Analyzing Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as an Assurance of Turkey's Security

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Abstract: How useful Article 5 is in providing collective defense has become a matter of discussion in Turkey, particularly in recent years. This study has analyzed Turkey's formal critical narrative about the article's benefits. Article 5 is also known as the "One for all and all for one" principle and concluded that facts and beliefs are different from each other. The study argues that NATO membership secured the Turkish state, and Turkey's position is no different from other members in terms of collective defense. It also found out that the reliance on Article 5 has diminished among member states due to waning loyalty to the organization. Furthermore, some NATO members' passive postures estranged Turkey from the alliance.

Keywords: Turkey, NATO, International Organizations, Security, Alliances

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Türkiye’nin Güvenliğinde Bir Teminat Unsuru: NATO Antlaşması’nın 5. Maddesi Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme

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Öz: Türkiye, Sovyet tehdidine karşı NATO Antlaşması’nın 5. Maddesi gereğince güvenliğini temin etmek amacıyla 1952’de NATO üyesi oldu. Ancak son yıllarda Türkiye’de 5. maddenin kolektif güvenlik bağlamında ne kadar etkili olduğu tartışma konusu olmuştur. Bu çalışma, Türk tarafının “Birimiz hepimiz, hepimiz birimiz için” mottosuyla da meşhur ilgili maddenin faydalarıyla ilgili görüşlerini incelemiş ve gerçeklerle iddiaların birbirinden farklı ve birbirleriyle çatışma içinde olduğu sonucuna varmıştır. Çalışma, NATO üyeliğinin Türkiye’yi koruduğunu ve Türkiye’nin durumunun kolektif savunma bağlamında diğer üyelerden farklı olmadığını iddia etmektedir. Ayrıca üyelerin 5. maddeye olan güveninin eridiği ve ittifaka olan sadakatinin azaldığı öne sürülmektedir. Bunun yanında, bazı NATO üyelerinin pasif duruşlarının Türkiye’nin NATO’dan uzaklaşmasına neden olduğu savunulmaktadır. Yöntem olarak, literatür taramasının yanı sıra, uluslararası araştırmalar ve NATO’nun sorumlulukları incelenmiştir. Çalışma, Türkiye’nin NATO’daki durumunu inceleyerek literatüre katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, NATO, Uluslararası Organizasyonlar, Güvenlik, İttifaklar

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تحليل: هل المادة الخامسة لمعاهدة الناتو ضامنة لأمن تركيا أم لا؟

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الملخص

اعتمدت تركيا على المادة الخامسة لاتفاقية حلف شمال الأطلسي (الناتو) من أجل توفير أمنها ضد التهديد السوفييتي، وبذلك أصبحت عضوا في الناتو في العام 1952. لكن تركيا شهدت في السنوات الأخيرة نقاشات حول مدى فعالية هذه المادة الخامسة في نطاق الأمن الجماعي. الدراسة تناولت آراء الجانب التركي حول فوائد هذه المادة التي اشتهرت بالمقولة «الفرد من أجل الجميع والجميع من أجل الفرد»، وتوصلت الدراسة إلى أن الحقائق مختلفة عن المزاعم وتتعارض مع بعضها البعض. الدراسة تشير إلى أن عضوية تركيا في الناتو توفر لها الحماية، وأن الوضع التركي لا يختلف عن وضع الدول الأخرى الأعضاء في سياق الدفاع الجماعي. وإضافة لذلك، يذكر أن ثقة الأعضاء في المادة 5 قد تقلّصت، وتضاءل الولاء للتحالف. وإلى جانب ذلك، يشار إلى أن الموقف السلبي لبعض أعضاء الناتو ساهم في ابتعاد تركيا عن حلف الناتو. واعتمدت هذه المقالة على تحليل الدراسات الدولية ومسؤوليات الناتو، إضافة إلى المراجعات الأدبية. المقالة تهدف إلى تقديم المساهمة في الأدبيات السياسية من خلال دراسة الوضع التركي في الناتو..

الكلمات المفتاحية: تركيا، الناتو، المنظمات الدولية، الأمن، التحالفات

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Introduction

NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has been alive, useful, operational, and beneficial for more than seventy years. While its main rival, the Warsaw Pact, was dissolved in 1991, it continued to defend its members even after the Cold War. When the Cold War was over in 1990, it was expected that the organization would no longer survive as its *raison d'etre* disappeared. However, this did not happen, and conversely, NATO was enlarged and became a 29-member military alliance as of 2020. However, although its former enemy no longer exists, there are new and diversified enemies, including Russia, China, 'thug' countries, terrorist groups, civil wars, migration, environmental disasters, and so on. As a NATO member, Turkey has been an active member of the organization since it joined the alliance in 1952. Although (1) it was not a neighbor of the Atlantic countries, (2) had an oriental socio-political culture, and (3) had a weak economy, its desire for positing itself in the West through westernization (and secularization) and the Soviet threat led it to knock on the door of NATO several times. While NATO allies refused the first three applications, they welcomed Turkey in 1952 due to various reasons that will be mentioned below. Turkey's NATO membership was both deterring and luring the Soviet threat. It was deterring because powerful Western countries led by the United States were behind it. It was also luring the threat due to it being a neighbor of the Soviet Union. This meant that Turkey was to be the first target of the Soviets in a likely war. When the Cold War ended in favor of the Western bloc, Turkey feared it would lose its significance for NATO. Nevertheless, conflicts, and wars taking place in the aftermath of the Cold War removed mutual suspicions regarding both sides' interdependence against each other. However, regardless of pre- and post-Cold War, there have always been rifts between the two sides since Turkey became a member of the organization.

