

American-Turkish Relations in the Aftermath of the WWII: The Beginning of American Hegemony Over Turkey

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ABSTRACT

This article aimed to examine the post-WWII era's international environment and the US's changing attitude towards Turkey in light of Morgenthau's political realist perspective. The US was not eager to have close relations with Turkey during the very early post-war period as it also embraced an isolationist foreign policy. Interestingly enough, the US had a close relationship with the USSR during and after WWII. More specifically, the close relationship between the USSR and the US continued until the US perceived the USSR as more of a foe, a threat to its national interest rather than a difficult friend. After the US realized the Soviet threat to its national interest, it started to have close relations and a partnership with Turkey. Although the US acted with the moral thesis of "democracy advocacy" to legitimize its close ties with Turkey, the relations that had been established in reality emerged with the concern of maximizing the US's national interests. This situation was explained and exemplified by showing the course of the emerging ties. The study concluded that the Turkey-US "strategic partnership", claimed to serve the interests of both states, is actually shaped around the US's national interests.

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Introduction

As a result of the Second World War (WWII), all parts of the world suffered from mass destruction. Europe was devastated, China was in a civil war, and Latin America was in a fight against poverty and authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, the United States (US) was politically stable and secure and economically the most powerful in the world in the aftermath of WWII. In 1945, the world system of the post-war period was not clear yet. However, it was clear that the United States was about to emerge as an important actor in the new world order. There were peaceful relations and cooperation between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the early post-war period. This cooperation that operated during the war and the early post-war period started to collapse at the beginning of 1947. Afterwards, there was a widespread idea in the eyes of the American society that the US was under the threat of the USSR and its Communist ideology. Therefore, the rapidly changing attitude of the American society led to a change of perception and attitude towards the Soviet Union, from positive to negative (Nordlinger, 1995, pp. 49-62).

In the meantime, on February 21, 1947, Britain, which was in a nationwide economic crisis, has informed the US in a note that it would no longer be able to provide military and financial aid to Turkey and Greece and that it would withdraw the military units deployed in Greece (US National Archives and Records Administration, 1947). As a result, the US began to support Turkey after Britain declared that it was unable to help with Turkey's moving forward against the expansionist foreign

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policy of the Soviet Union. The United States decided to implement a containment policy towards the Soviet Union because of the uncompromising attitude of the USSR as follows: not withdrawing from Iran and Poland, its demands on Straits (İstanbul and the Dardanelles), debarring free elections in Eastern Europe. The central target of the policy was to challenge communism. The US perception of Turkey had changed. The United States understood that Turkey was strategically essential for its containment policy and to block a possible attempt by the USSR to set foot on Middle Eastern oils. Under these circumstances, the US declared the Truman Doctrine, which can be accepted as the starting point of the Cold War. As the doctrine argued, the United States was helping Greece and Turkey militarily for both taking them to the Western block and making their militaries stronger as the outpost states of the Western block.

Although a few studies address the history of Turkish-American Relations, they focus on a wide period instead of concentrating on early Turkish-American Relations (Yılmaz, 2015). On the other hand, some studies discuss Turkish-American ties from the post-WWII period to current issues, but these studies try to explain the turning points of the relations (Güvenç & Ozel, 2020). Moreover, there are some studies specifically interested in the role of Turkey for the Truman Doctrine, yet they draw a historical map to understand how the relations started, instead of discussing the relations according to realist perspective (Satterthwaite, 1972). Even though there are some discussions on the American aids in the post-WWII period, these studies not only focus on Turkish-American Relations but also concentrate on American aid policy as a whole (Lüth, 2012).

Alternatively, this article has evaluated the purposes of the Truman Doctrine and the environment in the early aftermath of WWII under the theory of Morgenthau's six principles of political realism. The research fills the gap on the realist theory to explain the "strategic partnership" between the US and Turkey in the literature. Doing that also shows how the US managed to maximize its national interest and make Turkey dependent on the US. This study includes three parts and a conclusion. In the first part, Morgenthau's theory, six principles of realism are laid out extensively and a comprehensive table. (Table 1) In the second part, the international environment in the aftermath of WWII is reviewed to demonstrate how Turkish-American Relations developed gradually. In the third part, the article discusses the causes of the US attitude change towards Turkey in light of Morgenthau's six principles of realism in particular.

