Araştırma Makalesi - Research Article

Rethinking Populism Geopolitically: Authoritarian Populism and Migration Politics in Britain and Turkey

Popülizmi Jeopolitik Olarak Yeniden Düşünmek: Britanya ve Türkiye'de Otoriter Popülizm ve Göç Politikaları

Görkem ALTINÖRS[1]*

ABSTRACT

This research aims to analyse the authoritarian populism-migration nexus and to evaluate why and how authoritarian populist rhetoric vary in different geopolitical contexts. Recently, there has been a significant increase in the number of studies on populism and its impact on international politics and foreign policy. However, there is a dearth of research on the specific impact of authoritarian populist discourse on migration in different geopolitical specificities. This article will engage with two key research objectives to fill this gap. First, it examines the interaction between authoritarian populist rhetoric on managing migration in Britain and Turkey. Second, it interrogates whether the authoritarian populist impact on migration in these countries has overlapping features. This article contends that, as far as the authoritarian populism-migration nexus is concerned, populism is developed geopolitically.

Keywords- Populism, Migration, Geopolitics, Britain, Turkey

ÖZ

Bu araştırmanın amacı otoriter popülizm-göç neksusunu analiz etmek ve neden ve niye otoriter popülist retoriğin farklı jeopolitik bağlam ile değiştiğini değerlendirmektir. Yakın zamanda popülizmin uluslararası siyaset ve dış politika üzerindeki etkisini inceleyen çalışmaların sayısında ciddi bir artış olmuştur. Ancak farklı jeopolitik özelliklerde otoriter popülist söylemin göç üzerindeki spesifik etkisine ilişkin araştırma eksikliği bulunmaktadır. Bu makale, bu boşluğu doldurmak için iki temel araştırma hedefini ele alacaktır. İlk olarak, İngiltere ve Türkiye'de göçün yönetimine ilişkin otoriter popülist söylem arasındaki etkileşimi inceleyecektir. İkinci olarak, bu ülkelerdeki göç üzerindeki otoriter popülist etkinin örtüşen özelliklere sahip olup olmadığını sorgulayacaktır. Bu makale, otoriter popülizm-göç ilişkisi söz konusu olduğunda popülizmin jeopolitik olarak geliştiğini iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler- Popülizm, Göç, Jeopolitik, Britanya, Türkiye.

[1]*Sorumlu Yazar, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Bilecik Şeyh Edebali Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, gorkem.altinors@bilecik.edu.tr (https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7314-9349)

I. INTRODUCTION

How can we understand authoritarian populism-migration nexus within divergent geopolitics? More specifically, why and how does authoritarian populist leaders' rhetoric towards migration vary in different geopolitical specificities? These questions are puzzling because although anti-immigration rhetoric is considered as one of the main components of the right-wing authoritarian populism around the world, this is not the case in some of the geopolitical contexts. This research aims to analyse the impact of authoritarian populism on migration and to evaluate how populist discourses generate and/or shape migration policies in different geopolitical contexts. Recently, there has been a significant increase in the number of studies on populism and its impact on domestic/international politics, foreign policy, and global governance. However, there is a dearth of research on the specific impact of populist discourses on migration within geopolitical varieties. This is a significant absence for two reasons. First, the prominence of migration and asylum in electoral politics in the global North has increased in the last decade (Fisunoğlu & Sert, 2019). Second, the immigration and refugee regimes are facing significant challenges, e.g. increasing authoritarianism (Bhagat & Soederberg, 2019), the privatisation of refugee admission services (Manunza, 2017), and the excessive exploitation of refugee labour via de-securitised and informal employment (Baban et al., 2016). Against this political and socioeconomic context, this article will engage with the following key research objectives. First of all, it will explore how the "populist surge" (Mudde, 2016) in the global North and South is affecting migration and analyse the interaction between populist discourse on managing migration. Secondly, it will interrogate whether the populist impact on migration in the global North and South have overlapping features. To do so, this project will focus on Turkey and the UK as case studies.

