IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU'S NORMATIVE POWER IN ARMENIA: TRANSFORMATION OR TOLERATION?*

(AB'NİN ERMENİSTAN'DAKİ NORMATİF GÜÇ UYGULAMALARI: DÖNÜŞÜM MÜ, MÜSAMAHA MI?)

Tutku DİLAVER**

Abstract: *The European Union, with the need of ensuring its security, established relations with the newly independent countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The method for providing the EU's security was determined in the Common Foreign and Security Policy section in the Maastricht Treaty and extended with the European Neighborhood Policy. The imposition of EU values on EU's neighbors forms the basis of these policies. By this way, it is thought that an environment of the lasting peace will be established. Ian Manners, who examined these policies, describes the EU as a normative power. According to him, the EU has the ability to change, transform, and Europeanize other countries.*

Bilateral relations with Armenia started in 1991 and gained an institutional frame with the Partnership Agreement in 1999. However, neither PCA nor the Action Plan that was prepared for the implementation of PCA had the expected effect. Following the revising of the EU's own foreign policy, the Eastern Partnership program was initiated, and Armenia was included this

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program. In 2017, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement was signed. With this Agreement, the EU got a chance to act as a normative power in Armenia. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU as a normative power in Armenia. For this purpose, the 1999 Association Agreement, the Action Plan, the Country Progress Reports, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement and finally the implementation reports of this agreement will be examined.

Keywords: *European Union, Armenia, Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, Normative Power Approach*

Öz: *Avrupa Birliği 1991 yılında dağılan Sovyetler Birliği'nin ardından bağımsızlığını ilan eden ülkelerle kendi güvenliğini sağlama ihtiyacına bağlı olarak ilişki kurmaya başlamıştır. AB'nin bu güvenlik ihtiyacını sağlamak için kullanılacak yöntem Maastricht Antlaşmasının Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasında bölümünde benimsenmiş; Komşuluk Politikasıyla genişletilmiştir. Bu politikaların temelinde AB değerlerinin komşu ülkelere benimsetilmesi yatmaktadır. Bu şekilde kalıcı barış ortamının tesis edileceği düşünülmektedir. AB'nin bu politikalarından yola çıkan Ian Manners, AB'yi bir normatif güç olarak tanımlamıştır. Ona göre AB, diğer ülkeleri bu şekilde Avrupalılaştırmakta, değiştirmekte ve dönüştürmektedir.*

Ermenistan ile 1991 yılında başlayan ikili ilişkiler 1999 yılında Ortaklık ve İşbiliği Anlaşmasının imzalanmasıyla kurumsal bir çerçeve kazanmıştır. Ancak ne Ortaklık anlaşması ne de Anlaşmanın uygulanabilmesi adına hazırlanan Eylem Planı, Ermenistan'ın AB'nin beklediği ilerlemeyi sağlamasına yaramamıştır. AB'nin kendi dış politikasını gözden geçirmesini takiben Doğu Ortaklığı programı başlatılmış ve Ermenistan'da bu programın içine alınmıştır. 2017 yılında Kapsamlı ve Genişletilmiş Ortaklık Anlaşması imzalanmıştır. Bu anlaşmayla AB Ermenistan'da normatif güç olarak varlığını sürdürebilecek bir ortam elde etmiştir. Makalenin amacı AB'nin Ermenistan'da uyguladığı politikalar üzerinden normatif bir güç olarak etkinliğinin ne olduğunu değerlendirmektir. Bu amaçla 1999 Ortaklık Anlaşması, Eylem Planı, Ülke İlerleme Raporu, Genişletilmiş ve Kapsamlı Ortaklık Anlaşması ve son olarak bu anlaşmanın uygulama raporları incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Avrupa Birliği, Ermenistan, Kapsamlı ve Genişletilmiş Ortaklık Anlaşması, Normatif Güç Yaklaşımı*

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, former Soviet republics began to declare their independence one by one. These newly independent states that were economically and politically in an unstable position became a new focusing point for European countries. European countries, which had recovered from recessions in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars, ensured their need for a secure and peaceful environment by establishing the European Union (EU) during the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused the EU to confront a new challenge against the environment created over the years. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) determined in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty was an outcome of this need.[1] Shortly after, the Union created the accession criteria, commonly known as Copenhagen Criteria, which are the rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the EU[2]. Through this, a part of the newly independent states, especially eastern European ones, became the new members of the EU.

