

Dutch Policy towards the Indonesian Hajj, 1946-1949

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This paper examines the Netherlands Indies Government's *hajj* regulations from 1946 through 1949, the years in which the Indonesians struggled and finally gained their independence. The small number of studies about the Dutch *hajj* regulations focus on the late nineteenth and pre-Second World War period, while ignoring the period under investigation here. These studies suggest that the *hajj* regulations in that period reflect the concerns of the Dutch shipping companies about how to maintain their monopoly in the transportation of the Indonesian pilgrims to Saudi Arabia. This paper points out that the post-war period decisions were more politically motivated since the Netherlands Indies Government was concerned about the influence of the pro-independence and pro-republican *mukims*, the Indonesian residents in Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah. The paper concludes that the use of the *hajj* regulations for political expediency was unsuccessful.

1. Introduction

Performing *hajj* (the pilgrimage to Mecca) has always been strongly desired by Indonesian Muslims. For most Indonesian Muslims, the *hajj* marks an important transition leading to a new phase in life and to a change in social status. The Indonesian Muslims, upon returning from Islam's Holy Land, Mecca, usually have the title, Haji, added to their names due to the fact that they have performed the *hajj* rituals. More importantly they tend to dedicate themselves to a more religious life. Their changed life also leads most of them to enjoy greater status in society. Some of the Indonesian hajjis in rural areas even adorn themselves with white turbans to symbolize their haji status and to distinguish themselves from everyone else.¹

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1 D. van der Meulen, "The Mecca Pilgrimage and Its Importance to the Netherlands East Indies," *The Muslim World*, 31 (1940), p. 48.

Since the *haj* is such an important pillar of Islam, Indonesian participation in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca has involved sizable groups. Before World War II, between 10,000 and 30,000 Indonesians a year took part. A peak was reached in 1926/1927, when a total of 52,412 people went to Mecca.² During the war, however, going on the pilgrimage to Mecca became almost impossible. In 1946, though, Indonesian participation in the pilgrimage was resumed when a small number of pilgrims from the Dutch occupied territories of Indonesia went to Mecca. The numbers of pilgrims from 1946 through 1949 are given in Table 1.

The policy of the Netherlands Indies government towards the Indonesian pilgrimage to Mecca has only been touched upon in a small number of scholarly studies written in Dutch and English. In particular, the works of C. Snouck Hurgronje, J. Eisenberger, D. van der Meulen, and J. Vredenberg are worth mentioning. However, all of these studies confined themselves to the colonial period, namely, the period up to 1942. The attitude and the policy of the Netherlands Indies government towards the Indonesian *haj* from 1946 through 1949, the period in which the Indonesians succeeded in obtaining their independence from the Dutch, have been left out of the discussion.

However, reviewing some of these studies would still be of use. The first study of this kind was written by Christian Snouck Hurgronje, a famous Dutch Islamologist, who served the Netherlands Indies government as an adviser in Islamic affairs, namely, he was Adviser for Native and Arabic Affairs from 1898 to 1906. His detailed and well documented article, "De Hadji Politiek der Indische Regering 1909," which is included in his major work, *Verspreide Geschriften*, dealt mainly with the policy of the Netherlands Indies government towards the Indonesian *haj* until the beginning of the twentieth century. In his advisory position, he bitterly criticized the previous colonial regulations concerning the *haj* and pointed out that any restrictions related to the pilgrimage would have the opposite effect to whatever the government hoped to gain. Therefore, he recommended the lifting of the restrictions that were imposed upon the Indonesian hajjis by the colonial government such as the restrictions on the numbers of pilgrims allowed to go to Mecca and the haji exams. In his view, the great majority of the pilgrims were not under the sway of the pan-Islamic influences they might encounter there. According to Hurgronje, any political impact of the *haj* that might occur would only result from a prolonged stay in Mecca, such as a stay among the Indonesians who had settled in Mecca called the *mukims*.³

2 Jacop Vredenberg, "The Hadj: Some of Its Features and Functions in Indonesia," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde*, Deel 118, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1962, p. 149.

3 For his analysis of the government's *haj* policy, see Christian Snouck Hurgronje, "De Hadji Politiek der Indische Regering 1909," *Verspreide Geschriften*, ed. A. J. Wensinck, 7 vols. (Bonn/Leipzig's-Gravenhage: Schoroeder/Nijhoff, 1923-1927), 4/2, pp. 175-215. Snouck Hurgronje's work, *Verspreide Geschriften*, contains his most important works and publications up to 1927. This multi-volume work is compiled by his successor A. J. Wensinck, and it includes a complete bibliography of his publications as well as a name and subject index.

Another of Snouck Hurgronje's works related to the *haj* was his book *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century* which is the English translation of the second part of the two volume book in German entitled, *Mekka*. In the first German volume, he gives a complete history of Mecca up to 1887, using mainly Arabic sources. It is the final fourth chapter of the English volume and the German second volume that is important with respect to Indonesia because it is devoted to the activities of the Indonesian *mukims* in Mecca, who formed a large group in the cosmopolitan holy city. Besides the fourth chapter dealing with the Indonesian "colony," this volume describes in three detailed chapters public life, home life, and the study of scholarly Islamic disciplines in Mecca. Hurgronje tried to discover how being in Mecca along with many other pilgrims influenced the spiritual life of the Indonesians. As pointed out above, he did not consider the majority of pilgrims who speedily returned home dangerous to his country's government in Indonesia. What was much more important in his opinion was the so-called Jawah colony which included men from all over the Indonesian islands.⁴

Another study is that of J. Eisenberger, a Dutchman who wrote a thesis in 1928 at Leiden State University also on Indonesian pilgrims in Mecca. In his thesis, entitled "Indie en de Bedevaart naar Mekka," he endeavored to point out the economic and political importance of the *haj* traffic from Indonesia to Mecca for the Dutch colonial government. He tried to explain the background behind and the purpose of the *haj* regulations issued by the colonial government, regulations aimed at putting as many restrictions on the pilgrimage from Indonesia as possible. In his work, he suggested mainly that the restriction of the pilgrimage was a function of the monopoly system of the Dutch East India Company. He concluded that the government did not impede the pilgrimage for any religious reason. Rather it attempted to regulate it in order to benefit the monopoly system.⁵ In brief, Eisenberger's thesis was, unfortunately, an apologetic work which interpreted most materials in a biased way.

In 1940, another Dutch Islamologist, D. van der Meulen, also wrote an article. The short article in English entitled, "The Mecca Pilgrimage and Its Importance to the Netherlands East Indies," firstly explains the Islamic *haj* rituals and then the importance of the *haj* for the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia. He next describes how the *haj* was organized during the colonial period and discusses the lives and activities of Indonesian *mukims* in Mecca. His information mainly comes from his experiences in Saudi Arabia where he served as a Dutch representative during the early years of World War II.⁶

4 C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century*, trans. J. H. Monahan, E. J. Brill, Leiden, Lucas Co., London 1931, pp. 215-260. The English publication of this book includes only the second part. For the complete version of this book in German, see C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, 2 vols. Nijhoff, Haag, 1888-1889.

5 J. Eisenberger, *Indie en de Bedevaart naar Mekka*, Dubbeldewan, Leiden 1928, 220 pp. + Append., the Thesis: Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden.

6 van der Meulen, "The Mecca Pilgrimage," pp. 48-60.

