

## EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH GREECE\*

Ufuk ALKAN\*\*

**Makale Geliş Tarihi/Received:** 13/09/2021

**Makale Kabul Tarihi/Accepted:** 22/11/2021

**Makale Yayın Tarihi/Published:** 31/12/2021

**Atf için/To cite:** Alkan, U. (2021). Europeanization of Turkey's Relations with Greece. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Çalışmaları Dergisi*, 1(2), 111-129.

**Abstract:** The Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece is significant in that it exemplifies to some extent the way the EU has influenced Turkish Foreign Policy, especially after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. It is also illustrative of the rational instrumentality underlying Turkey's Europeanization. Therefore, it is argued in the article that Turkey has been consistently instrumental in its approach to the Europeanization of its relations with Greece. In this respect, the main research question concerns Turkey's relations with Greece and its impact on EU-Turkey relations. To this end, the Europeanization framework is applied to understand and explain how EU conditionality helps EU member states achieve their national interests. As a matter of fact, what the EU obliges Turkey to fulfil before its accession is decided unanimously by its member states. The member states of the EU have the opportunity to shape the conditions set out by the EU for fulfilment by Turkey through conditionality. Therefore, it is concluded in the article that for the advancement of relations with the EU, Turkey needs to improve relations with member states.

**Keywords:** Europeanization, Turkish-Greek Relations, Turkish Foreign Policy, Aegean Dispute

### TÜRKİYE'NİN YUNANİSTAN İLE İLİŞKİLERİNİN AVRUPALILAŞMASI

**Öz:** Türkiye'nin Yunanistan ile ilişkilerinin Avrupalılaşması, özellikle 1999 Helsinki Avrupa Konseyi'nden sonra, AB'nin Türk Dış Politikası'nı nasıl etkilediğini örneklemesi bakımından önemlidir. Ayrıca, Türkiye'nin Avrupalılaşmasının altında yatan rasyonel araçsallığı da göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, makalede, Türkiye'nin Yunanistan ile ilişkilerinin Avrupalılaşmasında sürekli olarak araçsal bir yaklaşımın etkili olduğu öne sürülmektedir. Bu bağlamda, temel araştırma sorusu Türkiye'nin Yunanistan ile ilişkileri ve bunun AB-Türkiye ilişkilerine etkisi ile ilgilidir. Bu amaçla, makalede, AB koşulluluğunun AB üye ülkelerinin kendi ulusal çıkarlarına ulaşmalarına nasıl yardımcı olduğunu anlamak ve açıklamak için Avrupalılaşma tartışmasına yer verilmektedir. Nitekim AB'nin Türkiye'ye katılımından önce yerine getirmesi gerekenleri üye ülkeler oybirliği ile kararlaştırmaktadır. Katılımdan önce AB tarafından Türkiye'nin yerine getirmesi için belirlenen şartlar, üye ülkeler tarafından oybirliğiyle kararlaştırılmaktadır. AB üye ülkeleri, Türkiye'nin yerine getirmesi için AB tarafından belirlenen koşulları koşulluluk mekanizması kanalıyla belirleyebilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, makalede, AB ile ilişkilerin ilerlemesi için Türkiye'nin üye ülkelerle ilişkileri geliştirmesi gerektiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Avrupalılaşma, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri, Türk Dış Politikası, Ege Sorunu

\* This article is partly based on the author's master's thesis "The Europeanization of Foreign Policy in Turkey: The Case of The Aegean Dispute in Turkey-Greece Relations" (Marmara University, 2013).

\*\* Dr., ufuk.alkan@coleurope.eu

## **Introduction**

Turkey's European Union (EU) accession negotiations have come to a halt, recently. The Europeanization of Turkey has become an obsolete subject. Rather than Europeanization, "de-Europeanization" or even "counter-conduct" have been voiced to define the current state of relations (Cebeci, 2016; Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016). Although the June 2018 General Affairs Council has noted that under present political circumstances there would not be negotiations for accession or modernization of the Customs Union with Turkey, the immediate post-Helsinki period was promising in terms of Turkey's European integration (Council of the EU, 2018: par. 35).

It is true that several domestic and EU level factors account for the current stalemate in EU-Turkey relations (noted below). Also, certain member states have been overly influential regarding EU-Turkey relations by uploading their national interests to EU level. For instance, the Council of the EU decided in December 2006 to suspend accession negotiations on eight chapters of EU *acquis* until Turkey applies the Customs Union equally to all member states, including to Cyprus (Council of the EU, 2006). In addition, Cyprus vetoes negotiations in six chapters of EU *acquis* and France in two chapters<sup>1</sup>. Prior to the start of rapprochement, Turkish-Greek bilateral differences had also hampered EU-Turkey relations. The Turkish-Greek rapprochement started to become Europeanized when Turkey's candidacy was declared at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. This means that it became an issue of the EU when bilateral differences between Turkey and Greece were referred to at the Helsinki European Council. Currently, bilateral differences over the Eastern Mediterranean also escalate the tension. Yet, this article's emphasis is on the pre-Helsinki European Council period. Post-accession negotiations period (namely, the period after 3 October 2005) is assessed briefly with reference to the loss of the EU's credibility in the eyes of Turkey<sup>2</sup>.

The Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece is significant in that it exemplifies to some extent the way the EU has influenced Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP), especially after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. It is also illustrative of the rational instrumentality underlying the Europeanization of TFP. Therefore, it is argued in the article that Turkey has been consistently instrumental in its approach to the Europeanization of its relations with Greece. Turkey has been instrumental in its approach to Europeanization because it expects membership of the EU in return. Socialization of Turkey into the EU's rules and norms is not likely given that Turkey is not in a position to upload its national interests to EU level. It only downloads from EU level. This is mainly because of the fact that Turkey is not represented in the EU's institutions and decision making processes. What the EU obliges Turkey to fulfil before its accession is decided unanimously by its member states. The member states of the EU have the opportunity to shape the conditions set out by the EU for fulfilment by Turkey through conditionality. In other words, they are able to upload their national interests to EU level. Therefore, it is concluded in the article that for the advancement of relations with the EU, Turkey needs to improve relations with member states.

The influence of the EU on TFP gained impetus after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. This is mainly because of the fact that there was a lack of credibility with respect to accession prospects of Turkey, especially after the 1997 Luxembourg European Council at which Turkey's candidacy was not declared. Thus, in the absence of a credible membership perspective, Turkey believed that it had virtually insignificant incentives for Europeanization.

---

<sup>1</sup> On the Cyprus issue and current developments, please see: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cyprus, (<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-cyprus-issue-overview.en.mfa>).

<sup>2</sup> On Turkey-Greece relations, please see: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Relations between Turkey and Greece (<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-greece.en.mfa>). On the Aegean dispute, please see: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Background Note on Aegean Dispute (<https://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-dispute.en.mfa>).

