



Special Issue,
International Conference on Military and Security Studies, ICMSS-2015

Letter

Evolution of the International Security Environment.

Dear Readers of JMISCI,

I have to start with a confession, distinguished Commandant, Generals, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. This is my first speech for a long time. So I am a little bit rusty. The reason is that I retired from public speaking last year. I was in London, giving a talk next to the Houses of Parliament. When I finished, a man in the audience, who looked like the American detective Colombo, you remember with the hand woven hat and dirty raincoat, came up on to the stage and said ' –Dr.Shea, Thank you very much for coming this evening, take this envelope, this is a small token of our appreciation.' I looked inside the envelope, and I saw a bundle of money. But I immediately thought: We live in the age of Facebook, Instagram, the social media, nothing can be secret any longer, right? So I decided to hand the envelope back. And when I did so, a tear went down his face. And he said ' –Ooh, Dr.Shea, thank you so much for giving this money back. Next time we will use it to get a really good speaker!'. So I decided immediately to retire. But then the Commandant approached me, and Turkish hospitality is legendary, which I've just verified again. So thank you very much, Commandant, for the kind hospitality, I've made an exception for you. Here I am, as they say in the music business, 'one night only', to talk to you today.

I have been asked to give you my sense of the evolution of the international security environment. And I will try to do so, in about 25 minutes, so that we can have the time for questions and answers. The one thing that I know as a public speaker is that, when you are speaking one hour, seems like one minute. And when you are listening, one minute

seems like one hour. One of my favorite books, is Edmund Burke's, Reflections on the Revolution in France. When he read it, William Pitt the Younger, who was the British Prime Minister at the time of the French revolution, said, 'This is a rhapsody! In which there is much to be admired, but absolutely nothing to agree with!' and after listening to me, you may also feel that this is a rhapsody, and you may disagree with what I say. And in that case fine, we can debate this further in the question and answer session. Finally before I kick off, let me apologize for my voice. You may think that last night I drank two bottles of whiskey, and stayed the night awake watching the television. Not true, I had a good night's sleep, but unfortunately, I have developed a terrible cold, which has made my voice and my cockney accent even worse than they usually are.

Well, the first thing I want to say about the security environment is, frankly, we are in a mess, and the first thing we need to do is recognize it. Despite all of NATO's good efforts, despite all of the hard work of the last 25 years, to build partnerships, to build cooperative relations, we face a situation, in and around Europe, which is going to take a minimum of 20 to 30 years to solve. No quick fixes, no silver bullets, no magic solutions, no quick exits, from the crisis which we now face. This is an assessment, obviously, but it is the situation that we face. Things have not turned out the way that we had hoped. That does not mean to say that the situation isn't retrievable but we have to recognize that all of our policies have to be crafted for the long term. This is going to take time. And the situation as we see in Iraq, Syria, Libya, at the moment potentially in

Ukraine, is likely to get worse before it starts to get better.

Second, we have a number of essential, requirements that we have to look into as we shape our policies. Number one: how do we go back to collective defense, which is the new emphasis of NATO, without going back to the cold war? Last time we did collective defence, it was a reflection of the cold war, but it also intensified the cold war. How do we escape that paradigm today? Collective defense, but still with the possibility that we can re-build a constructive relationship with Russia without waiting the 50 years that we had to wait with cold war containment? This is now called constraintment, not containment but constraintment; in other words, how do we constrain Russia's behaviour? Foreclose aggressive options, while still leaving the door open to return as quickly as possible to a constructive relationship. We cannot do a kind of 'tabula rasa,' eliminate entirely the history of the last 20 years, of cooperation with Russia. Security policy is about being part of the solution, not being part of the problem. So how do we construct security policy in a way that provides for our defense but does not reinforce competition, or antagonism, any more than absolutely necessary?

The third issue, is what I call generosity. For the first time, in NATO's history, we have to do many things at once. And that means, assessment of risks and making choices of the priorities. We have never had this situation before. Our commitments and priorities always more or less came as single packages and single lines of effort. We spent 12 years in Afghanistan, 16 in Kosovo, nearly 20 Bosnia. But the luxury was that there was nothing else to do. We did Kosovo, when Bosnia was coming to an end; we did Afghanistan, when Kosovo was largely stable. We had the luxury of focusing on one problem at one time and organizing ourselves for one contingency only. When we did crisis management, collective defense was over. That's finished now. We have a multitude of different issues, in a multitude of different regions. And certain Allies think differently about the strategic direction than others.

