

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE EU'S REACTIONS TO MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN TURKEY AND GREECE

Nihan Akıncılar Köseoğlu¹

Abstract²

During the last century, several military interventions occurred in Turkey and Greece. These military interventions into politics were tolerable until the end of the Second World War, as the world had been facing ongoing warfare since the early 20th century. However, in the early Cold War era, major international institutions were established to prevent war by forming alliances between countries. In this context, Turkey and Greece applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 in order to improve their economies through financial aids and their political systems by integrating into Europe. However, the EEC did not approve of the coups d'état of the Turkish and Greek military and objected to the military regimes which were founded subsequently. Arguing that the military interventions disrupted Turkish and Greek democracies, the Community insisted on the replacement of military rule with civilian politicians. In the light of this demand, this article compares the reactions of the EEC to the Turkish and Greek coups d'état in 1960 and in 1967 respectively. And it argues that the EEC showed stronger reaction to the Greek coup than to the Turkish coup. Even though the EEC was then just an economic organization, its responses to the coups show the sign of its future transformation into a multidimensional organization.

Keywords: EU, Military Interventions, Civil-Military Relations, Democratization, Turkish-Greek Relations.

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN TÜRKİYE VE YUNANİSTAN'DAKİ ASKERİ MÜDAHALELERE TEPKİSİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ

Özet

Geçtiğimiz yüzyılda, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da birçok askeri müdahale yaşanmıştır. 20. yüzyılın başlarından itibaren, dünya sürekli bir savaşa sahne olduğu için de bu askeri müdahalelere, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonuna kadar müsamaha gösterilmiştir. Fakat Soğuk Savaş'ın başladığı yıllarda, ileride meydana gelebilecek olası savaşları engellemek için uluslararası organizasyonlar kurulmuş, ülkeler bu organizasyonların çatısı altında bir araya getirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye ve Yunanistan, aynı zamanda Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu (AET) üyeliğine başvurmuştur. İki ülkenin de bu üyelikten beklentisi, AET'den gelecek mali yardımla ekonomilerini düzeltmek ve bir Avrupa ülkesi olarak güçlü bir siyasete sahip olmaktı. Ancak, AET, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da gerçekleşen darbeleri hoş karşılamamış, darbe sonrası kurulan askeri yönetimlere de karşı çıkmıştır. Askeri müdahalelerin,

¹ Assist.Prof., Fenerbahçe University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, nihan.koseoglu@fbu.edu.tr, ORCID ID: 0000-0002-8565-506X

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Türk ve Yunan demokrasilerine ara verdirdiğini ileri sürerek, ısrarla askeri yönetimlerin son bulmasını ve seçilmiş sivil politikacıların yönetime geçmesini talep etmiştir. Bu istekten yola çıkarak, bu makale AET'nin Türkiye ve Yunanistan'daki sırasıyla 1960 ve 1967 yıllarındaki darbelere vermiş olduğu tepkileri karşılaştırmaktadır. AET'nin Yunanistan'daki darbeye daha sert tepki verdiğini iddia eden bu makale, aynı zamanda AET'nin o dönemde ekonomik bir topluluk olmasına rağmen Türkiye ve Yunanistan'daki darbelere verdiği tepkilerle gelecekteki çok boyutlu bir örgüte dönüşmesinin sinyalini verdiğini söylemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB, Askeri Müdahaleler, Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri, Demokratikleşme, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri.

1. Introduction

With Greece under Ottoman rule between the 15th and 19th centuries, Turkey and Greece developed, starting from the Tourkokratia period, a dominant role of the military in politics due to the Ottoman tradition. After the Ottoman Greeks declared independence in 1821, both the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom adopted a 'Westernization' policy. In order to westernize their countries, both countries first aimed at the modernization of their armies. They followed the slogan: "the more powerful the army is, the more powerful is the country". Seeing each other as the greatest enemies, the two countries had fought each other for a century (between 1821 and 1923) without cease.

In May 1919, Mustafa Kemal initiated the Turkish War of Independence. In October 1923, he founded the Turkish Republic. Due to the fact that army officers had founded Turkey and Greece after their respective wars of independence, the military was regarded as the top authority. Thus, given also the historical legacy of military dominance stemming from Ottoman rule, democracy was interrupted several times in Turkey and Greece by military interventions.

In line with their Westernization policies, Turkey and Greece aimed at their integration into Europe through membership in several international institutions since the end of the Second World War. Membership in the European Economic Community seemed sensible to them as a means to improve their poor economies. However, the EEC set conditions for membership, among which the most important one was the Communities' importance given to democracy. Therefore, the EEC reacted to the frequency of military interventions in Turkey and Greece and declared that the two countries could not become members of the Community as long as the military's dominance in the political sphere lasted. This article focuses on the military interventions in 1960 in Turkey and in 1967 in Greece. The main question of this article concerns the EEC's respective reactions to Turkey and Greece. Comparing these reactions, which country was tolerated more by the EEC? And why?

2. Westernization / Europeanization of Turkey and Greece

2.1 Turkey

The Turkish War of Independence ended with the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Blaming Islamic religion for the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the leaders of the newly founded Turkish

Republic adopted the policy of Westernization for the progress and development of the country (Mahçupyan, 2000, p. 19). The new ruling elite under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk implemented a series of secularist reforms, trying to separate religion from state affairs. In line with Atatürk's Westernization policy, the caliphate was abolished in 1924, the new Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928, and religious schools and religious courts were closed down. Instead, a Westernized educational system was established with many of the teachers imported from Europe (Rustow, 1987, p. 16). Moreover, religious law, the Sharia, was eliminated and replaced with the secular Swiss code.