The policy of Greece to use the EU as a leverage against Turkey, *inter alia*, accounts to some extent for the EU's decision not to declare Turkey's candidacy at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council. Actually, accession of Greece to the EU in 1981 provided it with the opportunity to use the latter as a weighty leverage against Turkey<sup>3</sup> (Tsakaloyannis, 1980: 44; Aydın, 2000: 132). By using the EU as a leverage against Turkey, Greece aimed at forcing the country to concede from its policy towards the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus issue. Thereby, Greece sought to benefit from the conditionality mechanism embedded in the EU's relations with the third countries. This means that Turkey had to satisfy Greek national interests to advance its relations with the EU.

In the pre-Helsinki period, Greece was the only member state that opposed the referral of Turkey's membership application to the European Commission for an opinion in 1987, and it blocked final implementation of the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey in 1994 for political reasons (Uğur, 1996: 18). In addition, Greece blocked the forthcoming meeting of the Turkey-EU Association Council, and did not fulfil its commitment to drop its veto against the releasing of the Fourth Financial Protocol to Turkey in response to the Kardak crisis that broke out in early 1996. As a matter of fact, in some cases, the EU had to make some assurances in line with the Greek national interests to overcome the Greek veto. As a clear manifestation of its uploading strategy, Greece dropped its veto against the establishment of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in March 1995 conditionally only after the EU committed itself to confirm the eligibility of Cyprus for membership six months after the July 1996 Intergovernmental Conference which was to review the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Veremis, 2001: 44).

After experiencing some crises in their relations following the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, Greece concluded that engaging Turkey in EU accession process could be a better choice for the settlement of their bilateral differences. In other words, Greece expected that Europeanization of Turkey through conditionality would pave the way for the improvement of their relations (Triantaphyllou, 2005: 333; Diez et al., 2006: 579). Greece was well aware of the fact that it had a comparative advantage within the EU given its membership. In other words, Greece was able to project its national interests to EU level, and induce resolution of its bilateral differences with Turkey in line with its national interests<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, the post-Helsinki process of rapprochement between the two countries is not new but unique because of the EU's involvement in it. Its involvement rendered the process of rapprochement stronger because it provided the respective governments in both countries with arguments to justify their preference for the settlement of the Aegean dispute against domestic politics and veto players (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130). More importantly, accession to the EU became an important incentive for Turkey to reconcile its bilateral differences with Greece.

<sup>3</sup> Greece applied for membership in 1975, after seven years of dictatorship. The EU was particularly concerned with the implications of accession of Greece to the EU on Turkey-Greece relations. In its January 1976 opinion regarding accession of Greece, the European Commission argued that the EU should not be a party to the disputes between Turkey and Greece and therefore bilateral differences between the two countries should be settled through a pre-accession period (European Commission, 1976: 1). However, the opinion of the European Commission was disregarded by the Council of Ministers, and Greece could accede to the EU in 1981 without going through a pre-accession period (Tsakaloyannis, 1980: 35). Since then, Greece used the EU as a leverage against Turkey until the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Aydın, 2000: 132; Economides, 2005: 484).

<sup>4</sup>Another view is that Greece dropped its veto against Turkey's candidacy to achieve its goal of acceding to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Firstly, military expenditures wrought a heavy burden for the Greek economy at a time when the country aimed at achieving membership to the EMU Given that threat perceptions from Turkey have shaped Greek military expenditures for decades, accession to the EMU was highly dependent on avoiding arms race with Turkey. Arms race would end when the two countries resolved their bilateral differences. (Larrabee, 2001: 236).

## **1. Theoretical Framework**

The 1970 Luxembourg Report which led to the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) has initiated a process of consultation on foreign policy matters between the Member States of the EU. After cooperation proved fruitful, the Member States aspired to further coordinate their national foreign policies (Giegerich and Wallace, 2010: 433-434). In addition, some structural changes in the international system increased the Member States' quest for a common foreign and security policy. These structural changes are i) the end of the Cold War; ii) the rise of new security concerns; iii) the emergence of a unipolar world; iv) dissolution of the former Yugoslavia; and v) the security implications of the EU's enlargement to the Eastern Europe (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004: 2). The Member States that became aware of the usefulness of cooperation in the field of foreign policy pushed for a common foreign and security policy. Thus, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty established Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP).

Actually, CFSP is remarkably different from the EU's supranational policy fields. First of all, it is mainly intergovernmental being only politically binding. Therefore, assessing the Europeanization of foreign policy is rendered useless by the lack of concrete models for adoption and by the lack of the EU's exclusive competences in the field of foreign and security policy. This is why the research on Europeanization has belatedly penetrated into the field of foreign and security policy.

Theoretically, it is believed that cooperation in an intergovernmental policy field is hard to achieve. This is the basic assumption of intergovernmentalism which posits that the Member States will not sacrifice their national interests because decision making in intergovernmental policy fields happens through unanimity. Accordingly, any decision or agreement will perfectly reflect the core national interests of the Member States (Moumoutzis, 2011: 614). Such an assumption means that foreign policies of the Member States will not change because the core national interests of all Member States are represented in these unanimously made decisions and agreements. Conversely, liberal intergovernmentalism and rational-choice institutionalism argue that the final decision or agreement that is reached unanimously at any intergovernmental setting is the lowest common denominator of all Member States (Moravcsik, 1993: 500-501). There may be some mismatch between national and European interests because unanimity provides all Member States the equal chance to contribute to the content of the decision or agreement irrespective of their size and preferences (Moravcsik, 1993: 499-502). Thus, the final decision or agreement would not represent perfectly the interests of the even most powerful Member State. Another argument regarding mismatch between national and European interests is that national interests are not static because they change over time, thus a mismatch may occur over time (Moumoutzis, 2011: 614). Thus, Europeanization becomes relevant for foreign policy, as well.

The research on the Europeanization of foreign policy mainly deals with the implications of CFSP on national foreign policies, and it seeks to account for the transformation of national interests into European interests and vice versa (Cebeci and Aaltola 2011: 29). Europeanization in the field of foreign and security policy is described as being mainly "voluntary and non-hierarchical" because national foreign policies are Europeanized in the absence of a concrete model for adoption and in the absence of the EU's exclusive competences (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 7). The Member States are only politically required to align their national foreign policies with CFSP. Non-alignment would incur no legal responsibility on them.

The Europeanization of foreign policy may have different implications on national foreign policies. The most important of these are i) political and bureaucratic adaptation of foreign policy structures and processes to those of the EU; ii) changes in national actors' values, norms, role conceptions and identities; iii) changes in the actual content of national foreign policies; and iv) overcoming of both domestic and external resistance to change (Tonra, 2000: 225; Manners and Whitman, 2000: 246-9). Firstly, bureaucratic adaptation is important to implement CFSP properly. Thus, national foreign ministries must have structures compatible with the structures of CFSP. Secondly, Europeanization becomes easier when values, norms

and role conceptions and identities of States converge with European ones. Thirdly, the content of national foreign policies may be far more different from the content of CFSP before Europeanization. Therefore, the Member and Candidate States must incorporate into the content of their national foreign policies the issues in European Foreign Policy (EFP). Last but not least, the legitimizing strength of Europeanization may help national reformers to tackle domestic and external opposition to their reforms. In other words, domestic reformers may justify their reforms with the necessity of adapting to the EU.

