

## The Problems of Studying Ottoman Heritage in Serbia

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### **Abstract:**

Surprisingly, even though Serbia was a part of the Ottoman Empire for hundreds of years and Ottoman culture had a tremendous impact on Serbian culture, today Ottoman archaeology and art history do not exist as specialized fields of study in the country. Ottoman archaeology faces enormous difficulties. This paper examines the reasons for this in order to give a better understanding not only of the present state, but also of the possible future of Ottoman heritage research in Serbia.

The topics which were analysed in this paper are the relationship between the collective memory and historiography, presentation of the Ottomans as the "Other" of the Serbian identity, the aspect of colonisation, definition of the Ottoman heritage, position of the Ottoman heritage in the museums, and the use of the Ottoman heritage.

**Keywords:** Ottoman heritage, heritage reception, dissonant heritage, unwanted heritage.

### **Introduction**

While surveying historical legacies in the Balkans, Maria Todorova famously concluded that there were two which needed to be singled out: the Byzantine and "the other is the half millennium of Ottoman rule that

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gave the peninsula its name and established the longest period of political unity it had experienced. Not only did part of southeastern Europe acquire a new name -Balkans- during the Ottoman period, it has been chiefly the Ottoman elements or the ones perceived as such that have mostly invoked the current stereotypes. Aside from the need for a sophisticated theoretical and empirical approach to the problems of the Ottoman legacy, it seems that the conclusion that the Balkans are the Ottoman legacy is not an overstatement".<sup>1</sup> Her words have echoed in the scientific community -in order to understand the Balkans and individual countries in this region, it is important to study the Ottoman past and heritage of this region. Yet, this is not always as simple as it sounds, which can clearly be seen in the case of Serbia.

With the fall of the state's capital of Smederevo in 1459 Serbia became a part of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>2</sup> This event ushered in a new period in Serbian history and the country would remain a part of the Ottoman Empire for hundreds of years, up until the Serbian Uprising in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, which resulted in it gaining full autonomy in 1830.<sup>3</sup>

Since the territory of Serbia served as a border with Europe, it was of great significance to the Ottomans. This is why it may come as a surprise that today Ottoman archaeology and art history do not exist as specialized fields of study in this country. There are no courses being offered to students at the departments of archaeology and art history at the University of Belgrade's Faculty of Philosophy (the only such departments in a Serbian university), which means that future archaeologists and art historians do not learn anything about this period, its rich heritage, and that they cannot specialize in it. This in turn means that there are no archaeological excavations aimed at studying the Ottoman past of Serbia; the only systematic excavations carried out over the course of several years were those at the Ottoman Ram Fortress<sup>4</sup> built by Bayezid II, but they are an exception as they were a part of the much larger project of restoring the Fortress which was funded and carried out

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<sup>1</sup> Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12.

<sup>2</sup> Ema Miljković, "Ottoman Heritage in the Balkans: The Ottoman Empire in Serbia, Serbia in the Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Social Sciences Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi - Special Issue on Balkans* (2012): 129.

<sup>3</sup> Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920* (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 2000), 26-37.

<sup>4</sup> Machiel Kiel, "The Ottoman Castle of Ram (Haram) in Serbia and the Accounts of Its Construction, 1491," in *State and Society in the Balkans Before and After Establishment of Ottoman Rule*, ed. Srđan Rudić and Selim Aslantaş (Beograd: Institut za Istoriju & Yunus Emre Enstitüsü Turkish Cultural Centre Belgrade, 2017), 168.

by the Republic of Turkey through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Turkish: *Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı* - short TİKA).<sup>5</sup> No other such excavations were carried out but, of course, Ottoman finds are all too common on various archaeological sites because they are the most recent ones. Archaeologists come across them first when carrying out excavations at different sites, however they are rarely collected and analysed as the only archaeologist who occasionally researches them today is Vesna Bikić from the Archaeological Institute in Belgrade.<sup>6,7,8,9,10</sup> The only other attempts to study Ottoman heritage are those of the art historian Andrej Andrejević (1935–1991) who studied Islamic art during his career<sup>11</sup> and of Olga Zirojević (1934–) who is a historian and occasionally publishes works on heritage,<sup>12</sup> but admittedly, all of them are quite modest individual attempts.

Because Serbia was a part of the Ottoman Empire for so long, Ottoman culture influenced Serbian culture to a great extent. In fact, understanding Ottoman legacy is crucial for understanding present day Serbian culture and society. This is why more attention should be paid to researching, understanding and promoting Ottoman heritage but in doing so researchers and curators face a lot of problems which hinder their attempts as they stem from the fact that Serbs see the Ottoman period as a “dark age” period of their history and the infamous “Turkish yoke” period, as well as the Ottomans as colonizers, oppressors, and as

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<sup>5</sup> Olivera Milošević, “Obnovljena Ramska tvrđava,” *Politika* (2019).

<sup>6</sup> See Vesna Bikić, “The Early Turkish Stratum on the Belgrade Fortress,” in *Byzas 7 - Late Antique and Medieval Pottery and Tiles in Mediterranean Archaeological Contexts*, ed. Beate Bohlendorf-Arslan, Ali Osman Uysal and Johanna Witte-Orr (İstanbul: Ege Yayınları, 2007), 515–522.

<sup>7</sup> See Vesna Bikić, “Tobacco Pipes from the Belgrade Fortress: Context and Chronology,” *Journal of the Academie Internationale de la Pipe* (2012): 1–8.

<sup>8</sup> See Vesna Bikić, “Ottoman Weights from Belgrade’s Fortress: A Reconsideration,” in *Ottoman Metalwork in the Balkans and in Hungary*, ed. Ibolya Gereelyes and Maximilian Hartmuth (Budapest: Hungarian National Museum, 2015), 37–57.

<sup>9</sup> See Jelana Živković, Vesna Bikić and Myrto Georgakopoulou, “Archaeology of Consumption in Ottoman Urban Centres: The Case study of Iznik Ware from the Belgrade Fortress in the 16th and 17th centuries,” *Post-Medieval Archaeology* 51, no. 1 (2017): 132–144.

