

AN ANALYSIS OF WAR CONCEPT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: MORAL AND INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

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Abstract

War emerges as the last stage of conflicts due to the nature of international relations as well as human history. War can be a cause of changes not only for states but also for individuals and for their lives. In this respect, certain regulations are made in the system with the normative dimensions of the war, and thus individuals and societies are tried to be protected. However, at the same time, when the normative dimension of war is set aside, there are situations that need to be questioned in terms of morality and fairness. In this study, the effects and situation of war, which is the system determinant of international relations, on the individual level as an analysis level will be examined. In this respect, the study is based on a literature review of history and war related to the field. The main purpose here is to deal with international relations at the individual level and to present an epistemological and ontological investigation of the phenomenon of war.

Keywords: War, Individual, Identity, Law of war

ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLERDE SAVAŞ KAVRAMININ ANALİZİ: AHLAK VE BİREY DÜZEYİ

Öz

Savaşlar insanlık tarihinin olduğu kadar uluslararası ilişkilerin de ayrılmaz parçası ve doğası gereği çatışmaların son aşaması olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Savaş sadece devletler açısından değil bireylerin de içinde yer aldığı ve yaşamlarını idame ettirdikleri noktalara ilişkin değişimlerin kaynağıdır. Bu açıdan tarihsel süreç içinde savaşın normatif boyutları ile sistemde belli düzenlemeler gerçekleştirilerek birey ve toplumlar korunmaya çalışılmıştır. Ancak eş zamanlı olarak bu, savaşın normatif boyutu bir kenara bırakıldığında ahlak ve adil olma noktasında sorgulanması gereken durumları da ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu eksende, çalışmada uluslararası ilişkiler açısından sistem belirleyici güce sahip savaş olgusunun analiz seviyesi olarak birey boyutundaki etkileri ve durumu incelenecektir. Bu noktadan hareket ile çalışma alana ilişkin tarihsel ve savaş üzerine bir literatür taramasına dayanmaktadır. Buradaki temel amaç uluslararası ilişkiler seviyesinin birey noktasına indirgenerek savaş olgusuna ilişkin epistemolojik ve ontolojik bir sorgulamayı gerçekleştirmektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Savaş, Birey, kimlik, savaş hukuku

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*I am not only a pacifist but a militant pacifist.
I am willing to fight for peace. Nothing will end
war unless the people themselves refuse to go to
war. (Albert Einstein)*

Giriş

The concept of war, a phenomenon as old as human history, has been going on for centuries. While war has become an integral part of the historical process, it has also played an important role in the development and evolution of human history, in the formation of states and nations. War is an event that includes many qualitative and quantitative differences and always has negative results. During the 5,560 years of human history, 14,531 wars have occurred. Thus far, only 10 out of 185 generations on average have not encountered war. Considering that at least 2 wars occur per year on average, it may be argued that human history is almost a history of wars (Aslan, 2008: 235). Evren Balta, based on an optimistic estimate, states that 60 million people lost their lives in wars in the last century and that most of these wars took place for goals such as national identity and territorial integrity. After World War I, with the change of the nature of wars, the number of civilian deaths in wars exceeded the number of soldiers killed in the wars for the first time. Although only 5% of deaths in World War I were civilian deaths, 66% of deaths in World War II were civilian. As a matter of fact, ninety percent of those who died due to wars are civilians (Balta, 2014: 263).

As stated by Singer (1961) in the “level of analysis problem”, it must first be determined whether a person should be asked at a macro or micro level as the main problem here is where to place the war phenomenon. In this respect, it is important not only to ask questions about the international system but also to make an evaluation on the individual, which is the first stage of Waltz (2001)'s three levels of analysis¹ (individual-state-system), in order to observe the event and the phenomenon in all its dimensions. Although it seemst that the individual plays a minor role in the state and the system, it is actually the individual who forms the core of the system. In this regard, the center is the individual who always exists, even though he has transferred his rights to Hobbes' Leviathan with the social contract. Consequently, where should the war be based if the evil of the individual and the state's aggression affect the system? The desire to get what it wants is also present in the state, but also where should the concept of “morality” be put?

