

Turkey-European Union (EU) Relations after the July 15 Coup Attempt within the Framework of the Random Walk Model

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Abstract

This study examines Turkey-EU Relations after the coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016. The study was conducted using one of the decision-making models, the Random Walk Model. The study claims that the rhetoric of EU and Turkish decision-makers against each other after the July 15 coup attempt was made by zigzagging like a drunk walking on the pavement. Good rhetoric by EU decision-makers to Turkey will be shown by stepping to the right, and bad rhetoric will be shown by stepping to the left. The steps taken to the right will be evaluated as A, and the steps to the left will be evaluated as B. Then, inference will be made on how the relations will continue and how the relations will be evaluated. It will be explained that it draws zags. Undoubtedly, every event may not be of equal value in social sciences. Giving equal values here is to show that the causes and consequences of the events cannot be determined beforehand and that there may be different unpredictable results.

Key Words: Turkey, European Union, Random Walk, Coup Attempt, July 15

Sarhoő Yürüyüőü Modeli Çerçevesinde 15 Temmuz Darbe Giriőimi Sonrası Türkiye-Avrupa Birliđi (AB) İliőikleri

Öz

Bu çalıőma, 15 Temmuz 2016'da Türkiye'deki darbe girişiminin ardından Türkiye-AB iliőiklerini incelemektedir. Çalıőma, karar alma modellerden biri olan Sarhoő Yürüyüőü Modeli ile ele alınmıőtır. Çalıőmada, AB ve Türk karar vericilerin 15 Temmuz darbe girişiminden sonra birbirlerine karőı söylemlerinin, kaldırımında yürüyen bir sarhoő gibi zikzak çizerek yapıldıđı iddia edilmektedir. AB karar vericileri tarafından Türkiye'ye yönelik iyi söylemler sađa, kötü söylemler ise sola adım atılarak gösterilecektir. Sađa atılan adımlar A, sola atılan adımlar ise B olarak deđerlendirilecek, iliőiklerin nasıl devam edeceđi ve iliőiklerin nasıl zikzaklar çizdiđi anlatılacaktır. Őüphesiz sosyal bilimlerde her olay eőit deđerde olmayabilir. Burada eőit deđerler verilmesi olayların nedenlerinin ve sonuçlarının önceden belirlenemediđini ve tahmin edilemeyen farklı sonuçların olabileceđini göstermek için yapılmıőtır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Avrupa Birliđi, Rastgele Yürüyüőü, Darbe Giriőimi, 15 Temmuz


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Introduction

Turkey-EU relations, which started 62 years ago with Turkey's application for partnership, have always remained important since the beginning and have been one of Turkey's most important state policies. Turkey-EU Relations have progressed steadily since the first day of the application for an association. Nevertheless, Turkey has experienced positive and meaningful processes such as the preparation of the partnership agreement, the construction of the Customs Union, obtaining of the nomination status, and the start of the negotiation process. However, these relations have also experienced negative developments during the period due to human rights, fundamental rights, and freedoms, Cyprus. Despite all this, relations continued.

Turkey-EU Relations were severely damaged after the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016. Turkey did not receive the support it expected after the coup attempt and thought the coup attempt was supported by Europe. The EU criticized Turkey's practices after the coup attempt as contrary to EU values, and significant steps were not taken in relations, and Turkey-EU relations were dragged towards a stalemate. Moreover, the rhetoric and activities of both Turkish and EU officials towards each other in this process were zigzagged like a drunk walking on the pavement, and it was not possible to predict what would happen after an action.

In this context, this study will try to explain Turkey-EU relations within the framework of the random walk model after the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016. In the first section of the study, the random walk model will be explained. Secondly, Turkey-EU relations will be examined after July 15. In the third section, Turkey-EU relations will be discussed within the framework of the random model. In this section, the rhetoric and activities of both Turkey and the EU will be examined separately. It will be analyzed how both Turkey and the EU drew zigzags in this process and whether the relations will be positive or negative by means of evaluating the positive statements of both sides as a right step and A, negative ones as a left step and B point.

