Turkish Political Culture and Civil Society: An Unsettling Coupling?

Begüm Burak *

Abstract : *This paper attempts to analyze Turkish politics in the post-1980 period with a special reference to the relationship among the state elites, political elites and societal actors, and its impact on the constitution of civil society in Turkey. After the 1980 military intervention, the political and economic realms of Turkey witnessed a relative degree of liberalization through Özal's neo-liberal policies. The January 24 economic decisions paved the way for economic liberalization as well as letting new economic and societal actors emerge. These new economic actors were different from the prevailing economic actors which used to enjoy a considerable amount of opportunity spaces in the economic sphere. Together with the Özal governments, Islamic segments started to become powerful in both political and economic realms. This paper analyses the chief traits of Turkish politics and economics and their impact upon civil society aftermath the 1980 coup in general, and the relationship and/or interaction among the state elites, political elites and societal actors in particular. The engagements of newly-emerging societal and economic actors into Turkish political scene and the challenge of these actors against the so-called "Kemalist-Republican" elites are also illustrated in the paper. Moreover, state-Islam interaction, politics-Islam interaction as well as Kemalism-newly-emerging societal and economic actors interaction will be studied with a special emphasis to the post-1980 period. The major argument of the paper is that, in Turkey, both civil society issues and political issues reveal outcomes which are primarily shaped by the nature of the relationship between state elites and political elites in general and by Turkish political culture in particular.*

* Research Assistant, Fatih University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, bgmbrk@hotmail.com

Introduction

In the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention in Turkey, a considerable amount of liberalization in both economic and social realms has been witnessed through Özal's policies. Besides, a relative strengthening of civil society autonomous from the state, a newly-emerging Islamic societal and economic class also blossomed. In the context of new Islamic economic and societal forces, the role of the liberal economic policies in the post-1980 period cannot be underestimated. Different non-governmental organizations, human rights associations have been established. Moreover, the media has been emanated from the official authority and the state-run monopolies have been broken up. In line with these developments a new class of intellectuals who supported Turkey's becoming integrated into the Western world also emerged .

It can be asserted that the historical background of Turkey from the very beginning of the Republic experienced an evident antagonism between the state and the society. In addition, along with the military, the high bureaucracy of Turkey revealed a certain amount of distrust towards the society until the multi-party politics. But for almost three decades, the state-society relations have been changing direction. The civil society has become more enhanced, political and economic realms have witnessed a considerable degree of liberalization.

Some Theoretical Considerations

The term "civil society" has a long history, passing through several historical epochs in which it has been interpreted differently by prominent Western philosophers. For example, Gramsci was a proponent of the grouping together with cultural institutions that would ensure the hegemony of the ruling class.[1] The work of Gramsci represented a turning point with respect to the way in which the superstructure of society is composed of a conglomeration of institutions.[2] It can be said that civil society carries two distinct meanings. Firstly, it represents an important developmental stage in the history of Western Europe, secondly, it refers to a theoretical concept in the field of historical philosophy.

A historical analysis of civil society demonstrates that the growth of the bourgeoisie in the Middle Ages gave the term a new definition. The exercise of new freedoms that accompanied with increasing urbanization represented a new way of life, which was becoming increasingly independent of the state. The traditional definition of civil society is undoubtedly a liberal one.

Ernest Gellner defines civil society between the liberal and the critical approaches. However, his position is much closer to the liberal paradigm than to the critical paradigm. According to Ernest Gellner civil society is a set of diverse

non-governmental organizations, which are strong enough to counterbalance the state and prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of the society.[3] Gellner's civil society is not formed by a normal populace, but by modular men who are capable of exercising alternative professions, of communicating through the codes of a certain culture, of substituting one another, and of easily adapting to new conditions in cases of spatial and functional mobility. According to Gellner, modular man is a precondition for an "industrial miracle" and civil society.[4] On the other hand, for Hegel, civil society is a bourgeoisie phenomenon. In part, this is why ancient and medieval agrarian societies, which were not under strict state control, cannot be understood as civil societies.[5] It could be said that the emergence of civil society is primarily characterized by the spread of political and civil liberties.

Arato and Cohen define civil society as "the sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements and forms of public communication."[6] Generally speaking, the term civil society can be defined as the realm that welcomes the voluntary associations which are emancipated from state pressure.

