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Letter

Transforming an Army: The Trap of Culture, Politics, Technology, and the Economy

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Dear JMISCI readers;

I am a United States Army general, and I lost the Global War on Terrorism... Master Sun [Tzu] put it simply: "Know the enemy and know yourself: in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." (Griffith, 1963) We failed on both counts. I know I sure did. As generals, we did not know our enemy – never pinned him down, never focused our efforts, and got all too good at making new opponents before we'd handled the old ones. (Bolger, 2014)

When Army Spc. Thomas Wilson... asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, "Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to up armor our vehicles? Rumsfeld replied, "You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time." In March 2003, "the Army we had" was desperately short of the resources – such as body armor and reinforced vehicles – necessary to fight a war of this kind and long on submarines and other heavy equipment... (Stiglitz and Blimes, 2008)

An Army is a function of the society and the environment from which it is drawn. Hence, no matter how military leaders would like to transform their forces, society, culture, economic conditions, and other aspects of the environment impose constraints on what is possible. Culture, politics, and the economic system of a state decisively influence the organization of its armed forces and the way they fight. The U.S. Army is in a trap. It cannot transform itself significantly, or in a manner that maximizes its effectiveness. The American Culture of War decisively influences the organization, technologies, doctrines, theater strategies, employment, and size of the Armed Forces. While American forces are the most technologically advanced on Earth, they are not the most effective. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps were too small and ill equipped for the wars it fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army has been too small to achieve political objectives since World War II.

*The major argument of this work is that soldiers matter. Wars are **not** won with technology. They are won by soldiers. They are not won in the air. They are won on the ground. And, the numbers of soldiers matter. Soldiers cannot be produced overnight. A good infantry division takes years to produce. Something we Americans learned in World War II, and again in Korea, and in again in Vietnam, and again in Iraq in 2007, and we will without doubt have to learn this lesson again. Airpower, advanced technologies, "revolutionary doctrines," and Special Forces **cannot** substitute for large numbers of good, trained, motivated infantry soldiers. Advanced airpower technologies create beliefs and dispositions that wars can be fought and won quickly, easily, and cheaply. In this way, they influence the political decision for war and the strategy for the conduct of war. Airpower makes war a more attractive option.*

The Armed Forces of the United States are always, always, in a state of transformation. And, since World War II the U.S. Army has been too small to do all that was needed, all that was asked of it. Since World War II the U.S. Army has been on the defensive, fighting a losing battle against the proponents of airpower. Our Armed Forces are the most expensive on Earth. They have world-wide responsibilities, yet in 2007, the United States could not put 500,000 soldiers in Iraq to win the war and secure the peace. A few well trained divisions could have secured Iraq in 2003, could have stopped the destruction, and could have saved thousands of lives and billions of dollars, could have precluded the insurgency war that followed the conventional war. Today American political leaders cannot call upon the American people to serve. This is a form of militarism.

The problem with transformation and so called "revolutions in military affairs" is that our Armed Forces are always transforming in the same way – technologically, towards more advanced airpower, towards more advanced and expensive weapon systems, and away from soldiers, away from ground

combat, away from human engagement. War is a human endeavor. The ultimate objective of war is not the destruction of the enemy, but the creation of the conditions necessary for sustainable peace. Americans want to fight wars with technology. They want clean, pristine, neat wars. Americans don't want to put soldiers on the ground. They don't want to get in the mud. They do not understand the value and need for good infantry soldiers. (Korea is divided at the 38th Parallel. The Communist won the Vietnam War. South Vietnam no longer exists. Saddam Hussein survived the first Persian Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, even after the Bush Administration encouraged the Kurds and Shia to rise up against him. Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom were lost according to General Bolger.) I would not recommend that any other nation or state adopt the American form of transformation or vision of war. The Armed Forces of the United States have predominantly an airpower culture, and a growing Special Forces culture. They are very expensive ways of war. The American people and Hollywood have embraced this culture of war. As a consequence, the Armed Forces of the United States are incapable of transforming in such a way that they will be able to fight large scale conventional wars, counterinsurgency wars, or conduct effective post-conflict operations.

Let me start with my conclusions: people become invested in a particular way of war. The technologies they employ, the strategic and operational doctrines they develop, and the political decisions they make support culturally, politically, and economically regular forms of war, forms of war that display significant consistencies.

The Armed Forces of the United States will continue to be the most sophisticated and technologically advanced on Earth. Airpower will continue to be the dominant American instrument for the conduct of war, and the American people will continue to invest billions of dollars in weapon systems and military technologies, such as, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a weapon system that is already obsolete. American airpower militarism too frequently produces weapons that are not needed, and technologies that are dysfunctional.