The last and the most important study that needs mentioning is one in English by Jacop Vredenberg, another Dutch scholar, written in 1962. He attempts to shed new light on the subject by using primary sources such as the annual official reports concerning the *haj* (*bedevaartsverslag*) by the Netherlands consul in Jeddah. In his long and detailed article, which is entitled "The Haddj: Some of Its Features and Functions in Indonesia," Vredenberg tries to analyze the *haj* and the factors that influenced it from the last decades of the nineteenth century, especially from 1870, to the outbreak of the Second World War. In fact, he sometimes goes beyond these dates in order to explain the history of certain points. He also examines some of the economic functions of the *haj* and the policy of the colonial government in Indonesia concerning the *haj* as well as the implications for the government. Moreover, he gives a detailed analysis of the *haj* mentioning those whose revenue mainly depended on the pilgrimage such as the Dutch shipping lines that engaged in transporting pilgrims and the Hejaz government for whom the yearly stream of pilgrims provided the most important source of revenue. The ways the pilgrimage to Mecca were financed by the Indonesian Muslims were also explored in some detail.⁷

As already stated, the above works dealt with the colonial period. Thus, none of them examined the policy and the attitude of the Netherlands Indies government towards the Indonesian pilgrimage to Mecca during the years 1946 through 1949, the period when the Indonesians struggled for their independence from the Dutch. The main interest of this paper is this period. Archival materials obtained from the state archives of England, the Netherlands, and Indonesia are the main sources of information. What becomes clear is that the attitude and the policies of the Netherlands Indies government concerning the Indonesian *haj* were to a considerable extent determined by political motives. In the following pages some aspects of the policies adopted after 1945 will be examined.

In fact, the policy pursued after 1945 was a liberal one no doubt pursued in order to gain the sympathy of the Indonesian Muslims. The government made the necessary foreign currency available for the voyage and the stay in Mecca, but because of a shortage in foreign currency, it introduced a quota system. Therefore, every year the maximum number of pilgrims allowed to undertake the pilgrimage was announced. Another issue was the pro-republican attitude of the *mukims* in Saudi Arabia; that is, the Indonesian residents who mainly lived in the big cities like Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah. The Netherlands Indies government hoped that the arrival of many pilgrims from Indonesia would change the *mukims* pro-republican attitude. Therefore, it favored sending *haj* missions to Saudi Arabia.

The organization of the pilgrimage to Mecca was in the hands of the Department of Internal Affairs (*Binnenlandse Bestuur*). The closely cooperating Dutch shipping companies: the Rotterdamse Lloyd, the Stomvaart Maatshappij Nederland, and the

7 Vredenberg, "The Hadj," p. 91-154.

Stoomvaart Maatschappij Oceaan, called the Kongsji-Tiga, handled the transportation of the pilgrims from Indonesia to Saudi Arabia. After arriving in the Holy Land, the pilgrims came directly under the care of Arab shaikhs who acted as pilgrim guides. According to the regulations of the Saudi Arabian government, only licensed Arab shaikhs were allowed to organize the pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. The costs for this service were included in the fees paid by the Indonesian pilgrims before they left home.

2. The Indonesian Mukims in Saudi Arabia and their Reactions to the Dutch-Indonesian Independence Struggle

As already stated, the Netherlands Indies government hoped that the arrival of many pilgrims from Indonesia would change the pro-republican attitude of the *mukims* in Saudi Arabia. In March 1942 due to the conquest of Indonesia by Japan, the large number of Indonesian Muslims who had gone to Saudi Arabia before the war for the purposes of taking part in the pilgrimage and studying Islamic sciences were deprived of their remittances from Indonesia. However, starting in May 1942 the Netherlands government, through its Jeddah representative, began to provide financial help for about three thousand *mukims*, who were for the greater part intellectually prominent youths and middle-aged men. The help was given in money and in rice imported from Egypt. At the same time, presents and teaching materials were offered to the Indonesian students at the Indonesian religious schools in Mecca, Darul Ulum and Madrasah Indonesia, especially on the occasions of the Muslim festivals, *Ramadan* and *Id'ul-Adha*. To qualify for a monthly payment, it was sufficient to be of Indonesian descent, although claimants did not always produce their passports.⁸

The proclamation of independence by Sukarno and Hatta on 17 August 1945 was received by the *mukims* with great joy and enthusiasm. During a meeting held in Mecca on 27 September 1945, which was attended by about 300 *mukims*, the leaders of the group unanimously declared their support for the Republic. The following month they formed an action committee which later transformed itself into a permanent association called Perkumpulan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or the Indonesian Independence Organization.⁹

The *mukims* joined this organization in great numbers and also set out to promote the Indonesian struggle for liberty, especially among the pilgrims who came to Mecca from the many different countries. During the pilgrimage month in November 1945 they distributed a pamphlet in Arabic that had been brought to Mecca by the leaders of the Indonesian Independence Movement in Egypt. This pamphlet simply

8 D. van der Meulen, "Hoort Gij de Donker niet?: Begin van het Einde Onzer Gezagvoering in Indie," in *Een Persoonlijke Terugblik*, Wever, Frakener 1977, pp. 149, 153.

9 H. H. Dingemans (Dutch representative in Jeddah) to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Reactie Mekka op Gebeurtenissen in Indonesie," 8 December 1945, Jeddah: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Arsip Algemene Secretaria (Arsip AS), Jakarta, No: 753; see also A. Hasjmy, *Misi Haji: Menjalankan tugas revolusi di negara-negara Arab*, Almaarif, Bandung 1984, pp. 99-100.

called for the support of all Muslims for the Indonesian struggle for independence, and it urged the Arab countries to recognize the Republic of Indonesia as a sovereign state. Sometime in November 1945 the leaders of the Indonesian Independence Organization in Mecca also applied to Amir Mansur, the acting viceroy of the Hejaz, for permission to hold a meeting during which the aims of the organization could be explained to pilgrims from the various countries. The request was rejected, however, because Saudi laws prohibited any form of political propagandizing or political activities in the Holy Land. The leaders of the organization then tried to hold a small tea party during the pilgrimage at Mina. After a number of guests arrived and three speeches were made, the Saudi police intervened and arrested the leaders of the organization, but they were released two hours later.¹⁰

Initially, the Saudi Arabian government took a neutral stand concerning the political developments in Indonesia. Although it recognized only the Netherlands' sovereignty over Indonesia, it tolerated political activities by the *mukims* in Mecca, as the majority of the Indonesian people adhered to the same faith as the Arabs. Some government officials like Yunus Yasin, vice-minister of Saudi Foreign Affairs, hoped that the struggle between the Dutch and the Indonesians would soon be settled.¹¹

On 5 February 1946 the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a circular to its representatives in Cairo and Jeddah stating that providing financial help to the Dutch subjects outside Indonesia would be possible only if they signed a loyalty oath recognizing the Netherlands Indies government as the only lawful government in Indonesia.¹²

The Dutch representative in Cairo, Van Rechteren Limpung, sought to implement this plan by including the loyalty oath on the receipts offered to the Indonesian community in Cairo. However, this action was strongly rejected by the Indonesian and Indo-Arab communities in Egypt who adopted a resolution during a meeting held in Cairo on 27 February 1946. In the resolution, they declared that signing a receipt containing such a loyalty oath was treason towards their fatherland. They also resolved that they recognize the government of the Republic of Indonesia as the only lawful government in Indonesia. They held the view that they would prefer to suffer hunger rather than betray their fatherland.¹³

The Dutch representative in Jeddah, H. H. Dingemans, raised objections to the plan. He argued that such a declaration would be "premature," if it was not accompanied

10 L.B. Graffey Smith (British representative in Jeddah) to Foreign Office, 25 and 28 November 1945, Public Records Office, Foreign Office, London (FO) 371/46405-6393.

