

NEPAD and Its Achilles Heels

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Each passing year reinforces Africa's grim statistics of a continent in which many states are overtaken by poverty and conflict. In 2001, to cite just one statistic, 72 percent of the countries in Africa (39 of 54) were classified as low income – meaning that gross national income was below \$745 annually.¹ Equally dismal, conflict and instability in all the sub-regions continue to spread refugees. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees reports 6.3 million refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced people, returnees and other vulnerable groups, out of a total of 22.3 million globally, existed in Africa in 1999.² Against this background, African heads of states proposed and adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to provide solutions to stem Africa's continuing economic and political devastation. With NEPAD, African heads of state promise adherence to tenets of good political and economic governance to engender Africa's development. Essential to the NEPAD plan, and in return for compliance with democratic and free market norms, is the restructuring of the partnership between Africa and the developed world, particularly the Group of Eight industrialized countries (G8).

While these objectives have also been conditions for financial assistance between African and donor agencies in the past - such as in Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) - NEPAD seems to distinguish itself from past plans devised to solve Africa's development problems in three ways. Firstly, it demonstrates political

will on behalf of African leaders: rather than coming from the international community, the NEPAD initiative came from African heads of state themselves. Secondly, NEPAD has garnered the sustained attention of decision-makers in the G8: four African heads of state presented NEPAD and secured the interest of the G8 at the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, in July 2002. Finally, and perhaps most noteworthy, some African states have agreed that they will monitor each other to ensure good governance, sound economic policy, and social investment through an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

This article evaluates whether these features suffice to enable NEPAD to achieve its goals and surmount the expected obstacles to reform, unlike the development schemes that preceded it. In part, this article reviews development and democratization efforts in the past - drawing on the literature on policy reform generally, and in Africa specifically, to highlight the problems and opportunities policy reform initiatives have encountered. In addition, I provide insights to the incentives African states have for complying with stated initiatives.

Three preliminary conclusions emerge from this article: First, while political will engendered the design of NEPAD and is a significant factor, it must still contend with the inherent destabilizing features of economic reform namely, bureaucratic resistance and politically connected interest groups. Second, sustained, high-level attention from donors and the G8 must compete with strong domestic interest groups, which can produce contradictory policies. Third, a reliable and credible APRM is challenged by incentives for a superficial or narrowly defined review, potentially biased monitoring, and the absence of sanctions for bad reviews.

Four additional sections follow. In the next section, I provide an overview of the NEPAD plan. It outlines the incentives and constraints facing the African states and the G8 to

comply with NEPAD and the reliability and credibility problems facing the APRM. The third section evaluates the ability of political will, sustained G8 interest in the NEPAD initiative, and the APRM to mitigate some of the problems the African states and the G8 will face in complying with NEPAD. In the fourth section, I conclude.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development

New Political Will in Africa

The New Partnership for Africa's Development proposes that the political and economic governance will operate under a new framework. It is a response by African states to the immense poverty of the African continent by renewing pledges of conflict management, market reforms, and good governance.³ Differing from past economic development programs that have originated from international entities like the United Nations, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund, NEPAD was led by five African presidents – South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo, Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade, and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak. Through the adoption of NEPAD, African states prioritize six economic initiatives as key to Africa's development: 1) improve infrastructure by investing in information and communication technologies, energy, transport, water, and sanitation; 2) improve human capacity; 3) reform agricultural policy to provide incentives to the private sector; 4) reform environmental policy; 5) preserve indigenous cultures; and 6) develop and share science and technology platforms.⁴

In exchange for this commitment to reform and the APRM, African governments seek to renegotiate the financial partnership Africa has traditionally had with the developed world – in particular, the G8. Two channels will be pursued with the G8 to raise resources for sustainable development: increasing capital flows to Africa and improving market access for African

products.⁵ Increasing capital flows includes encouraging domestic investment, obtaining debt relief and cancellation, and increasing overseas development assistance and foreign direct investment.⁶ In parallel fashion, African states will obtain resources by improving the market access for agricultural products, mining, manufacturing, tourism, and services.⁷

As proof of the new commitment to good governance and sound economic policy and as a basis for a new partnership with the developed world, African leaders have adopted the *Declaration on Democracy, Economic, Political, and Corporate Governance* (hereafter, the *Declaration*) to serve as a guiding framework for policy. By signing the *Declaration*, African governments commit to the promotion of democracy and good political governance, sound economic and corporate governance, and socio-economic development. These three principles in the *Declaration* form the framework and rationale under which NEPAD will be advanced and its goals fulfilled.⁸ These three principles are briefly summarized below.