During the inter-war period, Turkey tried to integrate into Europe by placing emphasis on its European identity. Therefore, the new Republican elite rejected the linkage with the Ottoman past. For instance, only five years after the establishment of the Republic, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs "Tevfik Rustu (Aras) defined his country's new orientation and identity as that of a Western power to which 'the death of a peasant in the Balkans is of more importance than the death of a king in Afghanistan'" (quoted in Barlas & Güvenç, 2009, p. 425).

In the 1920s and 1930s, there appeared two main initiatives for a united Europe: Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe movement and Aristide Briand's European Union proposal at the League of Nations (LoN). Because the LoN had not been able to prevent the First World War, Coudenhove-Kalergi proposed the vision of a politically united Europe in his book 'Paneuropa' (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1926). In turn, French Foreign Minister Briand proposed a European Union at a conference of the LoN after the Great Depression of 1929, placing emphasis on its economic features more than peace and security.

The two abovementioned proposals for a united Europe "came at a time when Turkey was trying to break its international isolation and end its status as an outcast in European politics" (Barlas & Güvenç, 2009, p. 431). When Coudenhove-Kalergi published his book in 1923, Turkey was a newly-established, fragile country. Thus, he did not want to incorporate Turkey into his Pan-Europe project. "Briand also excluded Turkey from his European Union proposal for two reasons: first, Turkey was not a member of the LoN; second, it was not a part of geographical Europe" (Barlas & Güvenç, 2009, p. 431).

Although Turkey was excluded from a united Europe in these proposals, the newly established Republic was to be Europeanized through Atatürk's Westernization reforms. That is to say, the Turks had struggled with the West to become a Western country (Tunaya, 1960, p. 103).

After the Turkish political system was transformed into a multi-party system in 1950, the importance of membership in European institutions for the integration with the West was realized. Therefore, Turkey became a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948, at the time of its establishment. The OEEC aimed at the distribution of financial aid stemming from the Truman Doctrine. In 1949, the Council of Europe (CoE) was established in order to defend human rights and freedoms in the European continent after the human rights violations during the Second World War. Turkey became a member of the CoE in 1949 and signed the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950. The Convention founded the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as an international judicial body to which both states and individuals can

apply. When the treaties of the European Economic Community were signed in 1957, the European institution most attractive for Turkey was formed. Thus, Turkey applied for membership in the EEC in 1959, just after Greece. With this, the European adventure began for the country.

According to Öncü (1993, p. 258), “the Turkish elite have been the articulators of a grand political project – Westernization – which has indelibly marked the path of modern Turkish history”. During more than a century, “‘Western-ness’ was coupled and identified with progress and development” (Öncü, 1993, p. 258) for the ruling elite and has served as a reference for the future Turkish political leaders.

2.2 Greece

Greek merchants as well as other non-Muslim tradesmen constituted an economic bourgeoisie within the Ottoman Empire. They had close ties with the West through import and export and their knowledge of one, (or more), foreign language(s). As soon as the libertarian ideas spread among the Greeks, they planned and organized for a revolt against Ottoman rule. The Empire’s efforts of the Tanzimat reforms could not prevent this.

After the secession of Greece from the Ottoman Empire in 1821, “the newly independent Greeks embarked on the task of building a nation- state out of a former province” (Frangoudaki & Keyder, 2007, p. 1). The independence of the Greek Kingdom was recognized at the end of the London Conference in 1832. “The ancient Greeks invented democracy, but their linguistic descendants in modern times had to import representative government, a modern version of a democratic polity, from the West” (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002, p. 44). However, “Greeks were afraid of losing their Hellenic identity while catching up with the West” (Exertzoglou, 2007, p. 52).

Just as modern Turkey blamed the Ottoman Empire for inherited backwardness, Greece chose both the Ottomans and the Byzantine Empire as its sources of backwardness. Thus, “intellectuals and the emerging middle class of the Neohellenic Enlightenment movement championed a radical break with Ottoman traditions and the legacy of Byzantium which was thought to represent a period of decadence, decay, and superstition” (Özkırımlı & Sofos, 2008, p. 23) in the Greek history. Then, the country had to catch up with its European counterparts by modernizing its economy, politics, technology as well as culture.

In the first decades of the Kingdom, Greece paid attention to its military due to ongoing warfare. Thus, the country started its modernization attempts within the army. When Venizelos came to the Greek political scene in 1909, he had a revisionist policy in mind. He could easily expound his Westernized thoughts to the public through the daily press. Moreover, Venizelos gave importance to urbanization, which was a widespread tendency throughout Europe.

Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Greek politics had faced instability. On the one hand, Venizelist governments were interrupted by frequent military interventions. On the other hand, Greece fought continuously in the Balkans, in the First World War, and with the Turks in the Aegean until 1922. Thus, Westernization attempts stopped during this period. After the declaration of an independent Turkish Republic, the Republican movement gained popular support throughout Greece.

The Second Hellenic Republic was established in 1924.

During the 1920s and 1930s, Greece became a part of the two main initiatives for a united Europe mentioned above: Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe movement and Aristide Briand's European Union proposal at the LoN. Because of its geographical position, the country was included in these projects. However, they did not last long due to both imperfections of these early initiatives and the outbreak of the Second World War. Furthermore, since military interventions continued to be frequent and led to a four-year long Metaxist dictatorship in the second half of the 1930s, the Greek political system gradually became authoritarian - as was a more general trend in the Europe of the inter-war period. By the same token, the Westernization policy of the Republican rulers was interrupted until the early Cold War era.

