THE ONTOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION: THE LOSS OF WORLDS IN THE FACE OF RISING A UNIFORM GLOBE

Erdal Yılmaz

Marmara University
erdal.yilmaz@marmara.edu.tr
orcid: 0000-0002-2270-8224

ABSTRACT

Up until Kant's critical philosophy, it was not easy to speak of the "world" itself as distinct from "nature". After Kant, the world began to be considered from a historical perspective. Therefore, the world came to be considered as historical rather than natural, which is why it is possible to speak of different worlds in the history of thought. However, globalization more and more drives these different worlds into a uniform historical globe. In this paper, I consider the question of globalization as a passage "from multiple historical worlds to a uniform historical globe". By analyzing the passages from "nature" to the "world" and from the "world" to the "globe," I focus on how the idea of "dwelling in the world" and of "saving the earth" has increasingly transformed into the idea of "dominating the world" and of "owning the earth".

Keywords: Nature, World, Globalization, "Dwelling in the world", "Saving the earth", "Dominating the world", "Owning the earth".

INTRODUCTION

It is the first time in history that virtually every individual at every level of society can sense the impact of international changes. That is why, over the last few decades, an extensive debate goes on about globalization and its effects upon the future of human beings. While some thinkers express opinions in favor of globalization, others hold contrary views. Moreover, these thinkers also wonder whether the world is turning into a globe or not. Concerning globalization, we encounter three distinctive perspectives. These are the hyperglobalist, the skeptic and the transformationalist.

The hyperglobalists "have tended to regard globalization as the single important contemporary history."[1] According to this perspective, "contemporary globalization defines a new era in which people everywhere are increasingly subject to the disciplines of the global marketplace."[2] This viewpoint "generally privileges an economic logic."[3] Briefly, for a hyperglobalist, people are moving towards "a borderless world characterized by perfectly integrated international markets."[4]

In contrast to the hyperglobalist view, the skeptical view is that "all globe-talk is empty jargon, hype, myth, and rhetoric."[5] The skeptics defend the idea that "the state-centered Westphalia model still holds, governments continue to remain powerful in the economic sphere, and the national origins of multinational enterprises remain important for both business strategy and public policy."[6] For them, globalization is "more a myth than a reality because the world economy is still determined by competitive pressures and products generated at the national level, and they are dependent upon national, social and political institutions."[7] Thus, the world

---

[1] Jan A. Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 17.

[2] David Held and others, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 2.

[3] Ibid., 3.

[4] Kenichi Ohmae, ed., *The Evolving Global Economy: Making Sense of the New World Order* (Harvard: Harvard Business School Press, 1995), xviii.

[5] Scholte, *Globalization*, 18.

[6] Muhammad Ijaz Latif, 'Globalization: Myth or Reality?', *Pakistan Horizon* 63, no.4 (2010): 38.

[7] Paul Hirst, *From Statism to Pluralism: Democracy, Civil Society and Global Politics* (London: UCL Press, 1997), 239.

economy is "not truly global but centered in the developed countries"[8], which is why the skeptic emphasizes that the world is more regionalized than globalized. For the skeptical approach, the historical evidence of globalization confirms nothing but the increasing level of *internationalization* of the predominantly national economies.

The third perspective is the transformationalist perspective, which holds a middle ground between the above mentioned two approaches. The transformationalists consider globalization as a significant trend but one that coexists with other developments. For them, the nation-state will neither vanish nor remain unchanged; "states and societies across the globe are experiencing a process of profound change as they try to adapt to a more interconnected but highly uncertain world."[9] Thus, according to the transformationalist perspective, "human interaction networks are now penetrating the globe, but in multiple, variable and uneven fashion."[10] Moreover, its analysis and measurements of globalization are far more complex and multiple than what is presented by both the hyperglobalists and the skeptics.

From these perspectives, one may conclude that although proponents and critics may differ in their definitions, globalization signifies a historical process of becoming, as well as an economic and cultural result. These three perspectives analyze globalization in terms of its political, economic and cultural aspects. In my paper, I will try to analyze the phenomenon of globalization from a phenomenological point of view. Thus, this paper will not be directly concerned with the political and economic aspects of globalization. I will not define globalization; rather, I will attempt to describe how we arrive at globalization, and how globalization reveals itself in the contemporary world. For this purpose, I will sketch a phenomenology of globalization. In other words, I will analyze the mode of being of globalization. For this reason, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the ontological structure of globalization. I share here Heidegger's idea: "ontology is possible only as phenomenology."[11]

---

8 James H. Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 20.

9 Ibid., 2.

10 Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of Nation-state?". *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no 3 (1997), 496.

11 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY, 1996), §7:36.

Thus, the title of my paper can be reformulated as *The Phenomenology of Globalization: the loss of worlds in the face of rising uniform globe* as I shall attempt to phenomenologically describe the mode of being in which globalization reveals itself.