11 Dingemans, "Reactie Mekka," 8 December 1945.

12 *Officiële Bescheiden betreffende de Nederlandse-Indonesische Betrekkingen, 1945-1950*, ed. S. L. van der Wal and P.J. Drooglever and M. J. B. Schouten, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1971. vol. 3, p. 549 (note: 3). This official publication, which includes archival documents relating to the Dutch-Indonesian relations between the years of 1945 and 1950, will be abbreviated henceforth as OBNIB.

13 OBNIB, vol. 3, p. 479 (note: 1). In April 1946 the Egyptian government in an agreement with Al-Azhar University decided to provide a monthly allowance from Al-Azhar treasury for those Indonesian students and graduates who lost their payments as a result of this action. OBNIB, vol. 4, p. 263 (note: 1).

by a mutual relationship between the Dutch and the Indonesians. He also argued that it would be "inopportune," since such a loyalty oath was not given in Indonesia itself. He felt that the implementation of such a plan would lead to unrest and an untenable situation among the *mukims* in Mecca, especially if the pro-republican *mukims* tried to prevent the rest of the *mukims* from signing the loyalty oath. He argued that such disturbances would not be welcomed by Saudi officials and would very severely weaken the position of the Dutch legation in Jeddah.¹⁴

The Dutch government accepted his argument. In another circular dated 9 March 1946, it stated that financial help would be given either to those who signed the receipts that included the oaths or to those who registered with the Dutch Consulates in Cairo and Jeddah. Those who continued to receive their financial help would automatically be regarded as Dutch subjects.¹⁵

Another measure attempted by the Dutch was to increase the repatriation of the *mukims* under the assumption that they could be controlled more easily in Indonesia itself. In the middle of April 1946, through the Dutch vice-consulate in Mecca, the Netherlands Indies government announced that free repatriation passage would be provided for those *mukims* who wished to return to Indonesia. Those interested were asked to inform the vice-consulate in Mecca. However, only a small number gave their names out of more than 2000 *mukims* in Mecca. The majority dismissed the announcement as a "Nica repatriation" or Dutch (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration or NICA) repatriation and labeled the candidates for it "*Nica-mukims*."¹⁶ Their argument was that they would not return unless they received a declaration made by the Republican government about their returning or return only when the Dutch were no longer controlling Indonesia.¹⁷ By November 1946 only nine *mukims* were repatriated. Of these, six came originally from Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, while three were from Pontianak, West Kalimantan.¹⁸

In the meantime, the *mukims* began to distance themselves further from the jurisdiction of the Netherlands Indies government. During May 1946 about 70 percent of all *mukims* in Saudi Arabia returned their passports to the Dutch legation in Jeddah in a damaged state in order to express the fact that they no longer considered themselves Dutch subjects. They also rejected the financial help given by the Dutch legation in Jeddah, and on 21 July 1946 they set up a committee called the Komite

14 OBNIB, vol. 3, pp. 549-550.

15 OBNIB, vol. 3, p. 480 (note: 1), p. 550 (note: 2).

16 RICA is the abbreviation of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration established in Australia in December 1944 to handle civil affairs during the post-war restoration period of Dutch rule in Indonesia and to separate civil affairs from military affairs.

17 Nedinreg (Nederlands Indies Regering) to Minog (Ministerie van Overzeese Gebiedsdelen), "Bedevaart Mekka," 5 March 1946; W. Hoven (Director of Internal Affairs) to H. J. van Mook (Lieutenant Governor-General), "Repatriëring Moekimers," 28 October 1946; Dingemans to Van Mook, "Repatriëring Moekimers Mekka," 12 September 1946, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 753.

18 Dingemans to Van Mook, "Repatriërende Moekimers Mekka", 19 November 1946, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 753.

Pertolongan Indonesia (the Indonesian Help Committee or Kopindo) in Mecca to solve their financial and social problems. They also organized collection drives to meet their financial needs.¹⁹

3. Organization of the Indonesian Haj in 1946 and 1947

The pro-republican attitude and actions taken by the *mukims* caused the Dutch authorities to think again about the possible political influences that the new pilgrims from the Dutch-controlled part of Indonesia would experience in the Hejaz. Dingemans felt that the political influence the *mukims* could exert would be very great. As an example, he mentioned that the republican *mukims* could prevent the pilgrims from registering with the Dutch consulate in Jeddah and that they could force the pilgrims to dispose of their return tickets and the special Mecca passports in order to show that they were no longer Dutch subjects. To prevent such events, he recommended to the Netherlands Indies government that it urge the aspiring pilgrims to consider the pilgrimage to Mecca a strictly religious duty and their stay in the Holy Land only a dedication to religion. They would also be advised to complete their registration with the Dutch consulate in Jeddah and to pay particular attention to the purpose, value, and usefulness of their return tickets and Mecca passports. In the event of their loss, they should report to the vice-consulate in Mecca instantly.²⁰

The Lieutenant Governor-General, H. J. van Mook, held the view that since Islam was not separate from politics, it would not be worthwhile to advise the aspiring pilgrims to consider the *haj* only a religious duty. He was of the opinion that any hint by the government would be understood by the Muslims as interference in their religious life. However, he did agree with the other recommendations put forward by Dingemans. Van Mook thought that the local administration officials entrusted with issuing the Mecca passports should explain clearly to the aspiring pilgrims the importance and usefulness of their passports. During the journey, the loyal and respected pilgrim heads, who acted as travel leaders, would give the necessary guidance and information to them. According to van Mook, the best Dutch propaganda in the Hejaz lay in the Dutch diplomatic and consular officials extending maximum help and care to the pilgrims and exerting minimum political influence on the *badal* shaikhs, who acted as guides for the pilgrims in Mecca. In short, the pilgrims would be given the impression that they were being well cared for and respected by the non-Muslim government. In van Mook's opinion, open and official Dutch propaganda in Saudi Arabia would not yield much success because of the unfriendly attitude of the Arab countries towards the Dutch.²¹

19 OBNIB, vol. 4, p. 418; Dingemans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Inlevering Mekkapassen," 12 May 1946, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 753. The financial help to the rest of the *mukims* was stopped in February 1947 when the government began to allow their families in Indonesia to remit a small amount of money to them. Since 1942, the Netherlands Indies government paid a total of f800,000. Dingemans to Van Mook, 15 February 1947, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 754; about Kopindo, see also Hasjmy, *Misi Haji*, pp. 98-99.