This study focuses on NATO's principle of 'One for all and all for one' emanating from Article 5 (and following complementary articles such as Article 6) of the organization's charter. Turkish governments and people have always hinted at their suspicions about whether NATO can protect the country in case of a war or not. Yet, when investigated, it can be seen that there were/are overreactions and emotional approaches from the Turkish side. On the other hand, other NATO members seem to hardly empathize with Turks during grave moments. Furthermore, concerning subjective views about each other, what the 'One for all and all for one' principle achieved during peacetime was mostly ignored. Article 5 was invoked only once in the organization's history and the enemy was not a superpower like the Soviet Union but a terrorist group. Therefore, making judgments about the article without war will be unfair. However, on the other hand, if public opinion is considered, then not only Turkey but also many other members should worry about the effectiveness of the article/principle.

Methodologically, a literature review, concerning books, reports, articles, reports and the North Atlantic Treaty was examined. Also, a businessman having closes ties with the Turkish government and a retired Turkish army general that did not want to disclose their names were interviewed. Surveys conducted to figure out the favorability of NATO in member states were analyzed. Structurally, section 2 discusses Article 5 from a theoretical perspective. Section 3 is descriptive and analyzes Turkey's NATO membership, essential incidents, reciprocal accusations and Turkey's general discourse against NATO. Note that this section reflects Turkey's official views. Section 4 is the core part of this article since it discusses whether Article 5 indeed defended Turkey or it was short of expectations. That section can also be regarded as a fact-checking episode as it compares arguments of both sides. Finally, this article is expected to contribute to the literature of international alliances by analyzing the case study of Turkey.

I. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty

> Article 5 of the treaty reads:
>
> "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
>
> Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security".[1]

Also known as "One for all and all for one" clause, the article states that if a member is attacked, the others will defend the victim member individually

1 "The North Atlantic Treaty", NATO, August 22, 2012, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf. (accessed January 3, 2020).

or collectively. It does not include all defendable territories, but following articles cover non-mentioned territories. In addition, to legitimize its collective defense, NATO refers to Article 51 of the UN Charter and hires wordings from it. Yet not all parts of Article 5 are so clear. According to Sari, the article allows some members to remain idle.[2] In this sense, unless a consensus exists, the collective defense is not possible.

On the other hand, the term 'armed attack' was not precise until the September 11 attacks. Before that incident, whether terrorist attacks should be included with the armed attacks or not was a matter of discussion. Yet, when the US called for assistance as per Article 5 after the September 11 attacks, terrorist attacks were included in armed attacks. In addition, as Perot states, the armed attack must originate from abroad.[3] This means that domestic terrorism perpetrated by groups such as the PKK, the IRA, the ETA cannot be assumed to be an armed attack.

Theoretically, "Alliances, are formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states".[4] Alliances are mainly formed to secure participants against a hostile country or countries by balancing or exceeding their powers. While it is the weaker state that forges an alliance, great powers also ally with other states to increase their power.[5] According to realists, they are an integral part of international relations, without which it is impossible to survive in anarchical and uncertain circumstances. In line with Waltz's views, in the context of NATO, it was the uncertainty and the danger of the Soviet Union that forced member states to ally with each other.[6]

On the other hand, under an external threat, they ally with the more substantial power(s) that they assume to be more likely to win the War.[7] Regarding Turkey, as realist theory presumes, it wanted to become a NATO member to shore up its resistance capability against external threats.[8] Since Turkey felt the Soviet threat to be massive, it was impossible to ensure state security without band-wagoning to a stronger state or joining an alliance.

2 Aurel Sari, "The Mutual Assistance Clauses of the North Atlantic and EU Treaties: The Challenge of Hybrid Threats", *Harvard National Security Journal,* Vol.10, 2019, pp. 405-460.

3 Elie Perot, "The Art of Commitments: NATO, the EU, And The Interplay Between Law And Politics Within Europe's Collective Defence Architecture", *European Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2019, pp. 40-65. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1587746.

4 Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut", *Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, pp. 103-123.

5 John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, WW Norton & Company, 2001.

6 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010.

7 Stephen M. Walt, *The Origin of Alliances*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1987.

8 Tarık Oğuzlu, "Turkey and NATO", *Adam Akademi* Vol. 3, No. 1, 2013, pp. 1-10.

In addition to the common threat, as per the constructivist theory, Turkey's membership was also a matter of identity.[9] The membership was a confirmation for Turkey's being in the Western camp, a goal pursued since the proclamation of the republic in 1923. On the other hand, the US and other NATO members needed Turkey due to its large army and military bases that could be used for attacking or resisting the Soviet Union.