The second part of the title, "the loss of the worlds in the face of rising uniform globe", reflects my perspective concerning globalization. I will argue that the world has lost its worldliness (*Weltlichkeit/Mondanéité*) as an outcome of globalization. In order to explain how the world has lost its worldliness, I will focus on three concepts: nature, the world and the globe. Firstly, I will explain how and when conceptions regarding nature and the world changed; secondly, I will analyze the idea of "dwelling in the world" and of "saving the earth," and finally I will display how the world is becoming more and more a globe by losing its worldliness. In other words, in the last part of my paper I will explain how the idea of "dwelling in the world" has increasingly morphed into the idea of "dominating the world", and how the idea of "saving the earth" has turned into the idea of "owning the earth". Accordingly, I shall first consider the concepts of nature and the world.

TOWARDS A PHENOMENON OF THE WORLD AS DISTINCT FROM NATURE

Prior to Kant's *critical philosophy*, it was not easy to speak of the world itself, that is, to speak of the world as distinct from nature. The conception of the world as *kosmos, mundus* and *universitas* has always played a significant role in (Western) philosophy. However, before Kant, philosophical reflections paid little attention to the concept of the world itself. If one looks at Ancient Greek philosophy, one can see that the Greeks could doubt everything except "the reality of the rationality of the objective [natural] world."[12] For the Greeks, the universe was a *kosmos* that was ordered in a perfect and harmonic totality. The *kosmos* was that by which all existence became possible.[13] The highest object to which all beings could be

---

12 Kostas Papaioannou, "Nature et Histoire dans la Conception Grecque du Cosmos", *Diogène*, (1959), 6.

13 What the Greeks opposed to nature was not the spirit or the history, but *art* (τέχνη). Moreover, their concept of art as "imitation" indicates quite clearly the relations of subordination they establish between the human

attached was the eternal *kosmos*. The universe as a *kosmos* had no origin and would have no end. In short, for the Greeks, the *kosmos* was broadly defined as an "ordered whole" or a "world ordered and contained within the universe". Plato offers such an account of *kosmos* in the *Gorgias*. It reads: "Wise men say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men, are held together by the bonds of community and friendship and order and discipline and righteousness, and that is why the universe, my friend, is called an ordered whole or cosmos and not a state of disorder and licence."[14]

It follows, the universe as a whole contains no disorder or discord but order and harmony. In medieval times, this conception of the *kosmos* as an "ordered whole" was preserved by thinkers even though they thought that it was created by God, contrary to the conception of the Greeks. This way, until Kant the notion of *kosmos* as a rational explanation of the world was preserved. Like Sean Gaston[15], I call this classical worldview the *metaphysical* world. According to this conception of the world, there is no difference between nature and the world. The *metaphysical* world encompasses views on the world from Plato and Aristotle up to Kant's pre-critical writings. Collectively, they defend the idea that the world is a "timeless essence" and "an ordered whole".[16] The world is a "timeless essence" because it is not changed by any historical events; it is an ordered whole because the world as a whole contains no disharmony.

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* changed this conception of the world in philosophy because it transformed the epistemological status of the world. In this regard, there is a similarity between his own philosophical position and the Copernican revolution. Philosophers before Kant assumed that our knowledge must conform to the world; in contrast to this conception, for Kant, we should

---

world and the natural world. The human work acquires "form, intelligibility, value insofar as it fits into the organizing productivity of nature, and manifests the teleology that is immanent to it". Papaioannou, *Nature et Histoire*, 23. Art imitates nature so that, according to Aristotle, if things made by nature are made not only by nature but also by art, they come to be in the same way as by nature. Aristotle, *Complete Works,* ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1, 'Physics' (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 199a.

14 Plato, *Gorgias*, tr. Walter Hamilton and Chris Emlyn-Jones (London: Penguin Classics, 2004), 107.

15 Sean Gaston, *The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida* (London & New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), xi.

16 Ibid.

assume that the world must conform to the a priori forms of our knowledge. In other words, we must give up the assumption that the world is entirely independent from the character of experience. According to Kant, giving up this assumption involves adopting *transcendental idealism* (a term he coins to refer to his own philosophy). Kant uses the term "transcendental" to refer to the a priori conditions of all our cognition. As such, the term refers not to the objects of cognition, but to our way of cognizing insofar as it is to be possible a priori.

Kantian idealism, that is, transcendental idealism, announces a new perspective to the world and nature. It involves drawing a distinction between things as they appear to us, that is, *appearances* (*Erscheinungen*) or *phenomena*; and things as they are in themselves, that is, *things in themselves* (*Dinge-an-sich*) or *noumena*.[17] It means that we only ever know the world of things as they appear to us, and we never know how things are in themselves. Transcendental idealism involves abandoning the assumption that the world is transcendentally real. In other words, the world is not composed of things as they are in themselves. This is one aspect of Kant's rejection of the idea that the world is "a timeless essence and an ordered whole". The other aspect of his rejection is that, for him, the world is transcendentally ideal because the world is not independent of the subject. All worldly things appear to the subject only within the spatio-temporal relation. As time and space are within the subject, we might say that the appearances of all worldly things partially depend on the subject. I say "partially" because Kant does not reject the existence of sensible data outside the subject. Hence, he says that the world is transcendentally ideal.