Morgenthau's Six Principles of Realism

Morgenthau has been one of the most famous symbols of realism in international relations literature. He is known as a successor to Thucydides and Machiavelli since he used and improved their ideas. More specifically, Morgenthau's understanding of putting power and interest on the basis of politics was inherited from Machiavelli and Thucydides. Moreover, Morgenthau is the person who made realism a modern discipline with definite borders. In his study entitled *Politics Among Nations the Struggle for Power and Peace* (1978), he classified the main principles of political realism into six categories.

Firstly, he claimed that according to political realism, politicians have to consider the social laws of their influence. Of course, a politician may have opinions different from the society in which he/she resides. But he/she must be extremely careful when putting them into practice. He/she should consider the necessities of his political environment. In other words, a politician who seeks to change society must first understand its standards of judgment. Secondly, a politician must put the interest of the society he/she leads at the top of his/her hierarchy of needs. In international relations, political realism appears as interest, which is also described as power. Interest is about relations between the reasons of actions and the realities of the international conjuncture. According to Morgenthau, politics has a separate set of actions, as does economy, ethics or religion.

Table 1. Morgenthau's Six Principles of Political Realism (Morgenthau, 1978).

Principle	Adoption in this article
1. "Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure."	In order to understand how Truman legitimized his aid plan to Turkey and Greece in the eyes of his society. He manipulated American society by using their sensibility to security.
2. "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion."	In an attempt to realize why the US' attitude towards Turkey changed positively when it understood the Soviet threat.
3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest, defined as power, is an objective category that is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.	It is not about explaining the relations between political actors; it is about explaining political realism. Therefore, it is not used to explain Turkish-American relations in the aftermath of WWII.
4. "Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the ineluctable tension between moral command and the requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the political issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were morally more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than it actually is."	The road map is to consider how the US covered its hegemonic power on Turkey with moral values like creating a "democratic bloc".
5. "Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All nations are tempted-and few have been able to resist the temptation for long-to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe."	It is a must to show how the US defended its interest in the United Nations by using a moral based discourse instead of an interest-based one.
6. "Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles. The economist asks: "How does this policy affect the wealth of society or a segment of it?" The lawyer asks: "Is this policy in accord with the rules of law?" The moralist asks: "Is this policy in accord with moral principles?" And the political realist asks: "How does this policy affect politics and the political institutions?"	Significant to understand the absurdity of moral values in the anarchical international system. Authorities of the state only think to maximize the interest of their states. Therefore, they know that surviving in the international system requires enough qualifications.

Thirdly, considering political reality does not mean changing it. When a politician considers his/her personal opinions, he/she should create harmony between his opinions and the existing

political reality. The most influential tool that can be utilized by him/her is the power of changing the political reality. Interest and power are the core of politics, and the existing conditions of the time and place do not change this situation. In other words, interests may change, but interest-based politics does not. Fourthly, for politicians, morality means the security of the society they are governing, unlike other people. For them, the safety of society is the highest moral value. Therefore, they are able to understand the conflict between moral values and successful decisions in politics.

Fifthly, Morgenthau argues that political realism ignores universal morality. Yet, universal moral norms for all nations are a tool to legitimize their interests. In other words, political realism knows that national interests are more valuable than universal morality due to the anarchical character of the international system. Lastly, according to political realists, the political arena should be considered as an independent field since this field also requires unique virtues like law and economy. The *sine qua non* of this independent field can be described as power and interest.

The International Environment in the aftermath of the WWII

The US and the USSR were the absolute winners of WWII when European powers were destroyed. The result was a massive gap between these powers and the Europeans. Japan was very close to losing in the Far East, and Britain, which had several colonies, was relatively weakened. Therefore, the US became the hegemonic power in this region as well. In the Far East, the United States had an alliance with China and tried to maintain it.

From the German-Soviet war to Yalta Conference, there was considerable trust in the Anglo-American public opinion towards the USSR. The Red Army was referred to as a hero and a honorable army, and even Stalin was described as Uncle Joe. The reason behind this perception in American society was the legendary defense of the Soviet army against the Nazis. Moreover, the people in the US believed that if the USSR was not involved in the war, the United States could have been in the list of the defeated states. Therefore, it would not have been possible to establish a new world order without the USSR. At that time, there was confidence between the allied powers, the USSR and the US (Feifer, 1999). The expectation of "good relations" between the United States and the Soviet Union was an example of the idealist nature of American foreign policy that saw war as an interruption of the interstate accord. The United States thought that as soon as the war ended, the challenge to obtain power would also end (Hook & Spainer, 2014, pp. 25-26).

