

The Importance of Anatolian People in the Ottoman-Egyptian Struggle*

Osmanlı-Mısır Çatışmasında Anadolu Halkının Önemi

Fatih GENCER^a

^a Doç. Dr. Bitlis Eren Üniversitesi, Bitlis
Türkiye, fatihgencer13@hotmail.com,
ORCID, 0000-0002-8632-4510

ABSTRACT

The rise of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Kavala is one of the most important events that took place in the first half of the 19th century for the Ottoman Empire. His rebellion was also such a critical event for the Grand Powers that dominated international politics for at least ten years. Countless studies have been written regarding Mehmed Ali Pasha so far. While some of them discuss what he did for transforming Egypt into a strong and semi-independent state, others draw attention to the international dimension of the Egyptian crisis. But what is not explained is why his son, Ibrahim Pasha, invaded Anatolia quickly, how he dared to go to Kütahya, thousands of kilometres away from Egypt, why his resistance did not break after the Ottomans received military support from the Russians. The extent to which the inhabitants of Anatolia comprehend the conflict between Sultan Mahmud and Mehmed Ali has not been emphasised. It is also not adequately explained how the opponents of reforms and the remainder of the janissaries influenced the wars. This study tries to answer those questions by disclosing the condition of the Anatolian people and suggests how their attitudes played a decisive role in that crisis.

Keywords: The Egyptian Question, Anatolian People, Ibrahim Pasha.

ÖZ

Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa'nın ortaya çıkışı Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için 19. Yüzyılın ilk yarısında meydana gelen en önemli olaylardan biriydi. En az on yıl boyunca uluslararası siyaseti meşgul eden ve Avrupa'daki güç dengesini değiştiren Mehmed Ali Paşa isyanı büyük güçler açısından da mühim bir gelişmeydi. Mehmed Ali Paşa hakkında çok sayıda çalışma kaleme alınmıştır. Bu çalışmaların bir kısmı Kavalalı'nın Mısır'ı güçlü bir devlete dönüştürmek için neler yaptığına değinirken, bazıları ise Mısır krizinin uluslararası boyutuna dikkat çekmiş, bu şekilde Avrupa devletlerinin konu ile ilgili politikasını açıklamaya çalışmıştır. Fakat İbrahim Paşa'nın Anadolu'yu neden hızla işgal edebildiği, Mısır'dan binlerce kilometre uzakta bulunan Kütahya'ya gitmeye nasıl cesaret ettiği, bu esnada hangi zorlukları aşmak zorunda kaldığı, Osmanlıların Ruslardan askeri destek aldıktan sonra İbrahim Paşa'nın direncinin neden kırılmadığı soruları açıklanmamıştır. Bunun yanında Anadolu halkının Sultan Mahmut ve Mehmed Ali Paşa arasındaki mücadeleyi nasıl anladığı, reform karşıtları ve arta kalan yeniçerilerin savaşı nasıl etkilediği yeterince ortaya konmamıştır. Bu çalışma ile Anadolu halkının durumu ele alınarak yukarıdaki sorulara yanıtlar aranacak ve insanların tutumlarının Osmanlı-Mısır mücadelesinde nasıl belirleyici bir rol oynadığı açıklanmaya çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır Sorunu, Anadolu Halkı, İbrahim Paşa.

* Bu makalede bilimsel araştırma ve yayın etiği ilkelerine uyulmuştur. / In this article, the principles of scientific research and publication ethics were followed.

Atf-Reference: Gencer, F. (2021). The Importance of Anatolian People in the Ottoman-Egyptian Struggle. *Bitlis Eren Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 10 (2), 30-37.

1. INTRODUCTION

Sultan Mahmud II, who came to the throne at one of the Ottoman Empire's hardest times, believed that the only way to rejuvenate the state was to implement the western-style reforms in all spheres. Society, however, worried about the application of the improvement, especially the Muslim population, disliked both the reforms and even Sultan Mahmud himself. When he destroyed the Janissaries, a traditional part of Ottoman society, the opponents, deprived of their military power, were suppressed. Bektashi Order suffered the same fate as the Janissaries and their tekkes (the prayer place for Bektashi order) were closed and property was confiscated since they were associated with them. It is clear that a part of the Muslim population did not accept what Sultan Mahmud had done to the Janissaries and also the Bektashi Order. Many bards severely condemned Sultan Mahmud by using the poetry. For instance, Aşık Hakkı criticised the Ottoman administration heavily, and he likened Sultan to Yezid who was the killer of the prophet's grandchildren and the most hated person in the Islamic World. In so doing, he indicated what the public reaction to the destruction of traditional social institutions (Onhan, 2018: 72).

Captain Slade, who witnessed the process of outlawing Janissaries, recorded many cases that reflecting the feeling of the masses. It can be understood from his notes that what had been done to the Janissaries filled a significant number of the people with anger and a deep sense of sadness. According to him: *"The end of October, 1826, was also marked by a general opposition to the new imposts; but repeated executions at length brought the people to their senses, and made them regret the loss of the Janizzaries, who had been their protectors as well as tormentors, inasmuch as they never allowed the price of provisions to be raised"* (Slade, 1854: 141).

