A Constructivist Perspective: Russia's Politics on Ukraine and Annexation of Crimea (2014)

İnşacı Bir Bakış Açısı: Rusya'nın Ukrayna Politikası ve Kırım'ın İlhakı (2014)

Ayşegül KETENCİ *
Çiğdem NAS **

Abstract

In the study, Russia's relationship with Ukraine in terms of the annexation of Crimea is discussed using the Constructivist paradigm, which considers identity as the main motivation of states› behavior. Since Russia›s annexation of Crimea is due to the deterioration of Russia›s relations with Ukraine and Ukraine›s rapprochement with Western alliances, Russia›s relations with Ukraine were included in the study, and the annexation of Crimea is tried to be explained depending on these relations. On the issue of annexation, Russia strives not to be harmed its interests, which are based on its identity and tries to construct norms and create an appropriate discourse by emphasizing that Russia acts in accordance with international law. The case of Crimea is closely linked to Russia›s common history and culture with Ukraine, and the country›s mental codes, basic identity features that have existed for centuries.

Keywords: Russia, Constructivism, the annexation of Crimea, identity, discourse, norms

* Doktora Ögrencisi, YTÜ İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İliskiler Bölümü, ORCID: 0000-0003-3165-7358, email: aysegulketenci0601@gmail.com

** Doç. Dr., YTÜ İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, email: cnas@yildiz.edu.tr

Öz

Çalışmada, Rusya›nın Ukrayna ile olan ilişkisi Kırım›ın ilhakı özelinde, kimliği devletlerin davranışlarının ana motivasyonu olarak gören İnşacı paradigma kullanılarak ele alınmaktadır. Rusya›nın Kırım›ı ilhakı, Rusya'nın Ukrayna ile ilişkilerinin bozulması ve Ukrayna›nın Batı ittifakları ile yakınlaşması sebeplerine bağlı olduğundan, Rusya›nın Ukrayna ile olan ilişkileri çalışmaya dahil edilmiş ve bu ilişkilere bağlı olarak Kırım›ın ilhakı açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Rusya, ilhak konusunda kendi kimliğine dayalı çıkarlarına zarar verilmemesine, uluslararası hukuka uygun hareket ettiğini vurgulayarak normlar oluşturmaya ve politikalarına uygun bir söylem yaratmaya çalışmaktadır. Kırım vakası, Rusya›nın Ukrayna ile ortak tarihi, kültürü ve ülkenin zihinsel kodları, yüzyıllardır var olan temel kimlik özellikleri ile yakından bağlantılıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, İnşacılık, Kırım'ın ilhakı, kimlik, söylem, normlar

INTRODUCTION

Due to its geopolitical and strategic importance as well as because of its common and deep cultural and historical ties, Ukraine has great significance for Russia. In this article authors examine Russia's Ukraine policies and turbulent relations between these two countries in the recent period. Since the 2000s, Ukraine's attempts to move away from Russia's political orbit and approaching Western alliances was seen as an unacceptable development for the Kremlin. In this context, by using hard power Russia annexed Crimea with aim to prevent the relations from harming itself. Ukraine's approach to the West contradicts Russia's Slavic-Orthodox identity, its identity as a great and imperial state. Russia's Ukraine policies are closely related to these identity characteristics. According to the constructivist paradigm, the identity is at the heart of the states' policies. The behavior of the countries occurs due to the interests of their identity. Based on those assumptions, in the article authors explain the annexation with the constructivist approach.

In 2014, Russia's occupation and then annexation of Crimea became an important event that had great repercussions both regionally and globally. As a result of the intervention, Crimea became part of Russia. The article elaborates the annexiation of Crimea by constructivist paradigm. Russia's intervention in Crimea is discussed from an *identity*-based perspective that guides Russian policy, by explaining the questions of "who am I, who is the other one(s) for me" through Russian mental codes. While the basic identity features of Russia's response to the question "who am I" is elaborated through Orthodoxy, Slavism, being a great and imperial power, Western alliances are discussed as the "other". Language and discourse are important parts of constructivism, so discourses used by Russia for the annexation of Crimea are detailed.

Constructivism states that the formation of rules and norms is created by constantly repeating discourses and is used to legitimize actions. Russia strongly supports this argument of constructivism by constantly emphasizing the discourse that it did not actually act against international rules and norms in the annexation of Crimea. In addition, using its deep historical ties, its religious, cultural and ethnic identity features with Ukraine for annexation, Russia took advan-

tage of the east-west seperation of Ukraine and acted in the eastern and southern parts (particularly in Crimea) that remained under its sovereignty. The Western world, which are considered the "other", prioritize economic motives, especially energy, and refrain from using hard power in Ukraine, which is geographically distant and has an atmosphere of serious uncertainty and disagreement.

The Constructivist Perspective

Constructionism considers it as a failure that traditional theories such as Realism and Idealism could not predict the end of the Cold War and points out that these theories, which deal with actors competing for power, cannot provide an adequate explanation for agency, whereas the social world is created because of human actions.[1] Ontologically, the constructivist paradigm emphasizes the reality constructed by the society and the agent instead of the mere truth. For example, a paper does not mean "money" by itself, but when society accepts that paper as "money", it becomes a social reality and general acceptance. Constructivism deals with the social construction process of facts, not pure facts, and states that this construction will only occur through the "language and discourse" used by the society.[2]

Constructivism is a way of examining social relations, issues and events in the international conjuncture and the reasons for the differentiation of societies are tried to be explained in connection with each other.[3] Based on the effort to transformation social reality into science, the ever-present interplay between the natural and human sciences is examined. According to constructivist perspective, states are the main actors in the system and the most important structures in the system are intersubjective structures rather than material ones, identity and interest are interconnected and these are formed by intersubjective structures.[4] Constructivism offers alternative perspec-

---

[1] Sarina Onlar, "Introducing Constarctivism in International Realtions Theory", E-International relations, 23.02.2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/

[2] Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruciton of Constarctivism in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, SAGE Publications, Vol. 6, no. 147 (2000), pp. 159-160.

[3] Nicholas Onuf, *International Relations in a Constructed World*, "Constructivism: A User's Manual", Ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, (Londra: M.E. Sharpe Inc. Press, 1998), p.58.

[4] Alexander Wendt, *The Return of Culture and Identity in Theory* "Identitiy and Structural Change in

tives on anarchy, the balance of power, the identities-interests of states, and the relations between them.[5]

Constructivism is a social theory, emphasizing that knowledge and actors with knowledge construct social reality, identities, interests, norms, and their interconnected examination are among the main purposes of the theory.[6] Cultural structures of states occurs by the processing of identities as "knowledge" into the mental codes of the states through tightly linked sentiments, ideas, perceptions, beliefs, rules-norms and by protecting and keeping this information in states' memories. Perceptions of threat, friendship-hostility, hegemony, and related concepts are explained and become meaningful by cultural and social structures rather than material ones. Constructivism argues that science and reality are created and sustains an epistemological perspective by considering the role of objective reality in the construction of knowledge. Interests depend on the actor's definition of "self" and "the other" at the levels of internal and systemic analysis, and the relations attached to this definition. Identities have individual and social structural characteristics, while actors seek answers to the question of "who am I", they create cognitive structures by considering their expectations and interests. The response for "who am I" also refers to question "who is the other one(s) for me" and identity is created inside this paradigm.[7]

According to Onuf, human being is a social being and this argument is one of the most fundamental pillars of constructivism. Based on the argument that saying is equivalent to doing, the world is shaped and built according to people's words and discourses. There is an important and clear connection between discourses and the implementation-building of rules and norms, discourse has a profound effect on the audience. The constant repetition of discourses cause creating an agreement over time, becoming rules-norms that specify

---

International Politics", ed. Yosef Lapid, (London :1996), p.48

5 Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 23, no. 1, (1998, Summer), p.172.

6 Emanuel Adler, "Constuctivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates", *Handbook of International Relations*, 2. edition, Ed by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons, pp.116-117.