<sup>10</sup> See Vesna Bikić 2017, “Ottoman Glazed Pottery Standardization: The Belgrade Fortress Evidence for Production Trends,” in *Glazed Pottery of the Mediterranean Area and the Black Sea Region, 10<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries Volume 2*, ed. Sergey Bocharov, Véronique François and Ayrat Sitdikov (Kishinev: A. Kh. Khalikov Institute of Archaeology Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstanhigh & Anthropological School University, 2017), 207–216.

<sup>11</sup> See Sreten Petković, ed., *Bibliografija nastavnika i saradnika Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu* (Beograd: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 1995), 401–413.

<sup>12</sup> See Olga Zirojević, *Iz osmanske baštine* (Beograd: Balkanski centar za Bliski istok, 2018).

the “other” thus making it impossible to see Ottoman heritage as Serbian heritage; all of which is problematic to say the least.

### Collective Memory vs. Historiography

One of the biggest problems when studying Ottoman heritage in Serbia is the negative association people have when they think about it. Ottomans and their influence are looked upon with contempt since the Ottoman period as a whole is seen as a “dark age” period of Serbian history -the period of the mythical “500 years of Turkish yoke”; “mythical” as such a view has a lot to do with collective memory and very little with historiography.<sup>13</sup> Because of that, when talking about the “Turkish yoke” one has to bear in mind that this notion was not taken from historiography, but rather from collective memory in which Ottomans are perceived as the enemy. This means that the “Turkish yoke” myth is under the influence of nationalism as the Serbian national identity is based on, among other things, an antagonistic relationship with the Ottomans.<sup>14</sup> To illustrate the difference between collective memory and historiography we can look at the alleged religious intolerance of the Ottomans, which is an integral part of the “Turkish yoke” myth.

As Muslims, the Ottomans are perceived as enemies of Christianity and, as a result, enemies of Serbian national identity. Indeed, the Ottoman

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<sup>13</sup> Problems around the “500 years of Turkish yoke” myth become obvious as soon as one looks at how long it lasted. What date should be taken as the beginning of the “five centuries of Turkish yoke” is a question of ongoing debate. Some historians cite the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 as the beginning and the liberation of Old Serbia (Raška, Kosovo and Macedonia) in 1912 as the end of the period -thus they come to the conclusion that it lasted five centuries. However, during a significant portion of these “500 years of Turkish yoke”, Serbia was independent to some extent. For instance, the Serbian Despotate fell only in 1459 and the Principality of Serbia was founded in 1815; both of them were semi-independent states. Not to mention that Serbia already had autonomy as early as 1830. Because of this, other historians cite 1804 as the end of the Ottoman period since this was the year of the First Serbian Uprising, others 1830 when Serbia got its autonomy, while others still cite 1878 when Serbia was internationally recognized as an independent country (Srđan Milošević, “Arrested development: mythical characteristics in the ‘five hundred years of Turkish yoke’,” in *Images of Imperial Legacy: Modern Discourses on the Social and Cultural Impact of Ottoman and Habsburg Rule in Southeast Europe*, ed. Tea Sindbaek and Maximilian Hartmuth (Berlin: LIT Verlag Münster, 2011), 70). So, while there is not an agreement, if we were to take the fall of Smederevo in 1459 as the beginning of the Ottoman period and 1830 as the end, we would get that the “five centuries of Turkish yoke” lasted less than 400 years. Clearly the very notion of the “500 years of Turkish yoke” was created in order to suit the needs of the present, and not through careful scholarly analysis of the past.

<sup>14</sup> See Marko Šuica, “Percepcija Osmanskog carstva u Srbiji,” in *Imaginarni Turčin*, ed. Božidar Jezernik (Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 2010), 285–298.

Empire was a Muslim country, but the Ottomans did not force the people they conquered to convert to Islam. It is well known that the Ottoman Empire introduced the Millet system, which ensured religious tolerance - Christian and Jewish communities were protected under law and had their own identities.<sup>15</sup> Just like with other communities, the Millet system ensured that Serbian Orthodox Christians had the right to their own religion and identity.

The Ottomans also had another more practical reason not to force people to convert to Islam -non-Muslim communities had to pay a special tax, the *haraç*.<sup>16</sup> This tax is something negatively represented in Serbian collective memory since it is seen as something imposed on Christian Serbs by Muslim conquerors, who did not tolerate their religion. Of course, the *haraç* is presented in a different way by Ottoman sources, which look at it as a means to ensure security for people of different religions. Looking at it like this, it could even be argued that the Ottoman Empire was the most liberal county in medieval and early modern Europe when it comes to religious tolerance. A good example of this is offered by Sultan Bayezid II, who opened the gates of the Ottoman Empire to Jews who were expelled by the Spanish inquisition in 1492. Not only did he provide them with a safe haven where they were not persecuted like they were in Western Europe, but also because of their experience in commerce and knowledge of European languages, Bayezid II offered many of them high positions in the administration.<sup>17</sup>

Because other religions were tolerated and religious communities had a right to their own identities, conversions to Islam were not even that common. In fact, Christians were the dominant demographic group in the Balkans during the Ottoman Empire.<sup>18</sup> However, even though all faiths were tolerated, Christians, Jews and Muslims were by no means equal. The ruling class was Muslim and no one could hold a high position in the army or the administration without converting to Islam. Because of that, many pragmatic Christians converted in order to reap the benefits but there were also cases when converting to Islam was forced -the

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<sup>15</sup> Fatih Öztürk, "The Ottoman Millet System," *Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 16, (2009): 71-72.

<sup>16</sup> Marija Kocić, *Orijentalizacija materijalne kulture na Balkanu: Osmanski period XV-XIX vek* (Beograd: HESPERIAedu & Filozofski fakultet, Beograd, 2010), 98.

<sup>17</sup> Syahrul Hidayat, "Minority Groups in Ottoman Turkey before 1856: Different Arrangements of the Jews and the Christians under Millet System," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 4, no.1 (2014): 39-40.

<sup>18</sup> Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, 4.

*devshirme* or the “blood tax” as it came to be known in Serbia, which is an especially notable part of the “Turkish yoke” myth.