There is an accepted view that Turkey and the US have a long-lived alliance. Senior officials of both states have emphasized the common interests of Turkey and the United States since the end of WWII (Kuniholm, 1991). The breaking point of the relations was the expansionist foreign policy implications of the USSR in the post-WWII era. Great powers asked to see Turkey as a part of their alliances during WWII. However, Turkey successfully achieved to avoid entering the war thanks to the policies based on balance followed by its President at the time. As Turkey avoided the destruction of war, it later paid by being excluded from the international system in the aftermath of the war. At that time, the most severe threat for Turkey and the US was the changing foreign policy of the USSR, which implemented a passive foreign policy from the revolution to WWII and pursued an expansionist foreign policy with WWII. The expansionist foreign policy of the USSR included Turkey's territories too. In 1945, the USSR sent a diplomatic note to Turkey and demanded a military base on the Straits. It also had some territorial demands in the eastern region of Turkey, including the cities of Kars and Ardahan. These demands were vocalized in the Yalta Conference. Turkey asked to be supported by Britain, but Britain suffered from mass destruction because of the war. In that conjuncture, Britain was unable to help Turkey. Consequently, Turkey tried to get the support of the US which had become the strongest state of the world after WWII. However, the US had not yet understood the Soviet threat.

Although Britain was unable to help Turkey militarily, it promised to support Turkey against the Soviet threat diplomatically (Satterthwaite, 1972, p. 78). Britain also promised to include the issue in the agenda of the Potsdam Conference. In the conference, the USSR maintained its demands. Britain also asked for a change regarding the status of the Straits but also endorsed the territorial integrity of Turkey. The US believed that the problem must be solved between the USSR and Turkey. Although the US and the USSR agreed on changing the Montreux Convention at the conference, the attitude of the US against the USSR changed. After the Potsdam Conference, there were several turning points for the US in an attempt to comprehend the Soviet threat. Firstly, the USSR and Britain had invaded Iran in WWII. Both countries promised to call their military powers back in 6 months after the war. However, the USSR did not call its troops back. In fact, the USSR started to increase the number of soldiers in Iran. Secondly, in the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union guaranteed to withdraw from Poland, but it did not. Moreover, it aspired to create a communist alliance in the region. Stalin also promised not to intervene in the free elections in Eastern Europe, though he acted in accordance with his belief that if a state controls a region, it imposes its regime on the region as well (Lefebvre, 2005, p. 35).

This belief overlaps with the sixth principle of the Morgenthau, which emphasizes the absurdity of moral and intellectual values in the political arena (Art & Jervis, 2014, p. 13). From this point of view, this was understandable in terms of the international system, which has an anarchic character. There is a constant conflict between states, and due to this conflict, states cannot trust one another. Therefore, states tried to protect themselves and increase their power in the system just like what the USSR did in Eastern Europe. The US consistently asked to hold free elections in Eastern Europe to create a bloc against the USSR and throw them out from Europe (Hook & Spainer, 2014, pp. 31-32).

The National Liberation Front (EAM), a communist organization, boycotted the elections in March 1946 held in Greece after the war, and the right-wing party won and came to power. After that, the supporters of the monarchy won the referendum on the King's return to the country, and as a consequence, an uprising broke out in the northern region of Greece under the leadership of a communist leader named General Markos. When the leader of Yugoslavia, Tito, sent a force called the National Liberation Front to Markos and helped Albania and Bulgaria, Greece was dragged into civil war. After these actions, the US realized the communist bloc threat, led by the USSR. In other words, the US found out that the USSR posed a fervent threat to its national interests in the region as well. As a result, the US changed its attitude towards the Straits international waters because of the Soviet threat and began supporting Turkish territorial integrity. For example, Turkey, which is in a region where Russian military, economic and political influence could flow to the Middle East, was described as the "stopper on the bottle" in a 1946 study by the American Bureau of Near East and Africa Affairs (Hurrewitz, 1953, p. 92).