The fifth enlargement that started in 2004 has made the EU a neighbor of more complicated regions such as the Middle East, South Caucasus, and the Mediterranean[3]. These regions contain some conflicts that can be seen as a threat to the security perception of the EU. Especially after the Ukraine Crisis in 2013 and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the threat perception of the EU has strengthened[4]. Therefore, the importance given by the EU to its eastern neighbors has increased. The CFSP remained insufficient to meet the EU's need in this new situation. For this reason, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was developed to promote prosperity, stability, and security within the EU's neighbors[5].

In this context, Armenia became a subject to the EU's foreign policy just as other South Caucasus countries. Bilateral relations between Armenia and the EU were established in 1991, and Armenia was included in the scope of the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). Also, a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed between the two sides in 1999. In 2003 with the "Wider Europe" policy, the EU started considering Armenia as a neighbor and, since 2016, Armenia has been taking

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1   Haluk Özdemir, *Avrupa Mantığı* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınevi, 2015.): 278.

2   Özdemir, *Avrupa Mantığı*, 278.

3   Hakan Samur, "Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası ve Amaçları", *Dicle Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 10-11, no. 12-13-14-15 (2006), 163-196.

4   Erdi Kutlu ve Siret Hürsoy, "Yenilenen Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası Perspektifinden Avrupa Birliği'nin Doğu Komşularına Bakışı", *Ege Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi 9,* no. 2 (2018): 177.

5   "New European Neighbourhood Policy", *European Commission*, accessed November 9, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/european-neighbourhood-policy_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Neighbourhood%20Policy%20(ENP,Affairs%20issues%20remain%20a%20priority

part in the Eastern Partnership program as well. Moreover, Armenia and the EU signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2018, which is offering a new platform for their bilateral relations for the future.

This study aims to evaluate the policies implemented by the EU on Armenia within the theoretical framework of normative power approach, and to estimate the impacts of the normative practices. Therefore, it is necessary to define the normative power approach in the first part of the article. Afterwards, the policies implemented by the EU in Armenia will be examined within this theoretical framework.

Due the sheer number confusing technical terms and acronyms that the EU is known for using, a list of relevant terms and acronyms is provided below for ease of reading:

- Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

- European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)

- Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)

- Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

- Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA)

- European Currency Unit (ECU)

1. Normative Power Approach and the EU

In 2002, Ian Manners defined the notion of "normative power" as the ability to shape or change what is "normal".[6] Universal principles such as peace, freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental rights are the core elements of the European Union's presence which are granted in the founding treaties of the EU, and these principles are the basis of the EU's normative claim according to Manners[7]. Alongside with these fundamental norms, the EU has subsidiary norms such as social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance[8].

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6   Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (June 2002): 243-248.

7   Manners, "Normative Power Europe", 238.

8   Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 242-243.

In 2013, Manners suggested that the EU can demonstrate its normative power via several tools: "contagion", "informational diffusion", "procedural diffusion", "transference", "overt diffusion", and "cultural filter"[9]. It can be useful to explain these tools to understand EU's normative power on target countries. The first one, "contagion", has a close attachment to the EU's colonial history. It means that the EU might involuntarily transfer some of its values to other parties due to historical relationships between them. The second one, "informational diffusion", is the capability to understand the EU based on international principles during the accession process or partnership negotiations. According to Manners, the legitimacy of normative power derives from the acceptance of the relevant norms by the other parties. The third tool, "procedural diffusion", refers to "value translation", which is used to define bringing institutions close to the standards of the EU. The fourth one is called "transference"; which aims for the convergence between the EU institutions and the people. The "Erasmus Plus" program can be a good example of transference. "Overt diffusion" is the fifth tool, which is related to the physical presence of the EU in other countries. An example of this is delegations in other countries. Finally, "cultural filter" is the compliance with the values of the EU, with the Copenhagen Criteria for the candidate countries and fundamental and secondary norms for the partner countries.[10]

