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## **The Shifting Global Power Balance Equations and the Emerging Real ‘New World Order’**

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### *Abstract*

Expansion in globalization arising from increased interconnectivity and interdependence across the world is causing a shift both in the focus of what now could determine the principal international power variables and the criteria for power balancing calculus. One direct challenge to the status quo is the emergence on one hand of new state actors which are becoming more assertive, as well as some other new key non-state actors now matching states seemingly one-on-one on the world stage in many spheres of international political concourse. Consequently, there is a visible or perceptible shift from the current US-led unipolar ‘New World Order’ to a new form of multi-faceted power balancing structure that abstracts sharply from the traditional patterns of international power balancing calculus. The predominant position of the US in a post-Cold-War order is being threatened on several fronts. Consequently, unipolarity appears to be obviously on its decline. However, the US has started to respond in kind to such new threats to its continued international hegemony. It is a unilateral response that seeks to perpetrate unipolarity. But how long can it hold on to its grip and status as a global hyper power balancer? The challenges presented by such sundry scenarios including also other new related developments are exhaustively tackled here in this article.

*Key words:* globalization, New World Order, international hegemony, unipolarity

As it were, collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s has indeed been a crucial milestone in the annals of world politics. It actually presents a series of prospects as well as manifold urgent challenges to emergence of the so-called unipolar New World Order. Presently, the United States of America (USA) is at the helm of global affairs. It dictates at will most times the pace and general directions of global politics as it deems necessary. Such a role has become incumbent on it because it is the only surviving Superpower from the Cold War era. Russia is on a general decline like most other great and imperial powers after loss of their external alliances and satellite states abroad and after loosing major global contests with key rivals. But Russia's case had been made even more precarious with the internal schisms within the former USSR which resulted in huge losses of territories and other national material resources when it disintegrated into different new Republics.

In any case, a declining Russian profile on the world stage presents manifold positive prospects consisting of: first, the issue of enormous opportunities for the surviving superpower – the US, to fully assert its global influence relatively unchallenged as it were. Though there are now a few salutary challenges posed by most of the other older states to its increasing assertiveness on the world stage, this has not translated thus far into any real or potential challenge to its rising unilateral role in world affairs. In any case, perhaps the real challenges are now coming from some of the new non-state actors as well as the rising assertiveness of some key older 'medium' states. Together, these actors are currently displaying comparative strategic advantages in other vital facets of their power capabilities much to the detriment of the US. Second, a US-led unipolar world system also presents us with a befogged and a seemingly imposed singular world view of international issues most of the time. Much of the world has often times been bullied or cajoled into a bandwagon with the US and its European allies on major world issues. Events leading to the US-led NATO intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan recently, clearly attest to this fact here.

Third, the absence of a major contest between the US and Russia, also presents a compelling reason for the latter to also become inward-looking and more focused radically and deploy scarce resources to implement sweeping internal economic and administrative reforms needed to boost its domestic economy and society generally. This could invariably help facilitate a resurgence of its assertiveness on the world stage within a short space of time if progress is sustained in the right directions.

Fourth, an emergent unipolar order has also helped to encourage the growth or rise of new cultural assertiveness by, and the rise of new non-state actors with aspirations for great power status and strategic influences on the world stage. But what in essence is a unipolar world order and why should there always be an urgent need to balance the powers and the perceived threats of a unipolar power generally? From a general point of view, a unipolar world order can be defined as, “one in which a single power is geographically preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balance coalition against it”<sup>1</sup> Logically speaking therefore, a unipolar power can also be tagged a ‘Great Power’ of some sort and one that is more eminent than other rival powers because of its unique inherent power capabilities deployed in the international arena.