The American "Military Industrial Complex," and "Private Military Firm" will continue to exert enormous influence on the President and Congress of the United States, and through them on the Armed Forces. These companies are primarily motivated by profit. War in America is big business. The U.S. is the largest arms dealer on Earth, and the needs of the

industry frequently trump the needs of the services and the needs of foreign and military policy.

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps will continue to be too small to effectively conduct major ground combat operations against significant enemies, too small to conduct counterinsurgency warfare in most states on Earth, and too small to conduct post-conflict operations, without significant help from allies or the host state.

Inter-service competition for resources, influenced by industry and Congress, will continue to determine the force structure, organization, size; and hence, capabilities of the armed forces. Ground combat forces will continue to receive the least support and the least resources. The cultural myth of the dominance of airpower was not overturned by the two protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps will continue to seek and develop tactical and operational doctrines and technologies that make it possible for smaller and smaller forces to do more, to control more space and people, to exert greater destructive combat power, doctrines such as Joint Distributed Operation. They will continue to rely on small numbers of highly trained, highly skilled, professional soldiers.

The American people will continue to be disengaged, disinterested in national security issues. (Weiss, 2000) The American people will continue to over consume resources; hence, most Americans will continue to be physically incapable of serving in the Army. As a consequence, there can be no conscription even in the midst of war, and no ability to significantly increase the size of ground forces. Today the U.S. could not fight World War II. The most expensive and most technologically capable armed forces on Earth are manned by less than 1 percent of the people. The President, the armed forces, and private industry now conduct the war of the United States.

The Armed Forces of the United States will continue to rely on civilian contractors to deploy, sustain, and conduct operations. Today, they cannot go to war without contractors, cannot conduct peacekeeping operations, and cannot do anything without contractors. The burden of war is shifting away from the public sector to the private sector. Contractors are assuming this burden, and making enormous profits in the process. Contractors are enormously expensive and have deep roots in the American political establishment. (Singer, 2003 and Stranger, 2009) The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will ultimately cost the American people over three trillion dollars. (Stiglitz, 2008, Since this book was published

new estimates of the total cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been published. Some estimates put the total costs at over four trillion dollars.) However, because the bills were paid with deficit spending, by increasing the national debt, the American people remain almost untouched by the experience of two long wars.

The U.S. Congress will continue to be too ignorant of military affairs, too afraid of the professional knowledge and expertise of generals and admirals, too vested in the current system of military procurement, and too afraid of the potential responses of the American people to fully exercise civilian control of the Armed Forces or implement real reforms. The vast majority have no military experience.

1. The political and cultural environment for perpetual war:

Western arrogance/racism and the legacy of Western imperialism in regard to Muslims and the Middle East will remain a factor influencing decision-making in Washington. Films, television shows, and other American media continue to depict Muslims as the enemy, continue to depict them in a negative light, and racism remains a part of American life that influence U.S. foreign and military policies and strategies. (See the most popular war movie ever produced, "American Sniper.")

Israel will continue to exert enormous influence on American military and foreign policies in the Middle East. (In March 2015 Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the Congress of the United States in complete disregard of the President of the United States. He was invited by the Speaker of the House. His argument is for the United States to do more about Iran's nuclear program. Essentially he argued for war, a war for which there was enormous Republican Congressional approval.) The American political leaders will continue to provide Israel enormous resources to conduct its wars. American political leaders will continue to lack the courage to oppose AIPAC. (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007) (Mearsheimer and Walt wrote: "Washington's close relationship with Jerusalem makes it harder, not easier to defeat the terrorist who are now targeting the United States, and it simultaneously undermines America's standing with important allies around the world.")

The Neoconservative Ideology, that provided the ideas and motivation for the unnecessary war in Iraq, will remain a significant influence in the United States, particularly, in U.S. foreign and military policies and strategies in the Middle East. Hence, if a

neoconservative /Tea Party Republican is elected in 2016, we can expect another war in the Middle East. (Jeb Bush, the brother of George W. Bush, will probably be the Republican nominee for President of the United States in 2016. He has already announced his foreign policy team, which includes the neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz, the Bush advisor who pushed for the unnecessary war in Iraq.) Some scholars believe the United States is developing a system for perpetual war. (Bacevich, 2010)

The bottom line is that the American culture of war has evolved in such a way that it is less and less effective in achieving political objectives. It effectively removes the American people from the conduct of war, making it easier to go to war, sustain war, and to conduct war without regard to the people. The American culture of war is over reliant on advanced technology and "revolutionary doctrine" to achieve military and political objectives. It is over-reliant on contractors and industries that profit from and depend on war. And, the American culture of war is enormously expensive. Politically, it functions in such a way that it produces an arrogance that makes limited wars more likely.