The Normative Power approach has developed with the contributions of other scholars. Natalie Tocci argued that a real normative power must have an agenda which has determined goals and affects[11]. Manners agreed with Tocci and said that a normative practice can be evaluated according to the level of success of its results[12].

The Normative Power approach is still an evolving approach, based on the criticisms it has so far received. Nevertheless, one aim of this article is to contribute to this approach by examining the EU's practices in Armenia.

Manners defined the concept of Normative Power in two ways as a result of the criticisms he received. One of this is a "normative pouvoir" and another is "normative puissance". "Normative pouvoir" is the ability to determine what is normal by using soft power or "idea force". On the other hand, "normative puissance" is the actor that has the ability to decide what is normal[13]. However,

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9   Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, "Normative Power and the Future of the European Union Public," in *European Public Diplomacy - Soft Power at* Work, eds. Maia Cross and Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 191-195.

10 Manners and Whitman, "Normative Power and the Future of the European Union Public", 194.

11 Natalia Tocci, "Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and Its Global Partners," *CEPS Working Documents* No.279, December 2007: 11-15.

12 Manners and Whitman, "Normative Power and the Future of the European Union Public", 193.

13 Ian Manners, "Assessing the Decennial, Reassessing the Global: Understanding European Union Normative Power in Global Politics", *Cooperation and Conflict* 48, no. 2 (2013).

it is not always possible to understand the difference when the EU acts as a *puissance* or a *pouvoir*.

The normative power approach has also been criticized extensively for the real purpose behind the EU's policies. Some scholars have stated that the understanding of the EU as "force for good" is problematic because of its contradictions. As it can be seen in the "Arab Spring", despite the fact that EU supported the principles of democracy and human rights, it can also promote the authoritarian regimes to protect its own interests[14]. In accordance, the "principled pragmatism" approach in the EU's foreign policy adopted with the Global Strategy in 2016 seems to support this criticism as well[15].

Despite the criticisms on the real purpose behind the EU's foreign policy, some scholars review the outputs of EU's practices which can be defined as normative. It is seen that the outputs of the EU's foreign policies can sometimes remain weak, in contrast to the EU's normative power claims[16].

In the next part of the study, the EU's relations with Armenia will be evaluated within the scope of this theoretical framework. The transformative effect of the normative policies implemented by the EU on Armenia will be discussed.

2. EU's Policies in Armenia and the Effects of Its Normative Power

In the European Security Strategy of 2003, the importance of providing a peaceful and secure environment around Europe was highlighted. It is mentioned that Europe would become a neighbor to conflict-prone regions, and the EU should establish good and close relations with these new neighbors in order to manage the conflicts in these regions. The practices of neighbors would be harmonized with the EU, in return, easy access of these countries to the EU internal market would be provided[17].

The mention of the process of harmonization with the EU norms as a prerequisite is an indication that the EU has normative claims on these countries through its policies within the framework of CFSP and neighborhood policies. The EU primarily wants to be in contact with countries that are compatible with its values or have a common value base. With this

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14 Anna Skolimowska, "The European Union as a 'Normative Power' in International Relations. Theoretical and Empirical Challenges", *The Yearbook of the Polish European Studies* 18, 2015.

15 Münevver Cebeci, "AB'nin 'Arap Baharı'na Tepkisi ve AB-Ortadoğu İlişkilerindeki Bazı Anahtar Konular", in *Avrupa Birliği Komşuluk Politikası ve Ortadoğu* (Ankara: ATAUM, 2016): 41-45.