The long and complex history of the "just war" doctrine reveals the religious aspect of this doctrine at the first stage. Although a process based on Greek philosophers comes before us, it can be said that the formation of a religious-legal doctrine of "just war" has started to take place in Western

¹ In political Science and IR we use three levels which are the individual, state (or, society) and the international system.

European civilization. In this respect, the doctrine of 'just war', as it is known, is seen as a legacy from the early Roman religion (Draper, 1992:177).

In this study dimension of this historical process in the context of the individual is questioned. Therefore, as Fromm (1997) poses an important question about human nature: how we can speak of humanity outside of its physiological and anatomical meaning if humans differ from each other in their basic spiritual and intellectual structures, the main question in this study is whether the individual's tendency to violence increases in states' war declarations and processes and consequently whether the normative structure of war is transformed by the individual. For this purpose, rather than drawing a general judgment or conclusion, the nature of the phenomenon and the analysis of the situations in the human and the system will be focused. In this context, it is seen that the individual breaks the norms put forward to protect himself. The study will investigate the phenomenon from three dimensions: individual/identity, human rights/state, and war law/system. While individual identity gives us the core point, the human rights created by the individual are, in the first place, a means of recognizing the civic relations and obligations specific to the state. Finally, in the context of the system, state law appears as a means of protecting the individual from above, this time one more layer. Thus, the formation of the individual's identity will be mentioned first. The effects of psychological acts on the constructed individuals and then their use in the mass will be examined. Then, the defended aggressive motives in the nature of the individual will be briefly discussed. In the third part, the normative sanction system that he developed in the historical process to protect himself will be discussed and human rights development will be examined. Finally, individual reading of war will be made on morality/justice.

1. IDENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS

War or conflict exhibits a character related and shaped according to human nature. According to Freud, there are two basic instincts in man: love (eros) and the feeling of dying (thanatos). Individuals act on these two instincts. Thanatos is the impulse underlying emotions such as death and suicide. This feeling cannot be isolated against these negative attributes. However, the individual must learn to live with it (Crashman, 2000: 15). Eriksen states that human beings are born with aggressive impulses (violence) and libidinal impulses (which give people pleasure, happiness) from birth and act with these impulses. Especially the biological-based aggressive impulses, resentment, abuse, exposure to violence, indifference, and dissatisfaction as a result of lovelessness create a traumatic effect, causing aggressive feelings in the individual and shaking the individual's sense of trust. As a matter of fact, a child who has been victimized by being subjected to violence can identify with the person who victimized him or inflicted violence on him and forget his victimization for a moment. These

violent impulses reveal a perception of violence in which all negativities are attributed to the enemy and molded by “hatred” on the perception of enemy-friend created by the acquisition of identity (Eriksen, 2002: 23).

When the formation process of the identity of the individual is examined, it is seen that the identity etching process of the individual also includes the formation of the individual's behavior patterns and judgments. Volkan and Itzkowitz (2002) point out that psychoanalytic research on children revealed that no matter how great potential and talent an infant has in the first years of life, no one has a distinct sense of self and throughout infancy, the human mind is in a 'creative confusion'. While the holistic 'I' sense of the individual evolves gradually in the first three years of life, he also learns to attribute certain parts of himself to other individuals or things, namely “projection”. This situation reveals two types of projection. The first is that the child takes the good for himself in his integrity while reflecting the bad to the others, the second is that the child reflects the unintegrated, pleasurable, 'good' aspects to others to protect them. Children essentially belong to a large ethnic group in the process of acquiring an identity and accumulate what is known as shared reservoirs supported and fed by adults in the group (Volkan & Itzkowitz, 2002: 14-15). The function of the volcano to these “shared reservoirs” is to serve as a receiver for all children in the group to reflect (good and bad), especially at the peak of the gray-forming period. The concepts of “self” and “others” begin to form concretely in the child with permanent and fixed exclusions. This process is then combined with the growing child's more sophisticated understanding of concepts such as clan, ethnicity, nationality, and other broad group labels (Volkan, 2012: 14). In the definition of identities, the idea of them versus us, the child's “good” and “bad” perceptions pass through the mother-child channel. Their “nurturing/good” and “traumatic/bad” experiences are shared by all children in the group through mothers. In addition, children in the same group gain other common experiences as their worlds expand and begin to establish relationships with other important individuals, such as fathers and teachers, who give them appropriate reactions to the traditions and customs of the group (Volkan & Itzkowitz, 2002: 18-19).