2. The U.S. Army and the Transformation Trap: the Army, the American People, Operational and Tactical Doctrines

In the wake of the two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. rewrote its primary doctrinal manuals. The new U.S. Army doctrine stresses human engagement in war:

Humans live on the land and affect almost every aspect of land operations. Soldiers operate among populations....(The ideas in this paragraph were expressed by the Chinese theorist Mao Zedong in his development of his protracted war of attrition doctrine) They accomplish missions face-to-face with people, in the midst of environmental, societal, religious, and political tumult. Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is usually insufficient to produce lasting change in the conditions that spawned conflict. Our effectiveness depends on our ability to manage populations and civilian authorities as much as it does on technical competence employing equipment. Managing populations before, during, and after all phases of the campaign normally determines its success or failure. Soldier often cooperate, shape, influence, assist, and coerce according to the situation, varying their action to make permanent the otherwise temporary gains achieved through combat. (ADP 1, 2012)

The Army seems to have learned from its many years of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the Army learned these same lessons during the Vietnam War. The problem is not the Army. The Army is trapped by a system and culture of war that diminishes human engagement, diminishes soldiers, and diminishes ground combat. Army doctrine also states: "Because the land environment is so complex, the potential for unintended consequences remains quite high. In the end, it is not the quality of weapons, but the quality of soldiers employing them that determines mission success." (ADP 1, 2012) It is not just the quality of soldiers. It is also the quantity of soldiers that matters.

After World War II, with the occupation of Germany and Japan, the United States became a European and Asian power responsible for the security of hundreds of millions of people beyond the borders of the United States.

*--In 1939, when World War II started in Europe, the U.S. Army numbered less than **190,000 men**. When World War II ended in 1945, U.S. Army ground forces number more than 6 million men organized into 89 divisions. This was the result of conscription.*

*--In 1950, when the Korean War started, the U.S. Army numbered less than **600,000 men**, formed into 10 divisions. As General Ridgway observed: "We were, in short, in a state of shameful unreadiness when the Korean War broke out, and there was absolutely no excuse for it."*

*--In 1952, during the height of the Korean War, the U.S. Army numbered **1,596,419 soldiers**, organized into 20 active duty divisions. This Army was the result of conscription.*

*--In 1961, on the eve of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army had **858,622 soldiers** organized into 14 active duty divisions, roughly half its size of ten years earlier.*

*--In 1968, the year of the Tet Offensive and some of the worse fighting in Vietnam, the U.S. Army numbered **1,570,343 soldiers** organized into 19 active duty divisions.*

--In 1973, conscription ended. The American people eliminated themselves from the conduct of the wars of the United States.

*--In 1990, on the eve of the first Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Army number almost **800,000 soldiers** organized into 16 active duty divisions. However, the end of the Cold War called for a "Peace Dividend," and the G. H. W. Bush Administration started the process of drawing down the Army. This process was interrupted to fight the war against Saddam Hussein, but continued during the Clinton Administration.*

*--In 2001, the year of the terrorist attacks on the United States the U.S. Army numbered less than **500,000 soldiers**, organized into 10 divisions. However, under the heading of "Transformation," the George W. Bush Administration was planning to cut two divisions out of the Army's force structure. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 stopped the plan.*

Since World War II, the United States has tried to substitute airpower for man power, has tried to get rid of the Army's ground forces and substitute bombers and fighters. It is a fundamental American belief that airpower is a substitute for ground combat forces, and it is fundamentally wrong. In Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were too small to employ counterinsurgency doctrine. (Bremer, 2006) To do what was required in the state the size of Iraq required 500,000 soldiers. The Army and Marine Corps could not deploy half this number. And "allies" did not make up the difference. However, again it is evident that we refuse to learn this lesson. Recently the Under Secretary of the Army, Brad Carter, on the issue of the size of the Army stated:

"Between 2000 and 2011, we had all kinds of incentives in place trying to grow the Army during a war environment, and the most the enlisted force grew in a single year was nine percent." The Under Secretary added that if the nation wanted to build the Army back up from 420,000 to 550,000 or 570,000 soldiers, the force would need to grow by 35 to 40 percent in accessions annually. That's probably not possible, no matter what kind of incentives one puts in place, he said. "So my fifth question to you is: If we're going down to 420,000 or lower, how do you build it back up – how quickly can we recruit the right people, to make sure we have enough units, field grade officers, senior NCOs? This isn't an easy question to answer," he said. (Liepold, 2014)

