provided a consultation mechanism for foreign policy matters.⁹ Defence was not considered within the scope of EPC; but the impossibility of excluding security concerns from foreign policy discussions was soon recognized. As a result of the growing concern in Europe about the US foreign policy and the renewal of East-West tensions in the early 1980's; Britain took the lead in the adoption of 1981 London Report, which included discussions about the political aspects of security such as arms control, terrorism and armaments within the EPC. Moreover, the revived momentum of the integration process paved the way for extending the 'allowable areas of security in EPC', which led to the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart that added a reference to economic as well as political aspects of security.¹⁰ The Single European Act underlined in the Treaty form, the need to coordinate political and economic aspects of security.¹¹

Obviously, none of these efforts provided a defence identity for the EC. Until the end of the Cold War, security was acknowledged as a legitimate issue on the integrationist agenda. Acting as a civilian power, the EC had the ability to promote European security by economic and political means, rather than by military instruments. The end of the Cold War paved the way for extending that agenda to include both security and defence.

II. THE POST-COLD WAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The end of the Cold War presented an unprecedented opportunity for the development of a common defence policy. In the words of Sjursen, 'although the idea of a European security and defence identity was not invented by the end of the Cold War, it was given a new life with the breakdown of bipolarity in Europe'.¹² With the end of the Cold War, a broader security agenda emerged including the issues of ethnic unrest, nuclear proliferation, migration, transnational crime, economic prosperity, human rights and environmental

⁹ Jan Zielonka, 'Constraints, Opportunities and Choices in European Foreign Policy' in **Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy**, ed. Jan Zielonka, London, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p.1.

¹⁰ White, *op.cit.*, p.146.

¹¹ Title 3, Article 30 of the Single European Act.

¹² Helene Sjursen, 'Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy : The Idea of a European Security and Defence Policy' **A Common Foreign Policy For Europe : Competing Visions of the CFSP**, eds. John Peterson and Helene Sjursen, London, Routledge, 1998, p.95.

hazards. In this new security architecture, EU was well aware of the fact that having a common security and defence policy would increase its international credibility and injected this view into the 1990-1991 Intergovernmental Conferences which resulted in the Maastricht Treaty.

A. The Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty contained the aspiration to include defence as well as security on the Union's agenda, with the quoted formulation of the 'eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence'.¹³ Admittedly, no time scale has been agreed; but defence was now within the construct of European integration. In the meantime, the task of elaborating and implementing decisions that have defence implications was given to WEU, which would be the defence arm of the EU.¹⁴ Where the French wanted the Council to instruct the WEU, all that could be agreed was for it to have the power to make requests. As a result of the Maastricht provisions, the EU did not become a defence actor but the taboo over discussing defence matters since the 1950's was brought to an end. Moreover, expectations were raised that the EU would soon move towards a common defence policy.

B. The Transformation of NATO

Becoming more than a civilian power demanded the fulfilment of the defence aspirations of the Treaty of Maastricht. However, any expectation of rapid progress in terms of translating aspiration into action was undermined by NATO's strength and reluctance in permitting Europeans to include defence in the integration process. By the same token; although defence appeared linguistically on the Union's agenda, EU's progress in the achievement of a common defence policy in the post-Cold War era was overshadowed by the concept of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)¹⁵ and by the institutional primacy of NATO in the same period.

¹³ Fraser Cameron, **The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future**, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 1999, p. 25.

¹⁴ Christopher Piening, **Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs**, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p. 42.

¹⁵ Most commentators regard the concepts of 'ESDI' (European Security and Defence Identity) and 'ESDP' (European Security and Defence Policy) as synonymous. ESDI is a NATO project, aiming at the creation of a European pillar that draws upon the military capabilities, separable but not separate from the Alliance; whereas the ESDP is an autonomous politico-military project of the EU that was launched at the Cologne Summit of June 1999. In order to avoid this confusion at the level of acronyms, the ESDP was transformed into the CESDP at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. Adding 'C' for 'Common' does not change the sense of the ESDP and does not mark any political significance.