Regarding CFSP, the Candidate States adopt the EU's rules and norms as long as they serve their interests better than the other alternatives (Hill, 1998: 38). Accordingly, the EU offers some rewards when its norms and rules are complied with by the Candidate States. In the context of CFSP, there are three sorts of conditionality that induce the Europeanization of foreign policy. These are "conditionality through political criteria", "conditionality through CFSP *acquis*" and "conditionality through *de facto* political criteria" (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2009: 268-269). 'Conditionality through political criteria' refers to foreign policy implications of political criteria, e.g. democratization and good neighbourly relations (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2009: 267). On the other hand, 'conditionality through CFSP *acquis*' means to align national foreign policies with CFSP (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2009: 268). Lastly, 'conditionality through *de facto* political criteria' refers to the fact that the Candidate States are obliged to comply with some rules and norms that are not part of the EU's political criteria, e.g. higher standards for nuclear safety that were introduced as part of the EU's conditionality at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2009: 268).

Accordingly, Europeanization of foreign policy in Candidate States can be defined as changes in the national foreign policy practices and in the structures of institutions that guide national foreign policy for the purpose of aligning them with rules and norms of CFSP upon the awareness that the core national interests are to be achieved better not individually but collectively in European policymaking. Furthermore, there are some intervening variables specific to the Europeanization of foreign policy. These variables are "ideological hostility to further integration", "domestic politics" and "international forces and special relationships with the third countries (Hill and Wong, 2011: 18). Political elites may be ideologically hostile to integration in foreign and security policy on the pretext that national sovereignty is contingent on an independent national foreign and security policy (Hill and Wong, 2011: 18). Domestically, the public may oppose to a common foreign and security policy (Hill and Wong, 2011: 18). In the international fora, unilateral political or economic relationships with the third countries outside the EU may prejudice the Europeanization of foreign policy (Hill and Wong, 2011: 17). It is noteworthy that intervening variables and the logics embedded in the Europeanization of foreign policy determine the patterns of the Europeanization of foreign policy.

## 2. Path towards the Process of Rapprochement

The process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece and the Europeanization of Turkey-Greece relations are separate but interrelated phenomena. While the process of rapprochement started with the letter of the Turkish Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem to his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou in March 1999; the Europeanization of Turkey-Greece relations started when Greece dropped its veto against Turkey's candidacy to the EU at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council (Kotzias, 2009: 268).

The process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece was sparked on 24 May 1999 when the Turkish Foreign Minister wrote a letter to invite his Greek counterpart to embark on talks to improve their bilateral relations. Actually, it may well have started earlier in 1996 after the crisis over the Kardak rocks broke out. As a matter of fact, Costas Simitis who saw engaging Turkey in EU accession process as a prerequisite for the improvement of relations with Turkey took the leadership of Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) in January 1996 (Athanasopoulou, 1997: 88). However, rapprochement did not materialize

until 1999 mainly because of the intra-party opposition to rapprochement in Greece (Rumelili, 2007: 118). For instance, Cem approached his Greek counterpart, Theodoros Pangalos from PASOK for rapprochement earlier in 1998. However, the Greek Foreign Minister did not welcome the initiative. Therefore, the process of rapprochement could materialize only with the letter of Cem to G. Papandreou after the March 1999 Kosovo crisis<sup>5</sup>.

The first incident with potential to mar bilateral relations after the 1996 crisis over the Kardak rocks took place in January 1997 when Cyprus announced that it was planning to buy S-300 missiles from Russia to defend the new airbase on its soil constructed for the landing of Greek fighter aircraft for refuelling and rearming purposes in line with the joint defence pact concluded in 1993 (Diez, 2002: 146). Turkey reacted noting that it would destroy them through an air strike in case they are placed on Cyprus (*Milliyet*, 1997). However, a crisis was prevented from emerging when Greece and Cyprus decided to install S-300 missiles not on Cyprus but on the Greek island of Crete. A tentative attempt at improving relations between Turkey and Greece took place subsequently when the President of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel and the Prime Minister of Greece, Costas Simitis met in Madrid in July 1997 during a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting to discuss how to lead their future relations on a peaceful basis (Kut, 2001: 263). The most tangible outcome of the meeting became a joint declaration which promulgated six basic principles for the future of Turkey-Greece relations. These are: i) mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good neighbourly relations; ii) respect for each other's sovereignty; iii) respect for the principles of international law and international agreements; iv) respect for each other's legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean which are of great importance for their security and national sovereignty; v) commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding; and vi) a commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without the use of force or threat of force (Madrid Declaration, 1997: 1).

The joint declaration is important in that it shows how the two countries wanted to lead their future relations. In other words, it is illustrative of how Turkey and Greece viewed each other and of what they understood from good neighbourly relations. It is understood from references in the joint declaration to 'respect for other's sovereignty' that the two countries viewed the Aegean dispute as a sovereignty issue. Actually, it may be argued that the more an issue is associated with sovereignty the more difficult becomes its settlement given that sovereign rights are deemed non-negotiable.

Furthermore, the emphasis on 'respect for each other's legitimate vital interests and concerns in the Aegean' illustrates that both Turkey and Greece viewed their vital interests prejudiced in the Aegean by the activities of the other side. Both of them viewed some of what the other side calls its 'vital interests' as illegitimate given the emphasis on the 'legitimacy of vital interests'. For instance, Greece views having a 10-nautical-mile national airspace for its islands in the Aegean as a vital interest. For Turkey, this is illegitimate.

On the other hand, there is also the issue of unilateral acts. It is clear that by 'unilateral acts' the two countries referred to their respective previous activities on the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea. Actually, the two countries had already committed themselves to refrain from unilateral acts at the 1976 Bern Agreement. This shows that principles for the settlement of the Aegean dispute emerged throughout years.

Lastly, by referring in the joint declaration to the peaceful settlement of disputes on the basis of 'mutual consent' and 'without use of force or threat of force', the two countries may have meant their previous experiences. Turkey may have referred by 'mutual consent' to the unilateral referral of Greece to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the delimitation of the continental shelf in 1976. Greece may have

---

<sup>5</sup> The March 1999 Kosovo Crisis is qualified as the ultimate "triggering event" that enabled the process of rapprochement (Heraclides, 2010: 145).

referred to the 1995 *casus belli* resolution of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) by ‘without use of force or threat of force’.