This is a matter of national security. The Under Secretary was saying we cannot call upon the American people to serve, even during times of war. During the wars Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey wrote:

While we remain a resilient and committed professional force, our Army is out of balance for several reasons. The current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies.... Currently operational requirements for forces and limited periods between deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency to the detriment of preparedness for the full range of military missions. Soldiers,

families, and equipment are stretched and stressed by the demands of lengthy and repeated deployments with insufficient recovery time.... Overall, our readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build it.(General George W. Casey, "Chief of Staff of the Army Statement on the Army's Strategic Imperatives," before the Senate Armed Services Committee United States House of Representatives, 15 November 2007)

Again consider the words of a U.S. Army general. Shortly after the Vietnam War General Bruce Palmer Jr., wrote:

The Army's most serious problems were in the manpower and personnel area. Basically they stemmed from the failure to mobilize and the decision to hold to a one-year tour in Vietnam. Without at least a partial mobilization the Army was denied the use of the trained, experienced units and personnel present in the National Guard and organized reserves. This meant that, as the Army expanded from roughly 950,000 in 1964 to about 1,500,000 in 1968 to meet the requirements of Vietnam, the additional men and women entering the service were mostly very young, untrained, and inexperienced, resulting in the dilution of overall experience in the Army.... For the Army the overall simple arithmetic was that its so-called sustaining rotation base in the continental United States was not large enough to furnish the large number of trained replacements required each year for Vietnam and Korea.(Palmer, 1984)(General Palmer observed that: "The U.S. Army and its South Vietnamese allies in Vietnam at times demonstrated a tendency to rely on superior firepower and technology rather than on professional skill and soldierly qualities. Moreover, during Vietnam there were U.S. officials who constantly sought to develop some magical scientific breakthrough—something akin to the Manhattan Project of World War II that developed the first atomic bomb—that was to produce dramatic results and bring the war to a quick close. But it was a will-o'-the-wisp, an unattainable, somewhat foolish wish.")

In the 1960s the U.S. Army was too small to secure the people of South Vietnam, and each year it deployed a new, inexperienced Army to the fight. No operational or tactical doctrine ever created can make up for the shortage of trained, motivated, experienced soldiers.

The American People: In 1973 the American people eliminated themselves from the conduct of the wars of the United States. There are three parts to this argument: over consumption resulting in obesity and an overweight population, national unity and

cohesion, and the post-World War II American vision of war.

Overconsumption. Americans are the biggest consumers on Earth. This excessive consumption effects national security. It diminishes significantly the numbers of Americans capable of serving as soldiers. Consider recent findings:

From 2011 to 2012, 54 percent of Americans had abdominal obesity, up from 46 percent from 1999 to 2000. And the average American waist grew from 37.6 inches to 38.8 inches over the same period, according to the study to be published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*.... Nearly two in three women had abdominal obesity from 2011-2012, while 44 percent of men had it, according to the study.(Izadi,2014)

In *The American Culture of War* I wrote: "It is hard to imagine how the United States can remain a superpower with a significant portion of its population suffering from the debilitating effects of obesity.(Lewis, 2012) Being overweight has a physical and psychological effect. People who are overweight tend to lack motivation, drive, tenacity, energy, and confidence. They tend to not volunteer. They tend to not act aggressively. Overweight people tend to lack the physical capabilities and mental disposition required of soldiers and leaders in ground combat. They physically cannot charge the hill. Over half of the American people are overweight. This is a national security issue.

National Unity and Cohesion. Today the United States is, arguably, less nation and more state. Cultural cohesion and willingness to sacrifice for one another has fracture since World War II. The fractures are caused by many sources, economic, political, social, ethnic, and racial. Consider the words of Michael J. Weiss: "For a nation that's always valued community, the breakup of the mass market into balkanized population segments is as momentous as the collapse of Communism. Forget the melting pot. America today would be better characterized as a salad bar.... Today, the country's new motto should be 'E pluribus pluriba' 'Out of many, many.'"(Weiss,2000)

Dr. Weiss noted that "These lifestyles represent America's modern tribes, sixty -two distinct population groups each with its own set of values, culture, and means of coping with today's problem." The disunity is obvious when looking at the Congress of the United States. It is incapable of acting for the good of the country. Selfish interests and anger predominate. The question is: during periods of crisis can the people unite to form a nation and act as a

cohesive, coherent whole, willing to sacrifice for the greater good? I do not know the answer, but in 2007, when soldiers and marines were doing three and four tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, only one member of Congress recommended conscription. National cohesion and unity is a matter of national security.