The Changing Attitude of the United States towards Turkey: Maximizing Its National Interests

Towards the end of 1945, the attitude of the US on the regime of the Straits changed to the side of Turkey. The reason for the change in the attitude of the US was self-interest. According to Potsdam Conference decisions, the US gave a diplomatic note to Turkey on November 2, 1945. On this note, while the US asked the provisions of the Montreux Convention to be revised in accordance with the conditions of the period, it suggested convening a conference. In this note, the US abandoned the idea of granting the Straits an international status and free passage and defended that the Straits to be under the control of Turkey (The New York Times, 1945). As mentioned in Morgenthau's second principle stated above, the reality has changed in the international arena, and the US's attitude has changed 180 degrees accordingly. In other words, to the extent that the US realized that the USSR's

actions threatened its national interests, it moved away from the Soviet theses and approached Turkey's theses. On August 7, 1946, the Soviets listed their demands from Turkey in five principles:

- (1) The Straits should always be open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.
- (2) The Straits should always be open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers.
- (3) Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea Powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.
- (4) The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.
- (5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946)

After these developments, on August 15, US officials held a meeting and stated that the main aim of the Soviets was to obtain control of Turkey. According to the official, if the USSR obtained control of Turkey, it would be impossible to prevent the Soviet army from controlling Greece, the Near, and the Middle East. US officials believed that if the USSR took control of Greece, the Near, and the Middle East, those regions' connections with Western Block would be cut off. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, pp. 840-841). Therefore, as Truman said, the US could lose its authority in the United Nations:

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved. One aspect of the present situation, which I present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation (...) The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. (Truman, 1947)

It is possible to see Morgenthau's two different principles in this speech. First of all, the American people's level of security anxiety is extremely high. As noted above, security concerns were behind the positive view of the American people towards the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Thus, Truman underlined that the security of Turkey and Greece was a must not only for them but also for the USA. He claimed that there was a symbiosis between the security of these countries and the security of the USA. In this case, it can be said that he was able to understand the American people's main concern and tried to direct it to the new threat, as Morgenthau argued in his second principle.

Secondly, his emphasis on the status of the United Nations is remarkable. Three of the permanent members of the United Nations were in Western block. Therefore, the US asked to maintain the status quo to legitimize its policies by using the moral high ground as underlined by Morgenthau in his fifth principle. If the control of Turkey, Greece, the Middle, and the Near East were to be obtained by the USSR, the US could lose its hegemonic power in the United Nations.

As a result, the US gave a diplomatic note to the USSR on August 19, 1946. In this note, the US objected to the fourth and fifth demands of the USSR, concerned by the possibility of losing its connection with Turkey, Greece, the Near and the Middle East, as explained above. Turkey also gave a similar response to the USSR on August 22, upon the reconciliation of the UK and the US to reject these two articles. After this period of collateral diplomatic notes, the USSR gave up on insisting on its demands regarding the regime of the Straits. Although Turkey's sovereignty and freedom were violated in the previous threats by the Soviet Union, the US did not stand by Turkey since it did not feel a threat posed to itself. However, after the USSR began to threaten the US's interests, it assumed

the role of defender of freedom, democracy and sovereignty rights and provided moral legitimacy for its actions to protect its interests, as Morgenthau argued.

Turkey suffered from two main problems in the post-war period. One of them was the decreasing prices of food items and raw materials after the war. The other was that Turkey could not discharge its army because of the Soviet threat. Obviously, this was very costly for Turkey. Turkey also reserved 245-million-dollar into its central bank due to the risk of a possible war with the Soviet Union. Turkey asked to get 300-million-dollar credit from the US at the end of 1945, but it was rejected by the US at this time.

Similarly, Britain declared that they were unable to continue helping Turkey and Greece. At the beginning of 1946, diplomat George Kennan sent a long-written telegraph and explained the main purposes of the USSR's foreign policy. He believed that the foreign policy of the USSR included the effects of both: its revolutionist ideology and tsardom past. He suggested that the foreign policy of the USSR could be stopped only by implementing a counterforce (Lefebvre, 2005, p. 36). Truman thought that if other states got financial help from the USSR, they could behave as if they were an actor within the Soviet bloc. Therefore, the US could lose its authority in the Middle East and suffer from a major economic loss. President Truman tried to persuade the US Congress, and he did. He underlined that helping Turkey and Greece is vital to maintaining the stability of the Middle East. After the Truman Doctrine was enacted as law, The US Congress allocated 400-Million-Dollar for Greece and 100-Million-Dollar for Turkey. The US decided to block and get rid of the threat of the USSR in the region (Güler, 2004, p. 216). Truman gave his well-known speech in the US Congress, attempting to convince the members of Congress:

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace, and hence the security of the United States. (Truman, 1947)

In the speech, Soviet expansionism was constantly mentioned, and it was emphasized that Turkey, Greece, and Iran should be prevented from suffering the fate of Eastern Europe. It was the declaration of the containment policy of the US towards the USSR. Therefore, the doctrine was the first step of the long-standing Cold War and creating eastern and western blocs. It meant that a bipolar world had started with the declaration of the doctrine, caused by the ineffectiveness of international organizations and the destruction of Europe, as Morgenthau noted in his Sixth Principle of Realism (Art & Jervis, 2014, p. 13). Truman underscored that American security and freedom depended on Turkish and Greek freedom. Therefore, the US must help these states prosper (Evered, 2010, p. 51). Thus, it is possible to say that this help was not an ideal one but a pragmatic one.