At the end of the Second World War, Greece became an "association maniac" (quoted in Tassopoulos, 2007, p. 14) like many other European countries. "Associations were of every kind: political, educational, charitable, cultural, etc." (Tassopoulos, 2007, p. 14). Consequently, Greece became a member of the OEEC in 1948 at the same time as Turkey. Membership in this economic association guaranteed the country its economic development. Greece further applied for membership in the CoE in 1949 in order to reinforce democracy, human rights, and freedoms throughout the country. Finally, after the establishment of the EEC, Greece applied for associate membership in 1959. Membership was seen as guaranteeing a number of advantages, "such as maintaining and consolidating existing links with the West, going beyond historical dilemmas of the past between West and East, strengthening Greece's international bargaining power, preventing foreign interference in internal and domestic affairs" (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 2005, p. 225), and securing its position against Turkey in the Aegean and Cyprus. Although Featherstone and Kazamias (2001, pp. 4-5) argue that "Europeanization is more than just 'integration'" into Europe, Greece, since the end of the Second World War, aimed at the recovery of its economy by integrating into an economic alliance (Stavridis, 2003, p. 4).

3. Association Agreements with the European Economic Community

3.1 Greece's Association with the EEC

After the Greek application for association with the EEC on June 8, 1959, negotiations for the accession of Greece to the Community began on September 10, 1959. The Association Agreement, called Athens Agreement, was signed on July 9, 1961. It entered into force one year later on November 1, 1962 and "made Greece a privileged associate member of the EEC under the provisions of Article 238 of the Rome Treaty" (Kalamotousakis, 1976, p. 141). According to the agreement, the EEC aimed at developing the Greek economy by preparing short- and long-term development plans and even giving financial aids in order to have the country enter into a Customs Union. If everything went well, Greece would become a full member of the Community in 22 years.

Before the Greek association with the EEC, the country demanded to join any of the existing regional alliances to secure its economic and military growth. In this context, before the application to the EEC, Greece "took part in the lengthy negotiations (1957-8) of the Organization for European

Economic Cooperation, which at that time considered a British proposal for a European free-trade area embracing all Western European countries – an alternative to the Common Market” (Kalamotousakis, 1976, p. 150). At the end of these negotiations, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was formed under the leadership of Britain. Even though Greece was also invited for membership, it refused this proposal. After some time, however, Greece regretted its rejection, as it felt isolated in the region. It thus started to seek for ways to associate with the EEC. According to the Greek administration, an association with the EEC would develop the Greek economy on the basis of trade with other EEC countries and strengthen Greek politics in regional conflicts. During the negotiations with the EEC, Greece chose an associate membership, although it could have applied for full membership. According to Kalamotousakis (Kalamotousakis, 1976, p. 151), this was a good choice because

if Greece had opted for full membership, it would have been risking catastrophic consequences because (a) direct and unconditional membership would have meant acceptance of the accelerated time-table among the Six for the complete abolition of all tariffs and quantitative import controls, and (b) the geographic orientation and composition of Greek exports, consisting largely of few agricultural products having a low price and income elasticity of demand and a high elasticity of substitution, were substantially tied to the EEC countries.

When the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis signed the Association agreement with the EEC on July 9, he gave a speech which showed that Greece aimed at both economic and political improvements through EEC membership given its weak economy and instable politics during the post- Second World War era. Karamanlis aimed at being close to Western countries, thus gaining a European identity like other member states. However, the EEC seemed to have only economic aims concerning the country. Nevertheless, this was a relevant decision of Greece: if the country had not joined the EEC, it would have been isolated politically and economically in the European continent.

Why the Community offered a preferential status for Greece is another issue. The EEC aimed at the harmonization of Greek agricultural and financial policies in order to develop its economy throughout the 22 years leading up to membership and tried to assume the protector role of the United States and Britain.

After the Athens Agreement entered into force in November 1962, the relationship between Greece and the Community stayed problem-free for only five years - until Greek Colonels staged a coup d'état in April 1967. During these five years, Greek exports to EEC countries increased significantly. “Western governments were encouraged to establish industries in Greece which accelerated the revival of the economic activity since the U.S. civil aid came to an end during 1962” (Woodhouse, 1991, p. 282). Because Greek Colonels had rapidly transformed the military government into a military dictatorship, the dialogue between Greece and the EEC stalled. The relations were resumed when Greece applied for full membership in 1975, one year after the end of the seven-years-long military dictatorship. Negotiations lasted from 1976 to 1979. On January 1, 1981 Greece became formally a member of the EC (Pagoulatos, 2002, p. 3).

3.2 Turkey's Association with the EEC

After having become members of the NATO in 1952, Turkey and Greece turned to another powerful Western Cold War institution, the European Economic Community. When Greece applied for membership in the EEC in June 1959, Turkey also initiated a contractual association one month later on July 31, 1959 due to political and economic reasons (Saraçoğlu, 1992, p. 8). The EEC approved the Turkish application on September 11, 1959 and decided to start the negotiations (Saraçoğlu, 1992, p. 9). However, because Turkish democracy was interrupted by a coup d'état on May 27, 1960 and one year later three politicians were hanged, the dialogue with the EEC was frozen. In contrast, Greece succeeded in signing the Athens Agreement on July 9, 1961. Then, "[t]hrough there was a domestically troubled situation after the coup and the Turco – EEC relations were quite tensed after the Athens Agreement, in July 1962 the talks between Turkey and the EEC were resumed" (Riemer, 1999, p. 6). Finally, the EEC accepted to sign the Association Agreement, called Ankara Agreement, on September 12, 1963 in Brussels.

In the evening of the same day, Prime Minister İnönü interpreted this association as follows:

In my opinion, throughout the history of mankind, the most daring works of the human mind are brought into the body, the European Economic Community. With this Agreement, Turkey will be forever connected to Europe (Cumhuriyet, 1963).