20 OBNIB, vol. 4, pp. 536-537.

21 OBNIB, vol. 5, pp. 208-209.

The quota of pilgrims for 1946 was officially announced by the government on 3 June 1946 as 3,000. The aspiring pilgrims from the Dutch-controlled areas were asked to register with the offices of the *Binnenlandse Bestuur* which had the duty of issuing the special Mecca passports to the aspiring pilgrims. In its announcement, the government also stated that applicants from Java and Sumatra would not be accepted since these islands had not yet been brought under Dutch control. The cost of the pilgrimage for each pilgrim varied between f1,800 and f2,100 (or £170 and £200), depending on the duration of the stay in Mecca. The passage to Mecca cost f450 and the Saudi Arabian government demanded a sum of £ 41.50 as "fixed pilgrim's costs" for each pilgrim.²² This "fixed rate," which was introduced by the Saudi Arabian government after the Second World War, included quarantine costs, the pilgrim tax, money for the guides, and accommodation and transportation costs. The Saudi government also held the Netherlands Indies government responsible for the payment of this "fixed rate" and demanded that the money be paid in sterling or dollars. The Netherlands Indies government protested against this because it had to collect this money itself from the pilgrims and had to make available foreign currency for this purpose. Through the Dutch legation in Jeddah it tried to obtain favorable conditions by pressing the Saudi Arabian government to accept half of the pilgrimage costs in the Netherlands Indies currency (called Nica notes) and to formulate a fair "fixed rate" for the Indonesian pilgrims but without success.²³

However, by August 1946 it became clear that only about a hundred people had applied for the special Mecca passports. It appeared that the main reason for this was the strong position taken by the Republican leaders against the Dutch plans concerning the Mecca pilgrimage that year. When Ch. O. van der Plas, an expert on Islam, who served on the Lieutenant Governor-General's cabinet as advisor for Islamic Affairs from April 1946 to December 1947, paid a visit to South Kalimantan in April 1946 and offered the Muslim leaders, among other things, the chance to participate in the pilgrimage and when the government pamphlets were subsequently spread among the people announcing that offer, these actions led to prompt reactions by the Masjumi the Indonesian Islamic party, leaders who claimed that the pilgrimage to Mecca was being used by the Dutch only for propaganda purposes. The Masjumi daily *Al-Djihad*, which reported the visit of Van der Plas to that region, stated that the pilgrimage to Mecca had become a "Dutch propaganda tool." It viewed the Dutch offer as an attempt to win Muslims' favor and to induce them to side with the Dutch. It also stated that Indonesian Muslims would not let themselves be deprived of their

22 Het Dagblad (a Dutch newspaper published in Jakarta), 3 and 8 June 1946.

23 Dingemans to Van Mook, "Eventueele Bedevaart 1946," 14 February 1946, Algemene Rijksarchief (ARA), Archief Kolonial (Arch. Kol.), The Hague, No: 3964; Dingemans to Van Mook, "Eventueele Bedevaart 1946," 22 April 1946, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 753. Until the outbreak of the World War II the money that was brought into that country by the pilgrims from all over the Muslim world was the country's main source of revenue. Although the revenue from oil royalties considerably surpassed that from the *hajj* after the World War II, the *hajj* still plays an important role in the economy and welfare of that country.

rights. They were firmly determined to have 100 percent independence, it added.²⁴ In this respect, reference should also be made to K. H. M. Hasjim Asjari, a prominent *ulama*, who was also a member of the Masjumi party and of the conservative Islamic organization, Nahdatul Ulama. On 20 April 1946 he made a radio speech in which he explained that the obligation to go on the *haj* was in force only when circumstances permitted it. The pilgrimage to Mecca was *haram* (forbidden according to Islamic law) when the independence of the country was threatened by the enemy and when the time for the passage to Mecca was not opportune. In addition, he viewed the Dutch offer to support participation in the Mecca pilgrimage as a measure taken to deter Muslims from their current duty of defending the Islamic faith and the sovereignty of their state. In his opinion, these should have priority over other duties, including the haj, imposed by God upon Muslims. Finally, he called upon Muslims in general and the aspiring pilgrims in particular not to use the enemy's ships for the pilgrimage as this would help to enrich their (the Dutch) shipping companies, the Kongsi-Tiga. He promised that the Republican government would provide its own ships for the pilgrimage when it became an obligation again for Muslims to observe their religious duty.²⁵

Therefore, in 1946, there were only 70 pilgrims who actually undertook the Mecca pilgrimage organized by the Netherlands Indies government. They came from South Sulawesi and Sumbawa where Dutch authority had been effectively restored. From South and East Kalimantan, where initially great interest had existed in the pilgrimage, no candidate pilgrims came forward as a result of the counter-propaganda and threats used by the organizations who were not cooperating in these regions. Those who had intended to go on the pilgrimage abandoned their hopes of going and later gave as their reason the high cost of the pilgrimage, which had actually doubled after the war.²⁶

In 1947 the quota of pilgrims initially proposed by the Department of Internal Affairs was 5,000, but because of the shortage in foreign currency, the government, after consultation between the Department of Internal Affairs and the Department of Finance, decided that the quota for 1947 should be 4,000. It also decided to reduce the cost of staying in the Holy Land from £70 to £46. The "fixed rate" was also £5 less than in the previous year.²⁷

Of this quota, 3,000 places were assigned to East Indonesia, 500 to Kalimantan, and 500 to the Dutch-controlled cities in Java and Sumatra. The organization of the pilgrimage was again in the hands of the Department of Internal affairs and the

24 *Al-Djihad* (an Indonesian newspaper published in Yogyakarta by the Indonesian Islamic Federation, the Masjumi), 18 April 1946..

25 *The Voice of Free Indonesia* (an Indonesian newspaper published in Jakarta), 20 April 1946.

26 OBNIB, vol. 5, p. 208; see also the memoirs of the Dutch representative in Jeddah: H. H. Dingemans, *Bij Allah's Buren*, A. D. Donker, Rotterdam 1973, p. 178.

27 E. O. van Boetzelaer (Secretary of the government) to the Director of Foreign Currency Institute, 19 April 1947, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 754.

Kongsi-Tiga, but the actual responsibility for the work in 1947 was entrusted to local bodies established for this purpose. In the Dutch-inspired federal state of East Indonesia established at the end of 1946, the Badan Pengoeroes Kselamatan Hadji (the Management Committee for the Safety of Pilgrims or BPKH) handled the organization of *hajj* affairs in cooperation with Shaikh Bachmid, the Minister of State, who dealt mainly with Muslim religious affairs in East Indonesia. In South Kalimantan the Hulu Sungai Ulama Council (Madjlis Oelama Islam Hoeloe Soengai) and in the Dutch controlled city of Surabaya a five-member committee led by the chairman of the Penghulu Court, Abdul Gafur, were given responsibility by the government to handle the *hajj* affairs.²⁸ In general, these bodies extended their help to the aspiring pilgrims with respect to the *hajj* rituals, health, and embarkation matters. In addition, they also acted as intermediaries between the aspiring pilgrims and the shipping companies. Before the war, these tasks had been dealt with by the pilgrim shaikhs or pilgrim recruiters from Saudi Arabia.

In 1947, the number of candidates who applied for Mecca passports outnumbered the quota announced by the government. For instance, in South Kalimantan from where in the previous year no pilgrims had gone to Mecca, there were about 2,500 aspiring pilgrims who applied for the special Mecca passports. This was mainly due to favorable political developments and increasing cooperation with the Dutch from May 1947 on. In East Indonesia, there were about 2,000 more applicants than the actual quota assigned to that region.²⁹

Because the number of candidates surpassed the quota, the administration officials and the BPKH members in South Sulawesi faced serious complaints, especially by those who had their applications refused in the end. The BPKH's adoption of the tasks formerly carried out by the haji shaikhs was also criticized by the aspiring pilgrims when it charged each pilgrim an extra f30 to cover its expenses. The BPKH also had difficulties with the shipping companies because it demanded a sum of f45 per pilgrim from the companies, a premium that they used to pay to the haji shaikhs (or pilgrim recruiters) before the war.³⁰

4. Sending the Emir al-Haj Mission to Saudi Arabia

In the pilgrimage season of 1947, the Netherlands Indies government also decided to send an official mission called the Emir Al-Haj to lead the pilgrims from East Indonesia. However, lengthy preparations were required before such a mission could actually depart for Mecca. The different approaches adopted by the Dutch authorities regarding the character of this mission and the hesitant attitude of the Saudi Arabian

28 *Indische Documentatie Dienst van A. N. P. Aneta, 1946-1950*, Amsterdam, Seri II, No: 38, p. 451. This documentary series of the Dutch newspaper association will be abbreviated henceforth as IDD.