During the 1990s, NATO seemed to emerge at the apex of security arrangements in Europe with the EU playing a minor role and the concept of ESDI developing inside the framework of NATO.¹⁶ The first effort in re-branding NATO for the post-Cold War era was the introduction of NATO's New Strategic Concept at the Rome Summit of 1991. This concept pointed three main areas of future activity of the Atlantic Alliance: a broader approach to security, restructuring of its military capabilities for crisis management tasks and the permission for European allies for taking more responsibility in terms of their own security.¹⁷ Secondly, at its 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO launched a new project called 'ESDI' which involved both NATO and WEU, and marked the creation of the military instrument underpinning this project – The Combined Joint Task Forces. (CJTF's)¹⁸ At this Summit, the proposal of CJTF's was presented as an intention to upgrade NATO's ability to conduct non-Article five operations.¹⁹ The concepts of ESDI and CJTF's were further elaborated at the Berlin ministerial meeting in 1996.²⁰ According to Brussels and Berlin arrangements, ESDI within NATO is based on the idea of 'separable but not separate capabilities' from the Alliance.²¹ In other words, NATO's assets and capabilities would be made available to WEU –the agent of ESDI-operations that do not involve the US, on a case by case basis.²² However, the conduct of a WEU operation that drew upon the resources of the Alliance was made strictly conditional on NAC approval and subject to intense monitoring by the NAC.²³ This conditionality clause confirmed NATO's primacy for crisis management beyond Europe. To sum up; according to Brian White, these arrangements, rather than strengthening a European based defence identity, had the effect of further binding WEU and ESDI into the NATO framework and underlined the dependence of WEU upon NATO for military capabilities.²⁴

C. The Treaty of Amsterdam

The Treaty of Amsterdam marked no significant progress in the defence realm of the integration process. Limited achievements of the Treaty in security and defence policy had been easy to predict because the momentum had slipped

¹⁶ Sjursen, *op.cit.*, p.101.

¹⁷ **The NATO Handbook**, Brussels, Office of Information and Press, 1998-1999, p.65-68.

¹⁸ Howorth, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁹ The operations that did not involve the collective defence of the territories of NATO states; in other words 'out of area' operations are implied by the non-Article five operations.

²⁰ Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996.

²¹ Peter Schmidt, 'ESDI: Separable but not Separate', **NATO Review**, Vol.48, No.1 (Summer 2000), p.12.

²² Lluís Maria de Puig, 'The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO', **NATO Review**, Vol.46, No.2 (Summer 1998), p.6.

²³ Paul Cornish, 'European Security: The End of Architecture And The New NATO', **International Affairs**, Vol.72 No. 4, p.761-762.

²⁴ White, *op. cit.*, p 148.

from the EU some time before. The dominance of NATO in defence issues that was symbolized by the Brussels and Berlin agreements had cast a shadow over the EU. Moreover, the divergent views of the member states hindered the progress towards the achievement of a common defence policy. At the one end of the spectrum, France and Germany were pushing forward a fully integrated Union with a communitized foreign and defence policy; at the other end of the spectrum, Britain was calling for loose and intergovernmental Union in which defence issues remained in the hands of autonomous WEU.²⁵ However, there were some modest improvements on the way to a common defence policy.

In Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty, 'progressive' replaced 'eventual' in relation to the framing of a common defence policy. This could be interpreted as a stronger commitment to further action; but once again, this had been qualified by British insistence that the conditional phrase 'might lead to a common defence' remains in the Treaty.²⁶ The most important innovation of the Amsterdam Treaty was the inclusion of Petersberg tasks within the scope of the CFSP.²⁷ To carry out these tasks, the EU would avail itself of the WEU. In other words, WEU will provide the Union with access to an operational capability, notably for the Petersberg tasks. However, these tasks are apparently more related to a security rather than a defence role for the EU. Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty reinforced the institutional primacy of NATO in the defence field by stipulating that 'any decisions on defence must respect to the obligations of member states, which see their common defence realized in NATO'.²⁸ As a result of these facts, the Amsterdam Treaty enhanced NATO's predominant position in the defence realm and 'mapped out an appropriate security rather than defence role for the EU'.²⁹

Consequently, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, EU had the opportunity to develop its own defence policy and to forge a role for itself as the key military power in Europe, but 'missed that opportunity' by the mid-90s because of the re-emergence of NATO in a way that was unforeseen five years earlier.³⁰ The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties have challenged the 'notion of a civilian power' at the aspirational level by including the objective of the 'eventual or progressive' framing of a common defence policy that might in

²⁵ Rees, *op. cit.*, p.126.

²⁶ Cameron, *op.cit.*, p.77.

²⁷ Petersberg tasks are the operational missions including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making. These missions are given to the WEU by the Petersberg Declaration of 1992 which was issued by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU. See, Petersberg Declaration, WEU Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, <http://www.weu.int>.

²⁸ Article 17 (1)

²⁹ White, *op.cit.*, p.149.

³⁰ Sjursen, *op.cit.*, p.95.

time lead to a common defence. However, none of them succeeded in converting this rhetoric into action as a result of the divergent views of member states and NATO's primacy in the defence field.

III. TOWARDS CESDP: FROM ST. MALO TO LAEKEN

By the end of 1998, even before the Amsterdam Treaty was ratified, the possibility of developing a common defence policy reappeared on the European agenda. The removal of UK veto on security and defence issues, US support for an autonomous European defence policy and the evidence on the ground in Kosovo 'let the genie out of the bottle' and paved the way for ambitious plans such as the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The period starting with the Franco-British Summit in St. Malo in December 1998 witnessed the most significant challenge to the EU's vision as a civilian power. Successive European Councils - namely Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice, and Laeken - registered and still registering progress towards a European defence policy.³¹

The U-turn of Britain who always resisted the idea of a common defence policy because of its effects on British transatlantic links was the crucial factor that paved the way for the establishment of the CESDP. This sudden change in British foreign policy has taken place due to several reasons: Most of the commentators argue that the shift in Blair's policy stemmed from the desire to prove Britain's 'European vocation'.³² By emphasising defence cooperation, Britain would be able to compensate its policy of non-involvement in the monetary integration. Secondly, the New Labour government was convinced that the US would no longer automatically underwrite European security in the same way as it during the Cold War and due to this fact Britain was aware of the necessity for the EU to have an autonomous defence capability.³³ Furthermore, Britain recognized the erosion of Europeans' prestige in NATO where the US was the leader and the Europeans were solely the followers of the US.³⁴ As a result of these factors, Britain was now moving from 'laggard to leader' in promoting European defence integration.³⁵ In October 1998, at the informal European Council meeting in Pörschach, Tony Blair indicated that he

³¹ Anthony Forster and William Wallace, 'Common Foreign and Security Policy : From Shadow to Substance' **Policy Making in the European Union**, eds. Helen Wallace and William Wallace, 4th edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.487.

³² Robert E. Hunter, **European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?**, Rand National Defence Research Institute, 2002, p.29.

³³ Jolyon Howorth, 'Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', **Survival**, Vol.42, No.2 (Summer 2000), p.34.

³⁴ Philip Gordon, 'Their own army?' **Foreign Affairs.**, Vol.79 No.4, July-August 2000, p.12-13.