Democracy and Good Political Governance: African states pledge to uphold the rule of law, equal rights of citizens, an open political system, regular elections, separation of powers and transparent institutions.⁹ Accordingly, African leaders pledge to ensure that their constitutions reflect these new objectives, institute a fair electoral system, and encourage the development of civil society organizations.¹⁰ In addition, African leaders prioritize to manage conflict and respect the rights of women and ethnic minorities.¹¹

Economic and Corporate Governance: To promote economic growth and end poverty, African heads of state endeavor to adopt transparent public financial practices, public debt management, and international accounting

standards.¹² Through these principles, African states hope to increase market efficiency, reduce spending, consolidate democracy, and increase capital flow to Africa.¹³

Socio-Economic Development: The *Declaration* states that governments will undertake to create an environment conducive to private sector investment and growth. To this end, African leaders aim to improve education, promote gender equality, and foster greater partnerships between the private sector, government, and civil society groups.¹⁴ In particular, the government will focus on infrastructure and the macroeconomic environment.¹⁵

Interest by the G8

The G8 have displayed a sustained interest in facilitating the goals espoused by the NEPAD initiative. In July 2001, at the summit in Genoa, Italy, the G8 promised to cooperate under the New African Initiative – NEPAD’s predecessor. Termed the *Genoa Plan for Africa*, the G8 promised “a new intensive partnership” with Africa in support of among other things, democracy, peace and security, infrastructure development, economic and corporate governance, African private sector growth, and increased trade between the developed world and Africa.¹⁶ The summit the following year in Kananaskis solidified their participation and culminated in the *G8 Africa Action Plan*, which promises Africa “enhanced partnerships” with countries pursuing democratic governance and market policies.¹⁷ Specifically, the G8 commit to “promote peace and security in Africa, to boost expertise and capacity, to encourage trade and direct growth-oriented investment, and to provide more effective official development assistance.”¹⁸

Additionally, the G8 promise African states that they will harness resources, political support, and expertise to advance NEPAD's objectives.¹⁹

The G8 also supported international initiatives to provide assistance to Africa. During the development financing conference in March 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, the G8 pledged that, provided African countries remained committed to good governance and sound economic policy, as much as \$6 billion (of \$12 billion allocated by the G8) could be directed to Africa.²⁰ Similarly, the European Union (EU) has proposed the elimination of all tariffs on low-income countries.²¹

The African Peer Review Mechanism

The African Peer Review Mechanism underpins NEPAD. It will serve as the mechanism by which African leaders will ensure that they each abide by the norms of democratic governance and sound economic policy. Of all the components of the NEPAD plan, the APRM has received the most attention. Under the arrangement of the APRM, African leaders submit their national policies for review to other African states in order to verify to the larger donor community and the G8 their adherence to good governance norms and sound economic policies. States found in violation of these objectives undergo "constructive dialogue" with other African states.²² Presently, there are no other sanctions against violations of good governance and sound economic policy norms.

Adherence to good governance and economic policy and the use of the APRM have become a condition for investment by the G8 and, subsequently, the key to the success of NEPAD. The G8 *Africa Action Plan* promises "enhanced partnerships" if African countries can hold themselves to the principles of democratic and economic reform and social investment, through the self-policing instrument of the APRM.²³ Similarly, the G8 extended the same

condition to the additional development aid pledged at Monterrey.²⁴ Therefore, NEPAD's viability, if measured by the creation of "enhanced partnerships" with the G8, lies in the use and reliability of the APRM.