29 IDD, p. 452.

30 C.O. A. van Nieuwenhuijze (Advisor for Islamic Affairs) to P. J. Koets (Director of Education and Worship), "Verslag van Bevindingen te Makassar," 17 February 1948, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 754. For the pilgrimage, the Netherlands Indies government made available a sum of £440,000 and f2,000,000 for the year 1947. For 1948 it reserved £1,000,000 and f5,000,000. The same amount was maintained for 1949.

government, which did not wish to welcome the arrival of such a mission, lengthened the time needed for the preparations.

The idea of sending an Emir Al-Hadj to Saudi Arabia was first raised during a meeting held in Jakarta in the first week of July 1947 between Van der Plas and an unidentified representative of the East Indonesian State (Negara Inonesia Timur or NIT). The result of that meeting was that the NIT government appointed an Emir Al-Hadj to be an official pilgrimage leader from that State. It was also proposed that the Emir Al-Haj should pay a short visit to Egypt to meet the Egyptian King before his arrival in Saudi Arabia. Van Mook agreed with this suggestion.³¹ During a cabinet meeting on 8 July 1947 the NIT government decided to appoint the Minister of State, Shaikh Bachmid, an Indo-Arab from South Sulawesi, to lead the proposed mission.³²

According to Van der Plas, sending such a mission to the Arab countries would serve to consolidate the position of the East Indonesian State among the Muslims in Indonesia and the *mukims* in Mecca who regarded it as a puppet state and its government as a Christian government. Van der Plas hoped that the Muslims especially in East Indonesia would regard this official *hajj* mission as an important event and an initiative of the new State itself.³³ Elink Schuurman, Chief of the Dutch Far East Directorate (the Directie Verre Oost or DIRVO) in Jakarta, considered the proposed visit of Bachmid "very useful as a counter-show" against the Republic's foreign representation in Cairo led by H. Agus Salim.³⁴

However, this opinion was not shared by the government officials in the Hague. Van Boetelaer van Oosterhout, Minister of Foreign Affairs, regarded the proposed visit to Cairo as "inopportune" and "highly undesirable" because he thought that Bachmid as a so-called "Nicaman" would be "ridiculed" beside the politically powerful Republican leader, H. A. Salim. However, the Minister of State himself showed no objection to a visit to Saudi Arabia for the purpose of leading the pilgrims from East Indonesia.³⁵

C. Adriaanse, Head of Administrative Affairs for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that sending an Emir Al-Hadj would raise the question of sovereignty in Mecca. In his opinion, it would amount to a "demonstration of a sovereign state," which the NIT was not. He also criticized the name of the mission, because the Emir Al-Hadj originally meant a leader of an armed escort which protected the pilgrims when there was no or little order in the Holy Land. As law and order were effectively maintained by the Saudi Arabian government, in his view, the arrival of a mission with this name could give rise to "some irritation" on the part of the Saudi Arabian government. Moreover, he opposed the proposed visit to Egypt because he was of the opinion that

31 A letter of Van Boetelaer to Daeng Malewa Nadjamuddin (Prime Minister of the East Indonesian State), 5 July 1947, in file "Islam in Indonesia, 1947-1949," Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (MBZ), Semi-Statistisch Archief, The Hague.

32 *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, 13 July 1947.

33 van der Plas to Koets, 23 July 1947, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 755.

34 OBNIB, vol. 10, p. 516 (Note: 3).

35 OBNIB, vol. 10, p. 516 (Note: 3).

there was no need to play off the East Indonesian State against the Republic abroad, since the latter's position had been substantially undermined as a result of the first military action. In his opinion, the best publicity for East Indonesia lay in the Mecca pilgrimage itself and in the large number of pilgrims.³⁶

On 5 August 1947 J. A. Jonkman, Minister of Overseas Territories, cabled van Mook to postpone the proposed plan until the next pilgrimage (1948).³⁷ The Netherlands Indies government agreed with this decision. In the meantime, at the suggestion of Dingemans, the name of the mission was altered to Rais Bethat al-Sharaf which meant "Head of the Honorary Mission."³⁸ On 15 August 1947 van Boetzelaer van Osterhout sent another cable to the Chief of DIRVO stating that Shaikh Bachmid should go to Saudi Arabia not only as a pilgrim leader but also as the official envoy of the East Indonesian State.³⁹

Another difficulty involved in this matter was the attitude of the Saudi Arabian government which did not wish to receive this honorary mission on the grounds of financial and political considerations. According to the prevailing tradition, the members of the mission were to be the official guests of the Saudi government with all the financial consequences that would entail. This meant that the hotel bill was to be met by the government while all guests had motorcars at their disposal. They were also exempted from the so-called pilgrim tax. Politically, the Saudi government was put into an awkward position by the announcement of this mission because as a member of the Arab League which had already recognized the Republic it would be committing an unfriendly act against the Republic. Pressure from the Netherlands government finally induced the Saudi government to comply with the request. On 10 September 1947 the Saudi Foreign Ministry communicated to the Dutch legation in Jeddah that it had agreed to receive the mission and to provide all the facilities that the other missions enjoyed during their stay in the Holy Land.⁴⁰

In accordance with the quota decided on previously, about 4000 aspiring pilgrims were allowed to go to Mecca. Their departure from the various ports called "pilgrims' ports" such as Ujungpandang, Tanjung Priok, and Ampenan was an occasion for celebration. In the presence of the thousands of people who came to see their friends

36 C. Adriaanse to Minog, 31 July 1947, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 755. The term, Emir Al-Hadj was originally used by the Egyptian *hajj* missions that brought with them a *qiswah* for the Qabe and gifts to the prominent people of the Hejaz.

37 A telegram of Jonkman to Van Mook, 5 August 1947, in file "Islam in Indonesia, 1947-1949", MBZ, Semi-Statistisch Archief.

38 A telegram of Nedinreg to the Ministry of foreign Affairs, 11 August 1947, in file "Islam in Indonesia, 1947-1949", MBZ, Semi-Statistisch Archief.