2. Turkey's Almost 70 Years Old NATO Membership; A Turkish Perspective

Turkey was founded after the independence war won against Western powers in 1923. That time's great powers (Britain, France, the US, Italy) were also the ones that established NATO in 1949. After the Turkish Republic's proclamation on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, a westernization process in politics, economics, social life, and foreign policy was launched. Western laws were introduced after the abandonment of Islamic laws. Moreover, in line with westernization, a secularization process was commenced by the founders of the republic. When the Second World War began, Turkey had already finished its re-branding as per Western values.

Regarding the war, it remained neutral but posited itself on the side of allied powers. Despite Britain's efforts to pull Turkey into the war, the Turkish government did not declare war on Germany, causing fury among allied powers. But when the Turkish regime saw that Germany's defeat and the Soviet threat were inevitable, it panicked and declared war on Germany in order to be a member of the United Nations. This was because it did not want to break off from the West, which it embraced and turned its face to since its foundation.

As Turkish elites expected, as soon as the war ended, the Soviet Union began to voice demands for territories in Eastern Turkey and for co-control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. According to Bilge-Criss, the Soviets' hostile behaviors were to force Turkey to negotiate over control of the straits.[10] In other words, the Soviet Union was not able to attack Turkey. Yet, Turkish policymakers were sure that their northern neighbor was a threat in the long-term. Therefore, they welcomed the Truman Doctrine and accepted American aid. Erdem says that the Soviet threat decreased after Turkey received military aid from the US.[11] A second reason for Turkey's desire to join NATO was

9 Mark Webber et al, *Thinking NATO Through Theoretically*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

10 Nur Bilge-Criss, "Turkiye-NATO Ittifakinin Tarihsel Boyutu", *Uluslararasi Iliskiler Dergisi,* Vol.9, No. 34, 2012, pp. 1-28.

11 Can Erdem, "Turkey's Nato Entry And Echoes In The Press" (paper presented at the 1st International Turkish Culture and History Symposium, Yeditepe University, Istanbul, 2019, p. 308.

to complete its westernization process. Besides the compelling bipolar world system, Turkey could not have remained neutral due to ideological reasons. One of the main goals of secular Turkey was to be in the democratic Western front, and NATO membership would confirm that it was a member of the Western world.[12] In other words, it was a necessity for 'Modern Turkey'[13], which was dreaming of being 'the little America'.[14] Third, Turkey's economy was dependent on foreign aid, and NATO membership was thought to be a guarantee for the continuation of the aid. As per the Truman doctrine, Turkey was receiving $100 million from the US every year. American aid between 1950 and 1964 was equal to 17% of Turkey's GDP (2.1% in 1970).[15] A final reason among many other reasons was the Turkish army's need for modernization. The army was big in terms of number of soldiers, but it did not have advanced weapons. By joining the elite club (NATO), Turkey expected a fast progression for renewing its arsenal with better arms. Nevertheless, Turkey's dreams turned into a nightmare for three years as its first three applications were refused. There were various reasons for refusal such as Turkey's not being in the trans-Atlantic region, cultural differences, being a neighbor to a problematic region, and Great Britain's plan of including Turkey within a Middle Eastern military structure.[16]

However, NATO allies eventually accepted Turkey's membership. Thus, Turkey was under the protection of NATO as per Article 5 of the treaty. Regarding reasons for the welcome, the first and most salient reason was the Turkish army's heroic fight in the Korean War. The victorious army changed anti-Turkey sentiments in America and got the US support for membership. In addition and secondly, the monthly cost of a Turkish soldier was only $500, which was equal to one-tenth of an American soldier's annual cost.[17] Third, the US was trying to contain the Soviet Union but its only advantage against the Soviets was atomic bombs in its arsenals. However, when the Soviets also possessed atomic bombs, it understood that it cannot oppose the

12 Bulent Akkaya, "Türkiye'nin NATO Üyeliği ve Kore Savaşı", *Akademik Bakis Dergisi,* Vol. 28, 2012, pp. 1-20.

13 Naci Dogan, "Yeni Dunya Duzeni Baglaminda Uluslararasi Sistem, NATO'nun Rolu ve Turkiye'nin Stratejik Konumu", *Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi,* Vol. 5, No. 1, 2004, pp. 21-45.

14 Sinan Toprak, "The Evolution of Turkey 's Foreign Policy: The Truman Doctrine and Turkey 's Entry into NATO", Master Dissertation, Kalamazoo, Western Michigan University, 1987.

15 Gokhan Esel, "Nato Relations Between Turkey In The Period Of Military Coups (1960-1980)", The *Journal of Academic Social Science Studies,* Vol. 56, 2017, pp. 409-416.

16 Abdulkadir Baharcicek, "From Neutrality To Alignment: The Formation Of Nato And Turkish Bids For Membership", *Journal Of Academic Approaches* Vol.1, No. 1, 2010, pp. 57-68.