Random Walk Model in International Relations

The random walk model is based on statistics and mathematics and addresses a random process. This model was first introduced and developed by Karl Pearson in 1905 (Pearson, 1905, p. 294). This model is used in many fields from mathematics to statistics, economics to chemistry (Kohls and Hernandez, 2018). The model, which describes the path of a molecule in chemistry in liquid and gas format, is used to predict the share prices that are variable in economics and the path taken by the financial situation in the stock market. Therefore, this model is also used in some fields such as biology, physics, environment (Nau, 2014).

The Random Walk model applied to economics by Paul H. Cootner argues that price changes are "series independent" and that the history of price is not a reliable indicator of future price direction, and that price action is random and unpredictable. The Random Walk Theory is based on the "effective market hypothesis", which argues that prices fluctuate randomly around their true value. The theory also argues that "buy and hold" is the best market strategy to follow against any attempts to "disrupt the market" (Cooray, 2003, p. 3).

The Random Walk model is also used in the discipline of International Relations to analyze how decision-makers act when making decisions. It is like a drunk walking on a sidewalk cannot predict his next step. The more likely such a person is to go forward, the more likely he is to go backward. In this context, the decisions of decision-makers regarding foreign policy are also so different and random. In this model, used to explain the foreign policies of states, there is a point of action at every step in the foreign policies of the states, and there is randomness for the next movement. That is because foreign policy is open to different influences and there is a change in foreign policy at any time. Therefore, it is very unlikely that a state will predict the outcome of its foreign policy from the beginning. It is also likely that the subsequent processes of foreign policy will differ from those envisaged. Foreign policy events and decisions start from a certain point, and subsequent processes work differently from the designed ones from time to time. This difference can be due to domestic and international conjuncture as well as the resources that actors have. Therefore, there is constant randomness in foreign policy. Because sometimes an event that occurs in one country can have unforeseen consequences in the policies of another country. In this model used to describe conflict management and war, L. W. Sayrs argued that the intensity and

intensity of war could not be explained by drunken walking, but rather explained when regimes could change (Says, 1993, p. 223).

At the same time, Bulgarian nationalism and the change of Bulgaria's policies towards Turks are explained by this model. There is a nationalist wind blowing in Bulgarian politics. In the parliamentary elections held on July 5, 2009 the Geostationary Earth Radiation Budget (GERB) party, which was supported by Bulgarian nationalists and became the focal point of Turkish anti-minority rhetoric and actions, received 39.6 percent of the votes and formed a minority government. In the following 6 months, the government's most vocal attempts at action were against the Turks. Moreover, the Turkish news broadcast, which was broadcast for 10 minutes a day on the official channel, was requested to be abolished and a big campaign was launched in the country. The leader of a small-scale Bulgarian party even set himself on fire in Sofia to protest the Turkish broadcast. The issue did not end there, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria announced that he would support the referendum request brought by the ultra-nationalist party on broadcasting in Turkish; then, he took a step back because of rising reactions from Turkey and Europe (Korkmaz, 2017, p. 74).

Turkey-EU Relations after Coup Attempt on July 15

Turkey experienced one of the most interesting events of the recent past on July 15, 2016. There was an attempted coup by a group of soldiers in association with Gülenist Terror Organization (FETÖ) but the government quickly suppressed it. Several people were killed and injured during this attempt. After the incident, Turkey took drastic measures against those associated with the coup attempt, and many procedures against them, such as detention and arrest, were initiated. During the failed coup attempt, Russia was the first country to support Turkey. The EU made a statement after the coup attempt. From this point of view, Turkey thought that this initiative was supported by the EU, and this incident raised the issue of trust and belief between Turkey and the EU (Alemdar, 2016).

After the coup attempt, statements were made from Western states and the EU, especially the United States. For example, Donald Tusk, president of the EU Council of Ministers, condemned the coup attempt and said the EU supported the elected government (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016a). Tusk said that Turkey should be discernible after the event and stressed that Turkey's measures should not be contrary to EU values (European Commission, 2016a). Apart from the EU Council of Ministers, the European Commission condemned the coup attempt, expressed support for the civilian government and warned Turkey to respect democratic values (European Commission, 2016b, p. 12).