Civil society came to be associated with autonomous social units and organizations – voluntary associations, private companies, family homes, private and intellectual associations etc. – as well as with freedom of public opinion in general. These social units or organizations that make up civil society are based on the principle of recognition of basic human and civil rights. Also, civil society can be seen as the social bases of a free and pluralist democracy.[7] On the other hand, for Keane, civil society represents the sum total of all of the voluntary economic and cultural institutions that are concerned with activities "outside of the domain of the state", and if necessary, apply and /or exert different forms of pressure on the state, so as to maintain autonomy vis-à-vis the state.[8]

Historical Background of State-Society Relations or the Dominance of 'Strong State Tradition'?

Turkish civil society has traditionally been portrayed as weak, passive and controlled or channeled by the state through corporatist structures.[9] Some would attribute this to the vestiges of Ottoman political culture; others would point to the bureaucratic-authoritarian nature of the early Turkish Republic.

In the Ottoman Empire, there were barriers to the legitimation of an autonomous civil society. The patrimonial service elite was extremely careful to keep any sources of power under control that appeared outside the boundaries of the legitimate power structure. Also state control over economic life had deep roots, derived from the basic promise of a patrimonial system that the ruler is responsible for the welfare of his subjects.[10] By contrast, in the last decades of the Ottoman

Empire, two prominent elements of civil society were existent: Political parties and economic groups. The economic groups constituted the Ottoman bourgeois class. In addition to political organizations and economic groups, labor unions were also established.[11]

As known, with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the state elites, born under the wings of the Republican People's Party (RPP) whom I will call Kemalists carried out the reforms in an authoritarian manner. Hostile to liberalism and following the totalitarian politics of Italy and Germany, the state elites left no space for the civil society autonomous from the state.

The Turkish Republic inherited a strong bureaucratic state from the Ottoman Empire. Along with this, the Turkish state from the very beginning consolidated its power by representing itself as the carrier of highest ethical values and appointed itself to the role of civilizing the "irrational" masses. The modernization project carried out in a top-down fashion deeply affected the evolution of civil society in Turkey. That statist, top-down fashion paved the way for Turkish civil society to become very fragile from the very beginning.

By the late 1920s, the state also took control of the economy. This weakened civil society. In addition to the state's dominant role in the economic sphere, an elitist political society that hindered the progress of civil society was created further.[12] Since this legacy was also followed by those founding the Turkish Republic, civil society has continued to exist primarily in name only, especially with respect to the one-party rule of the Republican period.

The institutions of civil society gained momentum with the establishment of multi-party politics. However, this development was insufficient for the development of civil society in its modern and functional form. Optimistically, it can be argued that, in this new period of multi-party rule, the path towards the strengthening of the civil society was emerging. The number of associations augmented considerably during the multi-party period. For example, the legalization of unions under the Trade Union Law of 1947 paved the way for the slow but steady growth of a labor movement that evolved in parallel to multiparty politics. With the help of the Law related to the Labor Unions in 1947 the number of such organizations reached to 394 in 1958.

Over the course of time, this process of a relative strengthening of civil society was interrupted by the military coup of 1960. The new constitution promulgated after the coup was however thought to have created a legal framework that guaranteed greater levels of freedom. Indeed, the coup did little to promote the flowering of civil society in the fullest sense.[13] Following the 1960 coup, an indirect military intervention in 1971, and a full coup in 1980 occurred which further narrowed the space of civil society. The domination of the Kemalist state elites was obvious in the 1970s and in the early 1980s. Especially, within the economic sphere, the 1960s witnessed the economic policies which were carried out with a state-led strategy.

After the 1971 memorandum, the media, universities as well as the trade unions were nearly forfeited. In addition, following the 1980 coup, all political parties and trade unions were dissolved.

Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution, written under the tutelage of the military, was designed to reduce citizen participation in politics. Apart from that, in this period political activity was reserved for political parties. The explicit aim was to repress a pluralistic democracy in which trade unions, voluntary associations, and public professional associations played an open and active role in politics. In short, the term civil society in Turkey was existent just in name because of the non-political actors', namely the Army's intervention into politics and the legal regulations which favored the state against civil society. Moreover, the import substitution industrialization paved the way for a strong role of the state in the economic sphere and this also created an inconvenient atmosphere for the private business circles which were already weak at the time-being.