17 Serhat Guvenc, "NATO'nun Evrimi ve Turkiye'nin Transatlantik Guvenlige Katkilari, Uluslararasi *Iliskiler Dergisi,* Vol. 12, No. 45, 2005, pp. 101-119.

Soviet bloc with exhausted European armies.[18] Therefore, the US and NATO needed numerous land forces against the Red Army. Their urgent need was forty divisions of troops, but Europe could supply only twenty of them. On the other hand, Turkey had eighteen divisions ready for combat.[19] Besides land forces, NATO needed airbases close to the Soviet Union where it could deploy fighters and missiles. It was again Turkish territories that were the most convenient for deployments. Moreover, Turkey was controlling straits, and its ports could be used by NATO's marine forces. Consequently, the US could convince opposing and reluctant members to accept Turkey's NATO membership. Turkey (and Greece) finally became members of the organization on February 18, 1952. The membership was a win-win situation for both sides. While Turkey got itself accepted into the Western camp and secured its sovereignty through the membership, NATO deployed weapons, including nuclear ones, and armies on the Soviet border.

Despite a good start for Turkey-NATO relations, the key principle "One for all and one all for one" was a bit shady when it came to Turkey. The first disappointment happened after the Cuba crisis when Americans removed Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey in return for the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba. Turkey was not informed about the US decision. Yet, Turkey continued to stick with the organization. Right after this case, the Cyprus crisis erupted. When Turkey hinted that it may intervene in the island due to mass murder of Turkish Cypriots in 1964, US President Johnson sent a threatening letter to the Turkish administration, stating that they will not defend Turkey in case the Soviets got involved in the crisis. The letter was shocking as the Turkish government understood how weak NATO's security guarantee was for itself.[20] With this case, Turkey understood how excessively it relied on NATO and questioned the organization's fidelity to itself. As a result, Turkey began to diversify its friends and improved relations with the Soviet Union without moving away from the Western axis. Another crisis broke out when Turkey intervened in Cyprus and controlled one-third of the island in 1974. Despite US President Ford's opposition, US congress passed a decree banning sales of weapons and economic aid to Turkey. The interesting aspect is that it was Arab countries like Libya that supplied fuel to the Turkish army during the intervention in Cyprus. Turkey's trust in NATO decreased dramatically but continued to be a member as the enemy was strong and at the door. With the military coup taking place in 1980, the military-controlled state declared its firm allegiance to NATO.

18 Haluk Ulman, "Nato ve Türkiye", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi,* Vol. 22, No. 4, 1967, pp. 143-167.
19 Bilge-Criss, "Turkiye-NATO Ittifakinin Tarihsel Boyutu", p. 15.
20 Guvenc, "NATO'nun Evrimi", p. 107.

On the other hand, with the end of the Cold War, Turkey fell into a limbo. It was happy with the wane of the Soviet threat, but NATO's existence was necessary as it was a guarantee and a sign for Turkey's Western identity and security. The organization did not dissolve itself but Turkish policymakers feared that NATO would ignore Turkey's contribution to the alliance. As soon as the Cold War ended, the US and other coalition forces fought in the first Gulf War and then the Bosnian War. Regarding Turkey's position, it responded positively to all NATO calls. Yet, when Turkey was in trouble, other members angered Turks due to their reluctance to support Turkey and the embargoes that they put on Turkey. When the Turkish army was fighting Kurdish separatists in the 1990s, Germany did not sell weapons to Turkey on the excuse that its weapons were used to kill civilians. Other members also criticized Turkey for cross-border operations, which Turkey saw as necessary to fight terrorism. Thus, Turkey felt it was left alone in its struggle with terrorism in the 1990s. Moreover, France and Germany tried to form a European military structure that would replace NATO, but Turkey was not allowed to be a member as only EU members were entitled to participate.[21] The EU formed several security institutions like the EDA (European Defence Agency) but always excluded Turkey.[22] Furthermore, another crisis erupted between Turkey and NATO allies in 2007. When Turkey requested NATO's support for its fight against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), the request was deferred by the US.[23] Turkey again felt disappointed by NATO and questioned the organization's necessity for its security.

One year after the Syrian civil war started, the Syrian army downed a Turkish F-4 jet over the Mediterranean Sea on June 22, 2012, killing two pilots. Since threats continued, Turkey called for help from NATO, which was welcomed by other members. The US, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands deployed Patriot missiles on the Turkish-Syrian border while Italy deployed SAMP-T missiles in Kahramanmaraş city. However, right after Turkish fighters downed a Russian jet in November 2015 and the Turkish army began to target the YPG, the PKK branch in Syria, the US, the Netherlands, and Germany withdrew their missiles from Turkey. What is more, the US and other allies blamed Turkey for overreacting for a minor violation of its air

21 Omer Akgul, Soguk Savas Sonrasi Donemde NATO–AB Iliskilerinde Rekabet-Işbirligi Analizi ve Turkiye Faktoru, *Guvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi,* Vol. 4, No. 7, 2008, pp. 91-124.

22 The House of Commons, "The Future of NATO and European Defence", March 20, 2008, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/111/111.pdf. (accessed November 20, 2019).