The foreign policies of both Turkey and the US were directed by their presidents in the aftermath of WWII. Turkey had some advisors with leftist tendencies close to its presidents until the USSR threat emerged. Some isolationists of the US were doubtful about Turkey until they understood the need for Turkey in the region as an ally. The Truman Doctrine ended all these discussions and doubts and was a turning point in Turkish-American Relations, as George Harris underlined (Harris, Turkish-American Relations Since the Truman Doctrine, 2004, pp. 66-69). The US tried to increase the capabilities and the capacity of the Turkish army with the Truman Doctrine as a precaution against a possible war with the USSR. The USA military advisers believed that Turkey would have an important role in offensive action against the USSR in the Middle East (Leffler, 1985, pp. 816-817). Therefore, it should be pointed out that the doctrine mainly focused on military issues of Turkey and Greece because of the increasing Soviet threat.

The USSR made an effort to create a communist bloc. The US thought that the Soviet Bloc had gained power because of the destructive impact of WWII. Namely, the US needed to help European states rebuild their economies and maintain them within the Western bloc. The US thought that if they helped European states, they would act in alliance with the American bloc instead of the Soviet bloc. Therefore, Marshall – the US Secretary of the State at the time – declared that European states should come together to determine the needs of Europe. As a result, a conference was organized in Paris. Turkey was not included in the economic plan at the end of the conference. Thus, Turkey applied to the US directly to be included in the plan. The US accepted the application in accordance with their national interests because they could not risk losing Turkey. It shows that the subsidies started to be continuous. The projects were leading up to the containment policy of the US towards the USSR. The policy can be summarized as helping the states under threat of the USSR militarily and the states that suffered from civil wars because of the interference in their internal affairs by the USSR. Truman Doctrine was the starting point of this policy (Kissinger, 1994).

The military aspects of the relations played a key role at first; however, eventually, Turkey emerged as an actor that could demonstrate western values to the Middle Eastern states (Harris, 2004, p. 68). The United States tried to increase the capabilities of the Turkish army with the Truman Doctrine because of a possible threat of war with the Soviet Union. The United States military advisers believed that Turkey would have an important role in an offensive action of the USSR in the Middle East (Leffler, 1985, pp. 816-817). In the meantime, it was well-received by the CHP-led Turkish government in the initial stages of the doctrine. The majority of the press also welcomed it. Subsidies were well-received by the government because of several reasons. First of all, it meant that Turkey's solitude which occurred after WWII would end. Secondly, the United States was the largest power in the world, so becoming an ally of the United States would help fight against the Soviet threat. In addition, Turkey experienced the first non-single party election or first democratic election. Results of the election showed that the CHP started to lose its prestige in society. The CHP government tried to be ready for a possible war during WWII, so they invested in the military rather than providing better services. It led to poverty in the majority of society. Subsidies were a chance to rebuild the relations with the society for CHP and recover its dwindling prestige. Turkish officers announced the subsidies with idealist and unrealistic notions. For example, the bureaucrats who determined Turkish Defense Policies portrayed the subsidies as 'complimentary goodness'.

The reality, however, was that Turkey became economically dependent on the US. Of course, it was a long-term plan, but the starting point was the post-WWII period. The high-cost expenditures made by Turkey, which could not deploy its military units due to Soviet threats, continued after the war as well. In addition, the activities of the Soviets on Turkey, Greece, Iran, and China made the US concerned, so the US decided to support Turkey not only diplomatically but also militarily and economically. After WWII, Turkey lost its ability to pay its loans, which were taken under the Lend and Lease Act. On April 5, 1946, the US Ambassador stated that if Turkey paid 4.5 million dollars, all its debts would be erased. Afterwards, an agreement was signed on May 7, and as a result of Turkey's payment, its debts were erased (Ülman, 1961, p. 91).

