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ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO RECURRING FOREIGN POLICY CRISES: THE CASE OF TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS*

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Abstract

Building on Graham Allison's conceptual models framework, this paper presents a case in state level foreign policy analysis. To reflect on the role of organizational processes and bureaucratic bargaining in foreign policy decisions, the case of Turkish intervention in Cyprus is analyzed. Turkish parliament authorized military intervention during the Cyprus crises in 1964, 1967, and 1974. However, the respective governments in 1964 and 1967 refrained from military intervention while the 1974 authorization was followed by Turkey's "Cyprus Peace Operation." In order to understand the particularities of these decisions, rational policy, organizational process, and bureaucratic politics models are comparatively applied to Turkish decision-making during the respective crises. The argument is that the intervention decision can best be explained through a combination of rational calculations by consecutive Turkish governments and the gradual change in the standard operating procedures of the Turkish military and foreign policy bureaucracy. The findings have implications on the role of organizational routines in implementing foreign policy decisions as well as the basic assumptions of conceptual models framework and its explanatory power in different contexts.

Keywords: Foreign Policy Analysis, Conceptual Models Framework, Graham Allison, Turkish Foreign Policy, Cyprus

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TEKRAR EDEN DIŐ POLİTİKA KRİZİNE ÖRGÜTSEL KARŐILIK: KIBRİS'A TÜRK ASKERİ MÜDAHALESİ

Öz

Bu makale, Graham Allison tarafından ortaya atılan “Kavramsal Modeller” teorik çerçevesini temel alarak, devlet düzeyinde gerçekleştirilmiş bir dış politika analizi vakası sunmaktadır. Örgütsel süreçlerin ve bürokratik pazarlıkların dış politika üzerindeki etkilerini tartışmak amacıyla, Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'ta gerçekleştirdiđi askerî müdahale incelenmiştir. TBMM, Kıbrıs'ta 1964, 1967 ve 1974 yıllarında gerçekleşen her üç kriz esnasında da askerî müdahaleyi mümkün kılan bir tezkere çıkardı. Ancak 1964 ve 1967 yıllarındaki hükümetler müdahale kararı almazken, 1974 yılındaki tezkere “Kıbrıs Barış Harekati”nın dayanađı oldu. Bu makale, rasyonel politika, örgütsel süreç ve bürokratik politika modellerini her üç kriz esnasındaki karar alma süreçlerinin incelenmesinde kullanarak, alınan bu kararların farklılıklarını ve özelliklerini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Makalenin ana savı, 1974 yılında alınan askerî müdahale kararının ancak birbirini takip eden hükümetlerin rasyonel hesaplamalarının, Türk ordusu ve dış politika bürokrasisinin “standart işlem prosedürlerinin” zaman içinde deđişmesinin ortak etkileri ile açıklanabileceđidir. Bulgular örgütsel rutin ve programların dış politika kararlarının uygulanabilirliđi açısından önemine işaret etmenin yanında, kavramsal modeller çerçevesinin temel varsayımları ve farklı bağlamlardaki açıklayıcılıđı hakkındaki tartışmalara da katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış Politika Analizi, Kavramsal Modeller Teorik Çerçevesi, Graham Allison, Türk Dış Politikası, Kıbrıs

Introduction

1974 Cyprus Intervention is the only instance that Turkey ever sought to unilateral use of force against any other country. Cyprus intervention is a crucial case in making sense of Turkish foreign policy decision-making in the Cold War era and of the later policies since it gives an insight about how Turkish decision-making process unfolds in crisis situations and how it has changed together with Turkey's larger foreign policy stance. There had been serious clashes in the unstable Republic of Cyprus in late 1963 and 1967 as a response to which Turkey considered intervention to Cyprus as an option. However, Turkish commitment to Cyprus cause amounted to a full-scale military intervention only in 1974. What are the particularities of the Turkish decision-making that stopped the intervention in 1964 and 1967 crises but led Turkey to intervene in 1974? This article aims to contribute to the literatures on the role of bureaucracies in foreign policy decision-making in general and Turkish Foreign Policy in particular by analyzing the decision-making processes in previous crises and in 1974 using Graham Allison's conceptual models.¹

The significance of the case derives from its centrality in Turkish foreign policy as an important turning point. The period of 1960-1980 is identified as an era of 'relative autonomy' in Turkish foreign policy. The notorious Johnson letter of 1964 and the disillusionment it caused in Turkey represent the beginning of a less NATO-US oriented Turkish foreign policy.² Indeed, the humiliating letter of 1964 as well as the 1974 embargo has arguably led Turkey to reconsider its policies vis-à-vis the Western Bloc and the Soviet Union. This tendency is visible in reciprocal high-level visits among Turkey and the Soviet Union, increasing economic relations and declarations of cooperation starting right after the 1964 crisis and continuing up until 1980s. Moreover, the reorientation of the Turkish foreign policy was not limited to relaxation of relations with the Soviet Union in the context of détente but represented a change in the mindsets of the decision-makers, the foreign policy bureaucracy, and the public regarding the reliance on the US and NATO in international and security affairs.³ An analysis of Turkish foreign policy during the recurrent crises in Cyprus from 1964 up to the 1974 intervention can illustrate how this reorientation reflected in decision-making structures.

Previous literature notes that the authoritative decision unit in Turkish foreign policy making is usually either a single group or a coalition of several actors.⁴ Graham Allison's conceptual models framework both considers the rationalist explanations of foreign policy decisions and provides a useful tool for developing accounts of the bureaucratic and organizational processes of decision-making. This article examines three sets of variables, national/systemic, organizational, and domestic political, to develop explanations of Turkish

¹ Graham T. Allison. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *The American Political Science Review* 63 (3): 689-718.

² William Hale. 2000. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*. London: Frank Cass, 145-147; Philip Robins. 2003. *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*. London: C. Hurst&Co., 131; Baskın Oran. 2010. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 435-46.

³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 151; Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*,

⁴ Esra Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner. 2004. "Decisionmaking Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases." *Turkish Studies*, 5(2): 43-78.

foreign policy decision-making in Cyprus during the 1964-1974 period based on Allison's conceptual models. The analysis is built on the data from archival sources as well as the memoirs and published interviews of the bureaucrats and decision-makers at the time. The findings suggest that a combination of Rational Actor and Organizational Process models provides the best explanation. While rational policy paradigm describes the systemic and sub-systemic factors, organizational analysis reveals the internal dynamics of intervention decision. The Bureaucratic Politics model, at least with the available data, does not provide a satisfactory account. The findings have implications for extensions and application of Allison's model as well as the analysis of Turkish foreign policy decision-making.

The article proceeds as follows: The first section reviews the histories of the Cyprus crises in 1964, 1967 and 1974. Next, Graham Allison's conceptual models and their application to the case at hand are discussed. Then, the comparative methodology of the article is presented and Turkish foreign policy decision-making in each instance is analyzed. The final section concludes by summarizing the findings and discussing their implications.

Historical Background: Crises in 1963, 1967, and 1974

The intercommunal violence in Cyprus began on 21 December 1963 when Greek policemen killed two Turkish civilians in Nicosia. In the following week, 49 Turkish Cypriots and 20 Greek Cypriots died in the clashes.⁵ As the violence flamed up, Turkey took several assertive military and diplomatic steps. Turkish jets flew at low altitude over Nicosia and the Greek Cypriot officials were warned unless the assaults against Turkish settlements are prevented, the Air Force would conduct targeted strikes. The main battle fleet of Turkish Navy was moved from Istanbul to Mersin on the Mediterranean coast and some land troops stationed in Central Anatolia were redeployed to Greek borders. In addition, Turkey sent notes to Greece, Britain, and NATO stating that Turkey, Greece, and Britain should act in order to stop the violence, otherwise, Turkey would intervene unilaterally.

The public, cabinet, opposition and the military pressured Prime Minister İnönü for a military intervention when the violence against Turkish Cypriot community reached its peak in May 1964. İnönü also seemed pro-intervention and the *National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK)* decided for a military intervention to "establish a political and military beachhead."⁶ Despite the objections by the cabinet –especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs Feridun Cemal Erkin- and the military, İnönü insisted on consulting with the US before the intervention. The United States' response was the harsh Johnson Letter which reminded İnönü that Turkey cannot use NATO weapons in such a military operation and that in case of Soviet involvement; the US might not aid Turkey. İnönü's insistence for consulting the US was either for the reason that he did not really desire an intervention and he was sure the US would oppose military action or because he saw the need to consult with Turkey's ally in the face of open Soviet support to Makarios. In any case, Turkey did not attempt a military intervention and the United States assumed the role of mediation.

