

THE DEFENSE OF EXTERNALISM ABOUT REASONS FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

Some philosophers contend that people who accept certain moral judgments act in accordance with these judgments, and that it is odd for people to accept certain moral judgments and yet to be entirely indifferent as to acting on these judgments. According to these philosophers, moral considerations people hold motivate them to act in certain ways. Nevertheless, it seems possible for people to be indifferent to moral judgments they believe while acting. This is the main focus of the objection externalists raised against internalist claims just mentioned. I think that externalists are on the right track in criticizing the internalist contention that the connection between holding a moral belief and motivation to act is necessary. Accepting a moral principle may not have any corresponding motivation to act on the relevant principle. The arguments brought against internalism within the traditional reason/passion framework are not, however, strong enough to defeat it conclusively. Instead of the dualistic framework, I propose a new perspective based on a triadic division of soul, and the idea of autonomy of will, which I believe, help us definitely condemn internalism.

Key Words: *Hume, Kant, internalism, externalism, motivation, reason, action.*

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ÖZET

Nedenler Hakkındaki Externalizmin Yeni Bir Perspektiften Savunulması

Bazı belli ahlaki yargıları kabul eden insanların bu yargılara göre davrandığını, ve insanların belli ahlaki yargıları kabul ederken sıra eyleme geldiğinde bu yargılar açısından tarafsız bir tutum içinde olmalarının çok garip olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bu filozoflara göre, insanların inandıkları ahlaki düşünceler onları belirli bir şekilde davranmaya sevk eder. Ancak, insanların sıra eyleme geldiğinde kabul ettikleri ahlaki yargılara karşı tarafsız olmaları mümkün görünmektedir. Bu externalistlerin internalistlerin sözü edilen iddialarına karşı yaptıkları itirazın temel odak noktasıdır. Ben externalistlerin, ahlaki bir inanca sahip olmakla o inanca dayanarak eylemde bulunmak arasında zorunlu bir bağ olduğu yolundaki internalist iddiayı eleştirmekle doğru iz üzerinde olduklarını düşünüyorum. Bir ahlak ilkesini kabul etmek eylemde bulunurken zorunlu olarak o ilkeye göre hareket etmek sonucunu doğurmayabilir. Ne var ki, geleneksel olarak akıl/duygu çerçevesinde internalizme yöneltilen eleştiriler internalizmi kesin olarak yenilgiye uğratabilecek kadar güçlü değildir. Bu ikili çerçeve yerine bu yazıda internalizmi kesin olarak başarısızlığa uğratabileceğini düşündüğüm, ruhun üçlü bölüme ve iradenin otonomluğuna dayalı yeni bir perspektif önereceğim.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hume, Kant, internalizm, externalizm, dürtü, neden, eylem.

Some philosophers argue that people who accept certain moral judgments act in accordance with these judgements, and that it is odd for people to accept certain moral judgments and yet to be entirely indifferent as to acting on these judgments.¹ Moral considerations people hold motivate them to act in certain ways. Nevertheless, it seems possible for people to be indifferent to moral judgments they hold while acting. This is the main focus of the debate between internalists and externalists. According to internalism—a version of which is called “motivational internalism” and I refer to this kind of internalism throughout the paper—our moral judgments

¹ See David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2nd edition by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Bernard Williams, *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); David C. Hubin, “What’s Special About Humeanism,” *Nous* 33 (1999); Valerie Tiberius, “Humean Heroism: Value Commitments and the Source of Normativity,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 81 (2000): 426-446.

do necessarily motivate; one cannot rationally believe that one has a duty without being motivated to do it. That is, there is a necessary connection of sorts between moral judgment and motivation. If one judges telling lies to be wrong, then one is motivated not to lie. Knowing that someone judges lying to be wrong is sufficient for knowing that they are disinclined to lie. Motivational internalism contrasts with motivational externalism, which is the view that moral judgments in themselves do not necessarily motivate us into action, and that when they motivate us, the source of motivation is embedded in a desire external to the moral judgments at issue.² It is perfectly possible to have a moral judgment and not to have motivation to act on the judgment. Suppose that someone's judgment that telling lies is wrong expresses a belief. In order to know whether they have motivation to lie or not, we need to know, in addition, whether they approve of lying for externalists.