Critical literature on populism and migration posit that they can be understood as a result of and a response to the crisis of the neoliberal market economy in the late 2000s (Rodrik, 2018). Describing the relationship between populism and migration, on the other hand, is a double-edged sword and it is determined differently by varied geopolitical conditions. Populism is a disputed term and it is often described as a 'strategy 'that juxtaposes the people against the elite, although there are varied definitions of this 'strategy 'in the literature. For example, as an ideational strategy, defined as a thin-centred ideology that is attached to a thicker ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017), as a political strategy that indicates populism as a certain way of doing things in politics by underlining the role of agency (Weyland, 2017), and as a discursive strategy reducing populism to speeches and narratives and defining it as the political (Laclau, 2005). Although this study appreciates the merits of these 'strategic ' approaches, it deploys the concept of populism as a global (Moffitt, 2016) and authoritarian (Hall, 1985; Poulantzas, 2000) process. This understanding advances the critical understanding in two ways. First, it goes beyond the limits of methodological (inter)nationalism. Populism is often manifested in two analytical levels: national (e.g.Erdoganism in Turkey and Brexit in the UK) and inter-national (e.g. the Turkish Model in MENA region and Euroscepticism in the EU)[2]. Populism as a global and authoritarian process, on the other hand, is manifested in the global political economy level and understands world politics holistically. Second, it expands the scope of 'strategy 'to wider and global authoritarianism, so that it does not exclude ideational, political, and discursive strategies, nevertheless, it amalgamates them with the authoritarian tendencies in the global political economy. By doing so, it transcends the division between populist rhetoric or policy, right-wing or left-wing populism, populists in power or opposition, and populism in the Global South or North by its holistic approach.

Migration is a contested concept in the study of politics too. The term could problematically establish false dichotomies between 'economic migrants', 'refugees', and 'asylum-seekers '(İşleyen, 2018). In this article, migration is defined as global human mobility for permanent or temporary settlement. The governance of migration, on the other hand, describes the global, regional, or national policy-making to regulate this mobility and it varies geopolitically. For example, Turkey is considered as both a country of origin, transit, and destination for migrants, whereas, the UK is generally a country of destination. As a result, in 2016, Turkey was simultaneously considered as a potential EU member that would bring an influx of migrants to the UK and as a privileged trade-partner that would stop the influx of migrants to the EU. Such incompatibility demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between populism and migration within a wider international political economy. The first objective of this research is to explore how authoritarian populism is affecting the migration and to analyse the interaction between authoritarian populism and the managing of migration.

The relationship between populism and migration has been studied in the literature with respects to numerous related issues, such as foreign policy (Verbeek & Zaslove, 2017), nationalism (De Cleen, 2017), political

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[2] Chavez in Venezuela and Chavismo in Latin America.

economy (Hogan & Haltinner, 2015), xenophobia (Ruzza, 2009), security (Lazaridis & Wadia, 2015), international security (Kadıoğlu, 2020) etc. Although these studies give an excellent overview of this complex relationship, there are two limitations appear in the literature. First, populism is predominantly understood as the populist rhetoric only and often populist rhetoric and policy are taken as two separate things. Second, populism is regularly analysed as a 'national 'phenomenon, without acknowledging the embedded geopolitical aspects that both migration and global capitalism would bring. The complexity of this relationship brings us to the second objective of this article: to interrogate whether the impact of populism as a global and authoritarian process on migration in the global North and South have overlapping features. If so, why does it produce similar forms of migration governance in different geopolitical contexts; and if not, why does it produce different forms of governance? The relationship between populism and migration in the Global South and North is usually considered as two separate issues in two separate geographical locations. This research, however, argues that the populism-migration nexus is a geopolitical phenomenon, thus the relationship between populism and migration in the global North and South needs to be understood geopolitically.

In order to answer these research objectives, this study will analyse the nexus of populism and migration in Britain and Turkey and it will interlink this nexus with a geopolitical contextualisation by two countries that is thought to be both inside an outside of Europe. It will focus the political rhetoric towards migration and foreign policy in Turkey and the UK. This will help the research to fill the gap between populist rhetoric and populist policies, thus the relationship between populism and migration will be understood multi-laterally, rather than linearly. Finally, it will also assist the research to understand everyday practices of populism vis-à-vis the governance of migration. Therefore, the exploration and analysis of the relationship between populism and migration will be validated. Finally, by employing a comparison of British and Turkish practices, this analysis will interrogate to what extent and why geopolitics matter in understanding the relationship between populism and migration in the Global South and North.