The American Post-World War II vision of war was an airpower vision. With the development of the atomic bomb, which ended World War II, with the development of missile and jet technologies, with the development of satellite and space based information systems the American people came to believe that a revolution in warfare had taken place and that in the future wars would be fought and won with advanced technologies. Armies, many believed, were obsolete. This way of thinking is evident in American culture, media, expenditure of resources, and actions. In the 1950s and 60s a science fiction vision of war took hold in the United States. A Star Trek vision of war was born. Wars fought from the bridge of great vessels, starships, with laser and photon torpedoes. Wars fought by highly trained, high educated technicians. Wars that were neat and clean where only the enemy died. The problem is that, this vision of war, this way of thinking is fundamentally wrong.

Operational and Tactical Doctrine. As a consequence of too few soldiers, the Army and Marine Corps are constantly trying to leverage new technologies and innovate new operational and tactical doctrines that make it possible for them to do more with less, do more with fewer soldiers and marine, to control more space, to engage more people, to achieve more operational and tactical objectives. Today the Army and Marine Corps are trying to rethink ground combat operations, to figure out how they can fight and control vast areas with fewer soldiers. You hear terms such as: more expeditionary, leaner forces, improved tactical mobility, more lethality, more protection, reduced sustainment footprint, and information dominance. None of these attributes, no matter how sophisticated, no matter how proficiently executed will replace the need for large numbers of soldiers on the ground, soldiers who can communicate with people, soldier who have cultural understanding, soldiers who have respect for the indigenous population, soldiers who care about the mission and possess a little humility, as well as motivation.

The Army has four transformation options: one develop new technologies for ground combat, such as, unmanned ground combat vehicles and drones, UAV, capable of resupplying and reequipping forces spread

on vast areas; two, develop new tactical and operational doctrines, such as, Joint Distributed Operations, to make it possible to control vast areas with few soldiers; and three, develop super soldiers, Special Forces, men and women, so highly trained, so proficient, so educated, so physically capable that they perform multiple functions with great certainty. Of course, a fourth course of action is to do all three, and this is what the Army and Marine Corps are doing now.

A few years back I had the opportunity to participate in a symposium at Joint Forces Command. The title of the symposium was Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E). The Marine Corps was developing a new operational doctrine, called "Joint Distributed Operations." The objective was as follows:

Joint distributed operations are joint operations characterized by forces widely dispersed in multiple domains throughout an operational area, often beyond mutually supporting range and operating independently of one another because of distance or differing missions or capabilities, but supported by a variety of nonorganic capabilities.

JFC was trying to develop a way to control vast areas with very few soldiers or marines. In the 19th century the British and French were able to control vast areas of Africa with just a few soldiers. They had vastly superior technology, firearms, which the indigenous peoples could not match. Today, the Army and Marine Corps are trying to develop technologies that will create a similar advantage. However, at this point in time, as far as I know, no such technologies exist.

Consider the words of Colonel John Paul Vann, spoken in the early days of the Vietnam War: "The best weapon for this sort of war would be a knife, but I'm afraid we can't do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worst is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle—you know who you're killing." (Halberstam, 1988) Americans never learned this lesson. Throughout the Vietnam War they used offensive airpower to achieve victory, and ultimately we failed.

3. Airpower Militarism: Network Centric Warfare and the Joint Strike Fighter: The Trap

Airpower Militarism. Militarism is the use of resources to acquire military technologies and capabilities beyond what is needed for security. The JSF is already obsolete. It is an example of American airpower militarism. The JSF is a fifth generation fighter. The U.S. Air Force and Defense industry are already looking at the sixth generation fighter. At the same time the U.S. continues to build the F-22 Raptor,

newer, stealthier version of the F-18 Hornet for the Navy, and newer, more capable drones (UCAV) and long-range, stealthy, autonomous combat air vehicle (aircraft with artificial intelligence). Arguably, the drones and AIs make the JSF obsolete. Still, vast resources are committed to airpower technologies, while the Army is being downsized to fewer than 500,000 soldiers.

The F-35 is the most expensive airplane every developed, more expensive than the B-2 Stealth bomber, which cost near a billion dollars for two airplanes. Multiple nations are funding the aircraft and are planning to deploy it. All the services except the Army are going to fly it. (FY 2014, 2015) (The F-35A Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL), F-35B Short Take-Off/Vertical Landing (STOL), and F-35C Aircraft Carrier Variant (CV). The JSF is being built by Lockheed Martin, Aeronautics Division – Fort Worth, Texas. The UK, Canada, Australia, Italy, Netherlands, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, Denmark, and other states are paying for the development of the aircraft.) This aircraft is being funded by multiple states, including Turkey, South Korea, the UK, Canada, Italy, and Australia. The United States is exporting its vision of war, and it practices for making war. This aircraft is part of a larger vision of war, called *Network Centric Warfare*. This vision of war will not prove effective. Ask yourself, would this vision of war have achieved our military and political objectives in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan? The answer is NO.