16 Patricia Bauer, "The European Mediterranean Policy after the Arab Spring: Beyond Value and Interests", *Middle East Critique* 24, no. 1 (2015).

17 "European Security Strategy: Secure Europe in a Better World", *European Council - Council of the European Union*, 2009: 7, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf

understanding, they started the TACIS program in 1991 and Armenia, among other CIS countries, was included in this program.

Unfruitful period under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

TACIS, which run under the European Commission had a different agenda for each country. TACIS program aimed to synchronize the Western administration model with the post-Soviet countries. However, the Russian influence in the region kept the EU away from the region and the EU did not achieve its goals through TACIS.

In Armenia, education and nuclear safety were determined as priorities in the TACIS. On the other hand, strengthening the economic profile of the country required improvement the political situation according to the TACIS program report. To achieve these goals, Armenia had to become closer to the EU institutions and standards. In the period between 1992 and 1995, the EU spent approximately 7 million ECU/MECU (European Currency Unit, the predecessor to the euro currency) in the public administration reforms, educations, and policy advice areas[18]. However, the influence of the TACIS program was limited due to it being a technical support program. This meant that the EU did not get a chance to use informational diffusion and value translation as much as had initially aimed.

With the signing of the PCA in 1999, TACIS became a supportive tool of the implementation of PCA. The PCA different from TACIS in that it had a mission to promote democracy in the partner countries. To achieve this goal, the EU could make legal, economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological contributions[19]. The effectiveness of the agreements in force in 2001 began to be discussed within the EU. Armenia was unwilling to implement the PCA, as was the case in the other South Caucasus countries due to the regional effects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The failure to open the trade routes as expected caused the EU member countries to question their regional policies. This period also coincided with the questioning of the EU's understanding of foreign policy in general[20].

In 2003, the EU brought a new perspective to its foreign and security policies. The policies implemented by the EU in the region were included in the ENP

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18 "EU-Armenia Relations", *European Commission*, Memo, July 10, 1996,
    https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_96_69

19 Haydar Efe, "Foreign Policy of the European Union Towards the South Caucasus", *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 3, no. 17 (September 2012): 190.

20 Dov Lynch, "The EU towards a Strategy", in *The South Caucasus: A Challenge for EU*, ed. Dov Lynch (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, December 2003), 171-196.

framework. In this context, the EU prepared an action plans to observe the developments in the region. In parallel with this goal, the EU prepared an action plan for the implementation of PCA. In this plan, rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and strengthening of pluralization has determined as priority areas in Armenia.[21] A high-level mechanism consisting of EU representatives and officials from partner countries was envisaged in order to make progress on the targets set and to implement the agreement regime.[22] As Manners claimed, all these principles were the source of legitimacy of normative power of the EU.

When the action plan of Armenia is examined, it is seen that the emphasis on the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as determined in the country reports is repeated. Making constitutional reforms, strengthening the human rights and democratic structure, and fighting corruption was determined as top priorities[23]. It was highlighted that an ombudsman institution was needed within the framework of the Paris Principles[24]. Renewing the electoral code according to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) standards was mentioned. Following these, the rule of law and human rights issues were determined as the second priority areas. Close cooperation with the EU, OSCE, and the Council of Europe in these areas was noted as being needed[25].

ACTION PLAN FOR ARMENIA
• Strengthening the rule of law, democracy, and plurality
• Making constitutional reforms
• Making reforms on local administrations
• Improving human rights and fundamental freedoms
• Modernizing the business and government sectors
• Combatting corruption
• Making reforms on tax and custom system accordance with the EU standards
• Protecting sustainable development and environment
• Safely decommissioning the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant
• Making progress in resolving conflicts and improving regional cooperation

Table 1: Priority Areas of Armenian PCA, 1999[26]

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21   "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part", *EU External Service*, 1999, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-armenia_partnership_and_cooperation_agreement_en.pdf

22   Emma J. Stewart, "Mind The Normative Gap? The EU in the South Caucasus", in *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Richard Whitman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 65-82.