II. GLOBAL POPULISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL

For long, social sciences had been considered within the Eurocentric ontological standpoints only. Recently, there has been an increase in the number of studies that invite Politics & IR to be more inclusive of the non-West and become a 'global 'discipline (Acharya and Buzan, 2019). The 'global 'has become an oft-cited analytical category[3] not only in terms of 'the retreat of the state '(Strange, 1996) vis-à-vis the increasing relevance of globalisation in world politics, but also as a challenge to the Orientalist knowledge production (Hobson, 2020). Debates around 'global populism 'resonates across the discipline of Politics & IR in a similar vein (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017; De la Torre, 2018; Stengel, MacDonald, and Nabers, 2019; Holliday, 2019; Wajner, 2021b; Ostiguy, Panizza, and Moffitt, 2021; Moffitt, 2016). For example, Carlos de la Torre expresses his intention very clearly in the introduction to his edited volume, *Routledge Handbook of Global Populism*: "Differently from Eurocentric studies that relegate the multiple populist experiences of the global south to footnotes, this book aims to look at populism globally" (2018, 2). In a more recent collection, Ostiguy, Panizza, and Moffitt distinguish two approaches in the post-Laclauian understanding of populism as strategic and ideational approaches, where they also argue that "[t]o understand populism adequately … it is essential not to be cognitively restricted to Eurocentric or even Latin America–centric readings of the phenomena, but be global and truly cross-regional" (2021, 4). It is plausible to maintain that the idea of 'global populism 'is emerged as a response to the uneven distribution of case studies among the populism studies overwhelmingly in favour of Western and Latin American examples.

However, the question of 'what is global and what is not 'or more specifically, as Wajner points out, "the very idea of 'global populism'" remains puzzling (2021b). What is the global? What is the relationship between the global and the international? How can we understand the recent populist surge within the debates around globalisation, the international, and methodological nationalism? I argue that as a way to develop a global understanding of populism, it is equally problematic to analyse populisms in the non-Western and non-Latin American countries as isolated case studies without embracing the relationality between the domestic and international factors. This would lead to the reproduction of methodological nationalism and/or culturalism from the other way around, in which case the analysis cannot be 'global 'anyway. In order not to fall into the pitfalls of methodological nationalism, following Holliday's recent conceptualisation, it is argued in this study that in order to fill the gap between Comparative Politics and IR it is imperative to focus on the "interconnectedness between the 'domestic 'and 'international', or 'internal 'and 'external'" because "the international is integral to populism"

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[3] For a critique, (Anderl and Witt, 2020).

(2019, 3-4). This is closely connected to the concepts of authoritarian neoliberalism and the philosophy of internal relations where global capitalism's relationship with this 'interconnectivity' is sought within the geopolitical order.

III. INCORPORATING GLOBAL POPULISM WITHIN AUTHORITARIAN NEOLIBERALISM

The concept of authoritarian neoliberalism is coined by Ian Bruff (2014) in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in order to emphasise the increasing relevance of authoritarianism vis-à-vis the resilience of neoliberalism. By drawing on the concept of authoritarian statism/populism developed by Poulantzas and Hall, he argues that "…we are witnessing the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism, which is rooted in the reconfiguring of the state into a less democratic entity through constitutional and legal changes that seek to insulate it from social and political conflict" (2014, 113). Since the global financial crisis, neoliberalism increasingly relies on more coercive state apparatuses to constrain the popular resistance, and a qualitative shift in the inherent illiberal inclinations within neoliberalism itself (Tansel, 2017). Authoritarian neoliberalism allows us to go beyond the clear-cut dichotomies of the 'good' and the 'bad' capitalisms (Bruff, 2014: 120) and the associated populism within the same temporal disassociation as it provides us a historical overview. Overall, populism and the rise of populist far-right is commonly associated with the rise of illiberalism (Zakaria, 1997) and the crisis of the US-led liberal international order (Ikenberry, 2018). In the 2010s, the 'shift of axis' meant that global capitalism is gradually moving towards the emerging markets (BRICS, MIKTA etc.) and it started to change the core of 'liberal' capitalism with an 'authoritarian populist' one. However, limiting the rise of populism and its socio-politically contingent impacts within such a temporal span is problematic because it prevents us to see the historical embeddedness of populism, authoritarianism, and neoliberalism. Since its emergence in the late 1970s as a response to the crisis of post-war consensus, neoliberalism is attached to both authoritarian and populist form of governance. It not only required a shift towards free market, privatisation, deregulation, and de-unionisation for the 'economic' sphere; it also employed bolstering a 'strong state' (Gamble, 1994) for socio-cultural control in the 'political' sphere. It is plausible to maintain that authoritarian populism is not simply a 'paradigm shift' or the 'new phenomenon' of the last decade, it is rather inherent in neoliberalism since the 1970s.