The “blood tax” was collected once in 3 to 7 years when the authorities took healthy male children (unless he was an only child) between the ages of 8 and 20 to Istanbul. In Serbian collective memory this act is seen as the kidnapping of children which lasted several centuries -taking sons from their mother’s arms and forcing them to convert to Islam, which Serbs tried to avoid at all cost with some even maiming their children by cutting off their fingers. However, this is far from true. In reality, thanks to historical sources we know that the *devshirme* started declining in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and was officially abolished by the middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> century which means that it was not practiced in Serbia for almost a half of the whole Ottoman period. In addition, the true extent of the so called “blood tax” is not known; some sources cite that between 1400 and 1600, a total of 200,000 Janissaries were recruited this way from the whole territory of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>19</sup> Of course, such estimates should be taken with reservation, as it is impossible to get a precise number. Historical sources offer different and contradictory accounts. For instance, Konstantin Mihajlović (1435–1501), a Serbian born Janissary, and a royal decree from the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century state that one boy was taken per 40 households, while other sources offer much larger and much smaller figures which indicates that the “blood tax” varied from year to year and depended on the needs of the authorities.<sup>20</sup> However, the main problem with the perception of the *devshirme* is not its true extent, but the very way people interpret it today.

While Serbs today tend to look at this practice as something inertly bad, the kidnapping of hundreds of thousands of kids during several centuries of Ottoman rule, it is well known that not all of the people who lived in the Ottoman Empire looked at the *devshirme* like that. There are well known cases in which families wanted their sons to be taken and even tried bribing officials so that they would pick their sons as those children could go on to attain high positions in the army and administration after finishing their education in Istanbul.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Traian Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds: The First and Last Europe: The First and Last Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2015): 201–202.

<sup>20</sup> Gábor Ágoston, “Devşirme,” in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 183.

<sup>21</sup> Jean Sedlar, *East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 1000–1500* (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1994), 268–269.

Indeed, through the “blood tax” children from poor families could go on to become influential people with some even becoming grand viziers, which is, as we know, the highest position a person could attain in the Ottoman Empire. This kind of social mobility was unheard of in medieval Europe, but it was standard practice in the Ottoman Empire where most grand viziers were of Serbian, Croatian, Albanian, Bosnian and Greek origin. Over the years there were a few grand viziers of Serbian origin, but the two most prominent ones were Mahmud Pasha Angelović, who served as the grand vizier to Mehmed II, and the famous Sokollu Mehmed Pasha (Serbian: Mehmed-paša Sokolović), who served for a total of 14 years as the grand vizier to Suleiman I, Selim II and Murad III.

Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was born around 1505 in a Serbian Orthodox Christian family in Sokol, in the vicinity of modern-day Rudo. After being selected for the “blood tax” (possibly as a result of a bribe) and finishing his education in Istanbul in 1541, he went on to rise in the Ottoman hierarchy all the way to the position of the grand vizier to Suleiman I in 1565.<sup>22</sup> Yet, what is especially interesting is the fact that he bribed officials to select his family members for the *devshirme* and bring them to Istanbul.<sup>23</sup> In other words, like many others, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and his family did not see the “blood tax” as something evil, but rather as an opportunity for social mobility.

There are other examples as well, which is why such one-sided nationalistically inclined collective memory of the Ottoman past makes studying Ottoman heritage difficult. It makes it hard to objectively analyse the heritage of the period as it is not seen as a period of peace, but rather a period of oppression; not a period of religious tolerance, but a period of religious oppression; not a period which offered social mobility, but as a period of child-kidnappings. The Ottoman period as a whole is seen as something bad which the people of Serbia would like to forget or “push out of Serbian history”. As they cannot do that, they turn to the next best thing, which is labelling Ottoman heritage as unwanted foreign heritage and thus distance themselves from it. But, to what extent can such heritage be labelled as “foreign”?

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<sup>22</sup> Uroš Dakić, “The Sokollu Family Clan and the Politics of Vizierial Households in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century,” (Master’s thesis, Central European University, 2012), 34–42.

<sup>23</sup> Dakić, “The Sokollu Family Clan”, 44.

### Ottomans as the “Other” and Colonizers

The fact that the Serbian national identity is based on an antagonistic relationship with the Ottomans makes it difficult to see Ottoman heritage as an integral part of Serbian cultural heritage. Serbian collective memory rests on a strong “Us (Serbs) vs. Them (Ottomans)” view and since the “500 years of Turkish yoke” myth appeared in school textbooks during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it indoctrinated generations of children with this view of “them” enslaving “us” and setting “us” back<sup>24</sup> for hundreds of years.<sup>25</sup> As this view is still dominant in the public discourse, the Ottomans are seen as colonizers even though this notion is highly problematic since Serbia was not a colony of the Ottoman Empire and does not share any of the characteristics of a colony of an empire.

Albert Memmi describes the psychological effects of colonialism on the colonized people as well as the colonizers in his famous 1957 essay *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (French: *Portrait du colonisé, précédé par Portrait du colonisateur*). He notes that the colonizer is not interested in the people he is colonizing because he intends to change them. To do this, he depersonalizes them and takes away their freedom.<sup>26</sup> This process in turn affects the colonized people as they are no longer free agents capable of making their own decisions, which is why they are not seen as capable of leading their community or worthy of having the rights that the citizens of the county they belong to usually have.<sup>27</sup> This is not the case when it comes to Serbia under the Ottoman Empire.

As stated before, Ottomans did not have a plan to “change” or “civilize” the people they were conquering -they did not force them to adopt a new culture or religion. However, Serbs today see this period as a

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<sup>24</sup> It is worth mentioning that such depictions of Ottomans as “ruthless conquerors who enslave medieval states” and ushered in a dark age in which people lived in fear is not something unique to school textbooks from Serbia and other countries of former Yugoslavia. The same negative view is present in Albanian (see Olsi Jazexhi, “Depicting the Enemy: The Image of the Turk and the Muslim in Albania’s High School Textbooks,” in *Surviving Elements of Ottoman legacy in the Balkans in Non-Muslim Communities and Cultures*, ed. Halit Eren (Sarajevo: Centar za civilizaciju Balkana), 2009, 59–86) and Bulgarian textbooks (see Aziz Shakir “Ottomans’ Image in the Bulgarian History Textbooks from the Communist and Post-communist Era,” in *Surviving Elements of Ottoman legacy in the Balkans in Non-Muslim Communities and Cultures*, ed. Halit Eren. (Sarajevo: Centar za civilizaciju Balkana, 2009), 139–144), in which the Ottoman period is also represented as a period of “Turkish yoke”.