However, if the question “What is the "crowd" that shapes the personality and identity of a person?” is asked, it is seen that the mass acts as the main identity or perception trigger for the individual. According to the “social impact theory”, the individual begins to act on the thoughts of the group/society in which he/she belongs. Kelman adds three pillars to social impact theory. The first is compliance with others. The second situation is the willful participation and identification as a member of the group/society. The third is the internalization of the group to which he/she joins (Kelman, 1958: 51-60). The mass of individuals becomes a single entity/spirit and begins to obey the law of unification of mentality in the crowd. Le Bon (1997) states that some stimulating effects must be present in order to become crowd. These criteria vary not only according to race and the

formation of communities, but also according to the character and degree of the stimulants and stimuli that affect him. This situation makes the definition of the psychology of the crowd difficult (Le Bon, 1997: 19-20).

Le Bon collects the main characteristics of the individual in crowd under four issues. These are i) the disappearance of the conscious personality, ii) the dominance of the personality acting with the subconscious, iii) the direction of the thoughts and feelings in the same direction through contagion, and finally iv) the desire to immediately start the application of the suggestions (Le Bon, 1997: 28). With these conditions fulfilled, the individual now put the mass in the room instead of himself. From this point of view, it can be said that the individual is stripped of his moral values and the process of resorting to violence begins. According to Freud, the mass lives in the consciousness that has no doubt and great power. This creates a stance for him between loyalty to authority and infidelity as the mass respects power and is not influenced by the goodness which is regarded as a sign of weakness. For this reason, it is the strength, even bullying, that he expects from his heroes (Freud, 1975: 16). No matter how developed societies and how educated they are, they finally display attitudes and behaviors in line with the basic principles of large group psychology, mass psychology, and psychology of leaders. As Freud stated, with the search for power in the leader, the behavior and psychology of the leader becomes a factor in the formation of the psychology of his followers (Çevik & Çevik-Ersaydı, 2011: 5).

At the last point, a new "individual" isolated from the individual emerges. Therefore, the crowd becomes individualized. The formation of collective consciousness occurs as "mental spreading": every thought and every behavior become contagious and spreading (Le Bon, 1997: 28). The moral norms to be followed by the individual in the mass begin to be determined directly by the society. According to Freud, it is believed that the phenomenon of enthusiasm arises in the mass in discrete situations and this phenomenon allows for massive success (Freud, 1975: 18). Thus, the crowd gives the individual the impression of unlimited authority and invincible danger. However, it can reveal a situation of conflict with the authority feared by mass punishment. The individual finds the opportunity in the mass to do things that he would not do in his normal life, that it is not so strange to engage in or approve of these actions (Freud, 1975: 21).

On the other hand, when we look at the history of war, there has been a brutal and indiscriminate creation of death, whose victims were men, women, and children. Many of these events have created the impression of destruction in which neither traditional nor moral factors play any prohibitive role (Fromm, 1985: 8-11). These statements are followed by questioning the aggression we need to ask. Crashman poses the question whether the aggression is hidden in the individual's genetic codes. According to him, he points out that it is not possible for the individual to be tamed in this situation, but that it can be reduced to a less damaging level in cultural

and physical terms since aggression is one of the weakest drives even in the animal kingdom. (Crashman, 2000). In this context, these impulses remain hidden, no matter how civilized they are because both the instinct and the individual's gaining identity through the socialization process keeps these impulses so shallow that they can arise with a sudden spark.

2. WAR AND JUSTIFICATION OF WAR

Leaving aside the normative dimensions of war, there have been discussions about morality and fairness on the different philosophical and intellectual base for centuries. Ideas have been developed over the concept of just war regarding the ethics of war for centuries. The concept of just war has been discussed in a wide range from the dimension of religious morality developed in Western culture to international law (Ereker, 2004). At this point, the first name that comes to mind is the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), one of the greatest founders of international law, and his work, the *Law of War and Peace*, was published in Latin in 1625. According to Grotius, war is the reciprocal situation of those who try to resolve their conflicts by coercion (Grotius, 1967: 17).