According to Kant, we cannot say that the world is a whole. This is because, for Kant, we perceive only parts of the phenomenal world, not its totality. Our experience is always phenomenal and partial. In other words, our experience is always conditioned. However, this is not to say that we do not strive to know the unconditioned. Kant maintains that reason strives to ponder the unconditioned.[18]

---

17 Even though Kant uses *phenomenon* and a*ppearance* interchangeably, there is a difference between them. Whereas appearance is an undetermined object, phenomenon is a determined object through the concepts of the faculty of understanding. One can see the same Kantian approach to *thing-in-itself* and *noumenon*. To him, if they refer, they refer to the same thing. However, whereas noumenon refers epistemologically to it, thing in itself refers ontologically to it.

18 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A307-B364.

When we think about the phenomenal world, reason seeks some type of completeness or totality. The world as a whole is thus nothing but an idea.[19] It is an idea that signifies that the world is neither given ontologically, nor known discursively. The world as a whole is only a *regulative* idea of reason. It is this idea of the world as the principle of reason that enables us to speak of phenomena as a whole. Since, for Kant, the function of ideas is *regulative*.[20] Following Season Gaston, I call this critical solution the *regulative* world[21].

The *regulative* world is contrary to the metaphysical world, in that it does not conceive of the world as a timeless essence and an ordered whole. We understand the world as a regulative and a systematic unity through the exercise of our reason. It is clear that, for Kant, phenomenologically the world as a whole is only an idea. But, if the world is an idea of pure reason, what is nature? As for nature, it is reduced by *critical* philosophy to "a domain of external necessity comprising a mechanism of material lawfulness."[22] Kant's approach may be appropriate to "the most abstract and elementary domain of nature, which involves the purely material being of the universe, as a field of matter and motion without further qualification."[23] One can gather from these statements that, for Kant, nature and the world are not the same thing. This implies a revolutionary change in the traditional theory of the world because it is no longer considered as a ready-made whole or as a *timeless essence*, but as *regulative* world, which contains the contributions of its inhabitants and gains its wholeness thanks to subjective rational thinking.

Through Kant's conception of the *regulative* world, we clearly saw the difference between nature and the world. However, still his conception of the world does not give us the historical world that creates the possibility of globalization. Nevertheless the ideas of "dwelling in the world" and of "saving the earth", which are related to the historical world, and the idea of "dominating the world" and of "owning the earth", which are related to globalization, are based on this horizon opened by Kant. Thus, Kant's conception of

19 Ibid., A408-B434-5.

20 Ibid., A644-B672.

21 Gaston, *The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida*, xi.

22 Richard Dien Winfield, *Conceiving Nature after Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 9.

23 Ibid., 12.

the world remains significant. Next, I shall explain how Kant's conception of the world makes it possible for the ideas of "dwelling in the world" and of "saving the earth" to appear in the history of thought. In other words, I shall explain how Kant's abstract and "subjective" world becomes a concrete and historical world.

THE IDEAS OF "DWELLING IN THE WORLD" AND OF "SAVING THE EARTH"

As I have already mentioned, with the conception of the *regulative* world, Kant's *critical* philosophy profoundly changed the understanding of the concept of the world in the history of philosophy. This change influenced relevant philosophical research throughout the nineteenth century. Philosophers like Schopenhauer and Hegel were among those who were influenced. An extreme version of Kant's conception of the world could be seen in Schopenhauer's philosophy. The title of Schopenhauer's major work, *The World as Will and Representation*, aptly summarizes his conception of the world. For him, the world is the world of representation, that is, it is a world constituted by our own cognitive apparatus.

Hegel, on the other hand, found Kant's idea of the *regulative* world to be too subjective. In explaining the world as an idea of pure reason, Kant refers to the cognitive faculties of the subject. In response to this, Hegel attempted to establish a more concrete conception of the world. He argues that it is only when the world is as spirit –not as a concept or an idea– that one can grasp the actual world. It was in this sense that Hegel found Kant's conception of the world to be too subjective and, hence, ill-equipped at explaining this *actual* world.

According to Hegel, the world is "confused with nature, since it is a collection of what is spiritual and natural."[24] The natural aspect of the world is sublated more and more in the spiritual aspect of the world by the process of history. Indeed, history of spirit (mind, *Geist*) is for him a process of liberty.[25] The activity of spirit consists of several steps towards its liberation. "In the full liberation is given

---

24 G.W. Hegel, *Encyclopédie des Sciences Philosophiques,* vol. 2, '*Philosophie de la Nature*', tr. Bernard Bourgeois (Paris: J. Vrin, 2004), §247 Add.

25 G.W. Hegel, *Encyclopédie des Sciences Philosophiques,* vol. 3, '*Philosophie de l'Esprit*', tr. Bernard Bourgeois (Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), §385.

the identification of the three stages: (1) 'finding a world presupposed before us', (2) 'generating a world as our own creation', and (3) 'gaining freedom from it and in it'."[26]

In the first stage, the world is not totally separated from nature. It is both natural and historical; in fact, it is more natural than historical (spiritual) because the world is still a world presupposed before us, not generated by us. In the second stage, the world is a world created by human beings. In other words, the world is constituted by language, science, religion, art, philosophy, economics, law and the like. These fields are not the creation of an individual mind but necessarily inscribed in a community, values and knowledge. Thus, for Hegel, the world is no longer "the world presupposed before us" or nature. Instead, it is generated by our own creation.[27] In the third stage, spirit (mind, *Geist*) gains freedom from it and in it through art, religion and philosophy. This last step renders the world more historical because the spirit totally liberates itself from the world, while still remaining in the world.