7 Tom Andrews, "What is Social Constructionism?", *The Grounded Theory Review,* Vol. 11, no. 1, (2012), pp. 44-45

what people should or should not do. [8] To providing social communication, language plays a key role in the construction of social reality and the creation of intersubjective meanings through language practices.[9]Social events and facts are built in the historical process, the state is a part of the international system, and all the elements that create and maintain the state are included in the social construction process. [10]

Identity is the basis for the formation of interests, practices, actor behaviors are affected by identity, and the change of all these is related to identity.[11] How interests are formed is one of the main questions addressed in international relations. Interests arising from reasons such as wealth, prestige, security, and survival are the basic parameters in the formation of identities. The perception of the United States (US) regarding missiles in North Korea is not like the perception of the United Kingdom (UK). While the perception of threat is very high for the missiles in this country due to the perception of "hostility" for North Korea, it is in question for missiles in another country that is seen as friendly, because there is no perception of threat.[12] Identity represents representations of who an actor is and his answer to the question "who am I" is highly likely that the identities of small and large states will differ from each other. While the main purpose of small states is to ensure their survival, large states have purposes such as keeping their close circles within their sphere of influence and establishing certain dominance in political, military, and economic fields. [13]

International relations are built with collective intellectual factors and mental codes, these factors can change depending on time and

---

8 Nicholas Onuf, *International Relations in a Constructed World***,** pp.66-67.

9 Emanuel Adler, "Constuctivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates", **Handbook of International Relations**, 2. Ed. , Ed by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons, p.125.

10 Margaret P. Karns, Karen A. Mingst, **International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Govarnance**, (London : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 50.

11 Emanuel Adler, "Constuctivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates", **Handbook of International Relations**, 2. Ed. , Ed by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons, 127.

12 Ian Hurd, "Constructivism", **International Relations**, The Oxford Handbook, ed. Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal, Oxford Univeristy Press, 2008, 302-303.

13 Sarina Onlar, "Introducing Constarctivism in International Realtions Theory", E-International relations, 23.02.2018.

place. All parameters related to the change in the system should be followed carefully, because the international system is handled in a constant change and transformation.[14] The international system consists of variable structures, policies change when the identities and beliefs of the actors change, the changes in the system are both interdependent and constantly affected by each other. [15]

Russia's Poltics on Ukraine

According to Mackinder's theory of the heartland, to have world domination one must have a "heartland", the term used for the large landmasses of Europe and Asia.[16] In addition, being one of the countries with the largest territory on the European continent, Ukraine is in the critically important "heartland" between Russia and Europe.[17] Russia accepts the beginning of modern Russian history as the Principality of Kiev, which was established in the 9th century, and considers the geography of Ukraine as an inseparable part for its own existence.[18] The fact that in different time periods different nations lived in Ukraine and paved the way for the division of the country. The west of the Dnieper river was under the domination of Western nations and the east parth was under the rule of the Kremlin, and different feelings of belonging emerged as the citizens of the country felt close to the nations they were under rule.[19]

Ukraine has been considered as a buffer zone of strategic importance by Russia, due to its location between Russia and Europe. After the country gained its independence, some western states and Russian rulers shared the view that Ukraine would reunite with "Mother Rus-

14 Rey Koslowski, Frederich V. Kratochwill, "Understanding Change in International Poltics: the Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System", International Organization, vol. 48, no. 2, (1994, Autumn), p.223.

15 Rey Koslowski, Frederich V. Kratochwill, "Understanding Change in International Poltics: the Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System", p.216.

16 Dalaklis Dimitrios, "The Geopolitical Dimensions of Ukranian Crisis", 2015. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282007294_The_Geopolitical_Dimensions_of_the_Ukrainian_Crisis

17 A. Sait Sönmez, Harun Bıçakçı, Cuma Yıldırım, "Kırım Sorunu Bağlamında Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkilerinin Analizi", International Journal of Social Sciences and Education Resesarch, Vol. 1 , no. 3, 2015, p.657.

18 Tolga Bilener, Ulus Devlet Olma Sürecinde Ukrayna- Erhan Büyükakıncı, Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna, (Ankara: Phoenix Press, 2004) pp.313- 314.

19 Selim Kurt, "Güvenlikleştirme Kuramı Açısından Rusya Federasyonu-Ukrayna Çatışmasını Anlamak", Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Journal, vol. 75, no.1 (2020, January- March), p.14.

sia". For Russians, Ukraine was considered as an artificial state and a derivative of the Russians.[20] Russia's view of identity is related to ethnic and civic arguments, language and culture, and ethnic Russians, citizens of the Russian Federation, and eastern Slavic peoples can find their place in the term "Russian". Sense of identity is closely related to several factors in the context of Ukraine and Belarus: Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians share same ethnic background, Belarus and Ukraine are artificial states, so their borders are also artificial.[21] Constructivist narrative incorporates the projections of the distinction between "self and other", and it could be difficult and troublesome to make this distinction for Russians and Ukrainians, because they lived under the same state for centuries and shared the same history, culture and similar language, that's why it may blur the distinction between their identities. This Russian domination, which countinued and has been so valid for centuries, played an important role in the nation-building of Ukraine. [22]

The Annexation of Crimea

Protests started in Ukraine after Viktor Yanukovic won the second round of the presidential elections with a 3% margin during the presidential elections in Ukraine (November 2004). Supporters of Yushchenko and many foreign observers stated that the elections were rigged, and the western and central parts of Ukraine were parts of the country where opposition parties protested to the results. After the Supreme Court's decision to cancel the elections, Yushchenko received 51.99 and Yanukovych 44.2% of the votes in the repeated elections in 2005, and Yushchenko took office on January 23, 2005.[23] Putin provided serious support to Yanukovych and played an important role in the election campaign, Yushchenko supporters believe that Russia provides serious financial support for these purposes. Considered in this light, Yushchenko's election victory

---

20 Tolga Bilener, Ulus Devlet Olma Sürecinde Ukrayna- Erhan Büyükakıncı, Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna, pp.311-313.

21 Taras Kuzio, Paul D'anieri, "The Causes and Consequences of Russia's Actions Towards Ukraine", 16.06.2018, E-International Relations

22 Taras Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the 'Other'**,"** *Ethnicities*, SAGE Publications, Vol. 1, no. 3, (2001), pp. 359-360.

23 «Оранжевая революция»: как это было ? , Ukraina.ru web site, 22.11.2018. https://ukraina.ru/news/20181122/1021828841.html

in 2005 was seen as a regression in terms of Russia's hegomanic tendencies, as well as an undesirable defeat.[24] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine became one of the first CIS countries to join NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program, Ukraine's intention to join NATO was officially announced during the Kuchma period, and Yushchenko started an important dialogue about NATO membership, but with the pro-Russian Yanukovych government. In July 2010, the Ukrainian Parliament declared its non-alignment status with the policy document it adopted and declared that it would not join any military-political alliance.[25]

Even if the process leading up to the annexation of Crimea can be traced back to the 1990s and before, it is important to look at the developments in 2013 and beyond in order to understand the course of the case. The events that took place after Yanukovych suspended the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 caused an atmosphere of political uncertainty and Russia was concerned about the security of the Russian Black Sea fleet. [26] Russia used the chaos and uncertainty in Ukraine, "little green men in uniform" were seen in February 2014 in Crimea, which was considered as a lost Russian land by Russians. [27] Russia bases the annexation of Crimea on historical factors. According to Russia, the reunification of Crimea with Russia is explained by the collapse of the USSR, the creation of a new state, and it is closely related to Russian culture, historical codes and mental processes. [28] Ukraine includes a complex and multilingual structure, eastern Ukraine is largely Orthodox and the widely spoken language is Russian, while the western is Catholic and the Ukrainian language is widely spoken. In this context, the attempt of either side to dominate over the other may lead to a split or conflict. [29]

---

24 Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution", Council on Foreign Relations, **Foreign Affairs**, vol. 84, no. 2 (2005), p.50.

25 Порошенко подписал закон об отказе от внеблокового статуса Украины,
Tass News, 29.12. 2014. https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1678587

26 Anna Dolya, "The Annexation of Crimea: Lessons for European Security", **European Isuuses**, Fondation Robert Schuman Policy Paper, no 382, (23 February 2016): 3.

27 John Biersack & Shannon O'Lear, "The geopolitics of Russia's Annexation of Crimea: narratives, identity, silences, and energy*", Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 55, no. 3, (2014), p. 249.

28 Сергей Анатольевич Панкратов, ВОССОЕДИНЕНИЕ КРЫМА С РОССИЕЙ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ТЕНДЕНЦИЙ И ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЙ РАЗВИТИЯ СОВРЕМЕННОГО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ПРОЦЕССА, pp.79-80. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vossoedinenie-kryma-s-rossiey-v-kontekste-tendentsiy-i-protivorechiy-razvitiya-sovremennogo-politicheskogo-protsessa/viewer

29 Henry Kissenger, "To Settle the Ukranie Crisis Start at the End", The Washington Post, 5 Mart

Russia used the argument that it defended the Russian-speaking people in Crimea, stating that the people of Crimea demanded reunification with Russia in a democratic way and justified its hegemonic tendencies based on its identity, emphasizing that it was right. [30] The threat from the West in the invasion of Crimea was perceived as a threat to Russia's identity rather than Russia's territorial integrity. [31]

Russia's Identity Policies: Explanation of Russian Politics on Ukraine and Annexaton of Crimea *(Response to the questions Who am I and Who is the Other)*

A. Slavic, Orthodox, Imperialist, Great Power Identities of Russia   (Response to the question "Who am I")

Many different characteristics of a state can be discussed with different arguments to explain its identity. In the article, in connection with Slavism, Orthodoxy, Russia's identity is detailed and argued that the Kremlin has an imperial vision. Russia considers itself as great power. The abovementioned identity characteristics mostly affect Russia's foreign policy behaviors.