Realizing a New Partnership for Africa's Development

Is the New Partnership for Africa's Development different? Can political will of African leaders, interest by the G8, and the APRM avoid the pitfalls of past initiatives and bring development to Africa? The existing literature on credibility, Africa's development, and political economy highlight three important issues: first, political will does not suffice; second, the G8's promises on trade reform are key to realizing NEPAD'S objectives, but liberalization of Africa's market's is also important; and third, the APRM must prove reliable as a monitoring device.

Is Political Will Enough?

Evidence from Economic Reforms

Attempts at economic reforms are not new to Africa. The major effort at market liberalization began in the 1980s, with the World Bank's SAPs. Yet, two decades later, it is debatable that SAPs and other development frameworks have improved the economic situation in Africa; in fact, economic indicators have since worsened.²⁵ Moreover, SAP and other types of economic reforms frequently were partially or entirely reversed by governments,²⁶ as the expected hardships of liberalization began to materialize in the form of higher prices, higher unemployment, and higher volatility.²⁷ For those developing countries that were able to maintain reforms, studies have found that in fact, political will and leadership are two key variables in determining the successful implementation of reforms. In the review conducted by Williamson and Haggard (1994), "visionary leaders" and those with strong leadership skills were

more likely to succeed with reforms.²⁸ In a related manner, Geddes (1995) finds that outsiders – those leaders with minimal ties to the state – were also able to implement reforms.²⁹ Thus, Haggard and Kaufman (1995) argue that economic reforms will be implemented when the decision-makers can make decisions unencumbered and can by-pass bureaucratic intransigence³⁰ – in other words, they demonstrate the political will to reform and have the institutional ability to execute it.

But reversal of reforms is not necessarily due to the absence of or weak political will alone. Full implementation of reforms is hampered by both the fear that political power and support from interest groups will erode, as the economic reforms bring hardships, and the bureaucracy itself. Case studies indicate that strong interest groups or other forms of public pressure have brought reversals of reforms.³¹ However, the definitive effect of public pressure on political entities is unclear. Not all governments are penalized for the adverse effects of reforms and many are re-elected despite the imposition of difficult reforms.³² In more recent work, Humphreys and Bates (2002) do not find conclusive results that electoral accountability leads to better governance.³³ Rather than interest groups, the strongest obstacles to reforms have come from the bureaucracy itself.³⁴ The case studies surveyed by Haggard and Webb (1994) show that bureaucracies and the legislative institutions hindered the progress of reform the most.³⁵ States provide bureaucrats with patronage³⁶; changes in a particular institution may affect the level of patronage a bureaucrat receives – thus introducing the prospect that change will be resisted.³⁷ In a sense, then, political will can only take reforms so far. Political will and leadership are unequivocally important, but a decision-maker is constrained by the bureaucratic institutions.³⁸

Grindle and Thomas (1991) introduce the notion of a “policy space” – a description of the boundaries within which a decision-maker can act.³⁹ Identifying a “policy space” acknowledges the other constraints that a politician faces during the implementation of a reform. Accordingly, NEPAD must recognize its own “policy space” and take steps to enlarge it. To this end, support must be strategically secured.⁴⁰ In the short term, NEPAD can begin this process through the dissemination of information and the adoption of a more inclusive stance. As participants at an International Peace Academy policy forum emphasized, knowledge about NEPAD is thin in many African states. Civil society has not been part of the process of NEPAD nor has there been adequate discussion within Africa (the exceptions have been Senegal and South Africa).⁴¹ Moreover, the seemingly top-down nature of the development of NEPAD⁴² runs the risk of marginalizing the all-important bureaucratic institutions. Strides have been made recently in publicizing NEPAD - such as the summit in Abuja – but, these events are still at the heads of state level. More productive, perhaps, would be events that focus on how civil servants can incorporate NEPAD’s tenets into their work. In this regard, Senegal’s creation of a NEPAD office is notable. Other signatories should also consider having a NEPAD presence on the ground in order to begin integrating NEPAD at the national level. Such steps at increasing participation hold the possibility of engendering buy-in by the polity and the bureaucracy, and subsequently, compliance with the NEPAD reforms.