The Post-1980 Period: Towards the Instrumentalization of the State? Özal Governments and the Transformation of the Conception of "State" in Turkey

In the post-1980 period, a revival of civil society has occurred developing with the resurgence of liberalism in Turkey. Turkey went through important changes in the 1980s as a new economic program of export-oriented growth and the free-market economy was accepted to replace import-substitution policies. One of the most important consequences of this change for politics was the unprecedented development of the systems of communication and information flow which ultimately challenged the restrictive legislation of the 1982 Constitution.

In 1983 elections the nominee whom the military backed up could not get victory and Özal won the elections despite the military's discontent. This period starting with the 1983 elections in fact was a really significant one for Turkish political elites and state elites in general and Turkish civil society in particular. As the architect of the 24 January economic decisions, Özal paved the way for the neo-liberalization of Turkish economy. Also the then dominant role of the state elites was heavily challenged by him. As an extension of Özal's liberal stance, a free-market economy was formed in Turkey. Legal obstacles to political freedom were also removed by abolishing Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the 1982 Constitution, which prohibited the free expression of thought.[14]

The Turkish economy which has so far been dominated by the Kemalist national oligarchic bourgeoisie (TÜSİAD)[15] started to lose the state patronage that it used to enjoy. Özal opened the Turkish economy to wider competition from within and from outside.[16] Liberalization and deepening integration of the economy into the global market which began in the late 1980s also had an impact on traditional social

dynamics which gradually caused the strengthening of the Anatolian bourgeoisie.

Liberal economic policies in the post-1980 period, also spawned the emergence of a new urban middle class. Both the rising Anatolian bourgeoisie and the rising urban middle class adopted a curious lifestyle combining traditional rural values with urban norms. This situation created a new type of civil society, newly rooted in urban market relations, but whose world view has been directly shaped with traditional concepts of Islam[17]. In addition, Özal strongly encouraged the integration of Turkey into the European Union and the full adoption of democratic values and institutions. The outcome of Özal's policies was the emergence of political and social pluralism. During his time in power (1983-1993) a considerable amount of pluralism was also witnessed in terms of media. Private TV channels and radio broadcasts were introduced which can be seen as an important stimulus for enhancing civil society. Following these improvements in communication channels, it became increasingly difficult for governments to hide information from the public or to censure it.

Apart from that, it can be stated that Özal's political rhetoric was putting a major critique upon the "holy state" perception emphasizing that the state is an instrument for the well-being of the individuals. Besides defending a minimal state in terms of economic issues, Özal also argued that the state must not have a prominent role that dominates the religion. Moreover, the first private university namely Bilkent University was founded in Özal's office. In terms of judiciary, the right to apply to the European Court of Human Rights was introduced to the citizens. That development can be regarded as an important step for limiting state's heavy role in the judiciary. Within these years, A new class of intellectuals who had an Islamic background also emerged. This Islamic revival came into existence in both the visual media and the press. This new class of intellectuals and\or elites paved the way for a strong challenge against the Kemalist elites. The issues that were never put on the political agenda such as the education in the mother tongue were debated among these elites in the newly-emerging media.

Besides this relative pluralism in the societal actors, a new ideology was developed which was a synthesis of Ottoman Islam and Turkish popular culture. The new Turkish-Islamic synthesis focused on Islam as a consequence of the realization that religion might control and constrain class politics. Family, mosque and military barracks became the privileged institutions of the newly-introduced ideology, and Association of Intellectuals' Heart[18] [Aydınlar Ocağı] In line with this, it is known that against the threat of the Communism, Islam was made a permitted aspect of civil society from 1980 onwards. This role and power of Islam has immensely increased since the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, becoming an effective political, economic and cultural force that has dictated the changing nature of Turkish political system[19]

Indeed, after the 1980 military intervention, Turkey witnessed some kind of legitimacy crisis of the strong-state tradition along with the relative liberalism of political, economic, and social aspects as a result of Özal's policies. Since the 1980s,

the emergences of new actors, new mentalities, and a new political rhetoric have made the civil society in Turkey gain an important role in Turkey.[20] On the contrary, the privileged position of the so-called Kemalist state elites has been questioned in this context. Moreover, since the 1980s, civil society organizations in Turkey have generally increased in number and in influence[21]

In short, Özal wanted to transform Turkey from being an isolated, bureaucratic and military republic into an open democracy[22]. One should also note that Özal was among the first of the Turkish statesmen who did not hesitate to stress the 'Islamic' dimension of the Turkish national identity which led to the Islamic revival in both society and politics in the following years.