The main difficulty for motivational internalism is that one may, without being irrational, be indifferent to morality. "What makes our moral judgments true or correct," as Nick Zangwill points out, "is one thing, and what motivates us is another."³ Psychological questions about human motivation should not be conflated with the truth of a moral judgment. I think that externalists are on the right track in criticizing the internalist contention that the connection between a moral judgment and motivation to act is necessary. One may hold a moral principle while having no corresponding motivation to act on the principle. My task in this paper is then to indicate that the connection between moral judgment and motivation for action is not necessary; it is contingent. To serve this end, I shall critically examine some arguments brought against internalism in order to prove the contingency of the connection between a moral judgment and motivation or desire to act on the judgment. We shall see, however, that the arguments brought against internalism within the traditional reason/passion framework are not strong enough to defeat it conclusively. In order to condemn motivational internalism decisively, I argue, we should give up the traditional dualistic—reason/passion—framework of the controversy.

Instead of the dualistic framework, I espouse a new perspective based on a triadic division of soul, and the idea of autonomy of will, which I believe, help us definitely condemn motivational internalism.

² For a defense of this view, see Philippa Foot, "Morality as a system of Hypothetical Imperatives," *Philosophical Review* 81 (1972): 305-16; David Brink, *Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 1989); Nick Zangwill, "Externalist Moral Motivation," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 40 (2003): 143-154.

³ See Zangwill, "Externalist Moral Motivation," p. 146.

The soul in this triadic approach contains not only the faculties of theoretical or speculative reason and practical reason but also the faculty of appetite. In designating the difference between the faculty of theoretical reason and the faculty of practical reason, I shall appeal to Kant's distinction between practical reason, which he identifies with the will, and speculative reason.⁴ Though Kant's emphasis is on the autonomy of the speculative reason and of the practical reason from each other,⁵ I shall focus on the relationship of these two faculties with one another and with the third faculty, namely the faculty of appetite, that I introduce in this dualistic picture. I argue that the will is autonomous in determining or guiding an action, and it is the primary source of motivation to act. That is, it is the will's choice among the reasons provided by the faculty of speculative reason or by the faculty of appetite that determines action; neither speculative reason nor the faculty of appetite by itself always motivates one into action. On the ground of the tripartite division of soul, I try to demonstrate that motivational internalism is doomed to failure. One may not adopt any reason suggested by the faculty of appetite in guiding an action; in virtue of the speculative reason, one may hold a moral belief and act on the belief without necessarily having motivation to act on it.

A Meager Attack on Motivational Internalism

Hume's views on reason and passion are generally regarded as the primary source of internalist theories in philosophical literature.⁶ According

⁴ Kant uses "practical reason" and the "will" interchangeably: "... as practical reason or as the will of a rational being must reason regard itself as free. This is to say that the will of a rational being can be a will of its own only under the idea of freedom, and that such a will must therefore, from a practical point of view, be attributed to all rational beings." Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 3rd edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 50. See also *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1956), p. 126.

⁶ While the main focus of the controversy between the classic proponents of internalism and externalism was on the reason/passion dichotomy, modern advocates of these views concentrate on whether or not a desire that motivates one into action is embedded in or internal to the relevant judgment one holds. Yet, both the traditional and modern defenders of externalism argue that a

to Hume, reason or understanding is either about abstract relations of our ideas or about relations of objects; it can help us discover relations among objects but it cannot influence our will or volition.⁷ Reason in itself can never be a motivation for action; nor does it have any power to resist emotions. “Reason”, he says, “is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”⁸ Reason is capable only of devising means to ends set by desires. The only motivation for action comes from emotions, and reason merely serves to satisfy some sentiments and desires. Having a reason for an action is a matter of having a desire that would be satisfied by the action. As emotions are original existences, they cannot be irrational. Desires and emotions are basically noncognitive. Therefore, Hume concludes that reason and emotions cannot genuinely oppose each other, and that practical reasoning must always be grounded in the noncognitive psychological states or antecedent desires of individuals.

Hume further claims that rules of morality, which belong to the practical, are not conclusions of reason because an active principle can never be founded on the inactive. He writes accurately: “... ’tis impossible that the distinction betwixt moral good and evil, can be made by reason; since that distinction has an influence upon our actions, of which reason alone is incapable.”⁹ Actions of an ungrateful benefactor or of a burglar are not wrong in themselves; they are merely some physical actions and as such neutral. The wrongness of these actions lies in our emotional reactions to them. Only emotions have evaluative force on actions; reason has no power to dispute any preference of the mind based on emotions.¹⁰

judgment may motivate one into action independently of a definite desire while both classic and contemporary proponents of internalism deny this.