23 Gulnur Aybet, *Turkey's Security Challenges and NATO*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2012, p. 3.

space.[24] Some European allies even declared that they will not defend Turkey against Russia. Turkish policymakers thought that they would not see their NATO allies in a likely war against Russia.

In addition, when an unsuccessful military coup was attempted on July 15, 2016, NATO members did not condemn the coup until days after the government repelled the plot. In addition to the silence of NATO members about the coup, some NATO soldiers being in Turkey's bases during the coup were blamed for supporting the coup.[25] Interestingly, it was Putin that declared its support to the Erdogan government during and after the coup. Therefore, not friends but allegedly a foe was with Turkey's legitimate government. What is more, Turkey blamed Western media and politicians for supporting the coup and for trying to whitewash coup plotters, who were members of the FETO (Fetullahist Terrorist Organization), which Turkey recognizes as a terrorist group. The Turkish government and people assumed that America's inaction against the FETO leader and his followers were proof of the West's support for the coup. What is more, while the US does not extradite Fetullah Gulen, who is on Turkey's wanted list as being the head of coup plotters, many soldiers and civilians getting involved in the coup and fleeing to America and Europe were not repatriated. Therefore, Turkey felt betrayed by its allies.

Another recent development that worsened relations was America's undeclared sanctions on Turkey, particularly its ban on the sale of weapons. Turkey requested UAVs from the US going back to the Bush administration, but its request was denied. The Turkish government then bought them from Israel and started to produce its indigenous armed and non-armed UAVs. But the most controversial non-sale was that of Patriots. Turkey's first request to buy Patriots was in 2008, but the Obama administration refused it, claiming that the congress will not allow the sale. Turkey's response was to buy air-defense missiles from China, first. When the Chinese did not accept to share missile technology, Turkish authorities turned to Russia and eventually bought more advanced S-400 missiles. As a retaliation, Americans did not to sell F-35 jets, of which Turkey is a partner in its production program, and imposed CAATSA sanctions. Meanwhile, America's behaviors were not tit-for-tat. When Turkey bought Russian missiles as it could not buy Patriots, it was punished with banning sales of jets, rifles, engines, spare parts, etc. Thus, America's response always looked like holistic punishment.

24 Holly Willams and David Martin, "NATO Urges Calm After Turkey Shoots Down Russian Plane", November 24, 2015, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nato-urges-calm-after-turkey-shoots-down-russian-plane/. (accessed February 23, 2020).

25 Mustafa Kibaroglu, *Turkiye NATO Iliskileri,* Istanbul: SETA, 2017, p. 8.

Moreover, the US preferred to ally with the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) in order to combat ISIS in Syria. Turkey was furious as most of the SDF militants were from the YPG, which was established and commanded by the PKK, a designated terrorist group fighting Turkey since 1984. Turkey offered to the US to finish ISIS together, but the US administration opted for the YPG as a proxy on the land and gave them air support. In addition, many other NATO members in the US-led coalition joined the US in supporting the SDF. Turkish officials stated that they felt disappointed by their allies. As a result, Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield to remove ISIS from its borders, Operation Olive Branch to remove the YPG from Afrin, and Operation Peace Spring to create a 32 km deep safe zone for refugees on the Syrian side, which was under YPG control. While Turkey was fighting the YPG, the US and other NATO members condemned it and implemented sanctions. The Erdogan government did not step back and blamed NATO members for destroying a terrorist organization (ISIS) with another (the YPG). While Turkey blamed the US for supporting its archenemy, the US criticized Turkey for destroying its ally. Notably, the US media's support of the YPG was conspicuous. In return, Turkish media asked the US why it was keeping forces on the other side of the border to protect a terrorist organization but not on the Turkish side to protect Turkey from the terrorist organization. Besides the US, other allies also sided with the YPG and implemented sanctions such as not selling weapons. Turkey again reacted with fury and described the attitudes of allies as a stab in the back.

Finally, apart from Turkey-centric problems, public opinion surveys reveal that there is a problem of loyalty among NATO members. This is a problem affecting not only Turkey's reliance on NATO but also others. For example, a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2015 indicates that 'One for all and all for one' principle of NATO is no longer supported by allies.[26] According to the survey, only Americans (56%) and Canadians (53%) favor supporting other allies in a war against an enemy Russia.[27] The rest are against fighting for their allies. When the same survey was carried out in sixteen countries in 2017 and 2019, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom joined the club ready to fight for other allies. In fact, more than half of member states favor NATO, the US being at the top with 77% as per another survey.[28]

26 Pew Research Center, "NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, But Reluctant to Provide Military Aid", June 10, 2015, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/ (accessed October 7, 2019).

27 Those countries becoming a member after the end of the Cold War are excluded.

28 Gallup, "Majorities of Americans See the Need for NATO and the UN", March 4, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/247190/majorities-americans-need-nato.aspx. (accessed January 7, 2020)

Nevertheless, when there is the possibility of fighting, few countries are ready to sacrifice themselves for their allies (Table 2). This means that eleven countries out of sixteen countries will not defend others in case of a likely war with the enemy (Russia was named as an enemy for the survey).[29] Regarding Turkish people's views, while only 21% of them favor NATO, the lowest percentage among all members, 46% believe that the US will use military force if Russia attacks Turkey. However, the median percentage for 2019 was only 38%.[30] Yet, the percentage for Turkey is even lover; 32%. Table 1 and Table 2 might give more information about public views of member states regarding NATO's favorability and Article 5 obligations.