Political Islamists and the Alliance between the "Civil" Society Organizations and the Armed Guardians of the Regime

In the Cold War era, with the rise of the leftist challenges to the state, the state co-opted Islamic groups as an antidote to the communist threat. Besides that, the generals who carried out the 1980 military intervention supported the religious-based education both in public schools and in private institutions to cope with the threat of leftist ideology. This behavior of the state elites later caused the emergence of new Islamic actors, and the refreshment of the prevailing ones.

In addition to the Islamic groups, other groups and movements have formed. For instance, a political party, the Green Party was formed but later it was closed by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, many local and national political activist groups formed and became a part of public life.[23]

By the 1990s, after a period of substantial economic liberalization, Turkish civil society became more visible and vocal, often demanding greater political liberalization. The Global Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 provided an opportunity for Turkish civic groups to act in a very visible manner.[24] Moreover, the earthquake of 1999 played a key role in revealing the leading performance of civil society associations in disaster relief when the state proved incapable of mobilizing quickly and effectively enough.

On the other hand, the neo-liberal economic policies of Özal rule as well as his unusual attitude towards the key issues of Turkish politics such as Islamism or Kurdish issue paved the way for a relative enhancement of civil society in terms of Islamic economic and political actors. In other words, it would not be wrong to say that the erosion of Kemalist system and the weakening of state elites[25] were witnessed as an outcome of the expansion of political and economic opportunity spaces in favor of Islamic forces. The expansion of political opportunity spaces may be defined as democratization. In addition, the expansion of economic opportunity spaces may be defined as the neo-liberalization of the economy. These opportunity

spaces include civic and political forums, electronic and print media and the market. It can be claimed that opportunity spaces undermine state-based attempts to generate a hegemonic ideology which narrows the limits of public sphere. On the contrary, the liberalization and the expansion of the public sphere in Turkey, as noted above, was punctuated by Özal between 1983 and 1993. Government policy in the post-1980 period has encouraged the development of small and medium scale industries by taking an active role in the construction of organized industrial districts for small and medium size enterprises. In terms of political liberalization, in the 1980s, the locus of decision-making shifted from the traditional bureaucratic elites to political elites. This shift had significant consequences with regard to the relationship between the state and the business class. In this context, MÜSİAD (the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) was founded in 1990 to unite the small and medium scale enterprises.

The Kemalist transformation, in general, and the neo-liberal economic policies of Özal in the 1980s, in particular, created conditions conducive to the strengthening of political Islamist parties. It was this milieu of relative liberalization of the political and economic systems that brought the Welfare Party (WP) to power. Indeed, the link between the new socio-economic trends and the themes that political Islam has raised as an opposition movement can be observed in some social and economic indicators. For example, urbanization reached unprecedented proportions in the post-1980 period. Rapid urbanization led to the expansion of the informal sector and a steady decline in real wages throughout the 1980s.

Forming its political discourse on religious tenets and employing the rhetoric of "just order"[Adil Düzen], the WP got a strong electoral victory in the 1995 general elections. The religious discourse of WP was partly shaped by the currents of the identity politics of the time-being. In order to address the political demands of those who take the Kurdish identity seriously, WP emphasized the well-established theme of Islamic brotherhood. On the other hand, the continued modernization of Turkey, especially since the 1980s, occurred alongside, and perhaps was causally related to, a more conscious religiosity among a significant sector of the population. As a result of this, the WP became the big partner of the coalition government.

The policies of the Erbakan government is far beyond the scope of this study so, a brief over-view about the developments that led to the February 28 Process in 1997 will be made. In terms of undermining the state elites' prominent thoughts about the secular character of the regime, the Erbakan government led to a political crisis that divided the country along the secularist-Islamist axis. For example, the municipality of a small town in Anatolia under a Welfare mayor staged a play that depicted the Palestinian intifada with the stage decorated with posters of Islamist youth throwing stones at the enemy, repeatedly shown on television channels, seemed rather disturbing and agitating for many people.