It is understood from the archive records that a part of the janissaries, their adherents and the Bektaşî sheikhs, were exiled to cities including Kütahya, Amasya, Kayseri, Tokat, Ankara, and, Kastamonu, but, most of them were able to stay in touch with each other and maintain their existence. A report about the janissaries in Tokat highlights that they ignored the governor and acted in whichever way they wanted, and they would certainly rebel and cooperate with the enemy as soon as a war sparked off (BOA, HAT, 736/34933). Some of the Janissaries were tasked within various departments and different parts of the country. For example, they were appointed to the position that responsible for the guarding hajj roads in Aleppo, after changing their titles to the commander of the castle (BOA, HAT, 736/34919). Regardless of what they did or where they went, the never forgot how the janissaries were treated by the government.

The war of 1828-1829 which ended with a great defeat for the Ottomans, exacerbated the Sultan's situation. The insufficiency of the newly created army was a great disappointment for the Ottoman society. They, who were obliged to give their money and their sons to the government, naturally thought their sacrifices went to waste. Aşık Ali in the Caucasia, and Aşık Ruşeni in the Balkans, reflected the increased frustration in the administration in their poems, and both gave the sultan a wake-up call (Çoruk, 2007: 87-93). The number of opponents, who believed the abolition of the Janissaries was a mistake, had risen remarkably, and they openly began to criticise the Sultan. Simultaneously, the adherents of the Janissaries were supposed to infiltrate into the new army, and it was suspected that they might engage in a counter-revolution against the reforms. For that reason, Sultan Mahmud started to destroy his rivals in the army, and punished those who were accused of rejecting the reforms with death (İnce, 2017: 434).

After elimination of the Janissaries, Mahmud had a free hand to gradually rescind the empire's traditional institutions and tried to replace them with more modern ones, but, the biggest disadvantage of this policy was that there were no experienced or well-trained staff to perform the tasks needed by the government. Moreover, the destructive wars, constant revolts and economic difficulties prevented the Sultan from creating the powerful state of which he had dreamed. During the rule of Mahmud, the Kurush, the Ottoman currency, depreciated constantly. Above all, due to the war expenses in the years of 1828-1829, and after the treaty the war indemnity that the Ottomans had to pay 400 million Kurush to Russia, hurt the Ottoman economy. In this process, the silver content of the Kurush was reduced by 79% (Pamuk, 2012: 212). Therefore, the Ottoman government had to raise taxes, confiscate the lands of timar and foundation. In addition to these, the introduction of conscription caused a huge amount of public anger. Thus, the poor had to face up to further economic difficulties. Because of the depressing state of affairs, Mahmud had lost his reputation in his subjects' eyes, and due to the conducted western style reforms, he was called the "infidel sultan".

2. THE REVOLT AND THE FALL OF SYRIA

During the early of the 19th century, many rebels revolted against the Porte. Mehmed Ali Pasha was too different from the others in terms of his aims and potentials. He would not be content with himself being an ordinary governor or to obtaining a quasi-autonomy since he wanted to build a powerful country (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 1984: 41). The economic growth and military control constituted the basic principles of his administration. New crops, techniques and industries were introduced on a relatively large scale, and to the direct benefit of the treasury or the army. He had improved the bureaucracy and the military forces beyond the resources of Egypt (Douwes, 2000: 59-60). Beginning in 1820, Mehmed Ali succeeded in organising an army that was known as the Nizam-ı Cedid (New Order). It relied heavily upon European advisers and technology (Hunter, 1999: 15).

After consolidating his position in Egypt, Mehmed Ali planned to expand his territories towards Syria and Palestine. Thus, he took some of the influential people under his control, like Emir Beshir, one of the princes of Lebanon Druzes. In 1822, Emir Beshir had to take shelter in Egypt due to the hostility of his rivals (Polk, 1963: 84). Mehmed Ali decided to write a paper to the Porte in favour of him since he considered the prince as a potential ally. After his efforts, the Ottoman government allowed Emir Beshir to return to his country and obtain his post. Since then, both Emir Beshir and a part of the Druzes became faithful allies

of Mehmed Ali (Altındağ, 1988: 30). In the 1820s, Mehmed Ali's influence was felt more strongly in southern Syria and the coastal areas. In 1827, the judges of Damascus started to present gifts to him because of his dominant position, and many Christians had to take refuge in Egypt, where they had been received kindly (Douwes, 2000: 188-189). The local powers, like Berberi Mustafa of Tripoli, came under his protection when they got into trouble with the authorities (BOA, HAT, 411/21387).

Mehmed Ali Pasha had an interest in events that took place beyond the boundaries of Syria. For instance, he helped Ahmed Bey, a local power in Cilicia and one of the notables of Menemencioğlu tribe. The Porte intended to punish Ahmed Bey because of ignoring the government's orders. Mehmed Ali had interceded with the authorities for his forgiveness. So, from that time, he had been one of the closest allies of the governor of Egypt (BOA, HAT, 354/19883-A). Mehmed Ali even made contact with those residing in the districts close to Istanbul, such as Tahmiscioğlu Hacı Mustafa. He had been a captain in the army before the Mansure Army was founded. After the military reforms were introduced, he had to go to Istanbul for military training. At that time, his fiefs were confiscated and he was imprisoned for nine months due to his misconducts. He was able to escape to Egypt with the help of his friends amongst the authorities. After staying in Egypt for a while, he returned to Kastamonu when Mehmed Ali Pasha rebelled (BOA, HAT, 1233/48016).