Table 1: Favorability for NATO by the Public of Member States[31]

Country	1967	1977	1987	2017	2019
Canada				66	66
France	34	44	48	60	49
Germany	67	79	70	67	57
Greece				33	37
Italy				57	60
Netherlands	85	75		79	72
Spain				45	49
Turkey				23	21
United Kingdom	59	73	70	62	65
United States				62	52

29 David Galbreath, "All For One And One For All, Except When It Comes To NATO", June 12, 2015, https://theconversation.com/all-for-one-and-one-for-all-except-when-it-comes-to-nato-43139 (accessed October 23, 2019).

30 Pew Research Center , "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States", February 9, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/09/nato-seen-favorably-across-member-states/ (accessed February 11, 2020).

31 Compiled from PEW Research Center's various surveys. Visit https://www.pewresearch.org/

Table 2: Public Opinion about Article 5 Obligations[32]

Country	2015	2017	2019
Germany	38	40	34
Greece		25	25
Italy	40	36	25
Spain	48	46	41
Canada	53	58	56
France	47	53	41
United Kingdom	49	45	55
Netherlands		69	64
United States	56		60
Turkey			32
Median	47	47	38

3. Article 5 as an Assurance for Turkey's Security; An Objective Assessment

The previous section explained Turkey's NATO membership venture, event-based rifts between both sides, Turkey's accusations, and the changing behaviors of NATO members, literally their populations. This section, however, explains how credible accusations against each other are. Beginning with the membership process in early 1950s, it can be argued that it was Turkey that wanted to be a member rather than other members, which were reluctant to accept the new republic to their club. Hence, Turkey obtained the first benefit by becoming a member. As the second benefit, membership deterred the Soviet Union from invading Turkey partly or as a whole. Therefore, all (members) protected Turkey against a likely invasion without fighting. It may not be wrong if NATO argues that all (members) already protected one (Turkey) by the collective defense. The third benefit gained without fighting is fiscal and military aid to Turkey as per NATO membership. Without military assistance, it would be difficult to modernize the Turkish army. However, military assistance also led to the destruction of the indigenous defense industry, one of the primary losses the NATO membership caused.[33] A final benefit is a confirmation of Turkey's being a part of the West, which was an eternal goal of the young republic. Overall, beginning to be protected by Article 5 of the NATO agreement at the first phase culminated in three crucial

32 Compiled from PEW Research Center's various surveys. Visit https://www.pewresearch.org/
33 Arda Mevlutoğlu, "Commentary On Assessing The Turkish Defense Industry: Structural Issues And Major Challenges", *Defence Studies,* Vol.17, No. 3, 2017, pp. 282-294.

benefits, including repelling the Soviet threat and one loss. It may be nonsense to comment about events that never happened, but Turkey itself admits that NATO deterred a likely Soviet invasion. Therefore, membership was already a win for Turkey thanks to Article 5's assurances.

When the period between 1960 and 2010 is examined, it can be seen that Turkey and NATO (members) made common mistakes against each other. This period's distinctiveness was that the country was directly or indirectly ruled by the Turkish army, which always had good ties with NATO members. For instance, the army declared its allegiance to NATO and international organizations in the 1961 and 1980 coups. However, while civilian policymakers were also happy with NATO membership, more deviations could be witnessed in a political environment where the army is pacified. On the other hand, removing nuclear missiles without informing Turkey was a great and grave mistake of the US. Americans could have informed Turkish authorities and given some other security assurances, but they did not, or they were not disclosed. Theoretically, band-wagoning might protect a weak state from threats, but it brings more troubles as well.[34] Being an ally of a superpower is not always smooth and safe. Also, regarding the Cyprus case, Uslu says that when then Prime Minister Ismet Inonu understood that Turkey could not afford an intervention to the island economically, he informed Americans about the plan in order to show people that the US is not allowing the government to rescue Turkish Cypriots.[35] Moreover, from an American perspective, since a Turco-Greek war would have led to disunity in NATO, the US administration did not allow Turkey's incursion.[36] Americans could be correct since Greece quit NATO after the Turkish army's intervention in 1974 despite that it did not approve the operation. In other words, Turkey's intervention culminated in losing a member of the alliance. Yet, this loss does not delegitimize Turkey's intervention as Turkish Cypriots were being oppressed by Greek Cypriots. From NATO's perspective, it has the "One for all and all for one" principle, but there is no (and cannot be) any such principle stating which side to support if both sides are NATO members. Perhaps, what should have been done was that an active role be played by US-led NATO in Cyprus. For example, NATO could mediate or exert its plans for a peaceful solution, but this did not happen. On the other hand, the post-intervention arms embargo exerted by the US on Turkey forced Turkey to initiate its indigenous

34 Nasuh Uslu, "1947'den Günümüze Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Genel Portresi, *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2000, pp. 203-233.