⁵ Süha Bölükbaşı. 1988. *Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*. New York: University Press of America, 57.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 75.

Following the call for cessation of the conflict by the UN Security Council, a UN peace-keeping mission had been deployed on the island along what was going to become the famous 'Green line.' The Acheson Plans were drafted as a solution that might provide for both Turkish and Greek demands as well as the US strategic interests. The plan provided for *enosis*, a sovereign base for Turkey in the North and minority rights for Turkish Cypriots that would stay in Greek areas. The Acheson Plans provided for initial Turkish position in London Conference: partition [*Taksim*]. However, neither Athens nor Makarios, who was not represented in the negotiations, were in favor of such a solution. The revised version of the plan, which did not provide for any Turkish sovereignty was outright rejected by Turkey. The negotiations halted when Greek Cypriots initiated a massive attack against Turkish enclaves in Erenköy region to gain control over the northern parts of the island.⁷ Turkish response was limited to an air strike on 8-9 August 1964. Following mediation efforts of the US and Britain and another UN Security Council Resolution calling for stopping hostilities, a ceasefire was reached between local Turkish Cypriot forces and Greek National Guard. Even though the tensions remained still high, the clashes stopped for the time with the arrival of the UN peacekeeping forces.

The crisis flared up again in 1967, when Rauf Denktaş, leader of the Turkish-Cypriots, attempted to enter Cyprus although Makarios administration denied him entrance. Denktaş was apprehended and later deported back to Turkey thanks to diplomatic efforts by Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).⁸ Nonetheless, both Turkish and Greek communities were angered because of this middle-way solution and Greek reaction evolved into aggression under General George Grivas, the founder of EOKA, an organization that inflicted violence on Turkish civilians in pursuit of *enosis*. Greek Cypriot forces attacked two Turkish villages on 15 November 1967. It was a full-scale attack to control the area and break Turkish resistance. UN Secretary General U-Thant referred to this fact by stating, "... National Guard had planned in advance to carry out this operation in the event of any show of opposition by the Turkish Cypriots." Prime Minister Demirel announced that Turkey planned a military intervention to stop the hostilities.

As it will be discussed in the following sections, the resolve and capability of Turkey to carry out with its threat to intervene was doubtful, however, the United States predicted that Turkey would initiate military action and was once more determined to persuade or deter Turkey. Some forces of the American Sixth fleet were also deployed around Cyprus, arguably to deter Turkey from military action.⁹ The crisis was resolved through mediation of American diplomat Cyrus Vance as Greece agreed to terms of Turkey. Makarios stepped in when the negotiations between Greece and Turkey were jammed and agreed to Turkey's terms, though conditionally. He accepted Turkish demands for withdrawal of mainland Greek forces, dismissal of National Guard and return of Colonel Grivas back to Greece provided that Turkish and Greek contingencies established by 1960 treaties also withdraws from Cyprus. However, it is also contemplated that Turkey would risk operation, despite all concerns, if diplomacy had not worked.¹⁰

⁷ Ibid., 82.

⁸ Oran, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 444.

⁹ Nasuh Uslu. 2003. *The Cyprus question as an issue of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-American relations, 1959-2003*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 101.

¹⁰ Ibid., 100.

Inter-communal clashes in Cyprus carried on increasingly until 1974. On 15 July 1974, a pro-Enosis coup took place in the Republic of Cyprus. The very next day, Turkish National Security Council (MGK) convened and passed a resolution to start preparations for a military landing in Cyprus on 20 July. Just as the preparations were going on, the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sent a message to Prime Minister Ecevit urging Turkey to start talks with Greece in order to appease the crisis. Ecevit said that Turkey would only confer with Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee but it would not approach Greece since Greece was behind the coup. Ecevit clearly stated unless any implication of enosis even in the long run is removed, Turkey would immediately intervene militarily because the longer intervention was put off, the bloodier it would be.¹¹ While these talks were going on, Turkey completed its military preparations. On 20 July 1974, Turkish troops landed on Cyprus.

Theoretical Framework

Margaret Hermann conceptualizes a tripartite categorization of decision-making units in foreign policy decision-making: predominant leader, single group, and coalition.¹² Given the occasional coalition governments in Turkey and the role of military in foreign policy decision-making through National Security Council¹³; bureaucratic processes and intra-governmental politics play an important role in foreign policy decision-making in Turkey. In addition, foreign policy bureaucracy has also been crucial in Turkish foreign policy by representing the continuity in foreign policy with its conservative institutional structure.¹⁴ Therefore, the authoritative decision unit in Turkish foreign policy mostly takes form of single group or coalition depending on the nature of the occasion for decision and implicit decision-making rules for that occasion.¹⁵ This suggests that in order to make sense of Turkish foreign policy decision-making, an analysis of coalitional and bureaucratic processes is necessary. Graham Allison's Conceptual Models framework provides a useful tool to investigate the organizational processes and intra-governmental bargaining in foreign policy decision-making.

Rational Policy model is the crudest application of rational choice paradigm to foreign policy analysis. It assumes perfect rationality and complete information for a single, cohesive decision-making unit. The assumption of perfect rationality was later challenged with the concept of bounded rationality,¹⁶ and Allison's models has received much criticism over the years for its simplicity. One of the most comprehensive and constructive critiques come from Bendor and Hammond, who examines decision-theoretic and game-theoretic aspects of Allison's Model I. ¹⁷They specifically note that the model is too simple in terms of its focus

¹¹ Ivar-Andre Slengesol. 2000. "A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 11(2): 96-129, 118.

¹² Margaret Hermann. 2001. "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework." *International Studies Review*, 3(2): 7-81

¹³ See, 1961 and 1982 Constitutions.

¹⁴ See, Malik Mufti. 1998. "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy." *Middle East Journal*, 52(1): 32-50.

¹⁵ Esra Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner. 2004. "Decisionmaking Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases." *Turkish Studies*, 5(2): 43-78.

¹⁶ Robert Jervis. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁷ Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. "Rethinking Allison's Models." *The American Political Science Review*. 86 (2): 301-322.

on defining national objectives, time (one-shot vs. repeated games), and uncertainty. Some of those criticisms such as the assumption of one goal are also mentioned in Allison's later book by stating that "Nations seek security and a range of other objectives."¹⁸ Developing a formal model to explain Turkish decision-making is beyond the space requirements and the scope of this paper, which shares Allison's objective of offering alternative and/or supplementary explanations to widely used rational choice models. However, I formulate an informal rational choice proposition that takes those criticisms into account to explain Turkey's policies during the consecutive crisis situations in Cyprus.

A Model I explanation of the Turkish decision-making necessitates first defining Turkey's objectives in Cyprus and the international constraints on any action to attain those objectives. The friendly relations between Turkey and Greece had become uneasy since the 1950s, when the fate of Cyprus, a British colony by then, first came up as an issue. During the troubled process leading up to the military intervention in 1974, politicians and bureaucrats at different levels of Turkey's consecutive administrations clearly stated that the union of the island with Greece was not acceptable for Turkey. Enosis was considered as a threat to both the rights of the ethnically Turkish population on the island and Turkey's maritime security. But, in the context of Cold War, any step that can lead to conflict between Turkey and Greece or change the status quo in all or part of Cyprus, which was an independent and neutral country by 1960, was fiercely opposed by both the United States and Soviet Union. My proposition based on rational policy paradigm is that during the 1964 and 1967 crises, union of the island with Greece was not considered as a likely prospect by Turkish government and both superpowers strongly discouraged any military action in the eastern Mediterranean, which they feared might spiral into a larger conflict and tip the balance of power in the region in any direction. However, in 1974, the environment of détente and more pressing issues such as Arab-Israeli War made the superpowers less interested in Cyprus issue thereby not only increasing the risk of enosis but also making a Turkish military intervention to remove the risk once and for all a more viable policy option for Turkey.