Let me give you an example. We finished yesterday in NATO a crisis management exercise. We had two

fictitious countries. Tribia and Froland in the Indian Ocean. Both were on the verge of confrontation with an evolving humanitarian crisis. And we had to send a task force to the Indian Ocean to restore freedom of navigation. And as we looked at the force planning, the Allies in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, said, "Wait a minute, we can agree to this only on condition that this does not affect in any way the assurance arrangements that ensure the defense of our territory in the wake of the Ukraine crisis". And then the US intervened, and said, "Yes, we would be looking at the possibility of deploying an aircraft carrier into the region, but only for two weeks, because nothing must affect the ongoing coalition campaign, against DAESH, the Islamic state, in Iraq and in Levant". So you got a clear sense that for the countries in the south, the priority is obviously the Islamic State. For the countries in the east, the priority is Russia. So, some believe that it should be all about collective defence, others believe that it should be all about crisis management.

How are we going to balance these two essential risks? The south is more important for some, the east is more important for others.

How are we going to have a force posture that allows us to do both?

This is going to require generosity. In other words, the countries of the east have got to be prepared to participate in crisis management, and the countries of the south have got to be ready to participate in collective defense. For example, if you take the NATO Readiness Action Plan, which is the big result of our last Summit, it is obvious that it is very difficult to persuade 28 Allies to put billions of dollars potentially in infrastructure, prepositioned equipment, new headquarters, logistic arrangements, airlift, transport, very high readiness forces, if they believe that only six countries are really going to benefit, and they in the south, won't be able to benefit from those kind of arrangements. In other words what 28 Allies do, has to have some kind of return of benefit for all 28. 28 for 28. Therefore, we have to have a situation, where for example France, which is very heavily involved in Mali, the Sahel, CAR (Central African Republic), has been prepared to participate in a major way in the reassurance measures in the Baltic

states. France has deployed aircraft, it was the biggest contributor, by far, to our Steadfast-Jazz exercise in Lithuania, 18 months ago. Estonia, although heavily occupied obviously with the situation in Ukraine, has sent a company to the CAR. This has to be the model for the future. We can't have just one strategy for the south and one strategy for the east, with one group of Allies doing one, and the other group of Allies the other. The problems are too serious. The East can only be solved by 28 Allies, and the South can only be solved by 28 Allies. So there has to be the readiness of everybody to do collective defense and crisis management simultaneously.

What has changed? Essentially, we now face a situation which resembles a paradox. For the last 20 years, we have had a paradigm, where the big countries that use force were us, the NATO countries or the traditional West. We have used force on numerous occasions, on the assumption that we are defending the rules, preventing genocide, upholding liberal democracy, preventing borders being changed by force. And the adversaries, the disrupters of peace, the people who break the rules, have been the small guys. People like Kaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, even Usama bin Laden. Not major adversaries when it comes to the risk/benefit analysis of using conventional forces. Not adversaries who had the capacity to deter us, let alone defeat us.

Now, we are in a situation where big countries also have military power, just like us, and well prepared to use it. Not just for defence or humanitarian responses like the Responsibility to Protect but for national self-assertion and to intimidate and dominate their neighbours. We haven't faced the prospect of great power conflict for over 50 years, since the early cold war, a situation where other big powers in the world are prepared to challenge the rules. And the monopoly of the use of force is no longer in the NATO community. When President Putin held his Valdai conference a few months ago, there was an interesting slogan: "New rules or no rules". For a long time we lived under the assumption, that no matter how bad things were, certain rules such as the non-use of force, no change of borders, would be observed. That's not the case any longer. The rules are seen as unacceptable constraints rather than as assets that serve the

common interest. We are in a world where everything is in play, and everything is negotiable. Remember the famous phrase of Lenin, 'what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable.'