Indeed, it was foreseen that the governor of Egypt would try to capture Syria. The French consul at Saida and the English consul at Alexandria had reported that he planned to invade Syria. As Abdullah Pasha Governor of Saida figured out his intention, he strengthened Acre's fortifications, and laid the supply of ammunition and food in the castle. He also informed the Porte about the intention of Mehmed Ali (Polk, 1963: 83). Mehmed Ali used some quarrels between him and Abdullah Pasha as an excuse for the invasion, and in November 1831, sent an army to Syria under the command of his son Ibrahim Pasha. In a short time, Ibrahim Pasha occupied the whole province except for the castle of Acre, where he faced an unexpected resistance. Ibrahim Pasha was known as a victorious commander in the Islamic world as he had overcome the Wahhabis and thrown them out of Mecca and Medina. He was skilful in politics as well as in war, so, he did not want to seem to the Syrians as an invader. He used his reputation for legitimating the occupation of the Sultan's territories and tried to make the people, who hated Abdullah Pasha because of his misgovernment, in favor of the Egyptians (FO, 78/238, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 13 September 1834).

Ibrahim Pasha declared that all the population would be exempted from taxation for three years and promised a better life for them (BOA, HAT, 365/20187). He started to carry out a propaganda campaign against the Ottomans to discredit them in the eyes of the people, and he promised that all forms of oppression would be terminated under Egyptian control. So, he won many adherents and well-wishers in Syria (Koury, 1970: 197). Ibrahim Pasha was respectful of the people and never allowed the Egyptian soldiers to hurt them. He treated all of them equally, without regard to their ethno-religious identities or economic status. As he abolished the distinction between the Muslims and the Christians, the non-Muslim population welcomed his occupation (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 1984: 222). His strategy worked well enough because of the hard living conditions of the people. Thus, the Ottoman authorities became ineffective within a short space of time. Due to the widespread public reaction, the Ottoman governors had to leave their posts, and the residents of the cities, who were not under the control of Egyptians, sent messages to Ibrahim Pasha and asked him to appoint governors to them (BOA, HAT, 908/39773-A).

Ibrahim Pasha captured the castle of Acre on 27th May 1832 after a hard siege, continuing for about six months. As the Porte could not reach an agreement with Mehmed Ali Pasha, the war became inevitable, and the Sultan ordered an army to be sent to Syria under the command of Agha Hussein Pasha (Takvim-i Vekayi, Defa 18). Hussein Pasha reached Antioch in early July of 1832, when some of the Ottoman troops commanded by Mehmed Pasha gathered around Homs. Ibrahim Pasha immediately attacked Mehmed Pasha on 9th July to prevent the Ottoman forces from unifying. Mehmed Pasha was defeated so quickly that he had to leave from the battlefield without cannons, ammunition or even his papers (Kamil Paşa, 1327: 131).

Ibrahim Pasha tried to keep people at his side and used the circumstances that were quite convenient to make the Syrians support the Egyptians because of exorbitant taxes, misgovernment and insecurity of life and property. He sent messages to the surrounding provinces and to the tribes, inviting them to join him (FO, 78/212, Mandeville to Palmerston, 26 October 1832). He embraced those who were excluded by the Ottoman government and even the culprits. For example, Bekirbeyoğlu one of the fugitives of Rumkale, and Eyup Bey, the son Milli tribe's chieftain, became involved as his supporters (BOA, HAT, 370/20372-P). As the Egyptian propaganda was more effective around the battlefields, the tribes of Cilicia obeyed Ibrahim Pasha. After the defeat of Mehmed Pasha, the Menemencioğlu tribe broke off relations with the Ottomans. This resulted in Ibrahim Pasha being able to use the tribes as a backup force (BOA, HAT, 354/19883-A).

Ibrahim Pasha declared that the Janissary Army was revived in Aleppo. In so doing, he sent a strong message to the reform opponents that the only way for them to survive was to support him (Bilgin, 2015: 72-73). He immediately attacked the Ottoman Army on the 29th of June. Agha Hussein Pasha had to place his army, consisting mostly of irregular forces, in front of a vital passage named Belen. Consequently, Ibrahim Pasha gained a great victory, so, both Syria and Palestine fell under his control, and Anatolia was faced with the danger of invasion (Armaoğlu, 1997: 198-199). Ibrahim Pasha had used all the means to undermine the Sultan's authority in Syria and realised how propaganda was necessary to achieve his goals. After the experience he gained in Syria, he deployed his troops to Anatolia without hesitation.