Despite the existence of the WP's billing itself as the party of "civil society" against the "state", ultimately the party failed to stay in office. The military-led state

elites forced Erbakan to resign in order to be able to combat the so-called Islamic threat as an "internal" enemy for the regime. While carrying out this "post-modern" coup, the military obtained a considerable amount of support from the Kemalist "civil" society organizations. The Ataturkist Thought Association [Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği], some woman associations, some trade unions as well as some charity organizations supported the military in overthrowing a democratically-elected government. In this context, the activities of the 'Civil Initiative Five' [Beşli Sivil İnsiyatif] (composed of trade and employer unions such as Türk-iş, DİSK, TİSK, TOBB and TESK) were claimed to be working in collaboration with the military in order to force the Erbakan government to resign.[26]

In parallel to the support of some of the "civil" society organizations for the military intervention in 1997, it can be argued that "[t]he political impotence of civil society that continues as a result of Turkey's state-centered tradition of power is continually reinforced by the perpetuation of an official ideology established over time and grounded in the constitution and further propagated by those segments of society who closely associate themselves with this official ideology."[27]

As part of the pressure put on the Islamists, so-called "Islamic capital" was displayed, boycotted and prosecuted to eliminate financial sources for Islamic movements. Koranic courses run by various Islamic foundations were closed down. Islamic foundations and civil society organizations were put under strict control.[28] In sum, as a result of the February 28 Process, Islam's social and economic bases as well as its political agents were fully targeted. The important point to underline in this context is that, the role of the so-called "civil" society organizations cannot be neglected in the path to the military intervention. Also after the intervention, these actors continued to undermine the Islamic elements' status of the newly-emerged civil society in the post-1980 period.

In addition, by ending the liberal era toward Islam initiated by Özal, the coup also ended the coalition between the conservative center-right and the state.[29] From then on, the state elites started to adopt a more strict rhetoric towards Islamic actors. This rhetoric undermined the basis of the civil society organizations which had a different view about the Kemalist modernization project.

The Civil Society in the 2000s in the Triangle of State-Society-Politics: Prospects and Challenges

The 2000s in Turkish politics witnessed a significant change in terms of political actors. The electoral victory of the newly-founded Justice and Development Party (JDP)[30] whose leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the ex-mayor of Istanbul, from the cadres of the Welfare Party was seen as a significant change in Turkish politics. Because the leading figures of the JDP have claimed that they no longer belonged to the political Islamist circles. Instead, they argued that they have been conservative

democrats aiming to make Turkey a more democratic country with a more enhanced civil society. The election results can be regarded as a reflection of social support which opposed to the undemocratic and ineffective government policies of the previous years.

As noted above, the election results demonstrated the popular feeling in Turkey that the ineffective and undemocratic governing structure based on economic populism, clientelism, corruption and democratic deficiencies had run its course. In addition to this, strong societal calls for a more enhanced civil society have come to the fore. Strong economic actors like TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD have wanted a much wider space for civil society.

Indeed, by the early 2000s up to now, civil society has become an important element of Turkish politics through not only its discourse of democratization but also its associational activities.[31] The qualitative and quantitative importance of civil society have forced political elites and state elites to come to terms with democracy and a strong civil society.

Since the early 2000s, the state elites and the political elites have begun to evaluate the notion of 'civil society' not as an instrument for shaping the society, but as an indispensable element for the democratic consolidation of Turkey. In this context, it is argued that the most important historical development which paved the way for a more enhanced civil society in Turkey in the 2000s can be directly related with the EU membership process. With the growing and deepening relations between Turkey and the EU, important contributions to the strengthening of civil society have been witnessed.

In order to have a better understanding of the impact of the process of European integration on Turkish politics and modernization as well as state-society relations, it is necessary to touch briefly upon the membership affair of Turkey with the EU. The adoption and the implementation of the EU's social, political and economic policies are imperative and the basic requirement for the candidate countries to become a full member. In this process, the issue of civil society is vitally important for the European Commission and EU members. As often referred to the political aspects of the 'Copenhagen Criteria', the membership requires that Turkey must achieve a strong democratic stability, which ensures that the state governs society in accordance with the principle of the primacy of the rule of law. Thus, it is obvious that the Copenhagen criteria serve as a basis for the further democratization of the state-society relations in a given candidate country as Turkey.