After the events, there was a debate in Turkey about the death penalty against coup plotters. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that he would approve the death penalty if it passed the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) (Cagaptay and Jeffrey, 2016). This has been heavily criticized by the EU. It has been said that Turkey's EU process will be jeopardized if the death penalty is carried out. The Turkish authorities then stated that this issue is their domestic issue that the EU should not interfere, that Turkey does not care about the EU and that the vast majority of the people no longer want full membership in the EU (Euractiv, 2016a).

After the initiative was suppressed, EU officials condemned the initiative in Turkey and said they supported the country's electoral structures (Lecha, 2016, p. 2). At the same time, EU authorities have emphasized democracy, saying that the problems in the country will be solved peacefully (Kirisci, & Laub, 2016; European Parliament, 2016a). After the EU's rhetoric, Turkey was sharply critical and said that the EU could not go beyond condemning the coup attempt and warning Turkey about respect for EU values (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016b).

While these discussions took place after the coup attempt, Turkey's situation within the EU began to be discussed. The coup attempt was once again condemned by the EU and supported by Turkey's elected government. However, EU officials who say that security forces used disproportionate force in the face of events have warned Turkey about EU values and said that Turkey is in a very important position for the EU and that relations should not be damaged by rhetoric such as the death penalty (Foreign Affairs Council, 2016). Emphasizing the importance of EU values, EU officials criticized Turkey for not complying with EU values (Idiz, 2016). EU officials, who deemed it necessary to take several measures in Turkey after the coup attempt, said that these measures should be in line with EU values (European Parliament, 2016b). Turkey continued to speak harshly in the face of this rhetoric and announced that it

would not continue with the Readmission Agreement if visa liberalization was not achieved (Vincenti, 2016).

While relations faced significant problems, reports on visa liberalization were published and it was stated that despite all problems, cooperation between the two sides continued in areas such as the Customs Union and the fight against illegal immigration. Within the scope of the published report, it was said that there was a decrease in illegal migration to European countries through Turkey with the Readmission Agreement, but it was requested that the criteria for visa liberalization be fulfilled by Turkey as soon as possible (The Parliament, 2016). However, the report criticized some media outlets in Turkey for practices contrary to freedom of press and expression (International Federation of Journalists, 2016).

The Progress Report prepared by the European Commission in late 2016 also condemned the coup attempt by the EU and supported the elected government. The report emphasized that Turkey is an important country for the EU and criticized Turkey's practices as contrary to EU values after the July 15th event and emphasized that Turkey's stability must continue (European Commission, 2016c, p. 6). In this sense, the importance of cooperation between Turkey and the EU on issues such as the fight against terrorism and the fight against illegal migration was mentioned, and it was said that this cooperation should be deepened (Penev, 2016).

Despite EU rhetoric, Turkey failed to meet the regulations on EU values, and on November 24, 2016, the European Parliament took a decision and recommended that the full membership talks be halted due to Turkey's non-compliance with EU values (European Parliament, 2016c). Many officials, including the President, then said that this decision was a double standard and that Turkey would seek an alternative to the EU (EUObserver, 2016a). After this decision, some institutions within the EU and some member states, such as Germany, said that relations with the EU should continue and focused on accelerating accession negotiations. In addition, members such as Austria and the Netherlands have said that relations between Turkey and the EU should be ended due to fears about migration and religion (Euractiv, 2016b). For example, the Austrian Foreign Minister said that if the EP's decision against Turkey is not implemented, he will veto any decision on Turkey (Vytiska, 2016).

While this negative process in Turkey-EU relations continued, cooperation continued, especially on issues such as the fight against illegal migration, and cooperation between the two sides had a significant impact in reducing illegal migration (European Commission, 2016c, p. 7). Anyway, whatever happens in this case, it has been an important indication that the EU wants to continue its relations with Turkey (EUObserver, 2016b).

At a meeting in the EU in December 2016, the EP's decision to halt negotiations with Turkey was rejected, but it was decided not to open a new chapter until Turkey made the necessary arrangements (Nielsen, 2016). Therefore, it is emphasized that the future of relations will depend on the steps to be taken by Turkey. However, Austrian and Dutch officials stated that an alternative model of relations with Turkey would be better for the future of relations (Gotev, 2016). Turkish authorities regarded this situation as unacceptable and stated that they were considering nothing but a full membership process (European Council, 2016).