Organizational process model analyzes foreign policy decisions as an output of organizational routines which are called Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Model II rules out the assumption of perfect rationality and introduces an imperfectly rational bureaucratic machine, bounded by simple decision rules. Allison identifies two aspects of what he calls 'organizational action.' First is 'limited flexibility and incremental change.' This aspect refers to the crucial role of the established routines of the organizations on decision-making. Since SOPs has only limited flexibility and change is possible only along long periods of time; "Major lines of organizational action are straight, i.e., behavior at one time is marginally different from that behavior at $t - 1$."¹⁹ Second aspect, according to Allison, is 'administrative feasibility' which refers to effect of organizational routines on the implementation of the policy.

¹⁸ Graham T. Allison. 1971. *Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*. Boston: Little Brown.

¹⁹ Allison, "Conceptual Models," 703.

The second aspect of the SOPs was later elaborated by other scholars. Art argues that the effect of organizational routines on implementation of a certain policy is far more significant than their effect on decision-making.²⁰ Indeed, working through a big bureaucratic machine, it is hard for decision makers to make sure that the implementation of policy is in line with the policy itself. It is also argued that organizational routines not only mark off the implementation of a policy but also limits strategic decisions.²¹ Such centrality of what Allison calls 'administrative feasibility' implies that SOPs of certain organizations might be determining factor in certain decision moments. For example; the extent of the organizational and material capabilities of a military constrains the alternatives of decision-makers in an event of escalation.

A Model II based explanation of Turkish decision-making in Cyprus crises would focus on standard operating procedures of the Turkish military as well as Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy. It is arguable that main threat perceived by Turkey in 1964 was the Soviet Union. This threat perception should have determined equipment, capabilities, and the plans of the Turkish military, as well as the diplomatic strategies of the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Therefore, facing a crisis that is not identified in organizational routines and strategic plans of the military bureaucracy, Turkey was not able to intervene in 1964 and 1967 crises. Disappointed with Johnson Letter and realizing that Turkey's strategic aims were not limited to containing the Soviet Union, Turkey changed its threat perception. This change was reflected in SOPs and the material capabilities of the Turkish military that allowed, in the end, Turkey to implement the decision to intervene in Cyprus in 1974, which was not possible in the previous crises. Moreover, the potential international and legal repercussions of a military intervention and Turkey's possible diplomatic options were not properly planned by the foreign policy bureaucrats. From 1964 to 1974, Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy also developed strategies about how to respond if a new crisis erupts in Cyprus and the extent of diplomatic costs of a military action.

Bureaucratic politics model suggests that foreign policy decisions are result of negotiations between government agents with varying personal and organizational interests.²² Allison's Model III usually has been criticized harshly because of its incompatibility with the nature of American foreign policy decision-making. The influence of the President's subordinates in foreign policy is called into question. Bendor and Hammond, for instance, assert that the Model III does not reflect the nature of American foreign policy decision-making and it needs a model of hierarchy.²³ Indeed the role of government leaders is not clear in Allison's model. However, given the high frequency of coalition governments in Turkey during the period under investigation, as well as the historic role of the military in foreign policy and security issues; Allison's bureaucratic politics model has relevance for Turkish foreign policy decision-making in the case at hand. Yet, the unclear position of the leader is indeed a limitation for Model III. Moreover, Bendor and Hammond have another criticism that is highly valid also in Turkish case: decision makers do not always have different goals.²⁴

²⁰ Robert J. Art. 1973. "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique." *Policy Sciences*. 4 (1973): 476.

²¹ I. M. Destler. 1972. "Can One Man Do?" *Foreign Policy* 5 (Winter, 1971-1972): 28-40.

²² Allison, "Conceptual Models", 707-710.

²³ Bendor and Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models", 314-17.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 314.

A baseline model III explanation would explain the decision-making in Cyprus crises as a result of the negotiation between relevant actors with varying interests and objectives. Taking the abovementioned limitations into account, a Model III based explanation would focus on the political leader and the type of government at the time of each crisis as well as the military's role in politics and attitude toward the Cyprus problem, since the leader, government, and the military are the main actors in Turkish foreign policy decision-making. Clearly, in 1964 crisis, the personality of İnönü as the former 'National Chef' played an important role in decision-making. In that instance, one should bear in mind the well-known prudence of İsmet İnönü in foreign policy. However, the Prime Ministers in 1967 and 1974, Demirel and Ecevit, were not in such a confident position as the ultimate decision-makers since the military was actively meddling in politics and Ecevit was leading a fragile coalition between his secularist Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and Erbakan's Islamist National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP). Moreover, given the framing of Cyprus issue as the "national cause", assertions and roused speeches were much more commonplace than policy discussions. Therefore, it is doubtful that any actor's or organization's interest lied in preventing a possible military intervention. Nevertheless, I investigate the positions of relevant actors during each crisis and how the political will behind the intervention decision in 1974 was formed.

Methodology

This paper considers three types of independent variables: national/systemic, organizational, and domestic political. These three sets of variables are relevant to Allison's Rational Policy, Organizational Process, and Bureaucratic Politics models respectively. (See Table 1)

Table 1 – Independent Variables

	1964	1967	1974
National/Systemic			
<i>Threat Perception</i>	Low threat of Enosis	Low threat of Enosis	High threat of Enosis
<i>Systemic Attributes</i>	Peak of Cold War	Peak of Cold War	Détente
<i>Superpower Attitudes</i>	US: Harshly opposing USSR: Harshly opposing	US: Moderately opposing USSR: Neutral	US: Neutral/indifferent USSR: Not opposing
Organizational			
<i>Capabilities</i>	Lacking	Building	Able
<i>SOPs</i>	NATO focus	Changing	Contingency plans for Cyprus
Domestic Political			
<i>Government Type</i>	Coalition	One-party	Coalition
<i>Role of the Military</i>	Active and pro-intervention	Active and pro-intervention	Active and pro-intervention
<i>Leader</i>	İsmet İnönü	Süleyman Demirel	Bülent Ecevit

National/systemic level variables are “Systemic Attributes”, “Superpower Attitudes” and “Threat Perception”. Assuming Turkish decision-making unit is a coherent, perfectly rational and informed actor that interprets Cyprus question as a national security problem; these three explanatory variables are relevant to discussion of Rational Policy Model. Possibility of enosis was considered to be against national interests of Turkey by respective governments in all three crises. Therefore, firstly, the perceived threat of enosis will be considered as a prime factor that can explain policy adopted to deal with each crisis situation in Cyprus. Moreover, concerning a security problem in the Eastern Mediterranean, as a member of NATO, Turkey could not act without taking systemic tensions into account and it had to consider the attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union within the context of Cold War. Indeed, the US and the Soviet Union had played an active role during different phases of the Cyprus Crises, thus, their effect on Turkish decision-making should be explained. As it will be elaborated later, the strategic question of Cyprus and possibility of enosis is part of Greek-Turkish sub-systemic rivalry. Accordingly, the threat of enosis, attributes of the international system, and the attitude of each superpower to the Cyprus question are investigated in conjunction with one another to develop a rationalist explanation of Turkey’s policy choices.

Organizational variables consist of “Military Capability” and “Standard Operating Procedures of Turkish Military and Foreign Policy Bureaucracy.” As discussed in the theoretical framework, these two variables capture the main aspects of organizational action in foreign policy as conceptualized by Allison. The capabilities and the perceptions of the organizations influence how these organizations –and the governments- interpret any strategic problem and react to it. As Allison notes, “...the fixed programs (equipment, men, and routines that exist at the particular time) exhaust the range of buttons that leaders can push...”²⁵ The issue of military capabilities of Turkey regarding Cyprus crises, was raised by various scholars as well as decision makers to explain why Turkey did not carry out threats of military intervention in 1964 and 1967 crises.²⁶ Closely related to the material capabilities, routines and plans -the SOPs- of the Turkish military and foreign policy bureaucracy should also be analyzed. When Turkey entered NATO, Turkish threat perception was mainly oriented to the Soviet Union and so were its military and diplomatic plans within the framework of NATO. The organizational routines of the foreign policy bureaucracy and the Turkish military had been shaped so as to process information and devise strategies within this framework. Moreover, there is no doubt that the SOPs of the military had influence on Turkish decision-making in terms of feasibility of any decision regarding the Cyprus crises.