3. THE ATTITUDES OF THE ANATOLIAN PEOPLE IN THE OTTOMAN-EGYPT WAR

After the Belen War, Eyüp Bey, the chief of the Milli tribe, began to overtly provoke the clans against the Ottoman forces. Simultaneously, the janissaries of Damascus, joined the Egyptians troops in their move to the north by supplying about one thousand combatants (Douwes, 2000: 111). The Menemencioğlu tribe split into two groups. While the leader, Habib Bey,

remained loyal to the Ottomans, his brother Ahmed Bey and most of the leaders of the tribe followed the Egyptians. As most of the rural population adhered to the Egyptians, the Ottoman troops had trouble in having provisions (BOA, HAT, 907/39747-E).

The Ottoman administration commenced preparing for a new war when Ibrahim Pasha arrived in Adana. The authorities tried to impose additional taxes and conscripted more men to the army. The Anatolian people, who had already been impoverished for many years and had been faced with difficulties, were no longer willing to support the Porte. The British vice-consul in Trebizond reported that there was a widespread dissatisfaction in the city when fifteen thousand men were demanded from them. He also emphasised that those who had been forcibly conscripted declared that they would take no part in the war, and even more striking was that the people dared to talk of the dethronement of the Sultan (FO, 78/212, Mandeville to Palmerston, 26 September 1832).

The pashas retreated towards Konya and the authorities did not take the necessary precautions at Gülek Pass, which was an essential way passing through the Taurus Mountains and connecting Anatolia and Syria. Habib Bey, the chief of the Menemenciöglü tribe, was ordered to protect this strategic passage. He had limited forces, most of whom had uncertain loyalties (BOA, HAT, 907/39747-D). At the same time, his brother Habib Bey invaded Bereketli District on behalf of Ibrahim Pasha. Hence, the schisms in the Menemenciöglü tribe made the passage almost indefensible. According to a report written by Rauf Pasha, the maximum number of troops, including Menemenciöglü forces, was 1500 at Gülek, and the people of the adjacent districts were on side of the Egyptians, so it was futile to ask them to join in the protection of the passage. What made matters worse was that, the Ottoman commanders hated one another, and they were unable to behave in harmony. Rauf Pasha pointed out that the passage could not be defended (BOA, HAT, 907/39747-F). On 13 September 1832, five hundred Egyptian soldiers reached the Gülek Pass. Indeed, they were not strong enough to take it, but, when the men of Habib Bey saw the Egyptians approaching, they joined them, and Habib Bey had to flee. Thus, the Egyptians captured the passage quickly and eliminated the most important barrier to their entry into Anatolia (BOA, HAT, 366/20213).

After arriving in Anatolia, Ibrahim Pasha criticised not only the administration of the governors but also the reforms of the Porte. In his opinion, the authorities had started to the improvement movements with epaulettes and tight browsers, whereas they should endeavour to enlighten the minds of their people with education (FO, 78/222 Pisani to Mandeville, 10 March 1833). He promised a more peaceful, secure and prosperous future for those who joined him. The hajj season, coinciding with the time of war, facilitated Ibrahim Pasha's activities. He sent messages with the pilgrims who returned to their homes, discredited the Ottoman government to all provinces (BOA, HAT, 1233/48016). The successive defeats of the Ottoman Army and the propaganda of Ibrahim Pasha affected even the inhabitants of Istanbul negatively, and they started to criticise government policy (FO, 78/212, Mandeville to Palmerston 11 September 1832). When the Ottoman authorities realised how Egyptian propaganda was effective, they had to start counter-propaganda. With the instruction of the Grand Vizier, an edict, which declared Ibrahim Pasha and his allies were infidels and traitor, was published. The government also announced that the news spread by Ibrahim Pasha was fake and warned the people to be faithful to their real sovereign, the Caliph. But, it was difficult for the government to get a satisfying result from its struggles unless to form a strong army (BOA, HAT, 364/20152). For that reason, another official announcement was made to the public to warn the people that the Sultan would send an army of one hundred thousand men to punish Ibrahim Pasha and his supporters (BOA, HAT, 369/20347).

The people appreciated what Ibrahim Pasha had performed to create an effective administration in Syria. They already understood that those who resided under his control were in safe. Thus, the peasants, in disgust at the corruption, welcomed the Egyptian Army as a saviour, and delegates from the districts of Anatolia came to the headquarters of Ibrahim Pasha to greet the victorious commander of the Muslims and presented their loyalty to him (Jorga, 2005: 307). While the Egyptian army was pushing on toward Anatolia, some of the people were beginning to commit hostile acts against the Ottoman troops. Furthermore, they attacked the soldiers who withdrew in small groups. Therefore, some of the soldiers hid their identity by disguising themselves with civilian clothes. Meanwhile, when it was heard that Ibrahim Pasha had arrived in Ulukışla, the pashas and local authorities, who were seized with fear, retreated to Konia. The people were on the verge of choosing between the Ottomans and the Egyptians. Naturally, they could not be expected to take sides with the Ottomans, whose troops were destroyed. So, most of them chose to follow Ibrahim Pasha (BOA, HAT, 354/19881-C). For example, when Osman Hayri Pasha, the governor of Kayseri, decided to resist the Egyptians, the inhabitants of the city announced that they would not let him fight against the Egyptians since they did not want their city to become a battlefield. They also declared that they would join Ibrahim Pasha as soon as his troops entered Kayseri. As Osman Pasha could no longer trust the inhabitants, he informed the Porte that a large number of soldiers were needed in Kayseri immediately. The Porte ordered Osman Pasha, governor of Trebizond, to guard Kayseri, so, he went to Sivas and sent three thousand soldiers to Kayseri. But the inhabitants of the city declared that if the Ottoman troops entered the city, they would fight against them. Osman Pasha ordered the commander to keep calm and not clash with them. He wanted to solve this question in person, but he could not leave Sivas, since the residents of the city appeared to cooperate with the Egyptians (BOA, HAT, 354/19881-A). The Ottoman government handled the reports sent from central Anatolia and deduced that the people would support the Egyptians, so long as they ruled by the tyrannical governors. For that reason, the Porte ordered the authorities in Central Anatolia not hurt the people and to pay cash for whatever they bought (BOA, HAT, 362/20131).