Understanding Turkey-EU Relations in the Context of the Random Walk Model after the July 15 Coup Attempt


In this part of the study, the rhetoric of EU and Turkish decision-makers regarding each other after the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016 will be explained by the random model. In this context, the rhetoric of Turkish and EU officials against each other will be discussed separately. The positive rhetoric of both Turkey and the EU against each other will be evaluated as step right (A), while negative rhetoric will be considered step left (B). According to the result, inferences will be made about how the relationship continues and how it will continue.

EU's statements towards Turkey

- After the incident on July 15, EU officials condemned the incident and said they supported all democratically mandated institutions. (A)
- EU officials found the practices made after the incident in Turkey contrary to EU values and warned Turkey about this issue. (B)

- After the EU's reaction to the death penalty, which began in Turkey after the incident, Turkish officials said that this debate was unnecessary and said that a large number of people in Turkey no longer wanted to join the EU. (B)
- After the July 15 event, when the EU criticized Turkey for its practices, the presidential spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin, said Turkey did not give the support it wanted and that the West was nothing more than condemning the coup. (B)
- As the EU continued its criticism of Turkey, the Ankara government continued to harden its rhetoric, and Turkish officials announced on many platforms that the Readmission Agreement would not continue if the visa waiver did not begin (B)
- Despite this negativity between Turkey and the EU, Turkey continued the process of updating the Customs Union with the EU. (A)
- Following the European Parliament's decision to halt negotiations with Turkey, President Erdogan said Turkey would seek alternatives after the talks were halted. (B)
- When EU officials stated that an alternative partnership with the UK and Turkey could be formed, Turkish officials opposed it and focused on full membership. (A)

Considering Turkey's rhetoric, it can be seen that 2 A steps and 5 B steps have been taken. Although positive steps have been taken within these discourses, the process appears to be negative. Here, it can be said that the mutual rhetoric of Turkey and the EU shape each other's decisions.



Conclusion

The coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016 seriously affected and shaped both Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. Turkey has started to fight the group that carried out the coup attempt in domestic politics, and many people linked to the coup attempt have been detained, arrested and dismissed from their professions.

Turkey's domestic policy practices have also affected its foreign policy, and many actors in the international system, especially the United States and the EU, have damaged relations. Turkey's confidence in the West has diminished, especially after the coup attempt, which did not find the support it had expected from Western states. Among Western actors, especially the EU, has criticized Turkey for finding its practices and disproportionate use of force in Turkey contrary to EU values and said that the continuation of the full accession process depends on complying with EU values, and a recommendation was issued from the EP to halt the negotiations after Turkey's practices contrary to EU values continued.

After the coup attempt on July 15, it was observed that both Turkey and the EU zigzagged in their rhetoric and activities against each other. When examined from the EU point of view, the study has shown that 6 positive and 7 negative rhetoric emerged from the EU's 13 rhetoric against Turkey. When examined in terms of Turkey, it was seen that 2 positive and 5 negative rhetoric emerged from Turkey's 7 rhetoric towards the EU.

Due to the rhetoric between Turkey and the EU, the negative or deterioration of relations is more severe. However, it is possible to say that the EU has taken more steps to maintain relations than Turkey. In Turkey, the loss of trust and belief in the EU is a frustration with the existence of the double standard that is thought to be applied by the EU against Turkey, and it seems unlikely that there will be positive progress in Turkey without taking more concrete steps regarding the EU's full membership process. This prevents a clear idea of how the future of relations will continue. For this reason, the rhetoric of both Turkey and the EU towards each other zigzags just like the steps taken by a drunk while walking on the sidewalk.

Ethical Declaration

In the writing process of the study titled “*Turkey-European Union (EU) Relations after the July 15 Coup Attempt within the Framework of the Random Walk Model*”, there were followed the scientific, ethical and the citation rules; was not made any falsification on the collected data and this study was not sent to any other academic media for evaluation. Since the document analysis is examined in this study, there is no requirement for an ethics committee decision.