23   "Action Plan of Armenia", *European Commission*, 2006.

24   "Action Plan of Armenia", 2006.

25   "Action Plan of Armenia", 2006.

26   "Action Plan of Armenia", 2006.

As can be seen from these priority areas, the EU had a ground to use its normative tools such as process diffusion, transmission, overt dissemination, and cultural dissemination. The aim of the EU was to transform the legal and cultural structures of Armenia in accordance with the EU norms. Accepting these norms can be interpreted as a precondition for maintaining relations with the EU, and this provided the EU an opportunity to act as a normative *puissance*. However, no serious progress was achieved by Action Plan since no time frames were specified for the implementation of the contents of the Plan. When the Armenia Action Plan is examined, it is seen that only a few articles were given the year 2006 as the deadline for implementation. However, considering that the articles to be implemented were going to expire with action plans coming into force at the end of 2006, these arrangements became meaningless[27]. Consequently, no significant progress was made in any of these priority areas excluding some changes such as revoking the death penalty from the constitution. Manners suggested that the success of normative power depends also on the actions of the other parties to which normative power is applied.[28]

The fact that the EU's policies in Armenia and even in the region were not on a consistent and stable basis undermined EU's credibility in the region, especially in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Action Plans and PCAs prepared in all three Caucasian countries were interpreted by politicians and academics as a kind of wish list.[29] In almost all of the reports prepared to evaluate the effectiveness of the Action Plan in the following years, it was stated that Armenia was not making notable progress on human rights and fundamental freedoms. The necessary changes were not made in strengthening democracy and the expectation of fighting against corruption fell short. It was also noted that the relevant practices were weak and there was no improvement in issues such as discrimination[30].

The war that broke out between Russia and Georgia showed the importance of the South Caucasus for Europe. In such conjuncture, the EU changed its perspective to its eastern neighbors and decided to start the Eastern Partnership program in 2009. The aim of this program was similar to the PCA and Action Plan, that is to promote democracy, rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. However, the problem of achieving this goal in concrete terms had

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27 Narine Gazaryan, *The European Neighbourhood Policy and The Democratic Values of the EU: A legal Analysis* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014).

28 Manners, "Normative Power Europe".

29 Gazaryan, *European Neighbourhood Policy...*

30 See; "Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007", *European Commission*, 2008; "Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008"*, European Commission*, 2009 ; "Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2009", *European Commission*, 2010 ; "Implementation of the European Neigbourhood Policy in 2010 - Country Report: Armenia", *European Commission*, 2011.

to be overcome. According to the dominant perspective in the literature, the EU can be seen as successful in imposing its core values to another party only during the accession process[31]. Nevertheless, neither PCA nor Eastern Partnership has offered membership to the eastern neighbors. Therefore, as Manners stated, accepting these principles depends on the wishes of the countries. However, there are encouragers such as visa liberalization under the Eastern Partnership program[32].

In 2009, the need of the renewal of the PCA signed in 1999 came into the agenda with the Eastern Partnership. Negotiations between the two parties were concluded in 2013 and the agreement became ready for signature. It was planned to be signed at the 2013 Vilnius Summit of the European (Union) Council. However, Armenia gave up on signing the agreement and instead became a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which was established under the leadership of Russia[33]. In this case, it is thought that the fact that Russia was providing the border security of Armenia and that the oligarchs who held the government at that time had close commercial relations with Russia compelled Armenia to sign the EEU agreement.[34] On the other hand, it is possible to say that some of the moves made by Russia on Nagorno-Karabakh during this period prevented Armenia from establishing close relations with the EU. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Azerbaijan with a large delegation in August 2013 and signed several agreements during this visit[35]. Upon these developments, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan gave up on signing the Eastern Partnership Agreement planned to be signed at the Vilnius Summit. However, it is known that Armenia considers itself a European state and many people of Armenian origin live in Europe. Therefore, Armenia must maintain European relations without confronting Russia. Therefore, negotiations were initiated again to prepare a new agreement and the agreement was signed in 2017 under the name of "Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA)"[36]. The EU and Armenia prepared CEPA with less conditionality and prospects by considering its membership of the Eurasian Economic Union and its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

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31   Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering `Normative Power Europe'", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 3 (June 2005).