<sup>25</sup> Milošević, “Arrested Development”, 69–72.

<sup>26</sup> Albert Memi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (London: Earthscan Publications, 2003), 127–130.

<sup>27</sup> Memi, *The Colonizers*, 135–140.



“period of slavery”. They look at themselves as slaves and impute the characteristics of colonized people on themselves in an attempt to demonize the Ottomans by representing them as colonizers who robbed Serbs of their freedom despite the fact that they did not. In reality, Serbs were free citizens of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottomans did not force them to adopt a new culture or even a new way of life; they just brought it with them and Serbs adopted it on their own terms, which is why it is also questionable to which extent Ottomans can be described as the “other”.

“The otherness” of the Ottomans is based on three things: their culture, religion and national identity, but all of these aspects are questionable as the measure of their “otherness”. It is a fact that the Ottomans brought a new culture and religion to the Balkans, but this culture was adopted by Serbs rather quickly and a lot of Serbs converted to Islam. For instance, life of a Muslim and a Christian was not that different in the Balkans as people who converted to Islam continued to live just as they did before. They lived with their relatives and neighbours doing the same work they did before; everyday life of Muslims and Christians was almost the same aside from religious practices.<sup>28</sup>

National identity is no less problematic as a measure of “otherness”. As stated before, Serbs had a right to their own identity but talking about national identity in the past from today’s perspective is difficult if not impossible. We cannot know how most people saw themselves and in any case it is questionable who has the right to draw the line between a Serb and an Ottoman. What would even give that person the right to do so? Practically speaking -was Sokollu Mehmed Pasha a Serb or an Ottoman? He was from a Serbian family but also an Ottoman statesman. He converted to Islam but respected Christianity and did not force his family members to convert.<sup>29</sup> He lived in Istanbul but helped the people of his childhood community by funding and opening mosques, *mescids*, bridges

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<sup>28</sup> Kocić, *Orijentalizacija materijalne kulture*, 120–121.

<sup>29</sup> In fact, even though he was a Muslim himself, he helped restore the Serbian Patriarchate of Peć in 1557 with his cousin, Makarije Sokolović, becoming the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church. However, Ottomans even granted the Patriarchate of Peć a far greater extent, well beyond its former borders – it stretched from Dalmatia in the West to Bulgaria in the West, from Hungary in the north to Macedonia in the south, with it assuming control of dioceses outside of the Ottoman Empire as well. This restoration meant that service could be held in Serbian, new churches were being built, religious texts were copied, religious art was being made once again, all of which helped preserve Serbian culture and identity, and was possible thanks to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha’s efforts (Aleksandar Fotić, “Serbian Orthodox Church,” in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 519–520).

and caravanserais in and around his birthplace.<sup>30</sup> Both the Serbian people and his childhood community would have seen him as their own but so too would the Ottomans as he was the grand vizier and this is exactly the problem when trying to represent the Ottomans as the “other”.

There are numerous such cases where it is hard to draw the line, like the thousands of Christian Serbs who took part in the 1551 military campaign on the side of the Ottomans because Sokollu Mehmed Pasha asked them.<sup>31</sup> Another older case is the fact that after the death of Đurađ Branković in 1456 there was a divide in the Serbian aristocracy -one fraction thought that Serbia could be saved with the help of the Habsburg monarchy, while the other fraction thought that the state ought to align itself with the Ottomans. And, indeed, after the fall of the Serbian Despotate in 1459, some aristocrats fled to seek help from the Habsburgs while Ottoman sources claim that a significant number of them stayed and became *sipahi*.<sup>32</sup> These cases are interesting as the people chose to align themselves with the Ottomans and fight on their side<sup>33</sup> thus proving that it is hard to distinguish between who can and should be classified as an Ottoman and who as a Serb. After all, this distinction does not really exist since Serbs who lived in the Ottoman Empire were in fact Ottoman citizens.

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<sup>30</sup> Dakić, “The Sokollu Family Clan,” 46; 75.

<sup>31</sup> Dakić, “The Sokollu Family Clan,” 46.

<sup>32</sup> Aleksandar Krstić, “Which Realm Will You Opt For? – The Serbian Nobility between the Ottomans and the Hungarians in the 15th Century,” in *State and Society in The Balkans Before and After Establishment of Ottoman Rule*, ed. Srđan Rudić and Selim Aslantaş (Belgrade: Institut za Istoriju & Yunus Emre Enstitüsü Turkish Cultural Centre Belgrade 2017), 138–159.

<sup>33</sup> It’s worth mentioning that there are also earlier cases of Serbs fighting as a part of the Ottoman army, some even before the Serbian Despotate fell. Indeed, Serbs took part in some of the most important battles such as Mehmed II’s siege of Constantinople in 1453. It is well known that numerous soldiers were sent by Despot Đurađ Branković to aid Mehmed the Conqueror, but the famous Serbian born Janissary Konstantin Mihailović was also present (see Konstantin Mihailović iz Ostrovice, *Janičareve uspomene ili turska hronika*, (Beograd: Prosveta, 2014)). Another famous case is the Battle of Ankara which took place in 1402. It was in fact a battle between the armies of Timur and Bayezid I, yet not only did Serbian soldiers fight during the battle on the side of the Ottomans, but as vassals, Stefan Lazarević and Đurađ Branković fought alongside the sultan. Not only that, according to Stefan’s biographer, Constantine the Philosopher, the Serbian ruler even tried to save Bayezid once he was captured. See John V. A. Fine, *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 499. Of course, these cases are different in the sense that the people did not chose to take part in the campaign, and did so because the mentioned Serbian rulers were Ottoman vassals. However, they still illustrate that “Serbian history” and “Ottoman history” are intertwined so much that it is impossible to draw the line between them, and that doing so would be arbitrary.