35 Ibid, 208.

36 Ayse Omur Atmaca, "The Geopolitical Origins of Turkish-American Relations: Revisiting the Cold War Years", *All Azimuth,* Vol. 3, No. 1, 2014, pp. 19-34.

defense industry, which it sacrificed in the early years of NATO membership. Thus, military companies such as Aselsan and Aspilsan were beginning to be established during the embargo period in the late 1970s. Overall, as the most significant consequence of NATO membership, Turkey was safe from the Soviet threat during the Cold War.

Regarding the first two decades of the post-cold war period, it was again Turkey desiring to remain a NATO power though there was no longer the Soviet Union, and none would question its leaving if it had happened. Nevertheless, it maintained its membership either to stay in the Western camp or due to the belief that the country is more secure behind NATO's shield. However, Turkey's expectations turned into disappointment several times. For example, during the first Gulf War, NATO members sent their Patriot missiles to Turkey reluctantly while countries like Germany and the US placed undeclared arms embargoes on Turkey due to accusations regarding human rights abuses.[37] Meanwhile, Turkey had the chance to buy Patriot missiles in the 1990s, but it opted for F-16s instead. Patriot missiles' procurement is one of the significant reasons for the rift even today, but it seems that this problem could have been solved back in the 1990s. Yet, the US Congress' impediment for the sale of Patriot missiles being based on excuses such as banning technology transfer or Israel's security from Obama's presidency onwards is not understandable by Turks. Not sharing the technology of advanced missiles could be seen as being plausible to some extent but preferring a non-NATO member's (Israel) security did not sound reasonable. Finally, Turkey's call for NATO assistance against the PKK was dismissed since NATO does not deem domestic terrorism as an armed attack originating from abroad.

When the Syrian civil war began, NATO allies wanted Bashar Assad to step down, and sent their missile systems to protect Turkey. However, when a military superpower, namely Russia, started to fight alongside the Syrian army, NATO allies felt threatened even in their homes. Thus, they did not back Turkey after a Turkish F-16 downed a Russian jet. Turkey might have been overreacting but there are no terms of conditionality in NATO's agreement. While NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said NATO will stand together with Turkey, some members blamed Turkey and implied 'They are not all for Turkey'.[38] As a war between Turkey and Russia was less likely, the best policy for allies seemed to remain silent or show strong solidarity.

37 Sitki Egeli, "Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-go-Round", *All Azimuth,* Vol. 8, No. 1, 2019, pp. 69-92.

38 Robert Coalson, "What Are NATO's Articles 4 And 5?", June 26, 2012, https://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-nato-articles-4-and-5/24626653.html (accessed December 27, 2019).

In fact, downing a Russian jet that violated Turkish airspace for 17 seconds might be an overreaction, but it cannot be an excuse to leave Turkey alone. Regarding NATO's attitude during the failed coup of July 15, 2016, while the Turkish people was struggling to repel the coup conducted by a controversial group with less than 1% representation among the Turkish population, NATO members waited until the government neutralized the coupsters. Hence, Turks interpreted it as an endorsement of the coup by NATO. Finally, the US army's attempt to rename the YPG as the SDF was never born by the Turkish side. On the other hand, Turkish defense officials acknowledged that they neglected the political ramifications of buying missiles from a non-NATO country and their lack of interoperability with NATO's defense system.[39] It seems that the Turkish government did not consider the technical consequences.

There are also political reasons that caused Turkey-NATO relations to deteriorate in recent years. First, it should be noted that Turkey's foreign policy became more assertive during the Justice and Development Party governments. In fact, Turkey's relations with the West were quite good in the first years of the Justice and Development Party's rule. The Justice and Development Party government could even achieve the opening of EU accession negotiations by utilizing its conservative-democratic identity.[40] Yet, playing a more active role in the region, which was/is unfairly called "the neo-Ottomanist approach," led to a clash of interests with other NATO allies, particularly America. It is correct that Turkey did not support US sanctions against Iran, did not approve America's pro-Israel policy in the Middle East, supported the Muslim Brotherhood, worked with Sunni groups in Syria, and so on but it is not an obligation of a member state to act in line with the US. While previous cadres were generally striving to protect the status quo, the Justice and Development Party governments got involved in regional conflicts either due to its interests or conditions that forced them to do so.[41] Hence, it encountered NATO's superpower and great powers, which had different agendas in the same region. As can be seen, the contention is continuing over certain events mentioned above. While the profound reason is deemed as being Turkey's insistence on being a regional power, this study argues that Turkey is still in a defensive position since Turkey's involvement in conflicts brought no gains, and rather aimed to eliminate threats or preserve its current interests. As an example, Turkey is in Syria to prevent terrorist threats and

39 Mevlutoglu, "The Turkish Defense Industry", 287.

40 Erhan İçener and Zeynep Çağlıyan-İçener, "The Justice And Development Party's İdentity And İts Role İn The EU's Decision To Open Accession Negotiations With Turkey", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies,* Vol.11, No. 1, 2011, pp. 19-34.