When the Association Agreement came into force on December 1, 1964, the relationship between Turkey and the EEC officially commenced. The agreement divided the membership period of Turkey into three parts: the preparatory, transitional, and final stages.

After the signing of the Association Agreement, the Second and Third Financial Protocols were accepted in 1970 and 1977. On November 23, 1970, an Additional Protocol was signed which aimed at the completion of a Customs Union between the two sides within 22 years. However, these protocols were cancelled when the Turkish government decided to freeze the relations with the EEC in 1978, "referring to Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, the Self-Protection clause" (Riemer, 1999, p. 6). After the military coup of 1980, the dialogue between Turkey and the EEC was severed and the Ankara Agreement was suspended in 1982 for five years.

Ironically, although Turkey signed an agreement "the content of which was purely economic, the main driving force behind the Turkish application for the Associate Membership was mostly political rather than economic" (Sözen, 2005, pp. 3-4). The reasons, according to Hale, were "to gain easier market access to the EEC, to avoid being outflanked by Greece, and to be internationally recognized as a member of the Western Community of nations which had been an objective of Turkish leaders" (2000, p. 175) since the early days of the Tanzimat period. In turn, the Community had also fulfilled its objective by "bringing one of the strategically most important states in the boat" (Riemer, 1999, p. 6).

4. The First Military Intervention in Turkey on May 27, 1960

From the foundation of Turkey in 1923 until 1946, the country was governed by a single party, the Republican People's Party. On January 7, 1946, a powerful oppositional party, the Democrat Party, was constituted by four former MPs of the RPP: Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köprülü. Gradually, this party came to represent all the opposition and popular discontent among

the public which had been cumulating until then. Therefore, the DP gained popular support and won the 1950, 1954, and 1957 elections. As a result, the party governed the country for a decade, from 1950 to 1960.

Like the earlier opposition parties, the DP was established as an anti-RPP party. Because it was founded with the aim of securing fundamental rights and freedoms of the nation, the party adopted some liberal policies. It was a supporter of a laissez-faire economy and tried to bolster both national and foreign private sectors (Eroğul, 2003; Kasaba, 1993).

After the DP came to power in 1950, the members of the party elected Celal Bayar as the new president. He further was elected chairman of this new party. Thus, for the first time since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, a civilian president came to power. This showed that the DP had the potential to make important changes in the current system of the country. Every time Bayar was asked about the difference between the RPP and his party, he answered that they were like cooks preparing Turkish sweet 'helva' with different recipes (Ahmad, 1994, p. 156). While both Democrats and Republicans aimed at creating a 'small America' with one millionaire in each neighborhood, their methods for reaching this goal differed (Ahmad, 1994, p. 156).

As Zürcher notes, "under the RPP the state apparatus and the party machine had been merged (even officially) to the extent that one could say that the party was just one of the instruments through which the state controlled and steered society" (2004, p. 221). Likewise, in the first years of the DP government, the party abandoned its libertarian policies and began to put pressure on leftist ideas, just as the RPP had done with the right-wing, which had been heavily criticized by the DP MPs. As the DP governed the country as a single-party during a decade, the tradition of the RPP continued, and the Democrat Party rule became a state-party-government.

At the same time, the country faced growing economic problems. Since the Truman Doctrine was implemented in Turkey in 1947, a liberal economy had been slowly introduced to the country. In spite of the RPP's insistence on statism, the Democrats supported a free market economy for Turkey. Thus, after the DP came to power in 1950, it rapidly implemented liberalization policies. In the first years, these liberal policies combined with U.S. financial aid had positive effects in terms of a growing national economy. However, when American aid ceased, the DP's heyday ended. Because they did not have any development plan for solving Turkey's financial problems, the new Turkish liberal economy began to collapse. This meant that Turkish people began to get poorer, just as in RPP times. In July 1958, Menderes personally visited the U.S. and German Presidents concerning recovery programs. The two countries accepted to give financial assistance to Turkey in return for the devaluation of the Turkish Lira. Menderes did not accept but turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.

Despite its success in the 1957 elections, as people voted for Menderes rather than for the party, the DP started to lose power and popular support - it had become too authoritarian, too much like the RPP during the single-party period. In fact, "the Democrats' basic problem, pointed out by many foreign observers at the time, was that they tried to do too much too quickly and with insufficient means at their disposal" (Zürcher, 2004, p. 228). Because the DP had gained the majority of votes in the 1954 and 1957 elections, it thought that it was justified in acting in an authoritarian manner.

However, the authoritarian activities of the DP had sparked discontent among some parts of society. First of all, peasants were affected negatively by the DP's support for the mechanization of agriculture between 1950 and 1960. When the number of tractors and harvesters sharply increased, the peasants got poorer. This initiated the process of migration to big cities and the building of shanty towns (see Karpas, 1976). Moreover, since the DP wanted to control the bureaucracy, military, and academia, it reduced the salaries of these professions more than others. Their annoyance increased in the late 1950s when the DP attempted to seize RPP property, to punish newspapers which did not support the government, and to penalize academics and judges who were not pro-government.

As last authoritarian attempt of the party, Democrats established a Commission of Inquiry in April 1960 in order to investigate the RPP's plans, contrary to the Constitution. The Commission of Inquiry tried to reveal whether or not there was a plan for a coup d'état being made. In response, students and university academics began to demonstrate on the streets of Ankara. The DP government responded with martial law but could not end the expression of popular discontent. Its announcement of the abolition of the Commission on May 24 came too late. The foundation of the Commission had emphasized the DP's authoritarianism, which brought about the first coup of the country.