⁷ It should, however, be noted that if reason concerns solely with relations of objects or of abstract ideas, as Hume claims, then moral principles, which are embedded in natural feelings according to him, are discoverable by reason. If human feelings are part of nature, they must be subject to law-like relations like other physical objects, and these relations could be discoverable by reason. Moral principles, which are claimed to be rooted in natural feelings or passions, are, in other words, to be derived from law-like regularities, to which natural feelings are subject. If I feel thirsty, I ought to drink water to satisfy my natural desire for water. Likewise, if I feel ashamed while lying to someone, I ought not to tell a lie.

⁸ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 415.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 462.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 414-15.

Hume's theory of motivation is, I think correctly, claimed to be false by those who urge that reason plays a significant role in determining one's actions.¹¹ In contrast to Hume's claim, externalists emphasize that one's belief about facts may determine one's actions even in the absence of any motivation based on an antecedent desire. If I believe that to take a medicine will protect my health, I take the medicine even if I have no desire to take it, for instance. Likewise, if I believe that the lion on the street is artificial rather than real I shall not attempt to escape. A belief acquired by reasoning about relations of objects can motivate one to do or not to do something.

In addition, Hume's contention that emotions such as resentment and love of life cannot be irrational—because they are “instincts originally implanted in our natures”¹²—but only judgments accompanying them can be presupposes a complete separation of emotions from judgment; however, at the moment we obtain such a separation, we have to give up the governance of an agent's will and actions by emotions, as well. Even if motivation for action comes from emotions, this may be so because of the judgment embedded in them, which requires reason for guidance and control of action. Hume insists that only emotions as original existences can motivate one to do something. There is, nonetheless, no difference between content-less emotion—emotion dissociated from judgment—and an instinctual feeling that governs an animal's behavior. An agent is not, however, an animal acting on the basis of his or her instincts but a person acting on the ground of the content of his or her feelings. Although Hume acknowledges that while acting, a judgment accompanies one's desire, the authority in governing action belongs to the desire for him rather than to the judgment, which merely instrumentally—as a means—guides action. Yet, he provides no good reason as to why we should accept emotion instead of judgment as the main motivator of action.

To overcome the difficulties the Humean theory of motivation encounters, Bernard Williams suggests a sub-Humean model, according to which any element in an agent's subjective motivational set gives rise to an internal reason.¹³ In this model, one's deliberative process can create new

¹¹ Thomas Nagel, for instance, admits that motivation into action requires a state of desire; yet he argues that reasoning in accordance with practical principles may incite new desires so that the agent need not be restricted by the things already in his subjective motivational set. See Thomas Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), Chp. V-VII; See also Christine Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1986), p. 15

¹² Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, pp. 416-17.

¹³ Williams, *Moral Luck*, p. 102.

desires or subtract some motivational elements from the agent's subjective motivational set, which contains dispositions of evaluation, emotional reaction patterns, personal attachments and projects.¹⁴ Williams propounds that "nothing can explain an agent's (intentional) actions except something that motivates him so to act."¹⁵ He separates internal reason from external reason, and explains the latter by lack of motivation. Someone, say Owen, who knows that there is nothing in his subjective motivational set that could motivate him to join the army even after deliberation, might join the army because he could acquire a new motivation in coming to believe that as a result of his joining the army, his family would maintain a tradition of military honor. Williams calls such a reason external,¹⁶ and declares that all external reasons are indeed incoherent.¹⁷ To say that Owen's belief about family honor can be a reason for action because when in coming to believe it he acquires a new motivation contradicts with saying that Owen can act on a reason rationally even though he does not have any motivation for the action. This is because Owen's seemingly external reason to join the army is ultimately tied to a newly acquired motivation, i.e. maintaining a tradition of family honor. Hence, Williams concludes, "... the only rationality of action is the rationality of internal reasons."¹⁸ One's belief has no force in influencing one's actions unless it is part of one's dispositions, personal attachments, and so forth.

Some externalists deny internalism by claiming that one may have reason to do something without help of any desire or disposition, at all. Joseph Raz, for instance, argues that one's actions may conform to some reason that has nothing to do with one's having a specific motivation.¹⁹ To conform to a reason, one need not do anything in some cases. One has a reason not to kill another, and complies with such a reason without performing any action. Similarly, there might be more reasons for one's

¹⁴ Jean Hampton correctly observes that though nothing in his article—Internal and External Reasons— suggests that Bernard Williams is committed to motivational internalism, in his another writing he falsely identifies reasons with motivations. Samuel Scheffler makes the same mistake, as Hampton notes, and identifies not only reasons with motives but also motives with desires. See Jean Hampton, *The Authority of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 61-3.