According to Grotius, the most important of the basic and natural rights that a person has is the right to protect himself. Due to the first principles of nature, there is little to be condemned about war, and from this point of view, war is very compatible with the “first principles of nature”. In terms of ensuring the safety of life and property, this situation is not against the nature of using force (Grotius, 1967: 23). However, one of the most important problems is how people can exercise these rights. In this sense, the right to protect himself is among the reasons that justify war for Grotius. Besides, the fact that nature gives every living thing the right to protect itself shows that there is nothing to be condemned about war. For Grotius, war is a natural thing for people living in a state of nature. The first principles of nature are not that war is prohibited, but war is allowed. The most important reason for this is to protect the right to live, as stated above. Nature has given all living things the instinct and power to protect themselves (Torun, 2005: 83) According to Grotius, war is not against international law either. First, natural law prohibited all forms of war. Secondly, will-based international law reveals that its laws and practices do not prohibit engaging in war (Grotius, 1967: 25).

The second area where the individual protects himself is the regulation of the law of war. There are many regulations regarding the law of war. In terms of the law of war, Grotius discussed war, which is a set of rules to be applied in times of war and peace, in the context of natural law and international law. The first problem of Grotius, who tried to reach the rules that would be valid during and after the war and to control the war with law, was the just war doctrine that dates back to the European Middle Age and even the ancient Greek and Roman tradition. Here Grotius seeks the possibility of just war, what kind of war, if any, can be considered just. In

defining the law of war, Grotius moves from the idea that law is a rule of conduct. Law is what is fair or just. Thus, the law of war tries to determine the justification of war and the limits of what can be done in war. As a matter of fact, according to Grotius, injustice is also against the nature of human and society as a rational being. Therefore, according to Grotius, there are three conditions for a just war to take place. The first is to defend something that belongs to us, the second is to do it on the axis of self-defense, and the last to punish injustice. This last item establishes the proportional link of reciprocity in a sense. (Torun, 2005: 79-86).

On the other hand, the concepts of war and security are essentially linked in terms of international relations. At this point, security, according to Baylis (2008), refers to a power struggle that the state tries to provide at the expense of its neighbors. This situation, for neo-realists, is largely due to the structure of the international system and the tendency of violence will continue in the future as in the past. Therefore, the ultimate point of this violence can lead us to war (Baylis, 2008: 70-71).

Contrariwise, the anarchic nature of international relations emerges from the point of deterrence, which paves the way for violence to result in war or not. Just war theories, unlike the realist school, have come up with a normative content regarding the moral measures of resorting to war, taking into account the role of morality in international politics. Supporters of the just war theory are caught between realists who argue that war has no moral limitation and pacifists who argue that war is unacceptable in all situations. According to Saint Augustine, waging the war and making its weight felt on the people of the conquered land is tolerable for the weak character, but for the virtuous man it means evil. Also he points that, a war is not sinful under three conditions. The conditions for this are given for a 'just cause'; It is applied 'with the right intention' and on the authority of a prince. Of course, this is for Christians as Augustune put it in the context of that period (Draper, 1992: 180). However, we can also consider this situation as extreme.

Also, realist thinkers state that since war is a part and truth of international politics and system, morality has no place in world politics. According to Hans Morgenthau (1948), the issue that states should comply with moral principles and what will be good or bad between states differs. On the other hand, since the perception of interest among states brings power to the fore, moral principles lose their importance in international relations. However, Morgenthau does not completely deny the effectiveness of moral principles and argues that these principles can manifest themselves in the behavior and beliefs of the state (as cited in Nobel, 1995). When evaluated in this respect, the theory of just war in our time draws our attention to three aspects. The first one is that despite the idea that moral principles do not have a place in international politics, the normative regulations about good and bad affect their rhetoric, even if they are not in the behavior of the state. Second, the behavior of the state appears to be influenced by the categories

and prohibitions of the just war theory. And thirdly, the just war theory on which the USA is based has created difficult problems regarding both the anti-terrorist war practices and the just war theory. Considering the international structure as “anarchic”, realists believe that the rulers of the state carry the same motive, considering that the desire to gain power is something that is in the nature of the human being, that the states in the international arena continue to compete in an environment where there is no arbitrator to decide who is right and who is wrong, and that the only factor that prevents them is the other. They also state that states act in the same direction (Arı, 1997: 238, 239; Gözen, 2014: 159-168).