Evidence from Political Reform

Democratization in Africa, which commenced at the beginning of the 1990s, has also been difficult. Like economic reforms, it has had a short shelf life in Africa.⁴³ Scholars usually point to the national conference in Benin, which eventually replaced Mathieu Kérékou as president, as the beginning of democratization in Africa.⁴⁴ After the national conference in

Benin, similar events were conducted in other francophone countries; elsewhere nations held elections for the first time.⁴⁵ However, the democratic consolidation hoped for ten years ago has not occurred. Instead, it appears as if many political reforms have been reversed: a few presidents (such as Namibia's Sam Nujoma) have changed their constitutions to seek extra terms; leaders have abruptly suspended elections – such as occurred in Algeria in 1991; election results have been annulled – as occurred in Nigeria in 1993; little criticism or public sanctions have been leveled against the crack down on political freedom by Malawi's President Bakili Muluzi; Coups d'états have occurred in previously democratizing states – like the recent instability in Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, political reforms that have survived are only superficial in many countries– “virtual democracies” that only exist in name only.⁴⁶

What precipitated this decline and can political will turn this tide? For some, democracy in several African countries has stalled due to the instinct of politicians to preserve themselves. Elections have been manipulated or democratizing reforms postponed – leading many to doubt the depth of or commitment of leaders to political liberation.⁴⁷ Alternatively, democratization has also been linked to economic determinants. Bates (1999) argues that, with respect to the role played by economic factors, requirements from international financial institutions force African politicians to form relationships with outside donors rather than domestic groups – thus in part, delaying or preventing democratizing reforms.⁴⁸ Reinforcing these points, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) show that countries that had entered into structural adjustment programs did not undertake political reforms. Similarly, countries that had weaker relationships with donors (like Benin, Congo, and Zambia) due to the inability to comply with conditionalities, were more apt to institute reforms.⁴⁹ Over time, for governments that relied on the international community

for their political survival, superficial reforms sufficed, as donors did not demand much beyond the appearance of democracy.⁵⁰

These conclusions portend worrying implications for NEPAD, which relies on the assistance of the G8. If democracy is taken to mean that governments respond to their citizens, will it be possible for African countries to fully respond to their citizens, if their survival depends on outside assistance? In the case of political reforms, the political instinct for self-preservation may turn against political will as politicians who adopt democratizing reforms may be voted out of office. For this reason, I argue that African governments' pledge for political reform must depend heavily on the strengthening of civil society – the catalyst for reform at the beginning of the decade. Similarly, the G8 must acknowledge and press for the development of civil society. In fact, the relative strengthening of civil society is the distinguishing mark in Africa today.⁵¹ Importantly, civil society does not just work by providing pressure for change. Instead, civil society has the potential to re-engage government in enacting reforms on its behalf by becoming critical to a government's survival.

In sum, political will cannot suffice. Bureaucratic institutions pose challenges to economic reforms and political instincts for self-preservation may undermine democratizing efforts. NEPAD must deal with these hindrances. In both cases, the broadening of domestic political support will help to sustain reforms: economic reforms will have a better chance of surviving if political support is broad enough, while political reforms can be instigated and monitored with sufficiently strong civil society organizations.

The Interest of the G8

Under the NEPAD initiative, Africa relies on the G8 for two main reasons: firstly to help generate resources for development and secondly, to obtain access to world markets for Africa's products. In the case of securing additional funds, the G8 have been clear in stating that it