Turkey's efforts to seek US support to get rid of the solitude that emerged due to the balance policy implemented during the Second World War yielded results. As a part of the West, that is, of the anti-communist bloc, Turkey became a member of the IMF and the World Bank in 1947. Therefore, it can be stated that Turkey had made concessions from its economic independence for its political independence because the US aid that Turkey received in the military field made it dependent on the US in terms of spare parts and material integrity. As a matter of fact, Turkey allocated a cost-share of 143 million dollars from its budget for every 100 million dollars of aid it received. According to Okyar, this is why Turkey had to spend the reserves it had accumulated during the Second World War (Okyar, 1952, p. 341). Therefore, it is possible that the US made Turkey

economically and militarily dependent on itself under the “aid” cover as Morgenthau claimed in his fourth principle. As he argued, states try to maximize their power by using some moral claims in order to be the hegemonic power in the anarchical international system.

Of course, it could not be expected that these military aids given to Turkey would be used in matters that the US objected to. Therefore, in the military aid agreement dated July 12, 1947, the US stipulated that the aid given to Turkey cannot be used for purposes “other than the purposes for which it was given” (Arcayürek, 1987, p. 333). As a result, the US prevented Turkey, which was trying to protect the Turkish population in Cyprus from Greek massacres in the 1960s, by reminding them of this agreement. In addition, the US determined that, with the economic aid it provided, Turkey should address the issues that are of concern to Turkey’s own sovereignty. More clearly, the US imposed conditions on Turkey, such as an emphasis on chromium mining, increasing agricultural production and capacity, and modernizing agricultural tools in the process that started with Marshall aid. To sum up, the role that the US assigned Turkey within the global division of labor was one that would make Turkey meet the agricultural needs of the capitalist bloc instead of developing its industrial and technological production. Therefore, as Morgenthau claimed in his third argument, power is the only tool to change reality and identify concepts.

Conclusion

Actually, states are pragmatic actors, and they serve their national interests and are acting as selfish actors. At the beginning of the crisis between Turkey and the USSR, the United States was unable to recognize the Soviet Union as a threat to its national interests and did not help Turkey. When it understood that USSR was also a serious threat to the United States’ national interest, it decided to help Turkey to protect its own interests in the region, as stated in one of Morgenthau’s principles of political realism. The United States wanted to fill the gap of Britain in the region because the region is geographically close to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union was a definite threat to Turkey. The United States needed to contain the Soviet Union by creating a western bloc. The United States knew that Turkey was a must in order to increase its power in the Middle East. Turkey was a must for the United States because Turkey had a border with the USSR and was in an advantageous position to respond to a possible threat to Middle Eastern oils on time, as Morgenthau explained within his vision of political realism. The United States promoted democracy and was seen as the defender of democracy in the world in a capitalist sense. In addition, although there were many democratic principles to justify the doctrine and to convince Congress in accepting the Truman Doctrine, the United States implemented the doctrine to the two undemocratic states, in the beginning, Turkey and Greece, since the strategic importance of these states had stronger importance than their system of government, an action that is in accordance with Morgenthau’s perspective on political realism. Therefore, the doctrine was not a social responsibility project for the United States, as Turkish bureaucrats claimed. It was the process of mutual interest against the Soviet threat that Turkey needed to increase its military power for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union, and the United States could not risk Middle Eastern oils because of its national interests.

Turkey and the United States had a partnership for a long time in accordance with their national interests; however, the partnership sometimes becomes quite close and occasionally becomes questionable. Turkey was under the pressure of the Soviet Union expansionist foreign policy during and in the aftermath of WWII. Therefore, Turkey tried to get the support of the United States. Turkey was not successful in getting support because the United States and the Soviet Union were in a honeymoon phase at that time. The Soviet Union had some demands on the regime of the Straits and in the eastern parts of Turkey. At first, the United States believed that this was a regional crisis. Thus, it should be addressed by the USSR and Turkey. Then, several turning points occurred, showing that

the USSR was a serious threat to the interests of the United States, such as not the USSR's refusal to call its army back from Iran and instead further increasing the number of its soldiers. After these events, the honeymoon phase transformed into a power struggle between the United States and the USSR. The first step was a new challenge called the Cold War, and the application of the Truman Doctrine shows the importance of Turkey in the containment policy of the United States against the USSR.

On the other hand, this article shows that the US was the certain winner militarily and economically in these long-lived relations. As Morgenthau underlined, the main motivation of the states in the international arena is interest. Therefore, in that kind of game, the big player's income will be higher than the smaller one seen in Turkish-American relations. When Turkey's main motivation was to survive and get rid of the Soviet threat, the US' motivation included both surrounding the USSR and making Turkey dependent on the US. This type of relation, of course, creates a continuous asymmetry in favor of the stronger state, the US, as Morgenthau marked.

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Notes on Contributor

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