Finally, this article considers three domestic political independent variables; namely, “Leaders”, “Government type”, and “Role of the Military.” Allison defines bureaucratic politics as “bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government.”²⁷ Therefore, the variables of domestic political explanation are the domestic players that are positioned in government structure and who take part in

²⁵ Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 79.

²⁶ Nihat Erim. 1975. *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs* [Cyprus Issue to the Extent I Know]. Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii, 259; Cüneyt Arcayürek. 1985. Demirel dönemi, 12 Mart darbesi: 1965-1971 [Demirel Era and the Coup of March 12: 1965-1971]. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 119.

²⁷ Allison, “Conceptual Models”, 707.

foreign policy decision-making processes. In order to explain Turkish decision-making as a domestic bargaining process between players within hierarchy, the type of government and the leader appears as natural variables. In addition, the role of the military in politics is also a relevant factor on foreign policy decision-making process since, as many studies show²⁸, Turkish Military has been an important player in Turkish politics intervening with democratic politics on occasional intervals. Specifically, the relevance of Turkish Military in foreign policy decision-making derives from the fact that the Chief of Staff and superior command echelon attends the meetings of National Security Council, which used to exert immense influence on executive decisions or –to some extent- determine them.

In the following three sections, I offer explanations of Turkish decision-making at turn of events in Cyprus in 1964, 1967, and 1974 by analyzing the changes in these three sets of independent variables. Building on the information obtained from parliamentary debates, archives of government agencies of Turkey and other countries, and public statements by the decision makers, as well as the memoirs and published interviews of political leaders and the bureaucrats, I trace the process of decision-making at each crisis situation from rationalist, organizational, and bureaucratic bargaining perspectives.

Turkish Decision-Making as a Rational Action

There are three independent variables relevant for a rational actor explanation of Turkish decision-making in Cyprus crises. Three propositions can be made about how they determined the Turkish foreign policy. First, Turkish government in 1974 considered the threat of enosis to be imminent and intervened in order to prevent it. Secondly, the government saw the attitudes of both superpowers favorable -or at least indifferent- to a Turkish military action in 1974, thus intervened. Finally, these two considerations together prevented intervention in 1964 and 1967 but made intervention necessary and feasible in 1974. In what follows, I investigate each variable and trace if and how they changed throughout the three decision moments.

The first variable is “Threat Perception”. Turkish politicians declared in many instances that enosis was unacceptable to Turkey. An opposition MP in 1974 stated that “My dearest friends, all the governments and even all the representatives of each political party has declared many times how they are resolute, determined on Cyprus issue (...) [We have all said] that we were absolutely against the ENOSIS; if the ENOSIS was to happen we would do this and that.”²⁹ Since preventing enosis was defined as the ultimate objective of Turkey regarding Cyprus question, one has to consider how much the Turkish decision-makers weighed the threat of enosis in each case.

During 1964 crisis, there is no open statement on behalf of the government which reveals how seriously the threat of enosis was perceived. In fact, the emphasis was more on security of Turkish community and preservation of constitutional order in Cyprus. In a conversa-

²⁸ There are many studies analyzing role of military in Turkish foreign policy. For a review see, William Hale. 1994. *Turkish Politics and The Military*. London: Routledge.

²⁹ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* [Journal of Turkish Grand National Assembly Records]. Vol. 13, 1974. 18 July 1974, 9. Translated by the author.

tion between Erim and İnönü, Erim praised İnönü's diplomacy by saying that "We achieved a favorable result so far; we managed to stop the killings of Turks without any military casualty."³⁰ Another proof concerning low salience attached by Turkish government to enosis during 1964 crisis can be drawn from parliamentary discussions. On 16 March 1964 the Grand National Assembly passed the resolution which authorized the government for use of military forces in Cyprus in a closed session. Afterwards, the parliamentary discussions between the government and opposition continued on an amendment in "Political Parties Law."³¹ This is a clear sign that not only the government but also the opposition did not consider enosis as an imminent threat that needs immediate military response.

Similarly, during the 1967 crisis, Turkish government, this time led by Süleyman Demirel, did not attach prominence to the threat of enosis. Turkey reached its short-term goals in 1967 when Makarios and the Colonels Junta in Athens agreed to its terms. However, the objective of enosis was never abandoned, either by Athens or by Makarios. In fact, when Demirel tried to negotiate with the junta over Cyprus; Kollias, the Prime Minister of the Greek junta responded to him "Sooner or later, whether you want it or not, enosis will take place, so why not talk about it now?"³² But Demirel never believed that enosis was imminent and was eager to settle for the status quo as long as the violence did not take over the island. Talking on the Greek troops that infiltrated to Cyprus, Demirel said "[It is] a fact that Greece sent 10,000 troops to Cyprus. Yet, this doesn't mean enosis. As long as Turkey's treaty rights and its intention to use them exist, and as long as Turkish Cypriots' resistance lasts, enosis will be a pipe dream."³³

In the case of 1974 crisis, however, the evidence suggests that the salience attached to threat of enosis was different. In the parliamentary discussion for intervention decision in 1974, the opposition MP made the following statement "My dearest friends, Cyprus Question has come to the Grand Assembly on different occasions. This is the third time it comes to Turkish Grand National Assembly agenda for a resolution. This time the reason it is on the agenda is exceptionally different than the previous cases of 1963 and 1967." The government also perceived the coup that toppled down Makarios as paving a way to enosis that cannot be reversed. A telegram by the US embassy in Ankara sent to the Department of State on 15 July 1974 summarizes Ecevit's perception of the events as such: "[Turkish Prime Minister believed that] Coup completely engineered by Greek Govt. GOT (Government of Turkey) does not fear de jure enosis move in immediate future. On contrary, Turks believe that Athens will maintain fiction of separateness, as this will enable GOG (Government of Greece) in effect to have two votes in UN, while it has one foot in NATO camp and another in non-aligned world."³⁴ The head of Cyprus Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the crisis, Ecmel Barutçu suggests somewhat different, "...however, the coup made all Greek claims [of a constitutional crisis] on Cyprus issue irrelevant since the aim of the

³⁰ Erim, *Kıbrıs*, 264.

³¹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi. Vol. 3, 1964. 16 March 1964.

³² Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, 133.

³³ *Ibid.*, 129. Emphasis in original.

³⁴ "Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State." 1329Z. Ankara, July 17, 1974. In Laurie Van Hook (ed.) 2007. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976*. Washington: United States Government Printing Office.

coup was to annex the island to Greece.”³⁵ Although there were competing views in the government and bureaucracy about de jure enosis, they concurred on one point: Greece was effectively in control of Cyprus and Turkey was surrounded by Greek bases both on the west and the south. The red line of Turkish government was specified by the US embassy in another telegram on the same day: “GOT will move strongly, directly, and unitedly to prevent enosis by all means, including use of force, when and if it is convinced enosis is imminent. This is not only nationalist and emotional reaction but part of accepted Turkish grand strategy.”³⁶ The next day, following the MGK meeting, Prime Minister Ecevit declared that it was now “a simple matter for the Greeks to proclaim enosis and thus create a Hellenic island base from which, for the first time, Central and South-eastern Turkey would come within range of the Greek Air Force bombers.”³⁷

The analysis of Turkey’s assessment of the threat of enosis across the three crisis situations in Cyprus show that unlike 1964 and 1967 crises, the Turkish government in 1974 perceived union of the island with Greece a highly likely outcome following the 15 July coup d’état that brought a nationalist and pro-Enosis junta to power in Cyprus. As it will be elaborated below, the systemic and international factors were also much more permissive for Greek annexation of Cyprus in 1974 compared to the previous crises.

Second and third variables are interconnected as the effect of “Systemic Attributes” in Turkish decision-making is visible through the intervening variable of “Superpower Attitudes.” The character of the system, no doubt, both influenced Turkish concerns and was reflected on the attitudes of the superpowers regarding a Greek Cypriot move to unite the island with Greece and Turkey’s potential responses to such a development.