depends on the ability of African states to pursue policies of market reform and practice democratic governance⁵² - topics addressed above. In the second case, access to world markets for African goods depend both on the outcome of tariff negotiations with the EU and the US and on the ability of African governments to remove taxes that inhibit the importation of products. This section focuses on the factors that will enable African products to reach wider markets. While promises have been made to reduce barriers to trade for products from developing countries, they are only weakly credible.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) estimates that the lifting of trade barriers to African producers could double the continent's gross domestic product.⁵³ Existing on the sidelines of world trade, Africa has not been able to reap the benefits of the globalization of trade.⁵⁴ Sub-Saharan Africa's exports and imports were both 1.5 percent of world exports and imports in 1999.⁵⁵ In fact, estimates for Africa's annual loss from exports over the past thirty years has been calculated at \$68 billion.⁵⁶ Encouragingly, in September 2002, the EU adopted a measure that will eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade on all products but arms (also known as Everything but Arms [EBA]) from the least developed countries (LDC); by 2009 all products will enter the EU duty and quota free.⁵⁷ The EU receives the highest amount of exports from LDCs – in 1999 the EU took in approximately 37 percent of the LDC's exports.⁵⁸ For the African, Caribbean, and Pacific nations (ACP), market access to the EU is already fairly free – 94 percent of all goods (80 percent of which are agricultural) do not face tariffs in the EU.⁵⁹ One reason behind Europe's move to eliminate subsidies and free markets may be that the new members of the EU may not be able to afford them.⁶⁰

While the EU's efforts may add to the sustainability of trade reform, these efforts still face questions of credibility. Recently, France and Germany appeared to back out of a

commitment to cease the use of subsidies for agriculture.⁶¹ Recent moves by the US also raise questions about the possibility of market access – in May 2002, the US government passed a bill worth \$180 billion in farm subsidies over the next six to eight years.⁶² While the US recently announced that it would remove all tariffs by 2015⁶³ – this is still no guarantee that domestic forces will cause a reversal. Needless to say, the moves by the US and the EU reduce, in part, the incentives for African states to pursue liberalization of markets,⁶⁴ subsequently undermining NEPAD.

Nonetheless, there may also be limited gains from the outcomes of lower tariffs. Granted, the Lomé Convention, which negotiated preferential trading partnerships with the ACP nations shows some evidence of the usefulness of trade between developed and developing countries: as successive Lomé Convention agreements have become more restrictive, Africa's trade with the North has also declined.⁶⁵ However, the empirical evidence suggests that Africa's trade policies create far more harm than tariffs imposed from abroad.⁶⁶

Acknowledging the need to increase trade, more support should be given to African states as they try to liberalize their markets. Liberalization of trade is difficult and subject to reversals, as Rodrik (1998) has outlined. Impeding the implementation of many trade reforms is the uncertainty in outcomes from the reforms. In other words, it is not clear, *before the reforms*, which groups will gain or lose and or the extent of these changes.⁶⁷ Furthermore, government's have incentives to renege on proposed policies – thus discouraging the market from reacting to reforms.⁶⁸ Finally, equity issues may not be resolvable; the losses from trade reforms may be so large or the bureaucratic infrastructure needed for transfers so inefficient that compensation may not be possible.⁶⁹

Toward a Reliable African Peer Review Mechanism

The third distinguishing mark of NEPAD is the African Peer Review Mechanism. Indeed, it has received the most attention, as NEPAD derives its external support from the promise of the APRM. A positive reading from the APRM signals to investors and the G8 that the country in question pursues good governance and economic policies. Since the APRM is voluntary, naturally, the countries that elect to undergo a peer review will be those that can be assured of a reasonably good rating. This equilibrium has already revealed itself in the countries that have volunteered for peer review – for example, Ghana, Mozambique, and Uganda are generally hailed as governing or economic success stories. On the other hand, countries criticized for their human rights records, for example, may most likely not volunteer. Yet, while the APRM has been treated as the most important component of NEPAD, it has also generated the most confusion. As presently constructed, the APRM runs the risk of being used superficially, restricted in the scope of its investigations, and being weakly monitored. In short, the APRM starts on unsteady footing and may undermine, instead of increase, the chances that NEPAD pulls Africa from underdevelopment. For effectiveness, African states must take concrete steps to improve its reliability.