In this article, I argue that global populism needs to be understood within the debates around the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism around the globe[4]. In an introduction to special issue, Bruff and Tansel (2019, 1) argue that there are two connected trajectories in understanding authoritarian neoliberalism. First, "the intertwinement of authoritarian statisms and neoliberal reforms", and second, the "lineages of transformation of key societal sites in capitalism". This process is a crisis-ridden, conflicting set of practices that boost the potentials for resistance and domination, and resistances are necessarily progressive, "as signalled, for example, by the rise of new radical Right populism" (2019, 2). This is also closely related to what Bieler and Morton (2008) borrow from Antonio Gramsci, 'the material structure of ideology' which they then conceptualise within the 'philosophy of internal relations'. In a seminal study, they argue that global politics "…are best realised through a relational method that captures capital's internalisation through the states system of uneven and combined development, geopolitics and the global crisis…" as opposed to the ontological dualism among the extant literature of IR/IPE that "continuously separates out, in different ways, both the material *content* and/or the ideational *form* of 'the international' as well as agency and/or the structure of 'the international'" (2018, 6). Drawing on this point, I argue that we need to understand global populism without falling into the pitfalls of ontological dualism and by incorporating it within the uneven and combined development of global capitalism and the geopolitical consequences of global crisis. This is where the intertwinement of global populism and authoritarian neoliberalism is realised.

IV. THE SPATIALITY OF POPULISM: BEYOND STATE-CENTRISM?

How to conceptualise populism within geopolitics? It is argued in the above that methodological nationalism and ontological dualism are the pitfalls which prevent us to comprehend populism globally. In order to understand populism globally, it is crucial to start from the geopolitics of populism. The role of nation-states in the international system is a contentious subject. On the one hand, it is argued that nation-states are still the major unit of analysis as globalisation simply means an increase in interaction between individual states, on the other, that globalisation and global governance is leading nation-state system into an extinction. As also questioned by Bieler and Morton (2018), this dichotomy is problematic because it either reproduces crude state-centrism where the nation-states are perceived as self-contained entities; or it ignores the capacity of the domestic struggles within nation-states in expense of overemphasising the role global governance. This dichotomy reproduces narratives where spatio-temporality is almost absent. I argue that it is imperative to start with the geopolitical context to

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[4] See also, (Adaman and Akbulut, 2021; Adaman, Arsel and Akbulut, 2018; Akçay, 2018; Bahçe and Köse, 2017).

understand the social change and to bridge the internal and the external, or in other words, the 'domestic 'and the 'international '. The geopolitical is not necessarily an abstract field where self-contained states 'relations with each other are realised; it is rather a sphere where the relationship between the domestic and international social forces interact dialectically. Populism is also not immune to this dialectical relationship. Therefore, it is important that we understand the populist surge with its geopolitical contexts.

Foreign policy is undoubtedly one of the crucial elements of the geopolitics. There are several studies published recently that incorporates populism within foreign policy analysis (Chryssogelos, 2017; Verbeek &Zaslove, 2017; Destradi and Plagemann, 2019; Plagemann and Destradi, 2018; Taş, 2020; Löfflmann 2019; Wehner and Thies, 2020; Wajner, 2021a). Verbeek and Zaslove point out a puzzling question that although the populist parties share a common distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite, they do not have an identical 'populist 'foreign policy. They argue that 'the variation in their foreign policy preferences can be understood via the specific ideology populism as a thin-centered ideology attaches itself to" (2017). Perhaps, this specification can be understood as 'the varieties of populism '(Aytaç and Öniş, 2014). In this article, I focus on the governance of migration in specific countries in order to incorporate the 'specific ideology populism as a thin-centered ideology attaches itself to" in understanding the impact of populism on foreign policy.