The year 1964 represents the peak of the Cold War with the lively memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis and escalation in Vietnam. These tensions rendered the prospective cost of intervention decision really high for Turkey since an escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean had the possibility of evolving into a superpower conflict. Consequently, the coarse letter of President Johnson and the clear Soviet threat deterred Turkey from action. In August 1964, Soviets openly declared that “If a foreign armed intervention takes place in Cyprus, the Soviet Union will help Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence... and is willing immediately to start negotiations on this matter.”³⁸ Soviet policy vis-à-vis Cyprus problem had a sole aim starting with the unfolding of the 1964 crisis: preventing Cyprus from becoming a NATO base. As a US intelligence report puts “The Soviets want to keep the island from becoming a NATO base and thus weaken NATO’s southeastern flank—goals which are served by either continuing friction or independence.”³⁹

³⁵ Ecmel Barutçu. 1999. *Hariciye Koridoru* [Hallway of the Foreign Affairs]. Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 58. Translated by the author. Barutçu was the top bureaucrat in charge of Turkey’s Cyprus policy.

³⁶ Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, July 15, 1974, 2330Z. Ankara. in Van Hook eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States*.

³⁷ Mehmet A. Birand. 1985. *30 Hot Days*. London: K. Rustem & Brother, 3.

³⁸ Farid Mirbagheri. 1998. *Cyprus and International Peacemaking 1964-1986*. New York: Routledge, 34.

³⁹ Intelligence Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. OCI No. 1456/73. Washington, September 24, 1973. in Van Hook eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States*.

In 1967, as well, the tension of the Cold War was still high. The Vietnam War was going on with no sign of progress. Moreover, due to another recent escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Six-Days War between Israel and the Arab states, the tension was high in the region as well. The USSR kept the maintenance of the status quo as the priority of its Cyprus policy in 1967. Moreover, with the rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union after Khrushchev's ouster, which was marked by one of the biggest foreign funded industrial investments in Turkey, Soviet Union was not as skeptical of Turkey as in 1964.⁴⁰ Even though it is hard to argue that the Soviets would back a Turkish military action in Cyprus in 1967, they took up a more neutral stance. The US also maintained its policy developed after 1964, which favored partition as an ultimate solution but prioritized preventing a military confrontation between Turkey and Greece. In summary, during the 1964 and 1967 crises, the systemic imperatives and the attitudes of the superpowers were preventive of a Greek move to unite Cyprus with the mainland or a Turkish military action to eliminate the future threat of enosis.

However, the climate was different in 1974. Détente was at work as a result of the partial American and Soviet acknowledgement of multi-polarity and the consensus on reducing the tensions. The environment of détente mitigated both the US concerns about a Turkish-Greek escalation in Eastern Mediterranean that would give Soviets an opportunity to increase its influence in the region and the Soviet worry about Cyprus completely becoming a NATO base. The US attitude was nowhere near deterring Turkey from military intervention. Indeed, Undersecretary of the US State Department, Joseph Sisco, who was sent to London to meet with Ecevit just before the intervention, stated to Kissinger that he was being sent on a mission impossible.⁴¹ The failure of the US to deter a Turkish intervention mostly stemmed from the "preoccupation" of the administration with other problems. Kissinger in his accounts of the 1974 crisis states that the domestic problems of the US presented Turkey with an easiness to intervene militarily.⁴² The Soviet policy was marginally different than that of the US, and in Turkey's favor. The communication channels between Turkey and the Soviet Union were open before and during the 1974 intervention and Soviets declared their support for a limited intervention on behalf of Turkey as long as the international status of Cyprus was preserved.⁴³ Ecmel Barutçu, head of Turkish MFA's Cyprus Department in 1974, also recognized in an interview that Turkey kept "close contact with them [the Soviets], but I do not think this attitude can be described as consultation."⁴⁴ Even after the intervention, Soviets were careful not to attach any responsibility to Turkey and accused NATO and the US for the coup and subsequent evolving of the events; an attitude which angered the British and the American representatives.⁴⁵

The rational policy model accurately explains the international factors that contributed to Turkish decision-making during the crises in 1964, 1967, and 1974. After the 1964 crisis, Turkey realized that the status-quo in Cyprus was not sustainable and it may have to take

⁴⁰ Alvin Z. Rubinstein. 1982. *Soviet policy toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: the dynamics of influence*. Praeger Publishers, 26.

⁴¹ Slengesol, "A Bad Show?", 116.

⁴² Henry Kissinger. 1999. *Years of Renewal*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 218.

⁴³ Bülent Ecevit. *Dış Politika*[Foreign Policy], cited in Bölükbaşı, 194.

⁴⁴ Slengesol, "A Bad Show?", 126.

⁴⁵ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, 194.

military action to prevent enosis at some point. The threat perceived in 1974 was much more serious than in 1964 or 1967. As the international scene was favorable, Turkey took the decision to intervene in 1974. However, a rationalist explanation, while assessing the international and systemic circumstances that influenced the Turkish decision-making in Cyprus crises, does not consider internal factors and frictions that might have affected the final decisions but rather assumes a unitary decision-maker. Arguably, the international scene was in favor of a Turkish intervention in 1967 too, with a more moderate attitude by the US and the Soviet Union. Then, what did withhold Turkey from seizing the opportunity to discard any enosis implication for good? Can it be explained as an exclusively rational action of a unitary actor or did domestic factors also play a role in the policy outcome? The next two sections seek answers to these questions.

Turkish Decision-Making as an Organizational Process

Turkish decision not to intervene in 1964 and 1967 but to take military action during 1974 crisis can be explained as an organizational output by looking at the SOPs of the Turkish military and civilian bureaucracy. The 1964 crisis is generally cited as the turning point of a more “multi-faceted” Turkish foreign policy.⁴⁶ Organizational component of this new foreign policy concerns the change in the SOPs of Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*, TSK) as well as that of the foreign policy bureaucracy. The harsh US opposition in 1964 that involved a threat of serious consequences in case Turkey uses NATO equipment in a possible Cyprus intervention led to disillusionment in Turkey. The argument is that this disillusionment together with an awareness of material lacking led Turkish Armed Forces to initiate a change in its SOPs, accompanied by relevant military capacity building so as to involve a Cyprus contingency; a change that eventually made intervention decision possible for decision-makers in 1974. In order to test these arguments, two variables, capability of the Turkish military to carry out an amphibious operation in Cyprus and the standard operating procedures of the Turkish military and civilian bureaucracy are analyzed throughout the three crises on the island.

The variables are based on Allison’s conceptualization of organizational behavior. Allison starts the definition of standard operating procedures as follows: “Organizations perform their ‘higher’ functions, such as attending to problem areas, monitoring information, and *preparing relevant responses for likely contingencies*, by doing ‘lower’ tasks, for example, preparing budgets, producing reports, and *developing hardware*.”⁴⁷ As discussed before, SOPs have two roles in dealing with a foreign policy problem: First, they establish routines in order to facilitate information processing by a complex bureaucratic structure in complex situations. Second, they also shape and limit the implementation of foreign policy decisions taken by decision-making units. The italicized parts in Allison’s definition refer to the performative aspect of SOPs as the lower function of “developing hardware” makes the higher function of “preparing relevant responses for likely contingencies” possible. Accordingly, material capacity building of Turkish Armed Forces is included in the analysis of the change in the SOPs as an intervening variable.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 115.

⁴⁷ Allison, “Conceptual Models”, 700. Emphasis by the author.

When the intercommunal clashes in Cyprus first erupted in 1964, even though Turkey asserted its determination to militarily intervene unless the violence against Turks on the island are ceased immediately, neither the national security doctrine nor the material capability of the military favored such a military action. At the beginning of the Cold War, Turkey's security arrangements were designed first within a bilateral arrangement between Turkey and the US and then within the NATO framework. Initially, the American intention in providing military aid to Turkey was to improve Turkey's military capabilities in order to render it capable to assist in case of an offensive war against the Soviet Union but then, it evolved into a defensive arrangement within NATO.⁴⁸ Turkey's strategic role in NATO plans in case of a conventional war was to keep as many Soviet forces as possible away from Central European Theater, where the main clashes were expected to happen.⁴⁹ Turkey also assumed an important role in Nuclear Deterrence when Jupiter missiles were deployed in Turkey in 1959 with much Turkish enthusiasm.⁵⁰ This particular threat perception and defensive arrangement, no doubt, shaped the SOPs of Turkish military. The focus was inevitably on land forces in order to make Turkey as durable as possible against Soviet invasion. However, Turkey began to review these security arrangements in 1964. Bülent Ecevit, then secretary-general of the ruling CHP and future Prime Minister to order 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, said the following with regard to Johnson Letter:

We realized that our one-dimensional national security approach did not cover all contingencies. We began to discuss whether Turkey's membership in NATO contributed to Turkish security or actually increased dangers. We also realized that [NATO's commitment to our security] would be useless if our friends changed their minds [and did not stand up to their commitments] ... We also realized how isolated we were. Because of the [international] isolation, we faced enormous difficulties [in convincing other states] that our cause was just...⁵¹

In Turkish foreign policy, the decade following the 1964 Cyprus crisis represented the revision of the relations with the US and rapprochement with Soviet Union. Although Soviet Union's position did not immediately change after Turkey's disappointment with the US and NATO, following the Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, the rapprochement started with parliamentary visits and led to presidential meetings in a few years.⁵² In 1967, returning from his visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Demirel declared that Turkey-Soviet Union relations were not defined by hostility anymore even if not all doubts are gone.⁵³ Abandonment of the title of the 'Cold Warrior' was reflected in security arrangements as

⁴⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler. 1985. "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952." *The Journal of American History*, 71 (4): 808.