³⁵ Foster and Wallace, **op.cit.**, p. 486.

would have no objections to the development of an EU defence policy.³⁶ This informal Summit paved the way for a Franco-British 'Joint Declaration on European Defence' issued at the bilateral meeting in St. Malo on 4 December 1998, which is considered as a breakthrough in the CESDP project. St. Malo Summit advocated an autonomous political and military capability for the EU, by stating that the 'Union must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises'.³⁷

Secondly, the military stimulus to the launch of the CESDP project was the evidence on the ground in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, which revealed that the Europeans remained dependent upon the Americans for any sort of serious, sustained military intervention- even in Europe.³⁸ Apart from this embarrassment, the Europeans now realized 'how close the Americans were this time to staying out of Europe'.³⁹

The third momentum producing the CESDP project was the US support for greater autonomy for the EU in the defence field. America decided to tip the balance of US policy in favour of an autonomous EU firstly, as a way of satisfying Congressional demands for burden-sharing; and secondly, in the hope that this formula would relieve the military and strategic burden of US entitled to follow complex global security responsibilities.⁴⁰ As a result, Washington started to support the trend towards a more pronounced and forceful defence capability at the EU level, which paved the way for the realization of the Europeans' eternal dream of a common defence policy.

³⁶ However, Blair attached three conditions to the establishment of this policy: 1. militarily credible, 2. politically intergovernmental, 3. NATO compatible. For details see Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, 'Towards a European Defence Policy', *The International Spectator*, Vol.36, No. 3 (July-September 2001), p.47.

³⁷ The means of enabling the EU to take decisions and approve military action were also identified at St. Malo Summit. '...the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU.' Joint Declaration on European Defence, UK-French Summit, St. Malo, 3-4 December 1998, paragraph 2. Mark Oakes, *European Defence: From Pörschach to Helsinki*, House of Commons Library Research Paper 00/20, London, 2000, p. 42-43.

³⁸ For the implications of the Kosovo crisis on CESDP see; Alistair J.K. Shepherd, 'Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defence Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capability', *European Security*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2000), p.21.

³⁹ Gordon, *op.cit.*, p. 14-15.

⁴⁰ For the US support for CESDP see; Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and European Defence*, Chaillot Paper no. 39, Paris, WEU Institute of Security Studies, 2000.

In sum, a combination of political, strategic and economic reasons compelled the Europeans to develop an effective common defence policy. With the 1999 Cologne Summit, which borrowed much of the language of the St. Malo agreement, the CESDP project had begun to take on a life of its own in whole Europe. In Cologne, a detailed framework for the progressive framing of a common defence policy was established. Moreover, EU bestowed upon itself the institutional framework necessary to take political decisions concerning security and defence matters.⁴¹ On the whole, the agreements of the Cologne Summit mark a milestone in the development of a common defence policy- a process that would have been unthinkable a few years ago. After Cologne, each successive European Council has gradually given substance to the desire to give the Union a capacity for autonomous action in international crisis management. With the recognition that the European defence initiative would remain a paper exercise as long as it is not backed up by necessary military capabilities, the leaders established the 'Headline Goal' at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. In the context of the Headline Goal, EU leaders have agreed that 'cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able by 2003, to deploy within sixty days and to sustain for at least one year military forces up to 50.000-60.000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks'.⁴² However, the member states did not hesitate to declare that 'this process did not imply the creation of a European Army'.⁴³

After the Helsinki Summit, each European Council meeting – Feira, Nice, and Laeken – registered more progress towards the realization of the CESDP project. At the Feira Summit of June 1999⁴⁴, important decisions have been taken in regard to the CESDP. Firstly, 'civilian aspects of crisis management were strengthened through pledges to make up to 5000 police officers available for deployment to crisis regions'. Secondly, the necessary arrangements for the involvement of non-EU European members of NATO – Turkey, Norway, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland- in EU-led operations were made. Thirdly, the principles on the basis of which consultation and cooperation with

⁴¹ Political and Security Committee, European Military Committee and European Military Staff were the new institutions that were set out at the Cologne Summit. These innovations were put in place in the six months between October 1999 and March 2000.

⁴² 'Helsinki European Council', **Bulletin of the European Communities**, No. 12/1999, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000, paragraph 28. In the annex of the Presidency Conclusions, it is stated that these forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate air and naval elements. (Annex IV)

⁴³ The forces that were mentioned under the concept of the Headline Goal quickly gained the popular name of 'Rapid Reaction Force'.