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TÜRKÇE GENİŞ ÖZET

60 yıldan uzun bir süre önce Türkiye'nin ortaklık başvurusu ile başlayan Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği (AB) ilişkileri başladığı günden günümüze kadar önemini hep korumuş ve Türkiye'nin en önemli devlet politikalarından biri olmuştur. Ortaklık başvurusunun yapıldığı ilk günden itibaren Türkiye ve AB arasındaki ilişkiler gelgitli bir şekilde devam etmiştir. Buna rağmen Türkiye ortaklık anlaşmasının yapılması, Gümrük Birliği'nin yapılması, adaylık statüsünün elde edilmesi ve müzakere sürecinin başlaması gibi olumlu ve anlamlı süreçleri de yaşamıştır. Bununla birlikte dönem içinde insan hakları, temel hak ve özgürlükler, Kıbrıs gibi nedenlerden ötürü olumsuz gelişmeler de yaşanmıştır. Bütün bunlara rağmen ilişkiler devam etmiştir.

15 Temmuz 2016'da Türkiye'de yaşanan başarısız darbe girişiminden sonra Türkiye ile AB arasındaki ilişkiler ciddi biçimde zarar görmüştür. Türkiye darbe girişiminden sonra beklediği desteği görememiş ve darbe girişiminin Avrupa tarafından desteklendiğini düşünmüştür. AB ise Türkiye'de darbe girişimi sonrasında yapılan uygulamaları AB değerlerine aykırı bulduğu için eleştirmiş ve ilişkilerde önemli adımlar atılmamış ve Türkiye ile AB arasındaki ilişkiler çıkmaza doğru sürüklenmiştir. Üstelik hem Türk yetkililerin hem de AB'li yetkililerin bu süreçte birbirlerine yönelik söylemleri ve faaliyetleri tıpkı bir sarhoşun kaldırımında yürüyüşü gibi zikzaklar çizmiş söylenen bir söz ya da yapılan bir eylemin sonrasında ne olacağı kestirilememiştir.

Sarhoş Yürüyüşü Modeli matematiksel bir nesne olup, uzayda atılan rastgele adımların toplamından oluşan patikayı tanımlamaya yönelik bir süreçtir. Örneğin, bir molekülün sıvı veya gaz içerisinde izlediği yol, hayvanların yem arayışında takip ettiği patika, değişkenlik gösteren hisse fiyatları ve de bir borsa oyuncusunun finansal durumu rastgele yürüyüş modelleri ile tahmin edilebilir; ancak gerçekte tamamen rastlantısal olmama ihtimalleri de vardır. Bu örneklerin de gösterdiği gibi, rastgele yürüyüş modelinin ekoloji, psikoloji, bilgisayar bilimleri, fizik, kimya, biyoloji ve ekonomi gibi birçok bilim dalında uygulama alanı bulunmaktadır.

Sarhoş Yürüyüşü Modeli, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininde de karar-alıcıların, karar alırken nasıl hareket ettiklerini analiz etmek için kullanılmaktadır. Kaldırımında yürüyen bir sarhoşun hareketlerinden esinlenerek bulunan bu modele göre devletler de dış politikalarında zikzaklar çizmekte ve bir sarhoşun adımları gibi bir sonraki aşamayı tahmin etme olanakları bulunmamaktadır. Bu durum tıpkı kaldırımında yürüyen bir sarhoşun bir sonraki adımını tahmin edememesi gibidir. Böyle bir kişinin ileri gitme olasılığı ne

kadar fazlaysa geri gitme olasılıđı da o kadar fazladır. Bu bağlamda karar-alcıların dıř politikaya iliřkin kararları da bu denli farklılık ve rastgele bir durum göstermektedir.