Weapons such as the F-35, JSF continue patterns of behavior that are dysfunctional and ineffective. They distort our view of the world. Advanced weapon systems created environments which makes war more likely. Advance airpower technologies promise to eliminate the people from the conduct of war. This gives political leaders in democracies greater freedom to decide on war. Advance weapon systems promise a cheap, quick war, making war a more attractive alternative. Consider this: to justify the cost, the weapon has to be used. War. To demonstrate the effectiveness of a weapon battles are required. War. To get the government to buy more of a weapon, it has to be demonstrated and “effective.” War. Advanced airpower weapons give political leaders a sense of power. The power, however, is not real. Airpower alone cannot win wars. Consider the mission of the JSF:

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Mission: A force equipped with the F-35 units should permit the Combatant Commander to attack targets day or night, in all weather, and in highly-defended areas of joint operations. F-35 will be used to attack fixed and

mobile land targets, enemy surface units at-sea, and air threats, including advanced cruise missiles. (FY 2014, 2015)

The JSF cannot hold ground. It cannot communicate with people. It cannot determine the difference between a woman with baby and terrorist with a weapon. It cannot establish relationships with people. It cannot help people. In fact, all it can do is kill people. And war is more than killing people. Technologies, such as the JSF in fact, alienate people. They produce hate and anger when innocent people are killed.

Weapons produce arrogance. There was a tough-guy disposition and attitude in too many American political leaders, particularly in the neoconservatives, in 2003 when the Bush Administration pushed for a war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. (Vasquez, TARIH) (Vasquez wrote: “The hard-liners’ cognitive map of the world tends to be simple rather than complex. Hard-liners tend to be nationalistic and hold a militaristic view of the world. The hard-liner as a type is hostile toward and distrustful of the other nation, and feels unable to control events. In a crisis they are risk-takers. In personal relations they are prone to dominance. Except for the last, which is a personality characteristic, it is clear that the characteristics hard-liners share are something they have learned from their experience or imbibed from the culture around them.”) President George W. Bush, particularly, in his decision, actions, and personal behavior, demonstrated the “tough-guy” attitude and disposition. Consider his words spoken on the decks of the most technologically advanced warship ever built, the *USS Abraham Lincoln*, as he declared “major combat operations in Iraq have ended,” on May 1, 2003:

In the images of fallen statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era. For a hundred years of war, culminating in the nuclear age, military technology was designed and deployed to inflict casualties on an ever-growing scale. In defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Allied forces destroyed entire cities.... Today, we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians. No device of man can remove the tragedy from war, yet it is a great advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent. (Roberts, 2010)

He was wrong. Every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt has believed that “we have witnessed the arrival of a new era.” Yet, the Korean War was more primitive than World War II, and the Vietnam War was more primitive than Korean War, and in Iraq, in

an effort to save it, the U.S. finally had to redeploy infantry soldiers to the war zone. While billions of dollars of aircraft sat silent on runways. Again consider Bush's words, no humility, no respect for the Iraqi Army, no understanding that the true objective of war is sustainable peace. This disposition has not gone away.

4 A Political Environment for Perpetual War: Western Civilization and the Middle East/the Clash of Civilization, the Neoconservatives and Israel, and the Arrogance of Airpower Technology

Technologies and operational doctrines influence the decision for war. In political environments in which certain conditions exist, advanced technologies which promise a quick and easy victory, can be the final factor in the equation, the decision, for war. Arguably we have a political environment for perpetual war: Western Civilization and the Middle East, the Clash of Civilization, Neoconservative Ideology and Israel, and faith in technology create the conditions for perpetual war.

The Clash of Civilizations. Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington argue of the potential for a "clash of civilization." Lewis wrote:

In the course of the twentieth century it became abundantly clear in the Middle East and indeed all over the lands of Islam that things had indeed gone badly wrong. Compared with its millennial rival, Christendom, the world of Islam had become poor, weak, and ignorant. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the primacy and therefore the dominance of the West was clear for all to see, invading the Muslim in every aspect of his public and—more painfully—even his private life.(Lewis, 2002)

Many in the West believe this clash of civilization started decades ago. Western Culture devalues some people and highly values other people. As a consequence, the resources of society are distributed unevenly. Peoples are treated differently. Nations and states are treated differently. Some people are considered better than others. Why does this matter? This ideology influences U.S. foreign policy and the foreign and military policies of other Western nation-states in their interactions with non-Western states. The genocide in Rwanda is a case in point. No "Great Powers" showed up to stop the genocide.(Dallaire, 2005)