Moreover, in line with the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU is helping both Turkish officialdom and civil society organizations in the strengthening process of civil society. Non-governmental organizations such as the Human Rights Associations are improving their projects in close cooperation with relevant EU institutions. Thus, zones of civil society that have been fostered by the New Social Movements in Turkey since 1980 have been reinforced through EU policies.[32]

On the other hand, it has been argued that, state-centered Turkish modernity and the vision of an 'organic society' have been the main obstacles for a more enhanced civil society.[33] The civil society being a self-generating, self-supporting phenomenon and being an autonomous sphere from the state has started to gain ground for almost two decades in Turkey. In terms of a free-market economy, separation of the economic sphere from the state bureaucracy is an important indicator for revealing this ground. In terms of political culture, starting with the Özal period and getting relatively internalized with the EU membership process, tolerance and the rule of law also play a key role in making civil society more enhanced.

The 2000s have uncovered that the Turkish case also indicates that the advancement of civil society is closely related to the function and the role of state. Here, the attitude and behavior of the state elites in general and political elites in particular must be in accordance with the rule of law. They must also act in a value-free way not adopting ideological policies. It is asserted that this is necessary for the advancement of a competitive social environment where social groups can freely compete with.[34]

It can be asserted that in Turkey during the last decades, Turkish society has undergone rapid social/cultural, economic and political changes. One of the important sites where we observe clearly the process of change and its manifestations in Turkey is that of civil society, which has been growing since the 1980s, especially during the 1990s, in terms of its qualitative and quantitative importance for making Turkish society more liberal and democratic than before. Indeed, in Turkey today there are over 3000 civil society organizations, whose activities involve a number of issues, ranging from human rights to democratization, peace to environment, issue-specific problems to even meta-societal visions such as westernization, Atatürkism, Islamization and nationalism.[35] Moreover, it can be stated that quantitatively, civil society organizations have begun to play a significant role in articulating and representing the various ideological interests and political demands voiced by different segments of society, as well as in transmitting to the political actors the societal calls for democratization and the need for effective governing.

Concluding Remarks

The Turkish case indicates that the advancement of civil society is closely related to the function of and the role of state. The governance of state in accordance with the rule of law and its neutrality is necessary for the advancement of a competitive social environment where social groups can freely compete. Also, it is important to note that there is almost a direct relationship between civil society and democracy. In other words, in times of non-democratic tools' employment (such as military interventions or times of martial laws) civil society also gets injured.

On the other hand, in its relationship with the state, civil society helps put an

end to the misperception of the state as a transcendental and metaphysical entity. It is known that in Turkey, for a couple of decades, along with the advancement of civil society, the state has begun to be questioned, criticized, and even protested. Briefly, it can be stated that a strong civil society paves the way for the consideration of the state as an intermediary and instrumental institution.

The term 'civil society' was rediscovered by the Turkish intellectual milieu beginning in the 1980s. However in the post-1980 period, there still remain obstacles that continue to impede progress towards a more functional civil society. These obstacles include an unstable democratic process, state dominance, bureaucratic centralization, intolerance of political opposition and ideological structure of state practices and policies. In addition, in the case of Turkey, the central impediment to the development of fully harmonious state-society relations is the lack of freedom of thought and expression.

Moreover, the political impotence of civil society that continues as a result of Turkey's state-centered tradition of power is continually reinforced by the perpetuation of an official ideology established over time and grounded in the constitution and propagated further by those segments of society who closely associates themselves with this official ideology. The attitude of the state towards civil society has not always been oppressive. Starting with the 1990s, the state abandoned at least partially its oppressive policies. It tried to establish peaceful relations with non-state actors.

The EU is a key component for the development of an advanced civil society in Turkey. With the deepening relations between Turkey and the EU, civil society in Turkey has been getting more functional and enhanced. However, Turkey's EU membership is not the only stimulus that advances civil society. The transformation of political leaders' views towards the state, the weakening of the strong state tradition, the increasing pluralism and tolerance of Turkish society all pave the way for a more enhanced civil society in Turkey.

NOTES

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