From the above-mentioned analysis, one realizes that, for Hegel, it is only when the world is taken as a spirit that it is possible to grasp the world truly. For this reason, the world is first and foremost an *inherited* world, a set of moral values *already realized*; which is to say, the world is a "tradition". To distinguish the world from nature, according to Hegel, one must emphasize that it is through history that the world is created. Thus, for Hegel, the world unfolds by "history" and by "freedom", which is at the core of history. In other words, human history is the realization of freedom, which constitutes the world. That is why, the world is not natural, but historical (spiritual).

An *existential* version of Hegel's conception of the world can be encountered in Heidegger's thought. Heidegger criticizes the Cartesian conception of subject/object distinction. According to him, I am not a thing that thinks, but I am "being-in-the-world" (*in-der-Welt-sein*). Being-in-the-world is not a concept but a phenomenon, which Heidegger places beyond the traditional Cartesian dichotomy between subject and object. *Dasein*, which is used by Heidegger in place of the concept of subject[28], cannot know it-

---

26 Ibid., § 386.

27 Ibid.

28 Heidegger does not prefer to use the concept "subject," instead he uses the concept of "*Dasein*". In contrast to the dichotomy between subject and object, *Dasein* has an essential relation with the world.

self before the world, nor the world before itself. *Dasein* recognizes both itself and the world at the same time, because the essence of *Dasein* is being-in-the-world. "Being-in" (*in-Sein*) reveals a type of relation. "Being-in is not a 'quality' which *Dasein* sometimes has and sometimes does not have"… "*Dasein* is never 'initially' a sort of a being which is free from being-in", but which has a "relation" to the world.[29] If *Dasein* has a deeper relation to the world, one should here ask the following question: what does Heidegger mean by the word "world"?

The word "world" has a variety of meanings in Heidegger's thought.[30] To him, the world is, above all, not that which is seen as a kind of reservoir in which various objects occur. This conception of the world is given by scientific analysis of the character of inner-worldly beings. The scientist sees inner-worldly beings independently of their function, their use, or their value. To Heidegger, this kind of conception of the world is not primary. The world in his thought basically signifies the fundamental character of the being of *Dasein*, not the character of inner-worldly beings. On this note, he says, "The world is essentially disclosed with the being of *Dasein*."[31] It follows, inner-worldly beings can be discovered with the disclosedness of world. However, the world does not "become something subjective". Heidegger, as a phenomenologist, analyses the world based on the surrounding world of the everyday *Dasein*.[32] Based on this analysis, he argues that the world is not a sole entity or a series of entities, but the world is a horizon in which entities reveal themselves. Therefore, the world is not an entity *per se*, but a network produced by social and cultural relations. It can be gathered from these that the world is not an extended thing, as Descartes thinks. For Heidegger, insofar as the world is considered as the fundamental character of the being of *Dasein*, there is no *Dasein* without world and there is no world without *Dasein*. Because of this, the analysis of being of *Dasein* is important for better explaining the world. *Dasein* is not a completed being, but *Dasein* is always becoming. Heidegger says: "The 'essence' of this being [*Dasein*] lies in its to be. The whatness (*essentia*) of this being must be understood in terms of its being (*existentia*)."[33] If *Dasein* has not

29 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §12: 57.
30 Ibid., §14: 64.
31 Ibid., §43: 203.
32 Ibid., §14: 66.
33 Ibid., §9: 42.

a fixed essence, the existence of *Dasein* is temporal, and hence its existence is constituted historically. As Heidegger says, *Dasein* has, in every instance, its "history" because the being of this entity is constituted historically. Following these explanations, it can be said that, for Heidegger, *Dasein* is temporal and historical. Since the world is essentially disclosed with the being of *Dasein*, the world is also temporal and historical. As for nature, nature is also "historical"[34] because nature reveals itself in the (historical) world of *Dasein*. For Heidegger, I as a *Dasein* can see pure nature only by bracketing the world. However, bracketing the world is not possible because I am always "being-in-the-world" which constitutes my structure/essence.