Israel and American Jews exert enormous influence on U.S. foreign and military policies in the Middle East.(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007) In March 2015, the Prime Minister of Israel again addressed a joint

session of Congress. The American treatment of the Israeli nuclear weapons program and the Iranian nuclear weapons program are very different. The Western valuation of people has consequence in the real world. It has resource consequences. It has military consequences. The United States and the Western world are too frequently incapable of treating the Muslim world as equals. Last year the world watched Israel destroy Gaza, with weapons paid for by the United States. The American people and world did nothing. Today, the Prime Minister of Israel, BiBi, is arguing for the U.S. to take stronger actions against Iran. In 2016, there will be a Presidential election and AIPAC will influence the selection of candidates and the outcome of the election. If another neoconservative is elected President, the probability of another war in the Middle East goes up.

5 Conclusions: The American Vision of War is Too Narrow

The American vision of war focuses primarily on the employment of advanced weapon systems to kill people. It deemphasizes human nature. It fails to consider the environment in which it will be operating, it fails to consider the nature of the enemy, and it fails to consider the nature of the peace it seeks to achieve after combat operations. (We need to consider not just the enemy's capabilities, but his nature. In Vietnam we considered only the enemy's capabilities. Given that equation we should have won the war, but we did not because we failed to consider the nature of the enemy, his willing to suffer enormous casualties, his ability to adapt, to move underground, and his attachment to a particular way of life. We failed to consider human emotions, the drive and tenacity created, by the destructions of homes, loved ones, and ways of life. War is much more than killing.)We need to consider not just the enemy's capabilities, but his nature. In Vietnam, for instance, we considered only the enemy's capabilities. Given that equation, we should have won the war, but we did not because we failed to consider the nature of the enemy, why he fought, his motivations, his attachment to his political objectives, his culture, his willingness to suffer enormous casualties, his ability to adapt and, to move underground, and his attachment to a particular way of life. We failed to consider human emotions, the drive and tenacity created by the destructions of homes, the deaths of loved ones, and the loss of their ways of life. *War is much more than killing.* We also failed to consider our own nature, the nature of American combat power and the willingness of the American people to support long, protracted, wars of attrition.

And we made the same mistakes again. U.S. forces entered wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that they did not understand. Their ignorance of the situations, cultures, and environments in both countries was profound. Their ignorance of the capabilities of their own forces was no less profound, and their strategy of regime change with the employment of advanced technologies was so flawed, it was doomed from the start. Consider the words of Ali A. Allawi, Iraq's first post-Saddam Hussein Minister of Defense, written his book, *The Occupation of Iraq*:

In official Washington, the ignorance of what was going on inside Iraq before the war was monumental. None of the proponents of the war, including the neo-conservatives, and also no one in the institutes and think-tanks that provided the intellectual fodder for the war's justification, had the faintest idea of the country that they were to occupy. The academics and researchers who congregated around the Washington think-tanks and the vice-president's office, who had made Iraq their pet project, were blinkered by their dogmatic certainties or their bigotries. There was a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of Iraqi society and the effects on it of decades of dictatorship.(Allawi, 2007)

The vast majority of American political and military leaders did not understand the sectarian divisions in Iraq. They did not know the difference between Sunnis and Shias. They did not understand how things worked in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, did not understand the political and cultural environment in Iraq, did not understand how Iraqi economy functioned, and did not understand the degraded state of the infrastructure. How do you explain such ignorance, from a nation that annually spends more than \$50 billion on its intelligence agencies (NSA, CIA, NRO, NGA, NIA, and DIA)? (Information is not intelligence, and intelligence is not understanding. The United States had plenty of information, much of it wrong, and plenty of "operational intelligence," but it totally lacked understanding.) The answer is simple: they did not care. They did not care about the Iraqi people. Post-conflict operations, what DOD then called Phased IV Operations, were a disaster. Consider the words of General Jay M. Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, created by President Bush in January 2003, just before the invasion of Iraq:

I'm convinced in my heart of hearts that there's still a chance over there to have a stable economically viable, democratic confederation. And I want to underline the word confederation.... But in order to do that, we have to have a national strategy. I'm going to tell you,

there's no strategy for Iraq. There was never one when I was there, and I haven't seen one since I left. But, we have to have one. I'll tell you what I think ought to go into it. The first thing is an understanding that we, as Westerners, look at things through Western eyes. You cannot do that in the Middle East. You can't do it anywhere else in the world. What we fail to realize is that we in America, with our wonderful democratic government, can't take that government. (Toy, 2004)