⁴⁹ Kibaroglu, Mustafa, and Aysegül Kibaroglu. 2009. *Global security watch--Turkey: a reference handbook*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 59.

⁵⁰ Nur B. Criss. 1997. "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 20 (3): 100.

⁵¹ Cited in Süha Bölükbaşı. 1993. "The Johnson Letter Revisited." *Middle Eastern Studies* 29(3): 505-525, at 506.

⁵² George Harris. 1972. "Cross-Alliance Politics: Turkey and the Soviet Union." *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 12(1972): 1-32.

⁵³ Nasuh Uslu. 2003. *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*. New York: Nova Publishers, 76.

well. Following the public reaction which held the US responsible for Turkey's lack of naval capabilities to carry out a landing operation, Navy Association [*Donanma Cemiyeti*] was established by the government in 1965 to organize official fund-raising campaigns for strengthening Turkish Navy.⁵⁴ Turkey withdrew from Multilateral Force (MLF), a project aimed at creating a multinational European NATO fleet for nuclear defense of Europe.⁵⁵ Starting from 1966, referring to Montreux Convention, Turkey began to deny the passage of American vessels armed with missiles through the straits.⁵⁶ "Joint Defense and Cooperation Treaty" which reassured Turkish sovereignty in the US bases in Turkey was signed in 1969. Turkey's threat perception was changing after the disappointment with the US in 1964 crisis and so were its military SOPs.⁵⁷

Ecmel Barutçu, who worked in Cyprus Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs throughout the all three crises, describes a National Security Council (MGK) document prepared in cooperation with the military, which assessed every possible scenario and Turkey's modus operandi for each scenario.⁵⁸ The details of the document are unknown since MGK documents are still classified in Turkey. However, there is evidence through which we can infer the military preparations for the contingency plans in Cyprus. Barutçu says that this document was first drafted during the tenure of Haluk Bayülken, which began in 1971, and was finalized a few months before the 1974 intervention. The data on Turkish military inventory suggests a military capacity building towards an ability to carry out amphibious and airborne operations which can be traced back as early as 1965 but intensified after 1970.

Military capacity building following the 1964 crisis provides further concrete evidence for the changing SOPs of the Turkish military. The material shortcomings of the military during 1964 crisis was clearly stated by İnönü. Turkey's deficiencies for an intervention in Cyprus were revealed once more during the 1967 crisis. Not only the chief of the navy failed to do necessary calculations for a landing spot, the chief of the army stated that a successful operation in Cyprus necessitated fielding fifty tanks but there were only two landing crafts available. The air force, in no better shape, had only six helicopters and 150 parachutes.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, 124.

⁵⁵ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship*, 77.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁵⁷ Krebs dates the change in the threat perceptions of Turkey and Greece to their membership to NATO in 1952. The argument is that as NATO provided security for the two small powers against the Soviet threat, after 1952, they both began to spend more time and resource for regional problems, primarily for Cyprus question. Indeed Greece had begun to adamantly push for *enosis* as early as 1954 when they took the issue of self-determination in Cyprus to the UN. However, it was not until 1958 and without British efforts to get Turkey involved that Turkey changed its official position regarding Cyprus as Britain's internal affair. In any case, the change in Turkey's threat perception and security arrangements in 1964 were far more visible and significant. See, Ronald R. Krebs. 1999. "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict." *International Organization* 53(2): 343-377.

⁵⁸ Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru*, 50.

⁵⁹ Arcaçayrek, *Demirel Dönemi*, 135.

Table 2 – Landing Crafts Constructed in Turkish Shipyards, 1964-1974

	Commissioned Before 1964	Commissioned between 1964-1974		Total
		Launched before 1964	Launched 1964-1974	
Ç-101 Class Landing Craft, Tank	-	6	11	17
Ç-201 Class Landing Craft	-	4	12	16
Ç-301 Class Landing Craft, Mechanized	-	-	20	20
Total	-	10	43	53

Turkish Naval Forces commissioned thirty-six Ç201 and Ç301 class LUC type boats (used for transportation of equipment and troops in amphibious assaults) between 1964 and 1967. Only four amphibious assault boats were launched before 1964. Between 1970 and 1974, eleven Ç101 class LCT boats (used for transportation of tanks) were launched and put in service of the navy. At the time, Turkey had only six Ç101 class boats that were launched in 1943 but commissioned in 1967. (See Table 2)⁶⁰ The flagship of the Operation Atilla, the amphibious assault in 1974, TCG Ertuğrul was also put in service in 1973. TCG Ertuğrul was launched in 1954 in the United States but could be put in service after 19 years, a fact that shows it had not been a priority until at least a few years before the 1974 intervention.⁶¹ The same tendency of military capacity building is also visible in the inventory of Turkish Air Forces. C-160D Transall model transport aircraft of a Franco-German consortium and American UH-1H helicopters were added to the inventory of Turkish Air Force in 1970 and 1971.⁶² C-160D aircrafts and UH-1H helicopters served in the transportation of paratroopers and land troops during the 1974 intervention.

One can infer from these data that Turkish Armed Forces had been preparing for a Cyprus contingency in terms of both planning and capacity building since the outbreak of the first crisis in Cyprus in 1963. This incremental change in the SOPs of Turkish Armed Forces rendered intervention a viable option for Turkish decision-makers. Purchase of transport aircrafts and helicopters as well as the intensification of naval capacity building after 1970 also provides evidence for the plans that Barutçu mentions. The retrospective question of whether or not Turkey, while lacking military capability and SOPs, would have attempted to intervene in Cyprus in 1964 or 1967 if the systemic variables allowed is a matter of counterfactual history. Nihat Erim recounts that following the breakdown of the negotiations in 1964, Dean Acheson privately conveyed to him that if Turkey was to occupy the area designated as the Turkish base in the First Acheson Plans, the US would not interfere.⁶³ Maybe one can argue that the reason why Turkey did not intervene in 1967 despite a relatively

⁶⁰ The data for the table is drawn from Cem Gurdeniz and Erdogan Yucelis (eds.) 2000. *Cumhuriyet Donanmasi – The Fleet of the Republic: 1923-2000*. Istanbul: Seyir Hidrografi ve Osingrafi Daire Baskanligi.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁶² Official Website of the Turkish Air Force. https://www.hvkk.tsk.tr/T%C3%BCrk_Hava_Kuvvetleri/Hakk%C4%B1m%C4%B1zda/G%C3%BCn%C3%BCm%C3%BCz_Hava_Kuvvetleri/Envanterdeki_U%C3%A7aklar, accessed on 26.05.2018

⁶³ Erim, *Kıbrıs*, 406.

enabling system –if not as much as in 1974- was because the SOPs and material capacity of the Turkish Armed Forces prevented a viable military intervention. Explaining Turkish decision-making as an organizational output complements rational actor explanation filling in the gap of internal factors that led to intervention decision.

Turkish Decision-Making as a Result of Bureaucratic Politics

Bureaucratic politics explanation of Turkish decision-making in 1964, 1967 and 1974 crises would investigate the positions of the domestic actors that play a role in foreign policy decision-making in each case. Therefore, the positions of the leaders and the military bureaucracy, and the type of the government are relevant variables for such an explanation. Allison's suggestion that the broad range of foreign policy problems leads to power sharing in foreign policy decision-making is relevant for Turkish decision-making, however, bureaucratic politics explanation of the case at hand is the most controversial one since the data at hand is second hand –therefore, politically biased.