⁴⁴ Feira European Council, **Bulletin of the European Communities**, No. 6/2000, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000.

NATO should be developed were identified.⁴⁵ At the Nice European Council⁴⁶ of December 2000, this inclusion problem was analyzed in depth; alongside the issues of the improvement of EU's operational capabilities, the elaboration of the CESDP's institutional framework and the planning phase of military operations.⁴⁷ To sum up; with the establishment of new military and political bodies and the development of headline goal, the CESDP project is well on track and showing signs of progress. Moreover; the leaders announced at the Laeken Summit that the European defence force is now operational - without making any clarifications about what this actually meant. However, these attempts do not demonstrate that the period of civilian power Europe has come to an end; although they challenged the very existence of this notion more than any other efforts in the integration process.

IV. THE VISION OF THE EU IN THE POST- "SEPTEMBER 11th" ERA

Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the vision of the EU as a civilian power was challenged once again. However; the EU played a rather marginal role in the war against terrorism. In the immediate aftermath of these tragic events on 11 September, the EU stated its solidarity with and willingness to support the US.⁴⁸ Apart from the broad agreement to support the coalition against international terrorism and the adoption of the Plan of Action identifying the areas of cooperation -comprising humanitarian aid, economic and financial measures, diplomatic efforts, police and judicial cooperation, air transport security-between the US and the EU;⁴⁹ the only operational role designed for the EU in this context was related with the so-called 'backfilling' function that suggested EU's backfilling the selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility which are required to support operations against terrorism.⁵⁰ Therefore; in the

⁴⁵ Mark Oakes, **European Security and Defence Policy: A Progress Report**, House of Commons Library Research Paper 00/84, London, 2000, p. 11-12.

⁴⁶ 'Nice European Council', **Bulletin of the European Communities**, No. 12/2000, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001.

⁴⁷ Hunter, **op.cit.**, p.109-114.

⁴⁸ Maartje Rutten, **The EU's Military and Civilian Crisis Management Instruments after 11 September**, October 2001, www.iss-eu.org/new/analysis/analy008.html

⁴⁹ Franco Algieri, **EU Foreign and Security Policy in the post September 11th 2001. Some Lessons for the Reform Debate and for Transatlantic Relations**, Munich, Centre for Applied Policy Research, 2002, p.1.

⁵⁰ This backfilling mostly related to some combination of three NATO deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. For details see, Robert Hunter, **op.cit.**, p.165-166.

first test of US-EU military cooperation beyond Europe, the primacy of NATO was asserted and the option of CESDP was not even discussed.

As many commentators argue; despite all the efforts in the search for the fulfilment of the military power requirements, the EU has been portrayed as a 'civilian power' during the 'war against terrorism'; taking account of the role the EU had assumed in the context of CFSP and - its sub-system- CESDP. According to Christopher Hill, while ambitious plans are being developed and institutions are being created, defence remains a theoretical addition to EU's capacity to act and is likely to remain so. In addition, he argues that 'if the EU is a power, it's a civilian power'.⁵¹