• Slavic and Orthodox Identities

The religion is an inseparable part of the Russian identity. Based on the reality that the state and church in Russia are separated, they should work in harmony. The Russian tsars, besides giving themselves the title of divine rulers, accepted Russia as the 3rd Rome. The identity of the church state, which Tsar Nicholas I dealt with with the motto of *Nationality, Autocracy, Orthodoxy*, became a part of the identity formation during the 1917 Russian Revolution.[32]

Russia used the concept of the Slavic world as part of the Russian state identity in the 21st century in the socio-political field. The Slav-

---

2014 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html?utm_term=.65ddae2c9212

30 John Biersack & Shannon O'Lear, p.252.

31 Riccardo Alcaro, "West- Russia in Light of the Ukraine Crisis", IAI Research Papers, Ed. Riccardo Alcaro, Roma, 2015, Report of the Transatlantic Security Symposium, p.23.

32 Mara Kozelsky, "Don't Underestimate Importance of Religion for Understanding Russias Actions in Crimea", The Washington Post, 13.03.2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/13/dont-underestimate-importance-of-religion-for-understanding-russias-actions-in-crimea/

ic world has a metaphorical meaning and represents a "heaven on earth". In the last three centuries, the concept of the Slavic world was used on symbolic foundations and shaped the Russian national identity. During the first decade of the 21ˢᵗ century, the concept of the Slavic world was updated again, and used to support the geopolitical claims of post-Soviet Russia on building special relations with Ukraine and Belarus and became one of the supporting functions to promote the dissemination and strengthening of the Russian world ideology.[33]

The collapse of the USSR caused a very serious geopolitical upheaval for Russia. As a successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia lost a significant part of former Soviet territories. Ukraine's independence challenged Russia's claim to be the most important representative of the Slavic identity with its pan-Slavism vision.[34] For most Russians, nations like Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are Eastern Slavs, and that they should have strong relations.[35] The close relations between Russians and Ukrainians are also the source of the problems between two states. Russian population and ethnic Russians in Ukraine, consider that there is no difference between the two Slavic peoples, and therefore it is difficult for them to understand the reason for the existence of a separate Ukrainian state.

Russian foreign policy documents include the protection of Slavic rights. It is underlined that the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens living abroad will be protected based on international law and international agreements with the Russian diaspora, including expanding and strengthening the space of the Russian language and culture, developing the cultural and humanitarian ties of the Slavic peoples is an important component of the concept of foreign policy.[36]

---

33 Т.В. Евгеньева, В.В. Титов, С.Ю. Белоконев МЕСТО ОБРАЗА СЛАВЯНСКОГО МИРА В ФОРМИРОВАНИИ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИЙСКОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ, Вестник Томского государственного университета Философия, Социология, Политология, 2019. № 48, pp. 140-142. http://journals.tsu.ru/philosophy/&journal_page=archive&id=1826&article_id=40536

34 Zbigniew Brezezinski, ***The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and Its- Geostrategic Imperatives***, (New York NY: 2016), pp. 88-89.

35 Peter J. Duncan, "Contemporaray Russian Identity Between East and West", **Cambridge The Historical Journal,** Vol. 48, no. 1, (March 2005), p.286. www.cambridge.org/core/journals/historical-journal/article/abs/contemporary-russian-identity-between-east-and-west/02AE32765B16C104869D71B8F241D792

36 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, Law-Information Portal (Grant Ru- İnformatsionna-Prava-

The identity politics of the Russian Orthodox church also exists outside of Russia, espacially in the post-Soviet countries. The church supports the establishment of the union of trilateral Russia-Ukraine-Belarus, based on the broad definition of Russian identity. The argument is put forward that the separation of the mentioned states from each other is artificial, and it would be beneficial for all of them to be in solidarity again as they share same Slavic roots. And this argument is supported officially by the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church has a sentiment based on the understanding that *our blood is one, our religion is one*.[37]

With its own charasteristics and special mission to increase its effectiveness by creating political and diplomatic lobbies, the Russian Orthodox Church is a center of the Christian world today. The Moscow Patriarchate positions itself against Latin Christianity and tries to defend the interests of Orthodoxy at the state level geo-politically. It considers the Fener Greek Patriarchate as part of the Western policies. The Moscow Patriarchate states that it undertakes task of Russian unification in the post-Soviet countries. These are an important part of the Russian national identity and considered as the great success of the Orthodox geo-politics. In that regard, Russia wants to ensure the continuation of Russia's influence in other post-Soviet countries by unifying Belarus and Ukraine.[38]

The Russian Patriarchate realizes great efforts to ensure harmony and integration between churches and church members in the post-Soviet geography. Russia considers the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church to increase its influence in Ukraine as contrary to its interests and the situation causes tension. It is considered that increase of the influence of the Roman Catholic church would end with Ukraine's move away from Russian orbit, and would connect it to the Western economic and political goals.[39]

voy Portal)

Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации (12 февраля 2013 г.)
http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/70218094/

37 Anar Somuncuoğlu, Rus Ortodoks Kilisesinin Eski Sovyet Alanındaki Misyonu, **Karadeniz Araştırmaları,** no. 2 (Summer, 2004), pp. 101.
http://www.karam.org.tr/Makaleler/992132737_somuncuoglu.pdf

38 Anar Somuncuoğlu, "Roma Katolik Kilisesi ve Fener Rum Patrikhanesi'nin Eski Sovyet Alanındaki
Faaliyetleri" ASAM Press, *Stratejik Analiz*, ASAM Press, vol. 3, no. 28 (Ankara: 2002), pp.115-116.

39 İlyas Kamalov, *Putin'in Rusyası: KGB'den Devlet Baskanlığına*, (İstanbul, Kaknüs Press 2004), pp.133-136.

Besides the geopolitical factors, Russia's historical memory plays an important role in Russia's Crimean annexation. Crimea has a central place both the idea of Rome 3 and the understanding of Nicholas I that prioritizes nationalism. Orthodoxy taken from Byzantium was transferred to Russia in the Crimea, and Kievan Rus' Prince Vladimir was baptized in Chersonesos. The Russian Orthodox Church successfully competed with the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and tried to expand its sphere of influence in this geography. Russia's strong sense of belonging to Crimea is closely linked to religious belief, Orthodoxy is among the spiritual elements that enable Russia to increase and expand its influence in the south.[40]

The Russian Patriarchate aims to ensure harmony and integration among the churches in the post-Soviet geography. The efforts of the Roman Catholic Church to increase its influence in Ukraine cause Russia's concern. In this case, it is considered that a strategy based on Ukraine's move away from Russia and getting closer to the economic and political goals of the West will come to the fore.[41]

"This place (Crimea), Chersonese, where the Holy prince Vladimir was baptized, is the spiritual achievement of conversion to Orthodoxy. This success has ensured the determination of a common cultural value and civilization base uniting the peoples of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. In Crimea, there are the graves of brave Russian soldiers who were taken under the rule of the Russian state in 1783. The homeland of the Russian Black Sea navy is Sevastopol. Crimea is Balaklava, Kerch, Kurgan and Sapun mountain are each of these places sacred to Russia, symbols of the unprecedented courage of Russian military glory. Of the 2 million 200 thousand people living on the Crimean peninsula, 1.5 million are Russians, in addition to this, 350 thousand Ukrainians who speak Russian as their mother tongue and around 300 thousand Crimean Tatars live here."[42]

---

40 Mara Kozelsky, "Don't Underestimate Importance of Religion for Understanding Russias Actions in Crimea", The Washington Post, 13.03.2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/13/dont-underestimate-importance-of-religion-for-understanding-russias-actions-in-crimea/

41 İlyas Kamalov, *Putin'in Rusyası: KGB'den Devlet Başkanlığına*, pp.133-136.

42 Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (From Putin's speeches on Crimea) 18 March 2014

Официальный сайт МИД России (Из выступлений Путина по Крыму) 18 марта 2014 г.

Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

Crimea is vital for the motto of Nicholas I (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, nationalism) and the idea of 3rd Rome, as Byzantium ceded Orthodoxy to Russia on the peninsula and Prince Vladimir was baptized there. Crimea is important in Russian memory in many ways: Crimea witnessed wars such as the Crimean War, the World Wars, and in addition to the spiritual atmosphere of these wars, it is seen that Russia developed a sense of belonging to Crimea with religious feelings. Orthodoxy, in this sense, is one of the intangible elements used by Russia in its expansion to the south, so especially Orthodox Christian Russians supported Putin on the Crimean issue.

Religion plays an important role in understanding Russia's Crimean policy.[43] During the 2014 Crimean intervention, the Russian Orthodox church sought to support and praise the concept of the "Russian World (Russkiy Mir)" to justify Russia's military, religious and political arguments in Ukraine, emphasizing that this concept belongs to a larger civilization than Russia. Broadcasts on Russian channels led to an increase in conflicts in Ukraine.[44] Following the Crimean annexation, religious groups in Crimea also have faced significant difficulties. According to the report prepared by the Crimean Field Mission; while there were more than 1,400 religious groups registered before the annexation, only a dozen of these groups were registered under Russian law in 2015. In 1992, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church split from the Russian Orthodox Church and was not recognized by other Orthodox patriarchs. If the Ukrainian church of Kiev fails to gain recognition under Russian law, it may lose its church buildings and congregations in Crimea. The Russian Federal Security Service has been told that the Kiev Church will voluntarily give up the land in Simperofol, where it plans to build a temple, because buildings for the Russian Federal Security Service will be built there. In addition, the Kiev Orthodox Churches (located in Sevastopol, Kerch and Krasnoperekopsk) were repressed and closed.[45]

---

43 Mara Kozelsky, "Don't Understimate Importance of Religion for Understanding Russia's Actions in Crimea", 13.04.2014, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/13/dont-underestimate-importance-of-religion-for-understanding-russias-actions-in-crimea/

44 Kadri Liik, Momchil Metodiev, Nicu Popescu, "Defender of the Faith? How Ukraine's Orthodox Split Threatens Russia?", European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 30.05.2019 https://ecfr.eu/publication/defender_of_the_faith_how_ukraines_orthodox_split_threatens_russia/

45 One Year On Violations of the Rights to Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Association in Crimea, Amnesty International, 2015, London, p.22, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/

• Imperialist Identity

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, some difficulties and strains were experienced in the nation-building of the newly established states, especially those that were strongly under Russian influence, also geographically and economically subordinate on Russia.[46] Russia was an empire state with multiple identities since its establishment and the country's borders have changed many times because of the historical processes. After two important dates (1917 and 1991) when the Russian imperial disintegration took place, it is seen that the border regions were separated from the main (core) region of Russia, and new states were established near the border regions, and people from different origins such as Russian, Mongolian, Turkish and Tatar lived in the new states. The post-Soviet countries were defined in accordance with their administrative borders at the time of the Union, and these borders were drawn by the Russian leaders in accordance with political needs. 25 million Russians living in the Soviet Union with a population of 147 million remained outside the newly established Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus became independent states, and this caused the core of the imperial Russian state to be divided.[47] Russians, who recognize the Russian Federation as the successor of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, emphasize that restoring these historic predecessors is compatible with Russia's "imperial" state identity. Such imperial identity is essencial to build and maintain a multinational state.[48]

After the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, Russian ethnic population had faced several problems. It could be explained with Russia's imperial vision, which consideres the geography as its inseparable part. While the borders of the countries can easily change de-facto and de-jure, any change for imperial perceptions in the mental codes is difficult. It takes a very long-time spanning centuries

---

EUR50/1129/2015/en/

46 Gwendolyn Sasse**,** *The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict*, Ukranian Research Instıtute Harvard University, (Cambridge, Maassachusettes, 2007), p.21.

47 Dimitri Trenin, Russia's Changing Identitiy: In Search of A Role in the 21st Century, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 18.07.2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79521

48 Peter J. Duncan, "Contemporaray Russian Identity Between East and West", *Cambridge The Historical Journal,* Vol. 48, no. 1, (March 2005), pp.285-286, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/historical-journal/article/abs/contemporary-russian-identity-between-east-and-west/02AE32765B16C104869D71B8F241D792

to experience any change. The geography, where the Russian ethnic population is densely populated, reflects the arguments describing the projections of post-imperialism, expressing the dependence and interaction between Russia and the newly established states in the post-Soviet geography. Competing national and regional identities are one of the important factors that led to instability in the aftermath of Russian imperial disintegration.[49]

Concepts of faith and identity are critically important for both Russia and Ukraine, which have deep historical ties and share similar ethnic, linguistic and cultural characteristics. The constructivist perspective argues that Russia's imperialist doctrine is very effective in the field of identity, and states in which any Ukrainian nation exists indeed, these people are Russians who have forgotten their origins and would remember their identity when they return to Russia.[50]

After the Cold War, Russia lost a significant part of its territory and population, but one of the biggest disappointments was the loss of Ukraine. The loss in question; also meant the rejection of Russia's *imperial* identity, meaning the loss of geography which were rich of great agricultural and industrial resources, and potentially was able to turn Russia into a "great power".

Ukraine's independence also caused the loss of Russia's sphere of influence and its dominant position in the Black Sea, which it saw as a vital outlet for world trade in the Mediterranean and beyond. The separation of Ukraine from Russia was perceived as a serious geopolitical loss as well as a major setback for the ethnic and political identity of the Russians.[51] Russia regained its self-confidence after the Georgian War and got a big profit by taking Crimea after the Ukraine crisis, thus showing that it still has an imperialist vision as it did in the pre-Soviet period and continued its tendencies in the same direction.[52]

---

49 Gwendolyn Sasse**, The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict**, Ukranian Research Instıtute Harvard University, (Cambridge, Maassachusettes, 2007), p. 21.

50 Iurii Opoka, "International Approaches to the Crisis in Ukraine", **Polish Journal of Political Science**, vol. 2, no. 2, (2016), p.94.

51 Zbigniew Brezezinski, **The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and Its- Geostrategic Imperatives**, New York NY, 2016, p.92.

52 **Rusya'nın Doğu Politikası**, Ed. Sezgin Kaya, (Ekin Press, 2013), pp.30-32.

The annexation of Crimea, which took place in 2014, is related to the close ties of the Soviet Union with this new state in ethnic, linguistic, and cultural terms since 1991. The annexation is closely linked to the fact that the Russian population living in this geography forms a strong local minority in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine and Crimea, or it can be defined as a regional majority in the successor state. Historically, Crimea was an inseparable part of imperial Russia for centuries.[53] Following the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia moved away from the process of integration with the West in some respects and defined itself as a self-sufficient post-imperial nation that could maintain and imply an independent foreign policy in the Eurasian continent. Rather than defining itself as Western or Asian, Russia positions itself as a regionally and globally potent and forceful country, a great power that prioritizes and defends its national interests. [54]

• Being a Superpower

At the critical breaking points such as the defeat of the Crimean War in 1856 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had an intense effort to increase its influence and power globally. Russia's President Putin realized policies with aim to increase its power, to expand its sphere of influence and to be taken into consideration in the international affairs. Putin's foreign policy conteins prerequisites for Russia's aim of being recognized as a global great power.[55] Russians have historically assigned themselves the role of being a major and influential power in the international system, and the Russian Federation inherited this view after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this strategy is still alive. Even though it became relatively weak with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's poiticial acts and aims contain the projections of its vision and purpose of being a superpower. [56]

53 Anton Bebler, "Criemea and the Russian- Ukranian Confilict**", Romanian Journal of European Affairs**, vol 15, No 1, (2015), p.36.

54 Dimitri Trenin, Russia's Changing Identitiy : In Search of A Role in the 21st Century, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 18.07.2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79521

55 Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as a Great Power", **Russia as a Greta Power, Dimensions of Security Under Putin,** Ed. Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg, Christer Pursianem, (Newyork: Routledge Press, 2005), p.23.

56 Peter Pomerantsev, "Yes, Russia Matters: Putin's Guerrilla Strategy", *World Affairs*, Vol. 177, no.3 (September-October 2014), p.16.