It follows, for both Hegel and Heidegger, as I have mentioned, the distinction between nature and world is drawn through a reference to history and tradition. For Hegel, the world is first and foremost an *inherited* world, a set of moral values *already realized,* and, hence, historical. For Heidegger, the world as *Dasein*'s world is always historical. On this note, for Heidegger, only a human being possesses a world. In *the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, Heidegger explains this issue as follows: "1) the stone (material object) is worldless; 2) the animal is poor in world; 3) man is world-forming".[35]

Nevertheless, why is it that for Heidegger only man (*Dasein*) is world-forming? The first reason is that *Dasein* is not an inner-worldly being and, so, *Dasein*'s existence is temporal and historical. Contrary to *Dasein*'s structure, material objects and animals are inner-worldly beings. In other words, they are not temporal and historical. The second reason is language. Language plays an important role in the continuity of this world and its transmission to the new generations. According to Heidegger, language creates the possibility for human beings to have a world. In this regard, only human beings can have a world that is distinct from the environment. For Heidegger, animals do not have a world because they do not have language. Language is the defining factor. Since the world is not seen as impersonal but as a shared understanding between persons, what makes the world possible is language. Since human beings belong to language and history and participate in

---

34 Ibid., §75: 388.

35 Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, tr. William McNeil and Nicholas Walker (Indiana: Indian University Press, 1995), §42: 262-263.

them, they have a world and dwell in a world. Language provides the common ground in which human beings can meet. It is "a medium in which the tradition conceals itself and is transmitted."[36] As is sometimes said, language is not a prison but one's openness to tradition. It discloses the world, our everyday world or lifeworld.

In conclusion, the analysis concerning nature and the world shows that it is with Kant's critical philosophy that the first distinction between these two concepts appears. Whereas Kant emphasizes the subjective aspect of the world, Hegel and Heidegger emphasize the historical aspect of the world. For Hegel and, especially, Heidegger, the world means sense, and sense has a historical structure. The world is sense not only inherited from tradition, but also created by us. This conception enables us to speak of *multiple* historical worlds in which we dwell. Therefore, the world is considered as historical rather than natural, which is why it is possible to speak of different worlds in the history of thought. This conception of "multiple historical worlds" saves the earth, in the sense that it lets the earth free in its possibilities, while not forcing the earth to be present to the subject's purposes. In short, "the idea of dwelling in the world" entails "the idea of saving the earth". However, current globalization more and more drives these different worlds into a uniform *historical* globe[37]. In the remainder of this paper, I will focus on how, through the process of globalization, the idea of "dwelling in the world" has increasingly transformed into the idea of "dominating the world" and the idea of "saving the earth" into the idea of "owning the earth".

FROM THE WORLD TO A *HISTORICAL* GLOBE: THE IDEA OF "DOMINATING THE WORLD" AND OF "OWNING THE EARTH"

Current globalization process more and more drives the different historical worlds into a uniform *historical* globe. This process has enormous consequences for the local life, social cohesion

36 Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 208.

37 Instead of the notion of "globe", I use the notion of "*historical* globe" because I do not mean by this term a geometric space feature but historically, socially, culturally, realized feature of the process of globalization, which indicates the disappearance of differences of the worlds.

and community. Local lives and places are influenced not only by *present* people on the scene but also by *absent* others. As Antony Giddens says, "locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them."[38] Even though we retain a sense of familiarity in our day-to-day routines, this "familiarity" no longer derives from "the particularities of localized place"[39]. The sense of familiarity normally consists in our pre-thematic (non-theoretical) understanding of the surrounding world in which our day-to-day routines take place. When there was less communication between different worlds, people's local lives were determined by their surrounding world and its horizon. From this horizon, they developed their opinions about personal and social issues. In the process of the current globalization, local lives are enormously influenced by the changing technological and communicative areas. This means that, although everyone lives a local life in the world, the world, for the most part, is globalizing. Therefore, the state of familiarity with local routines is increasingly changed; even local lives in the different regions of the universe become very similar because the process of globalization tends to transform different worlds into a uniform historical globe. Thus, as Jean–Luc Nancy says, "the world has lost capacity to 'form a world'."[40] In other words, the world has lost its worldliness. One should, therefore, ask this question: what reasons have brought about the loss of the worldliness of the world? In an effort to respond to this question, I will focus on two interrelated reasons: (1) on the change in perception about time and space, which is particularly caused by technological developments, and the effects of this change upon the relation between a human being and its world, and (2) on language as the carrier of this mental and real change.

One can immediately say that technological developments connected the different parts of the world and ended the sense of distance. This has played a critical role in the process of globalization. Man has an essential tendency toward nearness and de-distancing.[41] As such, in order to make distance near, the human being

---

38 Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 19.

39 Ibid.,140.

40 Jean –Luc Nancy, *The Creation of the World or Globalization,* tr. François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of New York, 2007), 34.

41 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §23: 105.

is essentially de-distancing. Today, the human being is bringing about the de-distancing of the world by way of expanding and destroying the everyday surrounding world.[42] Ending spatial distances makes every point of space and the respective temporal events occurring on the globe *contemporaneous* with each other. "Unification of space" and "ending distances" thus tend to reduce a dynamic time to the single dimension of a *perpetual* present. As Lukács says, "time loses its qualitative, changing and fluid character: it freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum, filled with quantifiable 'things' (…): in short time becomes space."[43]

"Space without distance" and "time in the present" are socially and historically *produced* phenomena. They are inseparable from a form of society and a type of social relation. This is an abstract social relation, which signifies the essential characteristic of capitalist social formation; it is abstract because in this social relation, a human being is considered an isolated being –as a subject opposed to the "world". Therefore, the subject is cut off from the world, and "the centers of meaning-and-value production are today exterritorial and emancipated from local constraints."[44] This is what has brought about the loss of the worldliness of the world. That is why, as Franck Fischbach says, the loss of the world is first and foremost the production of a subject unrelated to the process of the production of the world.[45] However, this is one part of the process of globalization. There is another part of this process, which is concerned with our current reality. This part gives rise to the loss of the world on the one hand, and creates not abstract but historical global reality on the other hand. That is, whereas this social modality was first abstract in early periods of globalization, it has gradually become our reality.