4. THE LAST BATTLE AND FALL OF KONYA

The Ottoman Government started to prepare for the last war with full effort, so, decided to send its last and biggest army to Konya under the command of Grand Vizier Reşid Mehmed Pasha (Demirbaş,2016: 355) When Reşid Pasha reached Akşehir,

the people of Kayseri changed their attitude toward the Ottoman authorities in a positive way. Thus, the troops, sent by Osman Pasha, could enter the city without opposition. Osman Pasha could maintain the order in the city at first. But he knew that the masses would definitely revolt when the Egyptians got closer to the city (BOA, HAT, 907/39760).

As Anatolia was threatened by Egyptians, those who had been found guilty and excluded by the Ottoman government went to the headquarters of Ibrahim Pasha to restore their loss. For instance, Hacı Esatoğlu Kör Mehmed, the former tax collector in Kırşehir, joined the Egyptians to take revenge on the Ottomans. He had been charged with oppressing people and misappropriating money, and was dismissed by the government (BOA, HAT, 699/33712-A). Ibrahim Pasha was also trying to encourage the Ottoman soldiers to escape from the army. When an Ottoman spy was caught, Ibrahim Pasha tried to show him how well paid and fed the Egyptian soldiers were. Then, he released the spy to publicise how the Egyptians treated deserters and those who came over to them (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 1984: 223).

Ibrahim Pasha planned a series of revolts in Anatolia with the help of his supporters to terminate the authority of the Porte. Halid Bey, the former chief of the Pehlivanlı tribe, helped to execute his strategy around Nevşehir. He had been imprisoned because of carrying out illegal activities, but, he escaped and went to Damascus. When Ibrahim Pasha invaded Syria, he had returned to Nevşehir and fomented a futile revolt throughout Central Anatolia. After taking required support from Ibrahim Pasha, he came back to Nevşehir (BOA, HAT, 658/32128-B) and thanks to the military power of the Turkoman tribes, he was able to dominate the roads and restrain the Ottomans from Nevşehir (BOA, HAT, 657/32120).

Another powerful supporter of Ibrahim Pasha was Tahmiscioğlu Hacı Mustafa in Kastamonu. He allied with the fugitive janissaries and timar holders who opposed the military reforms and hated the "infidel sultan". In a short time, he took over the city and announced that many arbitrary taxes were to be rescinded (BOA, HAT, 1233/48015-E). Ibrahim Pasha appointed him as a governor to Kastamonu and ordered him to get along with all people regardless of their social status, and to protect the poor and the weak citizens. Thus, the residents were not forced to give them food and money, and he was able to win the hearts of the masses (Uzunçarşılı, 1937: 151). The Porte opened a detailed investigation to understand what had happened in Kastamonu after the revolt sparked off. It was understood from the inquiry's results that the local authorities mistreated the people, and the poor were obliged to pay illegal taxes. The other finding was that the fugitive janissaries agitated the masses against the government. The most important result of the inquiry for the Porte was probably that the insurgents were in contact with Mehmed Ali Pasha and acted as his agent (Gencer, 2016: 648)

The Porte decided to suppress the revolt of Halid Bey and instructed Osman Hayri Pasha, governor of Kayseri, to advance on Nevşehir, when the Grand Vizier left from Akşehir to Konya (BOA, HAT, 363/20142). After overpowered Halid Bey's backers with the help of Osman Pasha, the governor of Trabzon, he could enter Yozgat and restored order in the city (BOA, HAT, 907/39746-G). Osman Pasha sent messages to the people of Ürgüb and ordered them to obey their legitimate ruler, but, the messages were ignored, and his messengers were mistreated. Thus, he had to deal with this problem personally. Although the Pasha assumed that an agreement might be concluded with the notables of the city, the troops were attacked when they approached the city. Consequently, a war took place between the soldiers and the inhabitants, and about three hundred people were killed or chained (BOA, HAT, 363/20142). Osman Pasha was able to subjugate the people living between the surrounding districts of Kayseri. In the meantime, he questioned some of the leading figures of the rioters since he wanted to comprehend how Ibrahim Pasha influenced the masses. In so doing, he deduced that the oppression of the local authorities and the anti-government propaganda steered the people towards the side of the Egyptians. Then, the pasha decided to go Nevşehir and sent a message to those supporting the Egyptians, that the government would ignore their crimes and would pardon all of them (BOA, HAT, 907/39746-J). Indeed, it is understood from the many documents that the most important problem of the Ottomans was misrule. The notes of Slade confirmed the Ottoman documents. He stated: *"Let us see, however, whether the Janissaries were the cancer of Turkey. No; the real cancer that eats her up is corruption, universal corruption, commencing with the ministers of state, and multiplied through every department, even to the fakirs"* (Slade, 1854: 138).