Great powers are very sensitive to potential threats at regional and global levels, in this respect, Russian leaders have often emphasized that NATO's expansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is unacceptable for Russia, and with 2008 intervention of Russia in Georgia, the threat perception in question was clearly revealed. [57]

Russia's Crimean annexation is closely related to the Russian identity which it carries in the international arena. Russia defines itself as a great power and tries to design its foreign policy as a great regional power. In his speech to the Assembly on March 18, 2104, Putin stated that the referendum in Crimea was fair and democratic, in accordance with international legal norms, and explained his arguments on the subject in line with the deep-rooted historical ties and common culture between Russia and Ukraine. According to these arguments, the "right to self-determination" and "the Russian nation's protection of its own citizens" policies in the UN terms were prioritized and the intervention was carried out in parallel. The constructivist approach comes to the fore here; cases in international relations consider that it is acted in terms of not only being *right* but also *identity*. In this way, Russia's intervention in Crimea was also part of its identity. Russia intervened to Crimea to maximize its regional power.[58]

According to Karaganov, the accession of Crimea to Russia is a turning point in Russian politics, as Russia stopped the expansion of the USA and changed the power balance in Europe. The events in Ukraine are more about Russia's lack of endurance for NATO's eastward expansion, rather than about Ukraine itself. In the words of Karaganov, "*We should have understood earlier, we should have stopped earlier. The first rule of geopolitics: No great power, especially Russia with its history, will voluntarily surrender its buffer*

---

[57] John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukranian Crisis is the West's Fault?", *Foreign Affairs*, (September-October 2014), pp.5-6.

[58] *Ion Alexandru Onati, "Why Did the Conflict in Ukraine Start? A Realist and a Social Constructivist Approach", AALBORG UNIVERSITY: AUGUST 2016 SCHOOL OF CULTURE AND GLOBAL STUDIES (CGS): EUROPEAN STUDIES, p.39.*
https://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/239568100/Why_did_the_conflict_in_Ukraine_start_A_realist_and_social_constructivist_approach_Author_Ioan_Alexandru_Onati_Supervisor_Wolfgang_Zank.pdf

zones. The whole country is built on security and defense, throughout our history we are talking about the defense of the country. Therefore, the sovereignty of our country is very important to us."[59]

Considering Russia's interventions in Chechnya and Georgia and the annexation of Crimea, Russia's vision of "becoming a great power" comes to the fore. Russia perceives the strengthening of Ukraine's integration with NATO and the EU as a threat, and the threat perception causes it to develop and gain a power projection in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.[60] The answer to the question of how Putin can confront the West; the reason is that it is considered the possibility of retaliation as very low and that if there is a retaliation, it will be extremely weak. Putin considers that the EU is struggling with economic problems and that the USA will be reluctant to take a military initiative in a region that is far from its own borders and is not located in its near abroad. Explaining Putin's opposition to the United States and Europe only with geopolitical arguments such as the geostrategic location of Crimea and the control of pipelines would be insufficient because before the crisis there were many problems in Russia's relations with the Western world. [61] Russia's integration with Europe is not a priority for the Kremlin. But the protection of Russian values against the Western world is a priority. Putin's Ukraine strategy is more about rebuilding of state rather than expanding its land, and with eastern Ukraine intended to have closer ties Russia than the rest of Ukraine.[62]

---

59 Лилия Шевцова, Великодержавие и черный юмор — новая стратегия России
27.05.2016, https://inosmi.ru/politic/20160527/236663812.html

60 Rusya'nın agresif politikalarında "Kırım" Örneği, Savunma.tr web site, 07.01.2021, https://www.savunmatr.com/arastirma-analiz/rusya-nin-agresif-politikalarinda-kirim-ornegi-h6111.html

61 Ivan Krastev, "What Does Russia Want and Why?", Prospect, 6 Mart 2014, https://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/politics/what-does-russia-want-and-why

*62*Ivan Krastev, "What Does Russia Want and Why?", Prospect, 6 March 2014, https://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/politics/what-does-russia-want-and-why

B. Russia's Perception of the "Other" (NATO and Western Alliances – Response the Question "Who is the Other?)

The climate of disagreement and the erosion of trust between the USA and Russia had an impact on Ukraine, which reflefcted on Ukraine's relations with both the White House and the Kremlin. During the Yugoslavian conflict, Russia took a stance away from the US policies, triggering the perception that Russia could be the enemy in many US decision makers and pushed them to follow protectionist policies. In the 1990s, both the USA and Russia tried to be more interested in Ukraine, which followed a multi-faceted foreign policy, and tried to establish a sphere of influence there. Ukraine tried to focus on integration with the West, but due to the insufficient reforms in Ukraine, various difficulties were encountered in realizing this rapprochement. During the first period of Kuchma (1994-1999), the IMF had hesitations about financial aid and military contacts to Ukraine, citing reasons such as Ukraine's failure to fulfill the previous loan conditions and the risk of the country entering the sphere of influence of Russia.[63]

In the Kremlin was expressed that the continuation of NATO's Eastern expansion, and Georgia's and Ukraine's anti-Russian rhetoric were unacceptable. Russia's intervention to Georgia in 2008 was proof of this. Russia stated that NATO's eastward expansion, including Georgia and Ukraine, would harm its national security. Escaping from Russian orbit and becoming anti-Russian countries were not admissible for the Kremlin. Russia's intervention in Georgia has clearly demonstrated this understanding.[64] Ukraine followed the policy to develop its relations with the West and following the Orange Revolution, Ukraine tried to become member of EUand NATO. Ukraine's efforts to get closer to the West caused Russia's sharp reaction and Russia tried to prevent Ukraine's efforts to join NATO by increasing its influence on Ukraine.[65]

---

63 Taras Kuzio, Paul D'anieri, **The Sources of Russia's Great Power Politics, Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order**, (Bristol England, **,** E-International Relations Publishing, 2018) : 78-79.

64 John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukranian Crisis is the West's Fault?", 5-6.

65 Р. С. Мухаметов, ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА РОССИИ В БЛИЖНЕМ ЗАРУБЕЖЬЕ, Екатеринбург, Издательство Уральского университета (2015):27, https://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/35762

Putin's polarizing rethoric including "us" (Russians and Russian speakers) and "them" (Western alliances, dissident local opposition forces, dissidents, and fascists in Ukraine) was used on the Crimean intervention as a tool to win public opinion, mobilize public's sentiments and reduce domestic opposition.[66] When then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014, the socio-political chaos in Ukraine was explained as one of the reasons for Russia's decision to intervene. However, the United States and European states had also significant responsibilities in the occurrence of the Ukraine crisis. The efforts to push Ukraine away from Russia's influence, and events such as NATO's eastern enlargement and the Orange Revolutions, which could be characterized as main steps, were the main causes of the Ukrainian crisis. In addition to the West's influence on Ukraine, Russia underlined that the elected President of Ukraine was dismissed from the administration because of the coup, and this situation was perceived as an unacceptable "red line" for Russia. After all these, Putin enabled Crimea to join Russia with the arguments of preventing Crimea from being a NATO base and protecting Russia's interests due to its geopolitical importance.[67]

> "*Crimea is both a shared heritage and an important factor of stability, and this strategic region is a place that today only needs to be under strong and stable Russian suverenity, otherwise, as Russians and Ukrainians, we may lose Crimea in a near historical perspective. Considering that the statements about Ukraine's membership to NATO are also considered, what Crimea means for Sevastopol is important. The presence of a NATO fleet in a city where Russia has a military presence is a very definite and permanent threat to the south of Russia.*"[68]

To legitimize Russia's activities within the Ukraine case, Russian administering elites have looked for to define a vision that states the

---

66 Riccardo Alcaro, "West- Russia in Light of the Ukraine Crisis", IAI Research Papers, Ed. Riccardo Alcaro, Roma, 2015, Report of the Transatlantic Security Symposium, 67. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairp_18.pdf

67 John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukranian Crisi is the West's Fault? P. 1.

68 Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (From Putin's speeches on Crimea) 18 March 2014
Официальный сайт МИД России (Из выступлений Путина по Крыму) 18 марта 2014 г.
Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

worldwide control of the West is lessening in an unjustifiable unipolar world. Publicity that recognizes between Russia and the West has been utilized to reply to claims that Russia may be a noxious control and to spur pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine and their supporters in Russia. Russian media and lawmakers depicted the USA and the EU as dangers, and Russia defined itself as a protector of the Russian-speaking community and a constrain against Western organizations together within the clash of civilizations.[69]

The extraordinary significance given to NATO broadening has had a conclusive impact on Russia's strategy towards Ukraine. The behavioral rationale that driven to the Ukraine in 2014, which was a turning point within the whole foreign policy of Russia within the post-Soviet period, played vital role. In addition to the fear of NATO's advance among the causes of the Ukraine events, the idea that without Ukraine it would be impossible to reach a critical mass for the creation of a Eurasian power center with a population of 200 million was one of the important arguments.[70]

Russian Discourses on the Annexation of Crimea

Then-Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin made statements about the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia and declared that this was the end of the unipolar world order and that Russia had taken a great responsibility. Referring to its historical significance, Rogozin described the intervention as a revival of Russian identity.[71]

> "*The situation in Ukraine mirrors what has happened in the world over the past decades. After the end of   the bipolar world system, there is no longer stability on the planet. International and key institutions are not getting stronger, unfortunately they are getting weaker. Our western partners,*

69 Irina Shakhrai, "The Legitimization of Authoritarian Rule Through Constructed External Threats: Russian Propaganda During The Ukrainian Crisis", **East European Quarterly**, Vol. 43, no. 1, (March 2015), p. 47.