On May 27, 1960 Turkish army officers staged a coup d'état, arguing that the Democrat Party had acted against the Turkish Constitution. This coup was made by ratings and thus differed from the 1971 and 1980 coups that had been staged by high-ranking military officers. At three o'clock in the morning, Colonel Alparslan Türkeş read a declaration on the radio in which the Turkish military explained the reasons for the coup. "The statement announced that the Turkish armed forces had taken over the administration of the country 'to prevent fratricide' and to 'extricate the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they had fallen'" (quoted in Zürcher, 2004, p. 241).

After the coup, the National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi/ NUC), headed by General Cemal Gürsel and composed of 38 members, took over and formed the government. General Gürsel immediately closed down the Democrat Party and banned it from politics. He then arrested the leading members of the party, including President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes. General Gürsel rapidly obtained all authority and governed the country until 1961 when he transferred the government to civilians.

For the trial of arrested DP politicians, a special court was founded in Yassıada, an island in the Sea of Marmara. In the end, "123 people were acquitted, 31 were sentenced to life imprisonment and 418 to lesser terms, while 15 were sentenced to death" (Zürcher, 2004, p. 248). The NUC mitigated the death penalty of eleven people, but not of President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan. Thus, the NUC rapidly passed a law which suspended the execution of the death penalty for those above 65 years of age. This law was adopted for the former President of the Turkish Republic, Celal Bayar. Hence, the death penalty of Bayar was annulled and he was deported from the island. Zorlu and Polatkan were executed on September 16, 1961 and Menderes the next day. After these executions, Menderes became a martyr in the eyes of the majority of society and his memoir was used by DP's successor politicians (Ahmad, 1994, p. 192).

5. The EEC's Reaction to the May 27, 1960 Coup d'État

After the Turkish application for the associate membership in the EEC in July 1959, the Community decided to start negotiations in September 1959. Even though negotiations between Turkey and the EEC continued for several months, with the May 27, 1960 coup d'état the relations were strained. When the three DP politicians were executed in September 1961, the dialogue with the EEC was frozen.

The then President of France, General de Gaulle, strongly opposed to these executions. Because the three politicians were hanged despite his reaction, the Turkish association with the EEC was delayed for two years (Özer, 2009, p. 91). Although the relations between Turkey and the EEC worsened after Greece signed its association agreement in July 1961, the dialogue between Turkey and the Community was resumed in July 1962 with the special effort of Tevfik Saraçoğlu, the Turkey's permanent representative in the EEC. Thus, negotiation talks were re-started for the Turkish association with the EEC. Finally, Ankara Agreement was signed in September 1963 and Turkey became an associate state of the Community.

It seems that the EEC's reaction to the 1960 coup of Turkish colonels was not severe. While England, Ireland, Denmark and Norway applied for the membership in the EEC in 1961, negotiations with these countries were stalled in January 1963 due to General de Gaulle's veto (Özer, 2009, p. 92). Despite this, the EEC signed the association agreement with Turkey in September 1963. Thus, it can be said that Turkey was not reacted severely by the EEC compared to the frozen relations between the major Western European countries and the Community until 1967.

6. The Colonels' Dictatorship in Greece (1967 – 1974)

The civil war in Greece ended in 1949, while martial law was lifted and new elections were held in 1950. After a short-lived government, another election was held in 1951, but the result was again a short-lived government. Marshal Alexandros Papagos, who was a resigned Commander-in-Chief and the leader of a right-wing party, the Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagermos / GR), emerged as the winner of the new elections held in 1952. "Now a period of right-wing rule began that maintained until 1963" (Clogg, 1992, p. 147).

Papagos continued to govern the country until his death in 1955. Konstantinos Karamanlis succeeded him and renamed the party the National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis / NRU) in February 1956.

Because Karamanlis' NRU was successful in the 1958 elections, he called for an early election in 1961 in order to guarantee his rule for the next four-year term. However, the result fell short of his expectations because a high percentage of votes were given to a new party, the Centre Union (Enosi Kentrou / CU). The CU was constituted by Georgios Papandreou, who combined all of the center parties. Although Papandreou's CU gained popular support in the elections, Karamanlis' NRU was announced as the winning party. Thus, Karamanlis established a government which lasted until 1963. However, the two opposition parties, Centre Union and United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera / UDL), declared the 1961 elections null and void, accusing the NRU of fraudulence. In fact,

they suspected that an external power had intervened in Greek domestic politics. That is, “the opposition parties claimed that the army had implemented a NATO-plan, code-named Pericles and designed to deal with threats to internal security, to preserve the right’s hold on power” (Clogg, 1992, p. 155).

After elections, Karamanlis’ NRU started to lose popular support. Discontent among the public had increased due to his personal conflicts with the royalty, especially with Queen Frederica, and the assassination of an MP of the United Democratic Left. The Greek economy gradually deteriorated and unemployment and under-employment increased. Thus, strikes by workers, public servants, and teachers became frequent, which often led to clashes with the state’s security forces (Gallant, 2001, p. 195; Woodhouse, 1991, p. 283). Then, “huge protests by supporters of Papandreou’s Centre Union party shook Athens and other cities, forcing new elections in 1963” (Tsarouhas, 2005, p. 9). Consequently, Karamanlis had to resign and the Centre Union won the 1963 elections under the leadership of Papandreou.