To conduct a bureaucratic politics analysis, it is first necessary to identify the relevant actors and their relative powers in terms of foreign policy decision-making. After the 1960 coup, one of the most important institutions in Turkish foreign policy had been the National Security Council until very recently, although its decisions are advisory according to the constitution. The 1961 Constitution which was supervised by the May 27 Junta established the MGK to “issue principal views to the Council of Ministers for decision-making and coordination on national security matters.”⁶⁴ National Security Council was composed of the President, the Prime Minister, relevant members of the cabinet and the Chief of Staff and four commanders-in-chief of the Turkish Armed Forces. The council was established in order to enable military supervision in national security matters. The structure of the council suggests the active actors in foreign policy decision-making as the Council of Ministers, the military and the Prime Minister since the President of the Republic of Turkey had only a symbolic role in the executive during the time period under investigation. Therefore, in what follows, I investigate the government type and structure, the stance of the military, and role played by respective Prime Ministers during each three crises in Cyprus.

Government type –whether it is one party or a coalition government- determines the number of political parties that can affect foreign policy decision-making at the executive level. The representation of different party interests in the government can be expected to lead to more domestic bargaining over a foreign policy decision. In 1964, Turkey was experiencing a government crisis. CHP's coalition with two smaller center-right political parties was disbanded by a vote of no confidence while Prime Minister İsmet İnönü was in the US for the funeral of the President Kennedy. The new coalition of CHP and the independent MPs was formed the next day. Erim suggests that the significance of the Cyprus problem was an important factor which allowed the formation of the new coalition in a short notice.⁶⁵ İnönü was against a landing operation and favored diplomatic solution to the crisis. In his address to the Senate on 3 January 1964 he stated Turkey could not think of military intervention

⁶⁴ 1961 Constitution, Article 111. Translated by the author. Emphasis added by the author.

⁶⁵ Erim, *Kıbrıs*, 226-230.

before exhausting diplomatic ways.⁶⁶ The wind among the cabinet, however, was in favor of military intervention. The decision to bomb Greek positions on 8 August, according to the memoirs of Erim was taken due to the pressures put on İnönü in the cabinet.⁶⁷ Therefore, there is some scant evidence of push and pull between the Prime Minister and minor coalition partners in 1964, however, in the end, İnönü's prudent position prevailed.

In 1967 crisis, Süleyman Demirel was presiding over a one-party government. There is no evidence of friction on Cyprus issue in the government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs favored intervention in 1967, as in 1964,⁶⁸ however, Demirel never believed that enosis was imminent⁶⁹ and was eager to settle for the status quo as long as the violence did not take over the island.

The government during 1974 crisis was the uneasy coalition of CHP-MSP. Birand argues that some ministers had some reservations as to the possibility of success of a military action and whether or not the crisis could be solved peacefully; whereas, he suggests that "Despite all my research, I did not come by any minister who opposed the intervention decision in principle. Some had certain reservations and concerns, some suggested exhaustion of diplomatic ways, and some referred to the capabilities of the military that had not fought a war in the past fifty years. But no one bluntly opposed the intervention and stormed out."⁷⁰ Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner also investigate the decision-making process in 1974 as a bargaining among a coalition of autonomous actors –namely the parliament, the military and the coalition partners- within the framework of decision-unit analysis. They argue that there were differing views within this coalition and PM Ecevit, acting as a pivotal actor, formed a winning coalition behind the intervention decision.⁷¹ However, both Barutçu's memoirs and Birand's accounts suggest that the discussions in the numerous cabinet and MGK meetings were about the prospect of the success for military intervention and how to handle the process diplomatically. Moreover, there are many conflicting claims as to who was in favor of intervention and who persuaded whom for intervention. For example, Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner claim that minor coalition partner MSP's leader Necmettin Erbakan was in favor of waiting⁷²; however, in one of his accounts of 1974 crisis, Erbakan claims that it was him and the commanders who persuaded Ecevit for the intervention decision.⁷³ Birand also refers to some claims by Erbakan and a high official of MSP, which hold that many ministers of CHP in the cabinet opposed the intervention. However, he says that he never succeeded in conforming any of these claims.⁷⁴

⁶⁶ Erim, Kıbrıs, 218.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 381.

⁶⁸ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, 135.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 129.

⁷⁰ Birand, *30 Hot Days*, 44.

⁷¹ Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner, "Decisionmaking Process Matters", 54.

⁷² Ibid., 53.

⁷³ Erbakan later made various remarks that him and his party was responsible for intervention decision. Fehmi Çalmuk. 2000. *Bir Erbakan Hikayesi: Selamün Aleyküm Komutanım* [A Story on Erbakan]. Ankara: Kim Yayınları, 33-34. Translated by the author.

⁷⁴ Birand, *30 Sıcak Gün*, 44.

The evidence on the role and stance of the military during the Cyprus crises is clearer and more reliable. It is not clear whether it was İnönü's bluff or the reality but during the negotiations for NATO peacekeeping force in 1964, İnönü said to the US officials that he was under pressure by military for intervention.⁷⁵ In case of the bombing decision on 8 August, the military put pressure on İnönü as well. Erim narrates the cabinet meeting on 7 August as such: "Last night [7 August], according to the info delivered by the American ambassador, our aircrafts opened fire to Greek landing crafts. Whereas, the Chief of Staff Sunay said that they were not ordered to open fire."⁷⁶ Despite the fact that the aircrafts initiated the shooting against Greek military targets contrary to their orders, İnönü persisted in the morning meeting of the MGK. Erim recalls that Sunay was furious at the decision.⁷⁷ The decision to bomb military targets was taken that afternoon with İnönü harshly refusing the demands for landing but caving in to demands of limited bombing.

Pro-intervention stance of the military did not change during the 1967 crisis, either. Before the MGK meeting on 15 November that decided to hand in an ultimatum to Makarios, Chief of the Air Force Tansel stated that Turkey was paying the price for the mistake of delaying the military intervention.⁷⁸ However, despite the apparent pressures by the military, Turkey did not engage in any military action in 1967.

In 1974, when the questions about the readiness of the military were raised in the MGK meeting, the Chief of Staff Semih Sancar is cited to say "We are ready, but we are wondering if you are, also."⁷⁹ Thereafter, the chief of the Navy added "Gentlemen, I am prepared to land in a caique, but that is beside the point. What we want to know is, will you politicians be able to convince the world of the absolute necessity of this operation and win support for our action?"⁸⁰ The Turkish Armed forces was active in all aspects of political life let alone the foreign policy. CHP-MSP government was established following 12 March 1971 military memorandum and two-and-a-half years of interim governments. There is no doubt that military did not only give consultation on tactical details of the intervention but also played role in decision-making. However, the active role and the pro-intervention stance of the military was visible throughout all three crises. The military's pro-intervention stance does not account for the policy decisions in 1964 and 1967 crises.

Finally, the leaders, no doubt, played an essential role in each crisis situation in Cyprus. In 1964, when speaking during the vote of confidence for İsmet İnönü's new government, Erim stated in reference to the Cyprus issue that "Facing the problem at hand, esteemed Prime Minister [İnönü], with his experience and his historic personality, is the person who would make the least mistake."⁸¹ Bölükbaşı also notes the confidence to İnönü both in pub-

⁷⁵ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, 64.

⁷⁶ Erim, *Kıbrıs*, 381. Translated by the author.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 382.

⁷⁸ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, 134.

⁷⁹ Birand, *30 Hot Days*, 4.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* It is important to note that Erbakan narrates the very same conversation as the persuasion efforts of him and the commanders to convince Ecevit for intervention in Çalmuk, *Bir Erbakan Hikayesi*, 33. However, one should be aware of the fact that the main source of information is political and journalistic speculation, not official documents.