Potential for a superficial and narrow review

NEPAD's peer review has been the subject of debate because of hints that it would not cover political issues. Despite the signing of the *Declaration* and the *African Peer Review Mechanism*, Thabo Mbeki recently stated that the peer review would only cover economic issues; political issues, on the other hand, would fall under the auspices of the Commission of People's and Human Rights of the Africa Union.⁷⁰ Mbeki's apparent departure from the original intent of the peer review brought into clear relief the dependence on the APRM by the G8. In

response, the Canadian trade minister, Pierre Pettigrew, warned that if the APRM did not cover political situations, the aid promised by the G8 might not materialize. Moreover, challenging the voluntary nature of the peer review, Mr. Pettigrew stated that countries electing to forgo the peer review would receive less development assistance from the G8.⁷¹ Seeming to assuage hints that political issues would not be reviewed, Mbeki suggested that the political structures of the African Union would act as a peer review.⁷²

Still, fears of negative regional ramifications provide incentives for a superficial peer review that either glosses over deficiencies or restricts the scope of a peer review. Negative perceptions and realities, which may arise from a peer review process, have ramifications beyond a state's borders. For example, consider that firms sometimes make investment decisions based on perceptions, rather than objective criteria. A bad review for one or a few African countries may result in decreased investment in many more African countries. Indeed, as Humphreys and Bates summarize, in assessing the feasibility of doing business in Africa, research shows that investors discount African economies disproportionately more than other economies.⁷³ Zimbabwe's effect on South Africa serves as an apt example. Since 2001, as Zimbabwe has come under criticism for President Robert Mugabe's repressive government and unsound economic policies, the South African rand has suffered, as the region has become viewed as unstable.⁷⁴ Moreover, according to the director of British Trade and Investment in Pretoria, South Africa's seemingly conciliatory policy toward Zimbabwe dissuades foreign investors.⁷⁵ For example, investors have reacted to fears that South Africa's own land reform may follow the same violent road as Zimbabwe's. As a case in point, on September 2 and 3, 2002, when Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique seemed to support Zimbabwe's land

reform, the rand traded at R10.6595 on September 4, 2002, a reduction from R10.7550 against the dollar on September 2.⁷⁶

Zimbabwe is not the only case receiving limited regional sanctions. Likewise, Benin maintained close ties with Côte d'Ivoire's Robert Guei after he overthrew democratically elected President Henri Konan Bedie and has continued close relations with Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema, an authoritarian regime.⁷⁷ In the case of Togo, Eyadema's support of President Kérékou's opponent, Nicéphore Soglo, and ability to interfere in Benin's internal politics may explain the continuation of diplomatic ties.⁷⁸ Foreign policy considerations also color Tanzania's response to electoral fraud – it is less likely to condemn electoral manipulations of its allies. (However, Tanzania has displayed a willingness to condemn overthrows of democratically elected governments).⁷⁹ These examples illustrate that a state's foreign policy considerations can affect the chances for under-reporting or a limited peer review.

Mandating that the peer review mechanism covers all the areas that had been originally conceived are undoubtedly difficult political and economic decisions. However, the vacillation that has recently played out in the media has served only to undermine the promises by the African states. Equally significant, it allows the G8 to renege more easily on the promises for “enhanced partnerships” – promises that also may face great internal opposition. To save the peer review mechanism from insignificance, it is of paramount importance that the inclusion of both economic and political institutions is unquestioned.

Potential for a weak monitoring

The absence of outside monitoring and sanctions for offending states compounds the dangers of a superficial or narrowly defined APRM. The benefit of outside monitoring lies in the objectivity of the reviewers. As it stands, eminent Africans – heads of states, retired judges,

and prominent academics – along with civil society groups, would oversee the collection of facts by the peer review commission.⁸⁰ In order to impart credibility, the monitors must not have a stake in the outcome of a process. In its present construction, it is not clear that the APRM will employ *observably* impartial reviewers – threatening that the outcomes may be lopsidedly on the side of the state. Specifically, former heads of state and judges may have particularly strong ties to the state. Possibly, civil society groups and academics may provide the needed evidence of objectivity, but the constitution of the APRM does not receive sufficient emphasis. More information is needed on how the review commission’s members will be selected, the ratio of state to non-state affiliated members, and the decision-making procedures. The people who constitute the peer review committee and the stakes they might have in the outcome provide valuable insight to the reliability of the results.