32   "Eastern Partnership", *Polish Aid*, 2019, https://polskapomoc.gov.pl/Eastern,Partnership,1943.html

33   "Ermenistan'ın Avrasya seçiminin arkasında ne var?", *Sputnik Turkey*, 24 Şubat 2015, https://tr.sputniknews.com/analiz/201502241014148608/

34   Tigran Yepremyan and Narek Mkrtchyan, "On Reasons Behind Armenia's Integration Choice: EU vis-a-vis Russia-Led EEU," in *EU Relations with Eastern Partnership: Strategy, Opportunities and Challenges* (Chisinau: Print Caro, 2016): 193-194.

35   Esma Özdaşlı, "Avrupa Komşuluk politikası Çerçevesinde Avrupa Birliği Ermenistan İlişkileri", *Aksaray Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi* 8, no. 1 (2016).

36   Armen Grigorian, "Armenia and EU Sign New Partnership Agreement," *Jamestown*, December 4, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-eu-sign-new-partnership-agreement/

The EU's as a normative pouvoir in the CEPA

Despite this situation, CEPA creates a useful environment for the EU to implement normative power on Armenia, thus allowing the EU to exhibit either the *pouvoir* or *puissance* aspects of normative power. It is constituted by 8 parts and a preamble. The most important parts of the Agreement are mentioned under the Preamble, Political Dialog and Reform, and Justice, Freedom and Security titles.

In the Preamble section, the parties present their common goals in this agreement and future prospects due to its implementation. When it is examined closely, it can be seen that the parties will cooperate under the principle of universal norms, and Armenia declares its commitment to carry out reforms in the human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law, democracy, minority rights, and good governance areas[37]. This can be interpreted as the legitimate base for the EU's normative implementations even though the Agreement mostly arranges the commercial and economic issues.

After the Preamble, it is seen that Article 1 and Article 2 supports the objectives of the Agreement and the idea of embracing universal norms. In the Article 1, it is stated that cooperation between the parties will be developed based on common values and close ties; political dialogue will be established in all fields based on mutual interests will be strengthened; and tensions will be resolved to ensure international peace and regional security. There are priorities such as bringing Armenia closer to the EU *acquis* in order to increase its economic potential. In this section, the emphasis on freedom, justice, rule of law, and respect for human rights can be interpreted as these articles being essential for the Agreement. As a matter of fact, the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights are listed in the general principles section in Article 2, which are indispensable for this agreement.

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37 "Joint Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part", *EUR-Lex*, JOIN/2017/037 final - 2017/0238 (NLE), September 25, 2017, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017JC0037

Article 3

- to develop and strengthen political dialog on all areas of mutual interests
- to enhance the political partnership and increase the effectiveness of cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy
- to promote international peace, stability and security based on effective multilateralism
- to strengthen cooperation and dialogue between the Parties on international security and crisis management, in particular in order to address global and regional challenges and related threats;
- to strengthen cooperation in the fight against the proliferation of WMDs and their delivery systems
- to foster result-oriented and practical cooperation between the Parties for achieving peace, security and stability on the European continent
- to strengthen respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, good governance, and human rights and fundamental freedoms, including media freedom and the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and to contribute to consolidating domestic political reforms;
- to develop dialogue and to deepen cooperation between the Parties in the field of security and defence;
- to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts
- to promote the purposes and principles of the UN as enshrined in its Charter and the principles guiding relations between participating states as set out in the OSCE Helsinki Final Act
- to promote regional cooperation, develop good neighbourly relations and enhance regional security, including by taking steps towards opening borders to promote regional trade and cross-border movement

Table 2: The purpose of the political dialog in the CEPA[38]

When Article 3 and the Preamble part considered together, it is seen that the EU will cooperate closely with Armenia on issues such as developing a dialogue in the field of security and defense, supporting the resolution of conflicts, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Article 4, titled Internal Reforms, mentions issues such as the rule of law, democratic institutions, human rights and freedoms, increasing the independence, quality and effectiveness of the judiciary, increasing the administrative capacities and impartiality of law enforcement, and combating corruption. The parties have stated that they will cooperate on these issues[39].