Moreover, Georgios Papandreou’s son, Andreas Papandreou, became an MP during his father’s government. He was accused by the right-wing parties of being the leader of ASPIDA (Shield), a left-wing assassination group of the army. “The word means ‘shield’, but it was also an acronym standing for ‘Officers, Save Fatherland, Ideals, Democracy and Meritocracy” (Woodhouse, 1985, p. 5). This led Papandreou to lose further power when young Constantine II was to succeed his father King Paul in 1964. In May 1965, Papandreou dismissed his Minister of Defence and demanded to be his replacement. King Constantine II, who only had the right to appoint the Minister of Defence, did not accept. From then on, an enduring conflict between the King and Papandreou senior developed in which the former aimed at the latter’s resignation and the splitting of his party. In July 1965, King Constantine II succeeded in forcing Papandreou’s resignation despite widespread demonstrations by the supporters of the CU. They later called this royal intervention into politics *Apostasia* (renegade). They also named the CU politicians who replaced Papandreou by appointment of the King renegades. The dissatisfaction of the military was apparent at the time. Therefore, Papandreou tried to get the army officers on his side before his resignation. “He tried to reorganize the armed forces along lines more sympathetic to his government and to encourage the promotion of low-rank officers that were disadvantaged by the political environment after 1949” (Tsarouhas, 2005, p. 9). Nevertheless, high-ranking military officers were not pleased with this effort and opposed Papandreou.

Both the American and British administrations were aware of a coup plan in Greece, because the King had visited them to obtain their advice. General Kardamakis, the Chief of the Greek National Defence General Staff, confirmed to the Americans that “the decision for a coup d’état has already been taken, that it is no longer a question of whether, but when” (quoted in Maragkou, 2006, p. 430). However, the British and Americans later realized that they were informed about a different coup plan.

Subsequently, the leaders of the Centre Union and of the National Radical Union called for early elections to be held in May 1967. However, two colonels and a brigadier - Georgios Papadopoulos, Nikoalos Makarezos, and Stylianos Pattakos - staged a coup d’état on April 21, 1967 just before the elections would have been held. They aimed to end the political instability in the country that

predominated during the post-Second World War period. In addition, they honored their intervention as 'revolution'.

The Colonels' coup d'état on April 21, 1967 led "an authoritarian no-party system of government in Greece which resisted internal and external pressures for a change toward a multiparty system" (Xydis, 1974, p. 507). After the intervention, "Papadopoulos pronounced the Greek nation 'diseased' and in need of a 'plaster cast'" (Pedaliu, 2007, p. 188).

A Greece 'in plaster-cast' meant that Greeks had to live under a regime that derived its power from naked repression and those who resisted or were suspected of resistance to the "revolution", or even gathered together in numbers exceeding five persons, or grew their hair long or listened to proscribed music, or ate Russian caviar or even read Aeschylus, Sophocles, Mark Twain or Shakespeare, were subjected to show trials, incarceration, widespread torture and banishment to concentration camps in arid and scorpion infested islands (Pedaliu, 2007, p. 188).

The Colonels' dictatorship was led by a rightist secret organization, EENA (National Union of Young Officers), under the leadership of Papadopoulos who was in cooperation with KYP (Greek Central Intelligence Agency), composed of rightist army officers (Coulombis, 2004, p. 308). Under the leadership of Papadopoulos, this military coup d'état was transformed into a military dictatorship which was established against all political parties from right to left. The symbol of his dictatorship was a phoenix with a soldier's shadow in front of it. "Including Papadopoulos, the leading members of the junta were mostly officers from lower-class backgrounds who had achieved career advancement through the armed forces" (Gallant, 2001, p. 197). The difference of the 1967 junta regime from Pangalos' and Metaxas' dictatorships was that this coup was staged by ratings, while the latter had been staged by high-ranking military officers. Thus, in the first years of the junta, ratings pushed the high-ranking military officers to retire. As a result, "over 2,700 army officers were retired by April 1972" (Close, 2002, p. 115).

Because King Constantine II attempted a counter-coup against the Colonels' dictatorship in December 1967, he was sent into exile. At the time, Papadopoulos had extended his power by simultaneously becoming the King, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Education, and Government Policy. The Junta took "the armed forces, police, civil service, judiciary, universities, schools, the Church, as well as local authorities, the trade unions and agricultural cooperatives" (Close, 2002, p. 115) under direct or indirect control. Moreover, Papadopoulos introduced martial law, banned and suspended political parties, trade unions, newspapers and ancient works, arrested all communists, "condemned long hair on boys and mini-skirts on girls" (Woodhouse, 1991, p. 290), ordered "church parades on Sundays and flag- raising ceremonies each morning; while forbidding mixed-sex social events" (Close, 2002, p. 117). Thus, the junta regime and Papadopoulos personally became all-powerful. "Owing to the fact that the society was put under restraint by the Junta, political discussions in public – or for that matter over the phone or by mail – were generally regarded as risky" (Close, 2002, p. 115). However, "[t]he extent of opposition to the regime was firstly manifested by the attendance of several hundred thousand people at Georgios Papandreou's funeral in November 1968" (Close, 2002, p. 119), which was transformed into a demonstration for democracy.

Like in other countries of the world, mass student demonstrations emerged in the end of the 1960s as a resistance to the Junta. "In September 1969 one student [K]osta[s] Yorgakis, committed suicide in public in Genoa by setting fire to himself" (Close, 2002, p. 122). Because this irritated the Colonels, they started to toughen restrictions. In response, students occupied the Law Faculty of the University of Athens in March 1973. "They held protests, boycotted classes and in other ways disrupted the higher education system" (Gallant, 2001, p. 202). Papadopoulos therefore declared the 'coup from above' on June 1, which gave the signal to a presidential parliamentary republic of Greece whose symbol became only the phoenix (Xydis, 1974, p. 509). Moreover, on July 29 a new constitution was accepted by another plebiscite and a puppet civilian cabinet was set up on October 29 by Spyros Markezinis until the elections were held one year later. However, it did not last long because students revolted and organized a sit-in at the Athens Polytechnic in November. In response, Brigadier-General Dimitris Ioannidis, the head of the Military Security Police (ESA), made a coup d'état on November 25, 1973, which led to an armed conflict between students and police troops. The result was thousands of arrested, wounded and even dead people. "Now, President Papadopoulos was replaced by another military man, enjoying more limited powers" (Xydis, 1974, p. 509). This time the shadow of a soldier was reinstated in the front of the phoenix as the symbol of the Greek military junta. However, it was not difficult to predict at the time that the end of the dictatorship came closer.