Jack Levy however, asserts that such unipolar systemic power balancers can be identified on the basis of three fundamental empirical factors, namely: “1) a high level of military capability that makes them relatively self-sufficient strategically and capable of projecting power beyond their borders; 2) a broad concept of security that embraces a concern with regional and/or global power balances; and 3) a greater assertiveness than lesser powers in defining and defending their interests”<sup>2</sup>

It is true most times – and as Kenneth Waltz also posits, that the overall power capabilities of any Great Power cannot be viewed separately from its individual unit power attributes, rather, they can generally be scored together on all fronts.<sup>3</sup> There seems therefore now to be a compelling reason to exalt the unit-level analysis of a state’s inherent power capabilities that could be brought to bear on the international system. This is consequent upon the rather high incidents of sundry new challenges now posed by some older states as we experience resurgence in some of their unit-level power assertiveness. And indeed, this also pertains to the sundry new challenges now posed by some non-state actors with respect to how they have been deploying some salient aspects of their unit-level power capabilities in international concourse in the recent time.

The need for a unit-level analysis of international power variables of actors, seem to inhere in the fact that, a scenario where a unipolar power for instance is presented with multiple unit challenges to its overall power capabilities as currently germane in the system, it does pose a serious security threat to the effectiveness of such a Great Power’s continued pre-eminence in the system. It also raises a series of fundamental questions about the continued claimant by such a

power to the status of a principal systemic power balancer. Even in the general absence of a viable external alliance against it, such potentially credible unit-level challenges to its vital power capabilities tend to indicate that such a Great Power is currently experiencing a general decline in such identifiable areas of its unit-level power variables.

It is however, a known fact that a unipolar systemic arrangement has never lasted for too long as world history has repeatedly shown. This fact also inheres in what Robert Gilpin says could be tied to the intervening influences of “the differential growth in the power of various states in the system ... [and now at this instance, we can also add growth in the unit-level powers of some notable non-state actors that could generally cause] a fundamental redistribution of power in the system”.<sup>4</sup> Thus, it is the persistence of such uneven growth rates and unit-level growth rates that generally could act to narrow the strategic advantage in the relative power capabilities of a unipolar power balancer over its prospective new competitors. And eventually, this will result in the decline of such a Great Power – an ominous scenario which the US appears now to be contending with at the moment.

Paul Kennedy explains succinctly in his analyses that, emergence of Great Powers – and logically speaking, emergence also of such potential unit-level challengers as enumerated here in the foregoing, are generally structurally driven and usually considered a function of two basic factors. These consist first of ‘anarchy’ and the ‘differential growth rates’ experienced by states in the system. And with respect to the growth of new non-state actors, these factors could be conduced to also explain the high incidences of pervasive competition at the intra-state level and the differential growth rate of emergent ‘shadow economies’ in such locations including also the resultant decline in parallel national economies in territories where governments have lost capacities to effectively govern.<sup>5</sup>

It is a truism that the challenges of maintaining a unipolar world order are also equally quite daunting as it were. At the onset, there seems to be an inherent desire by states in the system not to co-habit for too long under the vagaries of such lopsided international power balance arrangements. Ideally speaking therefore, very little peace and stability has germane in such a context for long. Historical antecedents aptly demonstrate this fact succinctly. And if viewed then from a general point, the habitual practices of states in this area – as indicative of the two previous instances of unipolar arrangements, have demonstrated that states tend to exhibit a general aversion against an unnecessary prolongation of a unipolar arrangement on the world

stage. For instance, this was when France acted as a unipolar power balancer in 1660 and when Britain did the same in 1860.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, no matter how benign the US may now wish to project itself, including also its national ideology as well as its manifold national interests on the world stage, there are now ever present potentials for the emergence of new broad-based challengers to its unilateral global role. This has even been made more obvious recently with the assertiveness of some older states and new non-state actors in the military and economic realm. New states like Iran are also at advanced stages of acquiring frightening nuclear capabilities. Other non-state actors are also suspected to be quietly pursuing similar goals with the covert assistance of some of the so-called 'rogue states'.

Matters have even been made worse as some states like China are already matching - if not already surpassing, the US in economic terms. And as it were, even an economically benign Great Power has never lasted also for long on the world stage. The examples of France and Britain in the not-too distant past present us with grim reminders here. Benignity – whether feign or real, cannot honestly save the US from a possible decline of its overall power capabilities in the international system within the foreseeable future.