V. POPULISM, MIGRATION, AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE UK AND TURKEY

The UK and Turkey are selected as case studies in this article because of their geopolitical specificities. Geographically they are both located at the Western and Eastern 'ends' of Europe, and they both have had somewhat 'complicated' relationship with the EU as the 'otherised' nations of the continent. The UK was a member between the 1970s and 2020 and since between 2016 and 2020, Brexit occupied the central attention in the EU. Turkey is a candidate country and negotiations are very slow but still in progress since 2005. In terms of populism, both countries' leaders and politics encountered strong populisms in the last decade. The US could have been another case study since its geopolitical proximity to Mexico and Trump's way of handling the 'Mexican wall' to stop the influx. However, the EU and its relationship with the UK and Turkey is an important dimension of this article, therefore the case of US is left out.

A. Britain: Populism and Migration in the Age of Brexit

The purpose of this section is to analyse migration policies and discourses around immigration in the UK vis-à-vis the rise of populist nationalism and Brexit referendum. The interaction between migration and populism will be evaluated in this section. Finally, an overview of post-Brexit British Foreign Policy will be given to investigate the relevance of geopolitics in populist foreign policies.

Migration has been a sensitive and contested issue in the UK since the end of WWII. However, as Dennison and Geddes argue, immigration politics in the UK has become increasingly 'Europeanised 'from 2004[5] onwards because first, the number and ratio of Europeans moving towards the UK has increased extensively; second, self-identification of individuals as European has remained stubbornly low in the UK despite the high level in the rest of the EU countries, and third, "there are significant limits to the UK government's engagement with the EU's free movement, migration and asylum policy framework through non-participation in Schengen passport-free travel and various opt-outs" (2018: 1139). It is suggested that, as a 'Europeanised 'matter, immigration has been as salient issue, as there is a strong correlation between the rate of immigration at the local level and higher levels of vote for Brexit and anti-immigration populism (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). According to the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, the net migration to the UK hit a record of 329k in 2015 in which 216k was from the EU countries (The Migration Observatory, 2020). For the Leave campaign, it was imperative to leave the EU to reduce the migration from the EU. It is safe to maintain that the Leave campaign's slogan "take back control" 'and UKIP's poster "breaking point" is closely related to anti-immigration populism. According to Dennison and Geddes, there are three ways that the issue of immigration affected the Brexit referendum campaign. First, one of the key aims was to reduce the flows of EU citizens moving to the UK. Second, the two campaigns, Vote Leave and Leave.EU, used anti-immigration rhetoric, although the latter was more explicit about it. Third, the debate over immigration took over so that public opinion about EU membership did not change during the campaign (2018: 1146-7).

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[5] In 2004, Labour government under Tony Blair allowed access to the UK labour market by 10 new EU members, mainly central and eastern European countries.