Equally valuable, creating provisions for sanctions for violations found in the peer review may increase the peer review’s significance. As it stands, peer reviews will only go so far as to engage in “constructive dialogue” when reviews reveal violations.⁸¹ The *G8 Africa Action Plan* has clearly stated that assistance will depend on a country’s good review,⁸² whereas the state in question does not suffer material or political consequences by African states. The absence of sanctions by African states raises serious questions about African ownership of the APRM. While African states most likely cannot effectively threaten violators through financial means, an array of symbolic diplomatic options – such as suspension from key organizations – may exist. As it stands, even a group that finds violations may feel toothless in its mission. Providing a means for redressing wrongs may also encourage more accurate reporting.

Although Mbeki mitigated his opposition to the inclusion of political reviews in the APRM, the alarm sounded by a restricted APRM underscores its importance to NEPAD and the

G8. Thus, the burden on the African states is heavy to ensure a reliable and credible APRM. To this end, African states must focus on ascertaining the impartiality of monitors, instituting sanctions for violators, and ensuring that the APRM delivers an unambiguous signal.

Conclusion

NEPAD declares its uniqueness by asserting that a new political will exists in Africa to adopt political and economic reforms, the creation of the APRM to monitor their implementation, and the sustained interest by the G8. Nevertheless, each of these three distinguishing marks is problematic. Firstly, political will, while a necessary condition for reform, is not enough. Rather, evidence from past attempts at reform show that plans must include how to manage a potentially resistant bureaucracy. In addition, the empirical evidence shows that there are strong factors that may undermine the credibility of economic reforms, which must also be considered and mitigated. Secondly, the G8's promises also suffer from weak credibility. Principally, the domestic constituencies have the potential to discourage compliance with pledges made for development assistance. Furthermore, the request for market access to the G8 by African goods may not prove as effective as hoped. Finally, having emerged as the key component, the APRM must demonstrate that it can deliver a thorough, impartial, and reliable signal of a country's political and economic state. The importance of the APRM to the success of the NEPAD plan was underscored by the reaction of donors to a perceived weakening of the peer review process. A sound APRM also makes it more difficult for the G8 to renege on development pledges, it can serve as a barrier against unraveling political will, and perhaps as an outside constraint to an unyielding bureaucracy. Addressing some of these gaps will improve the chances that NEPAD becomes the channel for increased growth for Africa.

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NOTES

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² United Nations High Commission for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action* (available from <http://www.unhcr.org>)

³ New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), October 2001 (Available from <http://www.nepad.org/AA0010101.pdf> July 18, 2002), paragraphs 71-89.

⁴ NEPAD, *Sectoral Priorities*, paragraphs, 96-143.

⁵ NEPAD, *Mobilising Resources*, paragraphs 144 –170.

⁶ NEPAD, *Mobilising Resources*, paragraphs, 144-152.

⁷ NEPAD, *Mobilising Resources*, paragraphs, 153-170.

⁸ NEPAD, *Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance*, 18 June 2002, (Available from <http://www.nepad.org/Doc004.pdf> July 22, 2002), paragraph 6.

⁹ NEPAD, *Declaration on Democracy*, paragraph 7

¹⁰ NEPAD, *Declaration on Democracy*, paragraphs 13-15

¹¹ NEPAD, *Declaration on Democracy*, paragraphs 9 – 11.

¹² NEPAD, *Declaration on Democracy*, paragraphs, 16 – 19.

¹³ NEPAD, *Declaration on Democracy*, paragraph 18.

¹⁴ NEPAD, *Declaration on Democracy*, paragraphs, 20-23.

¹⁵ NEPAD, *Declaration on Democracy*, paragraph 23.

¹⁶ *Genoa Plan for Africa*, July 21, 2001 (Available from <http://www.g8.gc.ca/genoa/july-21-01-1-en.asp> December 3, 2002). See also, the *G8 Africa Action Plan* (Available from: <http://www.g8.gc.ca/kananaskis/afraction-en.asp>), paragraph 1.

¹⁷ *G8 Africa Action Plan*, paragraph 4.