Devletlerin dıř politikalarını aıklamak için kullanılan bu modelde, her adımda bir hareket noktası bulunmakta, bir sonraki hareket için de bir rastgele durum söz konusu olmaktadır. Çünkü dıř politika farklı etkilere aıktır. Dolayısıyla dıř politikada her an bir deđiřiklik söz konusudur. Bu nedenle bir devletin dıř politikasının sonucunu en bařtan tahmin etme olasılıđı çok dūřüktür. Ayrıca dıř politikanın sonraki süreçlerinin öngördüđünden farklı olma olasılıđı da yüksektir. Dıř politikada yařanan olaylar ve alınan kararlar belli bir noktadan bařlamakta ve sonraki süreçler zaman zaman tasarlanandan farklı işlemektedir. Bu farklılık aktörlerin sahip oldukları kaynaklardaki gibi ülke içinde ve uluslararası konjonktürden de kaynaklanabilmektedir. Bu nedenle dıř politikada sürekli rastgele durumlar bulunabilmektedir. Çünkü bazen bir ülkede ortaya çıkan bir olay, diđer bir ülkenin politikalarında hiç öngörülemeyen sonuçlar doğurabilmektedir.

alıřmada 15 Temmuz 2016'da Türkiye'de yařanan darbe giriřimi sonrası, Türkiye-AB iliřkileri sarhoř yürüyüřü modeli ile ele alınmıř ve iliřkilerde yařanan geliřmeler göz önüne alındıđında tahmin edilemeyen ve öngörülemeyen bir takım sonuçların ıkabileceđi ileri sürülmüřtür. alıřmada Türkiye'nin hem de AB'nin söylemleri ve faaliyetleri ayrı ayrı incelenecektir. Her iki tarafın da birbirlerine karřı söylemlerinde olumlu olanlar sađa adım ve A, olumsuz olanlar ise sola adım ve B olarak deđerlendirilerek hem Türkiye'nin hem de AB'nin bu süreçte nasıl zikzaklar çizdiđi ve iliřkilerin olumlu mu yoksa olumsuz mu olacađı analiz edilecektir. Tabi ki sosyal bilimlerde her deđer her zaman eřit olmayabilir ya da eřit düzeyde birbirini etkileyen sonuçlar doğurmayabilir. Bu alıřmada eřit deđerlerin kullanılması, diđer unsurlar sabit kaldıđında Türkiye ile AB arasında yařanan iliřkilerin neden ve sonuçlarının önceden tahmin edilemeyen ve adeta bir sarhořun adımları gibi sonuçlara neden olacađını göstermek olmuřtur.

Bu bağlamda iki taraf arasındaki iliřkilerde yařanan bazı geliřmeler ayrı ayrı ele alınmıř ve AB liderlerinin söylemlerini deđerlendirirsek 6 olumlu 7 olumsuz adımın atıldıđı görülmektedir. AB aısından bakılacak olursa süreç içinde olumlu adımlar atılmıř olsa bile olumsuz adımların daha ağır bastıđı görülmektedir. Bu durum da AB aısından Türkiye'nin 15 Temmuz darbe giriřimi sonrasında AB ile üyelik sürecinde karar alcıların olumsuz bir şekilde ele aldıđını göstermektedir. Türkiye'nin söylemlerine bakıldıđında ise 2 olumlu 5 olumsuz adımın atıldıđı görülmektedir. Bu söylemler içinde de olumlu adımları atılmasına rađmen sürecin olumsuz olduđu görülmektedir. Burada Türkiye ve AB'nin karřılıklı söylemlerinin birbirlerinin kararlarını řekillendirdiklerini söylemek mümkündür.

Türkiye ve AB arasındaki söylemler nedeniyle iliřkilerde olumsuz ya da kötüye gidif daha ağır basmaktadır. Ancak Türkiye'ye oranla AB'nin iliřkilerin devamı için daha fazla adım attıđını söylemek mümkündür. Türkiye'de ise AB'ye olan güven ve inan kaybı, Türkiye'ye karřı AB'nin uyguladıđı düşünölen çifte standardın varlıđından bir bıkkınlık sezilmekte ve AB'nin tam üyelik süreciyle ilgili daha somut adımlar atmadan Türkiye'de olumlu bir ilerlemenin olması mümkün gözükmemektedir. Bu durum ise iliřkilerin geleceđinin nasıl devam edeceđine yönelik net bir fikir ortaya konmasını engellemektedir. Bu nedenle hem Türkiye'nin hem de AB'nin birbirlerine yönelik söylemleri tıpkı bir sarhořun kaldırımında yürürken attıđı adımlar gibi zikzaklar çizmektedir.