In this article, I focus on the differences and similarities between two rival campaigns, Vote Leave and Leave.EU, to understand the impact of the geopolitics of global capitalism in the UK and its relevance with populism. Although they supported the same vote, to leave the EU, the campaigns were structured around two fundamentally distinct set of ideas. Vote Leave campaign was based on the idea of Global Britain. This campaign supports the idea of Britain could be back on the global stage as a primal actor if it loses the shackles of EU membership. For example, in September 2016, they re-posted (Global Britain, 2016) a news article from Express (2016) highlighting that there are 27 countries lined up to make a free trade deal with the post-Brexit Britain. Based on neoliberal political economy, Global Britain supports free trade, deregulation, and low taxes (Gamble, 2018). For them, rather than reducing to immigration control, 'take back control 'means a globally active and independent Britain without the anchor of the EU. However, reducing immigration from the EU is still an important part of their argument. For example, in a report published by Global Britain in 2017, *How the £30bn cost of EU migration imperils pensions & benefits: Why leaving the Single Market is vital for our public finances and to secure our pensions and benefits*, it is demonstrated that "EU economic migration represents a £30 billion per annum cost to the UK" and "[a] £30 billion annual cost is just under half the annual public spending deficit of £68.2 billion" (Lyddon, 2017: 18). The report finishes the argument by asserting "UK sovereignty means that the UK public interest in this area is no longer automatically overridden by the EU authorities as to the interests of the EU as a whole" (Lyddon, 2017: 18). In 2020, shortly after the completing of divorce, Boris Johnson said "[w]e will restore full sovereign control over our borders and immigration, competition and subsidy rules, procurement and data protection" (Gov.uk, 2020). There is clearly an emphasis on the national sovereignty over the EU economic migration; however, instead of downgrading Brexit into a matter of immigration, it actually highlights the economic independence. It is safe to argue that, although Leave voters would like to see a reduction in migration figures, Global Britain supporters are aware of the fact that the UK economy is dependent on migrant labour therefore "[s]trict control of immigration would undermine the flexible labour market and be inconsistent with the low tax, low regulation regime which the globalists sought" (Gamble, 2018: 6).

On the other hand, the rival leave campaign, Leave.EU supported the idea of Britain First. Britain First, based on economic nationalism, argued that "immigration would be reduced to very low levels, and government would intervene to bring back manufacturing jobs and the close-knit communities of the past" (Gamble, 2018: 4). For example, they clearly stated that "[w]e oppose the increasing colonisation of our homeland through uncontrolled, mass immigration" (Britain First, 2021a). For Britain First, it is important to reduce the net migration, not just economic migration from the EU, because first, there are "millions of unemployed British workers", and second, "[their] British way of life" needs to be protected. Therefore, "[d]ue to the tiny dimensions of our already overpopulated island homeland, Britain First will halt all further immigration into our country" (Britain First, 2021b). They argue that their stance is based on the globalism versus nationalism dichotomy. Clearly, instead of reducing the net migration from the EU, this campaign is more interested in a more holistic approach to halting the immigration to the UK and they seek for a pro-active state to restore the job market for the British workers. Although it is also argued that UKIP's term "EU Immigrant" successfully occupied the public debate during the referendum campaign (Favell and Barbulescu, 2018), UKIP and Nigel Farage's approach to immigration is more extensive than that. In the one hand, the "Breaking Point" poster which according to Farage has transformed politics, had the subtitle "[t]he EU has failed us all" (BBC, 2019), he also advocated the Australian visa point-based system for immigration (BBC, 2015) which indicates the extent of the issue for him and his party UKIP. In 2020, Priti Patel also brought the topic up and she highlighted that the asylum regime needs urgent fixing in the UK. The Australian asylum system based on offshoring is designed for Australia's specific conditions and does not seem applicable to the UK.

There is a very clear difference in philosophy between the two Leave campaigns. I argue that the difference in which populism is being ideologically attached to stems from the geopolitical context of the UK. On the one hand, Global Britain takes a stance where the UK's aspiration in playing a larger role in global politics is crucial, however, this aspiration and how it shaped populism is highly relevant in terms of the UK's proximity to the EU, such as the emphasis on the economic migration from the EU. On the other hand, Britain First and UKIP's position vis-a-vis the immigration and their populisms are also determined by the closeness to the EU, for example UKIP's policy, "[a]sylum will not be granted to migrants who have entered the UK illegally from a safe country like France, Belgium, or Ireland" (UKIP, 2017).

B. Turkey: Neo-Ottomanist Foreign Policy and Refugees

The purpose of this section is to analyse migration policies and discourses around immigration in Turkey vis-à-vis the rise of Erdogan's authoritarian populism and Syrian Civil War. The interaction between migration

and populism will be evaluated in this section. Finally, an overview of neo-Ottomanist Turkish Foreign Policy will be given to investigate the relevance of geopolitics in populist foreign policies.