In the international arena, Greece had been gradually weakened during the post-Second World War era. After the Great Depression in 1929, the world went into a huge crisis in October 1973 when OPEC announced an increase in the oil price because the USA gave military support to Israel during the Yom Kippur war between the Israeli and Arab people. All NATO members were first affected by this oil crisis and their economies deteriorated. Greece, a NATO member since 1952, was also affected by this worldwide economic crisis. Coupled with high inflation in the country, the Greek economy came to the brink of demise. Moreover, the Junta spent most state money on the construction sector, which led to foreign debt. Since the EEC suspended development loans due to the dictatorship, Greece started to suffer from money shortage.

The ongoing conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots furthermore reached its peak in 1974. Therefore, Brigadier Ioannidis sent Greek army to Cyprus in order to provide stability, despite the reluctance of Greek Cypriot President Makarios. Then, Makarios wanted Brigadier Ioannidis to remove the Greek army officers from Cyprus and "protested that the junta was trying to destroy the state of Cyprus, [but] Brigadier Ioannidis' mindless response was to launch a coup against the president, who was forced to flee the island" (Clogg, 1992, p. 168). In response to the Greek coup, Turkey intervened in Cyprus on July 20, 1974 for three days and the two countries came to the brink of war. However, this catastrophic event caused the end of the seven-years-long military dictatorship which also ended the Kingdom of Greece. Then, Turkey intervened in the island on August 14 for the second time and seized 40 percent of the island.

On July 24, 1974, the day after the end of Turkish intervention, the military government was abolished in Greece. Konstantinos Karamanlis was invited from his exile in Paris to be the head of the civilian coalition government of the Third Hellenic Republic (Woodhouse, 1985, pp. 157-166).

7. The EEC's Reaction to the Greek Dictatorship

The associate relationship between Greece and the European Economic Community started with the signature of the Athens Agreement. However, it did not last long. On April 21, 1967, six years after the Agreement had come into effect, three colonels made a coup d'état and briefly established a dictatorship. This interruption of democracy suspended the ongoing relationship. The EEC pressured Greece to restore democracy or it would limit the tariff reductions that were promised in the Association Agreement.

During the military dictatorship in Greece, the relations between the country and the EEC were frozen. The EEC indeed limited the tariff reductions and financial aid until the junta government ceased to exist.

The Greek Colonels' coup changed the attitudes of the EEC member countries which had seen ancient Greece as the cradle of democracy. At the time, the Community had only six members - West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) countries - which cooperated in the non-recognition of the Greek Colonels' junta regime. On May 8, 1967, the European Parliament initiated a debate to evaluate the military intervention in Greek politics. Three days later, the Parliament arrived at a decision about the situation in Greece (JOCE, 1967):

The Parliament expressed its concern over the suspension of democratic life in Greece; declared its solidarity with the Greek people; stated that the association could not be applied in its various facets unless the democratic institutions and civil liberties were restored in Greece; considered that the suppression of the Greek Parliament made impossible the functioning of the mixed Parliamentary Association Commission and estimated that until this Commission could function again the practical application of the association agreement would be delayed; expressed hope that Greece would soon return to normal democratic life; underlined the prime need that Greece respect the European Covenant of Human Rights; demanded that the civil rights of political prisoners be restored, and charged the appropriate organs of the EEC to follow all developments in Greece and inform the Parliament of all developments (Coufoudakis, 1977, p. 117).

According to this early decision of the European Parliament, the EEC was against the junta in Greece early on. One year later, West Germany's Bundestag decided on April 2, 1968 "to grant no further governmental credits to Greece until parliamentary democracy had been restored" (Xydis, 1974, p. 517).

The European Parliament adopted a resolution on May 7, 1969, in which it "reserved its right to have the association agreement revised or suspended" (Xydis, 1974, p. 519). Furthermore, at the time of the second anniversary of the Colonels' coup, the EEC condemned on May 28, 1969 with another resolution the interruption of Greek democracy and the martial law in force. The second article of the resolution stated that unless democratic and parliamentary structures were established, the Association Agreement would not be implemented, and that under these circumstances, future membership would become unrealizable (JOCE, 1969, p. 16). Thus, the EEC froze the association relations with Greece.

In fact, the EEC had not established written rules for freezing the association with a country. Because

the Community experienced a military intervention in politics of one of its associate states for the first time since its foundation, it used Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, the Birkelbach report, and the Italian memorandum (Coufoudakis, 1977, pp. 120-121). According to these documents, associate countries also had to fulfill the political criterion of the Community, namely adherence to parliamentary democracy. That is to say, if a country did not have a democratically elected parliament, it could not be an associate or a member state. Thus, the European Parliament of the EEC decided to suspend the Athens Agreement. The EEC stated that the EEC-Greece Joint Parliamentary Committee could no longer work with members of the junta for further development. Consequently, the Community stopped giving financial aid to Greece and discussing agricultural policies of the country.