Ibrahim Pasha kept a close eye on what measures the Porte had taken to avoid him, and how the army of the Grand Vizier prepared for the war. He supported the revolts throughout Anatolia to distract the attention of the Porte and weaken the Ottoman Army. Halid Bey spread the brochures declared that the Janissary army was re-established after the ritual sacrifice was made at the tomb of Hacı Bektash Veli (BOA, HAT, 363/20142-C). Ibrahim Pasha was also interested in the Bektashi Order. Before the war, the Bektashi dervishes invited the Muslim population to revolt against Sultan Mahmud and to join Ibrahim Pasha in bringing the true religion to power (Jorga, 2005: 308).

What is perfectly clear is that the people of Anatolia did not want to support the Ottoman Army against the Egyptians. As the soldiers, who were conscripted forcibly, did not want to fight at the side of the Porte, they escaped from the army whenever they found a chance (BOA, HAT, 354/19891-B). So, the young men were again drafted into the army, and the people were constantly forced to cover the expenses of the new recruits. Due to the insecurity, the trade and the agricultural activities had come to a standstill, and the people were able to pay the exorbitant war taxes by selling their animals and even their housewares. Therefore, they believed that the government would seize everything they had, including their children. Naturally, in these conditions, the Porte could not persuade the people to fight against Ibrahim Pasha (FO, 78/215, Brant, Report on the Trade of Trebizond for the Year 1832, 31 December 1832).

Grand Vizier Reşid Mehmed Pasha entered Akşehir on 7 December. He was informed that the most people in the districts around his troops were adherents of Ibrahim Pasha. He threatened Ibrahim Pasha's supporters with death, as he tried depriving the Egyptian army of the provisions taken from the citizens. In particular, he warned the people of Konya that if they continued

to collaborate with the Egyptians, he would attack the city and kill anyone over the age of seven (FO, 78/212, Mandeville to Palmerston, 19 December 1832; BOA, HAT, 367/20311).

Although Reşid Pasha had intended to surround the Egyptians in Konya for cutting off Ibrahim Pasha's connection with Egypt, Sultan Mahmud, who wanted to avenge the loss of previous wars as soon as possible, ordered him to attack (Sertoğlu, 1971: 2931). The battle started near Konya on 21 December. The Grand Vizier known as a brave soldier, fought on the front line of the battle, but, he unknowingly inserted into the Egyptian soldiers since visibility was severely reduced by fog. It was too late to realise that they were amongst the enemies. Therefore, he could not find a way to escape and was arrested. When it was heard that the Grand Vizier was captured, the order of the Ottoman Army was broken, and Ibrahim Pasha gained a big victory. There was, therefore, no barrier to his advancement towards Istanbul. If the Porte could not receive support from the European countries and Ibrahim Pasha could be courageous, he could have conquered the capital of the empire. (Gencer, 2016: 649-650) After the battle, the Sultan lost both his prestige, as well as the loyalty of the cities that were not yet invaded. Ibrahim Pasha could henceforth persuade the entire population of the Anatolia to revolt against the Ottoman government by announcing that the Grand Vizier had been arrested and the Ottoman army had fled (BOA, HAT, 352/19853).

The Ottoman forces had considerable trouble in withdrawing from the combat zone. The commanders were in dire straits because most of the soldiers had fled, and the guns could not be carried. Moreover, the severe winter caused the freezing of the feet and hands of the soldiers, who were starving and without proper equipment. What is worse, the inhabitants of surrounding villages took up arms and attacked them (BOA, HAT, 348/19768-E). The number of Ottoman troops who reached Eskişehir was about fifteen thousand. They were so undisciplined that their presence was seen as a threat, rather than a help. Their withdrawal proceeded as the Egyptians advanced towards Eskişehir. Some of them went to İznik, while the others moved to Bursa. The loyalty of these cities was crucial for the Porte because the Ottoman army had no more places of lodging (BOA, HAT, 369/20349). Therefore, the government tried to transfer those who were likely to join the Egyptians at Bursa. For example, the exiled janissary aghas and the discontented timar holders were sent to Çanakkale (BOA, HAT, 369/20365).

Once Ibrahim Pasha entered Kütahya on February 2, he found both notables and ordinary Muslims to cooperate with him in Western Anatolia, where he had a strategic interest in extending his influence (Ancombe, 2014: 86). So, he started to rule this region with his supporters. He named Ali Bey to Saruhan who had been exiled by the Porte like the other supporters of the Egyptians. Simultaneously, he appointed Süleyman Bey to Aydın. Both reached their posts with hundreds of the Egyptian soldiers at the end of February, so, the cities except on the coast of the Marmara and Aegean were brought under the control of Ibrahim Pasha (BOA, HAT, 691/33409-D).