70 Дмитрий Тренин, 20 лет Владимира Путина: трансформация внешней политики, 14 August 2019
https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2019/08/14/808755-20-let-putina

71 Рогозин объявил о конце однополярного мира, Ria. Ru web site, 18.03.2014, https://ria.ru/20140318/1000069137.html

especially the USA, prefer to be guided by the law of the powerful, not by international law in their policies….. It should be noted that Russia forgot about the Crimea and Sevastopol, the base of the Black Sea fleet, which contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Millions of Russians slept one night and woke up abroad, the Russian people became one of the largest divided peoples in the world.,,,,,Many opinion leaders and citizens stated that Crimea is a Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian city. While we felt all this with our hearts, it was necessary to start from the difficult realities and establish good relations with independent Ukraine on a new basis. Good relations with the Ukrainian people have always been a priority for Russia." [72]

Discourse about the annexation of Crimea emerged in the international community. Russia's intervention and a referendum without the permission of the Kiev administration made these actions "illegal" in the eyes of Western states, and intervention was explained as "occupation, annexation". It includes the rhetoric of "hard power", such as the use of force. Those who support the Crimean intervention use term "reunification", which means that citizens voluntarily participate in the solution of the problem. This definition refers to the elements of "soft power". Besides not using the words annexation and occupation consciously, Putin has repeatedly stated that there was no loss of life in the events.[73]

The annexation of Crimea to Russia had political, economic, and legal consequences. It can be argued that the annexation has very important effects in the international system. The area of political stability was significantly affected by the annexation, as the Russian government presented the society with a convincing idea and a unifying narrative from which it was possible to gain broad popular consensus. Depending on Russia's foreign policy, its domestic

---

[72] Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (From Putin's speeches on Crimea) 18 March 2014

Официальный сайт МИД России (Из выступлений Путина по Крыму) 18 марта 2014 г. Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

[73] Фурсов Кирилл Константинович, «Мягкая», «жёсткая» и «умная» сила в политическом дискурсе международного кризиса вокруг Украины, p.132. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/myagkaya-zhyostkaya-i-umnaya-sila-v-politicheskom-diskurse-mezhdunarodnogo-krizisa-vokrug-ukrainy/viewer

political agenda was also designed with these results in mind, and the public's approval of the Crimean intervention was used to legitimize Putin's regime. In the discourse of national patriotism, the Crimean issue was tried to be presented as an unconditional victory and a rhetoric was created accordingly. In the political discourse, it was aimed to determine the political considerations and motivations of the attitutes by using metaphors for Crimea such as "returning home", "get up on one's knees", "stability", "whose Crimea", and Russian propaganda proceeded by feeding on this content. [74]

Referring to the Soviet history, Putin argued that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was a mistake, and the unification of Crimea with Russia was a historical restoration of illegality. The transfer of Crimea to Soviet Ukraine in 1954 constituted "unconstitutional" according to the laws and norms in force at that time. The handing over of Crimea to Ukraine was considered normal because no one had foreseen the Soviet Union's collapse. Putin stated that Russia and Ukraine are not just close neighbors, they are like one body, that Kiev is considered the mother of Russian cities and that the two countries can only live together.[75]

Putin used the rhetoric that he was protecting Russian citizens to convince the Russian people of the legitimacy of the actions in the Crimea case. Appealing to national identity to gather support has been used in different periods of history. Russia uses its own identity from the perspective of constructivist arguments. [76]

> "And when we see this, we understand what worries the citizens of Ukraine, both Russians and Ukrainians, the Russian-speaking population living in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine in general. What worries them? They are worried about this mess… We believed, believe and will consider that Ukraine is not only our nearest neighbor, but actually our

---

74 И. В. Михеева, А. С. Логинова, А. В. Скиперских, "Интеграция Крымав состав России: «цена» вопроса", *ФИНАНСЫ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА* / Vol.21, no. 4, (2017), pp. 58-59. https://econpapers.repec.org/article/scnfinanc/y_3a2017_3ai_3a4_3ap_3a54-65.htm

75 Vasile Rotaru, "Russia's Post-Crimea Legitimization Discourse And Its Challenges For The Eap Countries" , Centre for European IOAN CUZA University of IASI**, EURINT,** vol. 3, (December, 2016), p. 33.

76 Ion Alexandru Onati, "Why Did the Conflict in Ukraine Start? A Realist and a Social Constructivist Approach", AALBORG UNIVERSITY: AUGUST 2016 SCHOOL OF CULTURE AND GLOBAL STUDIES (CGS): EUROPEAN STUDIES, pp.52-53

neighboring brother republic, our armed forces are comrades in arms, they are friends, most of them know each other personally, I want to emphasize that, I am sure that Ukrainian soldiers and Russian soldiers will not be on opposite sides of the barricades, but on the same side of the barricades." [77]

Establishing a Legal Norm (Russia's efforts to explain the Annexation of Crimea in accordance with international law)

Since there are no composed common lawful standards at the systemic level, the issue regarding the authencity about the activity of the states gets being contention utilized within the political field. The ill-conceived recognition of a state's activity causes different troubles and costs, in this setting, the state's security may be undermined, its partners may be misplaced, and it may be subject to sanctions and retaliations. States encountering mentioned challenges, change their rethoric ensuing activities to be seen as legitimate. When Russia's activities in Crimea are considered in terms of lawfulness, the contentions on which its genuine rethoric is based ought to be inspected. Through more than one million Russian-speaking citizens living in Crimea, Putin expressed with patriot and social sentiments and emotions inside Crimea to legitimize his claim.[78]

According to constructivist perspective, the geographical location of the country, its ties, and relations in mental cods to other states both affect and determine foreign policy choices. Putin explains and clarifies the Crimean intervention with the factors of emotional, cultural attachments and arguments. Also, he underlines that identity between the two countries are very similar, deep-rooted cultural and historical ties cause Crimea to be closer to Russia than it is to Ukraine. A strong Russian identity sentiment in Crimea can be used to explain Russia's interests. as construvtivist perspective underlines interests

---

[77] Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (From Putin's speeches on Crimea) 18 March 2014

Официальный сайт МИД России (Из выступлений Путина по Крыму) 18 марта 2014 г.
Обращение Президента Российской Федерации
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366

[78] Dana Tandilasvili, "Classical Realist and Norm Based Constractivist Analysis of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Annexation of Criema", *Towson University Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. XLIX, no.1, (Fall, 2015), p. 9, https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2016/06/SPRING16FALL15ISSUEpt2-1jhiif4.pdf

are connected to the idenetity of the states, it is considered that Russia acts by considering the identity of the people living in Crimea and based on the history of the people. It is stated that Russia's intervention in Crimea complies with the international law principles. and that it looks after the interests of the people living here, and that the referendum was an offer to Russia from an independent nation.[79]

> "The referendum held in Crimea on 16 March complies with democratic procedures and international legal norms. More than 82% of the electorate voted and more than 96% voted for union with Russia. To understand why such a choice was made, it is necessary to know the history of Crimea, what Crimea means for Russia and what Russia means for Crimea. Crimea represents common history and pride for Russia…
> "Attempts were made from time to time to forcibly make the Russians the object of assimilation, to deprive them of their historical memory and their mother tongue. Russians, like other citizens of Ukraine, have experienced political crises and problems of state that have plagued Ukraine for more than 20 years." [80]

Putin stated that he supported Russian population living in Crimea by acting to protect them from the uprising and chaos in Ukraine. Constructivist approach confirms that a rule or norm is cretaed if enough practitioners accept it and then adapt to it. For this reason, Russia's claim was that thanks to the referendum held in March 2014, it considered the result of the will of the people of Crimea and acted in line with this result, adhering to international norms and rules. Regarding Crimean case, Russia argues that thanks to the meeting of the two sides on a common ground, the people of Crimea acted in accordance with international law by using their independent will and inalienable right to conclude an international agreement. [81]

---

[79] Alexei Moiseev, "Concerning Certain Positions on the Ukrainian Issue in International Law," ***Russian Politics & Law***, Routledge Press, vol. 53, no. 2 (2015), pp.47-50.