However, the joint declaration was not potent enough to reconcile bilateral differences mainly because of the incidents that ensued. Firstly, relations between Turkey and Greece and the EU deteriorated following the confirmation by the EU of the eligibility of Cyprus for membership in early 1997 as it had promised Greece in 1995 in return for dropping its veto against the Customs Union with Turkey. Relations further deteriorated when the EU declared the candidacy of Cyprus at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council (European Council, 1997: par. 11). At the same time, Greece continued its veto on the Fourth Financial Protocol during the 1997 Luxembourg European Council. Furthermore, while Turkey hoped for candidacy status from the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, the EU confined itself to confirm its eligibility for membership mainly because of the country’s problematic relations with Greece and Cyprus (European Council, 1997: par. 31). However, Turkey’s eligibility for membership had already been confirmed in the 1989 Commission avis on Turkey (European Commission, 1989: par. 13). The 1997 Luxembourg European Council repeated the obvious and therefore did not satisfy Turkey. Turkey-EU relations were strained to the extent that Turkey threatened the Union with suspending political relations (Hale and Avcı, 2002: 41).

Although Turkey’s candidacy was not declared at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, the European Commission issued a European Strategy for Turkey in March 1998 “to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field” (European Commission, 1998: 1). To that end, it is stated in the Strategy that the possibilities afforded by the 1963 Ankara Agreement should be developed, the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey should be intensified, the financial cooperation should be implemented and Turkey’s participation in certain EU programmes and certain agencies should be assured (European Commission, 1998: 1). In addition, Turkey was invited to the upcoming Pan-European Meeting (European Commission, 1998: 1). However, to show its disapproval of not being declared a candidate and of candidacy of Cyprus to the EU, Turkey did not attend the March 1998 Pan-European Meeting that was held in London, the United Kingdom (UK).

Secondly, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999, the leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) which has been waging separatist terrorist attacks against Turkey since 1984, with a Greek Cypriot passport on his way to the airport in Nairobi, Kenya upon leaving the Greek embassy after being provided with shelter endangered bilateral relations seriously. The Öcalan affair had significant domestic implications both in Turkey and Greece. As a matter of fact, Simitis was facing a great pressure to resign because of the engagement of the Greek government in such an affair. However, the Greek Prime Minister did not resign but dismissed Pangalos and Ministers of Internal Affairs and Public Order for their involvement. Dismissal of the Greek Foreign Minister had particular resonance for Turkey-Greece relations as G. Papandreou, alternate Greek Foreign Minister known for his willingness to improve Turkey-Greece relations became the new Greek Foreign Minister (Öniş, 2003: 171).

Domestic implications of the Öcalan affair in Turkey were notable, too. Süleyman Demirel criticized Greece, harshly. The Turkish President even hinted Turkey’s right of self-defence (*Milliyet*, 1999). In response, Greece put its troops on alert along its border with Turkey (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 38). The two countries did not end up fighting. Nonetheless, Turkey did not rely on military means but diplomacy, and complained about the act of Greece before the United Nations (UN) via a letter (*Milliyet*, 1999a). On the other hand, rise of G. Papandreou to foreign ministry marked a new beginning in Turkey-Greece relations as both the new Greek Foreign Minister and his Turkish counterpart were willing to foster good neighbourly relations (Öniş, 2003: 171).

Willingness of the two Foreign Ministers for good neighbourly relations converged when the Kosovo crisis broke out in March 1999. The 1999 Kosovo crisis concerned both countries given their geographical proximity to the region (Nachmani, 2002: 116; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 127). This proximity made them vulnerable to the consequences of the crisis. The 1999 Kosovo crisis is important in that it provided the two Foreign Ministers with intense contacts on how to cooperate on the consequences of the crisis. These contacts led to a rapport between the two statesmen (Heraclides, 2010: 145). Thereafter, they came to the conclusion that they would better cooperate with each other than confront to resolve their bilateral differences.

The first step came from the Turkish Foreign Minister who wrote a letter to his Greek counterpart on 24 May 1999 to “share some views on ways in which to ameliorate bilateral relations” (Letter from Mr İsmail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Mr George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, 24 May 1999). In his letter, the Turkish Foreign Minister proposed to conclude an agreement to combat terrorism in addition to developing a plan to reconcile bilateral differences between the two countries through resorting to all peaceful means referred to in the UN Charter. In the letter, it was implied that Greece had to detach itself from supporting terrorism if it desired to improve its relations with Turkey.

Actually, Turkey expected certain benefits from improving its relations with Greece, e.g. to “limit the danger of a crisis in the Aegean” and “put international pressure on Greece to abandon its veto against Turkey’s candidacy to the EU” (Heraclides, 2010: 145). This means that fostering good neighbourly relations was viewed as necessary to prevent future crises from emerging in the Aegean and to overcome the Greek veto against Turkey’s candidacy.

In response to the letter, G. Papandreou called his Turkish counterpart to congratulate his second-term in office as Foreign Minister under the new government in power since May 1999 and asked for some time before an official reply to the letter. The June 1999 Cologne European Council convened before G. Papandreou officially replied. Whether Greece would continue its veto against Turkey’s candidacy was on the top of the agenda of the 1999 Cologne European Council (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 47). Actually, Turkey expected Greece drop its veto in the face of the recent developments in their relations. However, it soon became clear that Greece was not in a position to drop its veto on the grounds that Turkey had not still agreed to refer the delimitation of the continental shelf to the ICJ (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 48). In the face of the stance of Greece, the EU committed itself to review the prospects of Turkey’s candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (European Council, 1999: par. 59). Meanwhile, G. Papandreou clarified that Greece would not have opposed to Turkey’s candidacy in case it had fulfilled the same criteria applied to all other Candidate States (*Athens News Agency*, 1999). It was the first sign of the fact that Greece no longer wanted to use the EU as a leverage against Turkey to achieve its national interests.

Meanwhile, the Greek Foreign Minister officially replied to the letter of İsmail Cem on 25 June 1999. G. Papandreou invited Turkey to initiate dialogue on issues of low political significance like tourism, environment, culture, organized crime, trade, regional issues and energy transfer lines (Letter from Mr George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to Mr İsmail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, 25 June 1999). Turkey welcomed the letter. Soon afterwards, The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced a meeting between the two Foreign Ministers in New York at a UN Secretary-General sponsored meeting over Kosovo on 30 June 1999. The two Foreign Ministers met as scheduled, and agreed to hold meetings for dialogue and sign bilateral agreements on cooperation on the issues specified in the letter of Papandreou (Heraclides, 2010: 146). Accordingly, delegations from the two countries started to hold bilateral talks to foster cooperation on the aforementioned issues of low political significance.



Subsequent to the talks between the two delegations, Foreign Ministers of the two countries signed several bilateral agreements on cooperation<sup>6</sup>.