The Islamist AKP came into power in 2002 in the aftermath of the financial crises of 2000 and 2001 and the consecutive collapse of mainstream central right and social democratic parties that ruled the country with fragile coalitions in the 1990s. It is safe to maintain that the AKP did not start to impose Islamist and authoritarian discourse/policies in its first term until the alleged coup plots by the Kemalist army officers revealed in 2007. Until then, the AKP managed to consolidate the public opinion in favour of them as they presented themselves as a progressive, liberal and pro-EU central right-wing party. The AKP's success was often shown as an example of how Islamic values could be compatible with liberal democracy and capitalism. However, since its landslide victory in 2007, the AKP's both Islamist narrative and authoritarian practice had become more apparent. Although the 2008 Global Financial Crisis could be the beginning of the increasing populism around the world, as well as Turkey, I argue that 2013 was specifically crucial in understanding the AKP's populism. 2013 not only witnessed the Gezi Park Protests, the internal power conflict with the Gülenists which revealed corruption scandal, and the FED's monetary policy decisions that changed the global financial environment for Turkey (Akçay, 2020), it also marked a milestone in Turkey in terms of migration governance as the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) was established that year as a response to the influx of refugees amidst the Syrian Civil War (Fine, 2018).

It is safe to argue that the AKP's neo-Ottomanist foreign policy has become a part of its populism in the second term (Yalvaç and Joseph, 2019). Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision of 'strategic depth 'captures the essence of neo-Ottomanist moment. In this narrative, it is argued that the cultural and historical roots of the Ottoman Empire have long ignored by the Kemalist Turkey in terms of foreign policy making. In the post-war era, Turkey has become a part of the Western bloc, a member of the NATO since the 1950s, and consecutively Turkish foreign policy had been Western-oriented since then. Davutoğlu criticises this position and argues that an Eastern-oriented Turkish foreign policy has more potential because the Ottoman legacy in the Middle East and North Africa is still intact. TFP should break away from the West-looking orientation and focus on a new approach towards the MENA. This argument did not only stem from a paradigm shift in domestic politics in which case it reflects on the rising new Islamic capital and their aspiration to tackle old secular capital's dominance over European markets by expanding towards new markets in the MENA, it was also supported by the global power shift and the consecutive rise of authoritarian state capitalism, BRICS and other emerging markets, and right-wing populism globally in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The Syrian Civil War and the consecutive refugee crisis need to be understood within this pro-active neo-Ottomanist foreign policy. Turkey under Erdogan actively supported the Sunni opposition groups in Syria against the Shia Assad rule.

Bélanger and Saracoglu argue that "the unprecedented exile of Syrians in Turkey is not the source but rather a symptom of a crisis unfolding in Turkey's foreign policy with its Middle Eastern neighbours and the EU" and "xenophobic sentiments against refugees in Turkey are not simply the consequence of the large presence of Syrians" (2018b, 280). Turkey was not a passive recipient of refugees, it was rather an active agent of the crisis with its Islamist[6], nationalist, and populist[7] foreign policy. Therefore, it is important to understand the consecutive 'open-border policy' that Turkey adopted since the beginning of the refugee influxes. For example, in 2019, Erdoğan announced that more than 4 million Syrian refugees admitted to Turkey and $35 Billion was spent by his government (Euronews, 2019). He often criticises the main opposition parties (CHP and İYİ) for their sceptical position towards the refugees and he emphasises the importance of Islamic sentiment in hosting the Muslim refugees in Turkey. He also associates the anti-refugee element of the right-wing populism in West with Islamophobia. Therefore, it is safe to argue that, in terms of Syrian migrant crisis, a pro-refugee position for Erdogan serves to not only his Islamist populist rhetoric in domestic politics but also his neo-Ottomanist foreign policy.

Another aspect of Turkey's 'hospitality' towards refugees lies in the state-capital nexus (Bélanger and Saracoglu, 2018a). An overwhelming majority of the Syrian refugees 'under temporary protection' in Turkey live in urban areas together with Turkish societies (Erdogan, 2020). According to Erol et al (2018), this creates an opportunity of cheap and precarious labour for capital[8]. The 2016 deal between EU and Turkey also need to be

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[6] See also (Altinors, 2016).
[7] See also (Baykan, 2018).
[8] See also (Kaya et al 2019).

understood within the labour relations. Turkey, as a member of the customs union provides cheap goods for the EU. With such deal, the refugees would be kept outside of the union, also would provide even cheaper labour for manufacturing in Turkey.