The next big shift is the empowerment of the individual. Technology, social media, cyber have given the individual the power to disrupt that used to be the monopoly of the state. Where in the cyber domain you can organize an attack any time from anywhere in the world against anybody. Cyber has totally obliterated geography, and it's given the individual the power of massive disruption. A 16 year-old kid in California is able to control the dam system or the water supply system of California through use of malware, and accessing codes. Individuals can hide with impunity in cyber-space. They can reinvent their identities multiple times in cyber-space. They can come together and communicate with people that they normally would never meet in their lives, through cyber-space. And so you are seeing the empowerment of the individual, you are seeing the confusion of states and proxies; hybrid warfare is deniable, because the states hide behind the proxies and other groups. We have today, for example, several non-state actors that have incomes and armies larger than 50% of the countries in the world. Take Hezbollah, for example, 40,000 missiles and over 1 billion dollars of income a year, about 65,000 fighters. It's bigger than the majority of states and armies in the world. Countries like Syria and Iraq are a case in point where you have a multitude of different groups, instrumentalized by states that are acting against each other or helping each other through proxies.

The next issue is networks. Security issues are now increasingly emerging in the form of networks, partly organized crime, partly jihadism or something else. For many years in NATO I've dealt with the issue of improvised explosive devices, and we spent 65 billion dollars trying to deal with roadside bombs in Afghanistan. And we were trying jammers, body armor, hardening vehicles, route clearance, and satellite detection and so on. All to prevent the explosion or minimize the impact of the bang.

And suddenly we realized that this strategy wasn't working, because we were spending billions of

dollars to deal with a device that was costing a maximum of 50 to 100 dollars to manufacture and place. And as fast as we were taking them out, they were going back in.

So we started to analyze the issue. And we realized that it was a network. Was that one network? No. There were 8 networks, 90 % of the networks were organized crime. These networks were being used for multiple purposes, not just Improvised Explosive devices or potassium chloride and ammonium nitrate smuggling, but also for drugs smuggling, for weapons smuggling, for human trafficking, for money laundering, certain individuals were present in all of the networks. We were able to analyze who was running the network, where was the money coming from, where the technology was coming from, what was the relationship between, bribing customs, bribing industry, transit networks, and so on. And once we actually analyzed the network, we started to have some success in preventing the supply of these precursory materials into Afghanistan, because we were able to identify the routes and the individuals and to cooperate with the intelligence agencies, with the customs organizations, even with private industry to stop selling these ingredients to these individuals in these networks.

Let me give you another example of this; just before Christmas, we had a meeting at NATO on Africa and arms. And we had a British UN weapons inspector, who showed us a picture of a multiple launch rocket system in the Sinai. And he showed us one week later, the same system in Libya, and a couple of weeks later, the same system in Mali. In other words how the jihadist groups were literally using the same circuits, the same money supply chains and actually transferring weapons to each other. Like a car, I don't need it this weekend, you have it, you use it, and give it back to me at the end. So we are increasingly having to interpret threats in terms of the networks that organize against us and try to identify the weak points that we can disrupt.

That brings me to the distinction between internal and external security. Foreign fighters - about 3,500 - have left the EU to go to Syria or Iraq to join ISIL, al Nusrah or al Qaeda. That is a foreign policy problem. Foreign fighters coming back, from Syria and Iraq

become a domestic security problem. So the two are intrinsically linked. ISIL is encouraging mass migration now from Syria, over the Mediterranean into Europe. Turkey of course is affected by this as well. Many jihadists are hiding in this mass migration movement. That's again another example of how a humanitarian crisis could be instrumentalized to produce a security problem or security impact. Establishing the links to determine when a local problem becomes an international problem and a threat to us all becomes all the more important.

What about hybrid warfare, which is a big, preoccupation of NATO? Yesterday we had a meeting with the NATO ambassadors on hybrid warfare. What is it? It's nothing new. States have always used all of the instruments of power that they have available, to produce an effect. The issue is of course today, that there are many potential instruments which can be combined in many more ways and used more quickly.

Hybrid warfare is when many things are happening to you at once and creating maximum confusion, because none of these things are immediately attributable.

Who is behind it?

Is that explosion in my chemical plant an accident or an act of terrorism?

If it is an act of terrorism is it the act of a local group or has it been organized by a state?

Is there a pattern behind all of these attacks?

At what point, do these hybrid warfare attacks constitute a direct aggression, the equivalent of an armed attack?