¹⁵ Williams, *Moral Luck*, p. 107.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁷ Williams's reaction of external reasons relies on his presupposition that external reasons are indirectly linked up with an internal feature of the agent according to externalists. Yet, externalists can hardly be said to be committed to this view. It seems that Williams begs the question against the externalist.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

¹⁹ Joseph Raz, *Engaging Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 93.

particular action than the ones one takes into account at a particular occasion. There are reasons for one's actions that have no relation to one's motivations also in the case of unintended actions. One's intentional action may result in another action that one has unwittingly a reason to perform. In all these cases, one has reasons for one's actions while lacking motivation accompanying these reasons.

An internalist might repudiate Raz's view by arguing that in all these cases, there is a motivation accompanying the relevant reason. One's having reason for not killing another might associate with one's having a motivation not to kill another. The conformity of one's mental state with a reason without doing anything does not prove the absence of any motivation. In the same way, from the fact that one's actions conform to some reason of which one is not aware or one does not take into consideration at a particular occasion, it does not follow that one would lack any motivation to act on the reason when one takes it into account. Similarly, unintended actions might have some reason associated by a motivation or disposition of which one is unaware. So, none of these cases are conclusive to prove that the conformity of one's intentional actions with some reason does not require having some specific motivation.

Admittedly, an externalist might insist that, although it is possible that a definite motivation accompanies a reason for acting in some cases, it is not certain that in each case, a reason based on a desire by itself determines action. A person has a reason to do something only if doing that thing can be connected via deliberation, with an aspect of the world that is not an internal feature of the agent. It is plausible that one may act on a reason without any motivation embedded in it. Derek Parfit, for instance, argues that the truth of the belief that "I need some medicine to protect my health" gives me a normative reason to take the medicine whether I have a motivation to care about my health or not.²⁰ All reasons are external for him. He claims that the source of any reason is an aspect of the world that is not connected to an internal feature of a person through deliberation: "Reasons for acting, I believe, are all external. When we have a reason to do something, this reason is not provided by, and does not require, the fact that after Internalist deliberation we would want to do this thing. This reason is provided by the facts that also give us reason to have this desire."²¹ He rejects desire-based internalist theories, according to which any chain of reasons must end up

²⁰ Derek Parfit, "Reasons and Motivation," *The Aristotelian Society Supplementary*, 71 (1997), p. 113.

²¹ Parfit, "Reasons and Motivation," p. 130.

with some desire, by arguing that the mere fact that “we have some desire, never, by itself, provides reasons.”²²

Nonetheless, an internalist might maintain, even if my need for some medicine, which protects my health, gives me a reason to take the medicine, it does not give me a reason to protect my health. Without an internal reason to protect my health, I do not attempt to take the medicine. To protect my health I may take the medicine, but without having motivation to act on the belief that the protection of my health is necessary, I may not take it. Even if I have no motivation to protect my health, my promise to my mother to protect my health, for example, may give me motivation to take the medicine. My belief in the necessity of the protection of my health may be a reason for me to take the medicine despite my opposite inclinations, but this is because it is entailed by my higher-order desire²³ to keep my promise to my mother. Even if I act against my pre-existing motivations on the ground of holding a belief, this does not demonstrate the absence of any relevant motivation. In the absence of an internal reason, one can rarely be motivated to act in a certain way. Having a reason that is not connected to directly some internal feature of the agent is not by itself sufficient for motivating one to do something.

In this argument, the internalist implicitly identifies keeping a promise with a desire. If I had a powerful desire competing with my desire to keep my promise, I might not keep my promise, as the authority in governing action belongs to desire, according to motivational internalism. If I had still stronger desire that excludes my powerful desire not to keep my promise, then that stronger desire would determine my action. In any case, having a motivation is entirely contingent upon the existence of some specific desire for the internalist. But, an externalist might object, one’s action in the direction of taking a medicine may rely on one’s belief in the requirement of keeping a promise. One acts on the ground of one’s promise because one believes in the necessity of keeping a promise for its own sake irrespective of one’s desire to keep it. One ought to keep one’s promise if morality requires one to keep one’s promise. That is to say, if keeping a promise is a correct thing to do, one ought to do it. We may have no desire to keep our promises but this does not remove our obligation to keep our promises. An ideal rational agent chooses to act on his or her true beliefs in a consistent manner regardless of whether they are associated with some definite desire. Even if one has a general desire to act in accordance with the

²² Ibid., p. 128.