41 Toni Alaranta, *The 'New Turkey' As A Nato Member*, Working Paper 103, Helsinki: FIIA, 2018.

new waves of migrants. Turkish troops are in Qatar but do not pose a threat to neighboring countries. On the other hand, while Turkey's base in Somalia was established for training purposes, Turkish troops are in Libya to preserve a maritime deal signed with the legitimate government.

On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, NATO members have been relieved about their security and do not give so much importance to collective defense.[42] Therefore, many of them reduced their defense budgets. Such policy changes can also be interpreted as erosion in loyalty due to the absence of imminent threats. Like other countries, Turkey also feels safe as there is no longer a superpower threatening it. It believes that NATO membership is a necessity and is aware that it does not have to be on alert for external threats. As surveys indicate, Turkey and other members have less loyalty to the alliance due to the more peaceful environment of the world.

Finally, assuming that governments act according to public opinion, surveys show that while some allies are committed to supporting the rest, others consider circumstances necessitating the help. In other words, if they believe that the ally is guilty, they will not support it. It can be argued that NATO members will collaborate only if all are under threat or the US wants them to do so. When a single country or a few of them are attacked, most of the rest will not join a hot war but try to combat the enemy via sanctions. Regarding Turkey, while it has the lowest favor among all, its percentage about supporting other allies is not the lowest but still low. Turkish people and the government believe that NATO will not support them in case of a war. However, if it ever would act as per statistics, it is clear that Turkey would not support its NATO allies in a likely war either.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that Turkey suffered terrorist attacks and internal conflicts more than any other member in recent decades. If Turkey did not go through so many conflicts in a short period, it would probably favor NATO more than current percentages. Overall, NATO should be presumed as obsolete since most allies do not want to fight for other member states. However, this study neither argues that alliance commitments can be based on public opinion nor admits that people's views have zero effect on foreign policy. Governments, militaries, and international organizations might have different interests and priorities than do their publics and ignore the public to fulfill international obligations. According to Foyle, the decision-makers' reaction to public opinion may vary even when circumstances of different

42 Philippe Manigart, "Public Opinion and Europena Defense", Ppaper presented at the International Symposium on Public opinion and European Defense, Brussells, April 3-4, 2001.

cases are similar.[43] On the other hand, since sovereignty is given to people in democratic countries, ruling parties and elites generally do not ignore people's will, particularly when making such decisions as declaring war on another country, fighting alongside the other members of an alliance, and having nuclear weapons.[44] However, as Holsti argues, it is elusive to fully understand conditions affecting the public's influence on foreign policy.[45] Therefore, governments might either neglect public opinion or not. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's refugee policy was criticized by Turkish people, including his electorate but he did not change his policy until his party lost local elections. Moreover, since migrant policy risks a likely victory in the next presidential elections his government is looking for ways to find a permanent solution to the refugee problem. Consequently, while the above surveys may not be decisive, it may be too simplistic to say that policymakers will go on their way in case of an attack on a NATO member.

Finally, despite all rifts, the Turkish state remains in NATO. Perhaps, their decisions would be different had they believed that NATO membership was harmful rather than beneficial. An anonymous retired army General's view was also asked for this study. While he complained about NATO's low performance, he wants Turkey to maintain its NATO membership.

Conclusion

Article 5 of the NATO agreement that orders collective defense for a member that has incurred an armed attack has always been a matter of debate in Turkey. Turks are suspicious of it if it involves Turkey in a likely war or conflict. This study analyzed whether Turkey and other members can rely on NATO's assurance of security stemming from Article 5. After examining certain events and surveys measuring public opinion of member states about NATO, it has been concluded that it is not clear that other members will defend Turkey or any other member since the article was invoked only once in the history of NATO to protect the US against relatively small states and a terrorist group. However, regarding Turkey's position, the claim that NATO will not protect Turkey cannot be proven since Turkey did not face an existential threat after becoming a NATO member. In addition, deterring the Soviet Union from

43 Douglas C. Foyle, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating Variable", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1997, pp. 141-169.

44 Jerome Laulicht, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Decisions", *Journal of Preace Research,* Vol. 2, No. 2, 1965, pp. 147-160.

45 Ole R., Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus", *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 36, No. 4, 1992, pp. 439-466.

attacking Turkey by making it a NATO member can be regarded as a benefit of Article 5 without invoking it. On the other hand, Turkey's own preferences and compelling reasons in foreign policy made it to be in contention with its NATO allies. However, when NATO members' attitudes are examined, it can be concluded that they could still have proposed better solutions for Turkey.

In addition to the above, as per public opinion surveys, NATO members hint that they may not sacrifice themselves for others unless (1) they are at War, (2) the enemy attacks all, (3) all attack the enemy, and (4) the US leads. According to surveys, this thesis is valid for Turkey since it favors NATO least and does not seem to join a collective defense of its allies. Yet, NATO's and some members' failure or reluctance to address Turkey's security problems has a significant impact on Turkish people's views. Surveys also show that NATO members are not as much in allegiance to the organization as they were in the past, probably due to the non-existence of an imminent threat.

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