Kenneth Waltz reminds us succinctly that, “in international politics, overwhelming power [as usually exhibited by a Super Power in a unipolar arrangement] repels and leads other states to balance against it.”<sup>7</sup> Layne also adds that, the dynamics of a unipolar power arrangement is such that, it generally produces a series of systemic constraints with obvious implications for the subsisting power balancing calculus or power equation in the system. These factors are owed generally to the intervening influences of the uneven 'growth rates' and the 'sameness effect' as some of the principal catalysts that could likely 'impel eligible states' (or those with the capability to do so) to become great powers.<sup>8</sup>

Viewed then against the backdrop of such evolving trends on the World stage, the implications of these developments appear also all-embracing and thought-provoking to say the least. For one, there are also obvious indications at the moment of a general shift in focus from the military to the economic and even cultural variables as perhaps some of the most vital components of the inherent power capabilities a state can demonstrate to enhance its power status in the system. There is therefore an urgent need for these unit-level variables to be well accommodated in a new international power calculus. And this also inheres in the fact that, they

are increasingly becoming the new principal benchmarks now utilized by aspiring and subsisting Great Powers and new non-state actors on the ascendancy as they continue to foster their increasing global assertiveness in the recent time.

Added to this, is the fact that emergence of new Great Powers on the world stage also presuppose a shift from the European continent as the principal locale of international power contests as well as the emergence of new zones or spheres of power influences and control in other emergent regions across the world. This also pertains to the possible growth of new international non-military alliances, new geo-strategic cultural spheres of influences, and the emergence of new types of satellite states as well as new turfs for international 'proxy wars' of a different kind between the emerging new Great Powers.

As these trends indicate, such inter-Great Power contests portend to also abstract sharply from the traditional patterns and characters of '*hot wars*' involving military exchanges between states and indeed also the so-called now extant Superpower 'Cold War' ideological rivalries. In their place, there are indications of prevalence of new admixtures of '*hot wars*' and Cold Wars' which are now likely to be determined principally in both economic and cultural terms. These represent radical shifts from the military and ideological calculus of yester-years.

However, the growing incidents of regional integration across the world in the recent time - due to increasing incidents of globalization, has also translated into a growing assertiveness of geo-strategic economic regional blocs also on the world stage. They too are now claiming protective and exclusive rights against other competing economic areas. As Samuel Huntington posits succinctly in his '*Clash of Civilization*' thesis, "the years after the Cold War [has] witnessed the beginning of dramatic changes in peoples' identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines. Upside-down flags were a sign of the transition, but more and more the flags are [now] flying high and true, and [.....] peoples are mobilizing and marching behind these and other symbols of their new cultural identities."<sup>9</sup>

What such pervasive scenarios imply is that there is a general shift in focus from the traditional patterns of international affinities by states and indeed by the peoples of the world. This translates to mean the imminent emergence of new sources of fault-lines in various levels of international exchanges in the system. These would play out more in the social-cultural and economic realms as it seems. Such emergent trends could also result from fluidic scenarios where

evolving cultural identities will now be used as benchmarks to define who a group is as a way to distinguish them from others whom they must shut out effectively even if by force.

This strategy is an essential prerequisite for international concourse in the context of the emerging New World Order. And if each group has to survive the ensuing asphyxiating competitiveness in the real 'New world Order', it will be mandatory for them to play by such new rules of conducts. As Huntington also captures here vividly, "culture and cultural identities, are [now] shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world."<sup>10</sup> States and indeed other non-state international power players now have compelling reasons to harness fully their cultural as well as economic potentials – and of course with the much needed military back-up, as means to project themselves more effectively on the world stage.

That new Great Powers – emerging either in the form of state or non-state actors, would be an immediate possibility sooner than anticipated, is a forgone conclusion the way it seem. However, the character of these new great power balancers will be such that they could tend to also exhibit a general tendency to assume prominent leadership at the epicenters of the world's leading economic blocs as well as prominent leadership at the epicenters of the world's greatest civilizations.

This perhaps, is the only way any international actor can hope to fully assert itself on the world stage in the emerging 'real' New World Order. One should not also loose sight of the fact that non-state actors have now become quite assertive on the world stage and have also shown keen interests to pursue global-reach power status comparable to Great Power influences traditionally exerted by states. These are historical expediencies that require apt and timely critical analyses and expeditious responses in kind by the current key power balancers in the system the way it seems.

However, there are manifold empirical questions that can also be easily generated by such unfolding scenarios as painted here in the foregoing analogies. These are questions that could readily jump start a series of debates and new researches across the academia. These consist of the followings: first, who are the likely anti-US unipolar contenders for global-reach/great power status? Second, what are the factors that might propel them easily into prominence on the world stage? Third, what will be the new character of International Politics, and what will be the characters of the new proxies as well as the possible satellites states in the emerging new contests

between the new power players in the international system? Fourth, what could be a likely response of the US – the sole Superpower in the current unipolar system to such manifold assertiveness by new power players on the world stage? Fifth, what could be the likely character and outcome of a post-unipolar arrangement of the international system? Would it be bi-polar or multipolar in character and would these be defined principally along economic and cultural lines as against the extant reliance on the military variables?

***Which are the new potential great powers/global players and balancers?***

Both older states and new non-state actors are potential contenders in the newly evolving global power balance equation – in the so-called *real* ‘New Global World Order’. Abstract from the traditional reliance on the military factor, a determination of which states are likely to become these new potential Great Powers/global players is a function of their abilities to demonstrate meaningful degrees of assertiveness in the areas of economic dominance/influences as well as great degrees of cultural attractiveness in the epicenters of global civilizations.<sup>11</sup> And with reference to the new global-reach non-state actors, this would depend on their abilities to act as veritable vehicles and facilitators of the drive for cultural unifications between the medley of nationalities now striving for exclusive collective identities that differentiate them from the others.

The list seems endless here. But there are two basic criteria that seemingly also tend to exemplify some of the most serious contenders to this privilege global status. They refer to the potentials of a new player to possess and maintain global-reach military as well as global-reach economic capabilities on one hand and civilization-wide cultural appeal on the other hand. The military component of a major state-actor player should be such that in numerical terms, it should be adequate for its domestic security and defense purposes.

In addition, it should be sufficient also to enable it respond adequately and timely to any potential threats to its vital national interests and those of its allies and cultural kin-states in far flung locations across the world. One should not also lose sight of the import for its military potentials to be readily available at short notices also on the international plane for collective security-related chores needed to counter other potential threats to international peace and security generally anywhere in the world.



With respect to the economic components of a state-actor player, the domestic economy should have already been able to maintain a credible level of national industrial productivity self-sufficient for the domestic needs so as to reduce its dependence on external sources. Also, such products must be technologically compliant and must have already been able to capture cheap and profitable markets abroad in far flung locations. And by so doing, they must have helped generate adequate external dependence on such states by many others far and wide across the globe. And even if such states are still reliant on others for the supplies of vital raw materials, they should have also been able to position themselves strategically on the diplomatic plane in order to be able to compel such suppliers to dispense with their produces at very cheap prices and under favourable terms of trade beneficial primarily to the buyers even if at the detriment of the suppliers. What this implies is that such emerging states should be able to effectively adopt diplomatic arms twisting tactics through threats of sanctions and their likes in influencing other states to do their biddings at all times.

Concerning non-state actor aspirants to global player positions, in paramilitary terms there is a need for them to also be able to create, maintain and co-ordinate multiple transnational organizational cells ready to prosecute their heinous agendas as and when desired at very short notices also. Their numerical strength and unit-level command cohesiveness should also be at such a level of preparedness that decisions from the central command in remote 'underground mountainous' locations are dispensed with judiciously and to the letters any where across the world.

In terms of economic capabilities, such non-state actor aspirants to key international power 'balancer' positions ought to have solid financial and overall material resource wherewithal that can also match those of the incumbent state-actor balancers in the system. International power balancing is high-stake politics any day and there can be no equivocations about a player's inherent de facto power capability which ought to also be largely sustainable over a long period of time for it to be effective.

Thus, given the foregoing analogies it becomes evident that state-actors and non-state actors that could emerge on the international stage would likely include some of the followings: a re-assertive Russia, Germany, Japan (the limitations of its demography and cultural spread could grossly limit its effectiveness as a potential international power player), China, India, a united Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia in that order.<sup>12</sup> And for the non-state actors, one could also

envision the European Union (EU) acting as a major regional power bloc and from where it can also project itself as a major contender on the world stage especially in the economic and cultural realms. These are some of the vital components of the rallying points for states in the forthcoming inter-civilizational rivalries in the system.

There are also other culturally-biased international agencies like the Al-Qaeda international terror network that has begun to assert themselves on the world stage. The larger question then is, how does one ascertain if and when such states and non-state actors individually meet the acid tests of the criteria stated above for them to become de facto power balancers in the international system? This would require the task of critically exploring for answers to the next poser raised at the onset of the analysis. What this implies here is that, the following factors to be addressed here may act as some of the vital trajectories needed to propel international power aspirants into global prominence.

***What are the factors that might propel emergent new actors into prominence on the world stage?***

At the onset, it would seem growing unilateralism in global affairs by the current unipolar power balancer could cause a general scare amongst other states which could compel them to react and balance against such increase in arbitrariness in international concourse. Prevalence of a unipolar power balance can be tantamount to prevalence of absolute power in the international system. And for the mere fact that absolute power corrupts absolutely – which is an oft cited cliché in political discourse, it is indeed also true that in as much as absolute power corrupts and repulses, it readily also repels other rival powers to concert against its eventually on the long run. Therefore, some of the crucial factors that may account for the rise of new power players could consist of a combination of the followings:

First, the ongoing global economic melt-down in the Core capitalist states is already presenting a scenario that suggests the fact that world capitalism might just have began on pathway toward a general systemic decline. This has been made most obvious in the absence of the militant brand of Soviet-era World Communism that had hitherto offered itself or acted as the vital mirror needed to curtail the rather unbridled personal capitalist consumptive capacities usually premised on a general gross reliance on the use of credit facilities.

It is also a known fact that the strains in the global financial sectors across the capitalist Core owe roots in the overdosed and the rather outstretched credit limits in many Western states. This has acted as some of the crucial factors that readily account for the current meltdown in the world financial system. The logic here seems to inhere in the fact that where the capitalist Core now suffers such excruciate financial deficits or credit crunch, the inherent capabilities of these states could generally diminish retrogressively over time and to the advantage of those non-generic capitalist states - especially those in the so-called capitalist semi-periphery region.

If one then goes back to apply effects of the uneven 'growth rates' and 'sameness effects' on these emergent trends, it becomes evident that the emergence of new states – especially those outside the traditional capitalist core areas is already becoming a forgone conclusion. States like China appear insulated in a unique way from the harsh vagaries of the so-called global economic meltdown. Reason for this is tied to the strict restrictions placed on the use of credit facilities in the Chinese economy. This is one major reason that seems to be propelling China currently onto increasing global economic assertiveness.

Second, the current global financial melt-down, in as much as it affects economic trends generally across the world, the 'sameness' effects can never be the same. They seem to be much harsher at the epicenters of their own genesis in Western countries. The peripheral states also tend to be suffering some of these harsh effects and for the mere fact of their arrant over-reliance on the Core states for financial assistance in forms of loans, grants and other bogus humanitarian hand-outs handed over to them in the recent past.

And as it were, the Semi-peripheral states appear posed as the ones likely to suffer lesser effects of these harsh global financial realities and for the following reason. First, because they too also exploit others within the incumbent global capitalist arrangements, they are the ones likely to be in a better position to exploit the incidence of a now-weakened capitalist Core to their own advantage. The double digit economic growth rates now witnessed within some states in the Semi peripheral regions could likely promote the capabilities of emergent states in these regions and which could be translated into their increasing assertiveness in global affairs. China, India and a handful of other states add up the picture here. Logically speaking therefore, the bulk of new international power players (state-actors) could emerge principally from the semi-peripheral regions.

As for the new non-state actors, one could envision their prominent emergence also from the peripheral regions where multiple states are already on the verge of collapse. The global meltdown could likely aggravate the general dearth of funds needed by such states to continue paying for their internal state and regime security requirements. Multiples of internationally renowned drug cartels (for example in Bolivia, Columbia), other criminal and terrorists organizations (like Al Qaeda) that are also financially buoyant, might exploit the fiscal crises in the failed state regions to propel themselves into international prominence. From offering covert financial succor to the regimes in these failing states and to the outright take-over of these states like what was witnessed in the take-over by the Taliban in Afghanistan in the recent past, could become quite prevalent across the failed state zones in the capitalist peripheral regions.

Third, new breakthroughs in technology – especially, within the semi peripheral regions portend to propel new power actors into international pre-eminence generally. China's recent breakthrough for instance, in successfully undertaking the world's largest ship building venture as well as mastery of its extra-terrestrial satellite launching systems; the development of other potential new weapons systems; and including also Iran's recent breakthrough in nuclear fission technology that could most likely lead to the production of nuclear weapons any time soon, all could actually act as potential factors that could account for the rise of new power players in the system.

Fourth, some of the major power contenders against a domineering Western culture in global affairs have been linked to an assertive radical or fundamentalist brand of Islam, especially as promoted by such so-called rogue states and reactionary terrorist organizations like Iran and Al Qaeda respectively. Recently, there have been unsettling news reports of some blasphemous behaviours and cover-ups in Western Christendom following reported cases of alleged acts of sodomy perpetrated by some priests, as well as the ordination of gay priests in some European and American cathedrals. This also includes the permissiveness of some Churches to the unholy union of same sex in their folds. All these sour trends general tends to portray Christendom as a social way of life that is currently experiencing a critical crisis or a general moral decline.

It is also a known fact that Christianity has been a veritable vehicle for promoting the Western idealisms of internationally accepted civilized conducts that are premised on some divinely mandated moral precepts. What these trends therefore portend to do is to present on a platter of gold, good stand plank for the assertive brand of radical Islamism to critically project

itself more credibly onto the world stage as a better alternative to a decadent way of life or a general civilizational decadence as now been promoted by Christendom generally. From a logical point of view, both emergent state and non-state actors are likely to arise from the 'House of Islam'. And if Huntington's 'Clash of Civilization' thesis is taken here as given, it becomes evident that, religious ascriptions could also be one of the major vehicles through which new actors and power players could enhance their power potentials and international appeals that could easily propel them onto the world stage in the not too distant future.

***What will be the new character of international politics, and what will be the characters of the new proxies as well as the possible satellites states in the emerging new contests between the new power players in the international system?***

From a logical point of view, intense competitions for new sources of strategic raw materials will tend to be the principal focus of the ensuing power contests between new and old power players in the system. Especially of interest here, are new resources discovered in locations like the Central African region – Chad, Niger and Sudan on one hand (where there are now evidence of huge Uranium and Oil deposits), including in the Falklands Islands on the other hand (where Oil has also been discovered in large quantities).

By implications, these locations all present themselves as some of the many new possible zones for proxy wars and new hotbeds for the renewed rivalries between the emerging key power players in the system. Failing state capacities in these areas is also one useful vehicle that could promote some kind of unique proxy relationships between the assertive new states and the failing ones. This exchange will likely be premised on dependency of such locations on some of the emerging key international power players. The expediencies to tackle acute regime security as well as the overriding need for territorial defense against increasing numbers of well-armed international rebels and terror units will tend to galvanize such failing states to willingly begin to play second fiddles to such old and emerging new power players with capacities to perform these vital functions for them in the system. Both political and economic concessions could then be freely dispensed with and in exchange for a credible physical deployments or presence of such external powers within such failing states as a way to stabilize trends.

***How would these new power players interface with the new proxies and the so-called satellites that may emerge later on?***

The most likely scenario could be through imposition of a new form of exploitative neo-colonial rule by such external interveners possibly masked as prolonged external humanitarian interventions in the failed states regions. This could become very prevalent in the international system, especially in the dying days of the current unipolar arrangement. Such external controls could be direct (through outright take-over of civic administrations) or by covert means (through the rule by proxies and puppet indigenous collaborators). The failed state regions across the world also generally present us with an ominous prospect for the emergence of new ‘power satellites’ of a different type.

Humanitarianism could also become a recurrent pretext used by new and old power players to deploy their forces into the failed state regions. This will also be under the guise of helping to stabilize such territories whereas the main aim will be to get a leeway into such territories with the sole aim to exploit any natural resource with little or no challenges from the local population or their national elites.

**What could be a likely response of the US – the sole Superpower in the current unipolar system, to such manifold assertiveness by new power players on the world stage?**

The US will tend to become increasingly assertive unilaterally and consequently will increasingly become alienated internationally. And the eventuality of such a US response presents us with a scenario where an increasingly internationally alienated USA would begin to intensify its unilateral interventions across the world in a bid to counteract and curtail such new assertive actors across the world’s emerging political/economic/cultural hotbeds. This will lead to the possibilities of low scale international proxy wars and even frontal armed exchanges between the US and such new power entrants.

The pattern of its intervention could also abstract sharply from the erstwhile military focus and may span to other areas like economics and culture even though the muscle of the US would likely be increasingly facilitated by the recurrent massive or overwhelming deployment of its military might across the world. And as the challenges against US-led unipolarity increase, so would the frequencies and scope of the US interventions across the world likely would become. This would persist up till the point when the resolve or moral commitments and resources of the US have been outstretched far beyond its current inherent national capacities. This is when the real-time costs and harsh effects of maintaining a unipolar power balance would begin to have a

hurting and negative impact on the abilities of the US to continue to maintain its pre-eminent position in the system. It is at this stage that the new power balancers would begin to overtake the US and when they could begin to eventual subdue the last post-Cold War Superpower balancer of this century.

**What could be the likely character and outcome of a post-unipolar arrangement of the international system? Would it be bi-polar or multipolar in character and would these be defined principally along economic and cultural lines as against the extant reliance on the military variables?**

The end game in the ensuing exchanges between the key power players in the system would be such that, it most likely could produce the following outcomes and with grave consequences for the re-alignment of forces within the international system. These include the followings scenarios:

- a) It could result in the likely shift in the epicenter of the pendulum of international power balancing from the geographical West to the East
- b) It could result in the likely increasing intensities of low-keyed catastrophic civilizational frictions and high intensity wars across the emergent fault-lines of the New World's assertive global civilizations
- c) It could result in the likelihood of a forthcoming nuclear conflagration between the Western Christian and Eastern Oriental civilizations led by Islam. This point has been biblically foretold as the forthcoming 'Armageddon' and the final meltdown that will annihilate humanity and result in the end of recorded time for all human civilizations worldwide.

In conclusion here, one can posit in succinct terms that, the adverse effects of increasing interconnectivity and interdependence of states and peoples across the world as occasioned by globalization; the renewed focus on cultural symbols and identities as bench marks for socialization in the international system; coupled with the persistent of unipolarity/unilateral assertiveness by the US on the world stage; and the ongoing global financial meltdown that readily aggravates the precarious internal security/economic plights of most people in the failed state regions, generally portend to act collectively as veritable primers/trajectories that could

propel multiple new states and non-state actors into international prominence as key power players and power balancers in the emergent real 'New World Order'.

## NOTES

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<sup>2</sup> See Jack Levy, *War and The Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983): 8.

<sup>3</sup> See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979): 131.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Gilpin, *War And Change In World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 13.

<sup>5</sup> See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers: Economic Change And Military Conflict From 1500-2000*, (Unwin Hyman, 1988); and see also Charles Tilly, "Rise, Decline, Fall", *Reviewed Works: Michael W. Doyle, Empires*; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers: Economic Change And Military Conflict 1500-2000*; Susan Strange, *States And markets: An Introduction To International Political Economy*, in: *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jun., 1990): 323-329.

<sup>6</sup> Layne, op cit, p. 17.

<sup>7</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "America As A Model For The World? A Foreign Policy Perspectives", *PS*, (December 1991): 657- 669.

<sup>8</sup> Layne, op cit, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations And The Remaking of The New World Order*, (London: Simon and Schuster UK Ltd, 1997): 19.

<sup>10</sup> See *ibid*, p. 20.

<sup>11</sup> See *ibid*, p. 21-22.