At what level does a cyber attack constitute an Article-5 situation?

How should I respond when I don't have perfect attribution and less than adequate information; but delaying my response any longer could prove costly?

What if I am spending all of my energy focusing on a secondary attack and missing the real attack? For example, at NATO, a couple of months ago, we had a

major cyber attack and our big worry was that the attack, which was having the visible impact, the denial of service attack, which was overwhelming our server with multiple messages and which we were spending all of our time focusing on, would make us overlook malware much more destructive, espionage malware that was coming in through the back door. So hybrid is a fantastic way of diverting you on a secondary track so that you miss the real attack, which is coming when you are less prepared to identify and deal with it.

And how can we spot this early on?

How can we deal with it?

What we are seeing is that now the focus of security policy is increasingly on resilience. What are the vulnerabilities in my society? If I am going to be attacked where would you, my adversary, choose to attack me? Because these are my vulnerable points.

How do I make those vulnerabilities more resilient?

How do I make sure that there are no gaps in my resilience? For instance, confused responsibilities about who is responsible for protecting what – especially the question of who responds first: the nation, the EU or NATO, for instance? This is becoming an increasing preoccupation.

If I am attacked, how can I limit the damage, keep going and get back to normal operations as quickly as possible?

What are some of the ways, which the security environment is changing? What are the consequences?

Let me just mention a few principles and then talk about the NATO's operational response. First principle: assumptions. We have been basing our security policy for the last 20 years on assumptions that were wrong. We can't afford to do that any longer. One assumption was that Russia was going to become a more benevolent partner. Economic interdependence - this is an old theory, which goes back to the First World War, economic interdependence would constrain Russia's behaviour. The more we opened up to Russia the more Russia would become like us. We recognize

today that it is the other way. The more we opened up to Russia, the more Russia penetrated our societies. It bought up businesses, media, energy assets and even funded political parties or engaged public relations firms to run major campaigns. Russia sold us gas and in fact we became more dependent upon Russia. In Germany alone, over 300,000 jobs became tied to business with Russia. Economic interdependence doesn't bring about political change. Capitalism does not necessarily mean liberalism. Capitalism could prosper in almost any political system. This is just one example. I could give you many others but we cannot afford any longer to base our security on false assumptions about the nature of the other countries in the world and about the degree of influence we think we have on their behavior and internal evolution. In every country there may be people who want to be like us but that is not the same for their régimes who may see their survival as more based on confrontation. We may like order but others see more opportunity in disorder.

Hope is not a strategy. We need to be much more clear about the nature of our potential adversaries.

Moreover, over the last 20 years, we wasted a lot of resources for comparatively modest results. Let's be honest. Look at Afghanistan, which has cost the United States \$1 trillion so far. Basically we're not in a good position today to find resources to deal with new threats. Because of the legacy of the past. The United States stopped paying for World War II in 1965. We will stop paying for Afghanistan probably by the middle of this century. It will cost the United States \$1.4 trillion over the next 20 years to care for the veterans of Afghanistan and, Iraq. It's cost the United States \$6 billion to bring the equipment home from Afghanistan. It's going to cost billions of dollars in order to repair that equipment.

In other words, were it not for the legacy of the last 20 years, we would be in a much better position to deal with the more serious threats, we are going to face in the future.

We wasted a lot of resources over the last 20 years. We cannot afford to do that any longer. We have got

to make sure that the resources we have left, we use in a more cost effective way than we did before.

Then there is the issue of assessment. We are very bad at assessment. In Ukraine, we had 1400 cooperative activities last year. The year before, we had 1200 activities or meetings, more visits or more seminars. We must be making progress. Wrong. We have confused activity as such with concrete results and outcomes that we have affected. We do a lot, therefore Ukraine must be moving forward. We need to ask ourselves. Are we really getting anywhere? How can we measure if we're really making a progress? What effect are we having? For example, take the Readiness Action Plan. We know that it's a good strategy to oppose a Russian military incursion. But is it enough to deter or counter other forces of hybrid warfare by Russia? Is it going to modify Putin's behaviour? In other words, what is affecting the calculus of our potential opponents? I think Putin has a very good idea about his strategy that is affecting our calculus, our options. Are we able to do the same in reverse? We've got to be much better at this than we've been in the past. Measuring what we're doing, being honest with ourselves and getting out of this process orientated approach, where the answer to everything is more meetings, more visits, more activities, more projects. Winston Churchill once said that strategy is a very important thing but that occasionally one should consider the results.