There happened an earthquake measuring 7.4 on Richter scale on 17 August 1999 in İzmit, Turkey. Soon after the disaster, the Greek Foreign Minister called his Turkish counterpart to offer assistance. It was the first call Turkey received (*Athens News Agency*, 1999a). The Greek rescue team was dispatched to Turkey together with a number of doctors, nurses, seismologists and firefighting planes (*Hürriyet*, 1999). Turkey offered its assistance to Greece when an earthquake measuring 5.6 on the Richter scale hit Athens on 7 September 1999. Turkey dispatched its rescue team to Greece (*Milliyet*, 1999b). Thus, the process of rapprochement was legitimized on the eyes of the public given the mutual sympathy developed after the disasters (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 86). This is evidenced by the increasing civil-society dialogue between Turkey and Greece (Rumelili, 2007: 117).

The process of rapprochement acquired a new dimension after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, accession of Turkey was tied, *inter alia*, to the resolution of its bilateral differences with Greece. Therefore, the process of rapprochement was Europeanized.

### 3. The Europeanization of the Rapprochement

At the 1999 Cologne European Council, the EU committed itself to review the prospects of candidacy of Turkey at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. Therefore, the issue of Turkey's candidacy came to the fore as the 1999 Helsinki European Council loomed large on the horizon.

In the meantime, there was an emerging consensus within the Greek Foreign Ministry to drop the Greek veto against Turkey's candidacy. However, Greece hoped a gesture from Turkey in return for dropping its veto (*Athens News Agency*, 1999b). To that end, the Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis wrote to his Turkish counterpart, Bülent Ecevit to reiterate the quest of Greece for a gesture (*Athens News Agency*, 1999b). By a gesture, the Greek Prime Minister may have referred to the reopening of the theological school at Heybeliada in Istanbul or to the lifting of the *casus belli* resolution of the TGNA (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 85). On the one hand, the Greek government was particularly concerned with a gesture from Turkey because Simitis was afraid of risking victory prospects of PASOK at the upcoming general elections (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 95). In the view of the Greek Prime Minister, a gesture from Turkey would increase the public support for Turkey's candidacy. On the other hand, Greece feared alienating Turkey, and endangering the process of rapprochement and the Europeanization of the country through vetoing its candidacy (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 95). In addition, Greece expected certain benefits from dropping its veto. The first gain would be to make Turkey agree to proceed to the ICJ for the delimitation of the continental shelf (Aksu, 2004: 106). The second gain would be to guarantee the accession of Cyprus to the EU irrespective of the resolution of the Cyprus issue (Economides, 2005: 484-485). Thus, Greece conditioned dropping its veto on assurances from the EU for its cause regarding the Aegean dispute and the Cyprus issue.

<sup>6</sup> For instance, five cooperation agreements were signed in November 2001 in areas like culture, environment and academic cooperation. In addition, a cooperation agreement on issues like terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration came into force in July 2001. Another agreement was signed in March 2002 to build a natural gas pipeline to supply natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Greece through Turkey. Construction of the natural gas pipeline was finalized in 2006. For the EU, the construction of the pipeline is a symbolic move as "it is a physical link between the two countries" (European Commission, 2002: 44). Furthermore, a Memorandum of Understanding for the establishment of a Joint Disaster Response Unit under the UN was signed in September 2002. Another agreement on double taxation was signed in December 2002. Furthermore, a High Level Cooperation Council was established and further agreements on cooperation in the fields of border controls, diplomatic missions, standardization, investments, forestry, environment, energy and climate change, education, science technology, communication, illegal immigration and culture and tourism were signed between the two countries in May 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, 2010: 1)

The 1999 Helsinki European Council convened on 10 December 1999. Turkey's candidacy was declared although it did not offer a gesture. Greece did not veto Turkey's candidacy because it could upload its national interests to EU level through the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Aksu, 2004: 106; Triantaphyllou, 2005: 337). This means that Greece prioritized improvement of relations with Turkey to the extent of disregarding domestic implications of dropping its veto. Greece must have considered long-term benefits of improved relations with Turkey. As a matter of fact, after Greece lifted its veto, bilateral differences between the two countries turned into an issue of the EU and the accession of Cyprus to the EU was secured at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Keridis, 2001: 18).

Greece could upload its interests regarding the Aegean dispute and Cyprus issue into the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council. Paragraph 4 stated:

The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The Candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges Candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union (European Council, 1999a: par. 4).

The EU may have emphasized the equality of all Candidate States in the aforementioned Paragraph to strengthen the credibility of EU membership for Turkey given that Turkey had already felt discriminated when its candidacy was not declared at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council. Peaceful settlement of border disputes was referred to as one of the EU's values that must be respected to accede to the EU. Thus, the referral of border disputes to the ICJ became a Community principle of the EU with the 1999 Helsinki European Council (Rumelili, 2008: 105). Whether referral of border disputes to the ICJ would be referred to in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council without input from Greece is contested. By the peaceful settlement of border disputes, the EU meant the methods set out in the UN Charter. In the UN Charter, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means are stipulated as means to settle disputes peacefully (UN Charter, article 33.1).

In the Presidency Conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU reached a compromise between the respective views of Turkey and Greece on how to resolve the Aegean dispute. As a matter of fact, it was stated that referral of bilateral differences to the ICJ must be preceded by other means to settle bilateral disputes peacefully. However, to prevent the talks from failing, the EU invited the two countries to refer their bilateral differences to the ICJ by 2004. The possibility of referral to the ICJ for adjudication may have made the two countries adhere to bilateral talks more. In other words, the future ruling of the ICJ may not satisfy the either side in case the dispute is referred to the ICJ for adjudication. Therefore, Turkey and Greece may have preferred to continue their talks to resolve the Aegean dispute along their interests.

In addition, Paragraph 9.b enabled accession of Cyprus to the EU irrespective of a final settlement of the Cyprus issue. Paragraph 9.b stated:

The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this, the Council will take account of all relevant factors (European Council, 1999a: par. 9.b).

The aforementioned Paragraphs illustrate uploading by Greece to EU level of its national interests in return for dropping its veto against Turkey's candidacy. On the Aegean dispute, Greece could upload its preference for adjudication. To create time pressure on Turkey, the year 2004 was set as a time limit for negotiations. On the Cyprus issue, Greece could guarantee accession of Cyprus to the EU irrespective of a final settlement.

#### 4. Turkey-Greece Relations in the Post-Helsinki Period

The Europeanization of Turkey increased after the 1999 Helsinki European Council. As a matter of fact, Turkey had to meet sufficiently the Copenhagen political criteria to qualify for the launching of accession negotiations as stipulated at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (European Council, 1999a: par. 4). Thus, the prospects of launching accession negotiations was an important incentive for Turkey to Europeanize its domestic and foreign policy and institutional arrangements (Özer, 2012: 51). Accordingly, Turkey adopted several measures to align with the Copenhagen political criteria between 2001 and 2004. Meanwhile, the 2002 Copenhagen European Council convened on 12 and 13 December 2002. The 2002 Copenhagen European Council is important in that it increased the credibility of membership for Turkey. As a matter of fact, it stated:

If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay (European Council, 2002: par. 19).