By the loss of the world, I mean man's being in the world according to a *particular* historical and social modality. This mode of existence has the consequence of making the world an objective reality essentially extended in space, subsisting as such in a time brought back and reduced to the present.[46] Before globalization, man's be-

42 Ibid., §23: 105.

43 Frank Fischbach, *Temps, Espace et Capital* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2011), 91.

44 Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (Oxford: Polity, 2005), 3.

45 Fischbach, *Temps, Espace et Capital,* 39.

46 Ibid.

ing in the world did not imply an understanding of spatialization and temporalization as processes taking place objectively outside and independently of the person. In other words, man's being in the world did not imply a geometric space, a homogeneous time reduced to the only dimension of perpetual present. A human being considered himself as basically being in a common world; and community life supposed "a certain spatiality that is irreducible to the homogeneous geometric space of Descartes' *res extensa*"[47].

In the transition from one era to another, Descartes has been seen as the decisive figure. Before Descartes, who Ortega refers to as the *first modern* man[48], there was not a sharp distinction between *subject* and *object* (the natural world), for the natural world was not considered as the totality of entities within this world, characterized by extension. Even though the world was not considered as being different from nature, nature was not put as an object before the subject. In this regard, Descartes' delineation of *res extensa*, as referring to corporeal things, and r*es cogitans*, as referring to self, determined the modern conception of the natural world and subject/self. Behind the conception of space and time in the process of globalization, one can see traces of Descartes' heritage. Since Descartes conceives of the subject as an isolated island, it can be understood only from itself, and it imposes its ideas, which are found through mathematical reasoning, on the world. Perhaps, in conjunction with Protagoras' famous dictum "man is the measure of all things", one could argue that Descartes' claim was already made. However, the dictum does imply the idea that the human being can be a "measure" for beings without being opposed to them as a "subject". By contrast, in Descartes' philosophy, being is conceived idea-statically, as constant, a-temporal presentness. Every being is such only in terms of the subject-object polarity. The status of the world is firmly anchored in human subjectivity. The "world" is regarded as basically measured by the subject. So, it follows, the "world" has meaning only with respect to the subject, whose task is to master the world. However, upon further inquiry, one neither encounters an isolated subject nor a world as extended being in the surrounding world. These are abstractions. One en-

---

47 Jean-Marie Vaysse, *Totalité et Finitude. Spinoza et Heidegger* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2004), 177.

48 Julian Marias, *History of Philosophy*, tr. S. Appelbaum and C. C. Strowbridge (New York: Dover Publications, 1967), 211.

counters the same form of abstraction at the beginning of the current process of globalization.[49] Today, however, it is no longer an abstraction but, rather, has become our reality.

Increasingly, the world is no longer understood as a world which people inhabit, but as synonymous with "social reality" because the possibilities of the world are reduced to only one possibility which is the social reality of the present time. In contrast to "social reality", the world refers to a dynamic time, which takes into account all dimensions of time. In this conception of time, past and future periods are also very important because, while past time refers to history, tradition and the like, future time is open to different possibilities. In this respect, "a world is the common place of a totality of places: of presences and dispositions for possible events."[50] Conversely, a social reality in the present is only one of many possibilities in the world. By globalizing only one possibility, globalization tends to remove all other possibilities. Globalization of one social reality is, thus, accompanied by the loss of the worldliness of the world, in the sense that the globalization process, eliminating essential differences of worlds, expands both to the planetary dimension of the world and to planetary unification.

By eliminating essential differences of worlds, the process of globalization enables subjects to dominate the world and to own the earth, but not dwell in the world. Dominating the world and owning the earth are the culmination of the entire history of metaphys-

---

49 Some thinkers view globalization as standing in contrast to modernization because "while modernization excludes various 'others' that were deemed either pre-modern/traditional or only on the way to modernization, globalization includes us all, even our 'others'." Peter Beyer, 'Globalization and Glocalization', *the SAGE handbook of the sociology of religion,* ed. James A. Beckford and N.J. Demerath III (London: SAGE Publication, 2007), 98. These thinkers overlook the main characteristic of modernization and globalization. They do not realize that "others" do not remain as they are. The way of their thoughts, lives and the like are essentially transformed through globalization. The purpose of modernization, speaking roughly, was to modernize all traditional cultures. In the process of the current globalization, every different thing globalizes to the measure of globalization, which is generally included in the modernization. Thus, globalization renders *one social reality* linked to a singular historical tradition *a global social reality.*