²³ I use the notion of higher-order desire in the sense of an indirect specific internal reason or a particular desire that is not coincident with one’s direct desire for a definite action and yet determines the occurrence of the action.

truths of reason, this should not be conflated with having a specific desire that directly or indirectly determines one's particular actions. Unlike an act aiming to fulfill a definite desire, here an action complies with the truths of reason, whatever the specific content of the desires associating with these truths are. The difference between the two finds its best expression in the actions of a person who may inflict harm on himself or herself for the sake solely of complying with the truths of reason while he or she is able to avoid doing so. Socrates, who believes in the correctness of acting in accordance with the laws of Athens, for instance, chooses to die instead of escaping from the prison.

In many cases, the chief motivator of action is the desire to avoid pain. Even though in some cases one may endure pain, this is generally because of the desire to avoid greater pains. Perhaps, in the eyes of Socrates to live as a coward or rebel to the laws of Athens was much more painful than to die as a virtuous man respecting the laws, the internalist would say. In other words, directly or indirectly one's actions are motivated by a desire to avoid pain or to take pleasure for the internalist. Moreover, a person may keep his or her promise out of sympathy and compassion for others, i.e., a person might merely act on the basis of his or her natural dispositions or feelings that are embedded in his or her moral judgments. That is why moral judgments necessarily motivate one into action. There is no need for an extrinsic desire or for a sense of duty in order to motivate one into action.

The internalist treats reason purely instrumentally²⁴ in this argument. When the precepts of reason match one's desires, one takes them into account, according to the internalist; otherwise, one might ignore the truths of reason. Even if some actions of a person, based on certain specific internal reasons, are rational, however, the person counts as irrational if she does not care about overall consistency of her ends, reasons and actions. Reason demands not only the accord of one's desires and means appropriate to satisfy these desires but also the accord of one's reasons and ends with others' similar reasons and ends in determining an action. It plays a significant role in the choice of ends and means as well as in legislating and coordinating one's ends and actions with others' ends and actions. It is reason rather than desire, which tells us whether an end or a reason²⁵ is good

²⁴ David C. Hubin, for instance, argues that "pure instrumentalism is (uncontroversially) true." See "What's Special About Humeanism," p. 38.

²⁵ I would occasionally employ "reason" and "end" interchangeably because sometimes a reason and an end coincide in determining an action. For instance, the statement "Jane takes the exam because she wants to go to the graduate school" expresses both an end and a reason for Jane's taking the exam, namely *to go to the graduate school*.

for us to choose, whether or not the end or the reason we have chosen is consistent with our other ends and reasons, whether or not it is feasible or beneficial to realize these ends or to act on these reasons, and so on. If a desire to satisfy some natural feeling is incoherent with one's beliefs, one may extinguish one's desire.

The internalist also has problems in explaining weakness of will that the externalist does not. A person who acts only on the basis of his or her desires is, an externalist would go on to argue, a weak-willed rather than a rational person. A weak-willed person is motivated to act primarily on the ground of his or her desires despite the opposition of reason. The internalist appeal to the distinction between lower and higher-order desires may enable him to explain weakness of will to a certain extent.²⁶ A weak-willed person is, accordingly, the one who is unable to respond to his higher-order desires. Even if one is not a weak-willed person and is able to act on the ground of one's higher-order desires by controlling one's direct natural feelings and desires, however, one is still barely viewed as a rational agent so long as one's all actions are merely oriented to satisfy some sort of desire, according to the externalist. A rational agent has a capacity for intentional action.²⁷ What is intimately attached to intentionality is planning, having ends or choosing an end among the available alternatives on the basis of deliberation and understanding rather than on the basis of a crude "want." The rational agent has a capacity to act contrary to his or her natural dispositions—

²⁶ Harry G. Frankfurt's distinction between "second-order desires" and "first-order desires" describes well the distinction I mentioned between higher-order desires and lower-order desires: "Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to *do* this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call 'first-order desires' or 'desires of the first order', which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another." See Harry G. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" in G. Watson (ed.) *Free Will* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 82-3.

²⁷ J. David Velleman's argument against what he calls *standard story of human action*, according to which one's motives cause action, may enable us to clarify the notion of intentional action mentioned here: "What makes us agents rather than mere subjects of behaviour ... is our perceived capacity to interpose ourselves into the course of events in such a way that the behavioral outcome is traceable directly to us." That is, we add something to motivational influence of our desires, according to Velleman. See J. David Velleman, "What Happens When Someone Acts?" in J. M. Fischer & M. Ravizza (eds.) *Perspectives on Moral Responsibility* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 192-93. I take what the agent adds to motivational influence of our desires as constituting the essence of intentional action.

whether higher-order or not—and takes his or her natural inclinations and desires into account insofar as they fit his or her intentionally chosen ends or beliefs.