[80] Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (From Putin's speeches on Crimea) 18 March 2014, Официальный сайт МИД России (Из выступлений Путина по Крыму) 18 марта 2014 г.
Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

[81] Dana Tandilasvili, 9.
https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2016/06/SPRING16FALL15ISSU-Ept2-1jhiif4.pdf

"The Supreme Council of Crimea, declaring its independence and calling for a referendum, referred to the UN, referring to the right of the nation to self-determination. Ukraine also did the same thing, even in text, in the statement it made while leaving the USSR. They used this right for Ukraine, but they reject it for Crimea.... To quote the US memorandum submitted to the International Court of Justice in connection with the Kosovo hearing of 17 April 2009; "Declarations of independence can and often do violate domestic law. However, this does not constitute a violation of international law. " Actions in Crimea clearly comply with these explanations. Permission granted for Albanians in Kosovo is prohibited for Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea…There were casualties in the conflicts in Kosovo, is this a legal argument, International Court of Justice It doesn't say anything about it, it can't even be called a double standard anymore, the same object cannot be called black one day and white the next." [82]

CONCLUSION

Annexation of Crimea in 2014 can be considered as Russia's territorial expansion, but the analyses of Russia-Ukraine relations, in the context of historical and cultural ties, similar ethnic and language characteristics deepens the analysis level of the case. The changing international conjuncture is examined from a multidimensional perspective which can be explained with identity-based arguments. In the constructivist narrative, the interests of the states are explained based on their identities. It can be argued that Russia tried to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence by influencing Kiew administration in line with its own identity characteristics, and annexed Crimea by shaping its interests in this context. In the constructivist paradigm, for a state it is also important to define itself and its counterpart to form its identity. And this definition is handled through

---

[82] Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (From Putin's speeches on Crimea) 18 March 2014

Официальный сайт МИД России (Из выступлений Путина по Крыму) 18 марта 2014 г.

Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

the questions of *who am I and who is other*. There might be many features to explain the identity of a state. In this article, Russia's motives in the annexation of Crimea are analyzed based on the Slavic-Orthodox identity, its imperial and great power identities. Those identity elements are extensively used in the formulation of Russian politics. And to the question, *who is the other*, the answer is Western alliances.

Historical memory plays an important role in Russia's annexation of Crimea, as well. As we know, Russian Prince Vladimir was baptized in Kiev. The Russian Orthodox Church successfully competed with the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and tried to expand its influence in that geography. Russia's strong sense of belonging to Crimea is closely related to religious belief, Orthodoxy is among the spiritual elements that enable Russia to have its influence on Ukraine. With a mission that goes beyond the Russian territories, the Russian Orthodox Church aims to strengthen the ties between the post-Soviet countries with the motto *our blood is one, our religion is one*. It is accepted that Russian history emerged as a Principality in Kiev, which is called the "mother of cities" in the 9th century, Russians and Ukrainian people have lived in the same geography for centuries besides having Slavic roots. As required by the vision of Panslavism, Russia tried to be a protector of Ukrainians, who are ethnically eastern Slavs. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine's independence and close relations with Western alliances were perceived as a challenge to Russia's panslavist identity. The majority of Crimean population is ethnic Russian, who consider themselve as Russian and speak Russian language. Politically, they support pro-Russian governments, and it has been extensively used by the Kremlin for explaination of Crimean annexation. Today, Russia maintains its vision of being a "great power". Being a great power requires the effective use of military and soft power elements. And great powers are extremely sensitive to the threats against them. Ukraine's relations with the West and its potential membership status in NATO are perceived as threat for the Kremlin, which is contrary to the Russia's strategic interests.

It should be mentioned that Russia's imperial identity played an important role in the Crimean annexation. As Russia perpetuates its vision of imperial statehood as a continuation of the Empire and

the Soviet Union. Ukrainian independence since the collapse of the Soviet Union was considered one of the greatest losses for Russia. While the borders between states can be easily drawn by agreements and multinational states can collapse for various reasons, it is not easy to change the identity characteristics of states, even if it does, this kind of change can take a very long time. The arguments that make up the state identity have historical and mental depth. Imperial perceptions in Russian mental codes, efforts to create a multinational state, the desire to penetrate people who lived under Russian rule cannot easily change.

According to the constructivist paradigm *expressing* is equal to *doing*. Russia supports its policies rhetoric, interests and legitimize its action by developing discourses regarding the annexation of Crimea. The end of the unipolar world order, that Crimea represents a common history and pride for Russia, and that Russia behaves in accordance with international law norms. It is tried to establish a norm by constantly emphasizing that international law rules are complied with. Even though the events in Crimea are like Kosovo case, the rhetoric is claimed to be against international law by western states is frequently expressed.

Russia perceives events such as the Western alliances, which it defines as the "other", to develop close relations with Ukraine in the annexation of Crimea, to include Ukraine with the expansion of NATO to the east, and to establish NATO base in Crimea as "unacceptable". Russia reacts to Ukraine's rapprochement with the West, for reasons such as Ukraine's being under Russian domination for centuries and acting as a "buffer zone" between the West and the West.

The study tried to answer the question *what were the motives of Russia's annexation of Crimea*, by explaining from identity-oriented perspective. It was the first time since the World War II, Russia expanded its territory annexing Crimea. The case, which is one of the most striking examples of moving from discourse to action, has been tried to be handled with a more in-depth and analytical analysis by making use of the constructivist paradigm.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution", Council on Foreign Relations, **Foreign Affairs**, vol. 84, no. 2 (2005).

Alexander Wendt, **The Return of Culture and Identity in Theory** "Identitiy and Structural Change in International Politics", Ed. Yosef Lapid, (London :1996)

Alexei Moiseev, "Concerning Certain Positions on the Ukrainian Issue in International Law," **Russian Politics & Law** , Routledge Press, vol. 53, no. 2 (2015)

Anar Somuncuoğlu, "Roma Katolik Kilisesi ve Fener Rum Patrikhanesi'nin Eski Sovyet Alanındaki

Faaliyetleri" ASAM Press, **Stratejik Analiz**, ASAM Press, vol. 3, no. 28 (Ankara: 2002)

Anar Somuncuoğlu, Rus Ortodoks Kilisesinin Eski Sovyet Alanındaki Misyonu**, Karadeniz Araştırmaları,** no. 2 (Summer, 2004)   http://www.karam.org.tr/Makaleler/992132737_somuncuo-glu.pdf

Anna Dolya, "The Annexation of Crimea: Lessons for European Security", **European Isuuses**, Fondation Robert Schuman Policy Paper, no 382, (23 February 2016)

Anton Bebler, "Criemea and the Russian- Ukranian Conflict**", Romanian Journal of European Affairs**, vol 15, No 1, (2015)

Dalaklis Dimitrios, "The Geopolitical Dimensions of Ukranian Crisis", 2015.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282007294_The_Geopolitical_Dimensions_of_the_Ukrainian_Crisis

Dana Tandilasvili, "Classical Realist and Norm Based Constractivist Analysis of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Annexation of Criema", **Towson University Journal of International Affairs,** vol. XLIX, no. 1, (Fall, 2015)

https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2016/06/SPRING16FALL15ISSUEpt2-1jhiif4.pdf

Dimitri Trenin, Russia's Changing Identitiy : In Search of A Role

in the 21st Century, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 18.07.2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79521

Emanuel Adler, "Constuctivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates", **Handbook of International Relations**, 2. Ed. , Ed by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons

Gwendolyn Sasse**, The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict**, Ukranian Research Instıtute Harvard University, (Cambridge, Maassachusettes: 2007)

Henry Kissenger, "To Settle the Ukranie Crisis Start at the End", The Washington Post, 5.3.2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html?utm_term=.65ddae2c9212

Ian Hurd, "Constructivism", **International Relations**, The Oxford Handbook, ed. Christian Reus- Smit, Duncan Snidal, Oxford Univeristy Press

Igor Torbakov, "Rusya'da Ayrı ya da Rusya'nın bir Parçası: Ukrayna-Rusya İlişkilerinin Kederli bir Destanı", **Avrasya Dosyası**, vol. 6, no.4 (Winter, 2001)

Igor Torbakov, "Why Did the Conflict in Ukraine Start? A Realist and a Social Constructivist Approach", AALBORG UNIVERSITY: AUGUST 2016 SCHOOL OF CULTURE AND GLOBAL STUDIES (CGS): EUROPEAN STUDIES

https://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/239568100/Why_did_the_conflict_in_Ukraine_start_A_realist_and_social_constructivist_approach_Author_Ioan_Alexandru_Onati_Supervisor_Wolfgang_Zank.pdf