50 Nancy, *The Creation of the World or Globalization,* 42.

ics.[51] Following Heidegger's conception, it may be correct to argue that metaphysics reaches its ultimate fulfilment in the essence of the current globalization. The "will to power", which characterizes metaphysics to Heidegger, knows only the thirst for more power. This expresses itself in the frenzy of technological mastery. For we have gradually come to consider *thinking itself* in terms of mastery. Thinking is no longer a matter of open responsiveness to the world but of restless efforts to dominate the world, in the way that this approach renders *one social reality* linked to a singular historical tradition *a global social reality*. By doing this, it dominates the others in the world through one chosen possibility. Therefore, this kind of thinking and approach does not conserve and act as guardian of the riches of the earth, but rather exhausts the earth in trying to restructure it to the subject's purposes. While the idea of "dwelling in the world" does save the earth, in the sense of "setting something free into its own presencing",[52] the idea of "dominating the world" masters the earth and subjugates it, that is, "dominating the world" frames the earth in a way that it does not let the earth free in its possibilities, but forces the earth to fit into this frame.

This domination of the world is accompanied by the domination of some "international" languages, particularly English. Linguistic domination accompanies the ending distances. This factor plays an important role in the process of globalization as well because language is considered a tool of communication. However, language is not only a tool of communication but it is also an important carrier of meaning, culture and tradition and the like. That is why, as Habermas said, language is not a neutral medium of communication, but a medium of domination.[53] Conceived as such, language becomes an ideological medium. Language fashions our way of thinking, and thus the way of our lives, for language is the carrier of the world as sense/horizon. If language is considered as a tool for communication, it is then firmly anchored in human subjectiv-

---

51 For Heidegger, "metaphysics in all its forms and at all stages of its history is a unique fatality, but perhaps the necessary fatality of the West and the condition of its domination extended to all the earth." Martin Heidegger, *Essais et Conférences*, tr. André Préau (Paris: Gallimard, 1980), 88.

52 Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 2001), 148.

53 Jean Grondin, *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*, tr. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 129-135.

ity. It follows that the subject can master language, and its meaning which no longer comes from the world/horizon but from the subject's will and purpose. Thus, one chosen possibility in a world can be globalized in the same sense through "globalized" language by means of technological apparatus. In the process, the world, by lacking different possibilities, increasingly becomes a *historical* globe in which the differences of the worlds gradually disappear.[54] When one considers the worlds as horizon/sense, and language as their carriers, with the disappearance of the worlds and their languages, we lose also different perspectives about all things.

---

54 The process of globalization is described by some thinkers through the concept "glocalization" constructed by fusing globalization and localization, which was popularized by the sociologist Roland Robertson. 'Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity', *Global Modernities*, ed. Mike Featherstone and others, (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 25-44. He rejects essentialist polarities between the global defined through economic globalization and the local defined through local culture. The idea of glocalization is a challenge to the idea that the globalization process is a linear expansion of territorial scales that indicates ideas such as the global *versus* the local, the international *versus* the national, and the universal *versus* the particular. Robertson says about the process of the globalization that "I have tried to transcend the tendency to cast the idea of globalization as inevitably in tension with the idea of localization. I have instead maintained that globalization – in the broadest sense, the compression of the world – has involved and increasingly involves the creation and the incorporation of locality, processes which themselves largely shape, in turn, the compression of the world as a whole". Ibid., 40. Therefore, he prefers, instead of the notion of globalization, the notion of glocalization because this process is a process that contains both the growing importance of continental and global levels and the increasing salience of local and regional levels. In a nutshell, homogenization goes hand in hand with heterogenization. It seems to me that the notion of glocalization cannot explain very well the process of globalization even though it points to the interconnectedness of global and local levels, that is, to the idea that local spaces are shaped and local identities are created by globalized contacts as well as by local circumstances. To me, the idea of glocalization does not present an appropriate explanation especially for the loss of the world. Even though, in this process, homogenization goes hand in hand with heterogenization, it "disembeds" the socioeconomic relations characteristic of globalizing society and "reembeds" in the sense of global cultural. I do not argue that everything homogenizes, and that there is no heterogeneity. However, I argue that, even though there is heterogeneity, this heterogeneity does not prevent the loss of the world, that is, the disappearance of the different worlds into a uniform historical globe.

CONCLUSION

In light of the above analysis, I argue that, with Kant's *critical* philosophy, one finds a possibility to speak of the world as distinct from nature. In the process, this conception enables the emergence of two different conceptions of the world: firstly, the idea of dwelling in the world and of saving the earth and, secondly, the idea of dominating the world and of owning the earth. Especially via the technological developments, the first conception is transformed into the second one. This second conception of the world, which at present is being actualised, is called globalization. Globalization is undoubtedly a distinctive and significant feature of the recent history of the world. It brings about some risks and provides some opportunities for human beings. On the one hand, globalization promotes the removal of cultural barriers, which can do away with many of the negative dimensions of culture. I did not focus on this aspect of globalization in my analysis. On the other hand, since globalization tends to render one social reality linked to a singular historical tradition to a global social reality, it makes the world more regionalized than globalized. In this regard, the skeptics are right because the world is not, in the proper sense, global. However, the skeptics overlook cultural, economic and political integration between different worlds and its strong influences on states and societies. For that reason, the hyperglobalists are right because globalization brings about political, cultural and —especially— economic interaction between different cultures. Nevertheless, the hyperglobalist view overlooks the fact that some social realities linked especially to developed countries dominate the others, and that this situation causes the loss of the worlds, imbued with different traditions and meaning structures.