Indeed, it is the comments that power can be justified under the current conditions of determining clear differences between combatants and civilians. According to Baker and Stephens (2006), the use of force should only be for legitimate military purposes. In other words, the parties can attack each other with existing targets. Civilians should be excluded from this attack, and the use of force should match the military need for a specific purpose. (Stephens & Baker, 2006: 96) At the point of the civil-soldier distinction, Walzer states that there are rules that should not be violated and must be followed in war in order for the behavior of the soldier to be justified. In this context, the situation as to who the soldier can legitimately kill is related to the distinction between armed elements and civilians. A moral situation arises here, which means separating the armed element from the civilians and fighting only against the armed element. Therefore, the norms defining the legitimate reasons of wars for a just war, the rights of individuals belonging to the parties in war increase and decrease in proportion to the justification of the reasons for war. Therefore, soldiers who die in a just war are not considered to have died in vain (Walzer, 2006). In the last point, just war is the morally necessary to win a war and it should not include excessive violence.

On the other hand, the difficulty in identifying the aggressive and defensive individual leaves international law helpless in eliminating the armed forces. At this point, we encounter restrictions on the use of armed forces in international law. Here, the individual's situation of first protecting himself and then limiting others to protect himself draws attention because traditional international law prohibits using too much force to defeat the enemy. Roskin and Barry (2012) state that since the 1864 Geneva Convention, the use of weapons was restricted by multilateral contracts, and various norms were set about the course of the war. Neutral people, civilians, and prisoners of war are recognized as having rights and obligations, while the victorious state in the occupied territories must dominate their attitude and behavior towards the defeated people. In another example, according to the Geneva Convention of 1949, attacking harmless civilians is a war crime. As the most important example from the recent period, Baker and Stephens (2006) stated that 11 of the 21 Nazi officers/soldiers who were tried in the Nuremberg War Tribunals between 1945 and 1946 were sentenced to death

and set an example for the severity of the punishments against violence (Baker & Stephens, 2006: 95). While there was no classification as to war crimes before, the perception and sanctions of “crimes against humanity” against both civilians and prisoners changed after the world met Nazi Germany and its war crimes (Roskin; Berry, 2012: 422-423). However, the violence was not limited to the massacre in World War II, from the 1970s to the 1990s, the war/conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo continued in its bloodiest form, and in the 1990s new examples were provided by Serbs against Muslims in Bosnia the “ethnic cleansing” continued with the examples of genocide. According to Baker and Stephens (2006), these policies or attitudes are implemented as an acceptable strategy for some leaders in the contemporary world (Baker & Stephens, 2006: 95).

As Freud has stated, the motive to act with the impulses and the feeling of bloodthirsts reveals the darkest human nature in times of conflict by inciting hatred based on race, religion, and tribal differences, and individuals slaughter the other by abstracting them from their moral perception by giving them a new form. But in this case, where does that protection shield that is tried to be provided by war or human rights? Based on Grotius' definition of just war, if the argument that nature gives human beings the right to punish the crimes committed against them and that war based on penalty is just war, the natural law principles arising from the rational nature of man determine the limits of the rights that people have (Yalvaç, 2003: 86). However, again, this border becomes Hobbes' “man is wolf to man (*homo homini lupus*)” in conflict situations in anarchic environments. Indeed, instincts are directed towards the physiological needs of people. Instincts are the passions, the answer to the ontological needs, conditioned by the personality of man as good and bad. People differ among themselves in their passions for good and bad. In this respect, Thucydides points out that the cause of war is “a greed for power, arising from greed and passion”, according to this argument, wars always exist because human desires and ambitions are endless, but resources are limited. In the case of these limitless desires and limited resources, distribution takes place through violence (as cited in Balta, 2014: 266). Indeed, Arendt (2006) states that the phenomenon of violence carries more arbitrariness than values. At this point, Arendt states that the determination of fortune in the context of violence has the most impact on human issues on the battlefield. There is no certainty at this point, even if the plan is demolition projects, certainty cannot be mentioned (Arendt, 2006: 10,11).