⁸¹ Erim, *Kıbrıs*, 230.

lic and among foreign policy elite and refers to the prudence and brinksmanship of İnönü during the 1964 crisis. He claims that İnönü's all moves including his desire to notice the US of Turkey's intention to intervene in Cyprus were aimed at involving the US for the solution as he believed Turkey did not have any other choice in the face of open Soviet support for Makarios.⁸² As mentioned earlier, Demirel never believed that Enosis was an imminent threat for Turkey in 1967. Ecevit, on the other hand, was convinced that Turkey was surrounded by Greek military bases both in Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean following the Sampson Coup in Cyprus⁸³. When we compare the positions openly taken by the leaders at each turn, Ecevit appears as the one with the strongest preference for an intervention.

Not only particular perceptions of the leaders but also their worldviews and traits influence their decisions. For example, Kesgin, employing Leadership Traits Analysis (LTA) to analyze the role of Prime Ministers in post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy, argues that while Ecevit has a tendency to take advantage of opportunities as they arise; Demirel conceives international politics as a zero-sum game.⁸⁴ The difference may account for Turkey's re-frainment from intervention in 1967. However, as Kesgin also notes⁸⁵, a case-based analysis of leadership traits would provide a better insight for the leaders' role in particular decision moments. Incorporating a leadership analysis that takes the institutional constraints on the leaders may provide a better understanding of Turkish decision-making in Cyprus Crises as an intra-governmental bargaining.

With the available data, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, which explains foreign policy decisions as a result of bargaining between multiple actors fails to explain why Turkey did not intervene in 1964 and 1967 but intervened in 1974. First of all, despite the fact that there was a coalition government in 1964 and 1974; bureaucratic politics model cannot explain how İnönü's more prudent position prevailed in 1964 or the fact that there was no strong dissension within the government for intervention in 1974. The parliamentary voting does not directly reflect the intra-governmental politics but the consensus in authorization motions in both three crises suggest that pro-intervention position has always been powerful. The 1964 authorization passed with 485 yes and 4 abstaining⁸⁶; 1967 authorization passed with 432 yes and 1 no⁸⁷; and 1974 authorization passed unanimously.⁸⁸ Organizational interests might have played role in all political parties' support for intervention decision but the picture we can recreate does not reflect opposing views for intervention decision. Secondly, when we look at the stance of military and civilian bureaucracy, pro-intervention position seems prominent in all three cases. The evidence suggests that military and civilian bureaucracy played an important role in satisfying concerns about the inevitability and success of the intervention in 1974. Ecmel Barutçu recalls that the diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs needed to convince deputy minister Hasan Esat Işık about the need

⁸² Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson Letter Revisited," 519.

⁸³ Slengesol, "A Bad Show?," 118.

⁸⁴ Barış Kesgin. 2013. "Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers." *Turkish Studies* 14(1): 136-157, at 147.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* [Journal of Turkish Grand National Assembly Records]. Vol. 3, 1964. 16 March, 1964.

⁸⁷ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, 136.

⁸⁸ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* [Journal of Turkish Grand National Assembly Records]. Vol. 13, 1974. 18 July 1974, 52.

for intervention.⁸⁹ Even if we identify these concerns as a conflict within decision-makers, the conflict does not arise out of differing goals of the bargaining parties as postulated by Allison's Model III.⁹⁰ Logically, no one would commit to a non-intervention decision given the perceived threat of enosis. If Turkey had not intervened and enosis had taken place, no political actor could have borne the political responsibility of preventing the intervention.

If first-hand data were accessible, a sounder assessment of intra-governmental politics in decision-making process could have been done. But the data we have contradicts with competing views assumption of Allison for bureaucratic politics. Moreover, any domestic political explanation of Turkish decision-making in Cyprus crises should take the leadership structures and leadership traits since many sources imply the difference as to how these three leaders handle foreign policy problems. But in the end, in terms of domestic sources of Turkish decision-making, organizational explanation proves more convincing than bureaucratic politics explanation.

Conclusion

This article offers an explanation of the Turkish decision-making in three consecutive crises in Cyprus by looking at external constraints as well as the role of bureaucracy in Turkish foreign policy decision-making. Its main objective was to account for the variations in Turkish decision-making in terms of systemic constraints and bureaucratic processes. The findings have implications on the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus, decision-making processes that brought the intervention and the theory on the role of bureaucracy in foreign policy decision-making.

The analysis of the data at hand presents Turkish decision to intervene in Cyprus as a response to a security threat within the framework of sub-systemic rivalry between Turkey and Greece. The violence on the island and the persecution of the Turkish community turned the Cyprus question into the national cause; yet, the intervention in 1974 was a calculated response to a perceived security threat. Turkey defined enosis as a threat to its security as it feared from encirclement by Greek bases in the south and the west, and as a result, acted when it deemed intervention decision necessary and possible.

Cyprus intervention also represented a turn in Turkish foreign policy. Until the Cyprus question arose as a security threat with the pro-enosis movements in the newly established Republic of Cyprus; Turkish foreign policy had had two main pillars: first, preservation of the status quo reached with Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and second, integration of Turkey into NATO security framework, perceiving Soviet Union as the ultimate threat to the

⁸⁹ Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru*, 52.

⁹⁰ This is also one of the main criticisms Bendor and Hammond direct at Model III. See Bendor and Hammond, "Rethinking Allison's Models," 314.

status-quo. The possibility of enosis led to a change in the threat perception of Turkey. Decision-makers realized that the exclusive Soviet Union focus on security arrangements jeopardized Turkish security interests vis-à-vis Greece in the eastern Mediterranean. The overall change in Turkish foreign policy was outside the scope of this article but its implication on the intervention decision was discussed in terms of policy implementation. The capacity building in the Turkish Naval Forces and Turkish Air Force that began after 1964 crisis and intensified especially after 1970 allowed Turkey to address the security concerns in Cyprus.

Adding up the systemic constraints and the reflection of the change in Turkey's security perception on the standard operating procedures of the Turkish Armed forces; Turkey's decision to avoid intervention in 1964 and 1967 crises but to execute the intervention in 1974 is best explained by a combination of Allison's Model I and Model II. Bureaucratic politics model, on the other hand, fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the dynamics of decision-making in three respective crises. This can be attributed to three main reasons. Firstly, this model does not pay enough attention to the government leaders' role in bargaining games but the analysis of the three crises suggest that the leaders, especially İnönü in 1964, played an instrumental role in decision-making. Secondly, as mentioned before, Cyprus question was embraced as the national cause in Turkey until even the 2000s. Therefore, no actor could have taken the political risk of being the one that stood against intervention in Cyprus in case the enosis was realized. Even if there were actors that objected to the intervention decision they could not have defended this position in the political climate of the time. Thirdly, as mentioned just before, there might have been competing views on the intervention decision but the accounts we have about decision-making process are second-hand, thus, controversial. If the archives of the cabinet and the National Security Council were open for research, a much better analysis of the decision-making could be conducted.

There are several implications of this analysis for the study of Turkish foreign policy decision-making. First of all, studies of Turkish foreign policy decision-making should include leadership analysis. Cyprus case is an evidence for the need to incorporate the role of leaders in the analysis of decision-making. Especially after the adoption of a new political system in 2017, which bestows extensive power to the President over all branches of the government, role of the leader will be much more decisive in Turkish foreign policy. Secondly, bureaucracy plays an important role in Turkish decision-making both in terms of organizational processes and as a domestic source of foreign policy. For example, the military's pro-intervention stance in Cyprus intervention does not contradict with the government's decision in 1974, however, the stance of the military bureaucracy might have been an important determinant of decision-making in cases where it contradicted with political actors. Clearly, the military's role in foreign policy significantly diminished in recent years but the role of bureaucracy is important in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well.

Finally, the findings have some theoretical implications. Organizational explanation of Turkish decision-making shows that the role of organizational routines –the SOPs- is especially relevant in terms of implementation aspect of decision-making. Indeed, the organizational routines affect information processing for decision-making by interpreting the information in certain ways but their implementation aspect is more crucial in terms of presenting the possible choices. If it is not possible to carry out a decision, such decision, in fact, ceases to be a real option even if the organizations interpret the information in a way relevant to that decision. Moreover, bureaucratic politics analysis points out to some flaws in Allison's Model III. The case is a clear sign of that the assumption of competing goals due to differing individual and organizational interests is problematic. Individual and organizational interests may as well lead to shared goals or the actors in bureaucracy might simply interpret the foreign policy problem in the same way. Looking at the formation of political will in such cases was a crude suggestion raised in this article but the model certainly needs an improvement in this respect.

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