After the freezing of the relations with the EEC, the Greek junta rapidly felt isolated in the international arena. Greek Colonels reacted to the decision of the EEC by claiming that the Community tried to stop financial assistance to Greece, which was only beneficial for the country but not for the Community, during the five-year association period. After a while, "Greek officials admitted that Greece could not win such a challenge, while the domestic political consequences of such an action could potentially be serious" (Coufoudakis, 1977, p. 126). Despite the fact that the Greek Colonels decided to withdraw from membership in the Council of Europe on December 12, 1969, just before the eleven members of the CoE suggested excluding Greece from membership due to human rights violations, they insisted on maintaining the associate membership in the EEC.

The combined pressure of the EEC, the Council of Europe, the ILO (International Labour Organization), and to a lesser extent of the NATO and the UN, as well as "the complete diplomatic isolation from individual Western democratic European states, reinforced the Greek public's passive resistance to the junta" (Coufoudakis, 1977, p. 131). The Colonels' junta regime in Greece ended in July 1974 after the crisis in Cyprus. Elections were held and a government was established by elected civilian politicians. Karamanlis became the new Prime Minister of the Third Hellenic Republic and re-applied for EEC membership in 1975. At the time, the relationship between the EEC and Greece had been reconstituted, which resulted in EEC membership of the country on the first day of 1981.

8. Comparison of the European Communities' Reactions to Turkish and Greek Coups d'État

On May 27, 1960, Turkish colonels made a coup and ruled the country until 1961. This interruption of democracy led to a delay of the Turkish association with the EEC. Even though relations between the Community and Turkey were strained during the military government, the EEC entered into the relationship with Turkey by signing the Ankara Agreement in 1963 after the government was left to civilians. Moreover, Turkey signed an Additional Protocol in 1970 with the Community. Although another coup d'état was made on March 12, 1971 by Turkish generals who continued to govern the country until 1973, the EEC did not suspend the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

In turn, Greece had initiated a relationship with the EEC by signing the Athens Agreement in 1961. However, the Greek Colonels made a coup d'état on April 21, 1967 and constituted a dictatorship. At first, just as in the Turkish case, the EEC applied a wait-and-see policy. However, at the time of the second anniversary of the Greek military junta, the EEC declared the freezing of relations with Greece

and suspended the implementation of the Association Agreement. Moreover, it stopped giving financial assistance and limited tariffs due to the continuation of the dictatorship. Consequently, the country had to make efforts to re-constitute the relationship with the Community after the end of the junta regime in 1974.

Besides, Turkey and Greece had become members of the CoE in 1949. The Council was founded in order to safeguard human rights and freedoms on the European continent. Hence, the European Convention on Human Rights was formed within the CoE in 1950 and Turkey and Greece became parties of it. While in the Turkish case, the CoE did not react strongly to the 1960 coup, it suspended the membership of Greece after the 1967 coup and condemned human rights violations in the country.

To sum up, the EEC and the CoE responded more severely to the Greek military dictatorship than to the Turkish coup in 1960. In my opinion, the EEC and the CoE did not suspend the relationship with Turkey because of the short-lived quality of the military governments in contrast to the seven- years- long junta of the Greek Colonels. Both European institutions froze their relations with Greece until the long-lived junta regime was replaced by a civilian government.

9. Conclusion

Because of the historical legacy of military dominance in politics stemming from Ottoman rule, the Turkish and Greek nation-states were established by the generals of their armies.

In the Turkish case, after every coup d'état, new constitutions reinforced the power of the Turkish military. Thus, the dominant role of the military in politics gradually increased. Ironically, the modernization movement in the Ottoman Empire had started with modernizing the army. However, the powerful military under the leadership of the NSC, strengthened after every military intervention, gradually became the cause for breaks to democracy. This led to reactions of the EEC/EU, to which the military replied with an anti-EU attitude.

As a result, the military, which was seen as a modernization instrument that aimed at greater closeness to the West during Ottoman times and early years of the Turkish Republic, now distances the country from the West. Unless its powerful role in politics is overcome, the West seems unlikely to include Turkey into the European Union.

In the Greek case, when the Greek Colonels made a coup d'état on April 21, 1967, their leader Papadopoulos did not intend to leave the government for a long time. Thus, he established his military junta, which continued for seven years. This Colonels' dictatorship caused the suspension of the relations with the EEC. The Community withheld the implementation of the Association Agreement and stopped giving financial aid to the country. The CoE also suspended the membership of Greece because of human rights violations occurring under the Colonels' dictatorship.

A turning point in Greek history occurred when the Greek junta made a coup d'état against the Greek Cypriot government. The Turkish government responded to this intervention with a military operation in July 1974. After the Greek defeat in Cyprus, the dictatorship in Greece ended. The Third Hellenic Republic was established with the aim of consolidating democracy. The first task of the civilian

government was to eliminate the military from politics in order to establish a strong democracy and to become a member of the EEC. After several amendments to the laws on the role of army officers, Greece applied for membership in the EEC in 1975. Then, the relationship between the country and the EEC was reconstituted. After a period of negotiations, Greece became the tenth member of the EEC on January 1, 1981. From then on, Greece has been benefiting from its EEC/EU membership in terms of financial assistance, while the country in turn has improved its political system.

After analysing the military interventions in Turkey and Greece and the EEC/EU's reactions to them, it seems that the Community reacted to the Turkish coup of 1960 more positively than to the Greek military dictatorship of 1967. Because Greek membership in 1981 coincided with the Turkish coup of 1980, the strained relations between Turkey and Greece led to more difficult relations between Turkey and the EEC: Greece used its veto power several times against the candidacy of Turkey. Even though Turkey-EU relations have been improving since 1999, Turkey should still fulfill the requirements for EU membership.

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