3. INDIVIDUAL-WAR-MORALITY

The concept of morality can be considered as a layer that surrounds our personality and our environment. Like Althusser's metaphor in the context of ideology (as cited in Kazancı, 2002), we can say that humans are in a sea of morality. Of course, it is difficult to say that the masses are fully

conscious in carrying out their moral actions. In this respect, “moral” surrounds our life. It is not philosophers who introduced morality; before philosophy existed, there was morality in ages and nations that were completely unaware of philosophy (Heimsoeth, 1978: 14). The main function of moral propositions is that they are advisory (imperative); in other words, these propositions are action guides. However, unlike propaganda and psychological persuasion, there are logical relationships between moral propositions. A genuine moral proposition must be universalizable. This means that if one says x is good, then all other similar examples of x must be called good. One example of universalization occurs in a kind of rule of justice: Unless a morally relevant reason for different treatment is shown, people should be treated equally. Anyone who adheres to a moral principle is logically bound to the general application of this rule to all similar situations (Barry, 2004: 125). According to Michael Walzer (2006), although common moral values have a measure that can change indifferently, morality contains its own values. For this reason, tears are shed according to who died in the war (Walzer, 2006: 48). Fromm (1997) evaluates the situation with an evaluation on “humanity” that the “human condition” is the same for all of us; that we all live under the illusion of the indestructibility and separation of each other's. It assumes that we all passionately try to find an answer to the problem of existence by attaching to things, including that special thing “me” (Fromm, 1997: 38).

The idea that war is influenced by ideas of morality and justice is as old as war. This idea, which is tried to be read based on religious beliefs, is specific to many of the major religions. Interestingly, the distinction between just wars and unjust wars, dating back to the ancient Hindu texts, also occurs in Rome or the Middle Ages. In other words, this situation appears as a search in every period of the world. However, it can be said that the concept of just war is a rapidly transforming concept. The definition of just war in Rome has been freely interpreted to comply with the passions and security requirements of the political authorities. Even when the Roman Empire officially accepted Christianity in 389 B.C. and the church abandoned its pacifism, it justified the actions of the congregation with the defense of the empire and faith (Baker and Stephens, 2006: 198,199). Indeed, Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein included the determination in their correspondence where they exchanged ideas on war. Einstein stated the following regarding the situation;

The ill-success, despite their obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last decade to reach this goal leaves us no room to doubt that strong psychological factors are at work, which paralyse these efforts. Some of these factors are not far to seek. The craving for power which characterizes the governing class in every nation is hostile to any limitation of the national sovereignty. This political power-hunger is wont to batten on the activities of another group, whose aspirations are on purely mercenary, economic lines. I have specially in mind that small but determined group, active in every


nation, composed of individuals who, indifferent to social considerations and restraints, regard warfare, the manufacture and sale of arms, simply as an occasion to advance their personal interests and enlarge their personal authority." (Einstein: 1933: 15-16)

As a matter of fact, this determination is the most determining point in the change of the meaning of war. Like the paradox of democracy, the public can choose the "tyrant" through democratic methods while performing their own delegation of authority, and war can be the instrument of this tyrant / democracy. Therefore, the important thing is the purpose and direction of use of this tool.