Next thing is that we're going to have to be much better joined up between what NATO does and what our nations do. The last 10 years or so there's been quite a dichotomy between what was happening in NATO Headquarters, in terms of priorities, pre-occupations and defense planning and what the nations have been doing. In an environment where security threats are manageable, you can get away with that, ladies and gentlemen. But in an age where security threats are more urgent and resources are much tighter, we've got to adopt a much more holistic approach between what the nations are doing and ourselves at the multi-national NATO level. The NATO command structure and our training and exercise programmes have got to be much more linked to the national priorities, national planning. We need to make use of all of our resources and not just the common funded and a very small percentage

of resources in the NATO budgets. Nations must be prepared to devote to the Alliance more of their people, resources and capabilities. We must close the gap between strategy and means. Operations in very different areas, or dispersing our armed forces and capabilities in parallel universes: we can't afford to do that any longer. What we're doing in Brussels has to reflect the priority in Ankara or London or Washington and, of course, vice-versa.

What does that mean for NATO's future enabling environment? We need to know what is going on. We need to have a better idea. We have been taken by surprise too frequently by Russian snap military exercise or hybrid operations. If we don't know what to look for, we cannot recognize it when we see it. Even if we see things, they are only useful if we can correctly interpret their meaning. We have got to have much better situational awareness, much better strategic foresight analysis and planning and we've got to stop being reactive all of the time. That means that we have to overhaul our intelligence-sharing in the Alliance. We have to link intelligence to indicators. It's no good knowing things, if you don't know what they mean. The British American poet, T.S. Elliot, famously, said we had the experience but we missed the meaning. We have got to link intelligence to specific indicators that tell us something bad is happening. Something is significant. This is key to decision-making. It's no good having a NATO high readiness force, able to move in 48 hours. If it takes 48 days, to come to an assessment of the situation and to agree that something is happening, that the force needs to be deployed. We have to have some degree of agreement between the political side and the military side to delegate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the NATO military authorities the authority to initiate crisis response measures and to make preparations to activate and call up the forces, to make them ready to act, to give time for the political decision-making. This is difficult because, we have been in an age for the last 20 years where our political authorities micromanaged literally everything the military have done, in terms of rules of engagement and operational plans. It was okay in Afghanistan because you had plenty of advance notice that you were going to deploy a company in

Helmand. You had time to prepare and there were no surprises. It was all part of a very deliberated mechanism. We don't have the luxury of advanced notice and lengthy force preparation times any longer. We have to speed up political decision-making to correspond to this high readiness posture and the need to pre-empt aggression before it has time to take effect.

My other conclusion is that we have got to look at what I call war winning technologies, and more force-multiplier ideas. What are the things that are going to give us an edge? And how can they be acquired? In some cases, it's a new procedure; in other cases it is a new technology or the innovative use or combinations of old technologies. Let me just give you a just one example because I'm almost out of time.

Biometrics. In Afghanistan, we were trying to pull up explosive devices but we could never identify who was putting them in. We could never provide evidence that a person was the perpetrator. So we could never take the bad guys off the battlefield. But one day we found a solution, biometrics. That's the answer so we developed technology with the special operations forces for mobile laboratories, which could exploit biometric material. We then developed via satellite, a reach-back facility which could transmit that biometric information into a national laboratory to be analyzed. But what about Interpol? So we signed an agreement with Interpol and the FBI to declassify biometric information and put it into an Interpol database. A year after an explosion in Afghanistan, an individual arrives at John F. Kennedy airport in New York, using biometric data, and eyes scanned, fingerprints, DNA database, he is identified. But back in Afghanistan the justice system did not recognize biometrics. The Afghan legal system did not have the laws in place nor the technical ability. So we changed that as well. The biometrics evidence became applicable to the Afghan justice system. That is one example of one innovative technology which, if you can master it, use it and share it with the customs and the police and intelligence services, becomes a war winning technology. Because, when you start taking the individuals off the battlefield, the IED's go down. We need more of those kinds of things that we can exploit

to our advantage. And we need to have not just the technology but also the people, processes and organization to exploit it to full effect.