Aside from that fact, it is well known that Serbs contributed to the Ottoman Empire quite a bit in different ways -apart from everything mentioned so far, the wife of Sultan Bayezid I, Olivera, and the wife of Sultan Murad II, Mara, were Serbs; Ottomans borrowed several laws from the medieval Serbian state, including the Mining Law proclaimed by Stefan Lazarević in 1421 which was incorporated almost entirely into the Ottoman legal system; aside from the mentioned *sipahi*, in the 18<sup>th</sup> century a new Serbian elite made up of wealthy merchants emerged, *etc.*<sup>34</sup> Such cases perfectly illustrate that Ottomans cannot really be seen as the “other” since the history of the Ottoman Empire is an integral part of Serbian history because they are so intertwined. As a result, Ottoman heritage is in fact also Serbian cultural heritage, which is something people tend to ignore despite the fact that it is next to impossible to distinguish Serbian from Ottoman heritage.

### **What is Ottoman Heritage?**

Since the Ottomans are seen as foreign conquerors, Serbs do not see Ottoman heritage as their own, but an additional problem is defining what is Ottoman heritage in the first place. Defining it may appear to be a straight-forward task but it is not as major problems arises due to the ethnic connotation when saying “Ottoman heritage”. Put like that, it is not “Serbian” but rather “Ottoman”, yet defining what is Serbian and what is Ottoman is difficult at best, if not impossible when talking about cultural heritage. Take for instance two late medieval fortresses -the Ram Fortress and the Smederevo Fortress.

Ram was built by Bayezid II at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century on the banks of the Danube near present day Veliko Gradište.<sup>35</sup> This late medieval fortress was built by the Ottomans and used by their army; its whole history is tied to the Ottoman Empire, which justifies it being labelled as “Ottoman heritage”. However, the Ottomans did not prefer to build new fortifications. Instead they modified and used already built fortresses like the Belgrade Fortress, the Niš Fortress and the mentioned Smederevo Fortress.

After they conquered Smederevo in 1459, the Ottomans seized the Smederevo Fortress and somewhat modified it to suit their needs. They built another lower wall around the Fortress with an additional four

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<sup>34</sup> Miljković, “Ottoman Heritage in the Balkans,” 130–134.

<sup>35</sup> Kiel, *The Ottoman Castle of Ram*, 165–180.

towers, and inside it a *hamam* and mosques.<sup>36</sup> Today the only objects found during archaeological excavations within in the fortress are these Ottoman buildings.<sup>37</sup> In other words, the Ottomans are responsible for how the Smederevo Fortress looks like today even though their modifications were by all means minor. Since the Fortress was used by the Ottomans to house their garrison and modified by them, should it be considered “Ottoman heritage” or “Serbian heritage”? Unlike “Roman heritage” which can be interpreted as “Serbian heritage” as well, just saying “Ottoman heritage” implies the mentioned *us vs. them* divide and so it is hard giving an answer to such a question. But, these are the least controversial cases as we are talking about whole monuments. What about individual buildings, which were built by and used by Serbs during the Ottoman period; should they be considered Ottoman heritage or Serbian heritage? What about individual archaeological finds where it is impossible to know who used them, such as coins or pottery?

These problems stem from the fact that resisting Ottoman influence is an integral part of Serbian national identity even more than resisting Ottomans themselves. Ottomans, or simply “Turks” in the popular discourse, were enemies of Serbs but there was an even greater enemy: Serbs who adopted Islam and became “Ottomans”. They were called *poturice* and presented a greater threat to Serbian culture and national identity as they chose to adopt Ottoman culture while forsaking Serbian culture. They became so despised in the Serbian community that a popular saying arose – *Poturica [je] od Turčina gori* (English: *Poturica [is] worse than the Turk*).<sup>38</sup> This notion that it is important to resist Ottoman influence was passed on but today it is redundant because of the tremendous influence Ottoman culture had on Serbian culture despite this urge to resist it; influence which becomes even more explicit when looking at Serbian intangible cultural heritage.

Some more, some less, but all Serbs who lived in the Ottoman Empire adopted Ottoman culture and over time it became an integral part of Serbian culture. Maybe the best example of this is the oriental way of

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<sup>36</sup> Leontije Pavlović, *Istorija Smedereva u reči i slici* (Smederevo: Muzej u Smederevu, 1980), 187–190.

<sup>37</sup> Mladan Cunjak, *Smederevska tvrđava, novija istraživanja* (Smederevo: Centar za korišćenje Smederevske tvrđave, 1998), 114–126.

<sup>38</sup> Monika Skrzyszewska, “*Poturica gori od Turčina* or...? The Influence of Islam on ‘Our Muslims’ in Serbian Nationalistic Discourse (Review from the Second Half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century to the 1920s),” in *Turkish Yoke or Pax Ottomana: The Reception of Ottoman Heritage in the Balkan History and Culture*, ed. Krzysztof Popek and Monika Skrzyszewska (Kraków: Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2019), 112.

dressing which the Ottomans brought to Serbia; even Christian Serbs adopted this fashion and today such clothing with evident oriental motifs is considered traditional Serbian clothing.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, Ottoman culture influenced almost every aspect of Serbian culture, including the language. Even though during the 20<sup>th</sup> century there were attempts to push Turkish words out of the Serbian language as they sounded archaic, they did not succeed and today there are thousands of words in the Serbian language, which are borrowed from Turkish.<sup>40</sup>

Another aspect of everyday life in Serbia, which has a clear Ottoman origin, is the local coffee culture. The Ottomans brought coffee to the Balkans towards the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, just a few years prior to introducing tobacco to this region. Soon enough coffee shops, or rather *kahvehane*, were opened in all urban centres in the Balkans, including Serbia. The secretary of the French ambassador and writer Lefebvre while passing through the Serbian town of Prokuplje in 1611 noted seeing a few “Turks” who were sitting in the shade under the eaves of a *kahvehana* drinking coffee and smoking tobacco, which became a stereotypical image Western Europeans associated with the Balkans in the coming centuries.<sup>41</sup> However, coffee was not the only thing Ottomans introduced. Several staple foods in Serbia today have their origin in the Ottoman Empire such as *börek*, *sarma* or *dolma*, *baklava* etc.<sup>42</sup>