One's commitments and actions must be consistent for the sake of rationality but, an internalist could note, this does not pose any difficulty to the internalist²⁸ because the internalist, while calling for such consistency, may legitimately hold that one acts on a reason only if an intrinsic motivation associates with it. One might coordinate one's actions with others and extinguish one's pre-existing motivations and even higher-order desires for that sake but all of these are consistent with the instrumental reason. As a result, none of the above arguments decisively disprove the internalist contentions that the primary motivator of action is a specific desire embedded in a judgment, and that the connection between the judgment and motivation to act is necessary.²⁹ More specifically, the requirements of consistency, extinguishing first or higher-order desires, etc., do not falsify the claim that a moral judgment necessarily motivates one into action.

Towards a Moderate Externalist Approach

In the foregoing pages, I rehearsed some of the arguments brought against motivational internalism, aiming to show its falsity. We have seen, however, that the arguments brought against motivational internalism are not strong enough to condemn it conclusively. The falsity of the internalist claim that holding a moral judgment necessarily motivates one into action is yet to be shown. I think that the root of the problem lies in ignoring the role and autonomy of the will³⁰ in governing action—the will is indeterminate with respect to all objects, and in governing action it follows its own principles. Traditionally it is assumed that an agent's action is governed either solely by the faculty of reason or only by the faculty of appetite. The third faculty, the

²⁸ Valerie Tiberius suggests a “stable attitude account” to accommodate Humeanism with the requirement of consistency in time: “... when one has a commitment to the value of some end, ordinary instances of practical reasoning are constrained by that value.” In “Humean Heroism: Value Commitments and the Source of Normativity,” p. 434.

²⁹ I employ the term “necessary” in the sense that whenever one acts on a reason a motivation based on a desire associates with it.

³⁰ Kant thinks of autonomy of the will or of practical reason as the property that the will has of determining itself to action according to certain laws: “Reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independent of foreign influences.” In *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 50. I adopt Kant's conception of autonomy of the will in the sense that the will determines itself to action in accordance with its own principles.

faculty of practical reason, i.e., the will, is forgotten in this dualistic approach to agency and action. In what follows, I appeal to Kant's distinction between pure speculative reason and pure practical reason in order to prepare the ground for a new point of view to deal with the issue.

As noted before, Kant identifies practical reason with the will and distinguishes it from speculative reason while declaring the primacy of the former in determining action:

Thus in combination of pure speculative with pure practical reason in one cognition, the latter has the primacy.... Without this subordination, a conflict of reason with itself would arise, since if the speculative and practical reason were arranged merely side by side ... the first would close its borders and admit into its domain nothing from the latter, while the latter would extend its boundaries over everything and, when its needs required, would seek to comprehend the former within them. Nor could we reverse the order and expect practical reason to submit to speculative reason, because every interest is ultimately practical, even that of speculative reason being only conditional and reaching perfection only in practical use.³¹

Pure speculative reason and practical reason are relatively autonomous with respect to each other. Speculative reason keeps its autonomy by tracking truth in reasoning despite the plausible pressures coming from practical reason, such as, for example, in the case of wishful thinking. Practical reason is also autonomous; it may or may not take into consideration the advice of speculative reason in governing action. The speculative reason is advisor, the will is advisee but the choice is of advisee: "The will is thought of as a faculty of determining itself to action in accordance with the representation of certain laws, and such a faculty can be found only in rational beings."³²

Kant believes that the will is the source of its own practical laws. He explains the will's being the source of its practical laws by drawing a distinction between two senses of "will," which he calls *Wille* and *Willkür*. A rational agent through *Willkür*—the faculty of choice—may either follow the law given by *Wille* or may choose to satisfy the demands of his sensuous desires. A rational *Willkür* as *arbitrium liberum* is distinct from animal will as *arbitrium brutum* not by being absolutely independent of any

³¹ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, p. 126.

³² Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 35. The dignity of human nature lies in this autonomy of the will for Kant. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

determination but by being mediated by practical laws provided by reason.³³ Lewis W. Beck interpretes Kant's notion of will in these lines. He notes that "Wille as practical reason" represents "the legislative function, and *Willkür*, as the executive faculty of man," is the faculty of choice; it chooses between moral law and inclination, between morally good and evil actions.³⁴ Briefly, the autonomous will is the source of its own choices for Kant. The will operates in accordance with the laws it itself makes. That is, the practical reason or the will is not governed by the precepts of the speculative reason or of any other faculty.