39 OBNIB, vol. 10, pp. 516-517 (Note: 3).

40 Dingemans to DIRVO (Directie Verre Oosten, namely Bureau of Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jakarta), 10 September 1947, "Emir al-Hadj uit Oost-Indonesie," ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 755; A telegram of Dingemans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 September, 1947, in file "Islam in Indonesia, 1947-1949", MBZ, Semi-Statistisch Archief. The other members of the mission were: Sonda Daeng Mattejang, Baso Daeng Malewa, H. Abdurrahman, H. Bustami, Hasan Zakaria, H. Zairuddin and Darwish Zakaria. According to a decree issued by the President of the East Indonesian State on 27 September 1947, the State of East Indonesian government was to provide for this mission a sum of £150. ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 755.

and relatives off at the port of departure, the pilgrims went on board. Before their departure, they were all vaccinated against cholera, typhus, and other epidemic diseases. In Ujungpandang, the shipping company, Kongsi-Tiga, gave a pilgrimage reception, which was attended by a number of East Indonesian officials including the members of the honorary mission.⁴¹

Once the East Indonesian honorary mission was accepted by the Saudi authorities, the Sultan of Pontianak, Hamid II Alkadri, also wanted to lead an official mission there as the Head of the West Kalimantan Special Region. The Netherlands Indies government accepted his request without any objection.⁴² This mission included two other members, namely, H. Wibowo and Sayyid Abdurrahman al-Massawa, who both were Indo-Arab. The latter, who was a deputy head of the Government Information Service (RVD) in Jakarta, acted as the adviser and interpreter for the Sultan. The mission arrived in Jeddah on 22 October 1947 and was received by the Saudi Arabian government as its official guest.⁴³

However, these missions did not yield much success because they were soon challenged by the Republic's representative in Cairo, H. M. Rasjidi, who came to Mecca on 13 October 1947 to obtain the recognition of the Republic from King Abdul aziz ibn Saud. While the *mukims* branded the Dutch missions as Dutch propaganda, Rasjidi was welcomed by the *mukims* with demonstrations of great enthusiasm. He met King ibn Saud, who assured him that the Saudi government would not delay in recognizing the Republic. In the end, he was successful in his endeavors in that he was able to secure recognition for the Republic.

Moreover, the East Indonesian mission resulted in some political complications. When the NIT cabinet led by Nadjamuddin collapsed at the end of September 1947, Bachmid was not included in the new cabinet formed by S. J. Warouw on 7 October 1947. The new cabinet even wanted to recall Bachmid and replace him with another member of the mission. On the advice of Dingemans, it was finally decided to keep Bachmid as the head of the mission until he returned to Indonesia on 16 November 1947.⁴⁴ Then, there was the Sultan of Pontianak who wanted to visit Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, but because of cholera in Egypt the visit to that country became impossible while the governments of the other countries rejected his request for a visa.⁴⁵ Thus, he returned to Indonesia on 2 November 1947 via Karachi and New Delhi where he met the heads of some foreign missions. He failed to meet Ghandi and M. A. Jinnah, founders and heads of the states of India and Pakistan respectively.⁴⁶

41 IDD, Seri II, No: 38, pp. 451-452.

42 van Mook to L. J. M. Beel (Dutch Prime Minister), 12 October 1947, ARA, Archief Algemene Secreterie (Arch. AS), 1, 4-27.

43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Minog, 27 October 1947, ARA, Arch. Kol., Z 64.

44 Dingemans to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Complicaties Eremissie Oost-Indonesie," 15 October 1947, ARA, Arch. Kol., Z 64.

45 C. Adriaanse (A senior Dutch official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Minog, 27 October 1947, ARA, Arch. Kol., Z 64; OBNIB, vol. 11, p. 492 (Note: 4).

46 OBNIB, vol. 11, p. 529 (Note: 7).

As for how the Saudi Arabian government was to deal with the three Indonesian missions, it sought to find a middle way by showing no partiality towards any of the three missions. Pressed between the importance of the pilgrimage and the insistence on recognition of the Republic, it did not wish to favor one mission over the others because, in the Saudi view, all of the Muslims in the Holy Land were equal regardless of their political convictions and orientations. Bachmid and the Sultan of Pontianak were honored with golden swords by King ibn Saud while Rasjidi was given assurances for the recognition of the Republic. Dingemans described the coming of three Indonesian missions to Mecca with different aims and purposes as an "Indonesian anti-thesis" which very sharply established itself in the Holy Land.⁴⁷

Soon after the East Indonesian and West Kalimantan missions left Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government officially recognized the Republic as an independent and sovereign state on 22 November 1947. According to Dingemans, this recognition was "the logical outcome of the publicity of the Malino areas in the Holy Land." The Netherlands government considered this recognition "an unfriendly act" and tried to convince the Saudi government to reverse its *de jure* (by right) recognition of the Republic to that of *de facto* (actual) recognition but without success.⁴⁸

The arrival of the East Indonesian and West Kalimantan missions in the Holy Land also had a negative effect on the *mukims* who had organized themselves into the Perkumpulan Kemerdekaan Indonesia and Kopindo. In spite of the restrictive measures the Saudi regime imposed on political propaganda, they were actively involved in the spread of anti-Dutch propaganda and information, especially among the Indonesian pilgrims who came to Mecca from the Dutch occupied territories of Indonesia. They distributed a pamphlet which included a *fatwa*. Entitled, "Haram Naik Hadji," the *fatwa* simply forbid Muslims to go on a pilgrimage organized by an "infidel" (*kafir*) government.⁴⁹ According to one report, originating with the returning pilgrims, the number of *mukims* who engaged in the anti-Dutch campaign in Mecca was at least 100 persons who held regular informal meetings in several *gahwas* (coffee shops) in Mecca used mainly by Muslims and the Indonesian pilgrims.⁵⁰ According to another report, prepared by the Resident (a colonial official) of Lombok in early January 1948, it appeared that the pilgrims from this island in particular were exposed to a political campaign carried out by the *mukims* in Mecca. The report also suggested that the pilgrims brought back a lot of goods with them, goods that would not have been possible to buy by legal means. They were expensive textiles, gold watches,

47 Dingemans to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Drie Indonesische Missies in het Heilige Land," 7 December 1947, ARA, Arch. Kol., Z 71B.

48 OBNIB, vol. 12, pp. 19-20 (Note: 2).

49 Ministry of Internal Affairs (East Indonesia) to Van Mook, 12 January 1948; H. W. Federhof (Procureur General in Jakarta) to Van Mook, "Republikeinse propaganda te Mekka," 2 February 1948; Dingemans to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 March 1948, ARA, Arch. AS, 2, 3411.

50 Van Nieuwenhuijze to Koets and DIRVO, 16 December 1947, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 754.

shoes and ready-made clothes that would have been considered “lucrative” goods in Lombok at that time.⁵¹

The political campaign of the *mukims* was also directed against Dutch plans regarding the federal state system in Indonesia. When the Dutch proceeded with the formation of a federal state in East Sumatra in January 1948, on 2 April 1948 the *mukims* formed an East Sumatra Republican Front in Saudi Arabia which subsequently declared that it stood behind the Republic 100 percent. In June 1948 the *mukims* who came originally from South Sumatra also established a similar front in response to the Dutch plans to form a separate state in that region. Led by R. M. Amir Usman, the leader of the South Sumatrans in Mecca, it held the view that the definitive status of South Sumatra should be decided through a plebiscite as referred to in the Renville Agreement, and if the outcome of the plebiscite was for the “infidel administration” or for any administration other than the Republic, it was to be considered *haram*. A *fatwa* to that effect was also issued by such prominent Indonesian scholars in Mecca as H. Abdul Kadir and H. Abdul Muttalib of Mandailing. The *fatwa* was sent to Indonesia inside a small brochure, but it was seized by the Dutch before it reached the people of South Sumatra.⁵²

5. Organization of the Indonesian Haj in 1948 and 1949

The political aspect of the pilgrimage in 1948 was concerned mainly with the possible participation of the Republic in the pilgrimage. On 25 May 1948 Radio Yogyakarta, quoting a message from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, announced that the Republican government would consider sending a *haj* mission to Saudi Arabia.⁵³ The announcement soon prompted speculation on the part of some Dutch officials. They regarded it as a possible indication that the Republic also desired to send pilgrims from its territory. P. Bollen, the secretary of the Department of Internal Affairs, argued that the independent participation of the Republic in the pilgrimage would not be possible on legal grounds because the 1922 colonial Pilgrims’ Ordinance, which was still in force, stated that the Department of Shipping was to act as the agent for the pilgrimage in Indonesia. A possible joint participation under the Dutch flag depended entirely on the outcome of the negotiations between the Dutch and

51 Sukawati (President of the East Indonesian State) to DIRVO, “Aandachtvestiging Politiek Verslag Bali and Lombok, eerste helft January 1948, betreffende bedevaart,” 11 February 1948, ARA, Arch. AS, 2, 3411. Sukawati, after reading this report, sent a letter to the Dutch consul in Jeddah asking the consul to take the necessary measures to prevent the East Indonesian pilgrims from being exposed to republican propaganda in Mecca. To this request, Dingemans replied that it was not the task of the Dutch legation in Jeddah to report systematically about the East Indonesian hajis or to control their political behavior. See the report of Dingemans to DIRVO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Republikeinse propaganda onder Oost Indonesische pelgrims,” 12 April 1948, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 121.