In fact, the *Center for the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Serbia* within the *Ethnographic Museum* in Belgrade was inaugurated in 2012 in order to research, catalogue, process, store and present the intangible cultural heritage in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. As of 2020, 51 elements are inscribed on its *List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage Elements*. Out of them, several are Ottoman or have Ottoman origin such as *belmuž* or *kuymak*, traditional *čilim* or *kilim* making in Pirot and the Sjenica-Pešter type of *kilim*, *manti* from Novi Pazar, *kazandžijski zanat* or *coppersmith's trade* and the traditional process of making *kaymak*.<sup>43</sup>

This is exactly the problem with the ethnic connotation of “Ottoman heritage” -it is impossible to draw the line between what is Ottoman and

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<sup>39</sup> Kocić, *Orijentalizacija materijalne kulture*, 360–386.

<sup>40</sup> See Marija Đindić, “Turcizmi u savremenom srpskom književnom jeziku (semantičko-derivaciona analiza)” (PhD diss., University of Belgrade, 2016).

<sup>41</sup> Aleksandar Fotić, “The Introduction of Coffee and Tobacco to the Mid-West Balkans,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 64 (2011): 90–91.

<sup>42</sup> Kocić, *Orijentalizacija materijalne kulture*, 293–321; 340–345.

<sup>43</sup> For more information on the Center its list visit the Center’s website: <http://www.nkns.rs/en> (Accessed on 24 December 2020).

what is Serbian as this distinction does not exist. Like we have mentioned, Ottoman heritage is Serbian heritage since Serbs were citizens of the Ottoman Empire and the ones who created it, but the problem is that most people do not look at it like this. They only see mosques, Turkish baths and places, which remind them of the hardships during the Ottoman period as “Ottoman heritage” in order to nurture the “*us* (victims) vs. *them* (conquerors)” relationship. While there was no large-scale research project aimed at understanding the way people interpret Ottoman heritage, one small case study from Smederevo offers us a small glimpse into this relationship.

In the southeastern part of the Smederevo Fortress there is a sacred complex; initially it was built in the 15<sup>th</sup> century as an Orthodox church, but after the Ottomans seized the Fortress it was converted into a mosque. Yet, this was not the end to its history; in the 18<sup>th</sup> century when Smederevo was briefly a part of the Habsburg Empire, the complex was converted into a Catholic church. Its foundations were restored in 2012 and they feature elements of all three phases of its history such as the altar from when it was church, but also the *mihrab* from when it was a mosque. However, when the local population was interviewed, out of the total 962 people who were surveyed, 572 thought that there was never a mosque in the Fortress even though it was used by the Ottomans and the foundations of the mosque in the southeastern part are clearly visible. Yet, what is even more interesting is the fact that 18% of the people said that it is more important to restore remains of a church than those of a mosque, while 27% explicitly stated that, “a church is more important as it is a part of *our* culture, and a mosque is not”.<sup>44</sup> What percentage of the total population of Serbia shares such an explicitly negative view of “*our*” vs. “*their*” culture has yet to be determined, but nevertheless, even without such a study it is clear that people use Ottoman heritage to distance themselves from it, and public institutions help them do this.

### Ottoman Heritage and Museums

Museums are public institutions and as such they are tailored to meet the needs of the public. Since the public wants to distance itself from Ottomans or, better still, forget the Ottoman period all together, Serbian museums try to help it accomplish this goal. Possibly the best example of this can be seen in the *National Museum* in Belgrade as the museum

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<sup>44</sup> Miloš Todorović, “Percepcija sakralnog objekta u Smederevskoj tvrđavi kao primer zanemarivanja ‘osmanskog nasleđa’,” *Mons Aureus: časopis za književnost, umetnost i društvena pitanja* 57–58 (2017): 178–182.

showcases Serbian cultural heritage. Aside from a few antiquities from ancient Egypt and artworks from Western Europe, which are parts of the permanent exhibition, all other exhibited pieces reflect the culture of Serbia: archaeological findings from the Paleolithic to the late medieval period, currency from Roman times all the way to the 20<sup>th</sup> century and artwork from the medieval up to the modern period. However, only the numismatic collection has Ottoman heritage exhibited in the form of coins. There are no archaeological finds or artworks from the Ottoman period exhibited in the museum which clearly implies that they are not a part of Serbian culture or even Serbian heritage.<sup>45</sup>

Of course, there are examples of good practice where the Ottoman period is not left out. One such example is the *Museum in Smederevo's* permanent exhibition "The Smederevo Fortress: From Capital to Cultural Monument". As the name implies, the exhibition traces the history of the Fortress from its construction all the way to the present. Since the Fortress was used by the Ottomans, this period of its history is also featured with finds like coins and pottery vessels incorporated into the exhibition. But what is surprising is the fact that the accompanying texts and the catalog of the exhibition do not contain problematic descriptions of this period all-too-common such as "Turkish yoke", "period of slavery", "dark ages" etc.<sup>46</sup> However, cases like the *Museum in Smederevo* are rare and to understand why it is important to look at the research carried out by Siri Therese Sollie at the *Ethnographic Museum* in Belgrade.

Sollie conducted interviews with six curators from the museum about how they see the Ottoman past of Serbia. Her work showed some interesting and alarming things, like one of the curators admitting that he "lives with Ottoman culture" thus implying that he sees that culture as foreign. Four of the questioned curators viewed the Ottomans as having a negative influence on Serbia: they saw them as "foreign invaders who destroyed the glorious Serbian Medieval State". One of them had an even more explicit negative view saying that Ottomans interrupted the development of Serbia and did not bring anything good to the Balkans, while another curator argued that their arrival was fatal for the development of Serbia.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> For more information on the permanent exhibition visit the Museum's website: <http://www.narodnimuzej.rs/stalna-postavka/> (Accessed on 24 December 2020).