Next thing, we need to look at our ability to operate across the spectrum in all domains. I want to give you an example. We had an exercise a couple of months ago called Trident Juncture. It was interesting because at one stage of that exercise, SACEUR wanted to be able to take out a command and control center. He had two options. One option was to use missiles, kinetic forces - that is blowing up the target. The other option was to use cyber. SACEUR did the calculation, decided that the missiles would potentially kill many people, cost millions of dollars to employ and pose risks of escalation. A cyber operation, by contrast, would be as effective but much less costly. However, there were no rules of engagement and no agreed legal basis to do this kind of thing so the only thing you are authorized to do, is the potentially less productive and more risky route. So we have to ask ourselves, as we need to operate across the spectrum, what is the legal basis, the rules of engagement, and our understanding of other techniques that could be more effective or that we may wish to use? Another example, the piracy in the Gulf of Aden. We spend billions of dollar sailing ships up and down the Gulf of Aiden, looking for piracy. It has been quite effective, I have to say at the end of the day. It reduced the piracy but it has cost a lot of money and it's cost the deployment of a lot of ships. We need to shift those ships now to other things - to the Black Sea, the Baltics. But we have to continue our operations in the Gulf of Aden or the pirates will come back. So what is a more cost-effective or viable alternative to a big military operation?

I was with Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, the former Secretary General of NATO a couple of years ago, when he was speaking to a community of shipping insurance brokers and he was explaining to them how NATO was helping to solve the problem of piracy. One of the insurance agents asked the Secretary General a very interesting question: "Tell me how many ships go through the Gulf of Aden every year? - " 25.000. "How many ships have been captured by the pirates? - " 3 or 4". The agent works out the percentages. "What has been the ransom

So, ladies and gentlemen, the situation is desperate but not hopeless, or hopeless but not desperate, whichever way you want to quote it. We are in a difficult period, there might be some enormous challenges in the years ahead. It is very easy to focus on our weaknesses, and to some degree that's what we have to do. But we also have tremendous strengths, in terms of values, capabilities and partnerships and we need to use these more effectively to build a better future for all of us.

Thank you very much for listening to me. It was a pleasure to be here today.

Questions and Answers

Question: We are part of NATO, we protect the southern flanks of NATO. But we are not a member of EU. My question will be about our accession into EU. We, as a company, are a part of a group which is called European Land Systems Defence Industry Group. We meet every month in Brussels with our partners and talk about issues on defence. They suffer that defence spending is declining. We lastly heard that, we would not be accepted into the meetings of European Defence Agency. Here my question comes: If you were an advisor to EDA president or EU presidency, what would you tell him regarding Turkey's participation into EDA meetings or about EU accession?

Answer, Dr. Jamie Shea:

We have been trying to resolve the issue of NATO and EU for years, because everything that brings us closer is good for security, and there has never been a time like today when the EU and NATO are facing the same problems in the same neighborhood and having to work together. In fact, just before zooming on your question, since the Crimea, Ukraine crisis last year, we had much more interaction with the EU. I think the EU also recognizes that it has been challenged by Russia and by what is happening in the South, as much as NATO. So, we cannot afford to do different things in different places any longer and have two different strategies. So, I think, politically speaking, there is now an opportunity to move forward. It has been NATO's position for a long time that the EDA needs to have some kind of administrative agreement with Turkey. It has been a

principle for a long time. A country in NATO like Turkey should not be discriminated against because it is not in the EU, particularly if it is a candidate country for the EU which is true of Turkey. The previous Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen tried very hard to work out a good interim agreement before Turkey's accession to the EU, which would allow a good relationship between Turkey and the EDA, which would allow an information sharing agreement between NATO and EU. For example which would widen the scope of NATO and EU consultations, but unfortunately, he did not succeed. What I can say is that today we are trying to establish between Allied Command Transformation and the EDA, a working relationship in the area of capabilities, particularly to avoid duplication of effort. For example, they do helicopter pilot training, helicopter upgrades, that type of thing. And of course, Turkey, being a part of Allied Command Transformation can put its voice across to the EDA through this bilateral agreement. I know it is not a substitute for what Turkey would like, but I would hope before too long that we could try another political initiative between two halves of the Brussels to try to get this interim agreement. Of course, the issue of Cyprus would still remain open. I know this is very important for Turkey, but would not freeze the ability to have that closer relationship pending the resolution of these political issues. I think we came close in the past and we need to try it again. But I understand your frustration, we can only continue to make the case. That is in the EU's interest to involve Turkey, as quickly and as closely as possible.