In order to explain why the EU is still a civilian power despite this relative progress; the conceptual, institutional and operational limitations to the EU's capacity to act must be analyzed in a broader framework. *At the conceptual level*; the current CESDP framework is limited to only undertaking the Petersberg tasks which means that it does not take on the responsibilities for collective self-defence. However; in the sense that collective territorial defence is no longer a central question as it was in the Cold War, the lack of Article 5 guarantees within the scope of the CESDP does not generate any significant problems. Secondly; it is argued that Europe's military plans focus upon regional concerns and the CESDP does not assume global responsibilities. In order to assert its role as an effective military actor; the EU should make the necessary improvements for operating 'in and outside' Europe. *At the institutional level*; the CESDP operates through intergovernmental lines, which creates the problems of efficiency in an area where quick and effective decision-making procedures are vital. In this context, the EU should re-examine the relevant decision-making mechanisms. Finally; *at the operational level*; despite the Headline Goal that was adopted at the Helsinki Summit, EU is not militarily well-equipped to present itself as a military power. At the Helsinki Summit, the European leaders confirmed that the Rapid Reaction Force which would be deployable within sixty days and remain sustainable for at least one year in the field must be ready by 2003 for a full range of Petersberg missions. However, this didn't imply the creation of a European Army, which would be the most important component for a military power role. Moreover; the EU still faces significant shortfalls in terms of military capabilities -including lack of effective command and control system, heavy air and sea lift, search and rescue capabilities and also an adequate intelligence service - for the performance of Petersberg tasks. Therefore, the recourse to the NATO assets, mainly to US

⁵¹ Christopher Hill, 'Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap' in *A Common Policy for Europe*, eds. John Peterson and Helene Sjørnsen, London, Routledge, p.25.

assets, is indispensable for the EU even in the most modest military missions.⁵² The creation of an effective force projection capability combined with a satellite intelligence system that will end the traditional dependence on US military might, necessitates national military restructuring programmes, increase in defence expenditures and the consolidation of defence industries. As a result of these facts; the main axis of this article is based upon the basic assumption that unless and until these conceptual, institutional and operational problems are solved the CESDP will remain largely a paper exercise and the EU will continue to be portrayed as a 'civilian power'. In other words, despite the substantial progress that started with the St. Malo Summit, the EU has not succeeded in transforming rhetoric into reality in terms of injecting a defence dimension to its CFSP, and therefore did not mark the end of the period of a civilian power Europe.

CONCLUSION

After 1950s, with the failure of the EDC project, defence became a taboo subject within a purely European context for almost five decades. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the EU's opportunity to develop a common defence policy and to attach itself a military power role was overshadowed by the institutional preponderance of NATO under US leadership. Neither the Treaty of Maastricht, nor the Treaty of Amsterdam marked a substantial shift from EU's civilian power role; despite the fact that both included provisions for establishing a common defence policy in rhetoric. By 1998, with the launch of the CESDP project, the missed opportunity of 1990's, or even 1950's reappeared on the European agenda. Now, in 2002, the EU is planning to inaugurate a new and permanent set of security and defence institutions and gradually to forge a substantial 'Headline Goal' of military forces. Nevertheless, the progress since 1998 does not demonstrate that the period of a civilian power Europe has come to an end.

The widespread perception is that the credibility of the EU as an international actor especially in the post-September 11th era will be undermined unless it injects a military dimension to its CFSP. However, Brian White argues that the forms of civilian power deployed by the EU are very useful elements of its actorness and that the EU has made and continues to make significant contributions to security by helping to provide stability and peace in Europe.⁵³ For instance, the forms of civilian power - such as police, financial measures and judicial means - that the European Union wields are very useful elements of its international actorness in tackling international terrorism. This suggests that

⁵² Çınar Özen, 'Consequences of the European Security and Defence Policy for the European non-EU NATO Members', *Ankara Review of European Studies*, Vol.1, No.1(Fall 2001) p. 149.

⁵³ White, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

it might be more consistent with a civilian power role for the EU to act by using its diplomatic and economic instruments, rather than developing military capabilities. In the words of Karen Smith, 'rather than seeing military force as a panacea, the EU should re-examine the use of the instruments it possesses already which would show that a civilian power could also be effective in international relations'.⁵⁴ Moreover, the EU has to remain as a civilian power in the medium term, because, from an integrationist perspective, it's not possible to take responsibility for Europe's defence away from national capitals unless or until the member states are determined to remedy the political unwillingness to transfer powers to the Union in the defence domain. This constitutes the major stumbling block to the demise of the EU's vision as a 'civilian power'.

⁵⁴ Smith, *op. cit.*, p.80.