Democratization of Turkey was important for the improvement of Turkey-Greece relations, as well. Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria paved the way for the civilianization of foreign policy in Turkey, i.e. the decline of the military's influence in TFP (Özcan, 2010: 25). Thus, the post-Helsinki period witnessed further improvement of relations between Turkey and Greece. Cooperation between the two countries increased notably. For instance, A Task Force on the EU was established upon a suggestion by Greece in January 2000 to assist Turkish officials in EU affairs (Heraclides, 2002: 24). In the same period, some seminars were organized both in Turkey and Greece on customs administration, financial and agricultural matters, police cooperation and issues related to the transposition of EU *acquis* into national legislation (Heraclides, 2002: 24). Furthermore, Turkey participated in Dynamic Mix 2000 exercise of NATO which took place in Greece in May-June 2000. For the first time after Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, Turkish troops and military aircraft were in Greece (European Commission, 2000: 67).

Tensions between the two countries reduced significantly in the same period (Larrabee, 2001: 237). For instance, in the summer of 2001, a Turkish vessel decided to embark on a seismological survey in the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea, but it was cancelled after consultations between G. Papandreou and Cem (Tsarouhas, 2009: 52). In addition, bilateral contacts between the two countries increased. For instance, the Greek Foreign Minister, G. Papandreou paid an official visit to Turkey on 19 January 2000. It was the first time in 38 years that a Greek Foreign Minister officially visited Ankara (*Milliyet*, 2000). The Turkish Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem visited Greece officially one month after his Greek counterpart's

visit to Turkey. It was the first time that a Turkish Foreign Minister visited Athens officially in 40 years (*Milliyet*, 2000).

Moreover, the two countries have engaged in adopting Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) since October 2000. They agreed to develop three sorts of CBMs: i) CBMs within the framework of the 1988 Papoulias-Yılmaz Memorandum of Understanding; ii) Tension Reduction Measures; and iii) measures of good neighbourliness (Heraclides, 2002: 24). These CBMs are predominantly military in nature. They include, *inter alia*, commitments by the two countries to reduce the number, size and scope of their respective exercises in the high seas of the Aegean Sea; to notify the time schedule of national exercises for the following year; to fly unarmed over the Aegean Sea; to set up a direct telephone line between their Ministries of Foreign Affairs; to implement exchanges between military academies and military hospitals; and to clear landmines along the Meriç river (European Commission, 2001: 31; European Commission 2003: 53).

It was earlier noted that the process of rapprochement was strengthened in two ways by the EU's involvement. Firstly, accession prospects increased Turkey's adherence to its commitments (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130). Secondly, both governments could capitalize on the EU to justify their preference for rapprochement (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2008: 130). Therefore, the process of rapprochement did not come to a halt when different political parties came to power in Turkey and Greece. For instance, Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in November 2002 in Turkey. The Europeanization of Turkey and improvement of its relations with Greece continued thereafter.

On the other hand, the New Democracy (ND) led by the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis came to power in March 2004 in Greece. The process of rapprochement continued under the new government, as well. Improvements in Turkey-Greece relations have been referred to in the respective annual Progress Reports of the European Commission on Turkey, Accession Partnership Documents (APDs) and National Programmes for the Adoption of Acquis (NPAs) as well as Presidency Conclusions of the European Councils. For instance, in the first NPAA of Turkey which was adopted in 2001, it was assured that "Turkey will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue" (NPAA, 2001, Introduction). Thus, Turkey referred to dialogue as the main instrument for the resolution of its bilateral differences with Greece. Furthermore, in the APD of Turkey, under Short Term Priorities for Political Dialogue, it is stated that Turkey must:

pursue further efforts to resolve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter including, if necessary, jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and unequivocally commit to good neighbourly relations; address any sources of friction with neighbours; and refrain from any threat or action which could adversely affect the process of peaceful settlement of border disputes<sup>7</sup> (Council of the European Union, 2008: 10).

This means that for the improvement of Turkey-Greece relations: i) the option of proceeding to the ICJ in case bilateral talks fail should not be excluded; ii) bilateral differences between the two countries must be resolved peacefully; and iii) the use of force or threat of using force must be avoided.

The year 2004 was important in that it was the time limit set out by the EU at the 1999 Helsinki European Council for bilateral talks over the Aegean. The Aegean dispute has not been resolved to date although 'exploratory talks' continued until March 2016. The 60<sup>th</sup> round of exploratory talks took place on 1 March 2016, in Athens. However, Greece did not push for proceeding to the ICJ in 2004. Greece may

---

<sup>7</sup> The same was stated verbatim in the 2005 Negotiating Framework Document of Turkey (Council of the European Union, 2005: par. 6).

have believed that accession to the EU would be a stronger incentive for Turkey than time pressure (Rumelili, 2008: 105). In line with that, at the 2004 Brussels European Council, the EU did not call on Turkey to proceed necessarily to the ICJ but stated:

The European Council, while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with its neighbours and its readiness to continue to work with the Member States concerned towards resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In accordance with its previous conclusions, notably those of Helsinki on this matter, the European Council reviewed the situation relating to outstanding disputes and welcomed the exploratory contacts to this end. In this connection it reaffirmed its view that unresolved disputes having repercussions on the accession process should if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice for settlement. The European Council will be kept informed of progress achieved which it will review as appropriate (European Council, 2004: par. 20).

Thus, the EU confined itself to welcoming the improvements in Turkey-Greece relations. The December 2004 Brussels European Council is also important in that it paved the way for the launching of accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 (European Council, 2004: par. 29). The Europeanization of Turkey slowed down subsequent to the launching of accession negotiations to the extent that the post-2005 period is called de-Europeanization of Turkey (Cebeci 2026, Aydın-Düzgüt and Kaliber, 2016). This is mainly because of the fact that membership of the EU became a less credible objective for Turkey thereafter.

On the part of Turkey, several reasons underlie the loss of credibility of membership of the EU. First of all, the emergent negative stance in some of the Member States of the EU, e.g. Austria, France, the Netherlands and Denmark on Turkey's accession and the country's Europeanness caused loss of credibility (Müftüleri-Baç, 2008: 67; Sedelmeier, 2010: 424). In this regard, Nas argues that the case of the Europeanization of Turkey's identity is different from the cases of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), Malta, Cyprus and the Western Balkans because of the fact that "Turkey's candidacy and accession to the EU is not justified but contested on the ground of Europeanness" (Nas, 2012: 25). In addition, the public opinion in the EU has been increasingly against membership of Turkey on the pretext that Turkey is different culturally and religiously (Özer, 2012: 60). Also, the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 without a final settlement, and suspension of accession negotiations on eight chapters in 2006 because Turkey does not apply the Customs Union to Cyprus resulted in further loss of credibility. Moreover, the ambivalent language of the 2005 Negotiating Framework Document on Turkey's accession reduced credibility of membership (Özer, 2012: 60). It states that:

These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond (Council of the European Union, 2005: par. 9).