In another situation, according to Clausewitz, war becomes a tool used for the interests of the state in the system established by the individual in the name of his own protection. In this case, it is the individual who is responsible for ensuring the safety of the individual (Smith, 1990). To what extent, then, can the cycle of self-killing or the desire to sacrifice oneself for the country / state be rationalized in the name of moral self-preservation? The answer to this question, which is the subject of especially nationalism studies, is outside the rational individual behavior patterns. Ryan (2003) pointed out that following the US example, dying in war goes hand in hand with justifying war. He also included William Bennett's 2001 public opinion survey in his article. He states that 70 percent of the youth support the US presence/occupation in Iraq, but none of them are ready to die for tomorrow. It explains the century with the army-citizen mental world (Ryan, 2003: 15,16). The changing system reveals the feeling of keeping the individual away from war and removing death with it. However, it is controversial to what extent this feeling of detachment expresses the distance from violence during the war. Again, the moral dimension of war cannot be clear in the context of universality. However, the only ideal form is war, which is currently being read over norms.


What I want to put forward at this point is that the individual's self-protection position in war constitutes a stratified mechanism. Although this mechanism is seen as unbreakable, it actually consists of transparent walls. Here, the individual gains a sense of belonging and personality. In this way, he feels ontologically belonging to a community and becomes "we". The second layer is human rights that serve to protect "us". Human rights are the reflection of the internal policies of the state on individuals before they move to the international arena. In this way, while the individual provides human rights and security within the country, it also creates a defense against the state with the international dimension of human rights (See Diagram I).

Diagram I: Protection Systems of Individual



Although these layers are actually seen theoretically, it can be said that it is difficult to come across their practical applications exactly. Here, even if the individual wants to protect himself, there is an abstraction created by motives and becoming masses. In this case, a picture that exceeds the protection mechanisms of the individual emerges. Theoretically, it can be said that it reveals the cyclical victimization of the individual (See Scheme II). In fact, this scheme can be read the other way around. Violence and motives will be suppressed if individuals prevent the transition between layers. As a natural consequence of this, it can be said that war will be prevented. At this point, however, the problem is the ambiguity of what will be the spark that will start the war. For this reason, the individual and the state must act at the breaking point of the cycle with absolute rationality, which does not fit humanity in terms of interests / motives.

Diagram II: The Formation of the Individual's Victimization



At the last point, the effect of wars made by states in the international system is the individual. The stance at this point is thought-provoking that the individual who establishes the system and contributes to its functioning is also thought-provoking. The individual's saving of violence remains a trump card hidden in himself. Here, states' powers or motivations to make war also have an effect on this situation. Although Weber refers to the state as a monopoly of violence, can the state exercise this right over the violence used by the individual? If so, what would be the consequences of this on the power of war or violence. All these questions present a reality that perhaps

the laws and theories of war are limited. However, he might say that just as Gramsci's (1969) organic intellectuals use their intellectual accumulation according to power, violence is likewise flexible.

Conclusion

War is one of the greatest phenomena that have existed in the international arena for centuries and have influenced human history. In this respect, it is difficult to remove the war from the international system and human history as if it never existed. In the international system, it is one of the tools on which great powers and states rely and create themselves. Because war offers a reality despite all its negativities. As stated in the study, Grotius (1967) states that war is at the origins of human consciousness because wars are armies and armies are a warrior type of human being.

Throughout history, the destruction caused by wars and the nature of violence have revealed the most significant changes in the system. From this point of view, there is a moral questioning of interpreting the logic of political war in this study.

At the last point, it is difficult to determine an obscure state such as the morality of war. We can read this determination over the results of the violence created by the individual. Deaths, psychological, sociological, or physical discomfort of individuals and societies reveal the morality of the war that the generation that sees and feels the effects of the future war and the future generations live and will live. Of course, the state is responsible for the war firsthand. It declares and continues war on the axis of state interests. However, individuals who are instrumentalized by war have responsibilities at the point of use of violence. In this context, Theodore Van Kirk, a member of the Enola Gay crew, is responsible for the bomb dropped on Hiroshima as well as US President Harry Truman. Even if the subject is approached in the context of the chain of command, each individual involved in the process is responsible for the thousands who died and will die. As a matter of fact, the state is an apparatus surrounded by only normative rules and it has a monopoly of violence, and the person who uses this tool is the individual at the last point. The nature of the individual can justify the murder of siblings for the survival of the state as it throws bombs that killed millions. As can be seen, the state is a political tool used by the individual/individuals, and it is the individual who gives meaning to it.

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