Just as its being free in following the teachings of speculative reason, the autonomous will may or may not care about emotions or the demands of the faculty of appetite: "An absolutely good will, whose principle must be a categorical imperative, will therefore be indeterminate as regards to all objects and will contain merely the form of willing; and indeed that form is autonomy."³⁵ In this picture, the will has, metaphorically speaking, two feet; one is in the faculty of speculative reason and the other is in the faculty of appetite. Speculative reason can be used instrumentally; it may serve the demands of the will. But speculative reason maintains its relative autonomy with respect to the will. An agent may not comply with the dictates or truths of speculative reason in action; this does not, however, change the truthfulness of the agent's judgments and principles of speculative reason. In the same fashion, the will may not comply with the requirements of the faculty of appetite; yet, the latter keeps its relative autonomy with respect to the will, as well. One may have certain emotions that one does not want to feel, and one may not feel some other emotions that one wants to feel.

The will sometimes functions as a moderator; it listens both reason and passion and tries to compromise them. Passions may control the will by directly determining action if the will is weak. If the will is strong, it may disregard passions and desires and may subject itself to the precepts and evidence of speculative or theoretical reason. The will may adopt a reason as

³³ See Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 13. See also John R. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's *Religion*." Reprinted as an introduction to *Kant: Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1960).

³⁴ See Lewis W. Beck, *A Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason"* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 176-208

³⁵ Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 48.

an ultimate reason³⁶ for itself—this reason may be different from the greatest satisfaction of desires. Or the will may decide to act on several reasons at the same time. It not only chooses reasons but also orders them and coordinates actions matching these reasons. It may be estranged from the ends and reasons it was once committed to. In all these operations, the will may or may not listen the speculative reason or the faculty of appetite, as it is autonomous. In light of precepts of speculative reason, the will, the executive or governing faculty of action, may revise its ends or reasons for action; the speculative reason shows the will its constraints but it does not necessarily determine actions. Likewise, the will might guide and control action independently of any particular desire. The main source of motivation to act is the will; it is neither the speculative reason nor the faculty of appetite by itself. The will's decision or choice among reasons of the speculative reason or of the faculty of appetite determines action. It operates according to its own principles, one of which is the instrumental principle and the other is the categorical imperative.³⁷

³⁶ Unconditional or ultimate reasons are conclusive reasons; they have no equally competing alternative. That is, not only are ultimate reasons decisive but also incommensurate. See Raz, *Engaging Reason*, p. 106.

³⁷ See Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.), *Ethics and Practical Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 234-38. In addition to the instrumental principle and the categorical imperative, Korsgaard mentions the principle of prudence as a principle of practical reason, which is defined as a requirement that one should deliberate in light of one's overall good. In this context, she points out that for Kant, the principle of prudence is a hypothetical imperative because it operates on the will in so far as the will is committed to overall goodness as an end. There is no necessity, however, for the will to commit itself to this end and hence it is hypothetical. Categorical imperative requires consistency of the will with itself in its choices and as such it imposes a necessity on the will. To be rational, one ought, for instance, to adopt such and such moral principles that can be governing principles of action for everyone. Notice that for Kant, rationality requires not only acting in accordance with the instrumental principle but also acting in accordance with the categorical imperative, whose call for consistency, as opposed to what defenders of Humeanism claim, is atemporal and unconditional—as it is a formal principle of practical reason; it does not hinge on one's long-term interests or on prudential reasons. The necessity of the instrumental principle lies, according to Kant, in the dictum that "whoever wills the end wills the means." Everything is being equal, under certain circumstances, one has to choose those means necessary to realize the end one is committed to. Korsgaard criticizes Kant's notion that "whoever wills the ends wills the means" on the basis of an example of a person, Tex, who avoids sawing of his wounded leg by a doctor due to his fear of pain despite his desire to live. I disagree with

For some individuals, depending on their characters, reasons suggested by the speculative reason—based on some factual aspect of the world—outweigh reasons provided by the appetite or vice versa. But it is hardly the case that one's actions are always governed according to the reasons conferred only by the faculty of appetite. There is no necessity for the will to give priority always to the reasons based on desires over the reasons yielded by the speculative reason. The reasons the will accepts in governing action may or may not coincide with a desire. The will is autonomous; it is governed neither solely by the speculative reason nor merely by the faculty of appetite.