Under the title of Justice, Freedom and Security, issues such as visa liberalization, mobility and readmission, border security, migration, fight against corruption and organized crime (within the framework of this agreement and in accordance with the aforementioned principles) were decided to be carried out in cooperation with the EU[40].

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38 JOIN/2017/037 final - 2017/0238 (NLE).

39 JOIN/2017/037 final - 2017/0238 (NLE).

40 JOIN/2017/037 final - 2017/0238 (NLE).

When the Armenian CEPA is examined, it is seen that to respecting and embracing the principles on which the normative power approach is based on is essential. These principles form the basis of agreements and in case of their violations, agreement may be suspended or terminated[41].

The agreement has not yet fully entered into force, as it has not yet been ratified. However, the temporary enforcement process is carried out within the framework of the provisions of the Agreement. In this context, implementation reports have been prepared since 2018 to monitor the progress of EU Armenia[42].

Shortly after signing the CEPA, the government changed in Armenia due to mass demonstrations. Armenian people took the streets due to the discontent with the corrupt economic and political environment in the country. After mass demonstrations that lasted for about a month led by Nikol Pashinyan, Serzh Sargsyan resigned and Nikol Pashinyan became the Prime Minister. This period became known as the "Velvet Revolution".[43] These developments were also included in the 2018 progress report on Armenia, which shows that the EU closely monitors the events in Armenia. However, there has been no active EU intervention in this process.

In fact, the EU was pleased with the Pashinyan government that came to power due to it being consisted of pro-EU politicians. It was said that the newly appointed government believes in the building of open democracy and intends to carry out a series of reforms for the modernization of the country. It was mentioned that the road map of the CEPA plays a decisive role in terms of these reforms.[44]

Important issues such as the rule of law, combating corruption, guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms became part of the agenda of the new government. In this context, it was stated that the EU would be Armenia's biggest partner. As a matter of fact, the first Partnership Council convened in June 2018 consulted with the government on reforms regarding justice policies. For example, it was emphasized that reforms in the field of public administration had key importance.

New reforms to develop the democratic system were planned to be made according to the 1-year plan prepared by the government. It was stated that

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41 JOIN/2017/037 final - 2017/0238 (NLE).

42 JOIN/2017/037 final - 2017/0238 (NLE).

43 Rayhan Demytrie, "Why Armenia 'Velvet Revolution' won without a bullet fired", *BBC*, May 1, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43948181

44 "Partnership Implementation Report on Armenia", *European Union*, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/partnership_implementation_report_armenia.pdf

there are issues such as fighting corruption and strengthening the economy in the government's 5-year program. Based on the success of the Velvet Revolution, the importance of media and digital activism was highlighted. In this context, the importance of the decision to broadcast the parliamentary debates live, closely related to the government's own transparency, was emphasized.

The report suggested that Armenia's borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey remain closed due to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and this has an effect on the landlocked position of Armenia. It was also stated that the support given to the OSCE Minsk Group for the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continued. However, the EU did not show a solid attitude against the Armenian occupation in the Nagorno-Karabakh. It only made do with supporting OSCE process. This situation shows that the EU is unable to demonstrate its normative power on this issue.

It is seen that the EU has a positive approach towards Armenia because of the Velvet Revolution. This situation can be compared to the Georgian case of the 2003 Rose Revolution. Therefore, based on the example of Georgia, it can be assumed that the new government expects to adopt an attitude close to EU values regarding the rule of law, justice, judicial reforms, and combating corruption. However, despite the corruption investigation that began in Armenia, there are evidences that the new government has engaged in corruption as well.