Irina Shakhrai, "The Legıtımızatıon of Authorıtarıan Rule Through Constructed External Threats: Russıan Propaganda Durıng The Ukraınıan Crısıs", **East European Quarterly**, vol. 43, no. 1, (March 2015)

Iurii Opoka, "International Approaches to the Crisis in Ukraine",

Polish Journal of Political Science, vol. 2, no. 2, (2016)

İlyas Kamalov, **Putin'in Rusyası: KGB'den Devlet Baskanlığına**, (İstanbul, Kaknüs Press 2004)

Ivan Krastev, "What Does Russia Want and Why?", Prospect, 6 Mart 2014, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/what-does-russia-want-and-why

Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as a Great Power", **Russia as a Greta Power, Dimensions of Security Under Putin,** Ed. Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg, Christer Pursianem, (Newyork : Routledge Press, 2005)

John Biersack & Shannon O'Lear, "The geopolitics of Russia's Annexation of Crimea: narratives, identity, silences, and energy", **Eurasian Geography and Economics**, vol. 55, no. 3, (2014)

John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukranian Crisis is the West's Fault?", **Foreign Affairs,** (September-October 2014)

Kadri Liik, Momchil Metodiev, Nicu Popescu, "Defender of the Faith? How Ukraine's Orthodox Split Threatens Russia?", European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 30.05. 2019

2019https://ecfr.eu/publication/defender_of_the_faith_how_ukraines_orthodox_split_threatens_russia/

Mara Kozelsky, "Don't Underestimate Importance of Religion for Understanding Russias Actions in Crimea", The Washington Post, 13.03.2014,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/13/dont-underestimate-importance-of-religion-for-understanding-russias-actions-in-crimea/

Margaret P. Karns, Karen A. Mingst, **International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Govarnance**, (London : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004)

Nicholas Onuf, **International Relations in a Constructed World,** "Constructivism: A User's Manual", Ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, Paul Kowert, (Londra: M:E. Sharpe Inc. Press, 1998)

One Year On Violations of the Rights to Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Association in Crimea, Amnesty International, 2015, London

https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR50/1129/2015/en/

Peter J. Duncan, "Contemporaray Russian Identity Between East and West", **Cambridge The Historical Journal,** vol. 48, no. 1, (March 2005)

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/historical-journal/article/abs/contemporary-russian-identity-between-east-and-west/02AE32765B16C104869D71B8F241D7

Peter Pomerantsev, "Yes, Russia Matters: Putin's Guerrilla Strategy" **World Affairs**, vol. 177, no.3 (September-October 2014)

Rey Koslowski, Frededrich V. Kratochwill, "Understanding Change in International Poltics: the Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System", **International Organization,** vol. 48, no. 2, (1994, Autumn)

Riccardo Alcaro, "West- Russia in Light of the Ukraine Crisis", IAI Research Papers, Ed. Riccardo Alcaro, Roma, 2015, Report of the Transatlantic Security Symposium

https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairp_18.pdf

Rusya'nın agresif politikalarında "Kırım" Örneği, Savunma.tr web site, 07.01.2021, https://www.savunmatr.com/arastirma-analiz/rusya-nin-agresif-politikalarinda-kirim-ornegi-h6111.html

Rusya'nın Doğu Politikası, Ed. Sezgin Kaya, (Ekin Press, 2013)

Sait Sönmez, Harun Bıçakçı, Cuma Yıldırım, "Kırım Sorunu Bağlamında Rusya-Ukrayna İlişkilerinin Analizi", **International Journal of Social Sciences and Education Resesarch**, vol. 1 , no. 3, 2015, 657

Sarina Onlar, "Introducing Constarctivism in International Realtions Theory", E-International relations, 23.02.2018

https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-in-

ternational-relations-theory/

Selim Kurt, "Güvenlikleştirme Kuramı Açısından Rusya Federasyonu-Ukrayna Çatışmasını Anlamak", **Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Journal**, vol. 75, no.1 (2020, January- March)

Stefano Guzzini " A Reconstruciton of Constractivism in International Relations", **European Journal of International Relations**, SAGE Publications, vol. 6, no. 147 (2000)

Taras Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the 'Other'**,"** **Ethnicities**, SAGE Publications, vol. 1, no. 3, (2001)

Taras Kuzio, Paul D'anieri, **The Sources of Russia's Great Power Politics, Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order**, (Bristol England, **,** E-International Relations Publishing, 2018)

Taras Kuzio, Paul D'anieri, "The Causes and Consequences of Russia's Actions Towards Ukraine", 16.06.2018, E-International Relations

https://www.e-ir.info/2018/06/16/the-causes-and-consequences-of-russias-actions-towards-ukraine/#_ftnref3

Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", **International Security**, vol. 23, no. 1, (1998, Summer)

Tolga Bilener, **Ulus Devlet Olma Sürecinde Ukrayna- Erhan Büyükakıncı, Değişen Dünyada Rusya ve Ukrayna,** (Ankara: Phoenix Press, 2004)

Tom Andrews, "What is Social Constructionism?" **The Grounded Theory Review** vol. 11, no. 1, (2012) : 44-45.

Vasile Rotaru, "Russia's Post-Crimea Legitimization Discourse And Its Challenges For The Eap Countries" , Centre for European IOAN CUZA University of IASI**, EURINT,** vol. 3, (December, 2016)

Zbigniew Brezezinski, **The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and Its- Geostrategic Imperatives**, (New York NY: 2016)

2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, Law-Information Portal

12 февраля 2013 г. - Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации

http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/70218094/

Дмитрий Тренин, 20 лет Владимира Путина: трансформация внешней политики, 14 August 2019

https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2019/08/14/808755-20-let-putina

И. В. Михеева, А. С. Логинова, А. В. Скиперских, "Интеграция Крымав состав России: «цена» вопроса", ФИНАНСЫ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА vol.21, no. 4, (2017)

https://econpapers.repec.org/article/scnfinanc/y_3a2017_3ai_3a4_3ap_3a54-65.htm

Лилия Шевцова, Великодержавие и черный юмор — новая стратегия России

27.05.2016, Inosmi.ru Web site

https://inosmi.ru/politic/20160527/236663812.html

Махмут Сезер Чакмак, "Позиция СМИ Турции в отношении вхождения Крыма и Севастополя в состав Российской Федерации", Гуманитарный Вектор, vol. 3, no.9 (2014)

https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/pozitsiya-smi-turtsii-v-otnoshenii-vhozhdeniya-kryma-i-sevastopolya-v-sostav-rossiyskoy-federatsii

Р. С. Мухаметов, ВНЕШНЯЯ ПОЛИТИКА РОССИИ В БЛИЖНЕМ ЗАРУБЕЖЬЕ, Екатеринбург, Издательство Уральского Унверситета 2015, https://elar.urfu.ru/handle/10995/35762

Рогозин объявил о конце однополярного мира, Ria. Ru web site, 18.03.2014,

https://ria.ru/20140318/1000069137.html

Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (From Putin's speeches on Crimea) 18 March 2014

Официальный сайт МИД России (Из выступлений Путина по

Крыму) 18 марта 2014 г.

Обращение Президента Российской Федерации

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

«Оранжевая революция»: как это было ? , Ukraina.ru web site, 22.11.2018.

https://ukraina.ru/news/20181122/1021828841.html

Порошенко подписал закон об отказе от внеблокового статуса Украины,

tass news, 29.12. 2014,

https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1678587

Сергей Анатольевич Панкратов, ВОССОЕДИНЕНИЕ КРЫМА С РОССИЕЙ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ТЕНДЕНЦИЙ И ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЙ РАЗВИТИЯ СОВРЕМЕННОГО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ПРОЦЕССА, 79-80.

https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vossoedinenie-kryma-s-rossiey-v-kontekste-tendentsiy-i-protivorechiy-razvitiya-sovremennogo-politicheskogo-protsessa/viewer

Т.В. Евгеньева, В.В. Титов, С.Ю. Белоконев МЕСТО ОБРАЗА СЛАВЯНСКОГО МИРА В ФОРМИРОВАНИИ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИЙСКОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ, Вестник Томского государственного университета Философия, Социология, Политология, 2019. № 48

http://journals.tsu.ru/philosophy/&journal_page=archive&id=1826&article_id=40536

Фурсов Кирилл Константинович, «Мягкая», «жёсткая» и «умная» сила в политическом дискурсе международного кризиса вокруг Украины

https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/myagkaya-zhyostkaya-i-umnaya-sila-v-politicheskom-diskurse-mezhdunarodnogo-krizisa-vokrug-ukrainy/viewer