The tripartite division of the faculties of soul³⁸ just described justifies the denial of motivational internalism. A reason motivates one to do something if the will approves of acting on that reason. Since the will may govern action in accord with a reason suggested either by the speculative reason or by the faculty of appetite or by both, it is false to claim that all reasons are internal. One may have a reason to do something without having motivation or desire to do that thing. That is why, the connection between holding a moral judgment and motivation to act is contingent. The contingency of the relation between holding a judgment and having motivation to act on the judgment suggests the truth of externalism but, at

Korsgaard in that she neglects the fact that Tex's will is not thoroughly free in this case; it is under the restriction of fear of pain. So, Tex's case hardly constitutes a counterexample to Kant's dictum and to the necessity of the instrumental principle. Whoever wills the ends might not will some particular means, however, if there are alternative means. But Kant could eschew from this objection by introducing the notion of conjunction or disjunction of a series of means into his dictum. The connection between an end and a conjunction or disjunction of a series of means—if not simply an end and a means—is, he might argue, necessary. Even with such a revision, it is hard to talk of the necessity of the relation between ends and means, nevertheless, because of the autonomy of the will. The will may have an end and yet may not choose to fulfill that end if the end the will is committed to is weak or unable to compete with some other ends the will endorsed. That is, one may will an end and yet may not will the available means to actualize the end in acting. This also casts light, to some extent, on the connection between a moral judgment and motivation. As one may have a moral judgment but may not have a motivation to act on the judgment, the connection between a moral judgment and a motivation to act on the judgment is contingent.

³⁸ There are similarities between Plato's tripartite division of soul and the division of soul mentioned in this paper. See *Republic* 414b9-415a5. But it should be noted that although in Plato's account reason rather than the spirit or the appetite part of the soul is and must be the decision maker about what to do, here the governing faculty of action is the will instead of the speculative reason.

most, of a moderate one because one may act in accordance with a reason based on a desire, as well. In conclusion, the claim that all reasons are internal is as mistaken as the claim that all reasons are external. One may act on a reason in the absence of any motivation or desire to act on the reason. If the reason on which one acts is given by the speculative reason, and it is not coincident with a desire, the relation between the reason and motivation to act on the reason is scarcely held to be necessary.

Some Concluding Remarks

In the previous pages, we have seen that one may have reasons for doing something without necessarily being motivated to act on these reasons. A reason suggested by the faculty of appetite may not necessarily be a reason of the will to direct an action. As the will is autonomous, it is wrong to claim that all reasons are internal. One may act on some reasons not primarily because one's desires are identical with these reasons but because one believes in their truth and decides to act accordingly. By means of speculative reason, one may believe in the correctness of a moral judgment and act on the judgment without necessarily having a desire to act on it. Believing in something tracks the truth and requires approval or disapproval of speculative reason, but it does not necessarily require an emotional attachment of the will in ruling an action. A rational agent may have moral beliefs and act accordingly in the absence of any motivation to act on those beliefs.

One could argue that when moral judgments about emotions are paid due attention, it becomes hard to accept this claim. There is an inherent link between an emotional belief and the action it requires. Evan Simpson, for instance, notes that "the identification of something as dangerous gives the belief an inherent link to action...."³⁹ But as Simpson himself recognizes this link is not necessary. He does not, however, provide a description of the precise nature of the link while denying also that it is contingent. The link is contingent, nonetheless, if the notion of contingency is used in the sense that a belief might motivate the will to act despite the lack of a desire to act on the belief. A moderate externalist espousing such a notion of contingency finds no difficulty in explaining the link between an emotional belief and an action. Accordingly, holding an emotional judgment motivates one to act on the judgment; the relation between the two is contingent, however, upon the will's decision. If the will is informed about the danger of something by the speculative reason, it may disregard the risk and order an act, provided that it

³⁹ Evan Simpson, "Between Internalism and Externalism in Ethics," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 49 (1999), p. 205.

judges, perhaps willfully that the scope of the danger is not big enough to hinder action; or it may listen the speculative reason and act accordingly even if it has no desire to do so.⁴⁰ The upshot of all these considerations is this: it is incorrect to say that the connection between holding a belief and being motivated to act on the belief is necessary. Just as one may hold a belief but may not act on the belief, one may act on a belief one holds without having a desire or motivation to act on the belief.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Though I did not provide an argument for the tripartite division of soul suggested in this paper, its explanatory power yields a justification. The tripartite division of soul helps us not only clarify the precise nature of the tie between reason and motivation but also understand the relation between holding a moral belief and a motivation to act on the belief.

⁴¹ I want to thank the anonymous referee of *Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* for the valuable comments and criticisms s/he made on the previous version of the paper.