<sup>46</sup> Tatjana Gačpar et al., *Smederevska tvrđava – od prestonice do spomenika kulture* (Smederevo: Muzej u Smederevu, 2018), 50–55.

<sup>47</sup> Sollie Siri, "The Exhibition of Ottoman Heritage – from Collective Memory to Museum Display". *Glasnik Etnografskog muzeja* 76 (2012): 27–29.

This case study showed that curators working in museums share the view imposed by Serbian collective memory. This does not really come as a surprise but it is alarming that professional cultural workers, such as museum curators, see Ottoman heritage as something foreign and not as worthy as heritage of other historical periods. Fortunately, three of the younger curators admitted to Sollie that they were taught in school that, "Ottomans are the enemy of Serbs" but are now sceptical when it comes to such negative representations.<sup>48</sup> However, Sollie noticed that there are no serious research projects dealing with Ottoman heritage and the questioned curators admitted that none of them specialized in this heritage, as they did not even have courses about Ottoman heritage during their studies.<sup>49</sup>

Sollie's case study showed that the curators share the view of Ottomans derived from collective memory rather than historiography. Such studies should be conducted in other museums in order to understand how archaeologists, ethnographers, art historians and historians who deal with heritage look at Ottoman heritage as they are the ones who influence how the public perceives this heritage. Yet, even without such studies, it is obvious that Ottoman heritage is an unwanted part of Serbian culture, which causes serious problems.

### **The Use of Ottoman Heritage**

Cultural heritage is not something that exists on its own. It is created by people, who assign value to certain things from the past to suit their needs. As such, cultural heritage needs to have a purpose for what its being used. This can be seen in present day Serbia as well when looking at the reception of the heritage of different historical periods.

During the 90s nationalism dominated the public discourse. As the Middle Ages are of great importance for Serbian national identity, this nationalism led to medieval heritage being in the center of attention. This period was depicted as the "golden age of Serbia" and its heritage was dominant both in the public and the political discourse up until a shift on the political scene at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. With the fall of Slobodan Milošević's regime and a pro-Western government coming to power, politicians wanted to distance themselves and the country from the nationalism of the 90s. They wanted to represent Serbia as an integral part of Europe and did so by focusing attention to Roman heritage since the

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<sup>48</sup> Sollie, "The exhibition," 30-31.

<sup>49</sup> Sollie, "The exhibition," 32.



Roman Empire is widely seen as the cradle of Europe. As a result, the government sponsored project aimed at promoting Roman heritage in an attempt to present Serbia as the “birth place of Roman emperors”.<sup>50</sup> Since Euro-integrations are still ongoing, but nationalism is also present today, both Roman and medieval heritage get a lot of attention from the public and researchers as opposed to Ottoman heritage which does not have a purpose aside from being used to enforce the “us vs. them” relationship.

With Ottoman heritage being perceived as foreign, belonging to an invader who enslaved Serbia, naturally it is a typical case of unwanted dissonant heritage.<sup>51</sup> However, this does not mean that people, curators and researchers should simply ignore it. Far from it, this means that it is up to archaeologists, historians, art historians and ethnologists to research this heritage and the curators to show the public how it fits into Serbian history, how it influenced Serbian culture and what can be learned by studying. But aside from studying Ottoman heritage for its own sake, curators and researchers need to bear in mind that this heritage needs to have its own purpose in order to stay relevant in the public discourse and that it is up to them to find it. This might seem as an impossible task due to the perception of this period but that is not the case as other countries have shown.

The Ottomans are generally perceived as antagonists in the Balkans, but not all countries have the same relationship with Ottoman heritage. Heritage tourism is a good indicator because it reflects what people want to see and show to foreigners visiting their country. Serbia does not pay much attention to Ottoman heritage and focuses more on Roman and medieval heritage as is to be expected. However, in neighbouring countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and even North Macedonia, Ottoman heritage is an integral part of their touristic offers.<sup>52</sup> The Ottoman period in these countries is also perceived as a

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<sup>50</sup> Zorica Kuzmanović and Vladimir Mihajlović, “Rimski carevi i konstrukcija identiteta u savremenoj Srbiji,” in *Bolja prošlost: izmišljanje tradicije i novi identiteti* (Beograd: Evoluta, 2018), 136–139.

<sup>51</sup> The term “dissonant heritage” was introduced by John Tunbridge and Gregory Ashworth in order to emphasize that different groups interpret heritage differently and so they borrowed the term “dissonant” from music where it is used to describe two tones which cause tension instead of harmonizing (John Tunbridge and Gregory Ashworth, *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict* (Chichester: John Wiley, 1996), 20–33).

<sup>52</sup> Derek Bryce and Senija Čaušević, “Orientalism, Balkanism and Europe’s Ottoman Heritage,” *Annals of Tourism Research* 77 (2019): 97.

period of “Turkish yoke”, but they found a purpose for Ottoman heritage unlike Serbia where it is simply being pushed out of the public discourse.

### Research of Ottoman Heritage

To summarize, since Ottoman heritage is unwanted, it is obvious that archaeologists, art historians, historians and ethnologists will not pay much attention to researching it. As we have stated, there is not even any training being offered at Serbian universities for those who want to specialize in Ottoman heritage. There are no research projects, excavations and, aside from Vesna Bikić and to some extent Olga Zirojević whom we have mentioned, no one studies this heritage today. The only recent project, which could be mentioned, was the *Week of Ottoman Heritage*, which was held at the University of Belgrade’s Faculty of Philosophy in 2011. The goals of this conference were:

- “To raise awareness of the most recent theoretical and methodological frameworks for the research of Ottoman heritage. It is necessary to empower the scientific community in Serbia in this way in order to leave mythical and scientifically unfounded ideas about this segment of the past.
- Showing the complexity of the problem through diverse research approaches to Ottoman heritage. Studying the Ottoman past also opens a wide research area -from the role of the Ottoman Empire in global economic relations in the post-Columbus era, to the reconstruction of the everyday life in Balkan towns (for instance, coffee drinking, enjoying tobacco or going to the *hammam*).
- Developing awareness about the importance of protecting and possible uses of material and immaterial remains of the Ottoman past. By showing them it is possible to pave the way for their use within monuments from the Ottoman period in educational and touristic proposes, and more broadly for the development of new cultural checkpoints of diverse popular science content.
- Increasing the sensitivity of the scientific community in Serbia to the question of Ottoman heritage, but also pointing out the important role of individuals in making new and relevant interpretations of Ottoman heritage in everyday life more significant”.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Monika Milosavljević and Marko Janković, “Uvodna reč,” in *Nedelja osmanskog nasleđa*, ed. Staša Babić, Monika Milosavljević and Marko Janković (Beograd: Filozofski fakultet u Beogradu, 2011), 6.