52 Resolutions of the “Front Repulikein Sumatera Timur di Saudi Arabia” and “Front Repulikein Sumatera Selatan di Saudi Arabia,” ANRI, Jogja Documenten, No: 5315; Recomba of South Sumatra to Van Mook, “Plebisciet actie vanuit Mekka,” 22 June 1948, ARA, Arch. AS, 2, 3411. Recomba is the abbreviation of Regeringscommissaris voor Bestuuraangelegenheden (Government Commissioner for Administrative Affairs) created after the Second Military Action by the Dutch to administer the newly occupied territories in Java and Sumatra.

53 Dingemans to Van Mook, “Republikeinse deelname aan bedevaart,” 29 May 1948, ARA, Arch. Kol., Z 98.

the Republic. Bollen also thought that the use of foreign ships by the Republic to transport its pilgrims would undoubtedly hinder the future interests of the Dutch shipping companies which had a monopoly over the transportation of the pilgrims from Indonesia. If the Republic had serious plans to organize the Mecca pilgrimage, then the Dutch should prevent this by all possible means, he stated.⁵⁴

By August 1948, when it became clear that there were no preparations by the Republic to organize a pilgrimage to Mecca, this speculation was dismissed by the Dutch. The possibility remained, however, of the Republic sending a goodwill mission to Saudi Arabia.⁵⁵ This was proposed by K. H. Masjkur, Minister of Religious Affairs on 11 June 11 1948. The aim of the mission would be to make contact with the *mukims* and the representatives of other Muslim countries in Saudi Arabia in order to clearly explain to all Muslims the Republic's struggle for independence. The mission would also be able to contact the pilgrims from the Dutch controlled areas of Indonesia in order to clear up any misunderstandings among the people living under different administrations. Masjkur, thus, proposed that the mission include nine members, two of whom would be from Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The proposal was accepted, but because of the Republic's economic difficulties it was decided to send four members instead of nine members.⁵⁶

In 1948, the Netherlands Indies government allowed about 9,000 people to go to Mecca on the pilgrimage. The great majority of them were from East Indonesia and Kalimantan. The remainder came from the Dutch controlled parts of Java and Sumatra, especially from West Java. Among them, there were also some traditional leaders such as autonomous rulers, *adat* (customary) chiefs, and district heads.

In contrast to previous years, the political campaign in Mecca did not reach a significant scale. According to Dingemans, neither the Republican *mukims* nor the Republican *hajj* mission were involved in an active political campaign in the Holy Land. Public meetings were not held, nor did the Republican mission try to set up a permanent representative body in Saudi Arabia, something the Dutch were very much concerned about. Before the arrival of the mission, Dingemans had informed the Saudi government that the setting up a representative body would be considered by the Dutch government an "unfriendly act".⁵⁷ In his memoirs published in 1973, Dingemans noted that by December 1948 all the Indonesian pilgrims, except for a few who chose to prolong their stay in Mecca, returned to Indonesia peacefully. Political complications had not arisen because

54 P. Bollen to van Mook, 19 July 1948, ARA, Arch. Kol., Z 99.

55 Nedinreg to Dingemans, 3 August 1948, ARA, Arch. Kol., Z 98.

56 Masjkur to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Nota betreffende het zenden van een delegatie van her Indonesische Repub. naar Hedjaz in verband met de Hadj van dit jaar," 11 June 1948; H. A. Salim to the Vice-President (M. Hatta), "Delegatie Indonesische Republikeinse Regering naar Hedjaz," 19 August 1948, ANRI, Arsip AS, No: 123. This goodwill mission was composed of Ismail Banda (head-official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), R. H. Mohammad Adnan (Chairman of the High Court for Islamic Affairs and member of the High Advisory Council of the Republican Government), Mohammad Saleh Suaidy (an official in the Ministry of Religious Affairs), and H. Sutan Rajo Amen Samsir, who all were Masjumi members.

57 OBNIB, vol. 15., pp. 537-538 (Note: 3).

the *mukims* had not denounced the Indonesian pilgrims from the Dutch occupied territories of Indonesia. He described the 1948 pilgrimage a success.⁵⁸

Dingemans, in his report to Stikker on 4 October 1948, even asserted that renewed influence of the Indonesian pilgrims upon the *mukims* was beginning to take place. In his opinion, this was the result of the continued Dutch concern for the Mecca pilgrimage, the policy of allowing the families of *mukims* in Indonesia to remit money to them, and the fact that the Republic was not able to send any pilgrims or any money to the Holy Land.⁵⁹

A change was also observed in the political feelings of Republican *mukims* about the rest of the Indonesians in Mecca, who continued to have relations with the Dutch representatives in Saudi Arabia. Unity and tolerance within the Indonesian community in the Holy Land increased substantially. The Indonesian vice-consul in Mecca, Tarbidin, whose main job was informing the Dutch Consul-general in Jeddah of the activities of the *mukims*, described the political situation in Mecca at that time as follows:

Since the previous haj, the Republicans in Mecca and Jeddah have abandoned their antagonistic attitude towards the "Nica-*mukims*." This is largely due to the calm influence of the Republic's representative in Cairo, namely, H. M. Rasjidi who, as the Republic's representative made his *haj* and visited King Ibn Saud in Riyad to obtain recognition for the independence of the Republic. His calm, cool-headed approach and his fatherly advice made a deep impression, especially upon the Indonesian militant group in the Hejaz. 'There are no Nicas. We all are Indonesians here and brothers in Islam,' said he to his Republican listeners. Since then, the attitude of the Republicans towards the rest of Indonesian colony in the Hejaz has changed for the good; more *selams* (greetings) are exchanged between them; one can see them sitting together in the *gahwas*, places for private gatherings; it is no longer a bad thing to visit and even to lend money to each other. Previously all of these were *haram*. The two well-known Indonesian religious schools in Mecca, namely, Daroel Oeloem and Madrasah Indonesia that were inaccessible for 'Nica-students' previously admit them now without exception.⁶⁰

The feelings that the *mukims* shared about the Dutch did not change, however. The majority of them still avoided visiting the vice-consulate in Mecca. The visit to this office became *helal* (permissible according to Islamic law) only for those who were receiving money from their families in Indonesia. The *fatwa* that had been adopted by the Indonesian religious scholars in Mecca in 1946 described every Indonesian who visited the vice-consulate as a *kafir* (or infidel). The leading Indonesian organizations such as the Kopindo, Perkumpulan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, and the Sarikat Dagang Indonesia, a trade association that owned three shops, one each in Mecca, Medina and Jeddah, continued to maintain their non-cooperative stance.⁶¹