At this point, it can be useful to mention the talks leaked to the internet between Prime Minister Pashinyan and Intelligence Chief Arthur Vanetsyan in September 2018. In this conversation, an intervention in the judicial process was being discussed to prevent the release of former President Robert Kocharyan, who was detained within the framework of the corruption investigations[45]. Contrary to what the EU expects from the Pashinyan government, the attempt to intervene in the judiciary shows that the principles of the rule of law and judicial independence are not being adhered to. This situation creates a parallel situation with Bauer's comment on normative power. Bauer argues that the EU's normative power remains weak in practice[46]. Therefore, it can be considered that the reforms made in Armenian domestic law have not been met in practice. On the other hand, the fact that the EU did not include these talks in the report causes doubts on whether the EU is conducting an objective monitoring in Armenia. This situation may confirm the views of Skolimowska and Cebeci that the EU's normative power understanding is problematic and that it can ignore some situations if it is

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45 "How Armenian Justice Really Works", *YouTube*, September 5, 2018,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZOc3HxZLLA

46 Bauer, "The European Mediterranean Policy..."

against its own interests and that it can even support authoritarian regimes for the sake of its interests[47].

On the other hand, despite the EU having a suitable platform to implement its normative power in Armenia, it hesitated to use it on issues such as the conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. In 2020, Armenia attacked Azerbaijan twice , one of these was in Tovuz province which is a far from the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, and the other was in Nagorno-Karabakh[48] (which spiraled into an outright war between Azerbaijan and Armenia). These clashes showed that Armenia is far from to achieve the goals such as promoting international peace, stability, and security based on effective multilateralism, and to strengthen cooperation in the fight against the proliferation of WMDs and their delivery systems, and to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The EU remained silent during the clashes and has ignored the aggressive attitude of Armenia. Armenia fell into political turmoil in the aftermath of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. It remains to be seen what affect this will have on Armenia's stance on CEPA and EU's normative power in this country.

Conclusion

When the PCA, Action Plan, and progress reports concerning Armenia are examined, it is seen that the EU tried to implement universal norms such as democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and the adoption of the concepts of peace as Manners claims. The information dissemination tool, which Manners named as one of the normative tools, was attempted to be used in Armenia. Reforms in domestic law of Armenian were expected in parallel with EU *acquis*, and international treaties and principles. However, it is observed that the EU does not take into account some of the important claims that have also appeared in the progress reports. Armenia has lagged in terms of EU principles in matters such as democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, judicial independence, electoral security, and discrimination. The corruption rate in Armenia is one of the highest in the region.

In the assessment made through Armenia, it is seen that the EU cannot use its normative power effectively. The main reason for this is thought to be due to the willingness precondition as Manners stated. On the other hand, it is thought that the reason behind the failure of Europeanization of Armenia by using

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47 See; Skolimowska, "The European Union as Normative..." and Cebeci, "AB'nin 'Arap Baharı'na Tepkisi'…"

48 Tutku Dilaver, "The Conflict Between Azerbaijan-Armenia From Tovuz To Nagorno Karabakh," *Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM)*, Commentary No: 2020/32, October 7, 2020, https://avim.org.tr/en/Yorum/THE-CONFLICT-BETWEEN-AZERBAIJAN-ARMENIA-FROM-TOVUZ-TO-NAGORNO-KARABAKH

normative power until 2018 is due to Russia's effect in Armenia. However, the Velvet Revolution caused Armenia to enter a transformation process which makes it more open to EU norms. Yet, the new government has shown that it has failed to make the progress which the EU has desired. In fact, the Tovuz conflict and 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War have once again revealed how dangerous the tolerance shown to Armenia can be.

In the normative power approach, the definition of power includes both meaning as an actor, namely *puissance*, and *pouvoir* a type of power. When the normative power of the EU is examined from this point of view, it is seen that the EU does not appear as normative *puissance* in Armenia. Instead, the EU has a limited power in Armenia in terms of normative *pouvoir*.

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