¹⁸ *G8 Africa Action Plan*, paragraph 4.

¹⁹ *G8 Africa Action Plan*, paragraph 6.

²⁰ *F8 Africa Action Plan*, paragraph 9.

²¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *Duty and Quota Free Market Access for LDCs: An Analysis of Quad Initiatives* (Available from: <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poditctabm7.en.pdf> November 26, 2002),18.

²² See: NEPAD, *The African Peer Review Mechanism* (Available from <http://www.nepad.org/Doc006.pdf> 22 July 2002), paragraph 24.

²³ The *G8 Africa Action Plan*, paragraph 4

²⁴ *G8 Africa Action Plan*, paragraph 9

²⁵ Dennis Kapata, "Twenty Years of SAPs: What Next?" *Southern African Economist* January 1998, 5-6; See, also, Dani Rodrik, "After Neo-Liberalism, What?" *The Economic Times*, November 19, 2002 (Available from online database, December 6, 2002).

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- ²⁷ See, for example, Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, *Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 16-27 and Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 136.
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- ²⁹ Barbara Geddes, "The Politics of Economic Liberalization," *Latin American Research Review* 30, 2 1995, 208-209.
- ³⁰ Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995, 9; see also Williamson and Haggard, 576-7.
- ³¹ Geddes, 202.
- ³² Geddes, 202.
- ³³ Macartan Humphreys and Robert Bates, "Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons from Africa," *CID Working Paper*, no. 94, Center for International Development, Harvard University, September 2002 (Available online from <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/094.pdf>, December 6, 2002), 21-24.
- ³⁴ Geddes (1995), 209-210; Haggard and Webb, 13-15.
- ³⁵ Haggard and Webb, 13-15; See also Haggard and Kaufman 163-169.
- ³⁶ World Bank report on Africa's poor development notes that the civil service became the center for patronage to different ethnic groups. See World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank 2000), 26.
- ³⁷ Nelson 101-102; Geddes, (1995) 209-210.
- ³⁸ Nelson, 101-2; Geddes (1995) 209-210.
- ³⁹ Merillee Grindle and John Thomas, *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 8.
- ⁴⁰ Nelson argues that the creation of strong patron-client relationships were critical in determining the implementation of a reform (pp. 102-107).
- ⁴¹ International Peace Academy, *NEPAD: African Initiative, New Partnership?* New York, 16 July 2002, 11-12.
- ⁴² International Peace Academy, 11-12.
- ⁴³ See, for example, Larry Diamond, "Introduction," in *Democratization in Africa*, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Stephen N. Ndegwa, "A Decade of Democracy in Africa," in *A Decade of Democracy in Africa*, Stephen N. Ndegwa, ed. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001).
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- ⁴⁸ Robert H. Bates, "The Economics Bases of Democratization," in *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*, Richard Joseph, ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 86-89.
- ⁴⁹ Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 179-181.
- ⁵⁰ Joseph, 10-11.
- ⁵¹ Diamond, xxiv
- ⁵² *G8 Action Africa Plan*, paragraph 9.
- ⁵³ Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, "For NEPAD, trade would eclipse aid," *Business Day (South Africa)*, October 18, 2002 (Available from online database, October 28, 2002).
- ⁵⁴ Arvind Subramanian and Natalia Tamirisa, "Africa's Trade Revisited," *IMF Working Paper*, WP/01/33, International Monetary Fund, March 2001 (available from: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0133.pdf> , December 6, 2002), 3-4.
- ⁵⁵ Subramanian and Tamirisa, 4.
- ⁵⁶ Subramanian and Tamirisa, 3. The statistic applies only to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
- ⁵⁷ UNCTAD, 19-20.
- ⁵⁸ UNCTAD 18
- ⁵⁹ UNCTAD, 18
- ⁶⁰ Katzenellenbogen, "For NEPAD, trade would eclipse aid,"
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- ⁶⁷ Rodrik, 30-33.
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- ⁷⁹ Herman and Piccone, 192-193.
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- ⁸¹ NEPAD, *African Peer Review Mechanism*, paragraph, 24.
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