The Egyptian army was composed of less than 30,000 soldiers. Ibrahim Pasha was thousands of kilometres away from Egypt, and had limited means. He was in financial difficulty, had few weapons (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 1984: 224). Moreover, his soldiers were unaccustomed to the winter conditions, and their number was insufficient to invade a big country such as Anatolia. Despite all the disadvantages he tried to show Pisani, who was sent to negotiate on behalf of the British Istanbul Embassy, how powerful his army was. Pisani, who was influenced by Ibrahim Pasha's army and wrote to Mandeville that the whole Egyptian army was strong and in a perfect situation (FO, 78/222 Pisani to Mandeville, 10 March 1833). Indeed, if considering these conditions, one could think that Ibrahim Pasha acted with extreme recklessness, but, he very well knew how the Ottomans were in a bad situation. The Porte did not strengthen the military forces and had to dispatch a so-called army, composed of irregular and undisciplined soldiers, against the Egyptians. Besides, as the people of Anatolia accepted Ibrahim Pasha not as an invader, they supported him in providing provisions and they even joined his army (Altındağ, 1988: 63).

Ibrahim Pasha deduced that a real peace between Sultan Mahmud and his father was impossible, so he had suggested to his father that he acquire a fatwa from the Mufti of Aleppo to depose the Sultan. Furthermore, he offered the Grand Vizier to march to Istanbul together for the dethronement of Mahmud (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 1984: 224-225). He also sent letters to the governors and invited them to gather in Istanbul for the deposition of the Sultan. He was confident that the Ulama and the Muslims would support him (Ali Fuat, 1928: 85). Sultan Mahmud, who was under the danger of deposition, had requested help from the British before the battle of Konya. Meanwhile, the Russians had offered, against the Egyptians, to back him. When Mahmud was informed that the British refused to help, he had to accept the Russians' offer. Undoubtedly, one of the reasons why he made this decision was that the Muslim people turned away from him. But the Muslims, who hated the Russians, would not react in a positive way to what the Sultan did (FO, 78/221, Mandeville to Palmerston, 8 January 1833). The authorities had already warned him that if the Ottoman and Russian soldiers were dispatched to Anatolia together, the entire Muslim population would resist them with Ibrahim Pasha (BOA, HAT, 366/20244).

Sultan Mahmud strengthened his hand with the Russian navy, anchoring at the Bosphorus on 20 February, but, he lost his reputation in the eye of the Muslims. In so doing, he delivered his enemy a new weapon that could be used against him. Ibrahim Pasha started to spread the news that the Sultan who had adapted the lifestyle of the godless, agreed with the infidels to attack the Muslims (Armaoğlu, 1997: 204). The Muslims were irritated by the existence of Russian forces in Istanbul. The French ambassador Roussin, who personally witnessed the discontentment of the people, reported that it would not be a surprise if Sultan Mahmud would be dethroned soon (Anick, 1970: 27).

After the districts of Manisa and Aydın fell under the Egyptians' control, the adherents of Ibrahim Pasha attempted to capture Smyrna. Mansurioğlu Emin Efendi and the notables of Smyrna, encouraged and assisted by the Egyptians, went to the mansion of Tahir Pasha, the governor of the city, and forced him to abandon the office. Although the pasha refused them, they were able to displace him and the other Ottoman officers. Thus, seemingly, Smyrna was seized by the inhabitants of the city on

24 February (BOA, HAT, 361/20089-F). It was a great surprise to both Ottoman and the European authorities that such a big and crowded city as Izmir was delivered to the Egyptians without facing the enemy army. Concurrently, the British and the French overreacted to the invasion of the city since the Russians could exploit the Egyptian presence in Smyrna in order to stay in Istanbul, so, they declared that their flags at consulates would be lowered so long as the city was under the control of the Egyptians (FO, 78/222, Mandeville to Palmerston, 7 March 1833). Ultimately, after the diplomatic pressure of the mentioned states, the supporters of the Egyptians retreated from the city, and the Ottoman authorities returned to their posts (BOA, HAT, 361/20089-C).

As the British and the French wanted to remove the Russians from the Bosphorus immediately, they were pressing both Sultan Mahmud and Mehmed Ali Pasha to agree with each other. The Porte, more willing to establish the peace than they were, appointed Reşid Bey to negotiate the peace talks with Ibrahim Pasha. Reşid Bey and Ibrahim Pasha came to an agreement, called the "Peace of Kütahya" on 5 May 1833. Indeed, it was not an official treaty, but only an edict granting the administration of Syria and Palestine to Mehmed Ali Pasha and naming Ibrahim Pasha as the governor of Hedjaz and Adana (Kamil Paşa, 1327: 143). From the moment when Reşid Bey reached Kütahya, the people who had actively supported the Egyptians were worried about what would happen to them. While some of them asked Ibrahim Pasha to allow them to go to Syria with the army, the others wanted him to request the Porte for their safety of life and property. Reşid Bey warned the government about the worries of the people, and he emphasised that it would be devastating for the empire if the people emigrated to Syria (BOA, HAT, 366/20245-A). The Porte, considering Reşid Bey's advice, declared in the official newspaper *Takvim-i Vekayi* that those who supported the Egyptians would be forgiven for whatever they had done (*Takvim-i Vekayi*, Defa 58). Therefore, the first stage of the struggle between the Ottomans and the Egyptians was over.