According to Dingemans, the anti-Dutch and anti-colonial feelings of the *mukims* reached their highest level when the Dutch forces began to launch an overall attack

58 Dingemans, *Bij Allah's Buren*, p. 239.

59 OBNIB, vol. 15., pp. 321-322.

60 OBNIB, vol. 15., pp. 321-322.

61 OBNIB, vol. 15., pp. 321-322.

on the Republic on 19 December 1948. Then, even some Indonesian officials who worked in the Netherlands foreign service in Jeddah and Mecca showed their discontent towards the Dutch. One official in the vice-consulate in Mecca, namely, R. Mamun Rasjid Kusumadilaga (a medical doctor), offered his resignation, but he was persuaded by Dingemans to remain in his job. The reaction of the Saudi Arabian government to the Dutch offensive was also very sharp. Following the offensive, it prohibited the landing of Dutch airplanes on Saudi soil, but it did not take any steps to stop the landing of Dutch pilgrim ships from Indonesia because of the economic importance of the pilgrimage for the Saudis.⁶²

The quota of pilgrims for 1949 as decided on by the High Representative of the Crown on 9 March 1949 was 8,600, a number slightly less than that of the previous year. However, on the advice of Dingemans, the exact number was not announced until 8 June 1949 partly because of the even less favorable attitude of the Saudi government towards the Dutch and partly because of the unsettled political conditions in Indonesia. Dingemans also recommended to the Provisional Federal government that each pilgrim in 1949 be allowed to take as much as 30 kg. of rice. In addition, he suggested that prominent pilgrims such as autonomous rulers, head officials, and mission members be given special allowances because in the previous year most of them had complained to him that £45 was not enough to meet their daily expenses in the Holy Land.⁶³ The Provisional Federal government approved these suggestions without any objections. It was also decided that the prominent pilgrims be allowed to travel to Mecca by airplane. Finally, because of the shortage in foreign currency, the government decided not to allow the pilgrims to stay in the Holy Land for more than two months.⁶⁴

In 1949 the majority of the pilgrims came from East Indonesia and Kalimantan. Because of unrest and guerrilla warfare as a result of the Dutch offensive, the number of pilgrims from Java and Sumatra was very small, and the pilgrims from Pasundan State went to Mecca under a mission. However, this mission did not take on the magnitude of the East Indonesian mission.⁶⁵ In South Kalimantan, the guerrilla forces led by Lieutenant General Hasan Basri used threats against everyone intending to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca since they were opposed to people turning to the Dutch administration for permits or other assistance except where absolutely necessary. They claimed that the pilgrims were used by the Dutch only for propaganda purposes. It was reported that about 540 aspiring pilgrims in that region, who had already obtained their Mecca passports, decided not to use their permits in 1949.⁶⁶

62 Dingemans, *Bij Allah's Buren*, p. 240-242.

63 Dingemans to the High Representative of the Crown, "Inzake omvang bedevaart 1949," 22 January and 19 February 1949; J. G. Kist (Secretary of the government) to DIRVO, "Bedevaart 1949," 9 March 1949, ARA, Arch. AS, 2, 2752.

64 A letter of the Department of Internal Affairs to the Algemene Secretaria, 19 May 1949, ARA, Arch. AS, 2, 2752; *Indische Courant* (a Dutch newspaper published in Jakarta), 8 June 1949.

65 Dingemans, *Bij Allah's Buren*, p. 262.

66 *Indische Courant*, 20 and 27 July 1949.

In 1949 the Republic sent its own *haj* mission to the Hejaz. The aim of the mission was to improve relations between the Republic and the Arab countries and to express their gratitude to the Saudi authorities for the sympathy shown towards the Indonesian struggle for liberty.⁶⁷ At the time the mission was due to leave for Saudi Arabia, the Round Table Conference between the Dutch and the Indonesians was taking place in the Hague, and not surprisingly Sukarno instructed the mission not to return to Indonesia in the event that the conference failed. The mission was to stay in the Arab countries for some time in order to seek support from the popular leaders and government officials of these countries for the Republic's struggle for independence.⁶⁸

The mission left for Saudi Arabia on 28 September 1949, and it was received by King ibn Saud on 3 October. In Mecca the mission met the representatives of various Muslim countries, the leaders of the *mukims*, and various Saudi officials. After the completion of the *haj* rituals in the Holy Land, the mission went to Egypt where contacts were made with a number of Egyptian authorities including the President of Al-Azhar University and the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Dr. Azzam Pasya.⁶⁹ The mission returned to Indonesia on 7 December 1949 when it became certain that the Dutch would agree to transfer sovereignty to the Indonesians. In fact, the transfer took place on 27 December 1949 in Jakarta. Thus, the Dutch interest in the Indonesian *haj* for the sake of political gain ended without succeeding in its object.

Table 1

THE INDONESIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE HAJ, 1946-1949

Year	1946	1947	1948	1949
Quota:	3000	4000	8767	8600
1. West Java:	8	360	1727	1600
2. Central and East Java and Madura:	2	62	682	600
3. South Sumatra:	-	18	44	-
4. East Sumatra:	-	-	11	-
5. Bangka and Biliton:	-	-	13	-
6. West Kalimantan:	-	-	147	-
7. South and East Kalimantan:	-	486	3166	3000
8. Sulawesi:	20	1606		
9. Moluccas:	1	16	3026	3000
10. Lesser Sunda Islands:	39	1408		
11. Unspecified (from Sumatra):	-	-	-	570
Total Number of Pilgrims:	70	3959	8818	8770

(Source: J. Vredendregt, 1963: 145)

67 Hasjmy, *Misi Haji*, p. 26.

68 Hasjmy, *Misi Haji*, p. 31; De Beus to Dingemans, 28 September 1949, ARA, Arch. AS, 2, 3414. The mission was composed of Shaikh H. Abdul Hamid Samsir, M. Noor al-Ibrahim, Prof. Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (President of the Indonesian Islamic University), Shaikh Awab Sjahbal, and Ali Hasjmy.

69 Hasjmy, *Misi Haji*, pp. 136-146.

ÖZET

1946-1949 Yıllarında Hollanda'nın Endonezya Hac Politikası

Bu makalede, Endonezyalılar'ın başarıyla neticelenen bağımsızlık mücadelesi dönemini içeren 1946-1949 yılları arasında Hollanda Koloni Hükümeti'nin hacla ilgili düzenlemeleri ele alınmaktadır. Yapılan araştırmaların daha çok XIX. yüzyılın sonları ve II. Dünya Savaşı öncesine yoğunlaşmış olması sebebiyle bu dönem, Hollandalıların hac politikalarına ait az sayıdaki çalışmalarda dahi, etraflıca ele alınmamıştır. Söz konusu çalışmalardan anlaşıldığına göre o dönemde hacla ilgili düzenlemeler Endonezyalı hacıları Suudi Arabistan'a taşıyan Hollandalı gemi şirketlerinin çıkarları doğrultusunda gerçekleştirilmekteydi. Bu makalede, Hollandalıların Mekke, Medine ve Cidde'de ikamet eden bağımsızlık taraftarı Endonezyalı *mukimlerin* etkilerini kırmak için savaş sonrası düzenlemelere ilişkin kararların daha çok politik sâiklerden kaynaklandığına işaret edilmektedir. Makale, politik amaçlar uğruna hacla ilgili düzenlemelerin başarısız olduğuna işaretle neticelenmektedir.