Question: As you mentioned, security in the world is now completely a mess. We have to create a collective defense, but not in the sense of Cold War. However, today, we have an era like Cold War, and things are not black and white, what I call today is a 'functional multi-polarity.' Cyber, nuclear issues, etc. all are polar functions, sometimes fighting against and sometimes supporting each other. And we have many constraints about forming a collective defense. For example, India and US have good relations in terms of military issues. But yesterday we heard that India is almost signing a treaty about production of 5th generation fighter planes in Russia. So how can

My conclusion is okay, fine, you want to leave the West. We cannot stop you. That's your choice. We think it's a bad choice that doesn't make sense. What does it bring you? More Prosperity: No, more education: No, more integration: No, but that's your choice. But you cannot stop other people from integrating, just because you don't want to. You cannot stop other people going to the party, just because you want to leave the party. Russia leaves the West. However, it cannot drag all of the territory of the former Soviet Union along with it. That is what we are opposed to.

Number 2, we have to leave the door open. Russia historically has had some periods when it wanted to leave the West. It has always come back. I personally do not believe that Putin speaks for the Russian people when it comes to isolation. I think yes, there's a part of the Russian people that probably likes the idea of nationalism, the idea of restoring pride. However, the euphoria of nationalism does not last. Already, inflation is 15%, living standards are declining. The Ruble has lost 45% of its value and a \$10 drop in the price of oil costs Russia €2 billion in income. I don't think it's going to last. I think within a year so, Russians will say "Oh My God. This is not really making us rich or happy." In Russia, 132 people own 35% of GDP. I honestly do not believe the euphoria is going to last. What we have got to do is be very firm against the Russian régime. But we have got to be clear to the Russian people that we are not condemning Russia as a country or civilization that has left the West forever. When they want to come back, we are ready to receive them. We are not going to be the source of confrontation. If they want to go for confrontation, NATO will respond. But, I believe Russia will soon come back when they see what the alternatives are.

Mr. Putin wants to enhance economic relations with China and Asia. But these are not alternatives to trade with the West. The vast majority of Russian trade is with the West not Asia at the present time. We have to be patient. It may take a while for the nationalist euphoria to subside, but it will.

Sanctions. Every regime says that sanctions will not work. "We can survive, you can't hurt us." Do not

take it seriously. What else can they say? In reality the sanctions have a major impact. Many western companies, because of uncertainty, stop the investments. The Russian oil and gas industry is going to sink if modernization doesn't continue. Russia has to invest billions of dollars in new technology every year to be able to meet its production level. I don't believe the narrative of the government that the domestic industry and domestic production are going to substitute for the loss of imports and investments. When we look at the embargo of European food, we have found other markets. So the impact is minimal. But all of us know from our experience, sanctions take time. At this point the most important thing is having decided to our policy to stick to it. Sometimes I meet with Russian diplomats. They say "Come on Jamie. We know you. You are going to Puff and Huff for a couple of weeks and that won't last long. You guys don't have staying power and perseverance. Look at Georgia. You put the sanctions on Russia after Georgia and six weeks later you took them off. All we have to do is just wait for a while."

At this point, we have to stick to our policy and show that we are united. We have started very well. You know in the EU, NATO, and US, we stick to it.

I respectfully do not agree that we are ignoring the southeastern flank. It is vital. We have got Patriot missiles in this country with three Allies. There is an enormous focus on the help Turkey needs to deal with the refugee issue. I know too that two million refugees are on the Syrian border. Many NATO countries are participating in the coalition just south of you in Iraq. US is there, Belgium is there, France is there, and Germany is there. We have ships in the Mediterranean to deal with this situation. I understand your point that we should keep the focus on this flank. I don't think that it is an issue of strategic neglect.

Dr. JAMIE SHEA:

