



ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ | RESEARCH ARTICLE

NIETZSCHE AND HEIDEGGER ON MEANING: INFERENCES FOR THE ERA OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

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Abstract

Nietzsche points out that the noble taste of Greek lost its place to dialectic after Socrates, and thus, human beings lost their connection to their nature. After Socrates, through the exclusive use of conscious and logical language, the meaning became fixated in our society and we lost our connection to the dynamism in nature. Considering representations as meanings, in the Heideggerian sense, it should be noted that a represented object always implies a level of existence that is not limited to that representation but points to a Being of that representation. For Heidegger, in line with Nietzsche, however, there is a switch during the Hellenistic period from the understanding of "sign" as "showing for showing" to "sign" as an instrument to "designate", and that switch leads to the creation of representations between sign and its signified (hence the term "designation" with the focus instead on the signified). In today's neoliberal world, similarly, people are lost in and through representations (and even they become a representation to be consumed) and, in this way, lost in an inauthentic way of living. It is, then, not expected for the Covid-19 pandemic to lead us to the authentic way of living because the anxiety around it would be translated into fear, which is an inauthentic way of experiencing anxiety. As a solution, we should reinvent the language where the instinctual language of the real of our bodies and will would prevent the logical language from resulting in the fixation of meaning and representation.

Keywords: Heidegger, Nietzsche, Covid-19 Pandemic, Language, Represented Object, Neoliberalism, Lacan

NIETZSCHE VE HEIDEGGER ANLAM ÜZERİNE: COVID-19 PANDEMİSİ DÖNEMİNE İLİŞKİN ÇIKARIMLAR

Öz

Nietzsche, Sokrat sonrası, Yunanlılara ait asil yaşam zevkinin yerini diyalektiğe bıraktığını, ve bunun bir sonucu olarak da, insanlığın kendi doğası ile olan bağına kaybettiğini söyler. Sokrat sonrası, tamamen bilinçli ve mantıklı dilin kullanılmasının bir sonucu olarak, toplumumuzda anlam sabitlemiştir ve insanlar

doğanın dinamizmiyle olan bağını kaybetmiştir. Temsillerin de bir anlam olduğu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, Heidegger'deki anlamı ile, temsil edilen bir nesnenin aynı zamanda bu temsile indirgenemeyecek bir varlık seviyesini de işaret etmesi ve bu varlık seviyesinin de aslında bu temsilin oluşuyla ("Being") ilgili olması not edilmelidir. Heidegger için de, Nietzsche'de olduğu gibi, Helenistik dönemde "gösterge"nin "göstermek için göstermek" yerine bir "belirleme" aracı olarak anlaşılmasına doğru bir değişim vardır. Bu değişim, gösterge ve gösterilen arasında temsillerin kurulmasıyla, yani "işaret etme" durumuyla sonuçlanmıştır ve vurgu göstermekten ziyade gösterilene kaymıştır. Günümüzün neoliberal dünyasında, benzer şekilde, insanlar temsillerde kaybolmaktadırlar (ve hatta kendileri tüketilecek birer temsil haline gelmektedirler) ve bunun sonucunda da hayatı otantik olmayan bir şekilde yaşamaktadırlar. O halde, oluşturduğu kaygının kaygıyı deneyimlemenin otantik olmayan bir yolu olan korkuya dönüşecek olması sebebiyle Covid-19 pandemisinin bizi otantik bir yaşam biçimine yönlendirmesi de beklenemeyecektir. Çözüm olarak, içgüdüsel dil, yani bedenlerimizin ve istencimizin gerçeğinin dili tekrardan keşfedilebilir ve böylece mantıki dilin anlam ve temsil sabitlenmesine yol açması engellenebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Heidegger, Nietzsche, Covid-19 Pandemisi, Dil, Temsili Nesne, Neoliberalizm, Lacan

1. INTRODUCTION

What is it that we call "dying" or "living"? As of today, Covid-19 has taken millions of lives. Here, (as human beings) we face the coldness of death all over again. Throughout this paper, I will try to summarize the philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger on the matters of life, death, and representation, and then attempt to discuss what is there to say regarding today's pandemic.

1.1. The Problem of Socrates

To begin with, I think it is most plausible to mention what Nietzsche has to say about Socrates. Nietzsche in fact caricatures Socrates in his book, "The Twilight of the Idols", in the chapter titled "The Socrates Problem" (I have said that Socrates is caricatured in this book because the Socrates being discussed here could be interpreted as not Socrates himself but Socrates of Christian epoch, that is, Socrates from the view of Christianity). Throughout the above-mentioned chapter, Nietzsche (1997) evaluates Socrates (and Plato) as the "symptoms of decay" in Greek, as being "pseudo-Greek," or even "anti-Greek" (p. 12); points out that "the value of life cannot be assessed," nevertheless, Socrates and other philosophers took a stand as to assess the value of life (as if someone who is not a part of it) (p. 13); indicates that, with Socrates, the noble taste of Greek (noble in the sense that it is "connected to nature") was lost its place to dialectic (p. 14); questions that whether Socrates acts in according to his "ressentiment" with his dialectic, while trying to take revenge from the noble (p. 15).

With all the information given in the paragraph above, the question appears: What does Socrates represent there? The answer is a rather simple one: Socrates is the representation of what Nietzsche would consider the problem of his (or our) age. Socrates is the representation of reason which has triumphed over the experience of living: Dialectic has defeated the connection of human beings to their nature (In fact, the connection of human beings to their "bios" has been made possible only through the "logos," hence, the term "Biology"). The reason as the opposite of the experience of living has essential implications for today's human beings. We are animals in the end, but we have persuaded ourselves that we are more than that. Human beings are fragile in nature, and without one important characteristic, it would be impossible for us to become what we are today. We, as human beings, are the ones who have triumphed over nature (and all the creatures in it): We have become the masters to enslave them all. Once living in the African

savannas, how have we succeeded in it? Again, the answer is a simple one and provides us with the above-mentioned important characteristic: It is the use of “grammatical language” that has been primarily shaping our brains and making them evolve (Falk, 2016). “Language has played a prominent and possibly pre-eminent role in our species’ history,” says Pagel and further continues: In contrast to the chimpanzees (who live in African forests but not savannah), camels (who live in dry places but not in woods) or all other species, human-beings are able to exist in most of the habitats found on Earth. He remarks that the difference is likely to be the language that enables us to transmit information over generations (2017). In our lives, we depend on knowledge and skills, and it is through the use of language (and the creation of a culture that is evolving faster than our genes), we have had a complex reservoir through which we produce (Pagel, 2017). “Representation is the production of meaning through language” (Hall, 1997). And it is with the ability to represent that we, as human beings, also have the ability to go beyond the present experience and engage in the past and future (Callaghan and Corbit, 2015).

1.2. Logical and Instinctual Languages

Even though it is clear that the concept of language is quite essential for human development and evolution, and of course, for to become who we are today, to this point, it is not certain whether the language mentioned here is “language as logos” or another kind of language. Nevertheless, when the broader timeline of evolution has been considered, it would be inferred that the language being mentioned here is “language as a whole” but *predominated* by the existence of reason within it. However, as Nietzsche has noticed, there exists a simultaneous period in history in which reason (or logos) has completely conquered the lands of living with the advantage provided with the existence of language (Thus, in this point, there is no *predomination* but a *conquer*). It should also be noted at this exact moment that, for ancient Greek, neither logos and language nor logos and reason can be separated from each other. That is, logos has been conceptualized as the human being’s capability of communication, speaking, measuring, understanding, and living socially. Aristotle even considers logos as the specific difference differentiating humans and animals (Habash, 2018). Thus, it could now be inferred that it is in fact this simultaneous moment that logos, language, and reason become one and the same thing: That is, what is making us human beings and masters of nature:

But Socrates surmised even more. He saw past his noble Athenians; he grasped that his case, his idiosyncratic case, already wasn’t exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was silently preparing itself everywhere: the old Athens was coming to an end.—And Socrates understood that all the world had need of him—his means, his cure, his personal device for self-preservation . . . Everywhere, the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere, people were five steps away from excess; the monstrum in animo was the general threat. “The drives want to play the tyrant; we have to invent a stronger counter-tyrant” . . . (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 15)

The drives, that is, the living part of the human beings were driving them off-limits: There was uncontrollable chaos. Then, the reason became the answer: Logos (through the language making human beings the master of nature) took the stage, and it took it for good: It itself became what makes human beings the master of nature. Thus, once the supporting element of human evolution and survival, language (now reduced to logos and reason) became the element ensuring the

connection between human beings and nature is to be broken because it was this connection, in the beginning, supposedly resulting in all that chaos (Armstrong [2009], for example, proposes Logos as being what is making us masters at the first place. I instead follow the thought that it is the language that is making us “masters who are also *animals*” in the first place; nevertheless, it is the reduction of language to logos is what is making us mere “*masters*”).

Nietzsche herein mentions the ugliness of Socrates to clear his argument: He does so to arrive at a crucial point rather than having aesthetic purposes. That is, the ugliness of Socrates means that, for Nietzsche, he is also a monster inside: “monstrum in fronte, monstrum in animo,” meaning that “monster in the face, monster in the soul” (p. 13). The ugliness is a visible trait; therefore, for everyone who was to see Socrates, for Nietzsche, the invisible monster could also be inferred. This invisible monster, that is, the bad cravings which are growing in each person and creating chaos, seemed not to cause any problem to Socrates as he “become the master of all” (p. 16). Thus, Socrates was supposed to have the answer to end all of this chaos (And become the masters of our nature: Nature in the sense that both the earth on which we are living and our own bodies and drives).

Reducing language to reason has one crucial implication: We decided to be the “masters” and not animals, not anymore. The problem, then, is that we have chosen to kill what is alive in ourselves (or what is animal in ourselves) and invest in what is making us mere *masters*. Nietzsche (1997) did indeed remark on a similar point regarding the philosophers:

You ask me what's idiosyncratic about philosophers? . . . There is, for instance, their lack of a sense of history, their hatred for the very notion of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they're honoring a thing if they de-historicize it, see it sub specie aeterni —if they make a mummy out of it. Everything that philosophers have handled, for thousands of years now, has been conceptual mummies; nothing real escaped their hands alive. They kill and stuff whatever they worship, these gentlemen who idolize concepts—they endanger the life of whatever they worship. For them, death, change, and age, like reproduction and growth, are objections—refutations, even. Whatever is does not become; whatever becomes is not . . . (p. 18)

All the philosophy, and the science that has emerged from it, is then a position taken against the experience of life for Nietzsche. It is the reduction of language to logos (and departing from the mythos) that has created today's world; that is, our society is now that of scientific logos and where mythos is being disreputed (Armstrong, 2009). In this medium, the subject of Descartes has emerged: In this dualist perspective, two forms of substance were introduced, which are matter (which extends into the spatial realm) and the conscious mind (who “thinks”) (Howard, 2018). Thus, we became the subjects, and all the world around us (including our bodies and, of course, our drives) became the objects to be attended to and even controlled: The connection between the human beings as subjects (and as masters) and their animal nature is completely broken.

Nietzsche (2001) suggests that “consciousness in general has developed only under the pressure of the need to communicate” (p. 212). In the end, Nietzsche continues, consciousness is necessary and useful provided that it is between people, and it is these characteristics of

consciousness that have enabled it to be developed. According to Nietzsche, the need of human beings to be protected, be helped, and be with their equals has also made the expression of those needs required. Thus, the need for consciousness has appeared. Human beings were already thinking and feeling, but it is to “know” what is being considered and felt is what is in the realm of the consciousness: “Conscious thinking takes place in words, that is, in communication symbols” (p. 213). Nietzsche (2001) further continues with the relationship between language, communication, consciousness, and reason:

In short, the development of language and the development of consciousness (not of reason but strictly of the way in which we become conscious of reason) go hand in hand. One might add that not only language serves as a bridge between persons, but also look, touch, and gesture; without our becoming conscious of our sense impressions, our power to fix them and as it were place them outside of ourselves, has increased in proportion to the need to convey them to others by means of signs. The sign-inventing person is also the one who becomes ever more acutely conscious of himself; for only as a social animal did man learn to become conscious of himself - he is still doing it, and he is doing it more and more. My idea is clearly that consciousness actually belongs not to man's existence as an individual but rather to the community and herd-aspects of his nature; that accordingly, it is finely developed only in relation to its usefulness to community or herd; and that consequently each of us, even with the best will in the world to understand ourselves as individually as possible, 'to know ourselves', will always bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is 'non individual', that which is 'average'; that due to the nature of consciousness - to the 'genius of the species' governing it - our thoughts themselves are continually as it were outvoted and translated back into the herd perspective (p. 213).

Thus, once human beings have started to communicate through signs, what is to be communicated now belongs to the society one is living in. The animal part within the individual is left for the sake of expressing (and communicating) one's needs in the social medium. Nevertheless, Habash (2018) proposes that Nietzsche in fact considers two kinds of language, one is with logos (titled “conscious language,” which is linked to the discussion quoted above), and the other is without logos (that is, “instinctual language”). “Language without logos” is, Habash continues, the one which is instinctual and about the animal part of human beings (p. 455). Furthermore, Habash outlines Nietzsche's comments in “On the Origin of Language” which states the harm caused to language by the conscious thinking (p. 457); and comments in “The Dionysian Worldview” which notes that there exists “instinctive yet purposive” language that is the one that of “gesture and musical tone” (p. 465). Habash concludes with Nietzsche's proposition that for instinctual language to be expressed in a complete manner, there should also exist a conscious language. That is, the excess of instinctual language is expressed through the confrontation with the kind of language which is aiming the meaning to be fixated. Moreover, in a medium where instinctual language is weakened, the meaning would indeed become fixated (pp. 471-472), which has negative implications in this paper's context. What started with Socrates is, then, the fixation on meaning through the exclusive use of conscious language. Moreover, this fixation becomes even more rigid for the Cartesian subject. We, as human beings, become the followers of a fixed meaning, the truth, in the nature where no truth exists (or even if it is to exist, we do not have any faculty of knowing it, as Nietzsche did add [2001, p. 214]). And it is through the inability to obtain

such truth European nihilism shows itself. Neither Christian God nor modern science (that is, the science that is pursuing the “truth of existence”) could escape from it: It is the annihilation of all possible meanings and truth (Elbe, 2004, pp. 17-41).

It is important to note that the two types of languages mentioned above do not oppose each other. Nietzsche in fact argues against the opposition between instinct and reason and the apparent world and the “true” one (Constâncio & Branco, p. xv). Thus, rather than either/or solution, a continuum exists. Considering in terms of either/or solution, then, one could decide, for example, that we live in an apparent world and the true one is inaccessible, or that there is no kind of language apart from the one that is reduced to the reason. On the other hand, considering in terms of continuum brings the opportunity to let the world's (and language's) full potential appear to us. It is also essential to notice that while talking about instincts, Nietzsche in fact talks about the “will” intending to satisfy needs (Constâncio & Branco, p. xvi). Thus, while meaning becomes fixated, then, the role of “will” in the language has also become disregarded (Moreover, in the same manner, one could also argue that the concept of the unconscious becomes ignored with the praising of the conscious cartesian being).

1.3. Heidegger and Beyond the Represented Object

So far, Nietzsche's views on language and the possible implications of these views for today's world aiming for the fixated meaning have been discussed. Now, I will continue with the Heideggerian perspective to further the discussion.

For Cartesian context, as already discussed, the subject is separated from the object. That is, the object is represented to the mind of the subject, and it is through the mediation of the mind that the subject could relate to that object. Nevertheless, for Heidegger, through representation, it is also presupposed that there exists another level of existence that is not accounted for by that representation (Iain, 2019). Thus, for example, “tree” as a represented object always implies a level of existence that is not limited to a representation but points to a Being of that representation. Then, it is straightforward for Heidegger that, even though representations could mediate a person's relationship with an object, there also exists another level of relation where the subject is not separated from that object in the first place (Iain, 2019). To examine the difference between these levels further, Heidegger's comments on Aristotle should also be discussed.

Heidegger (1993) translates Aristotle's “On Utterance” as follows:

Now, whatever it is [that transpires] in the creation of sound by the voice is a showing of whatever affections there may be in the soul, and the written is a showing of the sounds of the voice. Hence, just as writing is not identical among all [human beings], so too the sounds of the voice are not identical. However, that of which these [sounds and writing] are in the first place a showing are among all [human beings] the identical affections of the soul; and the matters of which these [the affections] form approximating presentations are likewise identical. (pp. 401-2)

As Heidegger added, this translation also translates semeia, symbola, and homoimota in relation to the word “showing”. Heidegger has pointed out that “showing” brings something to

appear, enables the apprehension of that which appeared, and thorough discussion of that which apprehended. Nevertheless, he coined, there was a switch during the Hellenistic period, that is, the switch of the understanding of "sign" as "showing for showing" to "sign" as an instrument to "designate". And through this designation, representation becomes established from one object to another while reducing the previous relationship ("showing") to that between a sign and its signified ("designation") (p. 402). This discussion, then, shadows the one which is made above, that is, the one regarding the fixated meaning in language while adding the concept of representation to the picture.

Adding to the discussion given above, in his essay titled "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation," Jakobson (1959) has focused on a similar conclusion. As he has suggested, meaning should be located in the sign itself but not what is represented through that sign. Lacan has also taken a similar reading. Despite its meaningless characteristics, he claimed the primacy of a signifier over a signified while introducing the term "pure" signifier, that is, a signifier signifying nothing (Evans, 2006, p. 189). It is in the case of "Being" in Heideggerian terms, then, we have a "pure" signifier. That is, it is a signifier without a signified, or, it is a signifier that is signifying what cannot be fully represented in the language but lies-before-us. One should not be mistaken that it is without a function; that is, while doing so, "Being" also guarantees the presence of what is present through language, meaning that it "anchors" what lies-before-us to language¹. Thus, Heidegger would be claimed to reach a conclusion that the presence of what is present is what is anchoring language to what lies-before-us, and it is through this way that language and what lies-before-us (of course, what lies-before-us through language) would open itself.²

Considering that Heidegger also claimed that "language is the house of Being" is further supporting the current discussion; that is, as interpreted by Livingston (2005), what Heidegger tried to communicate is that language is determining our lives, that is, we live in it: "We think to bring Being to language." In this sense, Lacan, in my opinion, is Heideggerian³.

1.4. Neoliberalism and the Function of Represented Objects

To this point in the paper, the concept of representation (and fixated relationship between signifier and signified with the focus instead on the signified part) has been examined. Here, then, comes the discussion of these in today's cultural context.

Marcuse (1964) indicates that within the context of capitalism, people's levels of both working and consuming exceed what they need (as cited in Vanheule, 2016). McDonald, Gough, Wearing, and Deville (2017) have reviewed that purchasing non-necessary items for one's survival is related to the representational value of those items with respect to their ability to reveal self-identity. Moreover, as they continue in their review, it is also people themselves who

¹ Even what Lacan has to say regarding this issue would find a better basis through the discussion of "Being" as a signifier because, in the case of "Being", a signifier signifying nothing becomes obvious and clear, unlike any other signifier.

² In line with the end of the Nietzsche part, there is no opposition between what lies-before-us and what is represented in language, that is, they are anchored together in a continuum.

³ In Lacanian theory, beyond the master signifier, there is a lack, that is, a lack in the symbolic order that corresponds to the real where the subject is in unity with the world and that which is not signified (Evans, 2006, p. 163). Here, Lacanian reading of this scene results in the emergence of "Being" exemplifying a "pure" signifier, and it does not send us to other signifiers ("beings") in language but send us to what-lies-before-us, that is, the real, the unity before the emergence of the subject who lacks an object.

are commodified; that is, they become objects. And this commodification is reinforced through media and advertisements to have people think that the way to personal success is through the commodification of the self. Thus, it can be concluded that, in today's world, objects to be consumed or represented objects are portrayed and commercialized as the objects that would fully mediate one's relationship not only with the world but also with their self. And as discussed in the above sections, they clearly could not do so due to the presupposed level of existence implied through them. Nevertheless, the fact that represented objects are unable to mediate that relationship would result in further implications for those represented objects in the subject's part. Rojcewicz (2006) discusses Heidegger's use of the term "Bestand" in German to characterize modern technology in the process of unconcealment of the objects and tries to explore what Heidegger has connoted. He contends that, in today's world, things are at our disposal; that is, they are here to serve us, and apart from their uses, there is nothing for us to respect in them. Moreover, as he continues, things are disposable once their utility is exhausted. This consumer mentality which is a rather disrespectful form of consumer mentality, is what Heidegger is connoted while using the term "Bestand", he concludes (p. 84). Thus, these lines further our understanding of how people in today's world relate to their surroundings. It is implied that people do not relate to the objects at all. Instead, what they relate to is nothing but the mere representations that would presumably regard their use (and objects can be disposed of if they do not serve any use). Then, it can be concluded that represented objects, in this sense, mediate people's relationship with their surroundings only in a functional manner (And it could also be claimed that it is how people relate to other people now). Furthermore, it is also essential to notice that these representations have been established through being indicated as a signified (as discussed above in terms of the switch in focus from signifier to signified) in media and advertisement contexts. That is, the material aspect of the object is not taken into account and even forgotten, and it is the signified attached to that materiality is what is instead attended.⁴ Then, it becomes plausible to infer that people are going even more away from thinking if one considers thinking in Heideggerian sense. That is to say that people are lost in and through representations (and even they become a representation to be consumed) and, in this way, lost in an inauthentic way of living it.

2. CONCLUSION AND THE INFERENCES FOR THE ERA OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC

I would have been titled the section "Conclusion and Inferences for the Anxiety around the Covid-19 Pandemic", but I will claim the otherwise at the part of the anxiety, that is, in Heideggerian terms, I think that most people do not feel anxiety in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, or even if they did, they translate it into fear, fear in its sense for Heidegger that it is an inauthentic way of experiencing anxiety (as cited in Mowat, 2009). Here, the distinction between expectation and anticipation corresponding to the difference between fear and anxiety is important to be made (Wheeler, 2020). That is, people (most of them), in my opinion, are not anticipating their death (which would be the death that they own; however, it would resist to be conceptualized and represented) but are expecting a certain kind of death which is represented in media tools. Nevertheless, while expecting this second kind of "represented" death, that is, the death which is not owned, what they are afraid of becomes what is represented under the title of

⁴ Here, I purposefully use the word "material" while indicating a certain aspect of an object in order to make it similar to today's conceptions of the signifier as being the material form of a sign (Chandler, 2007, p. 15); even taken in the sense that Saussure himself indented, the signifier is the psychological impression of the sound (as cited in Chandler, 2007, p. 14), which is closer to the material form of that sound.

that “death”. In the case of expecting death, then, it is also possible not to expect that “represented” death or negotiate with it. Nevertheless, while doing so, people would still be positioned in response to the represented and expected kind of death. Then, it becomes impossible for this kind of situation to lead people to live authentically as feelings of anxiety normally would (Mowat, 2009). This discussion is in line with and supports the discussion in the previous section regarding neoliberalism and its consequences, such as consumerism and relating to the objects only with the mediation of representations. In the case of the Covid-19 pandemic, the mood of anxiety is instead translated into fear due to one’s inability to relate to things (i.e., one’s own death) without their representative form even if they resist being represented (hence the fear).

As a society, then, we are moving away from thinking, thinking in the sense that it is letting things to become (or appear). In today’s world, objects are forced to reveal themselves in certain ways, ways that are making them useful for us. Moreover, people have represented experience when they relate to not only the objects but also the other people; that is, other people are also forced to reveal themselves in certain useful ways. Then, all the possibilities of people and objects around us are not appearing or reveal themselves, meaning that, as a neoliberal society, we are struggling with only what is there for us to consume and then passing to the other objects to be consumed, thereby distancing ourselves from the authentic way of living.

In the Nietzschean sense, in addition to the paragraph above written in Heideggerian terms, as human beings who lost their connection to their real nature, in Covid 19 pandemic, what we experience is nothing but the existential crisis arising from the real threat of death. Today, we live in a hypothetical world: In the world where we live, everything is crystallized and mummified, including our past and future; the present time is never to be experienced. Nevertheless, one’s own death always resists being represented and conceptualized, as discussed above. Thus, as beings who become reliant on conscious representations rather than instinctual experience, Nietzsche’s nihilism comes to the stage and annihilates all the possible meanings in each instance where we face death. What to do, then, as the followers of the truth, if all the possibility of it is now ceased to be? Nevertheless, conceptualizing things is not the only way to handle the presence of death. Instead, returning to the language (or saving it from the place it has been put in the society) which could not be reduced to logos would provide us with the connection to our nature: This is the real of our bodies and drives, or our instincts and will. As it has been already emphasized, it is through conscious language that the instinctual language can fully express itself, and there is no opposition between them. Thus, we should create (or reinvent) the language where “language without logos” prevents “language conquered by logos” driven fixation of meaning and representation.

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