Actually, references in the aforementioned Paragraph to anchoring "Turkey in the European structures through the strongest possible bond" and to the "absorption capacity of the Union" have overtones of membership alternatives.

## **Conclusion**

This article attempted to portray the Europeanization Turkey's relations with Greece. To that end, the Europeanization of the process of rapprochement at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, and Turkey-Greece relations in the post-Helsinki period have been evaluated.

In this respect, it has been argued that rational instrumentality underlies Turkey's quest for fostering good neighbourly relations with Greece, i.e. the Europeanization of Turkey's relations with Greece. The rationalist approach of Turkey is evidenced by the fact that Turkey hoped to overcome the veto of Greece against its candidacy through rapprochement. This is mainly because accession of Turkey to the EU was tied, *inter alia*, to the improvement of the country's relations with Greece at the 1999 Helsinki European Council (European Council, 1999a: par. 4). This means that while Turkey hoped to overcome the veto of Greece against its candidacy through initiating rapprochement, it aims at achieving membership of the EU through further fostering good neighbourly relations with it.

On the other hand, it has been noted that the Europeanization of Turkey has decelerated because the prospects of membership has lost credibility after accession negotiations started on 3 October 2005. Slowing down of the process of Europeanization had implications for the process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, as well. Because accession of Turkey was tied, *inter alia*, to the resolution of its bilateral differences with Greece at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the loss of credibility of the prospects of membership may have decreased Turkey's quest for fostering good neighbourly relations with Greece. However, although the loss of credibility and the Greek debt crisis that broke out at the end of 2009 leading major instability in the country slowed down the rapprochement, a High Level Cooperation Council was established and further agreements on cooperation in the fields of border controls, diplomatic missions, standardization, investments, forestry, environment, energy and climate change, education, science technology, communication, illegal immigration and culture and tourism were signed between the two countries in May 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, 2010: 1).

Actually, when membership of the EU was valued notably, Turkey could overlook some domestic criticism to the resolution of the Aegean dispute and Cyprus issue, especially when the credibility of the prospects of membership was high. This means that Turkey had to undergo some political costs when fulfilling certain conditions set out by the EU for its accession. The weakening of the credibility of accession prospects has resulted in the slowing down of the Europeanization process. This has caused Turkey's alienation and impair Turkey's identification with the EU.

It is still difficult to answer the question of whether relations between Turkey and Greece would be normalized by the process of rapprochement and Europeanization. This can only be possible if the process of rapprochement further progresses and cooperation between the two countries is no longer limited to the issues of low political significance. In addition, socialization of Turkey into the EU's norms and rules subsequent to its accession or through other means may facilitate the emergence of a relationship with Greece similar to that between France and Germany that was desecuritized despite their conflict-ridden past. Increased cooperation and interdependence triggered by the EU between France and Germany may this time work for Turkey and Greece.

**Çıkar Çatışması:** Yazar(lar) çıkar çatışması olmadığını beyan eder.

**Disclosure Statement:** No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

## References

- Aksu, F. (2004) “Ege ve Kıbrıs Sorunlarının Çözümünde Avrupa Birliği’nin Tutumu”, *Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 2(3), 103-132.
- Athanassopoulou, E. (1997) “Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations”, *Mediterranean Politics*, 2(3), 76-101.
- Athens News Agency (1999) Greece Stands by Position on Turkey’s EU Prospects, 5 June, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1999/99-06-05.ana.html#03> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Athens News Agency (1999a) Issue of Greek Veto to EU Financial Protocol Reappears, 25 August. <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1999/99-08-25.ana.html#02> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Athens News Agency (1999b) FM Papandreou Cites ‘Progress’ in Greek-Turkish Dialogue, Decision to Expand Contacts, 25 September, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1999/99-09-25.ana.html#01> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Aydın, M. (2000) “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36(1), 103-139.
- Aydın, M. and S. A. Açıkmüşe (2007) “Europeanization through EU conditionality: understanding the new era in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 9(3), 263-274.
- Aydın-Düzgüt: and A. Kaliber (2016) “Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country?”, *South European Society and Politics*, 21(1), 1-14.
- Bulmer, S. J. and C. M. Radaelli (2004) “The Europeanization of National Policy?”, *Queen’s Papers on Europeanization*, 1/2004, [Online], Available at: [https://ceses.cuni.cz/CESES-141-version1-2\\_2\\_\\_Radaelli\\_europeanization\\_of\\_national\\_policy.pdf](https://ceses.cuni.cz/CESES-141-version1-2_2__Radaelli_europeanization_of_national_policy.pdf) [accessed: 15 November 2021].
- Cebeci, M. (2016) “De-Europeanisation or Counter-Conduct? Turkey’s Democratisation and the EU”, *South European Society and Politics*, 21(1), 119-132.
- Charter of the United Nations (1945). <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Kutuphane/MultilateralConventions/CharteroftheUnitedNations.pdf> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Council of the EU (2005) *Negotiating Framework Document*, 3 October. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002\\_05\\_tr\\_framedoc\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf) (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Council of the EU (2006) “2770th Council Meeting General Affairs and External Relations General Affairs”, *Press Release*, C/06/352, Brussels, 11 December.
- Council of the EU (2008) *Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey*, (2008/157/EC). <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:051:0004:0018:EN:PDF> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Council of the EU (2018) “Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process”, *Outcome of Proceedings*, 10555/18 ELARG 41 COWEB 102, Brussels, 25 June.

- Diez, T. (2002) "Last Exit to Paradise? The European Union, the Cyprus Conflict and the Problematic Catalytic Effect", Thomas Diez (der.) *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union* içinde. Manchester ve New York: Manchester University Press, 139-162.
- Diez, T.: Stetter and M. Albert (2006) "The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration", *International Organization*, 60(3), 563-593.
- Economides: (2005) "The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy", *West European Politics*, 28(2), 471-491.
- European Commission (1976) *Commission Opinion on the Greek Request for Membership*, COM(76) 30 final. <http://tr.scribd.com/doc/97512305/1976-EU-Commission-Opinion-on-Greek-Accession> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Commission (1989) *Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community*, SEC(89) 2290 final. <http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/1/4475.pdf> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Commission (1998) *European Strategy for Turkey: The Commission's Initial Operational Proposals*, COM(1998) 124 final. <http://aei.pitt.edu/4356/1/4356.pdf> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Commission (2000) *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2000/tu\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf) (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Commission (2001) *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, SEC(2001) 1756. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2001/tu\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/tu_en.pdf) (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Commission (2002) *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, SEC(2002) 1412 {COM(2002) 700 final}. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2002/tu\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/tu_en.pdf) (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Commission (2003) *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2003/rr\\_tk\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf) (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Council (1997) *Presidency Conclusions*, 12-13 Aralık. [http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1\\_avrupa\\_birligi/1\\_4\\_zirveler/1985\\_sonrasi/1997\\_12\\_luksemburg\\_zirvesi\\_baskanlik\\_sonuc\\_bildirgesi\\_en.pdf](http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_4_zirveler/1985_sonrasi/1997_12_luksemburg_zirvesi_baskanlik_sonuc_bildirgesi_en.pdf) (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Council (1999) *Presidency Conclusions*, 3-4 Haziran, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm) (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Council (1999a) *Presidency Conclusions*, 10-11 December. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm) (accessed 16 May 2020).