Populism in Turkey affects discourses and policies around the governance of migration in many contradicting ways. First of all, Turkey's populist foreign policy led the AKP to maintain a paradigm-shifting policy change and to be more active in the formerly Ottoman basin. Its activeness and support to the opposition groups in Syria assisted the turmoil grow and created the refugee influx. Turkey adopted an open-door policy for the refugees and let more than 4 million refugees to enter Turkey. Rhetorically, Erdogan used a discourse to help his foreign policy as soft power towards Muslim countries, and also to domestically in terms of polarising the societal divisions. This also helped the capital in Turkey to enjoy cheaper and informal labour for its export-oriented growth. Turkey's export mainly focuses on the EU and Middle East; therefore, this situation is dialectically connected. Finally, the EU deal for refugees needs to be understood within these dialectics.

VI. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, migration has become a salient and increasingly 'Europeanised' issue in the UK in the last two decades. It is safe to argue that the rise of populist right and its relevance to the issue of migration in the UK are highly connected to UK's geopolitics vis-a-vis the European expansion and its discontents. The difference between two rival groups of Leave campaign also confirms the importance and relevance of geopolitics. On the one hand Global Britain did not reduce Brexit into an immigration issue and it highlighted the importance of national sovereignty to make Britain a globally active actor. While they supported the idea of reducing net EU economic migration, they did not oppose a constant migration flow to the UK as it is required to sustain the economic activities. On the other hand, Britain First downgraded the whole idea of Brexit into immigration and emphasised national sovereignty as a matter of defending the country against immigrants. Compared to the first campaign, they oppose immigration wholly. Currently, the Johnson government adopted Global Britain as a new chapter for post-Brexit foreign policy. In Turkey, however, populism is used in a completely opposite way. Erdogan and his party's 'hospitality' towards refugees is puzzling at first. However, in the way that AKP's populism is shaped, it is clear that first, Turkey is partly responsible of the crisis in Syria as the AKP's FP actively supported the opposition forces, second, a support for 'Muslim' Syrian refugees serves Erdogan's broader Islamist populism.

Perhaps, it is also important to mention the recent rapprochement between Turkey and the UK (Altınörs, 2020). Turkey has been a hot topic during the Brexit campaign. "Leave.EU pointed out that EU proposals to allow visa-free travel to Turkish citizens had been tabled by the Commission in relation to a deal with Turkey on accommodating people displaced by the conflict in Syria, warning citizens to 'brace yourself for another influx'" (Dennison & Geddes, 2018: 1147).

Turkey is considered as both a country of origin, transit, and destination for migrants, whereas, the UK is generally a country of destination. As it was given above, this also reflects on the quality of populism in these countries. As far as populism is concerned, this does not mean that populism in Turkey has more progressiveness towards refugees than the UK, it indicates a broader and more expansive populist strategy that has been undertaken by Erdogan's AKP as a response to the failed foreign policy towards the Middle East. Nor does it mean the right-wing populism in the UK is established on anti-immigration rhetoric only, it needs to be understood in a wider way and as a response to the crisis of global capitalism. It is also imperative that neither UK nor Turkey's 'domestic 'responses to the global issues are mutually exclusive to each other, on the contrary, it represents a perfect example of how the national, the regional, and the global are symbiotically interconnected to each other. For instance, Turkey was simultaneously considered as a potential EU member that would bring an influx of migrants to the UK and as a privileged partner and arguably as an 'open refugee camp with cheap labour for the goods to be sold to the EU 'that would stop the influx of migrants to the EU. Such incompatibility demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between populism and migration.

I argue that understanding populism globally is an important attempt; however, it also needs to incorporate geopolitics and historically specific foreign policies that is necessarily historical materialist moment (Bieler and Morton, 2018). For example, in order to understand the concept of "migration state", Adamson and Tsourapas (2019) suggest "a typology of nationalizing, developmental, and neoliberal migration management regimes" in the Global South.

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**Poulantzas, N.** (1978). *State, Power, Socialism*. Verso

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