In conclusion, this analysis demonstrates that contemporary globalization does not have a unilateral structure but a complex one. For, in the process of globalization, there is a dialectical "push and pull" between opposing tendencies, such as the local and the global; a "disembedding" of local socioeconomic relations and a "reembedding" to global cultural and political belonging. The only view that is able to stand its ground is the transformationalist view, which conceives of the process of globalization in a multiple, variable and uneven fashion. Nevertheless, even though the process is such, it does not prevent the loss of the world, that is, the disappearance of the different historical worlds into a uniform *historical* globe.

REFERENCES

Aristotle. *Complete Works*. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Vol. 1, 'Physics'. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. Oxford: Polity, 2005.

Beyer, Peter. 'Globalization and Glocalization' in *the SAGE handbook of the sociology of religion*. Ed. James A. Beckford and N.J. Demerath III. London: SAGE Publication, 2007.

Fischbach, Franck. *Temps, Espace et Capital*. Paris: J. Vrin, 2011.

Gaston, Sean. *The Concept of World from Kant to Derrida*. London & New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.

Giddens, Anthony. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

Grondin, Jean. *Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994.

Hegel, G. W. *Encyclopédie des Sciences Philosophiques. Vol. 2,* 'Philosophie de la Nature'. Trans. Bernard Bourgeois. Paris: J. Vrin, 2004.

Hegel, G. W. *Encyclopédie des Sciences Philosophiques*. Vol. 3, 'Philosophie de l'Esprit'. Trans. Bernard Bourgeois. Paris: J. Vrin, 2006.

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: SUNY, 1996.

Heidegger, Martin. *Essais et Conférences*. Trans. André Préau. Paris: Gallimard, 1980.

Heidegger, Martin. *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Trans. William McNeil and Nicholas Walker. Indiana: Indian University Press, 1995.

Heidegger, Martin. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 2001.

Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

Hirst, Paul. *From Statism to Pluralism: Democracy, Civil Society and Global Politics*. London: UCL Press, 1997.

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Latif, Muhammad Ijaz. '*Globalization: Myth or Reality?*' *Pakistan Horizon* 63, no.4, 2010, 33-49.

Mann, Michael. 'Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of Nation-state?' *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no 3, 1997, 472-496.

Marias, Julian. *History of Philosophy*. Trans. S. Appelbaum and C. C. Strowbridge. New York: Dover Publications, 1967.

Mittelman, James H. *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Nancy, Jean –Luc. *The Creation of the World or Globalization*. Trans. François Raffoul and David Pettigrew. Albany: State University of New York, 2007.

Ohmae, Kenichi, ed. *The Evolving Global Economy: Making Sense of the New World Order*. Harvard: Harvard Business School Press, 1995.

Palmer, Richard E. *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer*. Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1969.

Papaioannou, Kostas. 'Nature et Histoire dans la Conception Grecque du Cosmos', *Diogène*, 1959, 3-31.

Plato. *Gorgias*. Trans. Walter Hamilton and Chris Emlyn-Jones, London: Penguin Classics, 2004.

Robertson, Roland. 'Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity'. *Global Modernities*. Ed. Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Robertson. London: Sage Publications, 1995, 25-44.

Scholte, Jan A. *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. London: Macmillan Press, 2000.

Winfield, Richard Dien. *Conceiving Nature after Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Vaysse, Jean-Marie. *Totalité et finitude. Spinoza et Heidegger*. Paris: J. Vrin, 2004.

Erdal Yılmaz

KÜRESELLEŞMENİN ONTOLOJİSİ: TEKDÜZE BİR KÜRENİN YÜKSELİŞİ KARŞISINDA DÜNYALARIN KAYBOLUŞU

Kant'ın eleştirel felsefesine kadar, "doğa"dan bağımsız olarak "dünya"nın kendisinden bahsetmek mümkün değildi. Kant'tan sonra dünya, tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla değerlendirilmeye ve buna bağlı olarak doğaldan ziyade tarihsel bir fenomen olarak görülmeye başlandı. Bu sayede düşünce tarihinde farklı dünyalardan bahsedebilmek mümkün oldu. Ancak günümüzde küreselleşme, bu farklı dünyaları aralarındaki farkları yok ederek gittikçe tek tip bir tarihsel küre olmaya doğru itiyor. Bu yazıda, küreselleşme sorununu "çoklu tarihsel dünyalardan tek tip bir tarihsel küreye" geçiş olarak ele alıyorum. "Doğa"dan "dünya"ya ve "dünya"dan "küre"ye geçişleri analiz ederek, "dünyada ikamet etme" ve "yeryüzünü koruma" fikrinin giderek "dünyaya hâkim olma" ve "yeryüzüne sahip olma" fikrine nasıl dönüştüğüne odaklanıyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Doğa, Dünya, Küreselleşme, "Dünyada İkamet Etmek", "Yeryüzünü Korumak", "Dünyaya Hâkim Olmak", "Yeryüzüne Sahip Olmak".