5. CONCLUSION

When Mehmed Ali Pasha rebelled against the Porte at the end of 1831, the empire was in a very delicate situation in many aspects. He promised the people a future of stability and prosperity, and guaranteed a life without heavy taxes. Besides, with the help of his supporters, he led the discontented people to revolt against the government. Ibrahim Pasha could gain both the territories and the hearts of the people by using propaganda instruments. As a matter of fact, the Ottoman administration felt strongly the destructive consequences of it and conducted to counter Egyptian propaganda directed against the reputation of Mehmed Ali and Ibrahim, but, it was difficult for the Porte to compete with Ibrahim Pasha who rescued the people from the heavy taxes. Ibrahim Pasha did not lose his self-confidence after the Russian soldiers arrived in Istanbul since he had ensured the support of a large part of the Anatolian people. With the help of this strategy, he could bring his army thousands of kilometres away from Egypt and provide them with supplies without any trouble, whereas the Porte had difficulties to feed its soldiers, who were quite close to Istanbul.

Indeed, the primary reason for the victory of the Egyptians was not only because of the impotence of the Ottomans but because of the people's negative approach to their state. Sultan Mahmud's reforms did not satisfy a significant part of the Ottoman population since they were seen as a dangerous way of eliminating faith in society. This is the reason why all the opponents of reforms, the fugitive janissaries and the dervishes expressed their reaction by supporting the Egyptians instead of the Sultan. In addition, the local authorities had seen people as a source of income that they could use at any time, and disregarded the living conditions of people who had to sell their housewares in order to pay the taxes. Besides, most of the Ottoman governors accused the people of revolt and betray instead of to understand why they had taken the side of the Egyptians. So, it can be said that the primary reason for the Egyptians triumphs was the attitude of Anatolian people who did not support the Porte and welcomed Ibrahim Pasha.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (Turkish Presidency State Archives– Department of Ottoman Archives)

BOA Hatt-ı Hümayun (HAT)

National Archive

Foreign Office (FO)

Ali Fuat. (1928). Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa. *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası*, 19 (96), 64-121.

Al-Sayyid Marsot, A. L. (1984). *Egypt in the Region of Muhammad Ali*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Altındağ, Ş. (1988). *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa İsyamı Mısır Meselesi 1831-1841*. Ankara: TTK.

Anick, N. (1970). *The Embassy of Lord Ponsonby to Constantinople 1833-1841*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, Montreal.

Anscombe, F. F. (2014). *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Armaoğlu, F. (1997). *19. Yüzyıl Siyasî Tarihi (1789-1914)*. Ankara: TTK.

Bilgin, Z. (2015). *Ağa Hüseyin Paşa'nın Hayatı ve Faaliyetleri (1776-1849)*. Unpublished Master Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, İstanbul.

- Çoruk, D. (2007). *XIX. Yüzyıl Sosyal Ve Siyasi Olaylarının Âşık Edebiyatına Yansımaları*. Unpublished Master Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.
- Demirbaş, S. (2016). A Fresh Look at Mahmud II's Purpose in Calling Russian Troops to Istanbul in 1833, *Journal of History School*, 9/XXVIII,347-378
- Douwes, D. (2000). *The Ottomans in Syria a History of Justice and Oppression*. London-New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Gencer F. (2016). İbrahim Paşa'nın Anadolu'yu İstilas, *The Journal of International Social Research*, 9/42,641-657.
- Hunter, F. R. (1999). *Egypt Under the Khedives, 1805-1879*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.
- İnce, Y. (2017). II. Mahmud Devri Reformlarının Tebaa Tarafından Algılanışı. *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, XXXII (2), 427-457.
- Koury, G. J. (1970). *The Province of Damascus, 1783-1832*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Michigan, Michigan.
- Jorga, N. (2005). *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*. V, (Çev. Nilüfer Epçeli), İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları.
- Kamil Paşa. (1327). *Tarih-i Siyasi-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye*. III, İstanbul: Matbaa-i Ahmed İhsan.
- Onhan, M. E. (2018). *Sosyal ve Ekonomik Açıdan Yeniçeri Ocağı'nın Kaldırılması*. Unpublished Master Thesis, Karamanoğlu Mehmedbey Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Karaman.
- Pamuk, Ş. (2012). *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Paranın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Polk, W. R. (1963). *The Opening of South Lebanon 1788-1840*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Sertoğlu, M. (1971). *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*. V, İstanbul: Güven Yayınevi.
- Sinoué, G. (1999). *Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa Son Firavun*. (Çev. Ali Cevat Akkoyunlu). İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.
- Slade, A. (1854). *Record of Travel Turkey, Greece, etc, and of a Cruise in the Black Sea with the Capitan Pasha*. London.
- Uzunçarşılı, İ. H. (1937). Kastamonu'da Tahmiscioğlu Vak'ası. *Tarih Semineri Dergisi*, 1, 139-152.