- European Council (2002) *Presidency Conclusions*, 12-13 Aralık.  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf)  
 (accessed 16 May 2020).
- European Council (2004) *Presidency Conclusions*, 16-17 December.  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf)  
 (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Giegerich, B. and W. Wallace (2010) “Foreign and Security Policy: Civilian Power Europe and American Leadership”, in Helen, Wallace, Mark A. Pollack and Alasdair R. Young (eds) *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 431-455.
- Hale, W. and G. Avcı (2002) “Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership” in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds) *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 42-64.
- Heraclides, A. (2002) “Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Détente: a Preliminary Evaluation”, *The Review of International Affairs*, 1(3), 17-32.
- Heraclides, A. (2010) *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hill, C. (1998) “Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP” in Jan Zielonka (ed) *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 35-51.
- Hill, C. and R. Wong (2011) “Introduction”, in Christopher Hill and Reuben Wong (eds) *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization*, New York: Routledge, 1-18.
- Hürriyet* (1999) Yardım Yağıyor, 18 August.  
<http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/1999/08/18/137263.asp> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Keridis, D. (2001) “Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy: Greek Policy Toward Turkey”, Dimitris Keridis ve Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (der.) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization* içinde. Dulles: Brassey’s, Inc., 2-18.
- Ker-Lindsay, J. (2007) *Crisis and Conciliation: a Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey*, London: I.B.Taurus.
- Kotzias, N. (2009) “EU, Turkey and Greece: The Paradoxes of Convergence” Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nicolaidis ve Kerem Öktem (der.) *In the Long Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Postnationalism* içinde. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 263-285.
- Kut, Ş. (2001) “Türk Dış Politikasında Ege Sorunu” in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed) *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 253-270.
- Larrabee: F. (2001) “Security in the Eastern Mediterranean: Transatlantic Challenges and Perspectives”, in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, Dulles: Brassey’s, Inc., 224-238.
- Larrabee: F. and I. O. Lesser (2003) *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation
- Letter from Mr George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece to Mr Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey (1999).  
<http://www.oocities.org/turkishgreek/papandre.htm> (accessed 16 May 2020).

- Letter from Mr Ismail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Mr George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece (1999). <http://www.oocities.org/turkishgreek/papandre.htm> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Madrid Declaration (1997). <http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/summer97/section.html> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Manners, I. and R. G. Whitman (2000) "Conclusion", in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds) *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 243-273.
- Milliyet* (1997) Denge Bozulursa Türkiye Vurur, 06 January, <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Milliyet* (1999) Atina'ya Savaş Uyarısı, 23 February, <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Milliyet* (1999a) İsmail Cem'den BM Atağı, 19 March, <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Milliyet* (1999b) Sevgi Köprüsüyüz, 10 September, <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Milliyet* (2000) Atina Cem'e Hazır, 02 February, <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Milliyet* (2000) Yunanistan'la Barış Süreci, 24 January, <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece (2010) *Joint Communiqué between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey*, 15 May, <http://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/joint-communicue-between-the-government-of-the-hellenic-republic-and-the-government-of-the-republic-of-turkey.html> (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Moravcsik, A. (1993) "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(4), 473-524.
- Moumoutzis, K. (2011) "Still Fashionable Yet Useless? Addressing Problems with Research on the Europeanization of Foreign Policy" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49(3), 607-629.
- Müftüler-Baç, M. (2008) "The European Union's Accession Negotiations with Turkey from a Foreign Policy Perspective", *European Integration*, 30(1), 63-78.
- Nachmani, A. (2002) "What Says the Neighbor to the West? On Turkish-Greek Relations" in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (eds) *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 93-121.
- Nas, Ç. (2012) "Europeanization of Identity: The Case of the Rebuffed Candidate", Çiğdem Nas ve Yonca Özer (der.) *Turkey and the European Union: Processes of Europeanization* içinde. Aldershot: Ashgate, 23-44.
- National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (2001). [https://www.ab.gov.tr/\\_195\\_en.html](https://www.ab.gov.tr/_195_en.html) (accessed 16 May 2020).
- Öniş Z. and Ş. Yılmaz (2008) "Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?", *Political Science Quarterly*, 123(1), 123-149.

- Öniş, Z. (2003) “The Role of the European Union in Greek-Turkish Relations: Perpetuator of Conflict or Contributor to Peace?” in Christos Kollias and Gülay Günlük Şenesen (eds) *Greece and Turkey in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A Political Economy Perspective*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 165-178.
- Özcan, G. (2010) “The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military in Foreign Policy Making”, *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, 23(2), 23-46.
- Özer, Y. (2012) “The EU’s Impact on Democratization in Turkey: Europeanization through Political Conditionality”, Çiğdem Nas ve Yonca Özer (der.) *Turkey and the European Union: Processes of Europeanization* içinde. Aldershot: Ashgate, 45-68.
- Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Background Note on Aegean Dispute <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-dispute.en.mfa>, (accessed 24 November 2021), (accessed 24 November 2021).
- Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cyprus, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-cyprus-issue-overview.en.mfa>,
- Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Relations between Turkey and Greece <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-greece.en.mfa>, (accessed 24 November 2021).
- Rumelili, B. (2007) “Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: the Case of Greek-Turkish Relations”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(1), 105-126.
- Rumelili, B. (2008) “Transforming the Greek-Turkish Conflicts: the EU and What We Make of It”, in Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert (eds) *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 94-128.
- Sedelmeier, U. (2010) “Enlargement: From Rules for Accession to a Policy Towards Europe”, Helen, Wallace, Mark A. Pollack ve Alasdair R. Young (der.) *Policy-Making in the European Union* içinde. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 401-429.
- Tonra, B. (2000) *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Tonra, B. and T. Christiansen (2004) “The Study of EU Foreign Policy: Between International Relations and European Studies”, in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (eds) *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1-9.
- Triantaphyllou, D. (2005) “The Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy Today”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 5(3), 327-346.
- Tsakaloyannis, P. (1980) “The European Community and the Greek-Turkish Dispute”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 19(1), 35-54.
- Tsarouhas, D. (2009) “The Political Economy of Greek-Turkish Relations”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 9(1-2), 39-57.
- Uğur, M. (1996) “Customs Union as a Substitute for Turkey's Membership? A re interpretation of EU-Turkey Relations”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 10(1), 11-29.
- Veremis, P. (2001) “The Protracted Crisis”, in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, Dulles: Brassey’s, Inc., 42-55.