Not only did Americans not understand their enemy, they also did not understand themselves, and the environment in which their forces would operate. Again consider the words of General Bolger:

We then added to our troubles by misusing the U.S. Armed Forces which are designed, manned, and equipped for short, decisive, conventional conflict. Instead, certain of our tremendously able, disciplined troops, buoyed by dazzling early victories, we backed into not one but two long, indecisive counterinsurgent struggles ill suited to the nature of our forces.(Bolger, 2014)

More accurately they were dazzled by their technologies, by stealth fighters, information technologies, space-based information systems, precision weapons, and their expectations from *network centric warfare*. The problem for the United States is that the White House, the Department of Defense, and Department of State have a very narrow vision of war. Consider these words from the U.S. Army Field Service Regulations:

The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces by battle. Decisive defeat in battle breaks the enemy's will to war and forces him to sue for peace. Only an offensive would obtain decisive results. To be successful, an offensive required not only concentration of superior forces at the decisive place and time but also co-operation of ground and air forces.(Matloff, 1965)

This is fundamentally how the Pentagon thinks about war. Find the enemy's main force and destroy it. It is an American adaptation of the German, Clausewitzian approach to war. The Cold War—America's prolonged struggle with the former Soviet Union—reinforced this vision of war. America's primary strategic doctrine during the decades of the Cold War was: Massive Retaliation. The primary instrument to achieve Massive Retaliation was strategic airpower. Airpower ultimately came to dominate the American culture of war. Airpower was supposed to win the Korean War. It didn't. It took U.S. ground forces, including a brigade from Turkey, and significant ROK Army forces to save South Korea.

Airpower under the theory of Graduated Response was supposed to win the Vietnam War. It didn't. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps, for a decade fought the entire war on the strategic defense, incapable of imposing its will on the enemy. In Iraq and Afghanistan, enemy forces were quickly destroyed, but the wars did not end. Against ISIS, the Islamic State, the primary American instrument for war is again airpower. J.F.C. Fuller in his critique of Clausewitz wrote:

But of all Clausewitz's blind spots, the blindest was that he never grasped that the true aim of war is peace and not victory; therefore that peace should be the ruling idea of policy, and victory only the means toward its achievement. Nowhere does he consider the influence of violence on eventual peace....(Fuller, 1961)

War is about more than killing people, and all that advanced technologies allow you to do is kill people more efficiently. War is ultimately about establishing a relationship and creating an environment in which peace can take place. In other words the true objective of war should be peace. War cannot be detached from the people on whose homeland it is being fought. And armed forces cannot be detached from the people, the culture that produced them.

Final Words: In my book, *The American Culture of War*, I advance an argument that explains the new American way of war:

Using culture as one of the major determining factors in historical change, I argue that the traditional American practice of war was no longer valid in the wake of World War II. The traditional American system for procuring soldiers and equipment and fighting war no longer functioned as a result of (1) the US becoming a "superpower," responsible for the security of the "Free World;" (2) the advent of artificial limited war, a result of the development of nuclear weapons; (3) the "revolution in warfare," a result of advances in airpower, missile, and other technologies; (4) expanding American expectations from life, a result of unparalleled growth in wealth and consumption; and (5) a new American militarism, a result of the military becoming a major industry, institution, and lobby in American lives.(Lewis, 2012)

I still think this thesis is correct. Since World War II and the early days of the Cold War the Armed Forces of the United States have been in a trap. They are trapped by the political and economic systems that maintain the American defense industry. The Armed Forces of the United States are always transforming, and they are always transforming in the same way – towards more and more advanced technologies, towards the most sophisticated and expensive

instruments of war ever produced by man, towards the most highly trained technicians ever employed, towards smaller and smaller ground forces that are less and less capable of winning the peace, towards an American people who are more and more disconnected from their armed forces, and less and less physically capable of serving in them, and towards a narrower vision and understanding of war. Let me leave you with this thought:

Human beings are the most advanced weapons system on the planet. Men and women, not the machines that they make, are the dominant weapon on Earth. The human body is the most resilient, precision weapon ever produced. The human brain, spirit, will, and ability to bond with other human beings and courageously sacrifice even one's life for the good of the community are the attributes that make man the dominant weapon on Earth. Humans are the most adaptable instrument and animal on Earth. The human ability to adapt – physically, psychologically, intellectually, and emotionally – has made humanity the most successful species. And while war motivates men to adapt by creating and producing tools and machines, it is man himself – not his tools or machines – that is the ultimate instrument of war.

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