The conference was a step in the right direction. But while researchers spoke about a number of topics during it, since then there has not been any work on developing Ottoman archaeology and art history as disciplines. Even though a whole decade passed, so far no one chose to specialize in this period, which means that even if the Ottoman material from archaeological excavations is collected, which is not always the case; there is no one to analyse and interpret it. Yet, aside from it not being collected and preserved, what makes it even more difficult to study the Ottoman heritage of Serbia is the fact that it was systematically destroyed over the years. From the First Serbian Uprising onward, mosques and other buildings associated with Ottomans were demolished during conflicts and peaceful times. This destruction of different buildings that would have become monuments if they had survived to the present is especially noticeable in the capital, Belgrade.

Belgrade was a prominent cultural center during the Ottoman period, a city where tens of thousands of people lived in the later periods; it is estimated that it had up to 98,000 inhabitants in the 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>54</sup> As Muslims made up a significant portion of this population, there were dozens of mosques in the city. However, all of them except two (the Bajrakli and the Batal Mosque) were destroyed along with Ottoman cemeteries after the Ottomans were forced to leave the city in 1862; in the years that followed, the Batal Mosque was also demolished and so the Bajrakli Mosque is the only one which still stands in Belgrade.<sup>55</sup> The same process of wiping the Ottoman period from memory by demolishing Ottoman monuments was carried out in all Serbian towns after the country gained independence.

It occurred even in the parts of the country that are predominantly Muslim today and so are far closer to Ottoman heritage due to its tie to their religion, such as parts of Southern Serbia. As this territory did not become a part of Serbia until the end of the First Balkan War in 1913, naturally the Ottomans had an even greater influence here. However, after the liberation, Serbian authorities tried to de-Islamize the region, which is evident by the fact that hundreds of thousands of Muslims were expelled.<sup>56</sup> And while such attempts were successful in the sense that they

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<sup>54</sup> Aleksandar Fotić, "Belgrade: a Muslim and Non-Muslim Cultural Centre (Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries)," in *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Antonis Anastasopoulos (Rethymno: Foundation for Research & Technology – Hellas Institute for Mediterranean Studies, 2005), 52.

<sup>55</sup> Jovan Šaljić, "Kako je oživela Bajrakli džamija," *Antropologija* 19 (2019): 76–77.

<sup>56</sup> Paweł Michelak, "The Image of Turkey in the Public Discourse of Interwar Yugoslavia During the Reign of King Aleksandar Karadžević (1921–1934) According to the

reduced the Muslim population, the far greater influence of Ottomans in this region is evident even today.

For instance, Novi Pazar was one of the most prominent Ottoman towns which is why it does not come as a surprise that there are numerous Ottoman monuments in its vicinity -the Novi Pazar Fortress from the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Gazi Isa Bey's *hammam* from the 15<sup>th</sup> century and Amir Aga's *han* from the 17<sup>th</sup> century, as well as sacred ones like the Lejlek Mosque from the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Tabak Ishak Mosque built in 1468, Altun-Alem Mosque built in 1516, Gazi Sinan Bey's Mosque built in 1528, Hayrudin Mosque built in 1528 and many others; today there are 52 mosques in the territory of Novi Pazar.<sup>57</sup> Other parts of the region also have a significant number of mosques, such as Prijepolje which has Ibrahim Pasha's Mosque and Sinan Bey's Mosque from the 16<sup>th</sup> century, as well as more recent one's such as the Mahmud Bey's mosque from the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>58</sup> And while such places offer us an insight into the possible extent of Ottoman heritage in other areas, we have to bear in mind that even such a "significant number" of mosques and Ottoman monuments is but a part of what was once everyday life in this region and in Serbia as well; the true extent of which is lost forever and therefore cannot be determined.

### Concluding Remarks

As is evident, the development of Ottoman archaeology and art history in Serbia faces serious problems. In order for them to become disciplines in their own right, researchers interested in this period need to overcome their own prejudices and help the public to overcome them as well. In addition, both the public and academics also need to find a purpose for Ottoman heritage. While hard, this is not an impossible task. Neighbouring countries have found a purpose for their heritage despite the fact that they share the "Turkish yoke" view of this period. Overcoming such prejudices about the Ottoman Empire is not even that new. Initially, the development of Oriental Studies in Serbia faced serious problems when the field was being established in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but it overcame them and now exists as a field of study with

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Newspaper 'Politika', in *Turkish Yoke or Pax Ottomana: The Reception of Ottoman Heritage in the Balkan History and Culture*, ed. Krzysztof Popek and Monika Skrzyszewska (Kraków: Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2019), 151.

<sup>57</sup> Mensur Zukorlić, "Oblici orijentalne kulture na prostoru jugozapadne Srbije" (PhD diss., University of Belgrade, 2016), 152.

<sup>58</sup> Zukorlić, "Oblici orijentalne culture," 167.

many notable scholars.<sup>59</sup> Admittedly, overcoming these challenges and developing Ottoman archaeology and art history, as disciplines will face even more problems as heritage speaks to people on a personal and emotional level because of its close ties with identity and culture. Nevertheless, it is possible to do so, but it remains to be seen whether Ottoman archaeology and art history will develop as fields of study in Serbia or whether researchers and the public will continue ignoring this period of Serbian history and its rich heritage.

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<sup>59</sup> Irena Ristanović-Kolaj, "Pregled razvoja orijentalnih studija na tlu bivše Jugoslavije 1857–1950," *Arhiv: Časopis Arhiva Jugoslavije* 15 (2014): 158–160.

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